Statement Of Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, And Democratic Manager Of The Senate Debate On The Anti-Terrorism Bill Thurs., Oct. 25, 2001 Today we consider H.R. 3162, the second House-passed version of the "Uniting and Strengthening of America Act" or "USA Act of 2001." Senate passage of this measure without amendment will amount to final passage of this important legislation, and the bill will be sent to the President for his signature. We complete our work six weeks after the September 11 attacks and months ahead of final action following the destruction of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995. The American people and the Members of this body deserve fast work and final action. THE PROCESS On October 4, I was pleased to introduce with the Majority Leader, Senator Daschle, and the Chairmen of the Banking and Intelligence Committees, as well as the Republican Leader, Senator Lott, and Senator Hatch and Senator Shelby, the United and Strengthening America, or USA Act. This was not the bill that I, or any of the sponsors, would have written if compromise was unnecessary. Nor was it the bill the Administration had initially proposed and the Attorney General delivered to us on September 19, at a meeting in the Capitol. We were able to refine and supplement the Administration’s original proposal in a number of ways in the original USA Act, and have continued that process in the development of this final bill, which reconciles differences between the bills initially passed by the Senate and the House. Let me outline just ten ways in which we in the bicameral, bipartisan negotiations were able to supplement and improve this legislation from the original proposal we received from the Administration: (1) We improved security on the Northern Border; (2) We added money laundering; (3) We added programs to enhance information sharing and coordination with State and local law enforcement agencies, grants to State and local governments to respond to bioterrorism, and to increase payments to families of fallen firefighters, police officers and other public safety workers; (4) We added humanitarian relief to immigrant victims of the September 11 terrorist attacks; (5) We added help to the FBI to hire translators; (6) We added more comprehensive assistance to victims; (7) We added measures to fight cybercrime; (8) We added a measure to fight terrorism against mass transportation systems; (9) We added important measures to use technology to make our borders more secure; (10) Finally, and most importantly, we were able to include additional important checks on the proposed expansion of government powers contained in the Attorney General’s initial proposal. In negotiations with the Administration, I did my best to strike a reasonable balance between the need to address the threat of terrorism, which we all keenly feel today, and the need to protect our constitutional freedoms. Despite my misgivings, I acquiesced in some of the Administration’s proposals to move the legislative process forward. We have been able to further improve the bill during discussions over the last two weeks. While some have complained publicly that the negotiations have gone on for too long, the issues involved are of great importance, and we will have to live with the laws we enact for a long time to come. Demands for rushed action are irresponsible when the roadmap is pointed in the wrong direction. As Ben Franklin once observed, "If we surrender our liberty in the name of security, we shall have neither." Let me be clear: No one can guarantee that Americans will be free from the threat of future terrorist attacks, and to suggest that this legislation – or any legislation – would or could provide such a guarantee would be a false promise of security to the public. I will not engage in such false promises, and those who make such assertions do a disservice to the American people. The Senate passed the original version of the USA Act, S. 1510, by a vote of 96-1 on October 11. The House passed a similar bill, based largely on the USA Act, the following day. The Majority Leader and I both strongly believed that a conference would have been the better and faster way to reconcile the differences between the bills and to allow consideration of the proposals that had been included in the putative managers’ amendment to S. 1510, which the Republicans did not approve in time for consideration and passage with the Senate bill. In an apparent effort by the Administration and House Republican leadership to try to pressure the Senate to accept that version of the bill, without strong money laundering or biological weapons provisions and with a 5-year sunset, the House failed to take the procedural steps necessary to convene a conference. Had a conference been requested and begun, a final bill would have been passed last week. Instead, without a structure or process, discussions were less concentrated and it was only after a leadership meeting late last week that the major outline of the measure was agreed upon. During the negotiations over the past two weeks, the Administration sought to eliminate the sunset altogether, but that effort failed. The House insisted that the Senate’s amendments to the so-called "McDade law" be dropped, and the Administration acquiesced. Eventually, the House accepted the Senate’s position on the need to include both money laundering and biological weapons provisions. Even then, the House Republican leadership reneged on the agreement to proceed by way of a traditional House-Senate conference. Instead, they opted to proceed by a new bill passed by the House yesterday in short order and sent to the Senate as an amendable measure. That brings us to today. The bill passed by the House yesterday was based upon informal agreements reached by Senate and House negotiators, but did not include additional important provisions to make the Justice Department more efficient and effective in its anti-terrorism efforts and to reduce domestic demand for illegal drugs, some of which are produced and supplied from Taliban-controlled regions of Afghanistan. I am disappointed that the commitment we received to hold a conference -- at which these proposals