U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee - Larry E. Craig, Chairman - Jade West, Staff Director

No. 55 March 18, 1998

Treaty Doc. 105-36 -- Protocols to the
North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic

Executive Calendar No. 16

Reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations on March 6, 1998, by a vote of 16 to 2 (Senators Ashcroft and Wellstone voting in the negative), with a resolution of advice and consent to ratification, subject to 7 declarations and 4 conditions. Exec. Rept. 105-14.

NOTEWORTHY

BACKGROUND

In July 1997, the North Atlantic Council -- NATO's decision-making body -- extended invitations to three former Warsaw Pact states to begin negotiations for admission as new members of the alliance: Poland, the Czech Republic (formerly the western portion of Czechoslovakia), and Hungary. Efforts favored by several European countries but opposed by the United States to admit Slovenia and Romania were unsuccessful in "this round" of expansion, but President Clinton has given strong assurances that the current expansion is the beginning, not the end, of the process.

The Senate's decision to give or to withhold its advice and consent to the enlargement of NATO takes place in the context of an American policy that has tried to address the concerns of current members of the alliance, the new members, aspiring members, and those countries that might never enter NATO. The invitations to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary followed signing of the NATO-Russia "Founding Act" of May 1997, which in the words of U.S. Secretary of State Albright provides Russia "a voice, not a veto," on alliance security issues, and which sets up a Permanent Joint Council to discuss issues of mutual concern to NATO and Russia. In addition, the Clinton Administration, in January 1998, signed a "Baltic Charter" with the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, which states that the United States "supports the efforts" of those countries to join NATO but gives no indication as to when that might be likely.

The negotiations for a revised NATO treaty were completed by December 1997 and submitted to national legislatures for ratification. To date, Canada and Denmark have approved the revisions. Although NATO is an alliance of equals, it is generally understood that the decision of the United States Senate will be the key to whether the expansion proceeds as planned.

The Founding Mission of NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in 1949 as an alliance for common self-defense among democratic, free-market countries in Europe and North America in response to the Soviet occupation and communization of most of Central and Eastern Europe at the end of World War II. The original members were the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Iceland, and Italy. Subsequently, the alliance has been enlarged on three separate occasions -- to include Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. During this period, NATO's clear purpose was to deter the Soviet Union and its satellites from an attack on non-communist Europe -- an attack that would threaten the security of the United States -- and, if deterrence failed, to achieve victory. This mission of the alliance is stated in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO's founding document, as follows:

The Parties [i.e., the member states] agree that an armed attack against one or more of them . . . shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Pursuant to this mission, NATO was so successful in deterring aggression that, throughout this phase of its history, the alliance did not resort to armed military force on even one occasion.

NATO's New Missions

The collapse of communism symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 not only redrew the political map of Europe but raised new questions about the purpose of the alliance. As the threat of armed military attack on alliance members receded -- and as former adversaries in the former Soviet camp expressed interest in joining the Western community of nations -- the understood purpose of the alliance shifted as well. Though the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91 was not a NATO operation per se, alliance communications, logistics, intelligence, and other capacities were used to help coordinate the international coalition against Iraq. The first armed military action in NATO history was not a defense of members' territory against armed attack but airstrikes against Serb gun positions in Bosnia. Now the site of an ongoing peace-enforcement effort, Bosnia, along with the Persian Gulf effort, may be considered as examples of the new "out-of-area" (i.e., on non-NATO territory) orientation of the alliance:

[W]ith the absence of a major imminent threat, . . . NATO will focus its defense cooperative efforts on new non-Article 5 missions, to include operations that occur out of area such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, crisis management, and humanitarian assistance. The Administration has cited the current operation in Bosnia, and the U.S.-led coalition in the Persian Gulf, as examples of how NATO can be used to build multilateral coalitions and in defensive cooperative efforts to assist in the democratic reform of the military in the new democracies.
[Views of the Committee on Armed Services, Committee's report, page 52]

This view of NATO's future role was strongly endorsed by President Clinton at the May 1997 signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act:

We are building a new NATO. It will remain the strongest alliance in history, with smaller, more flexible forces, prepared to provide for our defense, but also trained for peacekeeping. . . . It will be an alliance directed no longer against a hostile bloc of nations, but instead designed to advance the security of every democracy in Europe -- NATO's old members, new members, and non-members alike.

