Preface

John Dennis Lane was born in 1921 in Norwalk, Connecticut. He came to Washington to attend Georgetown University, from which he graduated with a BS degree in 1943. He also received a law degree from Georgetown Law School, following service in the U.S. Marine Corps during World War II. From 1949 to 1952 he served on the staff of Senator Brien McMahon, Democrat of Connecticut, first as executive secretary and then as administrative assistant.

Senator McMahon (1903-1952) had first won national attention as head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, successfully prosecuting criminal cases and frequently arguing before the Supreme Court. He won election to the Senate in 1944 and sponsored the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which created the Atomic Energy Commission and asserted civilian control over nuclear energy and weapons. Senator McMahon then chaired the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. He also served as Democratic Conference secretary. Highly regarded by the national news media, he withstood potshots from the crusading anti-Communist Senator Joseph R. McCarthy and won reelection to the Senate in 1950.

When President Harry Truman said that he would not seek another term in 1952, Senator McMahon announced his candidacy for the Democratic presidential nomination. Although the nation had not yet elected a Catholic as president, McMahon became a serious contender until he was diagnosed with an inoperable tumor. He died on July 28, 1952, shortly after hearing his name placed in nomination at the Democratic convention in Chicago from a hospital in Washington.

John Lane recounts Senator McMahon’s brief but notable Senate career and his bid for the presidency. While on the Senate staff, Lane also came to know Senators John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, and during the Kennedy administration he served on a special presidential commission to study regulatory commissions. He was a partner in the Washington law firm of Wilkes, Artis, Hedrick & Lane, and chaired several committees of the American Bar Association, for which he also reviewed the qualifications of presidential nominees to the federal judiciary. From 1991 to 1992, Lane was president of the Federal Communications Bar Association, and during the administration of President Bill Clinton he worked in the White House vetting judicial nominations. He died on August 18, 2012.
About the Interviewer: Donald A. Ritchie is associate historian of the Senate Historical Office. A graduate of the City College of New York, he received his Ph.D. in history from the University of Maryland. His books include *James M. Landis: Dean of the Regulators* (Harvard University Press, 1980); *Press Gallery: Congress and the Washington Correspondents* (Harvard, 1991); *The Oxford Guide to the United States Government* (Oxford University Press, 2001); *Reporting from Washington: The History of the Washington Press Corps* (Oxford, 2005), and *Our Constitution* (Oxford, 2006). He served as president of the Oral History Association and of Oral History in the Mid-Atlantic Region (OHMAR), and received OHMAR's Forrest C. Pogue Award for distinguished contributions to the field of oral history.
WITH BRIEN McMAHON  
Interview #1  
October 12, 2006

RITCHIE: I’d like to talk about you and your background. I see that you were born in Norfolk, Connecticut.

LANE: Norwalk.

RITCHIE: Norwalk, okay. And I wondered what your family did there. What was your family story in Norwalk?

LANE: My father was born in 1888 in Waterbury, Connecticut. His father came here at age three from Ireland and had worked in the mills. Connecticut, particularly in those days, had big factories and mills in every town. And somehow the family moved to Norwalk. Somewhere around the turn of the century they wound up there. My mother was born in New York City in 1890, and she graduated from New York Teachers College which is now Hunter College. She taught school in Connecticut. Her family moved out of New York City to Connecticut somewhere around 1910, and I was born in 1921.

RITCHIE: And you grew up in Norwalk?

LANE: Yes. My father was originally a chauffeur and he then saved his money and bought a failing gas station and put a lot of energy and effort into it and made it into a successful business. I used to have to work there after school and summers and vacations, which work I enjoyed. He was kind enough to give me a good education. Sent me to Georgetown. I graduated from the Foreign Service School at Georgetown.

RITCHIE: I saw that you were a graduate of Norwalk High School. They had you on the distinguished alumni list, and I noticed that Senator Brien McMahon was a graduate of that school as well.

LANE: That’s right, about 20 years before me.
**RITCHIE:** So I wondered if perhaps the high school might have been an important connection for you in that regard.

**LANE:** It really wasn’t. This is the depths of the Depression, and in those days there weren’t many scholarships available. Only the rich kids went to college. I never thought I would go to college. I was looking forward to probably working, like most of my classmates, in the factories around there. My mother just got so upset when I told her that I wasn’t going to go to college that she insisted that I straighten out and apply. I was accepted at NYU, but I was a year young for my age. My father gave me a year in a prep school so that I could get into almost any college. Somehow I picked Georgetown, because I was fascinated by Washington, D.C., and the opportunities and all the action, particularly with the New Deal. I wanted to get here—and I came.

**RITCHIE:** What year was that when you came?

**LANE:** The fall of 1940. I was in my second year when the war broke out in December of 1941. The following week I joined the marines. I went down to the Washington Navy Yard and joined the marines along with a whole group of students, most of them athletes.

**RITCHIE:** How did you decide to join the marines?

**LANE:** I wanted to get out of school. [laughs] I liked the marine uniform and the tradition. I kind of was attracted by it. There was a former president of the yard at Georgetown who was doing recruiting. His dress blues looked very good. I think he was a second or first lieutenant, but he was recruiting college students. And they had a program, which I didn’t realize at the time, they took us in the marines—I never had to register for the draft because I was in the service—and they sent us back to Georgetown in the reserves but not on active duty. I went on the accelerated program and finished four years of college in three. Then they sent us, as soon as we graduated, off to boot camp.

**RITCHIE:** Parris Island.
**LANE:** Parris Island, and then from there to Quantico to the OCS [Officers Candidate School], and then what they call Reserve Officer’s Class followed that. And then they sent you to some more schools. It was a great experience.

**RITCHIE:** Did you get into the war at all?

**LANE:** Oh, yes.

**RITCHIE:** Where were you stationed?

**LANE:** Well, I was all over the place. They sent me to Harvard for awhile, to the navy communications school. Well, then I picked up a specialty, besides being an infantry troop commander, I was a communications officer. I went out, first down to Cherry Point, North Carolina, and then to California and San Diego and then out to the Pacific. I was on an aircraft carrier for awhile. I wound up at the headquarters of the Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force Air, and became more than just the communications officer. It was a small staff, and about once a month he’d take a trip around to the hot spots.

**RITCHIE:** All over the Pacific?

**LANE:** Right. Flying around in a DC-3, island hopping.

**RITCHIE:** Pretty dangerous, wasn’t it?

**LANE:** I suppose so. Of course, everything was dangerous then. They were very dark days. No sign of any let up. It just was getting worse. The further we went toward Japan, the tougher it got. And those last two big battles were horrible. Iwo—I lost several of my friends there, classmates of mine at Georgetown. And Okinawa was terrible. Then we found out about the bomb. Nobody knew about it. The highest levels of the Marine Corps, they had no knowledge of it. And the whole world changed overnight.

**RITCHIE:** And the war ended.

**LANE:** And I was one of the first out. I came back in September 1945.
RITCHIE: That was very fortunate.

LANE: It was, but I got back and there were no jobs. All of industry had been on a war footing and all of the sudden there’s no war, and there’s no business, and nobody’s hiring anybody. Plants were shutting down and cutting back. So I had the GI bill and I decided that I should use it because I couldn’t sit around home, in my mother’s home. [laughs] So I went to Georgetown and they gave me a room and board scholarship, plus the GI bill to pay for tuition and books. It cost me nothing to go to law school.

RITCHIE: That’s great. Now, as an undergraduate, you were in foreign service. Did you think about continuing on with that?

LANE: Yes, I wanted to take the State Department exam while I was out in the Pacific and they said no, it’s only given at certain times and I think they gave it in San Francisco. There was no way I could get there. I wrote a letter to my senator and said this is unfair. I got a letter back from, I think it was Cordell Hull saying, “It’s unfortunate, but we can’t give it to the troops stationed around the world..” When I got back I looked at business and I did get an offer from Socony-Vacuum—it’s now Mobil, Exxon Mobil—but it was in Indonesia. Ten thousand dollars a year, which was more money than I ever thought I’d make. But I had enough foreign service, so I wasn’t about to go back out there. When we were out there, we never thought we’d get back. We just lived from day to day.

RITCHIE: When you decided, then, to go to law school, did you have anything in mind as to what you were going to do with the law?

LANE: No, not really. I never thought I’d be a lawyer. But then, as I got into it, I liked it. And I did quite well in law school. When I got out, again, there was a recession. There weren’t any jobs. It took me a long time, but I found a job. I figured I wanted to be a tax lawyer because that was a new field in law, because taxes until the war came along were not important. The only way you became a tax lawyer was to work in the Internal Revenue, so I shot for that and I finally made it. I got there and I found it was a terrible job. It was a fate worse than death. I mean, you were just a glorified file clerk, the government lawyer. It was very slow and you couldn’t do anything without getting all these approvals from supervisors and section chiefs. It was very dull.
RITCHIE: Could you tell me the story again about taking your bar exam?

LANE: Oh, yes. As I recall, it was a three-day exam and we prepped for it by going to a bar review course. It was given in the summertime down at the old Georgetown Law School at 6th and E Northwest. In those days, they had no air conditioning. The windows were open and they had a couple of fans, but it was hotter than Hades for those days. I got through it and passed.

RITCHIE: You mentioned who you were sitting next to when you took the exam.

LANE: Oh yes, James McCauley Landis, I didn’t know who he was. He was writing feverishly and I was writing these relatively short answers, and I was very worried. Then I found out during one of the breaks that it was Jim Landis who had been Dean of the Harvard Law School. He was sitting right next to me. We went alphabetical: L-A-N-D . . . L-A-N-E.

RITCHIE: He had never taken the bar exam.

LANE: Yes, he told me he’d never taken it. He had just been fired by [President Harry] Truman at the time. He had been chairman of the CAB, and I guess he was out of a job and he figured he needed to get the bar in order to be able to do legal work. He became Joe Kennedy’s lawyer. I think Joe took care of him.

RITCHIE: Yes, thanks to Tommy Corcoran, who set the two of them up.

LANE: Yes, Tommy was Joe’s lawyer at one time and they had a big falling out.

RITCHIE: How, then, did you come from the Internal Revenue Service to Capitol Hill?

LANE: An accident. One of my friends at the Internal Revenue Service, another young lawyer, his brother was the U.S. attorney in the District. He was a United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, Morris Fay—George Morris Fay—and Bill Fay was my friend. I told Bill that I didn’t like the job. I wanted to be a trial lawyer and go
down there and be an assistant DA. So he introduced me to his brother and his brother said, “Well, you have to get a letter from your senator.” And Fay knew Senator McMahon. So I said, “Okay, let me see what I can do, because we’re from the same hometown. But, you know, he’s older than I am.” Frankly, I’d never met him. But I had followed his career as a lawyer in the Justice Department. He had a tremendous career fighting the mob in Chicago with a series of important trials that he had won and made his reputation and ran for the Senate based on that.

I went up to Capitol Hill—and it was hard getting an appointment—I was dealing with his administrative assistant at the time. Finally I got to see him and he started asking me some questions and he said, “Well I know this guy. Are you any relation to George Lane?” I said, “Yeah, that’s my uncle.” He said, “Well, he was in my class in high school.” He says, “How’d you like to run this office?” I almost fell off my chair. He said, “When I was your age, I’d give my right arm right up to here for this job.” He said, “I’ve got to run for reelection. I’ve got to raise money. I’ve got to carry the load of the Foreign Relations Committee. I’ve got to run the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. I’m on the Commerce Committee but I haven’t got any time for it. And I’ve got to be on the floor. This office is a mess. Take it and run it.” Wow! This is the job I really wanted and never applied for!

When I was in the Internal Revenue, I parked my car on the Mall. Literally on the Mall, just park right out there and then walk across Constitution Avenue and into the building. When I finished work I’d head back, walking across the Mall, and I’d look up and the sun would be setting and it would shine on that glass up there in the Capitol dome. I used to look at that thing every day and I thought, man, that’s where I want to be. I would love to work up there. That is the place to be. And lo and behold, my prayers were answered. His office was unique in that his senatorial office was in the Capitol, on the first floor. That’s why I said when I came in, I had a parking space right at the entrance to the Capitol, the Senate entrance but near the dome. There’s a second set of doors before you go under the big, main steps, not the Senate side steps but the other steps?

RITCHIE: Yes.
LANE: Right there along that sidewalk right by the entrance. That’s where the Supreme Court Chamber is.

RITCHIE: They used to call it the Law Library door.

LANE: Yes, it was the law library. Well, the law library is upstairs on the gallery, but actually it was the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy offices during that period, in the Old Supreme Court Chamber.

RITCHIE: So he had his office close to that?

LANE: Right across the main hallway. His office looked down the Mall on the other side of the Capitol, on the west side. There were three rooms there. One like a reception room, a small office, and then his office, a big office. Then we had some additional space down below, out you know where that—

RITCHIE: The terraces, yes.

LANE: Yes, under that terrace, there’s offices. You could look out my window and I could see where they were working down there.

RITCHIE: So how many people were on the staff then?

LANE: We had relatively small staffs. Not like today. Nothing was like today. Gee, we had four people in that office which is the entrance to the suite, and there were two people in the small one, that’s six, and then the senator. And then I think I had four more people down below. How many is that?

RITCHIE: About 10 or 12, something like that.

LANE: Yeah, that’s right. See, I’m saying, “yeah,” and I shouldn’t.

RITCHIE: That’s okay. But when he said, “take over the office,” what did you have to do?
LANE: Well, I became what they call executive secretary, which was the number two person. He had a very talented man by the name of Eddie Roddan—Edward L. Roddan—who was appointed ambassador to Uruguay by Truman while I was working there. Then I became the administrative assistant, the top job. Eddie was a former newspaper man. He had been a White House correspondent for Hearst. He was very close to FDR and wrote Farley’s book, Behind the Ballots.

