Women of the Senate Oral History Project

JUDY ANSLEY

Staff Director, Senate Committee on Armed Services
Staff, Senator John Warner
1983–2005

Oral History Interview
August 31, 2018

Senate Historical Office
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Judy Ansley

Dated: 3/22/19

I, Betty K. Koed, accept the interview of Judy Ansley for inclusion into the Oral History Project of the U.S. Senate Historical Office.

Betty K. Koed, U.S. Senate Historian

Dated: 3/26/2019

Introduction

Born in Somerville, Massachusetts, Judy Ansley graduated from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and, in 1981, joined the professional research staff at the Congressional Research Service in the foreign affairs division. In 1983 she was offered a position as a research assistant for the majority staff of the Committee on Armed Services, chaired by Senator John Tower of Texas. For more than 20 years, Ansley worked on national defense and intelligence issues, including preparing the annual National Defense Authorization bill. With the exception of a few years in Senator John Warner's personal office, Ansley spent her Senate career as professional committee staff, eventually earning appointment as the committee's Republican staff director, the first woman to hold that position. Ansley recalls Congressional delegation (CODEL) trips with Senator Warner, the effect of bipartisan cooperation among senators on committee staff operations and legislation, and Senate debates over the Authorizations for the Use of Military Force for Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. She also reflects on being a national defense expert at a time when the field was dominated by men. Ansley left the Senate in 2005 to serve on President George W. Bush's National Security Council.

About the interviewer: Katherine Scott is a historian with the Senate Historical Office. A graduate of the University of Washington, she received a M.A. in history from the University of New Mexico and a Ph.D. in history from Temple University. She is the author of *Reining in the State: Civil Society and Congress in the Vietnam and Watergate Eras*, published in 2013, as well as various articles, chapters, and essays about U.S. political history.

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Judy Ansley
Staff Director, Senate Committee on Armed Services

August 31, 2018

KATE SCOTT: Today is August 31, 2018, and I'm here with Judy Ansley who was a long time Senate staffer, beginning in the 1980s and leaving in the early 2000s.

Thank you for being with us, Judy. I wonder if we could start with a general question about your childhood and your youth. What kind of female role models did you have as a child?

JUDY ANSLEY: That's a tough one, I hadn't thought about that! (laughs) I grew up right outside of Boston in a city called Somerville. My father was a fireman and my mother was a stay at home mom. She was probably my first role model, obviously the most important one.

I lived at home through college. I was the first generation to go to college in my family. My older sister and I were the first two. I was always interested in things that were a little bit different, Soviet studies. I was fascinated by European history and the whole Russian revolution, that whole thing. That's what I majored in. It was actually very interesting as I was growing up. My sister was in nursing school; my brother went to one of the military academies and was studying engineering. I was a political science major. (laughs) My father says, "Okay, this is great. I'm glad you like it. But what are you going to do with it?" I told him, "I don't really know. I would like to work for the government. There must be a job if there is a major." That is growing up how this whole adventure to Washington started.

I'm not really sure, other role models. When I was growing up, there weren't that many women in prominent roles, either in politics or elsewhere. But that didn't really bother me. If I wanted to do something, I was going to try it and see what happened. But it did prove to be a bit of a challenge. I think our generation of women, we were breaking some molds as we went through.

SCOTT: What year did you graduate from college?

ANSLEY: I graduated in 1980 and I was at Tufts University. I did a five-year program with the Fletcher School. When I graduated, I had a master's and a bachelor's. It was interesting, it was during the Jimmy Carter administration and a freeze on all government hiring. It was very difficult. I moved down to Washington on the basis of a GS-5 internship at the Library of Congress, of all things.

SCOTT: That was the CRS [Congressional Research Service] job?

ANSLEY: That was my CRS job, yes, in the foreign affairs division. It was terrific and turned into another research assistant job that was two years, and I heard about an opening on the Armed Services Committee, walked my resume over, and was there for almost 20 years.

SCOTT: That was my next question: how did you get the job on the Armed Services Committee?

ANSLEY: Yes, I just heard about it. I don't even remember. As you know, most jobs on the Hill are not posted. You have to hear about them. Somebody told me about it when my two-year job was just about up. I didn't know a soul. I literally walked over from the building I was working in, the Madison Building, and dropped off my resume and got called for an interview. It's interesting because people now will ask me: do you need to know someone on the Hill? No. It helps, but there are all kinds of ways to get jobs on the Hill. That's how I started. I started there as a research assistant in January of 1983.

SCOTT: You are not new to the Hill because you have been at CRS. But learning the ways of the Senate is different. It looks different when you are inside the institution.

ANSLEY: It does, it does.

SCOTT: So tell me, how did you figure out how things worked? Did you have mentors on the committee? Did you have people that you turned to for advice when you had questions about how to do something?

ANSLEY: The Armed Services Committee staff is a great staff. It's not really big. I think total there may be, at that time probably about 40, which included the professional staff and the clerical staff. I worked for a professional staff member who was terrific and I could ask him anything. But I think on the Hill you learn by observing. On Armed Services our big bill is the National Defense Authorization bill. It has been passed every year for, certainly, in all the time that I've been on the Hill and since then. That's the one authorization bill that is always passed. So you learn the legislative process really quickly that way.

We learned it first in committee, because before you even got to the Senate [floor], you'd have hearings, markup, those types of things, in committee. You learn pretty fast. It's very difficult to observe from the outside and understand how Congress works. You really have to live it and you have to be here and notice the interactions with the members and how that can define a lot of what happens in the Senate. The personal relationships in the Senate, especially, are huge. That's kind of the way—I just learned it as I went along. But there were certainly plenty of people on Armed Services that I could always go to if I had a question about procedure. We had great general counsels who would know how the Senate worked and how you can get your legislation moved through.

SCOTT: Were there many women on professional staff at that time, do you recall?

ANSLEY: When I started, I don't think there were any others. I was a research assistant. Most of them were staff assistants, so no, there weren't. And it was a while before there were any.

SCOTT: There are some big names on that committee in 1983: [Henry] Scoop Jackson was still alive, John Tower, [John] Stennis was still there, Barry Goldwater.

ANSLEY: Barry Goldwater, yes, huge, huge.

SCOTT: Tell me your impression—I don't know how often you would have run into the members at that point, or if you would have been in rooms when these discussions were underway—but I'd love to know your impressions of those members.

ANSLEY: Well, they were absolutely giants of the Senate. When I went over there, I was hired by Senator Tower. He was chairman at the time, so I worked for the majority staff. These guys were just institutions.

But the staff was in meetings with the members all the time, hearings, markups, whatever it might be. If you were a member of the staff, you were in the meetings. Now, obviously, there were smaller meetings that I wasn't party to until I advanced a little bit within the committee. But what was interesting—and you and I talked about it a little bit earlier, too—is back in those days the personal relationships between the members made such a difference. There was such a sense that they respected one another and they worked together and you couldn't tell who was going to get along by party affiliation. Learning those interactions and who got along with who and this member is going to support legislation because it's his friend who is proposing it, that was all very fascinating to see as we went through.

