Comments Presented at the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry

Hearing on

Homeland Security

Dr. Alfonso Torres

Associate Dean for Veterinary Public Policy and

Director, New York State Animal Health Diagnostic Laboratory

College of Veterinary Medicine

Cornell University

Wednesday, July 17, 2002

Washington DC

Senator Harkin, Senator Luger, and members of the Committee, I am Alfonso Torres, Associate Dean for Veterinary Public Policy and Director of the New York State Animal Health Diagnostic Laboratory at the College of Veterinary Medicine at Cornell University. I want to thank you for the invitation to testify on the President's proposal to create a Department of Homeland Security. I do so in behalf of myself only, and my comments do not necessarily represent the positions of either the State of New York or of Cornell University in matters related to this hearing. My comments are based on my extensive personal and professional experience of eleven years of work for the USDA, eight of those years at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center where I held the position of Chief of the Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory under APHIS, and later the position of Director of the entire Center under ARS. I also had the honor of serving as the APHIS' Deputy Administrator for Veterinary Services and Chief Veterinary Officer for the United States for three years until my departure from USDA only 5 months ago.

In general I support the President's proposal for the creation of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to increase our border security and be better prepared and coordinated in dealing with potential bioterrorist and agroterrorists attacks. The President's proposal calls for the transfer of all USDA's Animal and Pant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) activities under the Border and Transportation Security Division, and the transfer of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) under the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures.

The President proposal to include all APHIS activities into the new DHS reflects the recognition and general understanding of the importance of APHIS activities in safeguarding animal and plant health for more than 150 years. APHIS' contributions to the well-being of society in general have been well demonstrated in its success in keeping serious animal diseases and plant pests from entering our country. However, it is important to keep in mind that APHIS has many functions that are not totally related to the exclusion of animal diseases and plant pests from entering our country. Three out of five APHIS main programs: International Services, Wildlife Services, and Animal Care, do not have functions that are directly associated to the proposed mission of the new Department of Homeland Security. The other two: Veterinary Services and Plant Protection and Quarantine have some activities compatible with the activities assigned to the Division of Border and Transportation Security of the new Department. These activities are related to actual inspections at ports of entry and issuing import permits for agricultural commodities and restricted animal or plant pathogens. There are some activities of Veterinary Services related to response to natural disasters or disease emergencies when animals are involved, that would fit within the activities assigned to the Division of Emergency Preparedness and Response of the proposed Department. Finally, there are activities at the scientific centers and laboratories of APHIS and ARS that will need to be coordinated with the proposed activities assigned to the Division of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures.

Based on my experiences at USDA and my knowledge of APHIS and ARS mission and activities, I respectfully suggest that you consider the following suggestions when considering the President's proposal for the transfer of all APHIS and of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center to the new Department of Homeland Security.

1. APHIS, PPQ Port Activities: All agricultural port inspection could be transferred to the Border and Transportation Security Division of the DHS. Their duties are quite integrated to Customs Service of DOJ and they are already collocated at sea, land and air ports of entry. In compensation for the loss of PPQ personnel available for combating plant disease outbreaks, APHIS should receive funding (or retain funding not transferred to DHS) for hiring of plant health professionals to be distributed in all 50 states to conduct the necessary surveillance and diagnostic activities for plant health in the United States.

2. APHIS, VS and PPQ Import Export Permitting Activities: Activities related to the issuing of import permits for plant and animal agricultural commodities could be integrated to the Customs Service, as part of their import permitting activities.

3. APHIS, VS Emergency Management Liaison with FEMA: As proposed by APHIS in previous budget requests, there is a need to have emergency management veterinarians collocated with FEMA to coordinate their assistance in disasters of any origin where animals are involved. These positions (one or two at headquarters plus one for each of the eight FEMA regional offices) could be created as part of enhanced activities of FEMA under the new DHS.