could have been considered more fully -- was not honored. Nonetheless, H.R. 3162, which the House passed yesterday, contains additional improvements to the USA Act that had been negotiated on a bicameral, bipartisan basis, and deserves the support of the Senate. I do believe that some of the provisions contained both in this bill and the original USA Act will face difficult tests in the courts, and that we in Congress may have to revisit these issues at some time in the future when the present crisis has passed, the sunset has expired, or the courts find infirmities in these provisions. I also intend as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee to exercise careful oversight of how the Department of Justice, the FBI and other Executive Branch agencies are using the newly expanded powers that this bill will give them. I know that other members of the Judiciary Committee – including Senator Specter, Senator Grassley, and Senator Durbin – appreciate the importance of such oversight. Let me talk for a few moments about the need for congressional oversight. This bill has raised serious and legitimate concerns about the expansion of authorities for government surveillance and intelligence gathering within this country. Indeed, this bill will change surveillance and intelligence procedures for all types of criminal and foreign intelligence investigations, not just for terrorism cases. Significantly, the sunset provision included in the final bill calls for vigilant legislative oversight, so that the Congress will know how these legal authorities are used and whether they are abused over the next four years. Congressional oversight is especially necessary to monitor the implementation of these new authorities. I agree with Leader Armey that the sunset will help ensure that law enforcement is responsive to congressional oversight and inquiries on use of these new authorities and that a full record is developed on their efficacy and necessity. The Senate Judiciary Committee has the challenging duty to establish and maintain an oversight regime that allows the Congress to know how these powers are exercised. This bill will authorize the expanded sharing with intelligence agencies of information collected as part of a criminal investigation, and the expanded use of foreign intelligence surveillance tools and information in criminal investigations. Where foreign-sponsored terrorism is the target of an investigation, criminal and foreign intelligence jurisdictions clearly overlap and agencies must coordinate their efforts accordingly. This bill enters new and uncharted territory by breaking down traditional barriers between law enforcement and foreign intelligence. This is not done just to combat international terrorism, but for any criminal investigation that overlaps a broad definition of "foreign intelligence." Yet, before final passage of this bill, the Senate should recall our nation’s unfortunate experience with domestic surveillance and intelligence abuses that came to light in the mid-1970s. Until Watergate and the Vietnam war, Congress allowed the Executive branch virtually a free hand in using the FBI, the CIA, and other intelligence agencies to conduct domestic surveillance in the name of national security. It was the Cold War, Members of Congress were reluctant to take on FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, and oversight was non-existent. One of the few safeguards enacted into law drew a sharp line between foreign intelligence and law enforcement. The National Security Act of 1947, which established the Central Intelligence Agency, said – and still says today – that the CIA "shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions." The provisions on the disclosure of "foreign intelligence" from Federal criminal investigations make fundamental changes in the rules for the handling of highly sensitive personal, political and business information acquired for law enforcement purposes. Such information may now be disclosed to intelligence, defense, and national security agencies. The law is changed not only to permit the wider sharing of information from grand juries, domestic law enforcement wiretaps, and criminal investigations generally (in section 203), but also to require Federal law enforcement agencies to share this information with intelligence agencies through the Director of Central Intelligence, unless the Attorney General makes exceptions (in section 905). There would be far less controversy if these provisions were limited to information about domestic or international terrorism or espionage. Instead, they potentially authorize the disclosure throughout intelligence, military, and national security organizations of a far broader range of information about United States persons, including citizens, permanent resident aliens, domestic political groups, and companies incorporated in the United States. The information may be shared if it fits the broad definitions of "foreign intelligence" and "foreign intelligence information." The term "foreign intelligence" is defined to mean "information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities." The term "foreign intelligence information" is defined to include information about a United States person that concerns a foreign power or foreign territory and "that relates to the national defense or the security of the United States" or "the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States." Therefore, potentially, whenever a criminal investigation acquires information about an American citizen’s relationship with a foreign country or its government, that information is eligible to be disseminated widely as "foreign intelligence information" – even if the information is about entirely lawful activities, business transactions, political relationships, or personal opinions. Criminal investigations acquire voluminous information about persons who are not involved in illegal activity. Many individuals are investigated and later cleared. Many cases are investigated and never prosecuted. Many witnesses are interviewed whose testimony never surfaces at trial. Immunity is granted to compel testimony before grand juries about people who are never