While the new orientation to NATO may figure prominently in what all observers characterize as a "low threat" environment, the Committee was careful to state its position that NATO's traditional mission of collective self-defense would remain central. The Committee's report (pages 3-4) quoted with approval the views of Secretary of State Albright:

[W]e must consider the dangers of Europe's future. By this I mean direct threats against the soil of NATO members that a collective defense pact is designed to meet. Some are visible on Europe's horizon such as the threat posed by rogue states with dangerous weapons. Others may not seem apparent today, but they are not unthinkable. Within this category lie questions about the future of Russia. We want Russian democracy to endure. We are optimistic that it will, but one should not dismiss the possibility that Russia could return to the patterns of its past. By engaging Russia and enlarging NATO, we give Russia every incentive to deepen its commitment to peaceful relations with neighbors, while closing the avenue to more destructive alternatives.

The resolution of ratification states that "the core purpose of NATO must continue to be the collective [self-]defense of the territory of all NATO members" in accordance with Article 5, though it "may also . . . on a case-by-case basis, engage in other missions when there is a consensus among its members that there is a threat to the security and interests of NATO members."

Issues for Consideration

NATO expansion has very strong support from the large majority of political and military experts of both parties, including both 1996 presidential candidates; former President George Bush; former Secretaries of State James Baker, Warren Christopher, Henry Kissinger, and George Shultz; former Secretaries of Defense Richard Cheney, Melvin Laird, and William Perry; and former National Security Advisors Zbigniew Brzezinski, Anthony Lake, and Robert McFarlane; and many others. NATO expansion was endorsed in the 1994 House Republican Contract with America and the 1996 Republican Platform, as well as in several statements by the Senate and the House of Representatives. The views of NATO expansion proponents are reflected in the Foreign Relations Committee's report, excerpts from which appear in the following discussion.

Notwithstanding this support, there are also a number of prominent figures from both parties that are critical of or opposed to expansion of the alliance. These critics include a number of former Senators, including former Majority Leader Howard Baker, former Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn, and Malcolm Wallop. On March 11, 1998, a bipartisan group of 16 former Senators, including Gordon Humphrey and Gary Hart, expressed their view in opposition to NATO expansion in a letter to current Senators. Other prominent opponents include George Kennan (the author of the doctrine of containment of the Soviet Union in the late 1940s), former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, and President Reagan's adviser on Soviet affairs, Richard Pipes. The views of these and other critics are also reflected in the following discussion.

The Committee's report details the views of proponents of NATO expansion on the strategic rationale for expansion, NATO's strategic concept, future NATO enlargement (beyond the current three invitees), the Senate's role in the inspection process, the qualifications of the three invitees for NATO membership, the costs of NATO enlargement, and NATO-Russia relations. Among these, floor debate is expected to focus on three critical issues:

NATO Expansion and European Stability

Proponents of NATO expansion claim that adding new NATO members will eliminate a power vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, thus promoting stability in a part of Europe where instability in the past has contributed to the outbreak of war. In this view, expansion will provide a secure environment to encourage democratic, free-market development, and bring new members into an integrated Euro-Atlantic community. The Committee's report states (page 4):

Notwithstanding the collapse of communism in most of Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States and its allies face continuing threats to their stability and territorial integrity, including the potential for the emergence of a hegemonic power in or around Europe, conflict stemming from ethnic and religious enmity, the revival of historic disputes, or the actions of undemocratic leaders. Furthermore, emerging capabilities to use and deliver weapons of mass destruction, as well as transnational threats such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime, threaten both new and old democracies on the European continent. By providing a defense against many of these threats, NATO membership for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will extend the area in Europe where peace and democracy are not only present but secure.
Critics dispute the claimed stabilizing effect of expansion, noting that conflicts "stemming from ethnic and religious enmity," in the context of NATO expansion and America's assuming a primary burden of maintaining stability in Europe, run the risk of involving NATO and the United States in questions in which the United States has no direct national interest. These conflicts -- many of them, like the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, involving unresolved disputes from both world wars -- instead of being confined to the countries directly involved would become "flashpoints" for NATO involvement and possible intervention. For example, the libertarian CATO Institute has identified three possible flashpoints that might involve an expanded NATO: a border confrontation between Poland and the former Soviet republic of Belarus; a confrontation between Serbia and Hungary over the Hungarian minority in the Serbian province of Vojvodina (there are also large, dissatisfied ethnic Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Romania); and the noncontiguous Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania.

