Two Senators per State
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State. [U.S. Constitution,
Article I, section 3, clause 1]
During the summer of 1787, the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia established equal representation in the
Senate and proportional representation in the House of
Representatives. Called the “Great
Compromise” or the “Connecticut
Compromise,” the unique plan for congressional
representation resolved the most controversial aspect of the
drafting of the Constitution.
In the weeks before the Constitution’s framers agreed
to the compromise, the delegates from the states with large
populations argued that each state’s representation in
the Senate should correspond to the size of the state.
Large-state delegates promoted James Madison’s
Virginia Plan, the document that was the basis for several of the clauses
in the Constitution. Under this plan, the Senate and
the House would base their membership on the same
proportional “right of suffrage.” That
is, the number of senators in each state would be determined
by its population of free citizens and slaves. Large
states, then, stood to gain the most seats in the Senate. As justification for this advantage, delegates noted
that their states contributed more of the nation’s financial and defensive resources than small states,
and therefore, required a greater say in government.
Small-state delegates hoped to protect states’ rights
within a confederate system of government. Fearing the
effects of majority rule, they demanded equal representation
in Congress, as was practiced under the
Articles of Confederation and assumed in William Paterson’s
New Jersey Plan. In fact, some framers threatened to withdraw from
the convention if a proportional representation measure
passed.
Other delegates sought a compromise between
large-state and small-state interests. As early as
1776, Connecticut’s Roger Sherman had suggested that
Congress represent the people as well as the states. During the 1787 convention, Sherman proposed that
House representation be based on the population, while in
the Senate, the states would be equally represented. Benjamin Franklin agreed that each state should have
an equal vote in the Senate except in matters concerning
money. The convention’s grand committee reported
his motion, with some modifications, to the delegates early
in July. Madison led the debates against
Franklin’s measure, believing it an injustice to the
majority of Americans, while some small-state delegates were
reluctant even to support proportional representation in the
House. On July 16, delegates narrowly adopted the
mixed representation plan giving states equal votes in the
Senate within a federal system of government.
Once delegates established equal representation in
the Senate, they needed to determine how many senators would
represent each state. State constitutions offered some
guidance. Several states designated one senator per
county or district, while in Delaware there were three
senators for each of the three counties. Convention
delegates did not refer to the state precedents in debate,
however. Instead, they seemed to take a common-sense
approach in deciding the number of senators.
According to constitutional commentator Joseph Story
(1779-1845), few, if any, delegates considered one senator
per state sufficient representation. Lone senators
might leave their state unrepresented in times of illness or
absence, and would have no colleague to consult with on
state issues. Additional senators, moreover, would
increase the size of the Senate, making it a more
knowledgeable body, and better able to counter the influence
of the House. On the other hand, a very large Senate
would soon lose its distinctive membership and purpose, and
actually decrease its ability to check the lower house or to
allow senators to take personal responsibility for their
actions.
Given these considerations, delegates had a limited
choice regarding the number of senators. During the
convention, they briefly discussed the advantages of two
seats versus three. Gouverneur Morris stated that
three senators per state were necessary to form an
acceptable quorum, while other delegates thought a third
senator would be too costly. On July 23, delegates
filled in the blank in the proposal offered by Morris and
Rufus King: “That the representation in the second
branch consist of _____ members from each State, who shall
vote per capita.” Only Pennsylvania voted in
favor of three senators. When the question turned to
two, Maryland alone voted against the measure, not because
of the number, but because Martin disagreed with per capita
voting, which gave each senator, rather than each state, one
vote.
In its final form, the clause in the Constitution is
deceptively simple. “The Senate shall be
composed of two senators from each state” appears to
be a single provision, the designated number of senators per
state. Delegates agreed to this number, however, only
after they had considered a larger matter: legislative
representation. While representation proved to be the
most controversial issue in the convention, delegates
determined the number of senators quickly and with little
dispute.
Term Length
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of
two Senators from each State, chosen by the
Legislature thereof, for six Years. [U.S.
