Bioterrorism:
CDC’s Public Health Response
Statement of
Mitchell L.
Cohen, M.D.
Director
Division of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases
National Center for Infectious Diseases
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Department of Health and Human Services
Testimony
Before
the Committee on Governmental Affairs and Subcommittee on
International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services
United States Senate
Good
morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee.
I am Dr. Mitchell L. Cohen, Director, Division of
Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases, National Center for Infectious
Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
Thank you for the invitation to update you on CDC’s
public health response to the threat of bioterrorism.
I will update you on CDC’s response to recent anthrax
exposures, and I will discuss the status of implementing the
overall goals of our bioterrorism preparedness program.
As has been highlighted recently, increased vigilance and
preparedness for unexplained illnesses and injuries are an
essential part of the public health effort to protect the
American people against bioterrorism.
Prior to the September 11 attack on the United States,
CDC was making substantial progress toward defining, developing,
and implementing a nationwide public health response network to
increase the capacity of public health officials at all
levels–federal, state, and local–to prepare for and respond
to deliberate attacks on the health of our citizens. The events of September 11 were a defining moment for all of
us, and since then we have dramatically increased our levels of
preparedness and are implementing plans to increase it even
further.
Recent Anthrax Exposures
As you are aware, many facilities in communities around
the country have received anthrax threat letters.
Most were received as empty envelopes; some have
contained powdery substances. However, in some cases, actual anthrax exposures have
occurred. On
Wednesday, October 3, the Florida Department of Health notified
CDC of a positive anthrax laboratory test result in a Florida
resident who had recently visited North Carolina.
Samples were sent overnight to CDC for confirmatory
testing, and CDC dispatched two investigative teams–to Florida
and North Carolina–on October 4.
By Sunday, October 7, test results confirmed that a
second person–a coworker of the first individual–had been
exposed to anthrax and that traces of the bacteria had been
found in their workplace. A
decision was made to close the building, and additional CDC
staff were sent to help the state and local public health
department manage notification, health evaluations of other
coworkers, and provision of prophylactic antibiotics after the
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile was deployed.
As CDC was continuing to receive clinical specimens and
environmental samples from Florida, we became aware of a
possible case of cutaneous anthrax in New York City.
This person, an NBC employee in Rockefeller Plaza, had
opened envelopes containing powder on September 18 and 25 and
subsequently developed a skin lesion.
A biopsy of the lesion yielded evidence of anthrax. The diagnosis was confirmed by immunohistochemistry on a skin
biopsy specimen in CDC’s laboratory in the early morning of
October 12. The New
York City Department of Health and CDC immediately implemented
appropriate public health actions, including restricting access
to two floors of 30 Rockefeller Plaza and evaluating workers for
the need for prophylactic therapy.
CDC sent additional personnel to New York, joining the
more than 30 epidemiologists and other CDC staff assisting with
worker injury and enhanced syndrome surveillance following the
September 11 terrorist attack.
Laboratory studies on the powder from the September 25
letter were negative for the organism causing anthrax.
Subsequent investigation identified the letter that had
arrived on September 18, which was found to be contaminated with
Bacillus anthracis, the organism that causes anthrax.
On October 15, CDC was notified of a possible anthrax
exposure on Capitol Hill. A
letter, which has now been confirmed to have contained B.
anthracis, was opened by a Senate staff member.
This person took appropriate action, notifying emergency
personnel, and public health measures were promptly implemented.
Certain areas of the office building were closed, and
employees were screened by history for exposure and started on
antibiotic prophylaxis after a nasal swab was obtained to assess
the extent of the exposure zone.
CDC has sent over 70 epidemiologists, laboratorians,
environmental health experts, industrial hygienists, and other
public health professionals to Washington, DC, to assist local,
state, and federal authorities in the investigation.
Environmental specimens have tested positive from the
initial area of exposure as well as several other locations in
Congressional office buildings.
In addition, mail rooms in the U.S. Capitol complex have
had positive environmental samples.
Environmental specimens have also tested positive from
mail facilities servicing the Departments of State and Justice,
the CIA, the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, and the
U.S. Supreme Court.
