The
Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons Materials
and Technologies to State and Sub-State Actors
Testimony by
Jonathan B. Tucker, Ph.D.
Director, Chemical & Biological Nonproliferation Program
Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies
Washington, D.C. Office
before the
Subcommittee on International Security,
Proliferation, and Federal Services
of the
U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
November 7, 2001, 2:30 p.m.
Room 342, Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, and guests:
Many thanks for the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon on a
topic of great importance and concern in the aftermath of September 11: the
proliferation of chemical and biological weapons to states and terrorist
organizations.[1]
The recent series of anthrax attacks through the U.S. mail indicatindicateses
that
the global spread of dual-use technologies, materials, and scientific
know-how relevant to the production and delivery of chemical and biological
weapons (CBW) poses a serious threat to U.S. national security. Although to
date the exposures to anthrax-tainted letters have remained limited, a
large-scale attack with a chemical or biological agent against U.S. targets
at home or abroad is a real possibility.
In the past, only a few terrorist groups have acquired and used
unconventional weapons, and nearly all have encountered major technical
hurdles in doing so. Nevertheless, the anthrax attacks against the United
States indicate that terrorist use of biological weapons is no longer
theoretical; bioterrorism is a clear and present danger. The anthrax mailed
to Senator Tom Daschle’s office contained dried spores that had been
milled to an extremely fine powder and processed with chemical additives so
that they would become readily airborne and infect through the lungs,
suggesting that the perpetrators had access to specialized military
technology and know-how related to the “weaponization” of anthrax.
Perhaps they acquired a limited supply of this material on the international
black market, or—more worrisome—developed a manufacturing capability for
dried anthrax powder. If the latter is true, the perpetrators would have the
potential to disseminate larger quantities of dried anthrax spores through
the air, potentially exposing thousands of people.
Although the recent attacks have been relatively small-scale and not
designed to inflict mass casualties, their dramatic psychological and
economic impact on American society may inspire further biological weapons
proliferation by rogue states and terrorists. Moreover, in a unipolar world
in which U.S. conventional military might predominates, it is increasingly
likely that rogue states will turn to chemical and biological weapons as a
force equalizer or means of “asymmetric” warfare.
Given the possibility that the perpetrators have received assistance from
former weapons scientists or from a state-sponsor, it is important to
assess: (1) which states possess chemical and biological weapons, and (2)
the extent to which trade in dual-use materials and technologies contributes
to clandestine chemical and biological weapons (CBW) programs. My testimony
will first discuss the state and sub-state actors of CBW proliferation
concern. I will then turn to technologies and materials that could be
employed to produce and deliver these agents.
States of CBW Proliferation Concern
Evidence from open sources indicates that roughly 13 countries are
actively seeking biological weapons and closer to 20 are pursuing chemical
warfare capabilities. Proliferant states of particular concern to the United
States include Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.
Iraq
The
precise status of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons programs is
unknown because of that country’s efforts since 1991 to conceal the full
extent of its prohibited activities. Iraq’s expulsion of inspectors from
the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in December 1998, and its
continuing refusal to admit inspectors from the successor agency, the United
Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), has
further impeded international efforts to assess the status of Iraq’s
prohibited weapons programs. It appears likely, however, that Iraq has
rebuilt key elements of its chemical and pharmaceutical production
infrastructure that were destroyed during the Gulf War and by UNSCOM. These
dual-use facilities could easily be converted to the production of CBW
agents, and probably already have been.