RITCHIE: Oh, yes?

LANE: A very talented writer, but had nothing to do with the administration of the office. He was working on strategy and helping with speeches—not so much writing the speeches, but developing the thoughts and the theme. He was a very bright guy, very talented. So I had to run the secretaries and handle the mail. That’s really what I started out doing. The mail would come in in the morning and we had somebody open it and pile it up on my desk. Then I’d call the secretaries in and start dictating.

I learned very fast that to find out what was going on in Washington, you had to know, and the way to do it was to read the New York Times every morning. From then on, every day of my life, I read the New York Times, because they had the top guys covering the Pentagon, the State Department, the Treasury Department, both sides of Capitol Hill. Then we had a news ticker in the office so we could stay on top of developing stories, which was very important because there were a lot of little crises going on in foreign affairs and in national affairs. The senator was kind of a central figure in a lot of this and the press would come running over. They’d all of the sudden descend on the office and he had to be briefed before they hit the door. So things that were happening, I could follow during the day and go over and rip and read. It was an AP [Associated Press] ticker in a soundproof box, so it wouldn’t be too noisy. It was a very exciting period. I was very young. The Hartford paper said I was the youngest administrative assistant in the Senate.

RITCHIE: Well, Senator McMahon was pretty young also, wasn’t he?

LANE: Forty-eight when he died, yes. I was looking, just to refresh my recollection, I looked at the old Senate Directory, for 1952. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which he was very much interested in, much more than anything else, even
though he chaired Atomic Energy and went through all those problems of the AEC investigations and all that. The senators ahead of him in seniority, and this was over 50 years ago, Walter George was 75 and more occupied and interested in the Finance Committee and taxes. Tom Connally was 75, and Theodore Francis Green was 85. This was 50 years ago when 75 was much older than it is today. And they weren’t in that great shape, physically or mentally, in my judgement. I mean, they were all great men, but . . . . So the administration realized that, and the guy that was the hod carrier for the administration on a lot of these important things was Brien McMahon. Jack McFall was the assistant secretary of state. Before that, a guy that was killed—he was our ambassador in Guatemala.

RITCHIE: Peurifoy?

LANE: Jack Peurifoy, he was [Dean] Acheson’s lobbyist/liaison with the Senate, and he used to practically live in our office. He was there almost every day.

RITCHIE: To know what was going on?

LANE: Yes, or to tell us.

RITCHIE: And the Foreign Relations Committee met in the Capitol in those days, too. On the first floor.

LANE: Right, just down the hall. McMahon used to like to have lunch in his own office and they used to just haul it right down from the Senate Restaurant which was just down the hall. He’d invite people in for lunch and, once in awhile, invite me along with important people like the secretary of the air force or the secretary of the navy, or other senators.

RITCHIE: What can you tell me about Senator McMahon? What kind of a person was he?

Photograph on following page of Senator Brien McMahon (D-Connecticut, 1945-1952)
LANE: He was a great guy, actually. He was so young and most everybody he dealt with, with any power—people that had power—were all so much older. Even though he was so young, he always tried to make himself older. You know what I mean? For people who didn’t know him, he had sort of a gruff exterior, but he was very bright and really had a heart of gold. Not a real sensitive fellow, but his exterior appearance was a very strong personality. He’d look right through you. But he was actually a real nice guy. A lot of fun to work with.

RITCHIE: I was looking at Francis Wilcox’s interview and he admired Senator McMahon’s ability to question people at hearings.

LANE: Oh, yes.

RITCHIE: He particularly thought he did a terrific job when General MacArthur came to testify, that McMahon really got MacArthur in a corner in his testimony.

LANE: He nailed him. And you know who developed that line of cross-examination? That’s the one big moment of my life.

RITCHIE: Oh!

LANE: I did it.

RITCHIE: Can you tell me about that?

LANE: Oh, yes. That’s a great story. I have to back up a little bit. McMahon had fought the battle of civilian control over the bomb, with the army. Of course, he was accused of taking the bomb away from the military, and that’s what happened when they created the civilian AEC. The original draft legislation that was approved by Truman, the May-Johnson Bill, was to have the Pentagon run the nuclear business, the old atomic energy bomb building. McMahon thought it was a mistake and that this ought to be run by civilians. He had a big battle, a historic battle, turning the administration around, and turning the president around, and beating the Pentagon for the establishment of what kind of an apparatus we’d have for dealing with it in the future. So he’s very sensitive on the importance of civilian control of the military.
When Truman decided to fire MacArthur, he called McMahon down and told him he was going to do it. McMahon said, “Chief, I think it’s a mistake to fire him and leave him out there running around. I think you ought to call him back to here or to Wake Island again or to Hawaii or someplace, and then fire him.” But Truman asked him whether he would back him up if he did it. He said, “I will.” So the day that it broke into the press that Truman had canned him, McMahon was making a speech that night in Portland, Oregon, to the Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner. We worked that speech. He was actually the first one to back up Truman in that speech that night in Portland, Oregon. I remember I sent that speech to all of the newspapers around the country and I made the mistake of sending it under his frank. It was a political speech and it should have had postage. Some newspaper got a hold of it and wrote an editorial, I think it was the Wall Street Journal or something, saying, you know, “This is atrocious.” Geez, I got a hold of the Post Office department and got a check down there immediately, and paid the postage on it.

So, he was committed to backing Truman on this very unpopular decision. I was here, and I don’t know where you were at that time, but when MacArthur made that speech to the Joint Session of Congress, I was over there in the Capitol. He just took the country by storm. I mean, it was a very, very good speech. When they started preparing for these hearings—I’ll tell you a few stories about the hearings because it gets kind of interesting. And this brings back my own memory. I haven’t refreshed my recollection on this at all. So McMahon gets me involved directly with him as his counsel on this whole thing, and I turned over my routine stuff to another young man from Connecticut, a Harvard Law School graduate, George Carroll. And I just worked with the senator and the White House, and the Pentagon.

We had to prepare for this onslaught. Truman had appointed a former Congressman from Colorado, and later a senator, John Carroll, to head the White House effort on rebutting MacArthur and getting out what they claimed was the real story or the truth. A former professor of mine at Georgetown, Frank Nash, who was assistant secretary of defense, was the Pentagon lead, with Felix Larkin, the general counsel at the Pentagon. We began to have a couple of meetings, and they said to me, “We’re going to release all of these cables to you.” I remember John Carroll saying, “You’re going to get the whole thing! It’s going to be devastating. Wait until you see this stuff.” (He hadn’t even read it). But these cables were very routine and they were all on basic military
matters. So I started reading this stuff. Piles of it. I go through it and I said, “God, this stuff is nothing.”

We had a big meeting at McMahon’s house. It was the night before the hearing started, and let me remember this, Frank Nash was there, John Carroll was there, Eddie Roddan, who I had mentioned earlier, yours truly, and McMahon. I think that was it. This was to prepare for the hearing. They’re all talking about these cables and what MacArthur said, and what he did, and the Joint Chiefs and everything. I said, after they got into this and they weren’t getting anywhere—I mean, it was just a lot of who struck john garbage, you know? I said, “I don’t mean to talk out of turn, but I don’t think you’ll get anywhere arguing with MacArthur on strictly military matters. The guy’s an expert at military matters. I think that the biggest thing that I see, where his big weakness is, and nobody has picked it up, is the key in his speech—and I can remember the words—when he said ‘the issues are global, and to neglect one area of the globe at the expense of another is to court disaster.’”

By the way of background, Russia and China had a mutual assistance pact. If one of them would go to war, the other one would come in and help. And we knew that. If we went to war with China, we’d be fighting the Russians, too. McMahon knew and the Pentagon and the top brass at the White House should have known that at that particular point in time our so-called “nuclear arsenal,” atomic weapons, were not in the best of shape, because the bombs that we had had—I think it was all highly classified but all of our top leaders knew or should have known about it—were being removed to make smaller weapons and to trigger the H-bomb. So this would be the worst possible time, during that period, if we had to go to war, if we had to go into a nuclear showdown with the Russians. By this time, the Russians had the bomb.

So I developed a line of cross-examination—well, McMahon was smart, he picked it up very quickly—to test MacArthur’s knowledge of, since he said “the issues are global,” the state of the globe. See, he thought we were all just interested in Europe at the expense of the Far East, which wasn’t true, but Europe was always more important to us than the Far East. That was clear from our policies. But nevertheless, we developed this where McMahon would ask him a question about the state of our nuclear arsenal. He said, “Senator, I have no knowledge of that. I’m just an area commander.” And another one, “I remind you, Senator, I’m just an area commander. I don’t have that
responsibility.” Or “I don’t have that.” And then McMahon just pulls his own speech on him and says “You’ve proved my point. You are just an area commander and therefore, there are other considerations than just what you see in an area.”

“When we were in the marines, we had a name for it,” I remember telling McMahon that night. You become “Asiatic.” If you’re out there long enough the whole world revolves around Asia. Everything else is relatively unimportant. I said, “This guy’s been out there so long that he’s Asiatic, but he’s a very bright guy.” And so I remember Eddie Roddan saying, “Goddamn it, he has it! John’s got it! That’s it. Just focus on that and you’ll take him down.” And he did. The trouble is a reporter called him the morning before and started talking to him about MacArthur going on a “reconnaissance in force,” and McMahon led with that rather than with my line of questioning. So he sort of fell into the same old trap and started talking about military maneuvering and stuff. You’re not gonna do anything to him there. At the same time, in the hearings—these hearings were very critical. And they were holding it in closed sessions and releasing—

RITCHIE: A sanitized version.

LANE: Yes, like shortly thereafter. They were issuing these like three or four times a day while the hearings were going on. And the hearings went on. I remember McMahon saying, “Geez, this guy is really strong. He just sits there. He comes there in the morning, and he doesn’t go to the bathroom or anything. He just sits there and is very, very strong.” He was living in the Waldorf and flying down here every day. Did you know that?

RITCHIE: No.

LANE: Yes. He had his military plane. Somehow they would go back to New York at night and go live in the Waldorf Towers.

RITCHIE: One of the staff, I think it was Pat Holt, said that MacArthur would never take a drink of water while he was testifying.
LANE: Yes, that is why he never had to go to the bathroom. That’s the thing that got McMahon. I think Pat Holt is quoted in some book that I read where McMahon’s the one who got to MacArthur.

RITCHIE: Yes, and Francis Wilcox was also very impressed with McMahon about how good he was at questioning him and pinning him on that stuff.

LANE: Well, he was a very good trial lawyer, as just a young kid in the Justice Department out in Chicago. I’ll tell you about some of those stories. They were fabulous.

RITCHIE: Oh, sure.

LANE: What happened was McMahon got a job in the Justice Department, given to him by Homer Cummings, who was the attorney general for Roosevelt. Cummings was from Stamford, Connecticut, which is close to Norwalk. Homer Cummings told me this story because I was writing a book on McMahon, so I got a lot of really good stuff before Homer died. He said, “A lot of people think that I, you know, brought him along and favored him in the department.” He said, “Quite the contrary.” He said this mutual friend of theirs introduced him and wanted him to give McMahon a job in the Department of Justice. He said, “I saw him and I gave him the lowest job in the department, a lawyer in the bowels of the tax division. And I never expected to see him again the rest of my life.” [laughs] He said, “He rose to my attention by winning cases.” He said, “I was reluctant to promote him because I might be accused of favoritism because he came from Connecticut, but he earned everything.” Finally, he said, “I made him assistant attorney general in charge of the criminal division.” He was the youngest assistant that ever held the job, only because he won.

RITCHIE: What qualities do you attribute that to?

LANE: He was a very bright guy. Very broad in his education. Heavy reader. Read everything. Always had a book. Very much interested in foreign affairs and very much interested in peace. That was his mission. He could not figure out why we can’t have peace in the world. And we should wage it. Instead of waging war, we should be waging peace. He offered to give up the chairmanship of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy if he could get the subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee on the
Voice of America. His real passion was penetrating the Iron Curtain to get to the people. He believed that you could turn that, if you could only get through and get around the tyrants in the Kremlin.

Right in the middle of the Cold War, he proposed a peace resolution. I don’t know if you ever saw that. It was a Joint Resolution in the Senate expressing the friendship of the American people for the Russian people, or I guess the Soviet people, and all the peoples of the world. Right in the heart of the worst part of the Cold War. He got it through the Senate, and through the House, and Truman signed it. Then he went to the Voice of America and said, “Truman has sent this and they are silent. They’re not telling their people about it. Start hitting them!” Finally the Russians acknowledged it. But we were able to say that they don’t want the people to know that we’re friends and we’re not looking for a war. Same problem you have in North Korea today. Nobody’s getting through to those poor dumb people. But this was his passion. And this was why he wanted to get the Foreign Relations Committee chairmanship eventually.

And, you know, the three guys ahead of him, as I started to tell you before, Walter George was 75, and Tom Connally was 75—but they were old 75—and Theodore Francis Green was 85.


LANE: Well, Fulbright told me, “If McMahon hadn’t died, I never would have been chairman.”

RITCHIE: He just assumed that McMahon was going to be chairman.

LANE: Well he was ahead of him in seniority. Yes, he would have been, McMahon was the next in line, and then Fulbright. Fulbright had worked for McMahon in the Justice Department. They were friends but Fulbright resented the fact that McMahon had seniority. They both came to the Senate in 1944. Fulbright contended that since he had served in the House he should get seniority. McMahon prevailed in countering that Connecticut was a state longer than Arkansas.

RITCHIE: It’s interesting that he would take on atomic energy as issue right away, given the fact that he was—
LANE: He was a brand new senator, yes.

RITCHIE: And that was a very technical issue to be involved in.