Constitution, Article I, section 3, clause 1]
The six-year Senate term represented a compromise
between those constitutional framers who wanted a
strong, independent Senate and those who feared the
possible tyranny of an aristocratic upper house,
insulated from popular opinion. Although the
six-year term was not utilized in Parliament, Congress
under the Articles of Confederation, or the states’ upper houses, these institutions gave the participants at the Constitutional Convention some insight into the impact of term lengths on
legislative bodies. While few delegates to the
1787 convention wanted to emulate the House of
Lords’ lifelong terms or the Articles of
Confederation’s annual appointment of legislators
subject to recall, the framers’ reaction against
these extremes helped formulate their arguments for and
against long terms in the Senate.
Convention delegates seeking information about
more moderate term lengths turned to the state
constitutions. Although the majority of states
set one-year terms for both legislative bodies, five
state constitutions established longer terms for upper
house members. South Carolina’s senators
received two-year terms. In Delaware, the senate
had three-year terms with one-third of the
senate’s nine members up for reelection each year.
New York and Virginia implemented a similar class
system but with four-year terms instead of three. Only Maryland’s aristocratic senate featured
five-year terms, making this legislative body the focus
of the convention’s Senate term debates.
Framers either praised Maryland’s long
terms for checking lower house democracy or feared them
for the same reason, while some members of the
convention believed even five-year terms were too short
to counteract the dangerous notions expected to emerge
from the House of Representatives. In June,
James Madison, Edmund Randolph, and other convention
delegates cited Maryland’s experiences when they
argued for long Senate terms. According to
Madison, Maryland’s senate had never
“created just suspicions of danger.”
Far from being the more powerful branch, the
senate had actually yielded too much, at times, to
Maryland’s House of Delegates. Unless the
Senate obtained sufficient stability, Madison expected a
similar situation under the new Constitution. He
suggested terms of seven years or more to counter the
influence of the democratic House of Representatives. Randolph believed that the primary object of an
upper house was to control the more numerous lower
house. He noted that Maryland’s senate had
followed this principle but had been “scarcely
able to stem the popular torrent.”Seven-year terms, then, had a greater chance of
checking the House than terms of five years or fewer.
On June 13, the convention’s Committee of the
Whole reported an amended version of Madison’s
Virginia Plan. The revised document now designated seven-year
Senate terms, a provisional length immediately
criticized by some of the framers. For Alexander
Hamilton, only lifelong terms could check the
“amazing violence & turbulence of the
democratic spirit.”Other delegates
preferred four-year terms, while Madison began
advocating a new nine-year, three-class plan. On
June 26, the majority of delegations voted against the
nine-year plan, then adopted the six-year Senate term by
a vote of 7 to 4.
During the debate on the Constitution’s
ratification, Madison became a strong supporter of
six-year terms. In the
Federalist papers, he argued that Maryland’s experiment with
five-year terms proved that slightly longer terms posed
no danger to bicameral legislatures. In fact, he
expected the six-year terms to have a stabilizing effect
on the new national government. Long terms would
control turnover in the legislature, allow senators to
take responsibility for measures over time, and make
senators largely independent of public opinion.
Senate Classes
Immediately after they shall be assembled in
Consequence of the first Election, they shall be
divided as equally as may be into three Classes.
[Article I, section 3, clause 2]
Every two years, one-third of the Senate’s
members must be reelected or vacate their seats at the
end of their terms. Constitutional framers based
this three-class system on precedents established by
state governments. Delaware’s senate and
Pennsylvania’s unicameral council were divided
into three classes on a one-year election rotation,
while upper houses in Virginia and New York had four
classes and yearly elections.
At the 1787 Constitutional Convention, delegates linked the Senate class measure to the debate on term lengths. On June 25, Nathaniel
Gorham suggested a four-year Senate term with one-fourth
of the senators elected each year. Edmund Randolph
supported staggered rotation in the Senate, but wanted a
seven-year term “to go out in fixt proportion.” Hugh Williamson countered that
six-year terms were more easily divisible into equal
election cycles than seven-year terms. The
following day, Gorham called for a six-year term,
“one third of the members to go out every second
year.” Delegates considered a nine-year term, then
passed the six-year, three-class Senate clause by a vote
of 7 to 4.
Constitutional commentator Joseph Story
(1779-1845) explained the reasoning behind the
Senate’s class system. Framers hoped
biennial elections would bring stability to the Senate,
and in turn, to other branches of the new government. By gradually changing members, class rotations
would prevent senators from permanently combining for
“sinister purposes,” protect the Senate from
a rapid turnover in ideas, and encourage senators to
deliberate measures over time. Most important, as
the federal government’s only continuing body, the
Senate could provide leadership after major elections
and during other periods of national uncertainty.