Various reports indicate that Iraq may retain a sizable stockpile of
chemical munitions, including 25 or more special chemical/biological
warheads for the al-Hussein ballistic missile and 2,000 aerial bombs. Iraq
is also believed to possess sufficient precursor chemicals to produce
hundreds of tons of mustard gas, VX, and other nerve agents.[2]
In short, Iraq retains the materials and technical expertise to revive its
chemical warfare program within months, if it has not already done so. Iraq
has not signed or the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Iraq is also believed to retain a substantial offensive biological warfare
(BW) capability. During the UNSCOM inspections, Iraqi officials repeatedly
misled the inspectors as to the nature and extent of its BW program and
prevented them from verifying its claim to have unilaterally destroyed its
biological arsenal. According to some estimates, Iraq may retain a stockpile
of BW munitions, including more than 150 R-400 aerial bombs and 25 or more
special warheads for the al-Hussein ballistic missile. Iraq may also have
retained a mobile production facility with the capacity to produce dried
biological agents, which are particularly lethal. Iraq has not accounted for
17 metric tons of bacterial growth media and may possess undeclared stocks
of smallpox virus. Iraq currently maintains the technical expertise and
equipment to reconstitute its biological warfare capabilities within months,
including production of anthrax bacteria, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and Clostridium
perfringens (gas gangrene) toxin.[3]
Iran
Although Iran has signed and ratified both the Chemical Weapons Convention
and the Biological Weapons Convention, it continues to pursue the
acquisition of technologies and materials needed for the production of
chemical and biological agents. Iran began its chemical weapons program in
the mid-1980s in response to Iraqi chemical attacks during the Iran-Iraq
War. After 1985, Iran began manufacturing and stockpiling blister, blood,
and choking agents, including cyanogen chloride, phosgene, and mustard gas.
Reportedly, Iran began nerve agent production in 1994. Iran continues to
augment its chemical weapons production capability by seeking to acquire
relevant production technology, technical expertise, and precursor chemicals
from other states, including Russia and China.[4]
Iran appears to have initiated a biological weapons-related research program
in the 1980s. It is possible that Iran has produced small quantities of
agents and has begun to weaponize them, although the types of pathogens
produced are unknown. Iran is suspected of having a BW research laboratory
at Damghan. Furthermore, Iran has attempted to purchase BW-related materials
from foreign sources, ostensibly for civilian use.[5]
Given the dual-use nature of many of the pathogens, materials, and equipment
used in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries and in biomedical
research, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which Iran is engaging
in legitimate or illicit activity.
Libya
During the 1980s, Libya produced more than 100 metric tons of nerve and
blister agents at the Rabta facility, which Libya claimed was a
pharmaceutical plant. A project to build a large underground chemical and
biological weapons production facility at a second site called Tarhunah has
been underway since 1995, although international pressure has slowed the
pace of construction. Libya has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention
and is heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals and
production equipment.[6]
The Libyan CW plant at Rabta was designed by the German firm Imhausen-Chemie
and production equipment was supplied by other West European and Japanese
companies.[7]
Libya’s biological weapons program has apparently not advanced beyond the
research and development stage. It is possible, however, that Libya can
produce small quantities of BW agents. Libya’s offensive BW program is
heavily dependent on dual-use materials and foreign assistance.[8]
North Korea
Evidence in the public domain suggests that North Korea has operated an
extensive CW program for many years and has the ability to produce a variety
of agents, including adamsite,
mustard, sarin, and VX. North Korea has not signed the Chemical Weapons
Convention.[9]
Although North Korea is a party to the Biological Weapons Convention, it has
pursued BW capabilities since the 1960s and reportedly conducts research on
the biological agents that cause anthrax, plague, smallpox, typhoid, and
hemorrhagic fever. Given the advanced state of North Korean missile programs, it is capable
of delivering intermediate-range warheads filled with chemical or biological
agents.[10]
Sudan
A party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, Sudan has pursued the capability
to produce chemical warfare agents since the 1980s. Sudan has sought foreign
assistance from a number of countries that have CW programs, including Iraq.
During the 1990s, Sudanese officials allegedly produced chemical weapons in
collaboration with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda terrorist network, although
evidence in the public domain for this allegation remains equivocal.[11]
There are no confirmed reports that Sudan is pursuing a biological weapons
program.