Senator [John] Warner, who I ended up working for, was a very junior member at the time on the committee. He had an interest in foreign policy; I was hired to do work on foreign policy. We started working together at a very early stage in the process.

SCOTT: You went to work later on SSCI, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Is that when you formally joined on Senator Warner's staff? Or were you still professional committee staff?

ANSLEY: I was still professional committee staff. What happened was, I had been working for Senator Warner on Armed Services because by the time we did the switch to Intel, he had been either chairman or ranking member on Armed Services for a number of years. I was technically working for him. When we went to the Intel Committee was the year that Senator Thurmond reasserted his seniority on Armed Services, so Senator Warner got bumped from his top slot on Armed Services, which was Senator Thurmond's right, he did that. Senator Warner then became the ranking member on the Intelligence Committee. He took me over there. He only had three staff members on Intel. He had one who had already been there doing his Intel work,

because he had been a member. He asked me to go with him to Intel, and then he hired a staff director.

SCOTT: As I mentioned to you in an earlier conversation, I'm fascinated by congressional oversight and the challenges of conducting oversight, particularly when you think about something like intelligence, conducting oversight of the intelligence community or even national defense issues. I feel like much of the work that you do probably goes on behind the scenes quietly, in committee rooms or among Senate staff, maybe with phone calls with the administration. So much of that work is not public facing, for a variety of reasons. I wonder if you can tell me about the challenges of such oversight, of participating and conducting ongoing congressional oversight of intelligence or national defense issues.

ANSLEY: It varies, depending on what you are talking about. I noticed a huge difference between doing it on Armed Services and doing it on Intel. On Armed Services, in many ways, it was a lot easier because the Pentagon was a lot more open with information, quite frankly, even though a lot of their information is classified and we did have to do a lot of it behind closed doors, just because of the nature of the information. But they were very forthcoming. You ask a question and get the information. Now, that's not always the case, but for the most part. We had control of their budget. If we needed information on a weapons system or a program, whatever it might be, if they wanted the funding, they needed to provide the members with the information so that we could decide whether or not we thought what they were asking for was a good expenditure of taxpayer money.

We always had very close relations with the legislative staffs at the Pentagon and with the different services. You saw the stuff about Senator McCain. We had Senate liaison people within the Russell Building for all the military services. So, there is a very close relationship, and a good working relationship I would say, regardless of party, regardless of who was in the White House, we would have that oversight role. It was good.

It was very different on the Intelligence Committee. I found it kind of fascinating. Not nearly as much in public. Most of the Armed Services hearings could be open. There wasn't a lot classified. Even though there is a lot of intelligence work done at the Pentagon, that part we would have to do closed. But most of what we did was in open session. Intel was very different. By the nature of it, it did have to be closed. But what I found in dealing with the different intelligence agencies is, they would provide you the information eventually if you asked exactly the right question. That was a little bit of a frustration. I don't have a really wide perspective on that. I was only there for two years so I only had a very small number of people we were working with. It was a fairly contentious time. We had the [Aldrich] Ames spy investigation, which our committee conducted. We had some contentious issues we were dealing with at that point, the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] and the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence], because we hadn't changed how the intel community was structured at that point. It was a little more of a tense situation. It was a little harder to get information. But again, same thing.

In the end, Congress controls the budget, and that is really the trump card. Not that we would use it in that way, but if the administration could not justify what they are asking Congress to spend money on, then the committee is not going to approve it, it's not going to go forward. In the end, it ends up being both sides really need the other. If they don't provide the information, they are not going to get the money. It works pretty well, I would say. Even though some of it is behind closed doors, as a staffer that doesn't impact us in the least, as long as we get the information. I know it might be frustrating to the public that it is not out there, but I think in terms of the oversight role, we can conduct our oversight role whether it's open or closed.

SCOTT: What's the relationship with an IG [Inspector General] in these various agencies in terms of oversight? How did that work? Did you work with the IG much?

ANSLEY: I personally didn't. If we found something wrong and the IG needed to do an investigation, sometimes that would happen. But a lot of times we would do our own investigations. I didn't have much interaction. I would imagine that our general counsel would have more so. I don't remember much interaction with the IGs.

SCOTT: Some committees have a formal mechanism for investigations and oversight. Was that true on Armed Services? Did they have a unit of investigators?

ANSLEY: No, no. We had a really small staff. Relatively speaking, I think the staff was really small. We broke down more by subject area. If there was an issue within your particular subject area, you were going to be the one who was going to do the investigation. It was an additional thing. I know what you mean because I'm familiar with some of those committees, but we didn't have that.

SCOTT: How do you feel that your training at Tufts and the Fletcher School prepared you for your work here? You must have been working alongside many people who had law degrees, but you did not. Did that matter? Did you find that it was helpful to you?

ANSLEY: I always thought about going to law school and maybe that was something that I needed to do. I didn't find that that was a hindrance at all. There were some people, obviously at Fletcher, who were lawyers. But very few people that I ran across, even at Tufts or Fletcher, had government experience, which was actually very interesting. I didn't have that many people that I knew who had worked in the government before I actually came down here and started working here.

The preparation, interesting. I think more so in sort of the subject areas. I mentioned that I did foreign policy work. The classes that I took at Tufts, where I learned about the history of whatever country it might have been, that gives you a sense for what the countries are going to be like, how they are going to react to things. That was all very helpful.

In terms of political science, it's funny. I talk to groups now, people who are looking to get into the field, and I tell them one of the most useless classes that I ever took was an

introduction to political science where they supposedly tell you about all the different branches of government. Then you get down [here] and it's like the practice and the theory just don't go together at all. I actually thought that the theory was so boring. I thought, do I really want to get into this field? When you see how it all works, you do learn it very quickly. I knew the basics, obviously, because of my training. But to see how it actually happens is much more interesting.

SCOTT: I had a similar experience with a theories of policymaking course. It was deadly dull, and later I realized that it didn't have a lot of practical real world application.

I noticed that you had the title of minority staff director on the Senate Intel Committee. Can you define for a general audience what that means? On a daily basis, what kind of work are you doing as minority staff director?

ANSLEY: Some people would do minority staff director. Some people would do the Republican staff director, or Democrat. It just meant that we didn't have control of the Senate. I was not the staff director running the committee, I was the counterpart on the minority side.

We would have a role in determining what hearings would be set, the legislation as it moves through, how a bill is going to be drafted. I was basically representing Senator Warner. I think it was Senator [Dennis] DeConcini at the time who was the chairman, so I would work with my counterpart. One thing that is interesting on committees is that it takes a lot of cooperation to get a committee to be functioning and actually to pass a bill. I think it's one of the reasons that Armed Services has such a great record of actually passing the bills. The chairmen and ranking members have a history of really good bipartisan cooperation and moving the process forward. I had that role for, I guess it was about a year and a half on the Intel Committee, having to work with my counterpart to make sure there could be agreement between Senators DeConcini and Warner on hearings, schedule of events, moving legislation forward, so that was basically it.

SCOTT: Intel has this reputation, around here at least, and has for some time, of being a fairly cooperative committee, of not having some of the problems of partisanship that other committees have experienced over time. Did you find that to be true during your time on Intel?

