RICHARD W. MURPHY

Legislative Assistant to Senator Hugh Scott, 1964-1969

Oral History Interviews
November 5, 2010 & November 16, 2011

Senate Historical Office
Washington, DC
Deed of Gift

I, Richard W. Murphy, do hereby give to the Senate Historical Office the recordings and transcripts of my interviews on November 5, 2010 and November 16, 2011.

I authorize the Senate Historical Office to use the tapes and transcripts in such a manner as may best serve the educational and historical objectives of their oral history program. I also approve the deposit of the transcripts at the Library of Congress, the National Archives, the Senate Library, and any other institution which the Senate Historical Office may deem appropriate.

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__________________________________
Richard W.. Murphy

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Donald A. Ritchie
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I, Michael Birkner, do hereby give to the Senate Historical Office the recordings and transcripts of the interviews in which I participated on November 5, 2010 and November 16, 2011.

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Michael Birkner

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[date]

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Preface

At thirteen years old, Richard Watson (Dick) Murphy enjoyed a twenty-minute interview with his political hero, New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey, whose advice he asked about entering politics. Governor Dewey recommended that Murphy follow his own path and attend law school. Circumstances, however, led him to study international relations instead. Years later, Dick Murphy came to Capitol Hill on the staff of the man whom Dewey had selected to be Republican national chairman, Hugh D. Scott, Senator from Pennsylvania.

Dick Murphy was born on October 12, 1932, in Elmira, New York, the son of George R. and Dorothy Foote Murphy. He attended the Loomis School in Windsor, Connecticut, and then studied history at Yale, from which he graduated in 1954. Murphy enrolled in the Army ROTC and after graduation became a counterintelligence officer in Japan and Korea, from 1954 to 1956. Following his military service, he attended the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of Johns Hopkins University, and received a Master’s degree in 1958. At SAIS, he met his wife, Ludmilla (Luda) Murphy. They married in 1961 and have one daughter.

In Washington, Dick Murphy did public policy research at the American Enterprise Association (later the American Enterprise Institute) until he was hired in 1964 onto the staff of Senator Hugh Scott. Scott had been elected to the Senate in 1958 and faced a tough race for reelection in 1964. As a civil rights advocate, Scott played a significant role in the bipartisan alliance that broke the long Southern filibuster against the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Murphy recounts these efforts along with his work on a Republican alternative to Medicare. In the background, Senator Barry Goldwater was campaigning against New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller for the Republican presidential nomination. Goldwater’s subsequent campaign at the head of the national ticket further complicated Senator’s Scott’s own reelection efforts.

Senator Scott won his reelection in 1964 and then aligned himself with many of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s legislative initiatives, and became a stalwart supporter of Johnson’s policies in Vietnam. Dick Murphy assesses the Senate of the 1960s, where both parties were divided between liberal and conservative wings, and when cross-party alliances were commonplace. Often sitting on a couch at the back of the Senate chamber, he recalls his interactions with some of the more prominent senators of that era, and the legislation on which he worked.
After leaving Senator Scott’s staff in 1968, Dick Murphy became director of government relations for Merck & Company, then worked for the National Food Producers Association, and for the International Service Agencies, representing a group of American charities working overseas. He then joined the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a nonpartisan research center, where he was director of external relations and executive director of the CSIS American-Ukrainian Advisory Committee.

Dick Murphy gave the first of these interviews to Professor Michael Birkner at Gettysburg College. Professor Birkner then suggested a collaboration on a second interview that was conducted at the Senate Historical Office.
About the Interviewers:

Michael Birkner is professor of history at Gettysburg College. He received his bachelor’s degree from Gettysburg and his master’s and doctorate from the University of Virginia. He covered the 1988 presidential primary in New Hampshire for the Concord Monitor, where he served as editorial page editor for two years. He continues to contribute op-ed pieces to the Monitor and other newspapers. His scholarship has focused on aspects of nineteenth- and twentieth-century America: political, urban, oral and biographical history. He has most recently written about the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, with special interest in the role of his Chief of Staff Sherman Adams. He has also written on James Buchanan, the only Pennsylvania-born American president, and an award-winning book, A Country Place No More: The Transformation of Bergenfield, N.J., 1894-1994, that traced the development of a small community into an increasingly urbanized suburb of New York City.

BIRKNER: This is November 5, 2010. I’m Michael Birkner. I’m sitting in a quiet room in the basement of Musselman Library with Richard W. Murphy, a former aide to Senator Hugh Scott in the 1960s when Scott was in the United States Senate. We are joined by George Silvestri, a professor of American History at Montgomery College, who will be an observer. We’re going to talk about Mr. Murphy’s career and specifically his reminiscences of working for Senator Scott. Mr. Murphy, I wanted to get some background about you, because you did some interesting things before 1964, so why don’t you just tell me a little bit about yourself.

MURPHY: OK, well, I was born and raised in Elmira, New York and was educated partly there. After two years of public high school in Elmira, I went to a boarding school in Connecticut, now known as Loomis Chaffee, but it was the Loomis School in Windsor, Connecticut. And then I went on to Yale and got my undergraduate degree with a major in history. I’d been commissioned through the ROTC and I was in the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps for two years and was trained in Fort Holabird, Baltimore, Maryland. I also took an intensive eight-week course in spoken Japanese and then I went to the Far East, and I served in Tokyo for about five to six months in 1955 where I wrote a history of the 441st Counterintelligence Corps Detachment. And then I went on to Korea where among other things I was head of the Counter Subversive Branch [of the 308th Counterintelligence Corps Detachment] and I had nine American enlisted agents. Our main focus was on the political scene in South Korea because of our job, of course, was to gather intelligence on anything which affected the security of the Army command [Eighth United States Army].

I originally wanted to go into law because I was interested in politics. My political hero, starting as a seventh grader, was Thomas E. Dewey, the governor of New York. I worked very hard for his election against [President] Franklin Roosevelt in 1944, and I fought, bled, and died for him in 1948 when Harry Truman won the election, and I thought that was about the blackest day in American history. I was about ready to move to
Canada except that I was in school at the time in Connecticut. Well, I got over that and so that’s where my interest in politics dated from. I met Governor Dewey when I was almost thirteen years old in Elmira, New York—spent twenty minutes with him and after we talked about family and our dogs I asked him for his advice on how to go into politics.

BIRKNER: How old were you when you had that meeting?