Syria
Syria has one of the largest and most advanced chemical warfare capabilities
in the Middle East. With an estimated CW stockpile in the hundreds of tons,
Syria is believed capable of producing and delivering sarin and VX nerve
agent, as well as mustard agent. Major Syrian CW production facilities are
located near Damascus and Homs. Analysis indicates that Syria has chemical
warheads for Scud ballistic missiles and chemical gravity bombs for delivery
by aircraft. Syria’s chemical warfare program remains dependent on foreign
precursor chemicals and equipment, and it has continued to solicit foreign
sources of these materials.[12]
Syria has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Although it is likely that Syria is developing an offensive BW capability,
evidence suggests that it is currently restricted to a research program.[13]
With significant assistance from other proliferant states, however, Syria
could acquire a BW production capacity. Syria has signed but not ratified
the Biological Weapons Convention.
Sub-state Proliferation Concerns
Trends in terrorism over the past two decades indicate a shift from
political to religious motives. Today’s most pernicious terrorists are not
motivated by political ideology on the far left or right, but are more
likely to be extremists on the fringe of traditional religions or
idiosyncratic cults with an apocalyptic mindset. Because religion acts as a
legitimizing force by subordinating individual responsibility to divine
will, groups motivated by religious extremism experience fewer constraints
on the use of violence to inflict indiscriminate casualties. For example, a
millenarian ideology that espouses a belief in the imminence of Armageddon
could serve to justify mass-casualty attacks. Many of this so-called “new
breed” of terrorists have an almost mystical fascination with chemical and
biological agents because of the ability of toxic weapons to instill a
pervasive sense of dread and their similarity to biblical plagues.
Over the past decade, there has been an upsurge of interest by sub-state
groups in acquiring chemical and biological weapons. The best-known example
occurred in March 1995, when the Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo
released sarin nerve agent in the Tokyo subway. Despite an estimated net
worth of roughly $1 billion and the active recruitment of chemists and
biologists from Japanese universities to create a CBW arsenal, Aum was
unable to achieve its deadly goals. Cult scientists tried initially to
produce and deliver biological agents, including anthrax and botulinum
toxin, but because of technical problems they failed to inflict any known
casualties in nine attempted biological attacks. The cult then focused on
acquiring a chemical weapons capability and succeeded in producing several
gallons of sarin, as well as smaller amounts of VX and mustard agent.[14]
Although Aum sought to inflict mass casualties in its March 1995 sarin
attack on the Tokyo subway, the lack of an effective delivery system limited
the impact to 12 deaths and a few hundred serious injuries. This attack fell
far short of the cult’s goal of killing tens of thousands of civilians,
with the aim of triggering widespread anarchy and enabling Aum leader Shoko
Asahara to seize control of the Japanese government.
Another terrorist group, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), has also
demonstrated interest in CBW agents. Seydo Hazar, an ex-PKK member, told the
British newspaper The Observer that he had been ordered to build a
sarin bomb and that, after fleeing Turkey, he had left a cache of explosives
and chemical precursors for sarin at a PKK safe house in Drosia, Greece.[15]
Of course, the most prominent non-state actor believed to be involved with
CBW agents is Osama bin Laden. Numerous reports have claimed that Bin Laden
has attempted to acquire unspecified chemical weapons from entities in Iraq
and Sudan, and biological agents (including botulinum toxin, plague, and
anthrax) from biological suppliers in the Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, and
Indonesia. These claims have not been verified, however.[16]
Dual-Use Equipment and Technologies
Nearly all of the materials and equipment used to make CBW agents are
dual-use, complicating the control, detection, and interdiction of
proliferation-relevant exports.
Chemical Agents
Chemical warfare agents can be produced using 40-year-old technology and
synthetic methods that have been published in the open scientific
literature. Certain World War I-era chemical warfare agents, such as
phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, and sulfur mustard, are relatively easy to
manufacture. There are, for example, at least nine documented synthetic
methods for sulfur mustard[17],
and small quantities could be produced in a crude facility such as a
basement laboratory. Nerve agents require more technical sophistication,
primarily because of the difficult and hazardous cyanation and alkylation
reaction steps.
Although the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Australia Group (an
informal forum of 33 exporting countries) restrict trade in chemical weapons
precursors, determined proliferators have often circumvented these controls
by purchasing controlled chemicals from unscrupulous suppliers and evading
interdiction efforts by means of transshipment points and front companies.