ANSLEY: You know, I came from Armed Services, which I think is probably one of the most bipartisan. I think Intel was as well, but I didn't see that it was more so than Armed Services, to be honest. I think the nature of the work both on Armed Services and Intel lends itself to a lot of cooperation and a lot less posturing than I think on some of the other committees. And so much of it, especially in Intel, is done behind closed doors that there isn't the opportunity for the posturing that you might get on some of the other committees.

SCOTT: You mentioned the fact that so much of the staff on Armed Services works on this defense authorization bill. I'd like you to step us through that legislative process, if you

could. When does it start in the calendar year and when does it typically conclude? I know that varies. What were the steps along the way and what were you doing as staff?

ANSLEY: Okay, we would always start right at the very beginning of the year with a big hearing on global threats. What are the threats that we are facing, sort of as a prelude to we will soon be receiving the budget and what is the administration going to be asking us for to deal with these threats. We would usually have one or two hearings in January. We would usually, in a normal year, we would receive the budget from the administration in February, early February, and that starts our entire legislative process. The Armed Services budget, I think it is over 700 billion dollars now. It was more in the three to six [hundred billion range] by the time I left. So, it's a huge budget—thousands of legislative provisions that will come over in addition to the funding requests. We would start our oversight at that point, as soon as we received the budget. The oversight would involve the subcommittees as well as the full committee holding hearings on things that are in the request. Why does the administration want this many carriers, or a ship-building account that is so big? In more recent years you would have funding for Iraq and Afghanistan. What is that money going to?

We would hold hearings through until the early spring, you hold your oversight hearings, both at the subcommittee level [and] full committee. As a staffer at that point, if there were legislative provisions that came over that were in my area—I covered a lot of the NATO issues. When we were in the minority I covered all of the foreign policy issues, regardless of where they were in the world—I would have to examine those legislative provisions, contribute to whatever hearings that would cover those. In my case, it was mostly full committee because those types of issues tend to be more full-committee issues. You work with people in the administration to try to figure out what they are asking for and whether it made sense. That's all in preparation for the next step in the process, which is the committee markup.

The markup is basically where we take the administration's request and we actually draft a bill, draft legislation. Sometimes we accept it, sometimes we don't. There are changes. That would usually happen in, say, spring. We would look to do markup before Memorial Day—that would be a goal. That is a good year. Once we are done with markup and we report out the bill, the next step is you take the bill to the Senate floor, and that's where the whole process really opens up. That's where the committee has to defend what they are presenting. Members get to offer amendments. As you know, in the Senate there are no germaneness rules, and as I mentioned earlier we were one of the few legislative vehicles that always got passed, so we were a "Christmas tree."

We had amendments that we had to deal with. I can remember one year—and senators did not have to let you know that they were about to offer an amendment on a particular subject—I can remember the staff director calling me one day, and it was some very obscure provision, I don't know if it was the Galapagos Island, it was some environmental something-or-other and it had to do with a foreign country. He said, "Grab your file on this and get to the

floor." I hung up and thought, my file? I don't have a file on this! (laughs) You are sometimes really confronted with, "My goodness what are we going to do with this?" As committee staff you have to work these amendments whether you had a background in it, whether you knew anything about it. For the most part we did an awful lot of foreign policy work, because the Foreign Relations Committee generally did not pass an authorization bill. We would get an awful lot of the foreign policy work. I was always really busy on the floor when we had to deal with that.

You would have the Armed Services bill on the floor for a minimum of a week, sometimes two weeks, with hundreds of amendments, and the staff had to work through all of those amendments. You'd put packages together and you would try to talk some people out of things and you see what you can come up with. Once the bill is passed, the House goes through the same process and you come to conference. Conference could last weeks, months. In a good year, you are done with conference and you have the bill passed by early fall. This year was a good year. They have already had the bill signed into law. I can remember times that we were pushing up against Christmas. It just depends. It just depends on the issues. If it's an election year, election years tend to be faster because people want to leave.

That's the broad outline. It really begins right at the beginning of the year and you are going through the fall.

SCOTT: So it's full year.

ANSLEY: It's a full-year process.

SCOTT: And the staff is working on this continuously every stage of the way.

ANSLEY: Absolutely, every stage of the way.

SCOTT: I did note when you mentioned that in your portfolio were issues related to NATO and you also had foreign policy issues, I put a question mark there. Why foreign policy issues? Wouldn't that be the Foreign Relations Committee? Would you be working collaboratively? You anticipated my question: why would that be something that would be included in defense authorizations? You are saying that in addition to picking up the rather obscure and perhaps non-germane issues because it is a bill that must pass, you also would be handling some of the foreign policy issues that may not get through the Foreign Relations Committee.

ANSLEY: Also, if you look at the structure of the Pentagon, the Pentagon deals with overseas issues all the time, whether it is basing issues or whatever. They actually have within the Pentagon, you have people who were doing a lot of the things, on a much deeper basis than I was, you have people covering Russia, every part of the world. There are a lot of military to military relationships that go on. So Armed Services would do foreign policy work. On the Middle East, I can remember years ago the Kuwaiti reflagging issue during an early iteration of

an Iraqi type war. The Iranians mining the Persian Gulf. That's a foreign policy issue. Basing rights in foreign countries, burden sharing, whatever it might be, they were technically foreign policy issues, but they impacted the Defense Department and so our committee would look at them. Then there were the ones that really didn't impact as much, and those were the non-germane ones that we would get because we were a vehicle moving through.

SCOTT: There is often criticism that because this is a must-pass bill, it does become this vehicle for all kinds of things. Did you find that frustrating as a staffer on a committee to be working on some of these amendments that you thought were outside of the jurisdiction of the committee?

ANSLEY: Yes, and no, to be honest. On some of the foreign policy issues it was fine with me to be working on them because I thought they were important issues anyway. On some of them that were a little bit more obscure, I didn't really have the expertise and maybe not as much interest in them. For the most part, as a staffer, you are not giving up too much. You want to be working the issues, and I think you find that for people who are attracted to the Hill and like working here, you don't really want to give away very much. That was actually fine.

The thing that was interesting is, when we would go to conference, the House would bring in conferees from all of the different committees. Oh my goodness. We would have conference meetings with people, we would have hundreds of conferees on the House side. The Senate didn't do that. We only had Senate Armed Services conferees. But I can remember one woman who I am still very good friends with who was on the Foreign Affairs Committee on the House side. She would come to conference every year and give us her big speech about, "You are stomping all over our jurisdiction" and we'd listen. Okay, are we done with that? Can we move on? Yeah, yeah, yeah. We can move on. At one point, I joked with her. I told her, "You know, we preferred maybe not to do all your work if you could get your bill done!" (laughs) We had a good laugh about that. But the process worked. She was part of the process. We would always consult with the people on Foreign Relations, too, if there were issues that they were particularly concerned about. You know, we had a lot of things that were maybe not strictly Armed Services, but as a staffer I enjoyed working on those, too.

SCOTT: It's always good to have a lot of work.