MURPHY: Almost thirteen. And the governor told me how he got into politics because originally he was a singer. He had a marvelous baritone voice and I think originally he had planned to go into opera, but he went on to law school. He was a native of Michigan and he went on to law school and he advised me in effect to do what he did. He went to law school. He became a very prominent lawyer and of course District Attorney in New York and from then on first a candidacy for the Republican presidential nomination in 1940 and then he was elected governor of New York in 1942. Anyway, he was my hero, but I didn’t go to law school. I decided instead to go to graduate school and get a master’s degree in international relations, which I got in 1958 from the [Paul H. Nitze] School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University in Washington. And I had a very good assignment when I was in the Counterintelligence Corps in both Japan and Korea. I was interested in going into the intelligence business. I wasn’t interested in the CIA, although I interviewed for it. I wasn’t interested in becoming a Foreign Service Officer. I liked the Army and so I was hoping to get a job in the Pentagon as an intelligence analyst in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff of Intelligence there, but there wasn’t any opening and so I went with an outfit called the Ordnance Technical Intelligence Agency in Arlington Hall Station in Arlington, Virginia. And I stayed in long enough—three years—to get tenure or whatever the status in the civil service is called, but I decided that I didn’t want to spend the rest of my life in doing basically strategic intelligence research. If you like the tedious work of intelligence research, [the job] is good.

I wanted to be where the action was and I wanted to get up on the Hill, Capitol Hill, and I started networking, and there just weren’t any jobs available. The staffs were considerably smaller in those days, but I landed a job with the American Enterprise Association, as it was then known—it changed its name to the American Enterprise Institute—doing public policy research where I was in effect a one man mini-Congressional Research Service dealing with requests from congressional offices for background research—for example, help in writing speeches. And I started writing
speeches for different senators. Mostly they were Republicans. Most of our clientele on the Hill were Republicans although [Senator] Hubert Humphrey [of Minnesota] was one [Democrat] who would call on AEI. He’d call on any source he could find. The man was completely inquisitive, but, as I said, I wrote speeches for a number of Republican senators, one of whom was Hugh Scott. His legislative assistant was a fellow by the name of Jack MacKenzie. He used to call me all the time on stuff, particularly on foreign policy or foreign affairs, NATO and things like that. Scott wasn’t on any of the committees that were involved with foreign policy or security policy but I would put together stuff for Jack and, you know, it would go into the Congressional Record and things like that. So I did stuff for Scott indirectly.

Anyway, I may have met the Senator once, just casually. I met Bob Kunzig once casually. Bob was his administrative assistant. And in November of 1963 shortly after Jack Kennedy’s assassination, I remember one Friday I got a call from Bob Kunzig, and he said, “Dick, can you come up and see me at eleven o’clock?” I was downtown with AEI and I said, “Sure.” I got in a taxi and it dawned on me about halfway up there that Bob may want to talk to me about a job. And he told me that Jack MacKenzie was leaving the senator. Jack was from upstate New York and Jack took a job with Mobil Oil as a lobbyist in Albany and Jack highly recommended me as his replacement. And so Bob asked me if I’d be interested. And I said, “Sure.” And he said, “If you’re really interested in it, I’ll get you in to see the Senator.” Well, this being a Friday, I said “Well, let me think about it over the weekend and I’ll be back with you on Monday.” Well, I spent several hours over the weekend talking to various people whose political judgment I trusted. One of whom was Evron Kirkpatrick who had been one of my professors at Georgetown. I was working part-time towards a Ph.D. and he was Jean Kirkpatrick’s husband.

BIRKNER: What was his first name?

MURPHY: Evron. Anyway, everybody agreed. I had two questions: Number one, who do you think the Republican presidential nominee will be in 1964? And number two, what are Hugh Scott’s chances for re-election? Because he was running for his second term, planning to run for a second term. Everybody agreed that it would not be Barry Goldwater and Scott’s re-election would be a piece of cake. So I called up Bob Kunzig Monday morning and said, “I want the job.” And so he said “OK.” He said, “Come on up. You’ll see the senator at 5:00.” And so I went in to see the senator and I was well aware
that he had a good sense of humor. He told me, “I’m going to be running for reelection.” He said, “One of the big issues of the campaign is going to be healthcare for the elderly.” He said, “I can’t vote for the Medicare bill [King-Anderson] because I’m opposed to financing healthcare with payroll taxes.” He said, “I’m a cosponsor of a Federal-State healthcare for the elderly bill that was introduced by Senator [Leverett] Saltonstall, Republican of Massachusetts, and several of us Republicans are on that.” And he said, “None of us understands the bill, let alone can explain it.” He said, “I want something that is simple and straightforward and can be explained.” Well, I didn’t know any more about healthcare [than he did] but I quickly learned. And I saw a model in the Federal Employee’s Health Insurance Program—but that’s jumping ahead a little bit. He said, “If you don’t do anything else for me next year, if you come up with a great healthcare bill I’ll be immensely grateful.” And so he said, “Well, do you have any problems or concerns?” I said, “Well, not really Senator.” I said, “But I should point out first of all I’m not from Pennsylvania. I’m from Elmira, New York.” He said “Well, I’m not from Pennsylvania either.” He said, “I’m from Virginia and I’m proud of it.” And then I said, “Well, I’m not a lawyer.” And he said, “Well, do you know how to read?” And I said, “Yes sir.” And he said, “Well, you won’t have any problems.” He said, “We have the legislative counsel’s office here.” He said, “You just tell them what you want and they can draft the language, bills and amendments.” And he said, “We have good lawyers on my committee staffs.” He was on Judiciary and Commerce. Those were his two big committees and some other committees. And then he said, “And you can go to them. And then if you’re in a real pinch,” he said, “come to me.” He said “I’m a lawyer.”

BIRKNER: Your description of your time in his office suggests someone who was straightforward and unpretentious. Is that a fair characterization?

MURPHY: It sure is; it sure is. He could laugh at himself and he had a marvelous sense of humor and he also had interests outside politics. His main interest outside of politics was oriental art and particularly Chinese art. And I can tell you more about that later.

BIRKNER: We might get into that later a bit. The meeting that you had with Scott again leads to the premise that you were going to be on his staff. Is that the idea?

MURPHY: Yeah.
BIRKNER: It was a pretty done deal that you were going to work with him that year?

MURPHY: Yeah.

BIRKNER: What kind of notice did you have to give at the American Enterprise Institute?

MURPHY: Oh Lord, I think I gave them a month’s notice.

BIRKNER: OK and then you moved over to work with Scott?