Thus, although export controls are a useful means for slowing proliferation,
they do not constitute a long-term solution to the problem. Moreover, key
chemical weapons precursors can themselves be produced (with substantial
effort) from more basic chemicals, a strategy known as “back
integration.” Many of these more basic substances are commodity chemicals
that are widely used in industry to make pharmaceuticals, pesticides, and
other commercial products. In the early 1980s, for example, Iraq was
initially unable to produce thiodiglycol, a key ingredient in the production
of mustard agent, and ordered more than 1,000 tons of this chemical from
foreign suppliers, including a company in the United States. When the
Australia Group countries agreed to halt exports of thiodiglycol to Iraq,
the Iraqis developed a way to produce this precursor indigenously by
reacting ethylene oxide with hydrogen sulfide.[18]
Moreover, states or terrorists need not attempt to purchase CW precursors if
they seek a limited chemical warfare capability for use against civilians.
Several chemicals not usually classed as battlefield weapons are still
highly toxic, such as organophosphate insecticides. While not as lethal as
sarin or soman, these “second tier” chemical agents have similar
physiological effects to nerve agents and are far more accessible.
Almost all of the equipment used to produce CW agents is dual-use and
available to almost any country, and no “smoking gun” items of equipment
exist. A state seeking to minimize the health and safety risks associated
with CW production would probably seek to acquire corrosion-resistant
reactor vessels and pipes, as well as special ventilation and waste-handling
equipment. Nevertheless, states or groups wishing to conceal a clandestine
CW program from Western intelligence agencies could cut corners on worker
safety or environmental protection in an effort to minimize the telltale
“signatures” of illicit production. Indeed, Iraq sought to conceal the
manufacture of chemical warfare agents in ostensibly civilian facilities
engaged in the production of pesticides.
Biological Agents
The dual-use problem is even more acute with respect to the production of
biological warfare agents, such as anthrax and botulinum toxin. Pathogenic
microbes are widely available, either from the natural environment in areas
where diseases such as anthrax or plague are endemic, or from the hundreds
of culture collections scattered across the globe that provide seed stocks
for biomedical researchers and commercial biotechnology firms.[19]
The various types of nutrient media (“broth”) needed to grow
microorganisms are ubiquitous and widely traded. Because bacteria will
multiply exponentially under optimal culture conditions, a small seed stock
of cultures can yield large amounts of agent over a period of days or weeks.
This situation is further complicated by the fact that some dangerous
pathogens are not only studied by biomedical researchers but have also
become commercial products. For example, pharmaceutical companies currently
produce large quantities of botulinum toxin (trade name Botox) for medical
and cosmetic purposes.
The equipment used to produce biological agents is almost entirely dual-use:
stainless-steel fermenters suitable for growing anthrax are routinely used
to produce legitimate products such as vaccines, vitamins, food supplements,
biopesticides, and fermented beverages. A multitude of companies
manufacturing this equipment has grown up to service the burgeoning
biotechnology industry, complicating attempts to impose restrictive export
controls. Even freeze-drying (lyophilization) and milling machines, which
can be used to convert bacterial or viral agents into a dry powder for
optimal dissemination as a fine-particle aerosol, have become standard
equipment in the pharmaceutical industry.
Military facilities that produce biological weapons are nearly
indistinguishable from civilian vaccine plants, particularly if a
proliferator deliberately eschews measures for environmental protection and
worker safety. Iraq, for example, converted ostensibly commercial facilities
such as vaccine plants or single-cell protein factories for illicit BW agent
production campaigns. Technological advances such as computer-controlled,
continuous-flow fermenters and hollow-fiber bioreactors have greatly reduced
the size of a facility capable of producing large quantities of BW agents.
Moreover, fermentation tanks equipped with “clean-in-place” technology
make it possible to remove the telltale residues of BW agent production in a
matter of hours. As a result, detection of military production has become
substantially more difficult.