ANSLEY: It really is. And you always think you can do it better than anybody else. So I will go ahead and do it. (laughs)

SCOTT: Tell me about the conference process. This is something that I think not a lot of people understand. How does a conference work? As you say, you have a lot of people who are involved. For example, on the Armed Services Committee side, I know that at times all members of Armed Services have been considered conferees. Do they all come to the meetings?

ANSLEY: Yes. It's interesting. We had various levels of meetings. For your full conference meetings, yes, all members will be there. On the House side, a little bit different because not all of their Armed Services members are conferees, I believe. They have like 60 or 70, it's a huge committee, whereas we were more in the 20s, or low 20s range. If we would have just a regular conference meeting, whoever was a conferee for Armed Services on the Senate side and the House side would be at that meeting and all the staff that is associated with that. At times you would have conference meetings on particular issues, maybe on the issues impacting the Foreign Affairs Committee and then the Foreign Affairs conferees. It would be sort of issue dependent, but for the most part if it was a general Armed Services issue, all of the Armed Services members would be there.

Now, those would be the meetings with the members. Then there were staff meetings that would take place. A lot of the work would be done in the staff meetings because, you know, a lot of it is not controversial. A lot of it you can resolve all these issues. You know what the members' views are. Quite frankly, the members don't have time for thousands of provisions. They trust you to deal with them, brief them after, but you can get a lot done at a staff level beforehand. You need the members for the really difficult, controversial, and maybe more politically charged issues. And then we had meetings—It was kind of funny, we called them the big four and the little four. The big four would be the chairmen and ranking members on the House and Senate side and the little four would be the staff directors. (laughs) You know, we would have meetings at those levels, where, again, we could clear through a number of those issues. It's easier as you get to smaller groupings to resolve some of the issues.

SCOTT: What percentage of these provisions would you say are figured out at the staff level?

ANSLEY: Probably 75 to 80 percent, if not more.

SCOTT: Where would you meet? When the little four met, for example, where would you meet?

ANSLEY: We used to meet in the Capitol. We would meet in—whoever had the best hideaway in the Capitol, we would go to their room. We would do that. It's easier. Sometimes if we did the staff meetings and they were a little bit larger, we'd alternate. Sometimes we would do it on the House side, sometimes we would do it on the Senate side, because there aren't those big rooms in the Capitol—or there never used to be. We would just do that. Get your big books and walk across the Capitol to the other side.

SCOTT: I want to know about your work on Senator Warner's personal staff, '96 to '98, national security advisor first, and then national security director. Tell me about those titles and what you were managing in your portfolio. What were you working on?

ANSLEY: I was working on all of the issues that Senator Warner had to worry about with Armed Services, basically anything the Armed Services Committee was doing because those were two years where he didn't have a committee that he was either chairing or ranking member. We had a little bit of a hiatus in terms of his leadership role. I think he was Rules Committee chairman at the time. But he was still a member of both Armed Services and Intel so he still needed staff support on both. So, I had to do his work on that, whether it was preparing him for a hearing, doing a memo, doing questions for the hearing, making sure that on legislative issues his views were represented and incorporated into the legislation that went forward, dealing with constituent issues, if they arose. We did have other people on the personal staff who would do some of that on the defense side, but for the most part I was doing his work on Armed Services and Intel, but not from a committee slot because he didn't have them.

[Senator Thurmond] had asserted [his seniority] a couple years earlier, but Senator Warner still had a slot on Intel, a leadership slot on Intel, that we could move to and after that it was two years before he then became either chairman or ranking, I can't remember what happened first; I think it was ranking back on Armed Services, and as soon as that happened I went back to his Armed Services staff.

SCOTT: That's interesting. I wondered about moving to the personal staff. Did it change much for you?

ANSLEY: It does. I mean, the day-to-day I was still working for him and doing the same type of thing, but you don't have the ability to set the agenda when Senator Warner was not either chairman or ranking. It changed things, yes. It was good to get back to the committee. (laughs)

SCOTT: In the last couple of years of Senator Thurmond's last term in office, there were rumors that he wasn't managing the Senate Armed Services Committee effectively and that maybe leadership and other members, they were trying to work to see if they could move him off of the committee, or at least out of the chairmanship. Do you remember those conversations?

ANSLEY: I don't remember, about moving him out of the leadership, no, I don't remember those conversations. But yes, he was getting old. But he had a staff that was keeping things moving along and working on things. But I honestly don't remember talk about it.

SCOTT: I read it in a couple of newspapers, that's the only basis that I have for that question.

During the time that you are on Senator Warner's personal staff, there is a lot going on in the world. We have the NATO operation in Bosnia, we have a lot going on with the Clinton White House. Do you recall any stories about working with the administration on these issues, something that stands out to you from this time?

ANSLEY: The Bosnia thing was obviously—well the Balkans, everything having to do with the Balkans—was very interesting and was something that Senator Warner was involved in. Interestingly, I was on a CODEL [congressional delegation] with Senator Warner, it was actually a Senator [Robert] Dole CODEL in the summer of 1990, and it was right after the Iraqis invaded Kuwait. The trip was not designed to go there. It was really focused on Europe, Balkans, Russia, but the CODEL—the members of it, not the staff—the members took a trip into the Middle East area because of that, which was fascinating. The point of this is, we did get into Serbia. We went to Kosovo during that trip. We actually might have gone into Croatia; at that time it was still Yugoslavia. But a lot of fighting had already started. I will never forget going into Kosovo, which was a Muslim enclave. Serbs didn't like us going there. Dole was a big hero to the Kosovars because of the positions he had taken. [That was] the first time that I saw water cannons being used on protestors. It was like, wow, this place is a mess! You could see the whole country falling apart. In the years after that, just working on some of those issues, and what is the U.S. role, what is NATO's role, what is the UN's role and all of that. That was actually very fascinating.

I can remember a lot of hearings and having the administration people coming up and testifying. That was a kind of interesting case in something that I get asked about a lot when I speak to groups is about the authorization for the use of force, and when can the president use military power? What role does Congress have? It's really murky. As you go back and you take a look through all of this, Clinton never asked for an authorization to use force. In fact, I think—I've done a little bit of research on this on my own and also for Senator Warner—but you can go back to, I think it was maybe Reagan was as far back as I went. The only presidents who have asked for an authorization for the use of force have been Republicans. Democrats haven't, strangely enough. I don't know why. You can maybe say Obama sort of did in Syria, but we can get into a debate about that. Clinton never did; we were involved basically in a war in the Balkans and he never did ask for an authorization to use force. That was something that Senator Warner questioned people about during hearings. What are we getting involved in? What is our role? What are we committing U.S. troops to? Remember, during that time, the Cold War had just ended. We hadn't been in a war. This was all very new and something that as a committee we hadn't had to deal with some of these issues before. It was pretty controversial. But it was interesting to work on. I just find those things fascinating having been there in 1990. You are on the ground seeing some of these people and what they are dealing with. It was fascinating.

SCOTT: It's an example of a way that a CODEL can be very useful. They are often derided as junkets. But I've spoken with a number of staff and former members who have talked about the value of CODELs. You've been on a number of CODELs, I imagine. I'm sure you've heard that type of criticism.

ANSLEY: Yes, absolutely.

SCOTT: How do you describe the value of a CODEL?