In response to these concerns, the proponents believe that expanding NATO will discourage such conflicts by filling the current power vacuum in Central Europe. As Secretary of State Albright has phrased it, "A larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the area in Europe where wars simply do not happen." ["Senate Giving NATO Expansion a Virtual Free Ride," Washington Post, 3/8/98]

Costs of NATO Expansion

As the Committee's report [p. 20] states, the cost estimates of NATO expansion "vary widely, in large part due to differing assumptions, differing threat assessments, and varying degrees of recognition of the distinction between costs unique to NATO enlargement and costs that will be incurred by NATO members regardless of whether NATO enlarges." Accordingly, estimates have ranged from a high of $61 billion to $125 billion for the period 1996 to 2010 (of which the United States' share would be some $5 billion to $19 billion), according to a 1996 CBO study -- to a low of $1.5 billion over 10 years (of which the United States' share would be about $400 million), as calculated by NATO. The report states that the Committee made its cost evaluation based on a comparison of the various estimates, notably the $1.5-billion NATO estimate and a 1997 Pentagon study, which calculated the cost of expansion to include the three invitees as between $4.9 billion and $6.2 billion over 10 years, with the American share around $1.2 billion to $1.6 billion.

The Committee noted that --

the costs of NATO enlargement fit into one of two categories: (1) the cost for each of the current NATO members, and the new members, to meet fully their individual obligations to support the collective [self-]defense of the alliance, and (2) what each of the sixteen current allies, plus the three new members, must pay to support the common costs. The latter category includes everything from the construction of co-located airfields and a secure communications architecture, to the purchase of desks and chairs for NATO headquarters." [Committee's report, p. 19]

The report further states that only the latter category -- the so-called "common costs," as opposed to the "national expenses" accruing to each member -- was germane to the Committee's evaluation. The report also states the following four assumptions regarding the context in which expansion of NATO would take place:

Critics of NATO expansion point to the wide range of estimates as evidence that expansion proponents really have no idea how much the cost will really be, and that newer and lower estimates are politically motivated: "About this time last year, the administration rejected the NATO figures as too low. Then the politicking began. Now the price seems just right to the White House. . . . [A]n off-the-record comment [was] made by a U.S. official when the Pentagon released its report, 'Everybody realized the main priority was to keep the costs down to reassure Congress, as well as the Russians. . . . There was a strong political imperative to lowball the figures.'" ["Bait And Switch On NATO Costs," Investor's Business Daily, 3/16/98]

Critics also note that the large costs are likely to occur precisely in the "national expenses" to the new members, for which reliable estimates are not yet available. A condition in the resolution of ratification (Section 3(2)(A)(ii)) requires the President to certify that "the United States is under no commitment to subsidize the national expenses of the new members," but it is generally understood that the United States will in fact pay a substantial share of those costs. For example, a May 1997 ABC News report quoted the American Ambassador to Hungary to the effect that the American share of buying new planes for the Hungarian air force "will be perhaps 20 percent to 25 percent at most."

"Regardless of the exact amount," the Committee's report (page 22) concludes, "these estimates for the cost of enlargement represent only a small fraction of the costs that will be necessary to ensure that NATO remains a viable alliance in the next century. . . . The Committee again stresses the importance of all current and future allies to meet their commitments to the common defense. Anything less will result in a hollow strategic commitment."

American Relations with Russia

The Committee's report includes a detailed examination of the impact of NATO expansion on relations with Russia. The Report (page 23) states: "The Committee does not find NATO enlargement and the development of a cooperative NATO-Russia relationship mutually exclusive. . . . The enlargement of NATO, a purely defensive alliance comprised of democratic nations, does not threaten any country in Europe. In the view of the Committee, all Europe benefits from the existence of NATO, including Russia."