Nevertheless, chemical and biological agents do not become effective weapons
unless there is a means to deliver them. Manufacturing specialized CBW
munitions, such as artillery shells and missile warheads, requires a high
degree of technical sophistication, but several more primitive delivery
systems are dual-use. Unmodified agricultural sprayers (such as
crop-dusters) are not well suited for disseminating biological agents, but
these devices could be used to spread chemical agents over a fairly large
area, provided that the perpetrator takes precautions when filling the
sprayer tanks and is aware of meteorological dynamics. Some agents, such as
sarin, do not burn readily and hence could be dispersed with an explosive
charge. Both of these delivery methods would be within reach of most states
and certain sub-state terrorist groups.
Accessibility to Dual-Use Technologies
Attempts to regulate exports of dual-use technologies to countries of
proliferation concern have faced resistance not only from non-aligned states
that claim that such trade restrictions are discriminatory, but also from
international suppliers, companies, and research institutes that benefit
from the commercial sale and transfer of these technologies.
Another problem is that chemical and biotechnology companies are no longer
confined to the highly industrialized countries of the West. In a number of
developing countries, the availability of turnkey production facilities, an
increasingly skilled work force, and low labor and regulatory costs have
encouraged governments to promote these industries as a driver of economic
growth. This trend has resulted in international trade in a wide variety of
chemicals amounting to millions of tons per year, as well as a growing
interest in indigenous production of generic pharmaceuticals and vaccines.
Although the manufacturing processes utilized in developing countries may be
a generation or two behind those in the United States and Europe, they are
still more than adequate to produce chemical and biological warfare agents.
The burgeoning global commerce in the chemical and biotechnology sectors has
also spurred technological advances, some of which could facilitate the
production of chemical or biological weapons by state or non-state actors.
One example is the advent of microreactors that can process large volumes of
chemicals, yet are small enough to be disguised as laboratory equipment.[20]
The expanding global commerce in dual-use technologies will continue to make
it easier for state and sub-state actors to acquire chemical and biological
weapons. A number of cases illustrate this ominous trend:
Iran has relied heavily on foreign assistance to establish its
nonconventional weapons programs. Over the past few years, the Iranian
government has attempted to acquire CW precursor chemicals, production
technology, and scientific expertise from Russian and Chinese suppliers.
Iran has also attempted to acquire dual-use biological materials from
foreign suppliers, ostensibly for civilian purposes.[21]
Iraq received extensive foreign assistance to establish its offensive BW
program. Between 1985 and 1989, U.S. suppliers exported to Iraq cultures of Bacillus
anthracis (anthrax), Clostridium
botulinum (botulism),
Histoplasma capsulatam, Brucella melitensis
(brucellosis), Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene), Clostridium tetani (tetanus), and other dangerous pathogens.[22]
In the 1980s, Iraq’s State Establishment for Pesticide Production ordered
and received incubators and culture media from West Germany.[23]
Many of the dual-use materials that Iraq ordered from foreign sources, under
civilian cover, ended up in biological weapons research.
Agents of the Aum Shinrikyo cult purchased Clostridium
botulinum from a pharmaceutical company[24],
16 industrial-grade filters from an Osaka pharmaceutical company, and
chemical precursors and technologies from other commercial suppliers.[25]
State-Sponsors of Terrorism
Further compounding the threat to U.S. interests from the continued
proliferation of chemical and biological weapons is the possibility that
rogue regimes could supply CBW materials, equipment, know-how, or even
finished weapons to terrorist organizations. As the number of states with
CBW capabilities rises, the risk of direct or indirect transfer to
terrorists will increase.
Of all state-sponsors of terrorism, Iran is considered the most energetic.[26]
Despite Tehran’s official condemnation of the September 11 attacks, it is
still considered a sponsor of Hamas, Hizbollah, and Islamic Jihad, and may
have provided these groups with CBW training and materials before any recent
change of heart. The rise of the (relatively) moderate Mohammad Khatami in
recent years has done nothing to halt this behavior. Conservatives still
control the Iranian military and intelligence services, and it is estimated
that Iran provides more than $100 million in aid to terrorist organizations
each year.[27]
Such efforts are directed mainly by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC),
controlled by hard-line ayatollahs who are also responsible for Iran’s
weapons of mass destruction programs.