ANSLEY: I think it is difficult to understand what people are going through, whether it's the foreign people that you are going to visit or, quite frankly, in the case of a lot of the Armed Services CODELs, the U.S. troops who are stationed overseas. You get to go and talk to them as well. You have unfettered access to the U.S. military. Nothing is filtered through what the Pentagon wants you to hear. You get to talk to people on the ground. I think the members get to see living conditions, war fighting conditions. I think it's absolutely invaluable.

With Senator Warner I went to Iraq a number of times, including just a couple months after the war in 2003, in the summer of 2003. It is hard to describe stepping off a plane and it was almost like a furnace blast right at you. We are all in the body armor and all of that; going and visiting some of our troops and seeing the conditions they are living in. Also, it is interesting to hear their reaction to what they are doing. We found, meeting with a lot of our troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan, they were proud of what they were accomplishing and they were pleased that they were able to help the Iraqi people, the Afghan people. That is also, that is a very good side to see as well. You don't get that from all the news coverage. Also, just to see how an Iraqi citizen is living, or an Afghan citizen. You can't replace that without going.

Now, Senator Warner didn't spend an awful lot of time in some of the real vacation spots. (laughs) We tended to be in the war zones or Eastern Europe or Moscow or whatever it might be. I think you get a perspective talking to people in the field. Also, it's not just U.S. troops or whatever. We would always meet with the embassy people, not just the ambassadors, but also the people who are serving in the country. You'd just get a very valuable perspective that I think can really inform your work when you come back.

SCOTT: You feel that the information that you can gather on the CODEL really does find its way into the legislative process.

ANSLEY: Absolutely.

SCOTT: I wanted to talk about the time that you spent as deputy staff director and staff director on the Armed Services Committee. I think it's 1999 to 2005. During these years Senators Warner and [Carl] Levin were trading off as chairman and ranking member. What do you recall about their relationship?

ANSLEY: [It was a] very close relationship. They got along very well. They both respected one another. Quite frankly that translated down to the staff. My counterpart on Senator Levin's staff is still a friend to this day, just a wonderful person. Now, they had policy differences, no doubt. But it didn't interfere with their personal regard for each other. They traveled together a lot. So they really knew each other, liked each other, respected one another, and it just made the whole committee work (laughs) very well. They got along really well.

Senator Warner also got along very well with Senator [Sam] Nunn. They were good friends for years as well. It was a good relationship that he had with Senator Levin.

SCOTT: Can you tell me where you were on September 11 and what you recall about that day and the days after from your professional perspective on the Armed Services staff?

ANSLEY: Yes, that's one of those things that anybody who was in Washington will never forget where they were that day. I can remember that when I first heard that a plane had crashed, I had just dropped my youngest daughter off at the Senate Day Care Center and—which was just over by the Hart Building—I can remember exactly the intersection that I was at, stopped at a light right by the Hart Building right at Constitution about to take that turn and I heard about that plane. I thought, huh, okay. That's strange. Of course, everybody's first reaction was that someone with a Cessna didn't know what he was doing and crashed it. By the time I got to the Russell Building, the second plane had crashed, so we all knew that something was going on. I just remember going up to—we had all gathered in the staff director's office. I was deputy at the time. Nobody knew quite what to do. It's hard to imagine now because we have such preparedness and drills and everything, but everything was by the individual office. There were no alarm systems, there was nobody to tell you whether or not you should evacuate. We didn't know what to do.

I think by the time I got into the staff director's office, the plane had crashed into the Pentagon and we knew. We pretty much knew with the second plane. It was like, not only is this an attack, but it's not just New York. I can remember Senator Warner—his office was just across the hall from Armed Services—he walked over and he said, "I want you to get everybody out of here." So we all did. At that point, I'm worried about my daughter at the day care center. It was the first time that we got a call to evacuate from the day care center. My husband was working on the House side at the time and cell phones were all down and it was very difficult to coordinate with him and all. That was unbelievable. We all went out to the area right outside the Russell Building, the big park outside, which in retrospect, with that fourth plane headed to the Capitol, was probably the worst place any of us could have been. And then people just started dispersing. I think we knew, "Get away." In my case, I had to go get my car and get my daughter and see if I could find my husband. We just live in Alexandria. It took us almost three hours to get home, and you could see the smoke billowing from the Pentagon. It was very, very difficult. A very difficult day.

In the days that followed, Washington was really eerie. They had shut down National [airport] and you get used to all that noise and then there is the silence. How do we deal with all this? I thought the president did a great job in addressing the nation right away and kind of with a path forward on what we were going to do. It was very unnerving.

SCOTT: Shortly thereafter Congress does pass an authorization for the use of military force for Afghanistan. I imagine that Armed Services was—

ANSLEY: We were right in the middle of it.

SCOTT: Did those talks begin right away, after the attacks, do you recall?

ANSLEY: We were back to work the next day from what I recall. We went home that first day but then I'm pretty sure by the next day we were all back at work. I don't know if it was the day after. It was fairly quickly that the administration figured out who was responsible. The authorization to use force was very specific to those who had attacked. I think Al Qaida was actually mentioned in the resolution. It wasn't so much, in Afghanistan or wherever; it was really against these terrorists, who happened to be inside safe havens in Afghanistan. So it was probably within those first few days. I don't remember if it was maybe a week later that we passed it, but yes, Senator Warner was right in the middle of all that. Technically within the jurisdiction of the Foreign Relations Committee, but it was really done with leadership and with the relevant committees involved in all of that drafting. Yes, we were all involved in that. We can debate whether or not it should still be in force, but it was written in such a way that it was still even used by the Obama administration to go after ISIS. It was not very specific. It was more those who have attacked us on 9/11.

SCOTT: Right, and then the following year is the second authorization.

ANSLEY: Was it the year, or two years later?

SCOTT: Yes, it was 2003; 2002 was a long debate about what to do.

ANSLEY: Yes, it was.

SCOTT: Then eventually it is passed in 2003. You must have been intimately involved in that second authorization. I know that there was—having read the debates—I realized that there was a little bit more concern about this second authorization and a little bit more debate about the parameters of that authorization. There are a couple of amendments offered, including the Levin/Reed amendment, I believe, which is calling for a little bit more time, more information from the weapons inspectors before Congress responds, before Congress provides this authorization. Are there anecdotes or things that you recall about that particular debate, which lasted more than nearly 12 months. I'm sure a lot of the debate was going on behind closed doors among members and staff. What do you recall about that period?

ANSLEY: What was interesting about it was that the one for Iraq was really focused more on the weapons of mass destruction—Saddam Hussein and having somebody like him with control of weapons of mass destruction. The process that the administration went through with that was, at the UN, getting inspectors, having inspectors go in, having inspectors be thwarted (laughs), and then what do you do in response to that? A lot of it hinged on the intelligence reports. I can remember [CIA director] George Tenet coming up and it was in open session—he did it in closed as well—in open testimony [he was] very blunt. The slam dunk, everybody heard that, I heard that. Saddam Hussein absolutely was hiding weapons of mass destruction.