Late Friday evening, October 19, enhanced regional
surveillance activities–a collaborative effort between the
Washington, DC, Department of Health (DCDOH), the Maryland
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, and the Virginia
Department of Health–identified a patient with an acute
respiratory illness who was an employee of the U.S. Postal
Service’s Washington, DC, Processing and Distribution Center
(the Brentwood facility). The
patient’s illness progressed, and on Sunday, October 21, the
illness was confirmed as inhalational anthrax.
Between October 20 and 22, three additional postal
workers at the Brentwood facility were hospitalized for what was
determined to be inhalation anthrax.
On Thursday, October 25, a mail handler for diplomatic
pouch mail at an off-site mail facility servicing the Department
of State was hospitalized and subsequently confirmed as having
inhalational anthrax. Two
of these five workers have died.
On Saturday, October 20, CDC and DCDOH initiated an
investigation of the Brentwood facility, based on the clinical
presentation of illness in the index case.
Although no specific exposure event was identified, the
contaminated tightly sealed letter that was mailed to the
Senator's office was processed at this facility on October 12
before entering the Capitol mail distribution system.
The Brentwood facility was closed on October 21, and
antibiotic prophylaxis was recommended to employees working
there. In addition,
business visitors to nonpublic operations areas of this facility
also were offered antibiotics.
Subsequently, antibiotic therapy has been recommended to
all mail handlers in facilities receiving mail directly from the
Brentwood facility pending results of ongoing epidemiologic and
environmental investigation.
The first patient also worked at a second postal
facility. On
October 21, this facility also was closed.
Antimicrobial prophylaxis also was recommended for
workers at this facility pending further epidemiologic and
environmental testing.
As of this morning–October 30–2 cases of inhalational
anthrax have been identified in Florida, 5 cases of inhalational
anthrax have been identified in Washington, DC, 1 case of
inhalational anthrax and 6 cases of cutaneous anthrax have been
identified in New York City, and 2 cases of inhalational anthrax
and 4 cases of cutaneous anthrax have been identified in New
Jersey.
CDC is working with U.S. Postal Service employees and
managers on strategies to protect workers in mail-handling and
processing facilities from exposure to anthrax.
These strategies include administrative controls to limit
the number of workers potentially exposed, engineering and
house-keeping controls to prevent exposure, and personal
protective equipment for workers handling mail.
The best defense against such biologic threats continues
to be accurate information regarding how to recognize a
potential threat and knowledge of appropriate actions.
In the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR)
and in multiple health advisories distributed via the Health
Alert Network, CDC has issued several updates on the
investigations as well as interim guidelines for health
departments with recommended procedures for handling such
incidents. These
guidelines include advice to the public and state and local
health officials dealing with suspicious incidents, as well as
guidance to clinical laboratory personnel in recognizing Bacillus
anthracis in a clinical specimen.
The guidelines also outline post-exposure prophylaxis and
anthrax treatment recommendations. In persons exposed to Bacillus anthracis, disease can
be prevented with antibiotic treatment.
Early antibiotic treatment of all forms of anthrax is
essential. The Bacillus
anthracis strains in this outbreak are susceptible to
doxycycline and fluoroquinolones.
Ciprofloxacin or doxycycline is recommended as the
antibiotic for initial use for prophylaxis. Copies of the October 26, 2001, MMWR, which addresses
these issues, have been provided to the Committee.
This is the first bioterrorism-related anthrax attack in
the United States, and the public health ramifications of this
attack continue to evolve. In collaboration with state and local health and law
enforcement officials, CDC and the FBI are continuing to conduct
investigations related to anthrax exposures.
During this heightened surveillance, cases of illness
that may reasonably resemble symptoms of anthrax will be
thoroughly reviewed. The
public health and medical communities
continue to be on a heightened level of disease
monitoring to ensure that any potential exposure is recognized
and that appropriate medical evaluations are given.
This is an example of the disease monitoring system in
action, and that system is working.
Public Health Leadership
The Department of Health and Human Services’ (DHHS)
anti-bioterrorism efforts are focused on improving the nation's
public health surveillance network to quickly detect and
identify the biological agent that has been released;
strengthening the capacities for medical response, especially at
the local level; expanding the stockpile of pharmaceuticals for
use if needed; expanding research on disease agents that might
be released, rapid methods for identifying biological agents,
and improved treatments and vaccines; and preventing
bioterrorism by regulation of the shipment of hazardous
biological agents or toxins.