LANE: It was technical and it was also strategic. I don’t know how far you’ve gotten into that early Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the previous select committee of the Senate that McMahon chaired, because he put a resolution in to do it and they made him chairman. When they finally got the bill through, the McMahon Act, then he became chairman of the Joint Committee. You know, all the other Senate committee members were the chairmen to the standing committees?

RITCHIE: Oh.

LANE: They were the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, chairman of the Commerce Committee, chairman of the Finance Committee. It was the elders of the Senate on the Senate side. Now the House was different. But on the Senate side you had all the seniors and young McMahon in his first term. I’m not sure they trusted him that much. That’s the reason the elders all got on the committee.

RITCHIE: People like Richard Russell and others.

LANE: Yes, Russell was on the committee, from the Armed Services Committee, and before him Tydings. But that’s all it was, was just the standing committee chairmen were the other members of the Senate side of the Joint Committee.

RITCHIE: So they wanted him to handle it but they wanted to keep an eye on him while he was handling it.

LANE: Right. I think so. But he handled it with grace, and got along with them.

RITCHIE: And he seemed very much part of the institution or the establishment.
LANE: Oh, yes. He was secretary of the Democratic Conference. He was on the
Senate Democratic Policy Committee. Yes, he was somebody to reckon with. And very
young.

RITCHIE: That was when Scott Lucas was the majority leader—and the
Democrats were a hard majority to control.

LANE: But in 1950, Lucas was defeated. Francis Myers, who was the whip, was
defeated, and McMahon was reelected in—in those days—a Republican state. So he was
somebody to reckon with.

RITCHIE: I was wondering about the Joint Committee. Today everything is
pretty bureaucratic here and a senator’s office is separate from a committee office. Was
that true then or was there more of a connection?

LANE: No, he kept it separate. This was the time of the [Joseph] McCarthys and
the [Pat] McCarrans and the [William] Jenners and the spooks, so he kept the committee
really welled off from everything else. I didn’t get too involved with the committee other
than keeping track of what was going on. I kept my hand out of that committee. There
was a young lawyer by the name of Bill Borden who ran it. He was the staff director. No,
it was quite isolated from everything else and from McMahon’s office, even though it
was across the hall.

RITCHIE: They actually met in the Old Supreme Court Chamber?

LANE: Yes, they had their meetings in there, because it was a secure place.
Somehow they put in some kind of security protection. They had a security officer and,
you know, you couldn’t go in or out of there without signing in or being cleared.

RITCHIE: The Senate still uses the Old Senate Chamber above it for debates on
classified information. They move from the current chamber down to that chamber.

LANE: They do? To go into executive session?

RITCHIE: Yes.
LANE: I thought they had that room upstairs in the new part of the Capitol.

RITCHIE: They do but that’s just a small committee room and that’s just for when the Intelligence Committee or another committee has a classified briefing.

LANE: In those days I almost never had to go to the Senate Office Building. See, he was on the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee too, and that was up on the gallery level of the Capitol on the Senate side. So all of his committees were in the Capitol.

RITCHIE: So you never really had any cause to go across the street.

LANE: No, and he didn’t park in that Senate garage, he parked right were I did. I had a parking space on the Capitol plaza and he had a space right there at the entrance. So I never had to go to the Senate Office Building. Hardly ever.

RITCHIE: Was that a conscious choice on his part? He didn’t want to be over there in the office building with the other senators? He’d rather be near his committees?

LANE: Not only that, but it was Hiram Johnson’s old office.

RITCHIE: Oh.

LANE: One of the great senators from California. Hiram died in office and that office was empty and McMahon said, “Gee that would be great but I don’t have seniority.” But nobody else put in for it and he got it. He just moved everything over there. And also it was hard to find, which meant he wasn’t bothered with all the peddlers and the lobbyists and everything.

RITCHIE: The constituents, I suppose, didn’t drop by very often back then.

LANE: Yes, but if they did, they were very impressed, because he was the only senator with his offices in the Capitol. Very impressive and beautiful. It wasn’t very big, but right out his window you could look right down the Mall at the Washington Monument and the Lincoln Memorial.
RITCHIE: Those offices are used by the sergeant at arms right now.

LANE: It was the secretary of the majority’s office for awhile.

RITCHIE: Yes.

LANE: And after McMahon died they gave it to a senator from Michigan who was crippled—

RITCHIE: Oh, Charles Potter.

LANE: Charles Potter, yes. Hiram Johnson had his whole operation there and I think he only had one person who was his secretary, a woman who sat out in the front. If people wanted jobs, he said, “I’m not an employment office. The people of California sent me here to legislate.” He used to spend his time on the floor. The elevator right outside the door went right up to the chamber floor. It was a very, very good spot to be.

RITCHIE: Yes. Now you mentioned that you got a security clearance when you were there?

LANE: Yes.

RITCHIE: You felt that even though you weren’t part of the Joint Committee—

LANE: Well, just to protect McMahon and protect me. Yes, I got it.

RITCHIE: Because he had to deal with so much classified information.

LANE: Highest level, yes.

RITCHIE: And you must have had people coming into the office who were talking to him about classified information all the time.

LANE: Oh, all the time. I mean, [J. Robert] Oppenheimer would be sitting on my couch out in front of my office. [Admiral Hyman] Rickover, cabinet officers. I had
security clearance when I was in the marines, because I was with the Communications Office—you get the top-secret clearance. But I had to get a whole new one because the AEC had their own Q clearance.

RITCHIE: Right. And Senator McMahon—people seem to be impressed that he sort of knew what he was talking about when he dealt with classified issues.

LANE: Well, when this stuff broke he went to school at the Bureau of Standards. There was Doctor [Edward U.] Condon—he later went to Corning Glass—he was a governmental expert on matters nuclear. McMahon went and got a crash course from him on what this is all about. Then he held a whole series of hearings where he brought all the top scientific people, all the best minds in, to advise us as to what should be done. A lot of the hearings were not published because they couldn’t get a reporter that was cleared. But Chris Boland, a McMahon protege, is still alive and he was the counsel for that Special Senate Committee on Atomic Energy that held that series of hearings. I’ve got the hearings that they have and the report in my library.

But Hiram Johnson didn’t have a staff.

RITCHIE: That’s amazing for a senator from California.

LANE: I remember [Alben] Barkley when he was vice president, and the vice president’s office was upstairs on the floor level. He just had a woman, Flo Bratten, and a guy who was like a runner or messenger, a guy by the name of [William W.] Vaughn. And I think he had one other person. He used to drive his own car. He’d park it in the garage. It was a convertible with the top down! No security of any kind. One night, I remember talking to him maybe the week after they tried to assassinate Truman down there at the Blair House, those Puerto Rican terrorists. Truman ordered Secret Service protection for Barkley, but Barkley just had the reception room and his office and that was it. So this one Secret Service agent appears, and Barkley didn’t know what to do with him. He didn’t want him anyway. So he took a chair out of his office and put it out in the hall by his door, so the guy didn’t have to stand in the corridor. For him to sit there.

RITCHIE: It’s a lot different today.
LANE: Oh, my God! How the times have changed. You could walk in that Capitol Building any time day or night. And you know they did bomb it one time. Do you remember that?

RITCHIE: Yes.

LANE: When was that, back in the ’50s or ’60s?

RITCHIE: We’ve had several bombings. There was one in the ’70s and one in the ’80s here.

LANE: Seventies, but it was in the bathroom that we used to use.

RITCHIE: Yes, on the ground floor of the Capitol.

LANE: That was our toilet. Next to the senator’s barber shop.

RITCHIE: Yes.

LANE: There’s a couple of hideaway offices in there. That was the lavatory. That’s where they put a bomb. It’s right next to the main corridor.

RITCHIE: Yes, that was in 1971. So you mentioned the fact that Connecticut is a Republican state—

LANE: It was then.

RITCHIE: Was, at least. McMahon never won by huge amounts. He was always winning by about 52 percent of the vote or something like that—

LANE: He won handily. He won a 60,000 majority, which was unheard of in an off-year election. If there was a strong presidential candidate, like [Franklin] Roosevelt, running, the Democrats would win, but if it was an off-year election, the Democrats couldn’t win.
RITCHIE: I was just wondering how much of the business of his office was local business, Connecticut business? I mean, he was dealing with all of these national issues and international issues, but you never can forget your home base if you’re going to get reelected.

LANE: He didn’t spend a lot of time on the home base. After he left the Department of Justice, he started a law firm here in Washington, and he made money. He was one of the first of the New Dealers that knew their way around Washington. He also had some very important cases in the Supreme Court that he argued. And he made very good money—in those days it was considered to be very good money. He had a beautiful home here up on Woodland Drive, in the best part of town. And he belonged to Burning Tree Golf Club. He loved golf. He loved to “get the hell out of the Senate” and go play golf.

He didn’t have a home in Connecticut. He used to use his brother’s address. And he would go up there—like when he was running in 1950—in 1949, when they got out of here in, I think it was like September or something like that. He’d head for Connecticut and in the meantime I would set up speaking engagements for him all over the state. He’d tell me where he wanted to go and I’d find a Rotary, Kiwanis, Lions Club meeting, things like that. A year before the election, you could get in to these groups, and he would talk to them mainly about foreign affairs and the problems we faced in the world, and what we have to do, and how important it is that we try to promote peace in the world. He got a very good reception. Very bright guy. He could handle himself very well.

One day we’d be in Stamford, the next day, Bridgeport, and the next day another town. Very seldom would we be away over night. That’s how he campaigned. In 1950, he put most of his money in television. It was the first major Senate campaign that used television, and it worked. He went on live every night in New Haven [chuckles], on the only television station in the state. It didn’t get into the southern part, near New York, but got the rest of the state. And he just talked to the people. He was very good at it. He could look right at the tube and he was fairly convincing. He made a nice, clean campaign. Never said anything bad about his opponent. Didn’t even have to mention him.
RITCHIE: All of the work on foreign policy didn’t work against him in those days, it worked for him.

LANE: It worked for him there, because Connecticut was a pretty interesting state in that there’s a base of intelligentsia there with the whole Fairfield County, the more affluent people that work in New York and all. Then you’ve got Yale in New Haven, and then you’ve got the University of Connecticut, and Wesleyan. He was always close to all of the educational institutions. He graduated from Yale Law School. He helped the University of Bridgeport, and he helped Wesleyan. He always said that he’d like to pitch his campaign to the intelligentsia.

RITCHIE: Usually foreign policy works against senators. Voters vote pocketbook issues, but I guess that in the late ’40s the foreign policy was on the front page every day.

LANE: Well, when he ran in ’44 we were in the war, so that’s all foreign policy, and then in ’50—

RITCHIE: The Cold War.

LANE: Yes, the heart of the Cold War, and also we were in an economic recession, too. We were beginning to lose industry in Connecticut. They’ve lost it all since then, but every town had major industrial operations. Bridgeport, for instance, during World War II they called it the “arsenal of democracy.” The Remington Rand, and GE had their second-largest unit there. They made all of the washing machines and dryers and what they call “white goods”; Singer sewing machines, Sikorsky, Chance Vought Aircraft, Bridgeport, the whole brass industry was there, and the hardware industry, the ball bearing industry, the machine tool industry. The first automobiles were made there. It’s all changed radically.

RITCHIE: Would you have seen many lobbyists from any of those industries in your office in those days?

LANE: Not too many. Lobbying wasn’t as important, or wasn’t as bad, I guess, in those days, at least from what I saw. Maybe it was just as bad, but from my own
perspective, there wasn’t a great deal of it. For instance, I never heard of a fund-raiser for a senator when I was there. I’m sure they had them, but I never heard about them. They must have done it secretly. You know, shaking down the lobbyists for $1,000 or $5,000 or whatever you can get. That wasn’t done.

Of course, this was before television. We were ahead of the game because we used television, but we didn’t use a lot of the other. I mean, we put all of our money on TV. Since then, the way they now use television with these spot ads, it’s big money. Politics has become big, big money. It’s terrible.

**RITCHIE:** Yes, that’s sort of consumed it. Well, I was just wondering, as the administrative assistant, did you have to be the middle person between the senator and some of the interests in the state? Did you have to keep an eye on what was going on back home?

**LANE:** I had to, yes. I used to read the local papers. We subscribed to the major papers in the state and read them all. We had a little office in Connecticut that had one person in it who used to clip the papers and I never bothered reading the clippings. By the time I’d get them, I’d already know about it and I’d throw them in the wastebasket.

It was a lot of fun, particularly for a young guy. But it really scared me in the beginning. My God, it was such a change in my life and I thought I was going to have a heart attack for awhile. I had long hours, and worked very hard. I’d be there relatively early in the morning and there until late at night. He was a guy that would come busting in just before the hearing in the morning. If it was like a 10 o’clock hearing or a 9:30 hearing, he’d come in at 9:27 and a half and we’d go right into the hearing. Then he would stay late at night. I wanted to do a good job and I wanted him to appreciate it. So I always made sure that I was there before he got there, and I was always there when he left at night.

**RITCHIE:** Which meant a long day.

**LANE:** Oh, very long. It was hard on my dear wife.

**RITCHIE:** But the Congress wasn’t in session all the time.
LANE: It was, because of the war, the Korean War.

RITCHIE: Oh, of course, yes. So they were in a lot.

LANE: That was awful. In the 80th Congress, when the Republicans controlled it, they were finished in June or something like that. But no, when the Korean War came, we just went around the clock.

RITCHIE: That was also the era when Joe McCarthy came to notice.

LANE: Oh, boy, tell me about it! The first one to take him on was McMahon. He was appointed to that Select Committee of the—

RITCHIE: Foreign Relations Committee.

LANE: Special Committee of the Foreign Relations Committee, to investigate Senator McCarthy’s charges concerning the State Department. They had hearings, and it was a very tough period. I counseled McMahon on that. I said, “Look, try to control your temper.” He wanted to go get McCarthy. I mean, he hated him, and he wanted to tear his guts out. You know, McMahon was a tough guy. I said, “Don’t do that. Don’t do that. You’re playing right into him. Please don’t. Act like a judge up there. The guy apparently doesn’t have that much evidence. Give him enough rope.”