BIRKNER: So you would have a great interest in what was going on in the Republican presidential nomination contest?

MURPHY: Absolutely. I had met Goldwater. I wrote a speech for Goldwater in 1962 on the Geneva Agreements on Laos which had been negotiated by Undersecretary of State Averill Harriman. And I knew something about the Far East because that was my primary focus in graduate school. And I wrote this speech. I was concerned about the Geneva Accords and Goldwater was against it. And I wrote this speech and I went up to deliver it to him and I went with Dave Abshire who was the guy that hired me at AEI. Dave and Admiral Arleigh Burke founded the Center for Strategic Studies at Georgetown University, which later became the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Anyway, we went up to see the senator. Nice fellow. Very nice guy. But just in conversing with him it became evident to me that the guy didn’t know where Laos was. Didn’t know a thing about it and, what really shocked me, he seemed very casual about the whole thing. I gave him the draft. It was going to be a floor statement and we walked out. As we walked out of the [Old, now Russell] Senate Office Building, I said to Dave, “Is this guy serious about running for President?” And he said, “Yeah I think he is.” I said, “I don’t think he’s fit for the office.” I said, “He struck me as being a real ignoramus.” Well, he ended up being our nominee.
BIRKNER: Right. Well, now I’m just curious. As a presumptive candidate for re-election in ‘64 Scott obviously had even more interest than you in who’s going to be at the top of the ticket. Did he express to the staff his preferences about the Republican nomination in ‘64? Did he say he going to support Rockefeller? Was he going to support Scranton? Was he going to stay neutral? What was he going to do?

MURPHY: No, no. He supported Nelson Rockefeller that year. As you know, he was from the [progressive] wing of the party. He was the guy who organized the “We want Willkie” demonstrations at the Republican convention in Philadelphia in 1940.

BIRKNER: Not many people know what an important role he played for Eisenhower in ‘52 in the early going in the southern states and the western states.

MURPHY: [In 1964] He supported Nelson Rockefeller.

BIRKNER: And of course Rockefeller never made enough of a connection with voters. His marriage to Happy Rockefeller probably didn’t help any. But he just never really got the momentum with the voters in ‘64 or in any other year. [However] it wasn’t clear in your first months on the job who the nominee was going to be. You had the [Henry Cabot] Lodge factor. You had the potential Scranton factor, so things were very fluid in the first six months of ‘64.

MURPHY: Yeah they were. That’s correct.

BIRKNER: Could you just focus on the tasks that you had assigned to you by Scott in the realm of policies such as this potential healthcare bill or did you also get yourself sucked into any of the political stuff?

MURPHY: I was sucked into it during the campaign.

BIRKNER: Let’s talk about January to June, when Scott was out on the hustings for Rockefeller.

MURPHY: I was on the legislative side.

BIRKNER: And tell me what you were working on.
MURPHY: The important thing I was working on initially was that healthcare bill.

BIRKNER: This was in ‘64, so you were still dealing with the Congress with 176 or 177 Republicans in the House and I don’t know, maybe 42 or 43 in the Senate. You’ve still got a fairly decent contingent so the Democrats do need to pay attention to the Republican position in ‘64 on this healthcare issue. In ‘65 they may not need to. Were you talking to aides across the aisle or were you strictly working with Republicans?

MURPHY: Oh no, I was talking with everybody.

BIRKNER: So tell me some of the people you were talking with and some of the conversations you were having?

MURPHY: Well, first of all, I came up with a healthcare bill and the reason why that was a top priority was because the senator knew that we were going to have a vote in the Senate before the election and the Anderson bill was going to come up in the Senate and he was against the Anderson bill, so I came up with a bill which was cheaper and better than Medicare. When I came up with a package about this and a financing mechanism which was basically like the Federal Employee Health Insurance Program and the government shared the cost of the premium fifty-fifty except for people below the poverty line, which was then $3000 a year, but the Feds picked that up. It came from the general revenue. So then I needed to get a price tag on it. My friend, Paul Hawkins, who was working for the Health Insurance Association, put me in touch with Ed Pettingill, who was chief actuary at Aetna Life. He said, “He’s the best actuary in the business.” So I sent the stuff up to Pettingill and I’d be talking to him on the phone. We didn’t have faxes in those days and Pettingill looked over the bill and called me back and he said—Christ, I can’t remember the exact price tag—it might have been something like $180 premium for this thing. So with a little arithmetic, you know, we came up with an estimate of the cost, which was lower than the estimate for Medicare, and we had a more generous package of benefits. And so another friend of mine arranged to have printed a one-page summary of the bill and he arranged to have it put in every doctor’s office in Pennsylvania in the waiting rooms. And we [Senator Scott] didn’t talk about the bill much. It didn’t become an issue until the vote came in the Senate. And this was in September and it was right before Labor Day. We offered our bill as a substitute, knowing full well it would be
defeated. It was defeated on a voice vote. There might have been three or four senators on the floor. We asked for a division vote [where senators favoring and opposing the measure stand and are counted]. We might have had ten senators on the floor [for that]. It was defeated. So the Senator [Scott] voted against the Anderson bill.

**BIRKNER:** Is the Anderson bill a Clinton Anderson bill or some other Anderson bill?

**MURPHY:** It was—what was his name? He was from New Mexico.

**BIRKNER:** That was Clinton Anderson.

**MURPHY:** So we voted against that bill. Right away Genevieve Blatt—Hugh Scott’s opponent—issued a statement blasting the senator.

**BIRKNER:** Wait a minute, the Anderson bill came forward and Scott voted no.

**MURPHY:** After offering his [alternative as a substitute].

**BIRKNER:** And then the Anderson bill carried.

**MURPHY:** Oh yes.

**BIRKNER:** So Scott voted against the Anderson bill. That became a campaign issue against him?

**MURPHY:** Right. She [Blatt] blasted him within hours after the vote and we fired back with a statement accusing her of misrepresenting his position on healthcare and exploiting the aspirations of the elderly and all that and that shut her up because the two candidates had joint appearances throughout the state and during the course of the campaign the health bill was never mentioned.

**BIRKNER:** Without getting us tangled up with this at any length, it needs to be said that getting Blatt to that nomination was not a simple matter because of her very messy [Democratic primary] fight with Judge Musmanno, who essentially would not...
accept the results and gave her a lot of grief and made it a lot harder for her that fall than she might have otherwise have had it.

MURPHY: That’s true. A manna from heaven for Scott for sure; but let’s back up. You wanted to ask me about other things I’ve worked on and people that I’ve worked with.