It's interesting having then worked for the Bush administration, I am often times asked do you think the invasion of Iraq was a mistake? I maintain to this day it absolutely was not

because of the information the president had to go on. Given what he was told by the intelligence community, it would have been irresponsible not to. Unfortunately that information turned out—fortunately, or unfortunately—turned out not to be correct, but a president (and I would say members of Congress) often have to make life or death decisions based on imperfect information, and they rely on the people that they have to provide them with that information. There wasn't even a shadow of a doubt from the intelligence community. They absolutely were convinced that there were weapons of mass destruction. Given that, you know, the vote turned out the way it did.

What was fascinating to me is I remember Senator Warner being very concerned. What if there aren't any? He used to ask me about that a lot, after we would hear testimony or whatever. "What if there aren't [any weapons]?" It shows how smart he is! I would tell him, I said, "Senator, why would you even question that, given they are telling you that they have evidence." "Yes, but, what if?" I thought after the fact, wow, was he smart. There was something that told him that maybe there wasn't. I don't know. That was a much tenser time.

If you look at the authorization for the use of force after 9/11, there was no doubt. We had just been attacked. There was absolutely no doubt. When you got to the invasion of Iraq, we had been in war for a couple of years. I think there were a lot of people thinking they are just using this as an excuse because Bush just wants to attack Iraq. I honestly don't think that was the case. I think there were concerns. Think of somebody like Saddam. After we found out, after we went in we realized what this man had been doing to his own people. He used chemical weapons against his own people. If he had an inventory of weapons of mass destruction, what would he have done to us, to Israel, to anybody in the area? It was a threat. As it turns out, they weren't there. But that was a fascinating debate, as we went through that.

I was also involved in the debate for the first Gulf War when President George H. W. Bush—

SCOTT: Were you on Armed Services then?

ANSLEY: I was. That was fascinating.

SCOTT: Tell me about that. How do you think those two debates differ?

ANSLEY: Well, the one in 1990—that was the first one that I was involved in. I'm trying to think, that was before Clinton, so that was before the Balkans. That was really the first one that any of us had had to deal with in ages. That one was a lot closer, that was a five-vote margin. I remember sitting on the Senate floor when the vote was being cast and you could have heard a pin drop. It was one of those rare times when senators were in their seats and they stood up [to vote] when their names were called. It was really amazing. So that one was a little bit tighter in terms of the vote. But I don't think that there was a concern about whether we would

do it. It was more timing. Should we have waited longer? We had a huge UN coalition. There were UN resolutions.

What was interesting about the authorization to use force in all of the cases, they were all supported by a lot of UN resolutions, particularly the ones on Iraq. A lot of UN resolutions, and we had a lot of allies going in with us. It wasn't like it was some rogue U.S. operation in any of these cases. But we had at the time of the vote, there were hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops already prepositioned.

SCOTT: For the first—

ANSLEY: For the first Iraq [War]. Saddam had eliminated a country, something that in our lifetimes we had never seen that. Well, for the senators, they had lived through the [world] wars. So, it was a very tense time. Senator Nunn, who was chairman at the time—yes he was chairman; I think Warner was ranking—he [Senator Nunn] was opposed to this resolution. So it was a very difficult, a really difficult debate on that.

SCOTT: Senator Levin also opposed the resolution on the second one and offered an amendment hoping to—I wondered if, based on your assessment of their cooperative relationship (Senators Warner and Levin), does that change anything when the senators are clearly on opposite ends of an issue, and something of this magnitude, does it change anything?

ANSLEY: You know, it really doesn't. They are on opposite ends of a lot of issues, just in terms of their policy differences. Warner was a big supporter of Star Wars or missile defense, or whatever. Levin was one of the biggest opponents. In fact, it was the first year that Levin was chairman and Warner was ranking, Warner actually voted against reporting out the national defense authorization bill because of a provision on missile defense that Levin put in. That was then changed on the floor. It was flipped so Warner was able to support the bill in the end. They had a lot of policy disagreements because Levin is very liberal, Warner more on the conservative side. But it never impacted their personal relationship.

SCOTT: Or the operations of the committee?

ANSLEY: Or the operations of the committee, never did.

SCOTT: How often were you the only woman in a room of decision makers while you were here in the Senate?

ANSLEY: (laughs) Often. Very often.

SCOTT: Was that apparent to you at the time? Did you think about it? Were you conscious of it?

ANSLEY: You know, kind of yes and no. Yes, I was, but I had chosen a field and I had chosen a place to work where that just happened to be the case. I could be the only woman in a

staff meeting; I could be the only woman in a meeting at the Pentagon or at the committee. Oftentimes, when we traveled overseas, I would be the only woman. Yes, you have to develop a thick skin when you are in a meeting overseas and somebody comes up and asks you if you are the translator. I had that happen once. Our military escort was horrified. "No, she is the staff director!" (laughs) But these military guys just assume. So I had a lot of incidents like that where people assume that you are not there in a professional role. There were a lot of times that I would be the only woman in a room. That was okay. (laughs)

You have to prove yourself. It was different. I often felt like, coming up through the Armed Services Committee, that I had to work a lot harder than my male counterparts to achieve anything. I was always the lowest paid on the staff.

SCOTT: You were aware of that?

ANSLEY: Oh God yes. Oh, yes, yes. Salaries are all published. You know exactly who—but okay, if we have to be better, we'll be better. (laughs)

Yes, it's difficult. I have two daughters and I tell them, "You have no idea what it was like to be a woman in a profession where it's mostly men. Hopefully we did you some good and you don't have to put up with some of this stuff that we lived through." That's the way it was.

SCOTT: Did you experience overt discrimination? Did you have experiences where you thought you were treated differently because you were a woman?

ANSLEY: Yes. I can remember my very first day on the Armed Services Committee staff, one of the professional staff members—not the one that I was working for—came into my little cubby of an office and asked me to Xerox something for him. This was back in the day—when we were in school you were told as a woman don't learn how to type. If you know how to type, don't ever tell anybody because you'll be trapped into a clerical [job]. You want to be a professional. I thought, okay this is my first day on the job. This guy has been around forever. What do I do? I just looked at him and I said, "Is your staff assistant busy?" I think he was so taken aback that I didn't just jump up and do it for him that, "Oh, oh, well I guess I could check with her." I said, "Yes, that would be good." He never bothered me again. (laughs)

I didn't say it to be rude, but I was really offended. I didn't take this job—I had been working at CRS for a while in a professional capacity, I was hired as a professional. Would he have asked one of the men to Xerox for him? I don't think so. But he never bothered me again and I ended up getting along very well with him. I think that there were times that I saw things like that that. You know, you have to kind of take a stand.

Now, on the other hand, as staff director, if something needed to be done, I'd be standing at the Xerox machine Xeroxing. But that's different. That's more of a team type thing. That's more of, everybody pitches in. But that wasn't right, in my view. There are little things like that that would happen. And calling over to the Pentagon asking to talk to somebody and I was more

often than not asked, "Well, who are you placing the call for?" "Well, for myself!" (laughs) There is sort of that assumption. But that changed over the years. Quite frankly, people get to know you and it's fine. You have to do a little bit more, maybe, to establish that relationship or you did during those years as a woman. You look at the makeup of Armed Services. We had a lot of very older southern gentlemen. Yes, that made it a little bit difficult. But if you did your work and they knew you did your work, it was fine.