As the nation’s disease prevention and control agency,
it is CDC’s responsibility on behalf of DHHS to provide
national leadership in the public health and medical communities
in a concerted effort to detect, diagnose, respond to, and
prevent illnesses, including those that occur as a result of a
deliberate release of biological agents.
This task is an integral part of CDC’s overall mission
to monitor and protect the health of the U.S. population.
In 1998, CDC issued Preventing Emerging Infectious
Diseases: A Strategy for the 21st Century, which describes
CDC’s plan for combating today’s emerging diseases and
preventing those of tomorrow.
It focuses on four goals, each of which has direct
relevance to preparedness for bioterrorism:
disease surveillance and outbreak response; applied
research to identify risk factors for disease and to develop
diagnostic tests, drugs, vaccines, and surveillance tools;
infrastructure and training; and disease prevention and control.
This plan was developed with input from state and local
health departments, disease experts, and partner organizations
such as the American Society for Microbiology, the Association
of Public Health Laboratories, the Council of State and
Territorial Epidemiologists, and the Infectious Disease Society
of America. It
emphasizes the need to be prepared for the unexpected –
whether it is a naturally occurring influenza pandemic or the
deliberate release of anthrax by a terrorist.
It is within the context of these overall goals that CDC
has begun to address preparing our nation’s public health
infrastructure to respond to acts of biological terrorism.
Copies of this CDC plan have been provided previously to
the Committee. In
addition, CDC presented in March a report to the Senate entitled
Public Health's Infrastructure: A Status Report.
Recommendations in this report complement the strategies
outlined for emerging infectious diseases and preparedness and
response to bioterrorism. These
recommendations include training of the public health workforce,
strengthening of data and communications systems, and improving
the public health systems at the state and local level.
CDC’s Strategic Plan for Bioterrorism
CDC outlined necessary steps for strengthening public
health and healthcare capacity to protect the nation against
bioterrorist threats in its April 21, 2001, MMWR release
of Biological and Chemical Terrorism: Strategic Plan for
Preparedness and Response - Recommendations of the CDC Strategic
Planning Workgroup. This
report reinforces the work
CDC has been contributing to this effort since 1998 and
lays a framework from which to enhance public health
infrastructure. In
keeping with the message of this report, five key focus areas
have been identified which provide the foundation for local,
state, and federal planning efforts: Preparedness and
Prevention, Detection and Surveillance, Diagnosis and
Characterization of Biological and Chemical Agents, Response,
and Communication. These
areas capture the goals of CDC’s
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program for
general bioterrorism preparedness.
Preparedness
and Prevention
CDC has been working to ensure that all levels of the
public health community – federal, state, and local – are
prepared to work in coordination with the medical and emergency
response communities to address the public health consequences of
biological and chemical terrorism.
CDC is creating diagnostic and epidemiological guidelines
for state and local health departments and will help states
conduct drills and exercises to assess local readiness for
bioterrorism. In
addition, CDC, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the
National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Department of Defense
(DOD), and other agencies are supporting and encouraging research
to address scientific issues related to bioterrorism.
In some cases, new vaccines, antitoxins, or innovative drug
treatments need to be developed, manufactured, and/or stocked.
Moreover, we need to learn more about the pathogenesis and
epidemiology of the infectious diseases which do not affect the
U.S. population currently. We
have only limited knowledge about how artificial methods of
dispersion may affect the infection rate, range of illness, and
public health impact of these
biological agents.
Detection and Surveillance
As was evidenced in Florida, New York, and Washington, DC,
the initial detection of a biological terrorist attack occurs at
the local level. Therefore,
it is essential to educate and train members of the medical
community – both public and private – who may be the first to
examine and treat the victims.
It is also necessary to upgrade the surveillance systems of
state and local health departments, as well as within healthcare
facilities such as hospitals, which will be relied upon to spot
unusual patterns of disease occurrence and to identify any
additional cases of illness.
CDC is providing terrorism-related training to
epidemiologists and laboratorians, infection control personnel,
emergency responders, emergency department personnel and other
front-line health-care providers, and health and safety personnel.
CDC is providing educational materials regarding potential
bioterrorism agents to the medical and public health communities
on its website for Public Health Emergency Preparedness and
Response at www.bt.cdc.gov.