BIRKNER: Yes, and I wanted to just get a sense of how your days are going as you’re getting your footing as an aide to Scott. Let’s start by giving you a title. What was your title when you started working for Scott?

MURPHY: Legislative assistant.

BIRKNER: OK, now you’re legislative assistant. You’re full time. He has given you some very substantial responsibilities. How are you getting your footing? Did you have any particular mentor who is going to enable you to do your work better or do you simply find your own way?

MURPHY: Pretty much finding my own way in getting to know people, people that I could look to, to give me advice outside of the Scott office. One was Bill Hildenbrand who at the time was legislative assistant to Senator Caleb Boggs of Delaware. Bill and I became good friends. He was very helpful to me on coming up with this healthcare bill. Fred Arner of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress [now the Congressional Research Service]. He was helpful of course with the Library—that’s strictly a non-partisan position. Fred was the guy who helped work up the Saltonstall bill, which nobody could understand. And there were others, you know, in Republican offices, such as Charlie Clapp who was Saltonstall’s legislative assistant.

BIRKNER: He was the guy who was writing the book about the legislative process. [Charles L. Clapp, The Congressman: His Work as He Sees It (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1963)]

MURPHY: That’s correct; and Steve Horn, who later became a congressman. He was legislative assistant to Senator Tom Kuchel of California. In that year I did not have too much contact with Democrats except guys I’d see over at the Senate floor like Mark Shields. Mark was the legislative assistant to Senator [William] Proxmire of Wisconsin.
He would write a daily speech for Proxmire, urging ratification of the Genocide Treaty. I used to kid Mark. I’d say, “What are we coming up with today Mark?” And things like that, but the main legislation that was before us for a good part of that first half of 1964 was the Civil Rights bill.

BIRKNER: So, are you spending any time on that?

MURPHY: A lot of time.

BIRKNER: This is an issue that actually does matter to Hugh Scott personally and politically. Is that correct?

MURPHY: Absolutely, because he was an advocate for civil rights legislation going back to his first year in the House of Representatives in 1941. And so he was a strong advocate of Civil Rights. And we had a bipartisan coalition whose leaders were Hubert Humphrey on the Democratic side and Tom Kuchel on the Republican side. And these were the people who were the sponsors and co-sponsors of the Civil Rights bill. And Jack [Jacob] Javits on the Republican side and a whole bunch of the Democrats on the Democratic side, but we had regular strategy meetings. And I think Kuchel’s and Humphrey’s guys—they used to put out kind of a little newsletter to keep everybody informed as to who was doing what and all of that sort of thing.

BIRKNER: Now were these strategy meetings among staffers or were they among senators?

MURPHY: Mostly staffers, but senators, too, on occasion. And so then of course over here you had [Everett McKinley] Dirksen [from Illinois, the minority leader]. And Dirksen in one of his classical maneuvers did a 180-degree turn. And he had three guys on his staff. They were on the Judiciary Committee payroll. And they were known as “the bombers.” And Clyde Flynn and Bernie Waters, both Illinoisans, and Neil Kennedy who was a Yale graduate, as a matter of fact, class of ‘48. Those guys—they kept in touch with us but eventually it was Dirksen who came up. He was working with Mike Mansfield [from Montana], the Democratic leader, drawing upon what the others were doing to come up with the final version. But it was a fascinating period.
**BIRKNER:** You were a part of a major episode in American history. What was your role in all of this? Did you go to some of these strategy meetings among staffers? Were you yourself doing any kind of research or organizing? What were you doing?

**MURPHY:** I was mostly attending meetings. When it came to the actual debate we had different assignments. Hugh Scott was a captain. I can’t remember who his Democratic counterpart was [Murphy subsequently recalled that it was Sen. Edward V. Long of Missouri] but again these were among the co-sponsors. They were the captains for Title Five of the bill which had to do with the extension of the life of the Civil Rights Commission. So I was involved in drafting his [Scott’s] floor statement, which you know was aimed toward the legislative history of that part of the bill.

**BIRKNER:** You obviously had to have learned something about the 1957 Civil Rights Act, which helped create that commission.

**MURPHY:** That’s correct, and I was working with a guy, a lawyer who had been in the Justice Department in the Eisenhower administration and who was really familiar with the 1957 Act.

**BIRKNER:** Do you happen to remember which lawyer that was?

**MURPHY:** I can’t remember his name.

**BIRKNER:** OK, it wasn’t John Lindsay, or you’d remember that.

**MURPHY:** No, I can’t remember the guy’s name.

**BIRKNER:** That’s OK. What was your own personal feeling about the work you were doing? Were you feeling like this is something more than a job for you, were you energized in some way?

**MURPHY:** Oh I was energized completely. The beauty of working for Hugh Scott was that we had a complete identity of views on everything. You know he himself was not a legislator most of the time. He could be one on occasion. He was one of these guys who quickly grasped something, particularly in a committee session. He could really pick up on something and be right in the middle of it all in a committee. I think Hugh
Scott always looked upon this as his role. He was interested in the national leadership of the Republican Party. And he was very much concerned about who was going to be the standard bearer in the presidential elections and he was also of course in effect a titular leader of the Pennsylvania Republican Party. Of course when I was there the leader was [Governor] Bill Scranton and later [Governor] Ray Shafer.

**BIRKNER:** But he was in sync with Bill Scranton right? I mean, Shafer, Scranton and Scott had policy views in congruence with each other.

**MURPHY:** Yeah, and knowing Scott’s political background I had no problem ever disagreeing with the man. I was just in complete sync with him. I just loved working for him as a consequence.

**BIRKNER:** That’s a good thing to get up in the morning knowing that you like what you’re doing.

**MURPHY:** Absolutely, absolutely.

**BIRKNER:** Now I need to ask you a question that you may or may not want or be able to comment on but I think it’s useful to ask it. Can you give me your take on the basis as you see it for Scott’s strong advocacy of Civil Rights? He is a southerner. I think he’s born in 1900. He grows up in a period in southern history where white people’s attitudes toward black people were essentially the attitude of people in South Africa toward black people. And yet as you say from the get-go as a congressional candidate he is an advocate of civil rights. To what extent do you think this is simply practical politics in a district that has many black voters? To what extent does conviction play into it?

**MURPHY:** Well, I think there probably were some political considerations. Obviously I can’t get inside the mind of the man in 1941 so I really can’t answer that question as to how much of it was political and how much of it was conviction. But really by the time I worked for him it was conviction.