It is evident that Russians of differing political persuasions do not agree with this interpretation of the purposes or effects of expansion. For example:

Russia's attitude toward NATO enlargement has been and remains unequivocally negative. The signing of the Russia-NATO Founding Act does not alter that attitude in any manner. . . . Enlargement is a serious attempt to achieve political dominance of the Alliance in Europe -- to create a NATO-centrism, so to speak, backed up by a military force unparalleled in the world. . . . A negative attitude toward enlargement is possibly the issue on which there exists an almost 100 percent consensus in Russian public opinion. Some people view these plans as confirming the old bogey of the 'aggressiveness of NATO.' Others see it as a continuation of the old game designed to 'contain' Russia. Still others see a Western betrayal of those Russian forces that won the struggle against communism and are now building a democratic, market-oriented society. With some of these arguments one can agree, with others one cannot. But this consensus must be taken into account by the Russian leadership in building Russia's policy.
[Russian Ambassador to the United States Yuli M. Vorontsov, "One Thing All Russians
Agree On," Washington Post, 3/10/98]

The Committee nonetheless believes that "the development of a constructive relationship between NATO and Russia, as endorsed in the Committee Resolution of Ratification, may provide an avenue for Russia to contribute to the security and stability of Europe."

BILL PROVISIONS

Section 1. Senate Advice and Consent Subject to Declarations and Conditions.

This section consists of the Senate's advice and consent to the ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic subject to the declarations in section 2 and the conditions in section 3.

Section 2. Declarations.

Declarations are statements of the Senate's position, opinion, or intentions on matters relating to issues raised by a treaty but not to its specific provisions. Treaty Document 105-36 includes seven declarations, as follows:

  1. The Senate declares that United States membership in NATO remains a vital national security interest of the United States.

  2. The Senate states its findings regard the strategic rationale for NATO enlargement, including possible threats to the stability and territorial integrity of NATO members; the threat an attack on Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic would constitute to member countries; the contribution those three countries can make to the security of the North Atlantic area; and the enhancement their admission would have for the alliance.

  3. The Senate states its understanding that the North Atlantic Council is the supreme decision-making body of NATO, that its decisions do not require the consent of any other international organization, and that it has direct responsibilities for matters relating to the basic policies of NATO.

  4. The Senate states its understanding that the new members will have all the rights, obligations, responsibilities, and protections of alliance members; the Senate also endorses the political commitment made to Russia to neither deploy nuclear weapons nor station forces on the territory of the new member, but further stating that this commitment is not legally binding.

  5. The Senate states its finding that it is in the interest of the United States for NATO to develop a constructive relationship with Russia.

  6. The Senate states its sense regarding the important role that other European institutions such as the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe must play to advance the political, economic, and social stability of Europe.

  7. The Senate states its findings regarding the invitation of additional countries to join NATO, including that the United States has not consented to the invitation of any other countries but Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

Section 3. Conditions.

Conditions are requirements placed on the President by the Senate as part of the Senate's advice and consent to ratification. They are binding on the United States but not on other treaty signatories. Treaty Document 105-36 includes four conditions, as follows:

  1. The Senate declares that NATO's central purpose remains the collective self-defense of its members (though other missions may be undertaken based on consensus of the member states), and requires full consultation by the Executive Branch on any proposals to revise that mission. It also requires the President to report to the Senate on NATO's strategic concept.

  2. The Senate requires the President to report on costs, benefits, burdensharing, and the military implications of NATO enlargement and requires annual reports for five years on several key elements of burdensharing.

  3. The Senate requires the President to certify the Administration's previously stated position that neither the NATO-Russia Founding Act (nor the Permanent Joint Council established by it) provide Russia with a veto over NATO policy nor any role in NATO decision-making.

  4. The Senate sets forth constitutionally based principles of treaty interpretation and the appropriate role of the Senate in the consideration of treaties.

Section 4. Definitions.

ADMINISTRATION POSITION

No Statement of Administration Policy had been received by press time, but the Clinton Administration is known to strongly favor approval of NATO expansion.

OTHER VIEWS

Views of the Senate Committee on Armed Services

On February 27, 1998, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Thurmond and Ranking Member Levin provided the Foreign Relations Committee with the Armed Services Committee's recommendations on the matter of expanding the NATO Alliance. [These views appear on pp. 46-55 of Exec. Rept. 105-14.]

The Armed Services Committee's report highlights three issues of concern: costs of expanding the alliance; adaptation of NATO's mission to a post-Cold War environment; and impact of expansion on NATO-Russia relations

Costs

The Armed Services Committee points out that the four cost estimates for enlargement range from as high as $125 billion over a 15 year timeframe to as low as $1.5 billion over a 10 year time period, and attributes these vast differences to conflicting views on the current and future military requirements of NATO forces, the threat, the condition of facilities in the three candidate nations, and the activities identified by NATO as eligible for NATO funding.