Well, they started the hearings and the first day McMahon gets his temper up. He turns red and he starts going after him. He’s pointing at him. And McCarthy says, “See, you’re more interested in attacking McCarthy than getting the Communists out of the State Department.” I though, “Oh, God, he fell for it.” But anyway, that committee had [Henry] Cabot Lodge, [Bourke] Hickenlooper on the Republican side, and McMahon and Green and—

RITCHIE: Millard Tydings.

LANE: —and Tydings was the chairman. They originally asked McMahon to chair the committee and he tentatively agreed, but Ed Roddan and I persuaded him to
Edward P. Morgan, a former FBI agent, served as chief counsel to the special committee.

We thought it would adversely affect his chances for reelection. We said give it to Tydings, he will win easily in Maryland.

That was the committee. Then they would have these front page cartoons of—I remember a trash can that was reeking and McMahon and Tydings and Green were trying to hold the cover on it. It was all pro-McCarthy. The leading paper in the morning here at that time was the Washington Times Herald. And then the Hearst papers in New York, and the Scripps Howard papers, and they were awful. I mean brutal. Accusing us of treason. And then they had a guy who was the chief counsel of that committee, who had been recommended by, apparently, J. Edgar Hoover. What was his name?1 Great big tall guy. Oh shoot. I’ll think of it. He wrote a very tough report. It was too tough. I remember I tried to tone it down and it boomeranged on them. As a result, Tydings, who was virtually unopposed before—they had some kind of a political deal that the Republicans weren’t going to go after him and they’d give them the governorship and the Democrats would get the Senate seat—well, that all fell apart and an unknown lawyer in Baltimore became the senator from Maryland. Tydings got beat by McCarthy. McCarthy came to Connecticut three times during the campaign, but we were able to handle him. McMahon did not answer him. He got somebody else, a surrogate, to ask, “Who is this man from Wisconsin who’s coming and trying to tell you how to vote?”

RITCHIE: So you think that the Tydings Committee made a mistake in trying to be adversarial?

LANE: Right.

RITCHIE: They should have been more neutral, to hear the evidence.

LANE: A little bit. At least appear like they’re judicious.

RITCHIE: What was it about McCarthy that made people like McMahon lose their temper?

1Edward P. Morgan, a former FBI agent, served as chief counsel to the special committee.
LANE: Well, he was such a son of a bitch, and McMahon knew it. I shouldn’t have said that. [laughs]

RITCHIE: That’s all right. The whole institution just couldn’t figure out how to deal with McCarthy.

LANE: No, and the administration didn’t know how to deal with him, either. I remember, I said to McMahon, “You know, this guy is running wild.” I think McCarthy was largely responsible for the Republicans winning in 1952. [Dwight] Eisenhower was a strong candidate, of course, but they won both houses of the Congress. I think McCarthy was responsible for that.

RITCHIE: He created an atmosphere.

LANE: Right. Of distrust and got people frightened. Yes, I said to McMahon, “We’ve got to have an undercover secret operation against this guy.” I said, “From what I hear, he’s no good and there’s got to be a lot of skeletons in his closet.” He said, “Well, you got a good idea.” He calls up Charlie Murphy, who’s the counsel for Truman and he said, “Charlie, I want you to talk to John.” He said, “I want him to come down and talk to you about . . . he’s got some ideas. Let’s see what we can do.”

I had some really specific things that I thought ought to be done. I’ll never forget, I went down to see Charlie Murphy and he says, “Oh, I think they pay too much attention to McCarthy. I think we should just let him rant and rave.” He wasn’t interested at all in McCarthy. I said, “You’ve got subpoena power. You’ve got IRS.” I was going to really do something.

RITCHIE: But they never did.

LANE: It might have been frowned upon now, but no, they wouldn’t do a thing. Weren’t interested.

RITCHIE: Well, what was it like working in the Senate, when McCarthy was operating? Did it permeate into everything, or was it fairly isolated?
LANE: I think the Senate was okay. It was the public outside. Some of the right-wing groups were emboldened. The only thing that saved McMahon in Connecticut from being defeated was not just that he was a pretty damn good senator, but he was a Catholic.

It was hard for McCarthy to say that McMahon was a Communist or a Communist sympathizer. I think that if he hadn’t been a Roman Catholic, he would have been defeated. Because see, he went after a lot of the kind of stupid right-wing know-nothings. Some of them very well-intentioned but not very broad gauged.

RITCHIE: Well, McMahon really got a good press, looking at the newspaper clippings. People really thought highly of him. It seems like—

LANE: Yes. Did you see the editorials when he died?

RITCHIE: Oh yes, I saw some of them, at least.

LANE: The New York Times said that he gave politics a good name.

RITCHIE: Clearly a lot of people were talking about him as a presidential candidate.

LANE: Oh, yes. I was his campaign manager. And we were running.

RITCHIE: So he was pretty serious about it in ’52?

LANE: Oh yes.

RITCHIE: When did he start thinking about that?

LANE: Oh, he was thinking about it for years. He thought that after getting reelected in ’50, that was the next step to go. He had to win with a good result in order to be a viable presidential candidate. Sure, he was very much interested. I remember we had a meeting up in Connecticut one night and a bunch of his friends and some of his advisors, and they were asking him, “Why don’t you throw your hat in the ring?” He
turns to me and he says, “John what do you think I ought to do?” I said, “I don’t think you ought to do anything until you find out what Truman’s going to do, and we don’t know whether he’s going to run for reelection. But if he doesn’t run, I think, then we throw the hat right in the ring, immediately.” He said, “Yeah, I think you’re right.” So when Truman said he wasn’t going to run, McMahon went down and talked to him. He entered the primary in Illinois. I remember Truman telling him [chuckles], he said, “Brien, good luck, but those Ku-Klukers in Southern Illinois will cut you up.” That’s what Truman said.

**RITCHIE:** Well, Truman had a good sense of the Midwest.

**LANE:** Yes, down where he was, you know, Kansas City.

**RITCHIE:** How did McMahon deal with the issue of being a Catholic candidate? At that point, the only Catholic candidate had been Al Smith.

**LANE:** Yes, we knew it would be a handicap, but he thought he could do it. He thought, you know, the time will come. And he thought maybe I’ll be it. And [John F.] Kennedy told me later that if McMahon hadn’t died he probably would have never gotten a chance.

**RITCHIE:** That McMahon would have been the person that everybody turned to. Because he was still young enough that even if he hadn’t gotten elected in ’52, he would have only been in his fifties in 1960.

**LANE:** Right.

**RITCHIE:** Well, I’d like to talk more about Senator McMahon and especially about the presidential race in ’52. And I’d like to talk about what you did after that period. But this might be a good place for us to take a break.

**LANE:** Sure. We’ve been here a long time.

**RITCHIE:** You said you’re going to be back after Thanksgiving?
LANE: Right.

RITCHIE: Maybe sometime in early December we can do a follow-up.

LANE: That would be nice. This is very enjoyable. It gives me a chance to remember things. Things come to mind that I’ve completely forgotten about.

RITCHIE: Right, and you’re talking about a Senate that is very different than the one of today. We’re trying to preserve memories of that time period, those senators and those issues, and just how different the place was, how it has changed over time.

LANE: Yes, they were quite respectful of each other. Well, there were very tough partisan differences, but it didn’t get personal like it is today, where you see a lot of good senators just quitting because it gets too nasty here. And that’s terrible, isn’t it?

RITCHIE: Yes, it’s gotten very polarized.

LANE: Yes. The meanness, you didn’t see that. There was a certain decorum. A certain way that they treated each other. McMahon was considered one of the more partisan ones by a lot of the Republicans. They’ve talked to me about it over the years, you know. And he was partisan, but he was polite and respectful.

RITCHIE: Well, this has been excellent. Thank you very much.

End of the First Interview
PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS
Interview #2
December 6, 2006

LANE: On the [General Douglas] MacArthur hearings—those hearings were very important because he was becoming a full-fledged candidate for president and was being backed by much of the right wing of the Republican party, and various influential newspapers. Newspapers in those days were so much more important in politics than they are today.

I forgot to tell you that when McMahon used to travel around Connecticut, getting ready to campaign ahead of time, when we would go into a city he would always call on and chat with the political leaders. He would also visit the local newspaper and talk to the editor. Then he would do his thing at whatever the public gathering was, and then leave and go to the next town. But it was a regular practice that he would always call on the editor or publisher of the newspaper. As a result, he received a very good press, and most of the press was Republican in Connecticut, every one of the major papers was, except for the Hartford Times.

RITCHIE: But they took him seriously.

LANE: Yes, they took him seriously because he talked about serious matters.

RITCHIE: His issues weren’t necessarily partisan. Nuclear policy wasn’t a partisan issues, and foreign policy at that point was bipartisan.

LANE: To some extent. But Robert Taft was the Republican leader on foreign policy. He supported Herbert Hoover’s “Fortress America” and opposed most of the Truman program, including NATO. Hickenlooper was charging the AEC with “incredible mismanagement” and they were looking for spies in the program. And the Foreign Relations Committee had the problem of McCarthy and the State Department. So on balance it was not any easy time.

There was a different atmosphere. McMahon was very fond of [Arthur]
Vandenberg. They worked well together. But back in the MacArthur hearings, which I did have something to do with, I was trying to get him some help on the committee from other senators. If you look at the transcripts of the first few days of the hearings, no one was willing to take him on. There were just some platitudes. They were afraid of him. I remember Frank Nash, I mentioned him earlier, he was an assistant secretary of defense. He had been a professor of mine in law school, and was a good friend. He said, “John, you’ve got to get some of these other senators to pitch in and follow up on some of these things.” I said okay, so I asked McMahon to call a few of them, late in the evening. I would listen in on the phone calls. On important calls, I would listen in. I mean, it was just accepted. I didn’t say anything, but I used to listen and take notes, and remind him of things. I listened in one time when I got him to call Lyndon Johnson, because Johnson was on the committee. I remember Johnson saying, “Brien, you’re the lawyer, you’re the prosecutor. We’re relying on you.” He wouldn’t give him any help at all. “We’re looking to you to carry the ball.” Thanks but no thanks. He then called someone else, I’ve forgotten who it was, trying to get some help to no avail.

RITCHIE: MacArthur’s presidential boom didn’t last for very long.

LANE: No, well, it was deflated right there.

RITCHIE: We talked the last time a little about Senator McMahon’s thinking about running for president, and he was a serious candidate in 1952. When did you start to get into planning that campaign?

LANE: He had it in mind ever since I went to work for him. First he had to control his own party in Connecticut. When he ran for reelection in 1950, Chester Bowles was the governor. Chester had grandiose plans also to run for president. The trouble was he didn’t stay long enough in Hartford. He had all kinds of major government reorganization plans for Connecticut. He made the mistake of referring to Connecticut’s towns—there’s like 169 towns in Connecticut, each one of them have their own town government. Counties don’t have anything much to do in Connecticut, except maintain a jail and a courthouse, but the towns have the power. The towns elect people to the legislature. He made the mistake of calling these beautiful little towns in Connecticut “rotten boroughs,” like it was in Brooklyn or someplace. He really turned off a lot of people, and the Bowles campaign was in deep trouble. His friends kept saying to
McMahon during the campaign he should help Bowles, as if he wasn’t trying. He supported Bowles and the whole ticket but he couldn’t run their campaign. John Bailey, who McMahon had installed as state chairman after the 1946 election debacle, had hitched his wagon to Bowles. He and his friends kept complaining, “McMahon’s running his own campaign.” As if he wasn’t supporting them. McMahon would say, “Well, I’m the only one running for the Senate.” [laughs]

In the legislature, they lost the House but they kept the Senate by a close margin. They lost the governor, the lieutenant governor, the treasurer, the attorney general, every office. McMahon blamed it partially on the voting machine that they used. They had a party lever. In other words, a voter came in and at the top of the ticket was Chester Bowles, running for governor. A lot of people would vote against Bowles and just pull the party lever of his opponent, and it would vote all the other offices. McMahon tried to get the legislature to change the rules so that each individual office had to be voted, you just can’t block vote. And they wouldn’t do that. He said, “If they had only adopted what I said, we would have won everything in the state except the governor.” [laughs]

Every newspaper reporter from outside the state that was traveling to Connecticut to cover the campaign would always go to Hartford and they’d talk to Bailey, and they would get this report: “McMahon is running his own campaign.” That irritated him. To follow up, after Hartford they would come to Norwalk to talk to McMahon, so he knew what they were saying.

After the election, Bailey came to Washington to see McMahon. McMahon calls me into his office, with Bailey sitting there, and he turned to me and said, “John, what do you think I should do with him? Fire him?” He just pulled it on me, out of the blue, right in front of Bailey. I said, “Well, there’s a lot of work to be done to repair the party and I think he’s probably the best one to help do it. And I think we can all work together.” He left him alone, mainly because he didn’t have anyone qualified to replace him. The whole episode was McMahon’s way of punishing Bailey by embarrassing him in front of me. He also knew that Bailey worked hard at the job.

The next day after Truman announced at the Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner that he wasn’t going to run, I called Bailey, without McMahon’s knowledge. I said, “You better get yourself down here, because we’re going to go.” He did. He appeared that
On April 17, 1953, six Democratic presidential aspirants addressed a dinner at the Waldorf-Astoria hotel in New York City. The speakers were Senators Brien McMahon, Estes Kefauver, and Robert S. Kerr, Governor Adlai Stevenson, Vice President Alben Barkley, and Ambassador W. Averill Harriman.

RITCHIE: What kind of campaign did you plan? Were you going to run him in the primaries?