SCOTT: You mentioned offering counsel to your daughters. Did you also feel the need to counsel or mentor women in professional positions on the committee?

ANSLEY: Yes. I did that, I did that quite a bit. I would like to think that as I got into more of the management roles, they had less to deal with (laughs), but who knows! We had a lot of younger women who were working for us on the committee. If they ever needed to talk, or sometimes I would just sit them down and talk to them. I don't want to overblow it. It's not a huge thing.

Women have plenty of very good jobs on the Hill, especially now. I found that even though I wasn't paid as much, maybe I—I can remember that before I got promoted to a professional staff member, I had been doing the job for a minimum of a year, almost two years before they finally gave me the title to go with it. It was like, okay, yes it was frustrating at the time but they let me do the work. That to me was the most important thing, as long as I was able to operate as a professional, that was key.

SCOTT: Did you push for the title change yourself?

ANSLEY: Yes. You pretty much, on a committee staff—or, I would think on any staff—you kind of have to push. I think that is where, as women, we are probably not as good at that (laughs). It was difficult to do. It was difficult to do, but yes.

SCOTT: You mentioned to me earlier that Senator Warner had a number of professional female staffers in high powerful positions, influential positions. Did you have any sense for why that was? He was unique in that respect.

ANSLEY: I think Senator Warner, if he thought you were talented and capable—as you know working with members, a lot of it is personal rapport and how do you get along with them? It didn't matter to him. If the best person to do something was a woman, great. But I don't know. He was different, he was different in that way. Thank goodness he was! (laughs)

SCOTT: You took advantage of it!

ANSLEY: I did, yes!

SCOTT: In the last 25 years, or 30 maybe, there have certainly been a number of women who have entered the professional staff here in the Senate. That does mark a change in the

institution. There are a record number of women serving as members of the Senate at this point. Does it make a difference? From your perspective, does it matter to have more women around?

ANSLEY: Well, yes, I think it does. Everybody brings their own perspective. I think women will bring their own perspective as well. It's much more reflective of society at large. Why should there be a bunch of men in the room making all the decisions? Let's get more points of view in the room. Obviously, I think it's a very good development. It's good to see.

SCOTT: Looking back over the more than 20 years that you served in the Senate on staff, what do you think were some of the biggest changes that you witnessed? What changed here in the institution?

ANSLEY: Computers.

SCOTT: Yes!

ANSLEY: When I started we didn't have computers! (laughs)

SCOTT: How did that change the way you worked?

ANSLEY: It was fascinating. Well, everything had to be typed. Can you imagine thousands of pages of legislation or a committee report having to be typed? You didn't make changes quite as much! (laughs) That's one of the things that we did notice. You are on a computer and it's easy to make a change. That was a huge difference.

TV in the Senate. A huge change. Everybody started dressing a bit differently. The members all were told which ties looked the best. You could tell the color of ties. As staff, you had to be really careful about facial expressions if you are sitting next to a member or if you are behind them in a committee hearing. It was little things like that.

I'm not sure how much it changed the actual dynamics. Although, I think when TV first came to the Senate you were seeing members make a few longer and maybe more statements on issues because they weren't speaking to a quiet chamber in a sense. A little bit more posturing, maybe. (laughs) But did it fundamentally change the job? Probably not. So those were some, the technology changes were enormous, absolutely enormous. Cell phones. We had cell phones. I remember one of the older members that we had, members of our staff, who was notorious for you could never find him. I told him once, "You have to have your cell phone with you." There was one weekend and something was going on and I couldn't get in touch with him. The next staff meeting we had I said, "I told you that you had to have your cell phone." "Well, I did." I said, "Yes, but was it on?" "No, it wasn't." (laughs) It's little things like that. "Oh, you have to turn these on." But you have to catch up with all of that. (laughs)

SCOTT: Blackberries, email?

ANSLEY: Blackberries, oh my god. We had none of that when I started. You were a lot more accessible, good and bad. You never had a free minute because you had to have that Blackberry with you all the time. In some ways it makes things efficient.

SCOTT: Was Senator Warner a Blackberry adoptee? Did he take it with him?

ANSLEY: No, no. But he always knew how to get in touch with you. He would call one of his people to put a phone call through. He does use a cell phone now, but no, he really didn't [then]. Most of the members did not back when I was still here. I think it was still a little bit newer in terms of members sending out their own messages, or maybe it was just more so with the younger members, but Senator Warner didn't.

SCOTT: You left the Senate in 2005.

ANSLEY: I did.

SCOTT: I feel like a whole generation has passed. Technologically things have changed so much.

ANSLEY: Yes, they have. They have.

SCOTT: I should have asked: how do you define the role of staff director? You were staff director for Senate Armed Services Committee, tell me about that role.

ANSLEY: It's hard to describe. You are basically in charge of running the committee. Obviously for your member, for the chairman, but you are responsible for the staff on the Republican side. You are responsible for all of the administrative staff, which is non-designated. You are responsible for the hearings, the legislation, floor action, dealing with the other members and making sure their concerns are addressed. Helping the senator in structuring the committee, what subcommittees do you have? How are they run? Pretty broad, it's pretty broad.

I think every staff director does it probably a little bit differently. We would put together big books of legislation, which would be what would go in front of the members, huge, before markup. I would go through every single page. I would read through every single one of them and just make sure that it was in line with what the members, and particularly the chairman, wanted to be done. That it was grammatically correct, just all kinds of things like that. If I tripped over anything that legally didn't look right, I would get the counsel involved in that. I was pretty hands on. For my staff, I was probably a little bit too much hands on. I am very much a detail person, micro-manager, but I always found that with Senator Warner, he would expect me to know what was going on. In order for me to be able to respond when he would call and ask me about a particular issue, I felt like I needed to really know that issue. Not that I would block the staff. In fact, I always encouraged the staff to go and talk to him. If I ever had the chance, it would be like, "So-and-so is working on that, let me grab them and we'll come over and brief you." It's a big job.

SCOTT: Sounds like the kind of job that would make it difficult to sleep at times.

ANSLEY: Yes, and it did. (laughs)

SCOTT: I wanted to ask you about Senator McCain. Today he will be lying in state in the Capitol Rotunda. Clearly someone who has had a great impact on legislation for decades in the Senate, but also in particular on Armed Services where he has been chairman and ranking member for a number of years.

While you were a Senate staffer, you would have presumably worked fairly closely with his staff and maybe with the senator himself. Tell me your impressions of Senator McCain. How will he be remembered?

ANSLEY: I think he will be remembered the way he is being described this week: American hero, a true patriot, man of principle.

I think for the issues that I worked on in particular, he was a great voice in foreign policy. You were asking me earlier about the CODELs. McCain was the classic for a CODEL that never went to Paris, London, whatever. He went into all of the—what did Senator Graham say?—all of the "stans" whatever it was. Hard worker, unbelievable amount of energy. He will be remembered as a great man.