indicted. Wiretaps and microphone "bugs" and computer communications intercepts pick up extensive information about activities and opinions and personal lives that have no relevance to the criminal activity that they are authorized to detect or monitor. Where regulatory or tax laws carry criminal penalties, investigators probe the confidential financial details of business transactions and records. Federal criminal investigators have enormous discretion, with little statutory or constitutional guidance for how they interview people, conduct physical surveillance, recruit informants in organizations, and request access to records they consider "relevant" to an investigation. All that information would be eligible to be disseminated widely within the government, beyond the purposes of the criminal investigation, if it meets the definition of "foreign intelligence" or "foreign intelligence information." The risks of misusing this information were documented 25 years ago, when the Congress made public the record of Cold War abuses of investigative powers by Federal agencies acting in the name of national security. The Senate created a Select Committee to Study Governmental Affairs with Respect to Intelligence Communities, chaired by Senator Frank Church, to conduct a year-long investigation with extensive public hearings and detailed reports on the investigations of lawful political dissent and protest. The Church Committee found that the FBI’s internal security and domestic intelligence programs compiled massive files on activities protected by the First Amendment and the political opinions of Americans. During the height of antiwar protest and urban unrest in the late 1960's, Army intelligence joined the FBI in monitoring domestic political activity. National intelligence agencies such as CIA and NSA received extensive reporting from the FBI and the military, as well as from their own intelligence gathering on critics of government policy. Other law enforcement agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service were used to selectively investigate organizations based on their political views. Under presidents of both parties, these agencies disseminated information to the White House about the lawful political activities and opinions of critics of Administration policy -- all under the rubric of protecting the national security. The scope of intelligence gathering swept up environmental groups, women’s liberation activists, and virtually any organization that mounted peaceful protest demonstrations. During this unfortunate period in our history, the government did more than just gather information about protest and dissent. The FBI developed a systematic program to disrupt domestic groups and discredit their leaders, known as "COINTELPRO." The FBI’s efforts included the selective sharing of information from its investigations to deny people employment and smear their reputations. Beginning with Communist and socialist groups, the FBI’s COINTELPRO operations spread in the 1960s to the Klan, the "new left," and black militants. Elements of the civil rights and antiwar movements were targeted for disruption because of suspicion that they were "influenced" by communists; others because of their strident rhetoric. When some targets were suspected of engaging in violence, the FBI’s tactics went so far as to place lives in jeopardy by passing false allegations that individuals were government informants. The most notorious case was J. Edgar Hoover’s vendetta against Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. The Church Committee documented the FBI’s effort to discredit Dr. King by disclosing confidential information that was obtained from wiretaps and microphones targeted against him. The wiretaps were justified to the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations on the grounds that some of Dr. King’s advisors were Communists, but this excuse allowed the FBI to mount continuous political surveillance to undermine Dr. King’s effectiveness. The FBI disseminated allegedly derogatory information not only within the government, but to media and other private organizations including efforts to deny Dr. King the Nobel Peace Prize. Most vicious of all was the FBI’s preparation of a composite tape recording that was sent to him anonymously with an apparent invitation to commit suicide. During the 1964 Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City where the greatest controversy involved seating the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party delegates, the FBI provided the Johnson White House a continuous flow of political intelligence from the wiretaps on Dr. King’s telephones in Atlantic City. These methods of domestic political surveillance and covert manipulation and disruption have no place in a free society. They are lawful for the CIA to use against terrorists abroad, under Presidential authorization and oversight by the Intelligence Committees. In the United States, however, such surveillance activities by our government offends our fundamental First Amendment rights of speech and association, and undermines our democratic values. Since the Church Committee investigation, one of the main reasons for maintaining barriers between domestic criminal investigations and foreign intelligence operations has been a concern that the no-hold-barred methods used abroad must not be brought back into this country. The Church Committee recommended a series of safeguards, including charter legislation to set standards and procedures for FBI domestic security and counterintelligence investigations and to restrict the collection of information about Americans by the CIA, the National Security Agency, and other U.S. intelligence agencies. Although charter legislation was not enacted, the Attorney General issued guidelines for FBI investigations and Presidents issued Executive Orders requiring procedures approved by the Attorney General for the collection and retention of information about Americans by U.S. intelligence agencies. These guidelines and procedures have served for the past 25 years as a stable framework that, with rare exceptions, has not allowed previous abuses to recur. The most significant legislative