LANE: We entered him in the primary in Illinois, against Estes Kefauver. McMahon had friends in Illinois because of the time when he tried the notorious gangster cases in Chicago for the government. A number of his friends were by then important political people. The U.S. attorney in Southern Illinois was a great friend of his. He got the mayor of Alton, Illinois, to head up a committee in Illinois. We were going to go all out. We had reserved the grand ballroom at the Hilton to be our headquarters.

McMahon went down to Puerto Rico for a vacation at Christmastime in 1951. He came back in January of ’52. We were in New Haven and he was making a speech to a labor organization or a veterans group, I forget which, and his back was bothering him. It hurt him to sit, so he stood up for a while, up on the dias, and made his speech. I said to him, “What’s wrong?” “I don’t know, something’s wrong with my back, I’ve got a back pain.” We were in New Haven maybe a week after that and I remember he was in the Hotel Taft and he was in considerable pain. One of his friends there got the trainer for the Yale football team to come over and give him a massage, and that seemed to help. Then they had a big dinner in New York and they invited all the candidates. I remember it was Bob Kerr, and McMahon, and I forget who else. But there were four or five candidates and they were all invited to speak for 10 minutes, at the Waldorf. We were there and he was in agony. I had a friend that was a lawyer in New York, who had a brother that was a prominent doctor. I asked him, “Do you think you could talk him into seeing him?” At the dinner, he performed very badly. He couldn’t deliver his prepared speech very well. It was a poor performance.

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1 On April 17, 1953, six Democratic presidential aspirants addressed a dinner at the Waldorf-Astoria hotel in New York City. The speakers were Senators Brien McMahon, Estes Kefauver, and Robert S. Kerr, Governor Adlai Stevenson, Vice President Alben Barkley, and Ambassador W. Averill Harriman.
Later that night, I took him over to New York Hospital. He remained there for several weeks. Eventually, they discovered he had a tumor in the bone in the hip. It was inoperable, at that time, anyway. He was keeping it from us, and we were keeping it from him. As a matter of fact, I didn’t know the truth for a while, because they kept saying it was his sacroiliac. I was covering up because we had a campaign going. He still wanted to make a formal announcement, and we thought it would be good for him. At the Ambassador Hotel—it’s not there anymore—in New York, we had a large room and brought the Connecticut delegation down to visit him, and urge him to enter the race, and he agreed to do it. He made a little speech and the press was all there. In those days, newsreels covered things like that. But after that, he kept getting worse. I remember, we had to get him back to Washington somehow and there was no way he could ride in a commercial airplane. So I called the secretary of the Navy and asked to talk to his aide and said, “I’ve got a problem. I want to get the senator back here, but I don’t want to have any publicity. Can we get an airplane?” One of those little Beechcraft ambulance planes that had a cot in them to transport patients. We used to use them in the Marines. He said, “I’ll call you back.” He called me back in half an hour and said, “When do you want to set it up?” So I sent George Carroll, because I didn’t feel like flying up there, to Floyd Bennett Field. We hired a car to drive him out to Floyd Bennett Field, and then fly him back home to Anacostia Naval Air Station. Then they put him in Georgetown Hospital, and he died in July, right when the convention ended.

RITCHIE: Didn’t you even have a headquarters for him at the convention?

LANE: Yes, I gave up the grand ballroom at the Hilton to Alben Barkley and moved to a smaller room. I put a direct telephone line from his bed at Georgetown Hospital to under the floor of the convention, near the Connecticut delegates, and I had them build a booth there. That was my phone booth, to be able to communicate with him. It got to the point where he was trying to watch it on television and it was very hard for him to even talk. It was kind of sad. He was keeping it from us, we were keeping it from him. We were doing it for him, to keep his spirits up. But he did see himself being put in nomination. Before Chicago, I had gone to Hartford, because he couldn’t make it for the state convention where they elected the delegates. We got the delegates bound to vote for McMahon until released by him. Before I left for Chicago, I visited old Homer Cummings, the former attorney general, at his house. He and I drafted a nice letter from McMahon to John Bailey. McMahon was the chairman of the Connecticut delegation,
Bailey was the vice chairman, but McMahon not being there, Bailey was the acting chairman. So we wrote a nice letter and said that “my doctors have advised me that it would be unfair to go forward with this because I will not be able to campaign, and therefore I release my delegates.” But I had that in my pocket. All the other people were saying, “Who’s got the delegation, Bailey or Lane?” I had it, and I didn’t release it until I had an agreement with the Stevenson people, and the delegation went for Stevenson.

RITCHIE: What kind of an agreement?

LANE: Well, we’d be good friends. [laughs] After that they invited me to go out to Springfield, Illinois, to be on the campaign staff. I went out there for a short period of time and then left. I came to the conclusion that there was no way you could run a successful presidential campaign from Springfield, Illinois. They didn’t have the phone lines. They didn’t have the postal facilities. They didn’t have airline service. They had like two planes a day that went between Chicago and Springfield. It was just impossible. There was no place for the media. I said, “I’m out of here,” and I went back and ran [Abraham] Ribicoff’s campaign against Daddy Bush, Prescott Bush.

RITCHIE: Before we get to that, I was curious. If McMahon hadn’t become ill, what do you think his chances were that year? That was a wide-open convention.

LANE: Yes, it was.

RITCHIE: It took three ballots to nominate Stevenson.

LANE: Back in January, Averill Harriman came to his home and begged him to run. He said, “Gosh, Harriman came over to the house and he was just pushing me to throw my hat in the ring.” I think maybe Harriman figured he would be a favorite son from Connecticut and hold the delegation for him. And then secondly, one night Stevenson came by McMahon’s house. I think that Stevenson would have taken him as vice president. I have reason to believe he would have and was looking for him. You know, Stevenson was a “reluctant candidate who hadn’t made up his mind,” but he was running, despite his public posture. They would have made a pretty good ticket. Stevenson had been divorced, McMahon was a Catholic. You’ve got the McCarthy problem, McMahon could take that on. It might have worked.
McMahon and [Dwight] Eisenhower were good friends. Both of them loved to play golf and they used to play out at Burning Tree. Their wives were long-time friends, and the four used to play bridge together. I remember McMahon saying to me one day when we were walking down the Capitol steps, “If this guy Eisenhower wins, you and I will be okay.” [laughs]

RITCHIE: Even if he had gotten the nomination, any Democrat was up against Eisenhower.

LANE: Oh, yes, and would have gotten snowed. But if he had run, and handled himself well, he would have been in position for the next time around.

RITCHIE: Yes, because he was still only 48-years-old—

LANE: When he died, yes.

RITCHIE: So he could have even waited eight years.

LANE: He had a lot of talent, a lot of ability. Nobody’s perfect, but I was very fortunate that I was able to come here and work with him, because I can see other people that I sure wouldn’t want to work for, and that wouldn’t be a lot of fun. He gave me all kinds of authority and trusted me. One of his weaknesses was I think he trusted people too much.

RITCHIE: Well, in your case he got strong loyalty.

LANE: I gave him his money’s worth, yes. I used to sign checks with his name. I signed all his mail. He hardly signed any of his mail, unless it was something very important and it would be taken in to him, but I handled all the correspondence. We didn’t have the robo-pens in those days. I had to sign everything.

RITCHIE: How was it you went to Ribicoff’s campaign at that stage? Did you have any connections with Ribicoff before?
LANE: Oh, yes, I knew him when he was a congressman. He represented the first district in Hartford. He wanted desperately to get that nomination for the Senate. A couple of years earlier, one of the first attacks that McCarthy made was against Raymond Baldwin, Senator Baldwin from Connecticut. He was a former governor, a very well liked, moderate Republican, and a nice man. It was over the investigation of the assassination of Polish—was it Polish troops?

RITCHIE: Wasn’t that the Malmady Massacre, it was in Belgium I think.

LANE: Belgium yes, involving the Germans, and McCarthy had a big German population in Wisconsin, with Nazi influence in it, and he didn’t like the report that blamed it on the Nazis. He personally attacked Baldwin on the floor of the Senate, and McMahon went to his aid in the debates. But I think it soured Baldwin on the Senate, and Bowles appointed Baldwin to the supreme court in Connecticut. This created a vacancy and Bill Benton came in. Bowles appointed his old partner. But McMahon wanted that. Benton was a wealthy man, and McMahon wanted somebody that could fund their own campaign and wouldn’t be draining money that he needed for his campaign. Bailey was a candidate, but Bowles said to McMahon, “It’s going to be your choice.” I think Bowles didn’t want to alienate Bailey, so he put the onus or the burden on McMahon to tell Bailey that it wouldn’t work. At that time, Ribicoff also wanted the appointment and he was very unhappy.

RITCHIE: Benton was a feisty senator, but he didn’t last for very long.

LANE: No, well, he had to run twice in two years. He was appointed I think in January and he had to run that year, in 1950. He was elected by around 1,000 votes, in a very close race. He beat Prescott Bush.

RITCHIE: And Benton had taken on McCarthy as well.

LANE: Yes, I remember him coming over to McMahon’s office. He said, “Brien, I want you to read this. I am thinking about making this speech against McCarthy, and I want your advice.” McMahon said, “I don’t want to read it.” He said, “Yeah, but I want your advice.” He said, “Bill, I know you well enough that you’ve already made up your
mind that you’re going to do it. My advice won’t make any difference.” They both laughed.

Bill Benton made his fortune in the then relatively new advertising business in New York after graduation from college. He and his partner, Chester Bowles, started Benton and Bowles, which became one of the leading firms on Madison Avenue. They both sold out and decided to try public service at a relatively young age. Bowles became head of OPA during World War II, and Benton went to the University of Chicago as vice president and bought the Encyclopedia Britannica. He then served in the State Department in the early days of the Truman administration as assistant secretary for our foreign educational activities such as the Voice of America.

While in the department he developed the idea of a government-sponsored scholarship program for talented students to study abroad and in the process further America’s interest in promoting peace and understanding. He had trouble trying to get support in the administration for such a new program. He also lacked a sponsor on the Hill. Finally, he persuaded William Fulbright, himself a Rhodes Scholar, to introduce Benton’s bill. That’s how they became “Fulbright Scholarships.”

RITCHIE: That’s interesting. You mentioned Abe Ribicoff. What kind of a candidate was he in ’52?

LANE: Abe was a good-looking guy. He was studious, but it was night and day compared to McMahon. McMahon used to drive his own car—we called him “Barney Oldfield.” Ribicoff’s wife used to drive him around. I lived with them for awhile and got to really know them. With McMahon, he could go on television and talk. Ribicoff couldn’t. I found that out because I made a deal with the New Haven TV station to take five minutes or ten minutes, I forget, every night, right after the news, we bought the time for him. I thought he could just go on, a good-looking guy, but he couldn’t do it. He was never relaxed. He got scared, he got frightened by it. So okay, the next best thing would be to try to film it. Nobody up in Connecticut could do film, but we had prepared all these pieces for him. He came down here—we had a guy by the name of Bob Cord in the television gallery that had a movie camera and a studio, I guess he did it for some senators. He did those films, I don’t know if they were kinescopes or what they were. So when we put them on television in New Haven, they looked terrible. The quality was
atrocious. He was just stiff as a board. We had to cancel that. It wasn’t easy, and he was very nervous. He had money, but he was always very pessimistic. Maybe he had reason to be, because Eisenhower swept the election. But Ribicoff ran so far ahead of Stevenson that it set him up for the future.

He had never been in many of the towns of Connecticut. I took him around by the hand, introduced him to the people that I knew. In effect, he was riding on McMahon’s coattails. He told me, “When I get elected, I want you to come with me and be my right arm.” I said, “I’ve already decided I’m not going to work in politics or the Senate anymore. I want to get out.” Then he offered me a job in his law firm in Hartford, which was a compliment. I didn’t want that either.

RITCHIE: Why didn’t you want to come back to Washington after your experience with McMahon?

LANE: Well, I did, and I did for a while. It took me forever to clean out his office. When a senator died in those days, you were off the payroll in 30 days. So I had no income. I had the office, and I spent my time getting jobs for everybody that worked in the office. I wind up as the only one with no job! That’s when I went out with Stevenson for a while. I went out to Connecticut and brought my family up there when I ran Ribicoff’s campaign, but after the campaign I came right back here. Then I decided to open an office, both here and in Connecticut. I started my office with no law books and nothing but a phone book. Then I joined forces with another lawyer that I was renting space from, we formed a firm, and before you know it I was flying all over the world and all over the country on some wonderful cases that I enjoyed.

RITCHIE: What kinds of cases did you handle?

LANE: I had two distinct practices. One in Connecticut was a local practice. I would do real estate closings. I would do wills. I would counsel people. I’d have office hours on Saturday and my waiting room would be full of people waiting. They worked all week and the only time they could come would be Saturday. And I enjoyed it. Then I had a federal practice here. I had a client that hired me to do work that brought me before the Federal Power Commission, gas pipeline litigation. Then I was counsel for the railroad. I met a guy who wanted to run a proxy fight to get control of the New York,
New Haven, Hartford railroad—the so-called New Haven line. He was looking for a lawyer to take it on the come. I had plenty of time, so I did it. And we won. He wanted to make me general counsel of the railroad and I said, “No, I don’t want to sit up in New Haven, Connecticut. I’ll be your lawyer and handle all your stuff in Washington.” He put me on a nice retainer, and I had the same thing with the pipeline company, and Bridgeport Brass was a major industry in Connecticut, they hired me for some work. I began adding clients, and building a firm, and hiring people to work for me.

RITCHIE: Did you keep the dual firms for a while?

LANE: I kept them for a while. Actually, I lived in Connecticut. I moved my family up there, bought a home and lived there for a couple of years. The business had me in Washington. My wife, who was a Washington girl, was up in Connecticut with her one child. I said, “I can’t do that.” I bought a house down here and moved the family back.