SCOTT: One last thing: Senate markups. The big book that you are going to work your way through for the markup. Tell me, what is a Senate markup like? I think there are a variety [of styles]. The classic, like Kennedy, Senator Kennedy, coming in and rolling up his sleeves and getting down into it. How did it work on Armed Services?

ANSLEY: Pretty much the same. Markup would take about a week. We do it subcommittee by subcommittee. There would be about 10 of those books that we would work through, because they would be by the titles of the bills, so there would be at least 10 of them. We do subcommittee markups first. You would get most of the stuff taken care of at the subcommittee level and only those things that couldn't be decided would get raised up to full committee. You would have the members, their coats are off on the back of their chairs. The staff actually are the ones testifying. If it was your provisions that were being discussed, you would be sitting at basically what would be the witness table. Members would ask questions and you would go through it. You would have a discussion, votes, and move on to the next provision. It would take a good week and long nights. (laughs) Really long nights. By the end of it, you want to be able to have something you would report out and to be able to do that by the end of the week, you are changing things every day. If there is an amendment that is accepted, you have to draft all of the legislation and the committee report language that goes with it, which all has to be agreed to on both sides. There is an awful lot of work. How they did it with typewriters is beyond me. It was a challenge even with computers because things would change so much to get it all right.

That's what it is. There weren't dark smoky rooms because by then there was no smoking, thank god! For Armed Services, it was closed, so we didn't have cameras. I think that actually moved it along a lot more quickly. We didn't have to worry about what was classified, what was not. You could discuss anything because you knew everybody in that room had the requisite clearance to be there. It was very interactive. Members all sitting around the table, getting involved. It's good. It is a good process.

SCOTT: That would be a really interesting place to be.

ANSLEY: Yes, it was.

SCOTT: In 2005 you left the Senate to go and work for the [Bush] administration.

ANSLEY: I did.

SCOTT: Tell me a little bit about that. I would love to know your impressions of Capitol Hill from the [perspective of] the executive branch. How different does it look?

ANSLEY: Oh yes, huge! (laughs) I went to work for the National Security Council staff as the senior director for Europe. When I had started on the committee, NATO and the European issues were something that I did a lot of work on. As soon as I got a call from the administration, I obviously told Senator Warner right way. As soon as he heard that they were offering me the European one he said, "I'm going to lose you aren't I?" I said, "Yes, you are!" (laughs) It was hard to leave, it really was, because I had been here for a long time. But I had always wanted to work on the NSC staff. To be given an opportunity as a foreign policy person, that's kind of the place that you want to be eventually.

What I found fascinating about it was how few people in the executive branch actually understand the legislative branch. I mean, you have your specialists, your congressional relations people who obviously knew it very well. But I can remember being in meetings in my office and people would be coming up with suggestions, "Oh, we need to do this." It was like, "How? You are never going to get that passed! Did you think about the next step in the process?" They wouldn't, because not many of the people that I worked with—I worked mostly with people from the State Department, a little bit from Defense, but from where I was in the White House mostly from State—most of them didn't have any congressional experience. So they didn't really understand it as much. I found it kind of fascinating. You have got to think a couple steps through the process. You can come up with whatever policy you want, but if there is any legislative repercussions, you have to get approval for what you want to do. That was something that was interesting with my background that I could contribute regardless of the policy involved. But it was interesting.

I kind of thought after having done both of them that everybody should be required to do an internship, to do something, a fellowship, something on the Hill because it gives you a perspective that you wouldn't get otherwise just from observing.

SCOTT: That's fascinating. Did you miss your time in the Senate? Were there things you looked back on fondly and wistfully?

ANSLEY: I loved being in the Senate. I did. I can remember the very last day that I was there, I walked over to the Senate floor when I still had one of those badges that could get me into anyplace and I just sat there as they were doing wrap up and I thought, god I'm not going to be able to do this anymore. It was a little bit bittersweet. I had been staff director for a few years, I had been through a number of bills, but this was just such an opportunity. Senator Warner understood. He was very gracious about it. I told him I would have never left for anything other than being able to work at the White House and get a little bit different experience.

Once I was there, it was really difficult to think back on anything. It is relentless, the pace of work. I didn't think it could get much worse than being here in the Senate as staff director, but I really missed recess. You would get to August and it was like, what do you mean there is no recess? It's six, seven days a week, throughout the year. It's a very different pace. It was nice to have both experiences, but I loved my time at the Senate.

SCOTT: Tell me about Senator Warner. Tell me about the kind of lawmaker he is, the type of senator he was.

ANSLEY: You know, he is truly one of the greatest people I've ever met. A true southern gentleman. I know that sounds just like a phrase but boy, he is the embodiment of it. He is gracious, he is respectful whether he agrees with you or not. There isn't a time when he calls—and he still calls (laughs), I talked to him earlier this week—that he doesn't ask about my kids, or my husband. I got married while I was working for him, and he insisted on meeting my husband before he would agree to the marriage, which was really kind of funny.

He cares about people. He cares about issues. He doesn't let politics get involved, which in some ways—as you know—has caused him some trouble with people. He does what he thinks is right. That's why people stay with him for so long. He demands a lot from people, but not in a way that's offensive, or demeaning, or even overly demanding. He is so nice when he is asking you to do something (laughs). He is a great man. We would have some really good debates. I would say probably 90 to 95 percent of the time we would agree. When we didn't, so what, he is the member. He made his choice and then you march off and support it. He was a wonderful person to work for. He gave me some great opportunities that I'll always be grateful for.

SCOTT: One thing that I'd like to ask about before we wrap up. Senator Tower, of course, chairman of the Armed Services Committee and later nominee to run the Pentagon. That was a historic debate in the Senate about that nomination. What do you recall about that debate? Were you on the Armed Services Committee staff at that point?

ANSLEY: I was. It was horrible because we were still all technically working for Tower. There were a lot of people from the staff who were planning to go over to the Pentagon and work

with him, certainly his top people, right? I think he was treated horribly by the Senate. He would have been a great secretary of defense. I think the things that were said about him were—I didn't have access to all the information—but I think that there were a lot of political scores that were being settled. I just think he was not treated very well. That was too bad.

SCOTT: I think Senator Nunn took—

ANSLEY: —and some of his staff—

SCOTT: —took a lot of heat over the—

ANSLEY: Yes, yes. I had worked for Tower. There was more drinking back in the Senate back then. He was not the only one, you know. I never saw him incapacitated, impacted at all by alcohol. There were other senators who were, some of whom voted against him. So I thought it was a little bit hypocritical. I thought there were people who didn't want him to be secretary. I thought that was a very sad chapter in the Senate because there is usually a lot more respect between members and it really broke down at that point, and it was never entirely clear to me why. I'm sure there are people who know more about it, and who knows, maybe there were reasons why it was done. But from a fairly junior staff perspective of the time, I just thought he was treated horribly.

SCOTT: Thank you so much for your time. I really appreciate it. Is there anything that you think we've missed? Anything that you'd like to add?

ANSLEY: No, I think this is great that you are doing this and letting some of the women who are here now know what has come before. It's interesting. I think we've made great strides. Like you said, we have so many more female members and staff that it's much more a reflection of society and I think it's wonderful.

SCOTT: Thank you, Judy.

ANSLEY: Yes, sure.

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