At the start of the first session of Congress in
1789, the senators were divided into the three classes
by lot with same-state senators assigned to separate
groups. The first class’ term expired in two
years, the second in four years, and the third in six
years. Subsequent elections to all classes were
for the full six-year Senate term.
Qualifications
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have
attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine
Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall
not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State
for which he shall be chosen. [U.S. Constitution,
Article I, section 3, clause 3]
Delegates to the 1787 Constitutional Convention supported establishing membership limitations for House and Senate members. Influenced by British and
state precedents, they set age, citizenship, and
inhabitancy qualifications for senators, but voted
against proposed religion and property requirements.
Age:
The constitutional framers debated the minimum age for
representatives before they considered the same
qualification for senators. Although Delegate
James Wilson stated that “there was no more reason
for incapacitating youth than age, where the requisite
qualifications were found,” other delegates were
in favor of age restrictions. They were familiar
with England’s law requiring members of Parliament
to be twenty-one or older, and they lived in states
which either barred legislators under the ages of
twenty-one or twenty-five from the upper chambers.
As introduced in May 1787, James Madison’s Virginia Plan left Senate age restrictions to the delegates to decide, only stating that members of the second branch must
“be of the age of ____ at least.” Without debating the subject further, delegates voted in
favor of filling the blank with thirty, and passed the
clause unanimously on June 25, three days after
designating twenty-five as the minimum age for
representatives. In The Federalist,
No. 62, Madison justified the higher age requirement for
senators. By its deliberative nature, the
“senatorial trust,” called for a
“greater extent of information and stability of
character,”than would be needed in the more
democratic House of Representatives.
Citizenship:
Under English law, no person “born out of
the kingdoms of England,Scotland, or Ireland”
could be a member of either house of Parliament.
While some delegates may have admired the “strictness” of this policy, no framers
advocated a blanket ban on foreign-born legislators.
Instead, they debated the length of time members
of Congress should be citizens before taking office.
The states’ residency qualifications offered
moderate guidelines in this regard. New Hampshire’s state senators needed to be residents
for at least seven years prior to election. In
other states, upper house members fulfilled a five,
three, or one-year requirement, while state
representatives completed a residency period of one to
three years.
The Virginia Plan made no mention of citizenship
when Edmund Randolph introduced it to the convention in
May. Two months later, the Committee of Detail
reported a draft of the Constitution. Article V,
section 3 included a four-year citizenship requirement
for senators. On August 9, Gouverneur Morris
moved to replace the four-year clause with a
fourteen-year minimum. Later that day, delegates
voted against citizenship requirements of fourteen,
thirteen, and ten years before passing the nine-year
provision, making the Senate requirement two years
longer than that for the House of Representatives.
At the convention, delegates viewed the nine-year
citizenship qualification as a compromise “between
a total exclusion of adopted citizens” and an
“indiscriminate and hasty admission of
them.”While they were concerned that the
Senate, especially, might be subject to foreign
influence, they did not wish to close the institution to
naturalized citizens of merit. Two foreign-born
framers expressed these opposing considerations.
According to Pierce Butler, recent arrivals were
dangerously attached to their countries of origin, a
particular concern for senators whose role would include
review of foreign treaties. From his own
experience, he believed that naturalized citizens would
need sufficient time to learn and appreciate American
laws and customs before they could serve in government.
For James Wilson, however, lengthy citizenship
requirements “discouraged and mortified”
everyone they excluded. He agreed with Benjamin
Franklin that a strict policy would hinder positive
immigration and offend those Europeans who had supported
the Revolutionary War. On August 13, Wilson moved
to reduce the Senate qualification by two years.
Delegates rejected his motion, and confirmed the
nine-year requirement by an 8 to 3 vote.
Inhabitancy:
Although England repealed Parliament’s residency
law in 1774, no delegates spoke against a residency
requirement for members of Congress. The
qualification first came under consideration on August 6
when the Committee of Detail reported its draft of the
Constitution. Article 5, section 3 stated,
“Every member of the Senate shall be . . . at the
time of his election, a resident of the state from which
he shall be chosen.”
On August 8, Roger Sherman moved to strike the
word “resident” from the House version of
the clause, and insert in its place
“inhabitant,” a term he considered to be
“less liable to misconstruction.”