Before Iran became a vigorous supporter of such groups, Libya was
considered the overlord of international terrorism. As recently as 1996,
Libya provided support and possibly training bases for the Abu Nidal
Organization, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine—General Command. Recently, however, Libyan leader
Muammar Qaddafi has appeared to moderate his behavior. In addition to
extraditing the Pan Am 103 bombers for trial, Qaddafi has reportedly cut
ties with some radical groups such as Hamas.[28]
Nevertheless, the State Department maintains that Libya maintains contact
with other terrorist groups, including Islamic Jihad.[29]
U.S. government officials are also concerned about Libya because of its
known chemical warfare capability and its close relationship with Iraq.[30]
Finally, Iraq’s substantial experience with chemical and biological
weapons is well-known. As a state-sponsor of terrorism, Iraq has supported
the Abu Nidal Organization and the Palestine Liberation Front, although not
as generously as Iran. Saddam Hussein’s defiant and often erratic
behavior, his enduring hatred of the United States and Britain, and his
history of attempting to enhance his stature as a regional hegemon, suggest
that the transfer of Iraqi CBW materials or know-how to terrorists cannot be
ruled out.
Conclusions
In recent years, the growing availability of dual-use
technologies, materials, information, and expertise associated with the
production and delivery of chemical and biological weapons has exacerbated
the CBW proliferation problem. Indeed, the relative ease of acquiring these
weapons has increased their attractiveness to proliferant states that cannot
afford to acquire advanced conventional or nuclear weapons or lack the
necessary technical capabilities. Moreover, history has shown that both
state suppliers and unscrupulous companies are willing to sell sensitive
technologies and materials to customers willing to pay. The legacy of the
Soviet chemical and biological weapons programs, and the proliferation of
these weapons to other countries, has also increased the risk that sub-state
groups could acquire relevant technologies by stealing them from unguarded
facilities or by recruiting unemployed former Soviet weapons scientists.
Given the dual-use dilemma and the rapid diffusion of legitimate
chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnology industries around the globe,
strengthened CBW export controls can buy time, but they do not offer a
long-term solution to the proliferation problem. Accordingly, export
controls must be seen as one of a set of policy tools for addressing the CBW
proliferation threat, together with active interdiction efforts, passive and
active defenses, strengthened consequence management capabilities,
nonproliferation efforts in the former Soviet Union, and multilateral arms
control.
Although the Bush administration has taken a skeptical attitude toward arms
control, a strengthened international legal regime banning the possession
and use of chemical and biological agents, backed up by a credible threat of
severe economic sanctions and military action against violators, offers an
important tool for reversing the spread of these heinous weapons. Although
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC) impose blanket prohibitions on such weapons, both regimes have serious
weaknesses that currently undermine their effectiveness. Given the dangerous
precedent that has now been set by the actual use of anthrax against
civilian targets in the United States, it is vital for the international
community to strengthen both treaties to promote the international norm of
non-use and possession by states of concern and, by extrapolation, sub-state
actors as well.
For example, the United States has repeatedly accused Iran, a party to the
CWC, of systematically violating its treaty obligations. A Central
Intelligence Agency report to Congress in August 2000 stated that “Iran, a
. . . CWC party, already has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons,
including blister, blood and choking agents and the bombs and artillery
shells for delivering them. During the second half of 1999, Tehran . . . acquired or attempted to acquire indirectly through
intermediaries in other countries equipment and material that could be used
to create a more advanced and self-sufficient CW infrastructure.”[31]
Despite such allegations, however, Washington has failed to request a
challenge inspection of Iran as permitted under the CWC, undermining the
credibility of the treaty’s verification regime.
With respect to the BWC, the Bush administration decided in July 2001 to
withdraw from a six-year effort to negotiate a legally binding compliance
regime. Although the administration has proposed as an alternative a package
of voluntary proposals, these measures appear insufficiently intrusive or
effective to deter violations or to enhance compliance with the treaty.[32]
The Administration should work with our European allies to strengthen some
of the proposals by making them legally binding.
