Statement of Asa
Hutchinson
Under Secretary of the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate
Hearing on Container Security:
Assessing the Threat and Evaluating Our Response
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
March 20, 2003
Good morning, Madame Chairman and members of the Committee.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify.
I am pleased to be here on behalf of the Border and Transportation
Security Directorate (BTS) to discuss some of the initiatives
we have implemented to improve security in the aftermath of
the September 11th attacks – and to do so while still
protecting the flow of legitimate trade so important to our
national economy. On March 1, 2003, the initiatives I will
discuss today became Department of Homeland Security initiatives
as the U.S. Customs merged with the Border Patrol and the
immigration and agriculture inspection programs to form the
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, or BCBP. As you know,
BCBP is within the Department of Homeland Security’s
BTS Directorate.
As Secretary Ridge has oft stated, our primary objective
here at the Department is to prevent terrorism. At BTS, and
specifically within the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection,
our priority mission is preventing terrorists and terrorist
weapons from entering the United States. That extraordinarily
important mission means improving security at our physical
borders and ports of entry, but it also means extending our
zone of security beyond our physical borders. Indeed, the
initiatives I am going to discuss today are designed to push
our zone of security outward so that American borders are
the last line of defense, not the first line of defense against
the international terrorist threat. These initiatives –
like all BTS Smart Border initiatives – are designed
to improve security without stifling the flow of legitimate
trade. In fact, many of these initiatives promote the more
efficient movement of trade. Securing trade and facilitating
trade are two of the main goals of the BTS Directorate. My
statement today focuses on those specific initiatives the
Committee asked that I discuss.
Container Security Initiative (CSI)
Ocean-going sea containers represent the most important artery
of global commerce – some 48 million full sea cargo
containers move between the world’s major seaports each
year, and nearly 50 percent of all U.S. imports (by value)
arrive via sea containers. That means nearly 6 million cargo
containers arrive at U.S. seaports annually.
Because of the sheer volume of sea container traffic and
the opportunities it presents for terrorists, containerized
shipping is uniquely vulnerable to terrorist attack. Most
experts believe that a terrorist attack using a container
as a weapon or as a means to smuggle a terrorist weapon, possibly
a weapon of mass destruction, is likely. If terrorists used
a sea container to conceal a weapon of mass destruction and
detonated it on arrival at a port, the impact on global trade
and the global economy could be immediate and devastating
– all nations would be affected.
The purpose of the Container Security Initiative, CSI, is
to prevent and deter terrorists from using cargo containers
to conceal terrorist weapons, including potentially nuclear
weapons or radiological materials. Under CSI, which is the
first program of its kind, we are identifying high-risk cargo
containers and partnering with other governments to pre-screen
those containers at foreign ports, before they are shipped
to our ports.
The four core elements of CSI are:
- First, identifying "high-risk" containers.
These are any containers that pose a potential risk for
terrorism; i.e., that may contain – based on intelligence
and risk-targeting principles – terrorist weapons,
or even terrorists. We are using a structure called the
Automated Targeting System (ATS), a sophisticated rules-based
system, capable of sorting and processing vast quantities
of information very rapidly to identify the “high-risk”
containers.
- Second, pre-screening the “high risk”
containers at the foreign CSI port before they are shipped
to the U.S.
- Third, using technology to pre-screen the high-risk
containers, so that it can be done rapidly without materially
slowing down the movement of trade. This includes both radiation
detectors and large-scale x-ray-type machines in order to
detect potential terrorist weapons.
- Fourth, using smarter, “tamper-evident”
containers – containers that indicate to BCBP officers
at the port of arrival whether they have been tampered with
after a security screening.
Under CSI, we have deployed and continue to deploy small
teams of BCBP personnel to the foreign ports, of nations that
are partners in the CSI initiative. These U.S. personnel target
containers using computers that are connected to our Automated
Targeting System (ATS) system here in the United States. Our
host nation customs partners add information useful to the
targeting process, using their own systems. Pooling our information
and data results in better targeting decisions.
The next step is that the host nation’s customs officers
inspect the containers identified as posing a risk, using
non-intrusive inspection (NII) and radiation detection equipment.
The NII equipment generates x-ray and gamma ray images, which
U.S. and host nation officers study for anomalies that could
indicate the presence of terrorist weapons, including nuclear
or radiological materials. In the event that an anomaly is
detected through the NII or radiation detection equipment,
the host nation’s customs officers conduct a physical
inspection of the contents of the container. U.S. Customs
and Border Protection officers observe this entire process
to make sure security protocols are followed.