RITCHIE: You mentioned that Ribicoff ran against Prescott Bush, the grandfather of the current president. Did you have much dealings with Prescott Bush at that point?

LANE: Not at the time, because he was on the other side of the fence. And I’ll tell you a little story about McMahon. Bush wanted to run against McMahon in 1950. McMahon had some very unfavorable press in the Hearst newspapers. The Hearsts were after him. They had a financial writer who kept writing negative stories about McMahon. His name was Leslie Gould. I used to have to go over to Union Station and get the New York Journal-American everyday to read what charges he had against him.

When McMahon was in private practice, he had represented an immigrant by the name of Serge Rubinstein, who was a stock-swindler. It was on an immigration case where they wanted to deport him. He had a Portuguese passport he had procured somehow. McMahon argued the case and won it on a point of law that the government couldn’t look behind his passport. As long as it was a valid passport, they had to treat him as Portuguese rather than Russian or whatever the hell he was. Also, this guy was a draft dodger. So they had McMahon representing a Communist and a draft dodger. Oh,
they ran a series of articles with a picture where he looked like a gangster. It just drove him crazy.

At one point, Bush made a political speech up in Connecticut, and he talked about the Rubinstein case. This case had happened before McMahon was in the Senate. McMahon wrote him a letter—I helped him draft it—in which he sent it to him “return receipt requested,” a registered letter. He said, “This is to put you on notice that if you ever make these irresponsible charges again, I’m going to prosecute you to the full extent of both the civil and criminal laws of Connecticut. Very truly yours.” And we never heard another word about it. This was before the Sullivan case, where public officials became fair game. In Connecticut it was particularly bad because you could attach before judgment. In other words, when you filed a law suit against someone for libel, you could put an attachment on their home or their bank account and tie them up. Imagine that! And that’s what he was threatening him with.

RITCHIE: And it worked.

LANE: Yes, it was the end of that. We never heard another word. He also—oh, God, this is another great story. Have you got another few minutes?

RITCHIE: Mmmhmm.

LANE: The Hearsts were campaigning against McMahon. They were trying to kill him politically. They had a following in the New York area, which included Connecticut, among Irish Catholics. McMahon wrote a letter to William Randolph Hearst, Jr. Hearst came to visit him. McMahon had a memorandum in which he disclosed everything he knew about Rubenstein and the whole history of the case. He gave it to him and said “This is grossly unfair.”

It didn’t do any good. They kept it up. Eddie Roddan was still there then. He said, “You know, they keep talking about draft dodgers, but these Hearst boys have some problems themselves. I think you ought to get hold of their draft records, the files, they’re in the government storage out in St. Louis, in a warehouse, all of the records of the Selective Service. Get the files on William Randolph Hearst, Jr., George Hearst, etc.” I said, “How the hell am I going to get them? They’re privileged.” Eddie Roddan pulled
out the book and he said, “Look, Harry Vaughn, the president’s military aide, is a member of the Selective Service board.” So McMahon goes down to see Truman, and Truman hated the Hearsts too, because they were after him with awful vicious stuff. In those days they were potent. They had the big paper in San Francisco, San Diego, in Seattle. They had a paper in Los Angeles, too. And Baltimore, New York—

RITCHIE: Chicago.

LANE: Chicago, yes, the Chicago American. And they were a problem. So Truman picks up the phone and calls Harry Vaughn and says, “Brien wants to get these things, get them over here in the White House, in your office.” So I’m told to go down and see Harry Vaughn. I go down, I drove my car and parked it there in the driveway like you used to be able to, went in and Harry Vaughn has all these boxes of files in his office. He said, “I don’t want them.” I said, “Yeah, but can I take them out of here?” “Oh, sure.” So he got somebody to help me load them in my car and I brought them up to the Senate. I had a couple of friends of mine who were FBI—this is a terrible thing to tell, but I think the statute of limitations has probably run now—they were FBI agents and good friends. In those days, you didn’t have xerox machines. They had to use cameras, one of those big cameras that the agents had, and they set it up on a tripod so they could take a picture of the documents.

Well, we got the darnedest stuff, every one of them had deferments and excuses. One of them had to support his mother—they were all multimillionaires. And William Randolph Hearst, Jr., he was a war correspondent, but he always got sent to nice places, but I looked in his medical records—he’s long dead so I can say this—here’s his medical records and he had a social disease. I’m in the office, in the Capitol on the first floor, my two buddies are going through the records and laughing. They were getting these documents and blowing them up, and in order to develop the films, they couldn’t take it to the FBI lab, they took it to a guy they knew down on Ninth Street, right next to the Gaiety Theater. [laughs] We got all these films and we bring them back, we’re laughing and looking through it on a Saturday morning.

McMahon comes in his office—and we’re working in his office in the Capitol. I said, “Boy, wait until you see this!” I had one blown up. McMahon said, “Oh, my God, this is something!” So we prepared a speech he gave on the Senate floor, in which he
demands an investigation of the Hearsts and their draft records (which he already had). Oh, it was a tough speech. You can find it in the Record, about how they almost destroyed this country with their vilification, their yellow journalism. He traced the whole history of old man Hearst and the Spanish-American War, and demanded a Senate investigation, and that was the end of the Hearsts. The Hearsts never did anything after that. It didn’t go anywhere.

RITCHIE: But it was a shot across the bow, in other words?

LANE: Right. I remember him saying the Senate would be shocked if they saw some of these records. He was demanding to see them. [laughs] I remember Senator [George] Malone of Nevada, we called him “Heavy-headed Malone,” he got up and tried to defend Hearst on the floor. They had a very nice guy who was their correspondent, Bill Tice, do you remember that name? He was up in the press gallery covering the event.

RITCHIE: Yes.

LANE: He was a decent guy, but he knew. I felt that he didn’t like them either.

RITCHIE: So the advantage of having those records was you never had to release them, you just let them know you had them?

LANE: Right. There’s another little story that’s kind of cute. During the campaign of 1950, he ran against Joe Talbot, who had been a congressman, a very decent guy. McMahon didn’t engage in running down his opponent. He just talked about himself and his plans, and his program for peace. But the Senate Republican Campaign Committee sent a guy up there who was working with the McCarthy group. He was living in Waterbury, Connecticut, which is an important city. Some of our operatives reported back to me and I got his name, and I sent it to my friends who had connections. They went through the files and they found out he had a criminal record, a long one. [laughs] They said, “Oh, this is going to be great!” I got it blown up on a big board: Look what they’re sending into Connecticut to try to defeat Brien McMahon! We had the guy’s mug shot and all of his arrests. I had it all ready to go. When he went on television that night in New Haven, we were going to blow this. It was going to be a great story. McMahon said no, he didn’t want to do that. And actually, the guy’s wife worked in the
secretary of the Senate’s office. McMahon said, “No, the guy’s got a family. I’ll deal with guys who sent him here.” He put his hand on my shoulder and said to me, “We’re going to win anyway, we don’t need this.” I was all ready to expose the people working for his opponent, but I was shot down. [laughs]

RITCHIE: So this guy had a McCarthy connection, did you say?

LANE: Oh, yes. He was connected to Styles Bridges.

RITCHIE: I know McCarthy sent someone up to Maine to run against Margaret Chase Smith.

LANE: McCarthy came three times to Connecticut. We used Tom Dodd, who was out of favor with the party. The great story about Dodd—McMahon wanted to make him governor, but Tom had never been in the service. He got his friend Bob Jackson to appoint him to the trial staff at Nuremberg so he could come back and talk about the Nazi atrocities and get the Jewish vote in Connecticut. I mean, it was that crass. It would be a substitute for not being in the service.

When he came back he wanted to run for governor [in 1948]. McMahon said, “Okay, you’ve got to talk to”—I think it was about five people, leaders in the various sections—“you’ve got to go and make your deal with them, and we’ll support you.” Well, he never went to see the people. In the meantime, Bowles had gone to see these key people, and when Dodd came into the convention, Bowles had the delegates. Dodd got mad at everybody, “You’re giving me a screwing here,” and he left in a huff. But before he left in a huff, they got him in the backroom and they said, “Okay, you run for lieutenant governor.” He agreed, and then Tom went out with some of his friends and they said, “Oh, no, Tom, don’t let them do that to you.” So he leaves. When the convention started and they started with the lesser offices and they get down to lieutenant governor, I remember Bailey was up there saying, “Get Dodd!” So they could nominate them. They went down to the hotel and found out he checked out, he had gone. So they pulled a guy out of the audience and said, “Do you want to be lieutenant governor?” He was a bank teller in one of the small towns up there, Bill Carroll of Torrington, and it was like he had a heart attack! He turned white, but he agreed. So they made him lieutenant governor, and he won.
So in a few months after Dodd struck out on being lieutenant governor, and Ray Baldwin quits. There’s a vacancy in the Senate. If Dodd had gone along and been a good soldier and supported the ticket, he would have been in a favorable position to be appointed to the Senate. Then he realized what a mistake he had made and was very bitter about it. But when the campaign started and McCarthy came into the state, McMahon called Dodd in and said, “I want you to help me on this.” He agreed.

We put him on television. He was very good on television. We gave him a very good speech about: “Who is this man who’s coming in here from Wisconsin telling the good people of Connecticut how to vote. Let me tell you about him.” And he went on. And it worked. It did the job. Then after that, Tom wanted a federal appointment. McMahon took him down to Truman and said he helped him in the campaign. He wanted to be appointed to one of the regulatory commissions, and they promised him a job. Because Dodd had been close to McMahon, he began to get some good law business. But then he lost interest when he got some good clients and was making more money.

RITCHIE: Yes, he got his Senate seat eventually. You were going to mention something about Prescott Bush, did you ever have any dealings with him?

LANE: Yes. I mentioned earlier that I was counsel for the New Haven Railroad, and the New Haven Railroad got into financial difficulty and hard times because it was darned near wiped out by the hurricane in—

RITCHIE: ’38?

LANE: No. Well, 1938 they went through bankruptcy on that and they rebuilt it, but this was in 1955. The hurricane washed away a lot of the railroad and they were out of money, they needed government loans. I remember, Bush was very critical of them, and the management—and the management made some mistakes. I went to see him and he was very nice to me. I kind of pulled him off of the attack, and it worked. And then I was invited to his house one night. We had mutual friends, and he and his wife had us for cocktails out on their front porch in Greenwich, Connecticut. So I had a cordial relationship with him.
RITCHIE: He had a civil reputation.

LANE: Yes, he was a pretty nice gentleman.

RITCHIE: And he wound up voting to censure McCarthy, too.

LANE: Yes, thank God.

RITCHIE: You had a pretty active career with your law firm in the 1950s, but you were appointed then to a special commission when Kennedy became president.

LANE: That was in 1961.

RITCHIE: Had you been involved in the ’60 campaign at all?

LANE: Yes, and I had been involved a little bit in the two Stevenson campaigns, as an advance man, just to keep my finger in. I got to meet some wonderful people who down through the years became very important. Some of them became senators, others became important lawyers and judges. I’d advise any young man to get in politics, it’s fun. And also you meet some people that you’ll see again in life, in high places. I worked with Newton Minnow in the Stevenson campaign.

RITCHIE: What kinds of clients did you have in communications practice?

LANE: I had one of the major broadcasters, Westinghouse Group W. I had Motorola, which was developing all kinds of other uses for the radio spectrum, which was very tight, working with them in getting spectrum for all their engineering devices, like the cell phone, which came later. I worked on that case. I represented President Carter in a major case that I won at the Supreme Court. When he wanted to announce his candidacy for reelection, he wanted to buy a half an hour of time. He went to each of the three networks and they all denied him. There was a provision in the act, which had never been tested in the courts, which said a federal candidate has a right to reasonable access. We won a split decision before the commission because of politics. I forget how many commissioners we had in those days, but it was like three to two, something like that. The networks appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, and I won it in the
United States Court of Appeals on a split vote. It went to the Supreme Court, and of course being an FCC decision, the solicitor general takes over, but I worked with him on the brief and sat with him during the oral argument, and we won it in the Supreme Court. It was a major decision.

RITCHIE: How political was the Federal Communications Commission in those days?

LANE: It’s always been political, as most commissions are. It’s unfortunate. It doesn’t have to be. They are supposed to be independent. They’re carrying out Congress’ work, using powers given to Congress under the Constitution. They create these agencies because they don’t have time to do that work. I tried to talk to the Republicans to get behind this case, because it would help them, too. But they didn’t want Carter to have any time. It was kind of stupid. I talked to their lawyers. I said, “Gee, you should be right here with me on this case.” Because these networks were saying we’ll tell you when you can start your campaign. The networks said that it was too early to campaign, and yet they were running promos for their news, talking about their election coverage on the same network that says it’s too early.

RITCHIE: In those days there really were only three networks, you didn’t have all the cable networks, so if they said no there was no alternative.

LANE: Yes, you couldn’t reach the national audience, and that’s why I won. Also I had a major case—I made my living fighting the television networks, because they had such a powerful hold on the local stations. Westinghouse had stations affiliated with all three networks, CBS in Pittsburgh and San Francisco, NBC in Boston and Philadelphia, and ABC in Baltimore. They were also in the program business and in the news business. They had a lot of things going. They had a young man, Donald McGannon, who was my client who was running the show. They had a lot of interesting cases. But we brought a proceeding before the FCC which charged the networks with unduly restricting and restraining the local television stations, which led to an investigation of the networks, which led to rules adopted by the commission to open up prime time—that we call the “prime-time access rule.” I have been called the father of the prime-time access rule because I argued that case and I won that in the courts, too, against Lloyd Cutler. We became good friends, but we were always on the opposite side.
He was always representing CBS. There were a number of wonderful cases that I worked hard on, and had some measure of success. Eventually, I became president of the Federal Communications bar.