Madison seconded the motion, noting that
“resident” might exclude people occasionally
absent on public or private business. Delegates
agreed to the term, “inhabitant,” and voted
against adding a time period to the requirement.
The following day, they amended the Senate
qualification to include the word,
“inhabitant,” prior to passing the clause by
unanimous consent.
President of the Senate
The Vice President of the United States shall be
President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote
unless they be equally divided. [U.S. Constitution,
Article I, section 3, clause 4]
On September 4, 1787, the term, “vice
president,” appeared for the first time at the
Constitutional Convention. The Committee of Unfinished Portions reported a
method of electing the president and vice president, and
recommended that the vice president be the
“ex-officio President of the Senate.”
Although delegates passed the latter measure three
days later, few understood the extent of the vice
president’s duties, not having a similar position
in their own states. New York’s
constitution, however, contained the clear precedent:
“the lieutenant-governor shall, by virtue of his
office, be president of the senate, and, upon an equal
division, have a casting voice in their decisions, but
not vote on any other occasion.”New York,
then, is aptly credited for the establishment of the
vice president’s office in both its executive and
senatorial functions.
Convention delegates first considered the
selection of the Senate’s presiding officer after
the Committee of Detail presented a draft of the
Constitution on August 6. Article III, section 4
stated, “The Senate shall choose its own
President,” while another article designated the
president of the Senate as the executive’s
immediate successor. Both provisions passed
without dissent. Later in the month, however,
increasing support for a separation of powers motivated
the Committee of Unfinished Portions to create the
electoral college system, rather than have the national
legislature elect the president. The committee
also suggested that a vice president succeed the
executive in the event of a vacancy in that position,
but would otherwise serve as the president of the
Senate, casting votes only to break a tie. On
September 7, Elbridge Gerry and George Mason spoke
against the proposed measure, believing that it
conflicted with the goal to keep the executive and
legislative departments separate and distinct.
Roger Sherman defended the clause. “If the
vice-President were not to be President of the Senate,
he would be without employment, and some member by being
made President must be deprived of his vote.”
Evidently, most delegates agreed with
Sherman’s reasoning, and they passed the measure
by an 8 to 2 vote.
In
The Federalist, No. 68, New York delegate Alexander Hamilton explained
the necessity of the vice president’s Senate
position. To secure definitive resolutions, the
Senate’s president must be able to cast
tie-breaking votes, yet be denied a vote at all other
times. Therefore, the Senate’s presiding
officer must not be a member of the Senate, nor should a
senator be next in line for the presidency, since the
president’s successor should be chosen in the same
manner as the president.
Other Senate Officers
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also
a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice
President, or when he shall exercise the Office of
President of the United States. [Article 1, section
3, clause 5]
Before Constitutional framers designated the vice
president as the president of the Senate on September 7,
1787, they granted senators the right to choose other
Senate officers, including those from outside the
elected body. The clause was not debated at the
convention, but simply assumed in the Committee of
Detail’s report to the Constitutional Convention on August 6. According to James Madison, numerous
precedents made the measure “so obvious that it
[was] wholly unnecessary to vindicate it. ”Members of Parliament had been selecting clerks of the
house and sergeants at arms for hundreds of years, and
state legislatures appointed various administrative
officers. The Senate modeled its own offices of
the secretary, the sergeant at arms, and the doorkeeper
after positions established in the Continental Congress.
Unlike the secretary and the sergeant at arms,
the president pro tempore is an elected member of the
Senate, chosen by the Senate to preside in the absence
of the vice president. The position resulted from
the framers’ decision to make the vice president
the president of the Senate, but it originated in the
state legislatures. While other states provided
stand-ins for presiding officers, New York specified the
arrangement in its constitution: whenever the
lieutenant-governor “shall be unable to attend as
president of the senate, the senators shall have power
to elect one of their own members to the office of
president of the senate, which he shall exercise [until
the lieutenant governor resumes his position in the
chamber].”
At the convention, delegates first considered
having an elected senator be the president of the
Senate, as shown in the Committee of Detail’s
report on August 6. However, in September, Roger
Sherman observed that, except in the case of a tie,
the presiding officer would be deprived of his
vote. Rather than disadvantage one state by
elevating its senator to a non-voting position, framers
made the vice president the president of the Senate.