CSI adds substantial security to containerized shipping without
slowing down the flow of legitimate trade. Containers that
have been pre-screened and sealed under CSI will not ordinarily
need to be inspected again by U.S. Customs and Border Protection
when they arrive at United States seaports. Currently, every
container identified as high risk is being screened on arrival
to the United States. With CSI, it will usually be unnecessary
to do this screening here, if it has been done – “there”
– at a CSI port.
The Customs Service developed the CSI initiative in the last
two months of 2001, and Commissioner Bonner announced CSI
in January, 2002. Since then, CSI has generated exceptional
participation and support.
The goal for the first phase of CSI was to implement the
program at as many of the top 20 foreign container ports –
in terms of volume of cargo containers shipped to United States
seaports – as possible, and as soon as possible. Those
ports were the logical place to start CSI, because the top
20 alone account for nearly 70 percent, over two-thirds, of
all cargo containers arriving at U.S. seaports. The top twenty
ports include: Hong Kong, Shanghai, Singapore, Kaohsiung,
Rotterdam, Pusan, Bremerhaven, Tokyo, Genoa, Yantian, Antwerp,
Nagoya, Le Havre, Hamburg, La Spezia, Felixstowe, Algeciras,
Kobe, Yokohama, and Laem Chabang.
Within one year of the announcement of CSI, 18 of the top
20 ports agreed to participate in CSI. CSI has been implemented
and is operational in Le Havre, France; Rotterdam, the Netherlands;
Antwerp, Belgium; Bremerhaven and Hamburg, Germany; and in
Singapore, the largest container transshipment port in the
world. It will be operational at other CSI ports very soon.
BCBP is in the process of formulating the second phase of
CSI. Under CSI Phase 2, the CSI program will be implemented
at other foreign ports that ship a significant volume of cargo
to the United States, and that have the infrastructure and
technology in place to support the program. Sweden and Malaysia
have already signed CSI agreements for this phase. To date,
a total of 14 countries have agreed to implement CSI.
24-Hour Rule
Because CSI involves getting and using information about
containers before those containers leave foreign ports, the
advance transmission of complete and accurate vessel cargo
manifest information to BCBP is essential to its success.
Advance transmission of that information is also essential
to overall successful targeting of high-risk cargo containers
from any port, regardless of whether that port is part of
CSI, because the better the information and the sooner we
have it, the more effective and efficient U.S. Customs and
Border Protection can be in identifying high-risk cargo and
screening that cargo for terrorist weapons, including nuclear
and radiological material.
A final advance manifest regulation relating to oceangoing
cargo was issued on October 31, 2002, requiring the presentation
of accurate, complete manifest information 24 hours prior
to loading of a container on board a vessel at the foreign
port. Under that regulation, vague descriptions of cargo,
such as “FAK” (Freight All Kinds) are no longer
acceptable. On February 2, 2003, a strategy was begun to ensure
compliance with the so-called “24-hour rule,”
following a 60-day grace period to permit the trade to adjust
its business practices. BCBP is continuing that strategy.
The compliance strategy has involved issuing “no load”
orders and denying permits to discharge containers in the
event of non-compliance.
In the first month of enforcement, BCBP issued approximately
150 “no load” orders, but the trade is working
very hard to comply and we are seeing significant compliance
with many aspects of the rule.
Additional Protocols For High-Risk
Containers
If high-risk containers are identified after they have set
sail for the United States, BCBP makes a determination on
their level and source of risk. Depending on that assessment,
BCBP has protocols in place for working with a variety of
agencies, such as the Coast Guard to take appropriate next
steps. For example, when a determination is made that cargo
should not reach U.S. shores, BCBP works with the Coast Guard
to ensure that the cargo is screened and examined, including
the possibility of conducting examinations at sea.
Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, C-TPAT –
developed and started by the Customs Service in January 2002
– is an initiative designed to further reduce the risk
that terrorist weapons could be concealed in cargo shipped
to the United States. It does this by substantially improving
security along the entire supply chain, not just at foreign
seaports. By partnering with the trade community – U.S.
importers, customs brokers, carriers, shippers, and others
– we can better protect the entire supply chain against
potential exploitation by terrorists or terrorist weapons.