**BIRKNER:** It was conviction.

**MURPHY:** It was conviction.
BIRKNER: Did you ever notice Scott in terms of his interactions with African Americans?

MURPHY: Oh yes.

BIRKNER: And was he very at ease and so forth?

MURPHY: Absolutely and of course he was very, very close to Clarence Mitchell.

BIRKNER: From the NAACP.

MURPHY: Yeah, he was the Washington Director of the NAACP. And Clarence, people referred to him often as the 101st Senator.

BIRKNER: Right. So Mitchell could pick up the phone and talk to Scott?

MURPHY: Oh absolutely, absolutely and I talked to Clarence too, many times.

BIRKNER: I assume that Mitchell had a big stake in what was brewing in ‘64?

MURPHY: Absolutely.

BIRKNER: And he wants to be sure that the Republican supporters and the Democratic supporters are on the same page because there is a very determined opposition obviously coming from the southern wing of the [Democratic] party.

MURPHY: Absolutely.

BIRKNER: You could see something developing.

MURPHY: Sure. I met Clarence Mitchell. I met Roy Wilkins, the head of the NAACP. I met some of the other leaders. I also, of course, got to know Nick Katzenbach who was the deputy attorney general. And Nick was really the point person for the administration on the civil rights bill. And, you know, I knew these guys pretty well. They were involved in some of the meetings too.
**BIRKNER:** Now what about the business of the southern filibuster? Do you have remembrances of that?

**MURPHY:** Oh absolutely. We had a schedule worked out where we always had one or two civil rights senators on the floor at all times and we had a regular roster. I remember one day going in on a Saturday and I think there were three senators on the floor and one was holding forth at great length—John Sparkman of Alabama. And he was holding forth at great length. The senator [Scott] and I came in and the senator sat down at his desk and as he sat down John Sparkman said, “I see my good friend from Pennsylvania who’s just entered the chamber.” And he said, “And I know that he is a native of the Old Dominion.” He said, “One thing I’ve never understood about my good friend from Pennsylvania was why he is a Republican. When did he become a Republican?” And Senator Scott said, “Back in Virginia.” He said, “I became a Republican as soon as I learned how to walk.” And then the senator crossed his legs, folded his hands and in two minutes he was sound asleep. The people up in the gallery looking down probably thought that Hugh Scott was hanging on every word that Sparkman was uttering. And he was obviously asleep.

**BIRKNER:** A lovely story. But it does sound like Scott was not at all sound asleep either on the legislative or political side in ‘64. My perception is that in many ways you could call ‘64 the apex for Hugh Scott in politics because he is engaged in two of these major legislative battles and he’s doing it at the height of his powers. And then of course he’s engaged in a political struggle for survival when the odds, as you have already talked about, are against him.

**MURPHY:** Yes.

**BIRKNER:** So you’ve got to be a front row spectator and participant in some pretty interesting history.

**MURPHY:** Yeah.

**BIRKNER:** Now do you want to say anything more about getting this civil rights measure through or have you said what you know? Is there one story that we should put on the tape?
MURPHY: No, you know it was a matter of waiting out the [filibustering] senators and getting enough votes to impose cloture. And of course that’s where Dirksen was the key.

BIRKNER: Did he lean on some particular Republican senators—is that what you’re referring to?

MURPHY: No, I don’t think he leaned on people. I remember—this had nothing to do with the Civil Rights bill—I can remember only one occasion where Dirksen came up to Hugh Scott on the Senate floor and he said to Scott, “I need you on this.” I can’t remember what the issue was.

BIRKNER: You’re saying that Dirksen didn’t do that on a regular basis.

MURPHY: Not on a regular basis.

BIRKNER: Why not?

MURPHY: Because he knew that Scott and he didn’t see eye-to-eye on a number of issues. There was also a personal thing. I learned that from Hugh Scott. We were talking one time about the [failed] 1948 presidential campaign and he said, “Dick, you know who was the advisor on agricultural policy in that campaign?” I said “Who?” He said, “Congressman Everett McKinley Dirksen.”

BIRKNER: So why do you think that Dirksen was the key on the cloture vote?

MURPHY: Well, because he brought with him some conservative Republicans.

BIRKNER: He might not want a larger federal role in society but could still feel this is the right vote at the right time.

MURPHY: You see Goldwater was against it and he [Dirksen] brought people like Roman Hruska [of Nebraska].

BIRKNER: So Hruska actually voted for the Civil Rights bill?
MURPHY: Yes.

BIRKNER: That would be one vote that I wouldn’t expect. If he got Hruska’s vote then he did some pretty good work in ‘64.

MURPHY: Hruska and Dirksen were very close. And I think Hruska went along with Dirksen. I don’t honestly remember. But there were others you know, guys like Milton Young [of North Dakota] and [inaudible] probably went with him.

BIRKNER: –Scott was working beside him and the bill gets passed.

MURPHY: Yeah. We get the cloture. I remember the day after cloture we had I don’t know how many roll-call votes that day because Sam Ervin of North Carolina had a whole slew of amendments because, of course, they were operating under the time limitations of cloture. And Ervin was offering amendments to cut different titles out of the bill and so we had to stay right close to the chamber. The senator would be over there at the senators’ private room. I’d be on the Senate floor you know and he’d say, “Call me when you need me, Dick.” You know the bells were ringing right and left and everything like that. Ervin would be demanding a live quorum, you know, getting all the senators out and then calling for a roll-call vote. On one Ervin amendment to strike a crucial title from the bill, Scott entered the chamber just as his name was called and the senator said, “aye.” Amid the din caused by senators milling around talking, I shouted, “No!” The presiding officer asked Scott how he wished to be recorded and the senator said, “No.” The senator then turned to me and said, “You earned your pay for the year, Dick.”

You know, basically I was following the course of other bills that came before the Senate because the senator didn’t spend much time on the Senate floor. He was there basically for votes and he expected me to tell him how to vote, and you know I had to be ready. If we had time I’d give him a short explanation of what it was he was voting on. We had a major tax bill in ‘64 and I was relying on staff people from the Senate Finance Committee. I’d ask them to tell me what was going on. One person that I relied heavily on throughout my time with Senator Scott was Larry Woodworth who was the staff director of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation which was strictly non-partisan. Larry and I became good friends. And you know Larry had the ability to explain some highly technical stuff in plain English. He was a straight shooter and I trusted him completely. So when Scott would come bursting into the chamber I could tell him quickly
what it was he was voting on. Sometimes when he didn’t have time to hear what it was he was voting on he would say, “Just tell me how to vote.”