4. APHIS, Animal and Plant Health Laboratories & Science Centers: All APHIS, Veterinary Services laboratories and science centers involved in animal health including the Centers for Veterinary Biologics and the National Veterinary Services Laboratories at Ames, IA and at Plum Island, NY, the Centers for Epidemiology and Animal Health at Fort Collins, CO, and the Center for Veterinary Biologics at Ames, IA should be kept under the current administrative arrangements within USDA. The same recommendation applies to APHIS, PPQ plant health laboratories in several locations in the US and their Center for Plant Health Science and Technology at Raleigh, NC.

6. Due to their valuable contributions in the prevention, early detection, and response to any animal health event, they should receive additional funding from the new Homeland Security programs to provide enhanced protection to the health of our animals as well as for public health when zoonotic diseases are involved. There is an important integration taking place between The model proposed for the DHHS laboratories at CDC and NIH should be applied to the USDA laboratories. That would also apply to APHIS plant health laboratories, as well as to the ARS research activities at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center.

Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC): The President's proposal would move the PIADC from USDA into the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures Division of the DHS. It is important to point out that the PIADC was created at Plum Island, NY in 1954 as the only laboratory in the US where FMD and other highly contagious diseases could be studied. The PIADC is operated by USDA's Agricultural Research Service (ARS). Because of the legal requirements of restricting work on FMD to an island setting, APHIS' National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) has collocated at the PIADC its Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL). Thus, the PIADC has two components from two different USDA agencies: ARS and APHIS. The ARS conducts research on selected foreign animal diseases that for the most part are restricted to an island setting. ARS conducts research on many other foreign and domestic diseases that could be used as agents of bioterrorism or agroterrorism at other locations in the mainland. APHIS conducts diagnostic on highly contagious diseases of livestock at Plum Island as well as conducts training of veterinarians from the US and abroad, on the recognition and diagnosis of most foreign animal diseases, an activity outside the main scope of the proposed DHS. Therefore, it is very important to point out that not all research and diagnosis of foreign animal diseases that can cause extensive economic damage to our country due to an unintentional or intentional introduction are studied or diagnosed at the PIADC. In fact, all poultry foreign and domestic animal diseases are diagnosed at the NVSL facilities in Ames, IA, with research in many done at ARS' laboratories in Athens, GA. All equine foreign and domestic animal diseases are diagnosed in NVSL facilities at Ames, IA, as well as all transmissible encephalopathies including the surveillance for BSE or "Mad Cow Disease". If the idea is to move to the DHS all agricultural laboratories dealing with animal or plant pathogens that could be used for agroterrorism, then PIADC is not the only one. As indicated, their research mission is limited to certain animal diseases and they do not have expertise or facilities for research on plant diseases. NVSL diagnostic activities are coordinated with CDC laboratories when dealing with zoonotic diseases. Examples are the cooperative work on rabies, west Nile virus and other encephalidities common to humans and horses.

The PIADC is mentioned in the President's proposal as a laboratory with similar mission as the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) from the Department of Energy. The difference is not only in size, scope, and funding between these two federal laboratories, but also in that the LLNL is engaged in classified research activities, while PIADC has never conducted classified work. While is understandable the desire to better coordinate the different federal activities related to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear countermeasures, it is also important to point out that the federal laboratories dealing with human diseases and organisms that could be used for bioterrorism are not to be transferred to the DHS. These laboratories are at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) of DHHS (located at Atlanta, GA and Fort Collins, CO), and at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) also of DHHS at Bethesda, MD. In the case of CDC and NIH laboratories, the President's proposal will keep them under the current Department but would provide additional funding and programs for assisting the new Department of Homeland Security with laboratory support in the areas of diagnosis and research to enhance the capabilities of the US in deterring, preventing and responding to bioterrorist attacks. Exactly the same arguments could be made regarding the USDA's laboratory facilities and programs at Ames, IA and at Plum Island, NY. There is no difference in mission and activities between the NIH/CDC laboratories for human health and the NVSL/CVB laboratories of APHIS for animal health.

(comment on Homeland Security Act of 2002 -HR 5005 as amended)