As of September 10, they accepted the president
pro tempore as the presiding officer’s substitute
to preside over the Senate, or select another senator to
preside, during the absence of the vice president.
Senate Impeachment Trials
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments . . . And no Person shall be convicted
without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members
present. [Article I, section 3, clause 6]
Early in the 1787 Constitutional Convention, most delegates agreed that the inclusion of an
impeachment provision would help to hold national
officers accountable for their actions. The
Senate’s role in impeachment trials, however,
developed after months of consideration behind the
closed doors of committee rooms. Based on those of
the British Parliament and the state constitutions, the
Senate impeachment provision gave senators the
responsibility for trying impeached officials, including
the president of the United States.
Throughout the summer of 1787, committee members
reported impeachment plans to the full convention.
The preliminary resolutions were considered by the
Committee of the Whole and returned to selected
delegates for further revision. First submitted on
May 29, James Madison’s Virginia Plan
proposed a supreme tribunal to hear and determine cases
including, among other concerns, the “impeachments
of any National officers. ”On June 13, the
Committee of the Whole amended the plan’s
proposition. Section nine of the committee’s
report stated that the president could be
“removable on impeachment of malpractices or
neglect of duty. ”The revised measure did
not specify the procedures for trying the national
executive.
In June and July, the framers debated the merits
of involving Congress in the impeachment process.
Roger Sherman “contended that the National
Legislature should have the power to remove the
Executive at pleasure. ”George Mason
objected to Sherman’s plan, claiming that the
president would become the “creature of the
Legislature. ”John Dickinson countered with
an unsuccessful motion to make the executive
“removable by National Legislature at request of
majority of State Legislatures.”
On August 6, the Committee of Detail reported
that the House of Representatives “shall have the
sole power of impeachment ”and the executive
“shall be removed from his office by conviction in
the supreme Court, of treason, bribery, or
corruption. ”Two weeks later, the committee added
that “the judges of the supreme court be triable
by the senate, on impeachment by the house of
representatives.”
The constitutional plan then went for review to
the Committee of Eleven, consisting of one member from
every state represented at the convention. Presented to the full convention on September 4,
the Committee of Eleven’s report stated,
“The Senate of the U.S. shall have power to try
all impeachments [by the House of Representatives]; but
no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of
two thirds of the members present. ”The
framers debated the clause on September 8. Arguing
that the executive would become dependent on the
legislature, Madison opposed Senate impeachment trials.
He moved to strike out the words “by the
Senate” after the word “conviction,”
but the resolution was rejected. Later that day,
the delegates agreed to Gouverneur Morris’
addition, “and every member shall be on
oath” before they passed the final measure by an 8
to 2 vote.
InThe Federalist,No. 65, Alexander Hamilton explained the Committee of
Eleven’s rationale for placing impeachment trials
in the Senate: no other institution would be
sufficiently dignified or independent to handle the
proceedings. Furthermore, the British Parliament
and the state constitutions provided similar models for
legislative impeachments. In England, impeachments
were instituted by the House of Commons and tried by the
House of Lords. Penalties for conviction ranged
from fines to jail, banishment, or death. Following the Declaration of Independence, the
states based their constitutions’ impeachment
clauses on their colonial charters, which limited both
the punishment and the conditions for impeachment.
Madison, in
The Federalist, No. 47, referred to the impeachment provisions in the
New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts state
constitutions. In New York, members of the
legislature and the judiciary served on a court of
impeachment, while in New Jersey, select officers could
be dismissed by the upper house on impeachment by the
lower house. The clearest antecedent to the U.S.
impeachment clause, however, is found in
Massachusetts’ 1780 constitution. Section 2,
Article VIII states, “The senate shall be a court,
with full authority to hear and determine all
impeachments made by the house of representatives,
against any officer or officers of the commonwealth, for
misconduct and maladministration of their
offices.”
Treaties
He shall have Powers, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided
two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .
[U.S. Constitution, Article II, section 2, clause 2]
As they debated the controversial treaty-making
clause, the delegates to the 1787 Constitutional
Convention considered, but did not follow in whole,
those precedents with which they were most familiar.