BIRKNER: I guess given how busy these people were, this was essential for almost all senators.

MURPHY: That’s right. And also, you know, he told me when I first started working for him [that] “I follow other people sometimes.” He said, “On agricultural bills I generally will be with George Aiken of Vermont.” [Aiken] was ranking Republican on [the Committee on] Agriculture. He said, “On defense matters I rely pretty much on Dick Russell of Georgia.” Russell was chairman of the Armed Services Committee. About civil rights they were poles apart, but on national security matters [Scott] agreed with Russell. And this is true I think with members of Congress generally. They follow certain colleagues whose judgment they trust. And that’s what I did with staff people. And I would read Congressional Quarterly. Congressional Quarterly would come to the office and it would go to the senator. And the senator would read Congressional Quarterly. That I would say was his major source of information for following the whole Congress. He read that thing. I’d see underscoring in it and little notations on it so I knew he read that because I’d get it after he did. And so that’s how we kept ourselves informed.

BIRKNER: Did Scott’s staff members have working lunches on a regular basis with like-minded staffers from other comparable senators, or did you eat your lunch at your desk? How did it generally work?

MURPHY: I often ate lunch at my desk. Usually when I’d come in I would be in the office by eight o’clock. And I would take a look at the newspaper headlines. I would quickly go through the Congressional Record and then I’d go down to the cafeteria and I’d have coffee with some of the staffers, including Bill Hildenbrand. And there’d be senators down there too, but not Hugh Scott. He wasn’t in that early in the morning. [Mike] Mansfield [of Montana] and Aiken had coffee together every morning. John Williams of Delaware was down there, but we didn’t sit with the senators. We’d just have coffee among ourselves. And I usually would be back in the office by nine o’clock.

BIRKNER: Where was it that you had this coffee? What building?
MURPHY: In the Dirksen Building [known then as the New Senate Office Building].

BIRKNER: In the Dirksen Building.

MURPHY: Our office was in the Russell Building [known then as the Old Senate Office Building], at the time on the fourth floor, room 451. But that was my routine. Within an hour I quickly looked at the Daily Digest and the Congressional Record, take a look at the headlines in the Washington Post and the New York Times and go down and have coffee with the boys and then come back and start to work.

BIRKNER: But lunch was at your desk on more occasions than not?

MURPHY: More occasions than not. Sometimes I’d have time to go down to the Dirksen Building cafeteria and have a grilled cheese sandwich or something like that.

BIRKNER: You’ve mentioned the name Hildenbrand three times so I’m guessing that he is probably the person you felt closest to on the Hill?

MURPHY: Yeah, and we were two entirely different personalities.

BIRKNER: You should probably spell his name for the transcriber.

MURPHY: H-i-l-d-e-n-b-r-a-n-d, William F. Hildenbrand. A native of Pennsylvania and a sports announcer for a radio station up in Philadelphia before [coming to Washington] and then he had a job in the Eisenhower administration. The last couple years of the Eisenhower administration he was HEW’s [Department of Health, Education and Welfare] legislative liaison. And then he went with Cale Boggs.

BIRKNER: Caleb Boggs [Republican from Delaware].

MURPHY: First he went with Congressman Haskell [Harry Haskell] of Delaware and then he went with Caleb Boggs and that’s when I knew him.
BIRKNER: For the transcriber—it’s Caleb Boggs, not to be confused with Hale Boggs of Louisiana. You were in the middle of saying that you were two people who were very different. I think that’s what you were just saying.

MURPHY: Oh, Bill and I were entirely different. You know, he could be kind of crude but he had a heart of gold. And he just had a lot of good common sense. I’m not sure whether he ever went to college but Bill and I were together for a long time, from the time I arrived till Hugh Scott was elected minority whip [in January 1969]—he beat Hruska to be minority whip. This was after Kuchel lost the California [Republican] primary. And as soon as Kuchel lost the California primary in [June] 1968 to Max Rafferty, Hugh Scott jumped in as did Roman Hruska, but Scott was in there “firstest with the mostest” and he ended up winning that thing, so he was Dirksen’s deputy for a few months.

BIRKNER: Right.

MURPHY: Dirksen died in September 1969. I worked for the senator until the end of January so I was there when he was elected minority whip and I would have become his administrative assistant had I chosen to stay. The only reason I left Hugh Scott, it had nothing to do with him. [I left] because the hours were horrendous. I was in his office as long as the Senate was in session and so sometimes I wouldn’t get home ‘till after midnight. And I had a young daughter at that point, a baby daughter, and I wanted to have more time with my wife and her.

BIRKNER: Working as a staffer is very much a young man’s or woman’s game.

MURPHY: It’s absolutely so. So what I was going to say, Hildenbrand became Hugh Scott’s administrative assistant [in the whip’s office]. And later he became secretary to the minority working for all the Republican senators. I remember when Howard Baker [from Tennessee] became the [majority] leader [in 1981], he [Hildenbrand] became secretary of the Senate.

BIRKNER: That sounds right. Now I want to get back to the staff role in ‘64 working for Scott. Is Bob Kunzig back working for Scott by ‘64?

MURPHY: Oh yes. Kunzig came in ‘62 or ‘63, I don’t remember.
BIRKNER: He had worked in the Eisenhower administration.

MURPHY: Kunzig ran for attorney general of Minnesota in 1962 I believe. He was defeated and then he went with Hugh Scott I guess in the beginning of ‘63. So he was the administrative assistant until Ray Shafer was elected governor of Pennsylvania in 1966. And then Bob left to become head of the General Services Administration up here in Pennsylvania under Shafer. Bob’s relationship with me was very straightforward. Bob said to me at the very beginning—he said, “Dick, you are the one that’s legislative assistant. You deal directly with Hugh Scott.” He said, “I’m really not interested in legislation. But keep me informed.” He said, “But you don’t have to inform me on everything.” He said, “I’ll call you now and then and ask you what’s going on.” And Bob would call me sometimes and of course our offices were right next door to each other. He’d say, “Dick, what’s going on?” I said, “Give me a couple of minutes Bob.” And I’d take the Congressional Quarterly in. It had the whole rundown of what was going on. I’d say, “Here, read this article. And then if you have any questions I’ll be happy to answer them.”

BIRKNER: I’m assuming you were involved but occasionally he would get questions or even demands from key constituents and he would need to get filled in on what the issue was and where Scott was on it so he could give a better answer.