Finally, in response to the anthrax attacks, the United States should devote
greater political and financial capital to strengthening the CWC and the BWC,
make more effective use of existing treaty instruments (e.g., by requesting
a CWC challenge inspection of Iran and other suspected violators), and seek
to brand the possession and use of chemical and biological weapons as a
“crime against humanity” under international law.
[1]
I am grateful to Cheryl Loeb and Gary Ackerman of the Monterey Institute
for their invaluable assistance in preparing this testimony.
[2]
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “Unclassified Report to Congress on
the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000,”
September 7, 2001 <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_sep_2001.htm>;
Javed Ali, “Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War: A Case Study in
Noncompliance,” Nonproliferation Review 8(1), Spring 2001, p.
43-58; Kelly Motz, “What Has Iraq Been Doing Since Inspectors Left?
What Is On Its Shopping List?” Iraq Watch, http://www.iraqwatch.org/updates/update.asp?id=wpn200107231601;
United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), “Report:
Disarmament,” January 25, 1999, http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/ucreport/index.htm;
Steve Bowman, “Iraqi Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW)
Capabilities” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service,
February 17, 1998), pp. 1-5; U.S. Government White Paper, “Iraq
Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs,” February 13, 1998, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/iraq_white_paper.html;
Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East:
Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery
Options, and Weapons Effects, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, June 2001, <http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/me_wmd_mideast.pdf>,
pp. 75-79; United Nations
Special Commission (UNSCOM), “UNSCOM Main Achievements,” May 1998,
<http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/achievement.htm>;
Physicians for Human Rights, Winds of Death: Iraq's Use of Poison Gas
Against its Kurdish Population (Boston, MA: Physicians for Human
Rights, February 1989), pp. 1-2.
[3]
United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), “Report:
Disarmament,” January 25, 1999, http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/ucreport/index.htm;
Motz, “What Has Iraq Been Doing Since Inspectors Left?”; Bowman,
“Iraqi Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Capabilities; Barbara
Starr, “UNSCOM Inspectors Still Doubt Iraq's Arms Claims,” Jane's
Defence Weekly, February 25, 1998, p. 18; U.S. Government White
Paper 1998; Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East,
2001, pp. 81-84; Jonathan B. Tucker, “Lessons of Iraq's Biological
Weapons Programme,” Arms Control/Contemporary Security Policy,
14(3), December 1993, pp. 229-271.
[4]
E.J. Hogendoorn, “A Chemical Weapons Atlas,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, September 10, 1997, p. 37; Gregory F. Giles,
“The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Weapons,” in Planning the Unthinkable, Peter Lavoy, Scott Sagan,
and James Wirtz, eds., (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp.
79-103; W. Seth Carus, “Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Implications and Responses,” Middle East Review of International
Affairs, 1998, 2(1), pp. 1-14; Henry L. Stimson Center, “CWC
Status: States of Chemical Weapons Proliferation Concern,” May 27,
1998 <http://www.stimson.org/cwc/status.htm>;
Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Iran: Objectives, Strategies and
Resources,” Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington,
DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1997) < http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf>,
pp. 3-4; Michael Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and
Intentions (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, 1996), pp. 9-25; Anthony H. Cordesman, “Weapons of Mass
Destruction in the Middle East: National Efforts, War Fighting
Capabilities, Weapons Lethality, Terrorism, and Arms Control
Implications,” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International
Studies, February 1998), pp. 22-24; Centre for Defence and International
Security Studies (CDISS), “Devil's Brew Briefings: Iran,” <http://www.cdiss.org/cbwnb1.htm>.
[5]
Cordesman, “Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East,”
February 1998, p. 24; Centre for Defence and International Security
Studies (CDISS), “Devil's Brew Briefings: Iran,” p. 24; Office of
the Secretary of Defense, “Iran: Objectives, Strategies and
Resources,” p. 5; U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence
to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, August 1996), p. 68.
[6]
Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Proliferation: Threat and
Response,” January 2001, p. 47.
[7]
Robert M. Gates quoted in William Tuohy, “U.S. Pressing Allies on
Libya Chemical Plant,” Los Angeles Times, January 3, 1989, p.
10.