result of the Church Committee investigation was the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 which required court orders for national security electronic surveillance in the United States. No longer did the Executive branch have exclusive control over the vast powers of U.S. intelligence to conduct wiretapping, bugging, and other communications monitoring in this country. Surveillance was limited to foreign powers and agents of foreign powers, and the statutory probable cause standard for targeting an American as an "agent of a foreign power" required a showing of clandestine intelligence activities, sabotage, or international terrorist activities on behalf of a foreign power. Americans could not be targeted solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment. Surveillance of Americans under FISA was limited to counterintelligence purposes to defend the nation against foreign spying and terrorism. Americans could not be considered "agents of a foreign power" on the basis of their lawful business or political relationships with foreign governments or organizations. The Congress has been cautious in the decades following the revelations of the Church Committee about allowing use of criminal justice information for other purposes and, specifically, on sharing such information with intelligence agencies. In 1979 Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti testified before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights that the guidelines for "any dissemination outside the Bureau...will have to be very, very specific. We will have to be very certain the dissemination is lawful, meets the same standards of certainty, of intent, which is the basic reason for the collection of the information and the investigation...." On the issue of FBI sharing with the CIA, Attorney General Civiletti said "you have to be extremely careful in working out, pursuant to the law, the information which is being exchanged, what its purpose is, how it was obtained and collected, so that you are not inadvertently, out of a sense of cooperation or efficiency, perverting or corrupting the fact that the CIA’s main duty is foreign intelligence, and they have no charter, no responsibility, and not duty performance, no mission to investigate criminal acts in the United States." The bill we are passing today makes potentially sweeping changes in the relationships between the law enforcement and intelligence agencies. In the current crisis, there is justification for expanding authority specifically for counterintelligence to detect and prevent international terrorism. I support the FBI request for broader authority under FISA for pen registers and access to records without having to meet the statutory "agent of a foreign power" standard, because the Fourth Amendment does not normally apply to such techniques and the FBI has comparable authority in its criminal investigations. However, I have insisted that this authority to investigate U.S. persons be limited to counterintelligence investigations conducted to protect against international terrorism and spying activities and that such investigations may not be based solely on activities protected by the First Amendment. None of the changes in FISA would authorize investigations of Americans for the broader, more ambiguous purpose of collecting "foreign intelligence" generally. In that respect, the bill adheres to the basic principles recommended by the Church Committee. The gravest departure from that framework, and the one with most potential for abuses, is the new and unprecedented statutory authority for sharing of "foreign intelligence" from criminal investigations with "any other Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official." The Church Committee warned of the political abuse of the dissemination of intelligence from domestic investigations. Intelligence was disseminated to the White House to track the contacts of members of Congress with particular foreign embassies. Information was volunteered to the White House about Administration critics and other political figures. The Church Committee found "excessive dissemination of large amounts of relatively useless or totally irrelevant information" to the White House that was not evaluated and "thus exaggerated the dangers." The Church Committee recommended permitting FBI dissemination of personally identifiable information about Americans to intelligence, military and other national security agencies in two areas – "preventive criminal investigations of terrorist activities" and "preventive intelligence investigations of hostile foreign intelligence activities." This has been substantially the practice under the Attorney General’s guidelines and Executive order procedures since then. The new authority to disseminate "foreign intelligence" from criminal investigations, including grand juries and law enforcement wiretaps, is an invitation to abuse without special safeguards. Fortunately, the final bill includes a provision, which was not in the Administration’s original proposal, to maintain some degree of judicial oversight of the dissemination of grand jury information. Within a "reasonable time" after the disclosure of grand jury information, a government attorney "shall file under seal a notice with the court stating the fact that such information was disclosed and the departments, agencies, or entities to which the disclosure was made." No such judicial role is provided for the disclosure of information from wiretaps and other criminal investigative techniques including the infiltration of organizations with informants. However, that authority to disclose without judicial review is subject to the sunset in four years. Other safeguards can, if used properly, minimize the unnecessary disclosure of "foreign intelligence" that identifies an American. When the information comes from grand juries or wiretaps, the Attorney General is required under the bill to establish procedures for the disclosure of information that identifies a United States person. The Senate Judiciary Committee will want to take a very close look at these procedures. Although not required under the bill, such procedures would also be desirable for