Under C-TPAT, companies sign an agreement with BCBP to conduct
a comprehensive self-assessment of their supply chain security
and to improve that security – from foreign loading
docks to the U.S. border and seaports – using C-TPAT
security guidelines. These guidelines were developed with
a large amount of input from the trade community, and include
such items as procedural security, physical security, personnel
security, education and training, access control, manifest
procedures, and conveyance security.
Those companies that meet C-TPAT security standards receive
expedited processing through our land border crossings, through
our seaports, and through our international airports. This
partnership enables us to spend less time on lower-risk cargo,
so that we can focus our resources where they are needed most
– on higher-risk cargo. It is a program through which
businesses win, government wins, and, most importantly, the
American people win.
To date, over 2,000 companies – 2,060 as of March 13,
2003 – are participating in C-TPAT and have signed agreements
with BCBP to improve the security of their supply chains.
Members of C-TPAT include 60 of the top 100 importers and
32 of the 50 largest ocean carriers. Collectively, C-TPAT
companies represent 90 percent of the containerized sea cargo
entering the United States, and about 40 percent of all imports
by value.
Currently, importers, carriers, brokers, freight forwarders,
and non-vessel operating common carriers are eligible to apply
for participation in C-TPAT. In January 2003, we also began
accepting applications from domestic marine port authorities
and terminal operators, who are already encouraged to participate
in the U.S. Coast Guard Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular
(NVIC) program for waterfront facilities. We have plans to
expand C-TPAT to foreign manufacturers and shippers as well.
Finally, to ensure the consistency of guidelines provided
to operators of marine ports and terminals, BCBP and the Coast
Guard have worked closely to ensure that the Coast Guard’s
(NVIC) programs for waterfront facilities are consistent with
C-TPAT guidelines for Ports and Terminal environments.
Operation Safe Commerce
Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) is a public/private partnership
being implemented by the TSA, dedicated to finding methods
and technologies to protect commercial shipments from threats
of terrorist attack, illegal immigration, and other contraband,
while minimizing the economic impact upon the vital transportation
system.
OSC involves developing and testing technology and systems
to improve container security, consistent with the principles
and security practices of ongoing security programs, such
as CSI and C-TPAT. Specific supply chains along particular
trade routes are identified; then every aspect of the supply
chain, from packaging to delivery, is analyzed for vulnerabilities.
Based on this analysis, plans will be developed to improve
security throughout the entire supply chain, and potential
solutions will be tested in an actual operating environment.
Specifically, OSC is addressing three key components to secure
supply chain management. They are: (1) demonstrating what
is needed to ensure that parties associated with commercial
shipping exert reasonable care and due diligence in properly
packing, securing, and manifesting the contents of a shipment
of goods in a container; (2) demonstrating various methods
to ensure that information and documentation associated with
these shipments is complete, accurate, and secure from unauthorized
access – this may entail transmitting information in
a secure electronic format; and (3) testing supply chain security
procedures and practices in order to determine the impact
of these procedures when combined with the implementation
of enhanced manifest data elements and container sealing procedures
(including effective intrusion detection), to determine the
most effective method to reduce the susceptibility of a shipment
in transit in an international or domestic supply chain to
illicit interference.
OSC is to be carried out using the three major U.S. container
load centers: Seattle/Tacoma, New York/New Jersey, and Los
Angeles/Long Beach. Seventy percent of U.S. container movement
originates or terminates at these centers. We are now, accepting
proposals from these identified ports. This acceptance period
closes on March 20, 2003.
OSC’s Executive Steering Committee, which is co-chaired
by the Deputy Commissioner of BCBP and the Associate Deputy
Secretary of the Department of Transportation, is responsible
for managing OSC. The Transportation Security Administration,
the Coast Guard, the State Department, the Commerce Department,
the Justice Department, and the Homeland Security Council
also have individual representatives on the Steering Committee.
Conclusion
CSI and the 24 Hour Rule provides a mechanism for the U.S.
Government to appropriately scrutinize the international movement
of marine containers coming to the USA. The cooperative efforts
of the federal government and the regulated parties in C-TPAT
and OSC allow realistic, practical, business-oriented enhancements
to that scrutiny. This provides more assurance of a secure
international trade network, allowing BTS to deliver on securing
and facilitating trade.
Thank you again Chairman Collins, and the members of the
Committee, for this opportunity to testify. I am happy to
answer any questions you may have.
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