MURPHY: That’s right. I would keep him in informed on that because Bob was dealing with Pennsylvania. Bob was dealing with Pennsylvania politics and that was his bailiwick and of course Bob became the campaign manager [in 1964] once we got into the campaign. And Bob went off the Senate payroll as did Edith Skinner who was the senator’s executive assistant and Gene Cowen, Eugene Cowen, who was the press secretary—those three along with Barbara Sweeney and Margie Lynch, who were the Senator’s secretaries. They went up to Harrisburg, affectionately known among the staff in those days as “Saigon on the Susquehanna.” And that was where the campaign headquarters was. I remained in Washington because the Senate was still in session until well into October that year. And Hugh Scott always wanted to be recorded on how he would have voted had he been present. And he left that entirely up to me.

BIRKNER: Would you pair him?
MURPHY: Occasionally I’d pair him. Sometimes in the live pairing, more often than not it was a dead pair but his position was always recorded. And then during the session after that period of time when he was away I would send him a report on what his position was on each of these issues—whether it was amendments or bills, final passage, and he never questioned my judgment on any of that. I was also acting administrative assistant. So while they were up in Pennsylvania which was really from Labor Day on with one exception—the Senator came down to cast a vote on the final passage of the Appalachian Regional Development bill. And he came down just for that purpose. And he said a few words about it. He didn’t know what he was talking about and he turned to me after and he said, “Dick write a brief statement for the [Congressional] Record,” which I did. I put out a statement for that.

BIRKNER: It’s really impressive to me how versatile you had to be and how quick on your feet to do your job well. You’re not dealing here with a high school social studies paper. You’re dealing with high policy and you don’t have a lot of leeway to just wing it. You could potentially get it really wrong [which would] make your boss look very bad.

MURPHY: Yeah.

BIRKNER: So you had to be very quick-witted it and you had to know how to get information fast in a pre-computer era.

MURPHY: Right.

BIRKNER: Everything you had done in your life to that point must have helped you: undergraduate education, post-graduate education, excellent experience in public policy business, writing working papers for AEI. It seems to me you are really the right kind of person in the job you were in. I don’t think I could have done what you did.

MURPHY: You know the history major was so important to me and especially History 45 at Yale, “the Course of Chinese History,” because in that course Dixie Walker [Professor Richard L. Walker], in addition to our term paper we had to write about a half dozen short papers each semester. And he gave us kind of a broad range of topics among which we could pick. And he said, “Those papers are not to exceed two pages double spaced in length.” And he said, “I want you people to learn how to write
concisely.” And he said, “Because President Eisenhower demands a one page memo-
randum.” And let me tell you. Hugh Scott demanded it. You know sometimes I
would send him something long and he’d say, “Dick, I want it in one page or less.” And
he said, “If you have attachments you can put them on; if I have time I’ll look at them.”
And so—

**BIRKNER:** You’re learning how to get to the core of something very fast as part
of the job.

**MURPHY:** Yeah, absolutely, absolutely. And I was much less verbose with him
than I am with you.

**BIRKNER:** Well that’s alright. Tell me a little bit about your attitude about this
tough political year of 1964. You watched some things unfold but you’ve already
telegraphed that you couldn’t have expected what happened at the national level. You say
when you were originally thinking about this you know Goldwater didn’t seem like the
likely nominee but [Henry Cabot] Lodge gets in the race and briefly catches fire in ‘64.
Rockefeller stumbles, Goldwater doesn’t do particularly well but he has this extraordinary
organization working for him.

**MURPHY:** And Scranton was procrastinating and they [his supporters] were
kicking and screaming.

**BIRKNER:** Kicking and screaming. Eisenhower’s role was ambiguous. It’s very
hard to even understand from the inside because clearly Eisenhower was sympathetic to
Scranton as opposed to Rockefeller, but he was not willing to get involved in
electioneering for Scranton or even endorse him. What are you talking about among your
friends about the political situation for the Republican nomination [in 1964]? Obviously
you are rooting for somebody.

**MURPHY:** I was rooting for Rockefeller. And I was absolutely appalled when
just before the [June] California primary Happy Rockefeller conceived a baby.

**BIRKNER:** Well, she delivered a baby.
MURPHY: Delivered a baby and that killed them. And then Bill Scranton jumped in and of course we were all just rooting for Scranton. I didn’t go to the convention in San Francisco. Scott of course went and Bob Kunzig and Gene Cowen and Edie Skinner went to San Francisco. And of course Scott was the point person on the platform for Scranton. And you know it was Hugh Scott who fought the Goldwater people. And the chairman of the platform committee was John Rhodes, Congressman John Rhodes of Arizona, and [Wisconsin Representative] Mel Laird. And I knew Laird from my time at AEI. And they were pretty mean, you know, the Goldwater people were actually very mean. I knew Karl Hess because Karl Hess started working for AEI when I was still there. Karl Hess was Goldwater’s speechwriter. Karl had no education at all to speak of, he wasn’t very bright and I can mention something about him later on, too. But so, you know, here we were just absolutely appalled by what transpired in San Francisco. And after the convention the senator and Mrs. Scott took a slow trip back east. They went up to Vancouver and they took a Canadian Pacific train across Canada. And went to Ottawa, and he sat up in the spectator’s gallery in the House of Commons, the Canadian House of Commons. And then he came back to Washington. And I think it was in August of 1964 that he went up to Harrisburg for a meeting of the Republican State Committee and it was then that he very reluctantly endorsed Goldwater’s candidacy. And I’m sure you’ve seen his statement or can get a hold of his statement where, in effect, he said that, “I support him as the standard bearer of my party.” And he said, “I feel that the party has honored me by selecting me as its candidate for Congress and for the Senate.” And so he felt obligated to support the party. And that was about all he had to say about Goldwater for the rest of the campaign.

BIRKNER: Well, I think if anything you need to accentuate the fact that you don’t find any connection whatever to Goldwater in any of his literature and not even much emphasis on being a Republican. [Scott’s] poll numbers told him that Goldwater was going to get crushed in Pennsylvania and he had to do something to get people to vote for him.