[8]
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and
Response, pp. 47.
[9]
Ibid., p. 9.
[10]
Ibid.
[11]
Michael Barletta, “Chemical Weapons in the Sudan: Allegations and
Evidence,” The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1998,< http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/barlet61.htm>,
pp. 115-36.
[12]
Michael Eisenstadt, “Syria’s Strategic Weapons,” Jane's
Intelligence Review, May 1993, p. 170. Office of the Secretary of
Defense, “Syria:
Objectives, Strategies and Resources,” Proliferation: Threat and
Response, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1997), pp.
18-19. Cordesman,
“Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East,” 2/98, p. 21.
“Devil's Brews Briefings: Syria,” Centre for Defence and
International Security Studies (CDISS), 1996 <http://www.cdiss.org/cbwnb5.htm>.
Ahmed S. Hashim, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Deterrence Case
Study 1: Syria (Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Arms Control
Institute, 1998), p. 5. Uzi Mahnaimi, “Syria Builds Nerve Gas
Arsenal,” London Sunday Times, November 17, 1996 <http://personal.the-times.co.uk:80>.
Paul Beaver, “Syria To Make Chemical Bomblets For Scud Cs,” Jane's
Defence Weekly, September 3, 1997, p. 3.
[13]
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and
Response, January 2001.
[14]
David E. Kaplan, “Aum Shinrikyo (1995),” Toxic Terror: Assessing
Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons,” Jonathan B.
Tucker, ed, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), p. 221.
[15]
Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Excerpts
from News Reports, Commentaries and Statements on PKK Terrorism,”
09/28/97, < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/eh/eh04/01.htm>;
Nils Lathem, “Osama Bought a Batch for 10G,” NYPost.com <http://www.nypost.com/news/worldnews/32458.htm>.
[16]
Simon Reeve, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden
(Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1999).
[17]
Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of
Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115, December 1993, pp. 21-22.
[18]
Ibid., p. 23.
[19]
U.S. culture supply houses are now under stricter federal controls, but
comparable controls do not apply to culture collections overseas. See
Jonathan B. Tucker, “How to Regulate the Trade in Toxins” [op-ed], New
York Times, October 26, 2001, p. A23.
[20]
Scientists at DuPont and MIT have used microreactors to produce hydrogen
cyanide and phosgene, two chemical warfare agents. See Nicolas P. Chopey
with G. Ondrey and G. Parkinson, “Microreactors Find New Niche,” Chemical
Engineering, March 1997, pp. 30-33.
[21]
Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Proliferation: Threat and
Response,” January 2001 <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf>.
[22]
William Blum, “Anthrax for Export: U.S. Companies Sold Iraq the
Ingredients for a Witch’s Brew,” The Progressive 4, April
1998, p. 18.
[23]
Der Spiegel ,
FBIS-WEU-90-196, “We Have Surprises,” October 8, 1990, pp. 148-152.
[24]
Robert Guest, “Cult Germ Was Claim as Police Find Bacteria,” Daily
Telegraph, March 29, 1995, p. 13.
[25]
Mainichi Daily News, “Bacteria Used in Germ Warfare Found at Cult
Site,” March 29, 1995, p. 1; Kyodo, “Aum Bought Experimental Cells
Before Subway Gas Attack,” May 18, 1995.
[26]
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism.
“Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism,” Patterns of Global
Terrorism 2000, April 2001,<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/>.
[27]
Boaz Ganor, “Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism”, <http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=5#Conflicts>,
p. 4.
[28]
Ray Takeyh, “The Rogue Who Came in From the Cold,” Foreign
Affairs, May-June 2001.
[29]
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism.
“Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism.”
[30]
In the late 1980s, evidence surfaced that Libya had built two large
chemical weapons facilities, including a secret underground plant at
Tarhunah. The CIA also fears Libya may have engaged in joint BW
development activities with Iraq.
[31]
Central Intelligence Agency, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the
Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 1999,”
available on-line at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications.bian/bian_aug2000.htm.
[32]
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the
President: Strengthening the International Regime Against Biological
Weapons,” November 1, 2001.