CDC is working with partners such as the Johns Hopkins
Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies (www.hopkins-biodefense.org)
and the Infectious Diseases Society of America to develop training
and educational materials for incorporation into medical and
public health graduate and post-graduate curricula.
With public health partners, CDC is spearheading the
development of the National Electronic Disease Surveillance
System, which will facilitate automated, timely electronic capture
of data from the healthcare system.
Diagnosis and Characterization of Biological and Chemical
Agents
To ensure that
prevention and treatment measures can be implemented quickly in
the event of a biological or chemical terrorist attack, rapid
diagnosis is critical. CDC
has developed guidelines and quality assurance standards for the
safe and secure collection, storage, transport, and processing of
biologic and environmental samples.
In collaboration with other federal and non-federal
partners, CDC is co-sponsoring a series of training exercises for
state public health laboratory personnel on requirements for the
safe use, containment, and transport of dangerous biological
agents and toxins. CDC,
also in cooperation with the Association of Public Health
Laboratories (APHL) and the National Laboratory Training Network (NLTN)
have sponsored a “hands-on” laboratory course for public
health microbiologists. In
conjunction with the course, CDC produced two videos that were
distributed to the participants as well as to members of the NLTN.
The participants in this course are now using these videos
and the other materials developed by CDC to train other
laboratorians in their states.
CDC is also enhancing its efforts to foster the safe design
and operation of Biosafety Level 3
laboratories, which are required for handling many highly
dangerous pathogens. Furthermore,
CDC is developing a Rapid Toxic Screen to detect people’s
exposure to 150 chemical agents using blood or urine samples.
Response
A decisive and timely response to a biological terrorist
event involves a fully documented and well rehearsed plan of
detection, epidemiologic investigation, and medical treatment for
affected persons, and the initiation of disease prevention
measures to minimize illness, injury and death.
CDC is addressing this by (1) assisting state and local
health agencies in developing their plans for investigating and
responding to unusual events and unexplained illnesses, and (2)
bolstering CDC’s capacities within the overall federal
bioterrorism response effort.
CDC is formalizing current draft plans for the notification
and mobilization of personnel and laboratory resources in response
to a bioterrorism emergency, as well as overall strategies for
vaccination, and
development and implementation of other potential outbreak control
strategies such as quarantine measures.
In addition, CDC is developing national standards to ensure
that respirators used by first responders and by other health care
providers responding to terrorist acts provide adequate protection
against weapons of terrorism.
Communication Systems
Rapid and secure communications are crucial to ensure a
prompt and coordinated response to an intentional release of a
biological agent. Thus,
strengthening communication among clinicians, emergency rooms,
infection control practitioners, hospitals, pharmaceutical
companies, and public health personnel is of paramount importance. To this end, CDC is making a significant investment in
building the nation’s public health communications
infrastructure through the Health Alert Network (HAN).
HAN is a nationwide program to establish the
communications, information, distance-learning, and organizational
infrastructure for a new level of defense against health threats,
including bioterrorism. Currently,
13 states are connected to all of their local health
jurisdictions; 37 states have begun connecting to local providers
as well; and CDC is also directly connecting to groups, such as
the American Medical Association, to cast a broad net of coverage.
CDC has also established the Epidemic Information Exchange
(Epi-X), a secure, Web-based communications system that provides
information sharing capabilities to state and local health
officials. CDC also provides timely satellite broadcast and
web-broadcast training through the Public Health Training Network. For example, CDC experts recently shared information on
anthrax with physicians, hospitals, and other healthcare providers
across the country.
Ongoing communication of accurate and up-to-date
information helps calm public fears and limit collateral effects
of the attack. CDC
communicates with the public directly through its website on
emergency preparedness and through a public inquiry telephone and
email system, which,
since the recent attacks, has responded to hundreds of questions
daily. In addition,
CDC communicates to the public by releasing daily updates to the
news media, answering inquiries from the press and providing
medical experts for interviews.
The National Pharmaceutical Stockpile
Another integral component of public health preparedness at
CDC has been the development of a National Pharmaceutical
Stockpile (NPS), which is mobilized in response to an episode
caused by a biological or chemical agent.