In Great Britain, treaties were made by the king
and, in certain cases, had to be approved by a majority
vote in Parliament. The Continental Congress,
which had no executive branch, dispatched agents to
negotiate treaties. The treaties only went into
effect after two-thirds (nine out of thirteen) of the
states approved the documents. This inefficient
process was further complicated by the states’
ability to enter into their own treaties. While
the delegates agreed that the states could not continue
to make treaties with foreign powers, they disagreed
over the manner in which the United States should
negotiate, draft, and ratify international pacts.
On August 6, the convention’s Committee of
Detail reported a preliminary Constitution to the full
convention. Article IX, section 1 stated, “The
Senate of the United States shall have power to make
treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of the
Supreme Court. ”Throughout August and into
the month of September, the delegates debated
treaty-making as a separate issue from the rest of the
clause. Several delegates opposed granting the
Senate sole control over treaty-making. While some
wanted the executive to have that responsibility, others
advocated involving the entire legislature in the
process. Small-state delegates, however, preferred the
Committee of Detail’s treaty clause because it
gave each state an equal say in the adoption or
rejection of treaties.
On September 4, the Committee of Eleven reported
a treaty clause that appeased many of the delegates:
“The President by and with the advice and Consent
of the Senate, shall have power to make Treaties.”
After further debate, the delegates unanimously
approved the clause on September 7. The clause,
however, was taken up again, this time to add to it the
words, “But no treaty shall be made without the
consent of two thirds of the members present. ”
Shortly thereafter, the convention adopted James
Madison’s addition, “except in treaties of
peace,” which would be ratified by a simple
majority vote. The next day, the delegates struck
out the peace treaty exception and considered dropping
the Senate super majority as well. After two
delegates cited the Continental Congress’
“two-thirds of the states” example, however,
they voted to keep the two-thirds requirement.
Although adopted by the convention, the treaty clause
continued to stir debate in the period before the
Constitution’s ratification. As one of the
clause’s strongest proponents, Alexander Hamilton
defended the provision in The Federalist, No. 75. Remarkably, given the delegates’ extreme
dissension over treaty-making, he wrote, the clause
“is one of the best digested and unexceptionable
parts of the plan.”
Nominations
[The president] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers
of the United States . . . . [U.S. Constitution,
Article II, section 2, clause 2]
Debated over the course of several weeks, the
Constitution’s nomination clause split the
delegates into two factions: those who wanted the
executive to have the sole power of appointment, and
those who wanted the national legislature, and more
specifically, the Senate, to have that responsibility.
The latter faction followed precedents established
by the Articles of Confederation and most of the state constitutions. These
documents granted the Continental Congress
and the state legislatures the power to make
appointments. The Massachusetts constitution
provided an alternative model, however. For over
one hundred years,Massachusetts had divided the
appointment responsibilities between its governor, who
made the nominations, and its legislative council, which
confirmed the appointments.
Rather than adopt the Massachusetts model
immediately, the convention delegates initially granted
the president the power to appoint the officers of the
executive branch and, given that judges’ life-long
terms would extend past the authority of any one
president, the Senate would appoint the members of the
judiciary. Framers in favor of a strong executive,
however, argued that Senate appointments would lead to
government by a “cabal” swayed by the
interests of constituents. Other delegates,
fearful of monarchies, wanted to remove the president
entirely from the appointment process. On
September 4, the Committee of Eleven reported an amended
appointment clause.Unanimously adopted on
September 7, the clause, based on the Massachusetts
model, provided that the president shall nominate
and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint
the officers of the United States.
Sources
Anderson, Thorton. Creating the Constitution: The
Convention of 1787 and the First Congress. University Park, Penn.: The Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1993.
Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. The Federalist Papers. Edited by Clinton Rossiter. New York: Mentor, 1999.
Haynes, George.The Senate of the United States. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1938.
Jillson, Calvin C. Constitution Making:
Conflict and Consensus in the Federal Convention of
1787. New York: Agathon Press, 1988.
Kurland, Philip B. and Ralph Lerner. The
Founders’ Constitution. 4 volumes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
Madison, James. Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787. Athens, OH: Ohio University, 1966.
Story, Joseph. Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States. 2 volumes, fifth edition. Edited by
Melville Bigelow. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1891.
Swindler, William F., ed. Sources and Documents of
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Van Doren, Carl. The Great Rehearsal: The Story of the Making and Ratifying of the Constitution of the United States. New York: The Viking Press, 1948.