disclosure of information from criminal investigations generally, as permitted under section 203(d). In section 905, where the bill requires disclosure to intelligence agencies from criminal investigations, the Attorney General is authorized to make exceptions and must issue implementing procedures. Again, these procedures will be closely examined by the Senate Judiciary Committee. These procedures will be critical in determining the scope and impact of these provisions. Will they focus the sharing of information on international terrorism, which is the immediate and compelling need before us, or will they sweep more broadly? Will they permit automatic dissemination to intelligence agencies of any information about foreign governments, foreign organizations, or foreign persons that is obtained in FBI investigations of international organized crime and white collar crime? What are the specific circumstances under which confidential information collected by particular agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service or the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, will be disseminated to the U.S. Military or other agencies? What will be the guidelines for including information that identifies United States persons? How will need-to-know decisions be made on the handling of this information, and how will access be controlled? What will be done to ensure compliance with the 1947 ban on CIA having "police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions?" These and many other questions must be the subject of the Judiciary Committee’s oversight of the implementation of the surveillance and intelligence provisions of this bill. Our government is entering uncharted territory. Much of the government’s experience from the Cold War era before the mid-1970s warns us of the risks of abuse. Reasonable measures that we are taking to protect against international terrorism may have far-reaching ramifications beyond the immediate crisis. There has never been a greater need for Congressional vigilance to ensure against unnecessary and improper use of the wide discretion being granted by a new law. I intend to ask the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence to advise the Judiciary Committee of their implementation plans and practices every step of the way. The final bill includes a long overdue remedy for unauthorized disclosure of information obtained from electronic surveillance under FISA and under criminal procedures. If the government monitors the conversations of a person under the electronic surveillance procedures of title 18 or FISA and that information is disclosed without proper authority, the aggrieved person may recover money damages from the Federal Government. Such improper disclosure is what happened in the past when the FBI passed information from the electronic surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King to selected private individuals and organizations in an effort to discredit Dr. King. The government itself would be liable, in addition to individual employees, if something like this ever happens again. This provision is especially valuable in this bill, because of the expanded sharing of information from electronic surveillance in criminal cases to agencies with intelligence, military, and other national security responsibilities. When this kind of sensitive information is disseminated more widely, the risk increases that it will be leaked. As a deterrent against malicious leaks, this provision wisely includes procedures for administrative discipline as well as the civil remedy against the Government. When a court or the appropriate agency determines that there is serious question about whether or not an employee willfully disclosed information without proper authority, disciplinary proceedings must be initiated. If the agency head decides that discipline is not warranted, he or she must notify the Inspector General with jurisdiction over the agency and provide the reasons for the decision not to impose discipline. Representative Barny Frank deserves credit for developing this proposal, and the Department of Justice has worked with Representative Frank to ensure that the procedures for civil discovery take into account the needs for protecting related criminal investigations or prosecutions and classified operations under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. When Congress authorized electronic surveillance in 1968 under title 18 and in 1978 under FISA, the legislation imposed civil and criminal sanctions for violations by individuals. This bill takes the law two steps forward by adding government liability and administrative discipline against government employees. Along with the sunset provision, judicial oversight of the sharing of grand jury information, and other improvements, the Frank amendment reflects the valuable contribution of the House of Representatives towards making this a balanced bill. VICTIMS The heart of every American aches for those who died or have been injured because of the tragic terrorist attacks in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania on September 11. Even now, we cannot assess the full measure of this attack in terms of human lives, but we know that the number of casualties is extraordinarily high. Congress acted swiftly to help the victims of September 11. Within 10 days, we passed legislation to establish a Victims Compensations Program, which will provide fair compensation to those most affected by this national tragedy. I am proud of our work on that legislation, which will expedite payments to thousands of Americans whose lives were so suddenly shattered. But now more than ever, we should remember the tens of thousands of Americans whose needs are not being met – the victims of crimes that have not made the national headlines. Just one day before the events that have so transformed our nation, I came before this body to express my concern that we were not doing more for crime victims. I noted that the pace of victims legislation had slowed, and that many opportunities for progress had been squandered. I suggested that this year, we had a golden opportunity to make significant progress in this area by passing