The role of the CDC’s NPS program is to maintain a
national repository of life-saving pharmaceuticals and medical
material that can be delivered to the site or sites of a
biological or chemical terrorism event in order to reduce
morbidity and mortality in a civilian population.
The NPS is a backup and means of support to state and local
first responders, healthcare providers, and public health
officials. The NPS
program consists of a two-tier response:
(1) 12-hour push packages, which are pre-assembled arrays
of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies that can be delivered to
the scene of a terrorism event within 12 hours of the federal
decision to deploy the assets and that will make possible the
treatment or prophylaxis of disease caused by a variety of threat
agents; and (2) a Vendor-Managed Inventory (VMI) that can be
tailored to a specific threat agent.
Components of the VMI will arrive at the scene 24 to 36
hours after activation. The
NPS was mobilized for the first time on September 11, when a
12-hour push pack was deployed to New York City, delivering 50
tons of medical supplies to the site of the disaster in 7 hours.
In addition, substantial quantities of VMI were delivered
to New York City within 24 hours.
Components of the VMI were deployed to Palm Beach, Florida,
Montgomery County, Maryland, and Trenton, New Jersey, to provide
adequate supplies of antibiotics to provide prophylaxis to
individuals who were potentially exposed to anthrax.
CDC has developed this program in collaboration with
federal and private sector partners and with input from the
states.
Core Capacities for State and Local Health Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response
CDC has been working with partners at all levels to develop
core capacities needed to respond to pubic health threats and
emergencies. CDC is
also developing specific guidelines to assist public health
agencies in their efforts to build comprehensive bioterrorism
preparedness and response programs.
This collaborative effort engages federal, state, and local
partners in determining what is needed for state and local public
health agencies to improve their preparedness and response to
bioterrorism. This
process enables health departments to more effectively target
specific improvements to protect the public’s health in the
event of a biological or chemical terrorist event and will provide
the framework for future program efforts.
The core capacities effort is for dual purpose.
While these capacities focus on bioterrorism events, they
are also relevant to naturally occurring infectious disease
outbreaks and natural disasters.
Challenges
CDC has been addressing issues of detection, epidemiologic
investigation, diagnostics, and enhanced infrastructure and
communications as part of its overall bioterrorism preparedness
strategies. Based on
federal, state, and local response in the weeks following the
events of September 11, and on recent training experiences, such
as the National TOPOFF event and the Dark Winter exercise,
CDC has learned valuable lessons and identified gaps that exist in
bioterrorism preparedness and response at federal, state, and
local levels. CDC
will continue to work with partners to address challenges such as
improving coordination among other federal agencies during a
response and understanding the necessary relationship needed
between conducting a criminal investigation versus an
epidemiologic case investigation.
These issues, as well as overall preparedness planning at
federal, state, and local levels, require additional action to
ensure that the nation is fully prepared to respond to acts of
biological and chemical terrorism.
Disease experts at CDC are working with partners at other
federal agencies and in state and local health departments to
develop strategies to prevent the spread of disease during and
after bioterrorist attacks. Specific
components include (1) creating protocols for immunizing at-risk
populations subject to the availability of suitable vaccines; (2)
isolating large numbers of exposed individuals when there is risk
that the disease can be spread from person to person; (3) reducing
occupational exposures; (4) assessing methods of safeguarding food
and water from deliberate contamination; and (5) exploring ways to
improve linkages between animal and human disease surveillance
networks since threat agents that affect both humans and animals
may first be detected in animals.
Conclusion
In conclusion, CDC is committed to working with other
federal agencies and partners as well as state and local public
health departments to ensure the health and medical care of our
citizens. We have
made substantial progress to date in enhancing the nation’s
capability to prepare for and respond to a bioterrorist event.
The best public health strategy to protect the health of
civilians against a biological attack is the development,
organization, and enhancement of public health prevention systems
and tools. Priorities include strengthened public health laboratory
capacity, increased surveillance and outbreak investigation
capacity, and health communications, education, and training at
the federal, state, and local levels.
Not only will this approach ensure that we are prepared for
deliberate bioterrorist threats, but it will also ensure that we
will be able to recognize and control naturally occurring new or
re-emerging infectious diseases.
A strong and flexible public health infrastructure is the
best defense against any disease outbreak.
Thank you very much for your attention.
I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
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