**RITCHIE:** You mentioned that you were involved in the 1960s campaign. What did you do then?

**LANE:** I knew Jack Kennedy quite well, and I knew Robert, but not as well. Robert was running the campaign. Their campaign quarters were right above my office at 1001 Connecticut Avenue. Steve Smith had been one of my students when I was up at Georgetown, he was Kennedy’s brother-in-law. I can tell you an interesting story about Kennedy that most people don’t know. He was elected in ’60 and was assassinated in ’63. I wasn’t working on any official job, but I used to talk to them from time to time. I tried to convince them—I talked to Steve Smith, who ran the political operation from outside the White House. He had an office down in the Esso Building, which is gone now, where the Labor Department is. I said, “You should pick your opponent, force the Republicans to nominate somebody [in 1964] who we decide can be most easily defeated.” This was my strategy. They said, “How do you do it?” I said, “Well, you get your guys to begin to attack him, every time he says something, take him up, get him in the limelight, make him a spokesman for the other side.” I said, “This is what Charley Michelson [publicist for the Democratic National Committee] did for [Franklin] Roosevelt in 1936. He picked Alf Landon, the governor of Kansas, and they got the secretary of agriculture to attack him. They got the Home Loan Bank Board, everybody, and they built him up, and then he’d have to respond. They had him in the newspapers.” I said, “You do the same thing.” They said, “Who do you think?” I said, “[Barry] Goldwater.” “Goldwater!” I remember one of them saying, “I’d be afraid of him.” I said, “Listen, he would be perfect. Start it.” So they did. I remember Steve called me up and asked me if somebody could work in the backroom in my office, the place for files, where he could do research. It was a guy named Milt Gwirtzman, who worked for Teddy Kennedy, and said it was not appropriate for him to do this work in the Senate. I said, “Sure, I’ll give you a room in the back, where nobody can see him. He can come and go as he wants.” He was doing the Goldwater research. They agreed, they were running with it. About four or five days after the assassination, that was folded up and gone. But it was already underway, and it worked for Johnson. It was no contest.
RITCHIE: So you give the other person free publicity by attacking them—

LANE: Right.

RITCHIE: And making them in the eyes of the press look like a contender.

LANE: In the eyes of their own party. “He’s a stand-up guy,” you know. Eddie Roddan was the one who talked to me about that because he worked for Charley Michelson. He told me how they did it, and I tried to do the same thing for Kennedy. I was just copying what Roddan had told me. I can’t claim that I caused all this, but I know that I planted the seed, and I know that it was being nurtured.

RITCHIE: Well, that’s an interesting strategy, I wonder if it’s been used other times. Can you tell me about the White House commission you were appointed to?

LANE: Yes, I read in the paper one morning in 1961 about how Kennedy was going to appoint this special commission, by executive order, that would look into the problems of the independent agencies of the government. A mutual friend came into my office that morning and I showed him that. He was heading to the White House. He said, “Would you like to be on that?” I said, “Gee, I’d love to be on that.” Because I was handling all these cases before the Federal Power Commission and having a terrible time with the deficiencies in the whole process. He said, “I’m going over there, I’ll ask them.” So he had a meeting with the president and he said, “You know John Lane.”

Kennedy said, “If John wants it, he can have it.” So he called [James M.] Landis in, and Landis said, “We’ve already picked all of them and we’ve already told them.” He said, “Well, take one of them off. If John wants it, give it to him.” [laughs] So I got a call from Jim Landis. Ted Reardon also phoned from the White House. He was in the meeting with Kennedy.

RITCHIE: So the panel was supposed to reexamine the regulatory commissions?

LANE: Yes, and they were talking mainly about procedures. We worked hard for about a year and issued a report, which nobody paid much attention to, but there were some reforms that we got them to do internally, on their own. We had law professors that
were reporters for committees that we formed. They would examine certain things in the agencies and then come up with a report, and then the agencies would adopt them. None of them were monumental, but they were all helpful.

**RITCHIE:** Well, Kennedy certainly reinvigorated a lot of those commissions. That was more of an active time for them, Newton Minnow and others.

**LANE:** Yes, but Jim Landis was behind all of that. Of course, Kennedy wanted him to do it. Because the agencies were in bad shape under the Eisenhower administration. There were scandals and outright corruption.

**RITCHIE:** They seemed to become more active in terms of trying to promote reform in their fields.

**LANE:** Yes, and that was work. We used to meet on Saturdays. Meet all day. Barrett Prettyman, Judge Prettyman, was the chairman, and he worked us. But it was great for me, because I was sort of the junior and these were all the experts, except me. I was just a lawyer.

**RITCHIE:** It must have put you good standing when you were going to deal with these commissions later on.

**LANE:** You would hope so, but I don’t know. They probably didn’t like us for it.

**RITCHIE:** In the ’60s you continued your work in communications. Did you have anything to do with the Johnson administration?

**LANE:** No. I knew Lyndon Johnson well. As a matter of fact, I represented him when he bought his house from Pearl Mesta. Well, actually, I represented Pearl Mesta, because when Phil Graham of the *Washington Post* told Johnson that he needed a better house—he was living up off of Connecticut Avenue, back on I think it was 30th Street, in a small house. He told him he was vice president of the United States and he needed to have a much nicer place to live and entertain. So Johnson told him to go find him a place, and Phil Graham got Pearl Mesta to sell her house, Les Armes, which they changed to The Elms, up on 52nd Street, which happened to be just around the corner from where I
lived. Pearl had a certain figure that she wanted, net, net, net. She didn’t want to pay any costs or anything else, so Johnson had to get her a lawyer, so they called and asked me to do it. Bobby Baker called me. I said, “Sure, I'll do it.” What the heck. Covington & Burling who represented the *Post* were representing Johnson. I assume neither of us was paid.

I used to see him from time to time. He called me “Johnny.” I took him to Hartford, the first time he had ever been in New England. This was when he was the Senate majority leader. He agreed to go up there to talk to a Democratic dinner when Ribicoff was governor. I got a plane from Westinghouse and we flew up. It was the first time he had ever been in New England. So I knew him well. I knew Bobby Baker very well.

**RITCHIE:** What type of a person was Bobby Baker?

**LANE:** Bobby was a very sharp guy, very reliable. McMahon used to say, “If I want to find out what’s going on on the floor of the Senate, I ask him, because he pays attention.” He was a very valuable employee, and I found him very straightforward. He always gave you a straight answer. Very reliable. I think he got a very bad deal. It was because of Senator Kerr, and a bad judge.

**RITCHIE:** In what way?

**LANE:** He was enamored with Kerr because Kerr had a lot of money. Kerr used his money to help himself with other people, other senators who didn’t have money and so forth, he would give them money, in cash. And Bobby Baker became the guy who used to hold the little tin box that they had. They called it the “leadership fund.” He started going into business with some people that he shouldn’t have, and he was building a hotel in Ocean City. A big hurricane came and severely damaged the project. He was in trouble financially. Kerr gave him money to put him back on his feet. It was cash money, there was no paper trail, but Kerr died and Baker lost the only witness to the deal. He was accused of taking the money and not paying income tax on it, and he went to jail, which was a real tragedy. I liked the guy a lot. I found out later that the judge in the case had a very strong dislike for Baker’s lawyer, Ed Williams, which I feel hurt Baker’s case.
**RITCHIE:** But yours was just a friendship with Johnson, you didn’t have any particular dealings with his administration?

**LANE:** No, I was practicing law at that time. I never asked him for anything. I knew his administrative assistant, who also came to a tragic end, Walter Jenkins, a very nice guy. I used to work with him when I was up here. I also knew Hubert Humphrey very well. I worked as an advance man for him when he was vice president, running for president. That was during the Vietnam War. They wanted me to help them, and I said, “Okay, I’ll handle it when he has to go to a military base.” I went to Key West, Florida, to the Naval Air Station, where he inaugurated some water desalination plant, and then I did the Coast Guard Academy, where he spoke to their graduation, in New London, where I could have protection. Because everywhere else you’d get killed by the protesters.

I was at that convention in Chicago in 1968. I was actually supposed to monitor the Connecticut delegation, to keep them in Humphrey’s camp. That was my job, so I was with the Connecticut delegation out there.

**RITCHIE:** I guess the most famous moment of that convention was when Ribicoff and Mayor Daley faced off against each other.

**LANE:** Wasn’t that awful? Disgusting. But Ribicoff loved to have a whipping boy. He did that while he was governor. He had to have somebody to beat up. Then everybody would cheer him. I remember they had a deputy motor vehicle commissioner who was just a political hack from Hartford. He did something in the motor vehicle department, like gave a driver’s licence to someone who had it taken away for drunk driving, or something like that, and the press got hold of that. Oh, Ribicoff was so indignant. Fired him publicly, so the public would applaud. He was kind of tough.

**RITCHIE:** He had a sense of theater, at least.

**LANE:** Oh, yes. He was very attuned to the public and particularly the press. One of the editors of the New Britain paper’s son was killed in a traffic accident, and the next day Ribicoff proclaimed a crack down on speeding. Anyone that went over the speed limit loses their driver’s license. Big war on speeding. But great from the public
standpoint. But if some other kid had gotten killed it would have been nothing. It was because it was the editor of a paper that supported him.

RITCHIE: You mentioned that your time with the Senate was relatively short, but it was a good time to be here because there were a lot of people just beginning their careers in that short period who were going to be dominant figures in politics for another generation.

LANE: Well, Johnson was one of them. He was new to the Senate.

RITCHIE: Johnson, Humphrey, Nixon, they were all in the Senate at that stage.

LANE: Yes, I saw them all up close. I got to know Jack Kennedy because McMahon was home ill when Joe Kennedy called him and told him he was going to enter Jack against Cabot [Henry Cabot Lodge] for the Senate. I walked in when he was talking to him on the phone. He hangs up and he says, “Joe is going to enter Jack.” I said, “Jack Kennedy for the Senate? Really?” Because I knew Jack, and he was a playboy. A nice guy, riding around in the Cadillac convertible with the top down, living it up in Georgetown, because I lived up there too at the same time. I knew Jackie. She used to come in to Billy Martin’s tavern up there, with her camera. I said, “My God!” But he said, “I’d rather have a Kennedy in the Senate than a Lodge.”

He told Joe, “Look, they’re going to say that the Democrats lost China.” He said, “We had these extensive hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Far East and what to do about it.” And he said, “If you go through the hearings, we had everybody in, all the experts, the secretary of state and everyone.” And he said, “It was almost unanimous, and you can see it in the record, that we agreed there wasn’t much you could do in China. We never did have China to lose in the first place. All you can do,” he called it “matches and gasoline,” a little sabotage here and there, a little CIA operations. “But Cabot Lodge,” he said, “is on the record agreeing with this, but the hearings are classified and they’re in the Foreign Relations Committee.” Joe called him back and said they couldn’t get access to them. McMahon said, “I’ll get them and have them in my office. Have Jack come and see John Lane, he’ll have them.” I remember Cy O’Day, who was on the committee staff, got them. We hauled them down to McMahon’s office, just down the hall, and I had them back in his office (McMahon was then sick).
So every day Jack Kennedy would come over and read these. I got to know him a little better, because I knew him before that, but got to know him a little better. Then there were a couple of other things best left not mentioned, [laughs] which I helped him on.

RITCHIE: When he was running in ’52?

LANE: No, in 1960, it was another young lady that some of his opponents knew about and were trying to document. I alerted him to it, and he was really grateful.

RITCHIE: I know that James Landis worked on that ’52 campaign, and he said that was when he began to take Kennedy seriously. That when Kennedy was in the House he hadn’t been that impressive.

LANE: That was my attitude, yes.

RITCHIE: But when he campaigned for the Senate he got more serious about what he was doing, and impressed Landis much more at the point.

LANE: Right, he impressed me, too, and after he got in the Senate, but not before. I had the same reaction. I have a picture of the Senate when they were considering the NATO treaty in the Old Senate Chamber. You probably have that.

RITCHIE: I’ve seen pictures taken in there, yes, when they were doing the renovation of the current chamber they moved back in there. That was 1950.

LANE: Right. For the whole year we were in there. It was very crowded, but very nice.

RITCHIE: Very convenient for your office.

LANE: Oh, yes, everything was convenient to my office. They had a Senate law library up off the gallery. Years later I was working on a book about McMahon and I went up there to do some research. I talked to the very nice man who was the librarian at the time, he’s now retired, and he told me something which I thought was very interesting. He said, of all the senators, all the time he worked there 25 years or
something, there was no more than a handful—he said you could count on one hand the number of senators that have looked into the library and there was only one that ever used it to any degree, who personally went there and used the library, McMahon. When he was working on his Atomic Energy legislation in 1946. He said, “He used it extensively, and I helped him.” I thought that was very telling. The only senator that ever personally used the library.

RITCHIE: Everyone else sent their staff to do that kind of work.

LANE: Or the Legislative Reference Service, the staff doesn’t even do it.

RITCHIE: I did a Google search on your name and I came across a couple of articles about your confrontation with the Reagan administration, when you were on the ABA panel.

LANE: Oh, yes, on the standing committee on the federal judiciary, right.

RITCHIE: I was curious about that and hoped you would talk a little about that.

LANE: Well, I was on that ABA committee for two different terms. It required a lot of work. We would get from the attorney general the name of someone that they wanted us to investigate and evaluate. We had regular procedures for doing this. They would give us a questionnaire filled out which listed all of their important cases, the opposing counsel, the judge that handled it. We would start out by going through that and talking to their peers, and see how they were evaluated. In the beginning of the Reagan administration, when William French Smith was the attorney general, everyone they appointed was a conservative, but they were good lawyers, solid lawyers, so we didn’t have any trouble with them, because we weren’t supposed to look at their politics. Leave the politics to the president and the Senate, we only looked at their professional qualifications, and how they were regarded by their peers, and by the judges. It took a tremendous amount of work. You have to prepare a detailed report and a report on each interview, and that goes to all members of the committee, when you finally have a recommendation. Then it does not go to the administration. We only gave the attorney general a well-qualified, qualified, or non-qualified rating. They never got our report on the background, those were destroyed afterwards.
I kept track of my time and one year I had over a thousand hours on this. I had the United States District Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and then the Federal Circuit, I had two circuits. I had a number of Supreme Court nominees. I found it so easy to deal with the members of the Supreme Court. I would just call them on the phone and they would either take the call right away or return it immediately. They were most helpful, if they knew the candidate.