Another cost concern raised by the Committee is the reported reluctance of our allies to pay the costs of enlargement. The Committee notes, however, that the allies have assured Armed Services Committee Members that they are committed to fulfilling NATO financial and military obligations as expressed in the Final Communique of the December 1997 Defense Ministerial.

At the same time, the Committee recommends an understanding be included in the Resolution of Ratification that the United States will not bear a disproportionate share of the costs. The Committee also expects that funding in the defense budget for the U.S. share of NATO activities will not increase by more than $400 million over the next 10 years (unless the assumptions driving the estimate changes or the threat increases), and believes that the level of U.S. burdensharing in the Alliance should be maintained at the current level of 24 percent, if not less.

Adapting NATO to a Post-Cold War Environment

The Alliance maintains that Article 5 "collective defense" will remain the core mission of NATO. Yet, as the report points out, "with the absence of a major imminent threat, the Committee understands that NATO will focus its defense cooperative efforts on new non-Article 5 missions, to include operations that occur out of area such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, crisis management and humanitarian assistance" [p. 52]. In fact, the Administration has cited the current operation in Bosnia and the U.S.-led coalition in the Persian Gulf as examples of how NATO "can be used to build multinational coalitions and in defensive cooperative efforts to assist in the democratic reform of the military in new democracies" [p. 52]. At the same time, the Committee points out that "the differences between the United States and a number of its partners over the war in Bosnia were a threat to the Alliance's cohesion. On the other hand, the NATO air strikes on Bosnian Serb targets that led to the Dayton negotiations and the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia have contributed to Alliance cohesion." [p. 52] The Committee further notes that not all our NATO allies supported the United States during the recent Iraq crisis.

The Committee recommends that an understanding be added to the Resolution of Ratification stating that the core mission of NATO should remain collective defense, and that only when it is in the national security interests of the United States, and with consensus of the Alliance, should NATO engage in non-Article 5 operations.

NATO-Russia Relations

The Founding Act, signed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, President Clinton and NATO leaders, established the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), a forum where NATO and Russia can consult on issues of mutual interest. The Senate heard testimony on January 29, 1998, from former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who stated his strong opposition to the PJC as an adjunct to the Alliance and his concern that Russia not be allowed to participate in NATO meetings. He also indicated his concern that Russia is using the PJC to distract NATO from its core function, to denounce U.S. policy, and to divide the alliance.

The Armed Services Committee has been assured by the Administration that the PJC will not be used as a forum to negotiate NATO's strategic doctrine, strategy or readiness, and that Russia will not have a voice or veto on matters internal to NATO. Further, the Committee recommends an understanding be included in the Resolution of Ratification stating that the North Atlantic Council, the decision-making body of the Alliance, retain that absolute right.

Views of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's unclassified views regarding the security and security-related risks associated with the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO were forwarded to Senators Helms and Biden on March 5, 1998 [pp. 56-62]. A copy of the classified report is available to Senators.

The Intelligence Committee's report makes the following findings:

Any intelligence sharing inevitably involves some risks. Nevertheless, "the intelligence relationships with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will be, on balance, a net plus for U.S. and NATO interests. [p. 59, emphasis in original]

Cooperation with the three countries on intelligence issues began before the idea of NATO enlargement itself took root; sharing intelligence in the NATO context will build on a pattern of bilateral cooperation which has existed for nearly a decade. Further, based on the information provided to the Committee, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have proven to be reliable in handling operational information and capable of guarding classified information -- some of it extremely sensitive.

The Intelligence Committee notes that these countries are not entering NATO as surrogates for an outside power. While past associations makes these countries vulnerable to Russian intelligence activity, such vulnerability will be reduced further over time.

The Intelligence Committee further understands that it will take time, technical advice and assistance from other NATO members to help these countries overcome the legacy of their communist past, the Committee also points out that the three governments will need to devote adequate resource to support professionalized intelligence and counterintelligence services, and must demonstrate their political support for these services' role in safeguarding the political order to ensure successful integration.

By the time the three countries join NATO, according to the Intelligence Committee's report, a decade will have passed since the collapse of their communist regimes. Contacts with the United States and other allies, and NATO, coupled with continuing modernization programs and priority assistance efforts from current NATO members, should help ensure that all three satisfy membership security requirements by the time of their accession to NATO in April 1999.

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