S.783, the Leahy-Kennedy Crime Victims Assistance Act of 2001. I am pleased, therefore, that the antiterrorism package now before the Senate contains substantial portions of S.783 aimed at refining the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (VOCA), and improving the manner in which the Crime Victims Fund is managed and preserved. Most significantly, section 621 of the USA Act will eliminate the cap on VOCA spending, which has prevented more than $700 million in Fund deposits from reaching victims and supporting essential services. These and other VOCA reforms in the USA Act are long overdue. Yet, I regret that we are not doing more. In my view, we should pass the Crime Victims Assistance Act in its entirety. In addition to the provisions that are included in today’s bill, this legislation provides for comprehensive reform of Federal law to establish enhanced rights and protections for victims of Federal crime. It also proposes several programs to help States provide better assistance for victims of State crimes. I also regret that we have not done more for other victims of recent terrorist attacks. While all Americans are numbed by the heinous acts of September 11, we should not forget the victims of the 1998 embassy bombings in East Africa. Eleven Americans and many Kenyan and Tanzanian nationals employed by the United States lost their lives in that tragic incident. It is my understanding that compensation to the families of these victims has in many instances fallen short. It is my hope that OVC will use a portion of the newly replenished reserve fund to remedy any inequity in the way that these individuals have been treated. CONCLUSION As we began discussions with the Administration about this bill, there were sound and legitimate concerns on both sides of the Capitol and on both sides of the aisle about its implications for Americans’ rights and freedoms. There also was sincere and committed belief that we need to find a way to give law enforcement authorities new tools in fighting terrorism. We began this process not intending to see how much we could take out of the Administration’s proposal, but with the determination to find sensible, workable ways to do the same things, but with checks and balances against abuse. And that is what we did. In provision after provision, we added safeguards that were missing from the Administration’s plan. In the process we greatly improved this bill, adding checks and balances, provision by provision; structuring these tools in more effective ways; adding practical steps in the Senate such as a tripling of our security strength on the Northern Border, facilitating the hiring of translators, authorizing a program of grants to states for emergency preparedness, and curbing the abuse of our banking system by money launderers. By taking the time to read and improve an anti-terrorism bill, Congress has done the Administration a great favor in correcting problems. We have used this time wisely. We have produced a far better bill than the Administration proposed, and this also now is a better bill than either the Senate or the House had initially approved. We have done our utmost to protect Americans against abuse of these new law enforcement tools. In granting these new powers, the American people and we, their representatives in Congress, also grant the Administration our trust that they will not be misused. Congressional oversight will be crucial in enforcing this compact. To paraphrase former President Reagan, we will entrust, but with oversight. The four-year sunset provision included in this final agreement will be an enforcement mechanism for adequate oversight. This measure could not be considered today and would not be in the improved condition it is without the steadfast commitment of our Majority Leader. Senator Daschle deserves all the credit for all that is good in this bill. Without his commitment and focus, we simply would not be in the position to pass this bill today. On my behalf and more importantly on behalf of the American people, I want to publicly acknowledge his vital role in this legislation. I have done my best under the circumstances and want to thank especially Senator Kennedy for his leadership on the Immigration parts of the bill. My efforts have not been completely successful and there are a number of provisions on which the Administration has insisted with which I disagree. Frankly, the agreement of September 30, 2001 I had reached with the White House on the sharing of criminal justice information would have led to a better balanced bill. I could not stop the Administration from reneging on the agreement any more than I could have sped the process to reconstitute this bill in the aftermath of those breaches. In these times we need to work together to face the challenges of international terrorism. I have sought to do so in good faith. We have worked around the clock over the past month to put together the best legislative package we could. While I share the Administration’s goal of promptly providing the tools necessary to deal with the current terrorist threat, I feel strongly that our responsibilities include equipping such tools with safety features to make sure that new tools do not cause harm and are not misused. I want to conclude my remarks with thanks for the efforts of many staff members who have worked tirelessly under unusual and enormously inconvenient circumstances to help us craft the legislation before us today. In particular, I want to thank Mark Childress and Andrea LaRue on the staff of Majority Leader Daschle, and David Hoppe on the staff of Republican Leader Lott. I would also like to thank Makan Delrahim, Jeff Taylor, Stuart Nash, and Leah Belaire with Senator Hatch, the Ranking Member of the Judiciary Committee, Melody Barnes and Esther Olavarria with Senator Kennedy, Neil McBride and Eric Rosen with Senator Biden, Bob Schiff with Senator Feingold, and Stacy Baird and Beth Stein with Senator Cantwell. Finally, I would like to thank my own Judiciary Committee staff, especially Bruce Cohen, Beryl Howell, Julie Katzman, Ed Pagano, John Elliff, David James, Ed Barron, Tim Lynch, Susan Davies, Liz McMahon, Manu Bhardwaj, and Tara Magner. # # # # #