I did [William] Rehnquist, and testified at some length on Rehnquist. I don’t know whether you picked that up. My Democratic friends were not happy with my testimony.

RITCHIE: But you were talking about his professional qualities, not his politics.

LANE: Right. I took a position that he had already been confirmed and was a member of the court for life. Some of them were looking at it like here’s a new judge. I said, “Look, the guy’s already on the court. He’s on there for life. The only question is—it’s a narrow question—what kind of a chief justice would he be.” Let’s see what are the important qualities for a chief justice: they have to be collegial; they have to have a good administrative capability; they have to be willing to make improvements and changes; but the main thing is they have to be able to get along with their colleagues. I started out talking to everybody up on the court. I got wonderful reviews. The best ones were the liberals. One of them said, “Talk to the little people around here, the people who work around here.” And I did, I talked to the clerks, I talked to ex-clerks, I talked to the other justices’ clerk, everybody gave him high marks. So I surprised them in the hearing by testifying for him. It’s all laid out there.

RITCHIE: You said that William French Smith initially sent up very competent lawyers—

LANE: Yes, he had respect for the courts and he was a good lawyer himself. He wouldn’t put any political hacks on the court. But boy, when [Edwin] Meese got in there, we started getting down to the bottom of the barrel. I had several of them that were clearly not qualified. Some didn’t have any trial experience. How are you going to put a guy on a trial bench who never tried a case? That’s crazy. It’s all right to have a couple of them on the Court of Appeals, you can put some law school professors there, but not
on the trial bench. And we found some of them—there are things that the FBI doesn’t pick up because people are afraid to talk to the FBI, they are concerned that under the Freedom of Information Act it may be discovered, so they don’t get much. In our system, we’re able to give confidentiality and we’ll hang by it. I had several candidates that were not only not qualified but they had some problems of a rather serious nature. The chairman of the committee is the only one that deals with the Department of Justice. I would tell the chairman, “This is really a problem,” and he would talk to them and say, “Do you want us to continue this, because if we do, it’s looks like it’s not going to be good.” They would have to come back to us and say, “Continue it,” if they got their back up, or they’d say, “Thanks a lot,” and the guy withdraws. Then there’s no publicity, nobody knows, rather than make a fight out of it. It’s kind of delicate work, and you’re dealing with people’s lives and their careers. But there are basic criteria, standards that we tried to maintain. It’s tough. Takes a lot of time, a lot of effort.

RITCHIE: At some point, they decided that you were against them and tried to get you off the committee.

LANE: They did. They got an incoming president of the ABA not to reappoint me. [laughs] The Wall Street Journal had a couple of dirty editorials. It wasn’t true. It said I leaked information. I never leaked any information. Anyway, the next year I was back on the committee with a new president of the ABA. He felt very badly. I remember we have a dinner at the American Bar Association, I guess it’s the midwinter meeting, at which the president of the American Bar is there, and past presidents, the attorney general, the deputy attorney general, and everybody else. Bob Fisk was then chairman and mentioned me. Everybody stood up and I got a standing ovation—and Meese is sitting there! [laughs] It was kind of nice, particularly for my wife, who worries about these things.

RITCHIE: It reminds me of when the Senate goes through confirmation hearings. Administrations automatically assume that anybody they send up should be confirmed. If your party is the White House, senators are willing to bend over backwards. But I remember when Jimmy Carter sent Bert Lance’s nomination up to head the OMB, Senator Ribicoff was chair of the committee that handled that nomination and they shot him right through. After he got confirmed, then all the bad news started to break about him. Ribicoff later said they didn’t do Carter any favors by not scrutinizing
the nomination, and no one was ever going to get a free ride in his committee anymore. It’s sort of like the ABA, the worst thing would be to let this nomination go forward and then find out about their record.

**LANE:** Well, it was a great process for the administration, but you know, politics is politics. I was just so glad to get off and do some regular legal work. There was something else I was going to mention: I worked in the White House, too.

**RITCHIE:** When was that?

**LANE:** For Clinton. I was in the White House counsel’s office as special counsel, working on judicial appointments for the circuit courts.

**RITCHIE:** What years were that?

**LANE:** It was when he first came in, what year was that?

**RITCHIE:** 1993.

**LANE:** He took office in January of ’93 so it was probably the summer of ’93, ’94, and probably part of ’95. Then I just got too busy with other things, and I had some health problems, so I gave it up.

**RITCHIE:** You were vetting nominations?

**LANE:** Yes. They would have maybe two people that they would narrow it down to and then they’d ask me to do my own investigation, and I’d do the same thing I did with the ABA. I’d call people. I had by that time a number of lawyers all over the country that were prominent and knowledgeable. I had good contracts with lawyers and judges to get real good evaluations. Then I would do my little report and that would be it. It was kind of fun.

**RITCHIE:** What’s it like working in the White House?
LANE: It’s kind of chaotic. [laughs] It’s a lot of people, a lot of very young people, but most of them of good cheer, and kind of fun. The one thing about being in the White House, when you telephone someone, the secretary says “he’s not available” and starts to take your number, as soon as you tell them that you’re in the White House Counsel’s office and you need to talk to him, they say, “Oh, just a minute, let me see,” and boom, bing, you get him on the phone. [laughs]

RITCHIE: That’s the ultimate clout.

LANE: Right, that was kind of fun. Most of my work I did by telephone.

RITCHIE: Well, you’ve seen the government from all sides, legislative branch, judicial, and executive.

LANE: Right, and I’ve enjoyed every bit of it, as you can tell. There’s probably a lot of other things that I could talk to you about, but I don’t want to take any more of your time.

RITCHIE: Well, it’s been very interesting to go back and look at that time period. You worked for one of the more interesting people on Capitol Hill. He had a short career, but it was a memorable one.

LANE: Yes, it was like a skyrocket. It was really rolling, and then it’s gone. But he had a good name, and it lasted. It helped me that I worked for him.

RITCHIE: Did you find that your identification was that you had worked for him?

LANE: Yes, and that helped me, because I had nothing when I went off the payroll. I’ll tell you one thing that disappointed me a little bit. Some of the people around the Senate, particularly the committee staff members, used to be very pleasant and very anxious to help when they thought that McMahon might be the chairman, but when he was dead they hardly knew me. That happened, I noticed that, and even in the management of the place, the secretary of the Senate’s office, I remember Les Biffle, who was always solicitous of McMahon. I’d walk down the hall and he’d be coming the other
way. I’d say, “Hi, Les,” and he’d hardly even notice me. I was young, but I had a good lesson on human nature. I think you know what I mean.

RITCHIE: Right. When you know that a person worked for a particular senator, they often take on the characteristics of that senator.

LANE: Oh, they do! Bobby Baker started talking like Lyndon Johnson, like he was from Texas.

RITCHIE: But you know that if somebody worked for Senator so-and-so you can trust him, or you have to watch out for them.

LANE: Right. I had a number of cases representing people before congressional committees, mostly over on the House side. I represented the president and chairman of Westinghouse in Kefauver’s investigation of their antitrust cases. It was kind of a difficult period for them. Kefauver was very tough, but his staff was weak, so we did very well.

RITCHIE: That’s another thing, senators are known by having good staffs that give them extra status in the Senate. I guess it can also work the other way as well.

LANE: Sure. Anyway, I had a good run.

RITCHIE: Well, thank you very much.

LANE: Than you very much. This was exciting for me.

End of the Second Interview
# Index

American Bar Association (ABA) ........................................ 56, 58, 59
Appropriations Committee. Senate ........................................ 16
Atomic Energy, Joint Committee on .................................... 6, 7, 9, 14, 16 20
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) ................................... 9, 10, 20, 31

Bailey, John .................................................. 33, 35, 36, 38, 45
Baker, Bobby .................................................. 52, 61
Baldwin, Raymond (D-CT) ......................................... 38, 46
Barkley, Alben (D-KY) ........................................... 20, 34, 35
Benton, William (D-CT) ........................................... 38, 39
Biffle, Leslie .................................................... 60
Boland, Chris .................................................... 20
Borden, Bill ...................................................... 17
Bowles, Chester .................................................. 32, 33, 38, 39, 45
Bratten, Flo ...................................................... 20
Bridges, H. Syles (R-NH) ......................................... 45
Burning Tree Golf Course ........................................... 22, 37
Bush, Prescott (R-CT) ............................................ 36, 38, 41, 42, 46

Capitol Building .................................................. 5-9, 11, 17, 18, 21, 37, 43, 60
Carroll, Bill ...................................................... 45
Carroll, George ................................................... 11, 35
Carroll, John ..................................................... 11-12
Carter, Jimmy .................................................... 47, 48, 58
Catholics ......................................................... 28, 29, 36
China .............................................................. 12, 54
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) ..................................... 5
Clinton, Bill ..................................................... 59
Commerce Committee, Senate ........................................ 6, 16, 18
Connally, Tom (D-TX) ........................................... 9, 15
Corcoran, Thomas G. ............................................. 5
Court of Appeals, U.S. ............................................ 47, 48, 57

62
Cummings, Homer .................................................. 14, 35
Cutler, Lloyd ....................................................... 48

Daley, Richard J. ................................................... 53
Democratic Policy Committee, Senate .......................... 16
Dodd. Thomas (D-CT) .......................................... 45, 46

Eisenhower, Dwight D. ........................................... 27, 37, 40, 51

Fay, Bill .................................................................. 5, 6
Fay, George Morris ................................................ 5
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) ......................... 26, 43, 58
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ............. 48
Federal Power Commission (FPC) ............................ 40, 50
Fisk, Bob .................................................................. 58
Foreign Relations Committee ................................. 6, 8, 9, 14-16, 25, 31, 54
Fulbright, J. William (D-AR) .................................. 15, 39

George, Walter (D-GA) ........................................... 9, 15
Georgetown University ................................................. 1-5, 11, 49
GI Bill of Rights ....................................................... 4
Goldwater, Barry (R-AZ) .......................................... 49
Graham, Philip .......................................................... 51
Green, Theodore Francis (D-RI) ................................. 9, 15, 25, 26
Gwirtzman, Milt ...................................................... 49

Harriman, W. Averell ............................................... 34, 36
Harvard Law School ................................................ 5, 11
Hearst, William Randolph, Jr. .................................. 8, 26, 41-44
Hickenlooper, Bourke (R-IA) .................................. 25, 31
Holt, Pat .................................................................. 13
Hoover, Herbert ....................................................... 31
Hoover, J. Edgar ....................................................... 26
Hull, Cordell (D-TN) ................................................ 4
Humphrey, Hubert (D-MN) ....................................... 53, 54
H-bomb .............................................................. 12
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ........................................ 4-6

Johnson, Hiram (R-CA) ............................................ 18-20
Johnson, Lyndon (D-TX) ........................................... 32, 51, 61
Joint Chiefs of Staff .................................................... 12
Journal-American, New York ......................................... 41
Justice Department ................................................... 6, 14, 15

Kefauver, Estes (D-TN) ................................................ 34, 61
Kennedy, John F. (Jack) (D-MA) ................................... 29, 47, 49-55
Kennedy, Joseph P. .................................................... 5, 54
Kennedy, Robert F. (D-NY) ........................................... 49
Kerr, Robert (D-OK) ................................................... 34, 52
Korean War ........................................................... 25

Landis, James M. ................................................ 5, 50, 51, 55
Landon, Alfred (Alf) .................................................. 49
Legislative Reference Service (LRS) .................................. 56
Libel laws .............................................................. 42
Lobbying .................................................................. 9, 18, 23-24
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr (R-MA) .................................... 25, 54
Lucas, Scott (D-IL) ...................................................... 17

MacArthur, Douglas .................................................. 10-13, 31, 32
Malone, George (Molly) (R-NV) .................................... 44
Marine Corps ........................................................ 2, 3, 13, 19, 35
May-Johnson Bill ...................................................... 10
McCarthy, Joseph (R-WI) ............................................ 25-28, 31, 36, 38, 44-47
McFall, Jack .............................................................. 9
McMahon, Brien (D-CT) ............................................. 1, 6, 8-21, 25-46, 52, 54-56, 60
McMahon Act ......................................................... 16, 56
Meese, Edwin .......................................................... 57, 58
Michelson, Charles ................................................... 49-50
Minnow, Newton ..................................................... 47, 51

64
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morgan, Edward P.</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murphy, Charlie</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myers, Francis (D-PA)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nash, Frank</td>
<td>11, 12, 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Haven Railroad</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>8, 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominations</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwalk High School</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Senate Chamber</td>
<td>8, 17, 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppenheimer, J. Robert</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentagon</td>
<td>8, 10-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peurifoy, John</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potter, Charles (R-MI)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prettyman, E. Barrett</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican terrorists</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reardon, Ted</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehnquist, William</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Campaign Committee, Senate</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ribicoff, Abraham (D-CT)</td>
<td>37-41, 52, 53, 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rickover, Hyman</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roddan, Edward</td>
<td>12, 13, 25, 42, 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt, Franklin D.</td>
<td>14, 21, 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubinstein, Serge</td>
<td>41, 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russell, Richard (D-GA)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russell Senate Office Building</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secret Service</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, Margaret Chase (R-ME)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, Steve</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, William French</td>
<td>56, 57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>