MURPHY: Well, in that connection you know I was involved in that campaign at long distance from Washington because one of the things we did in the campaign is we came out with Murphy Memos. And this was a leaf we took from Senator Kuchel’s book when he ran for re-election in California in 1962 against a state senator by the name of Richard Richards, the Democratic candidate. Steve Horn, who was Kuchel’s legislative assistant, would come out with these whenever Richards attacked Kuchel on some of
Kuchel’s votes. Steve would come up with the Horn Memos [which were sent] to editors and political writers with newspapers and radio and television outlets [throughout California]. And we took a leaf from that. And so, you know, I’d get a call from Harrisburg and they’d say, “[Blatt] has attacked him on this vote and that vote.” I remember one in particular that Scott had voted for. She had attacked him [he was a congressman then] for voting to override President Truman’s veto in 1947 of the Reed-Bullwinkle Act which [she claimed] directly cost the jobs of three thousand railroad workers in Altoona, Pennsylvania. My job was to come up with an answer to that. I didn’t know anything about the Reed-Bullwinkle Act. But I quickly got information. I looked at Scott’s statement in the *Congressional Record* from that time. I called on a couple of railroad lobbyists and asked them about what the Reed-Bullwinkle Act was all about and anything like that. So I got the information and I came up with a hard-hitting response. And you know these things [memos] would be issued out of Harrisburg with my name on it. And they got to be a thorn on her side. [There] was an Associated Press dispatch from some town in Pennsylvania where she wanted to know who Murphy was. “Now what’s his business in all of this thing?” you know. [Scott] just ignored all that. So that’s one of the things I did. The other thing I remember from that campaign: Goldwater came into the state about six or seven times. One time I got a call from Karl Hess: He said, “The senator wants to go to the Philadelphia Navy Yard to say that he’s going to fight to keep the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard open.” And he wanted my advice. He said, “We’re going have him come in by helicopter.” He wanted my advice as to what Goldwater ought to say. “What can Goldwater say that would help Hugh Scott?” And I said, “Karl, the best thing Goldwater can do to help Hugh Scott is to stay the hell out of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.”

**BIRKNER:** Well, that was very straightforward.

**MURPHY:** Yeah, and you know he came in six or seven times and Scott was always somewhere else as far away [as possible]. George Goodling, congressman from this district right here, he [brokered] a joint appearance by Goldwater and Scott in York. And when Scott heard about it he blasted Goodling and managed to find something [to do] up in Wilkes-Barre [instead].

**BIRKNER:** Scott proved to be more perceptive than Goodling because Goodling lost his seat that year in an otherwise safe district.
MURPHY: Absolutely—and anyway when Goldwater’s campaigning in the Philadelphia suburbs he made some remarks which I think could fairly be construed as anti-Semitic. I can’t remember exactly what he said but I was appalled when I saw it. A few days later we received a letter from the chaplain of Jewish students of the colleges and universities in the greater Pittsburgh area. It was a three-page letter, single spaced, telling Hugh Scott that he wanted to vote for Scott but he just couldn’t do it because of what Goldwater was saying and the type of people who were behind it and all of that. I was so upset. I called the man and charged it to my home phone number and I spent forty-five minutes on the phone pleading with him, begging with him. I told him all about Scott’s role in the presidential campaign, the pre-convention. I told him what he’d done out there [San Francisco]. I told him how he was running away from Goldwater whenever he came into the state. I don’t know if I convinced him but I sure gave it—

BIRKNER: You gave it the college try.

MURPHY: Absolutely, absolutely.

BIRKNER: So what are you hearing from your friends or from the senator himself about his chances of overcoming of what’s going to be a Johnson landslide.

MURPHY: I’ll tell you what his attitude was. During the campaign he was writing his book on Chinese art, *The Golden Age of Chinese Art* [Rutland, Vermont and Tokyo, Japan: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1966].

BIRKNER: No, not during the campaign.

MURPHY: During the campaign. He would be writing.

BIRKNER: I don’t want to misunderstand you.

MURPHY: Yes.

BIRKNER: OK.

MURPHY: He was, in his spare time, working on his manuscript.
BIRKNER: Hard to believe.

MURPHY: Longhand, and then he would send the longhand thing into Harrisburg from wherever he was in Pennsylvania, to Barbara Sweeney his secretary, to type the [pages] up in draft form to send back to him. One day the thing came into Barbara Sweeney and Bob Kunzig happened to be right there. And he saw that thing and he picked up the phone and he called the senator and he said, “Hugh” he said, “Hugh, that goddamn book has got to stop,” He said, “You’re in a fight for your life.”

BIRKNER: Well, somebody had to say it.

MURPHY: Well, Scott just said “Relax Bob.” He said, “We’re going to win this thing.” And that was his attitude. And so anyway the news we got the weekend before election day was in Harrisburg—the Senator sat down with Governor Scranton and John Bucci. He was the pollster for the Pennsylvania Republicans and Bucci gave him the news. He said, “Lyndon Johnson is going to carry the state by five hundred thousand votes and Hugh Scott is going down the tubes.” That was his assessment. Well, Lyndon Johnson carried the state by one million six hundred thousand votes.

BIRKNER: That’s enormous.

MURPHY: It was staggering.

BIRKNER: I think that number may be exaggerated.

MURPHY: I think it was over a million, I’ll tell you that. I think it was one million six hundred thousand and Scott’s plurality, finally after the absentee ballots were counted, was about between seventy and seventy-one thousand and I was involved with the count of the absentee ballots. My wife Luda [and I] went up to Philadelphia on election day, in the evening. We took the train up to Philadelphia. I remember it was raining and we went to the Sheraton Hotel, the Philadelphia Sheraton Hotel which was the campaign headquarters, because that’s where the senator was and we were up there in his suite for the returns. And I’ll tell you we were all gloomy because I remember getting off the train and learning that Johnson had carried Connecticut by a landslide and it just looked horrible. We were watching on television. And the senator was in his private quarters and he was on the phone with Scranton. And Scranton was following certain key
precincts around the state and he was feeding the information to Scott. And you know the senator would be coming around trying to cheer us up. He’d say, “We going to make it,” and things like that. But we went to bed that night after midnight and we were behind. Well, first thing in the morning the Scott forces went into court in Philadelphia and Allegheny Counties and got an injunction to impound the absentee ballots because we wanted to make sure there was going to be an honest count. And actually the Blatt people shared our view because of course they were reformers. And so I was involved in the recount in Philadelphia. Scott’s attorney for that recount was a fellow by the name of Mort Witkin. And Mort was an old time Republican Party pol. He had been a ward leader in Philadelphia under the old Republican machine. And I remember when we walked into the City Council chambers Mort pointed toward down below to the Philadelphia election workers ready to start the count, and we started to work and he said, “Dick, you see those SOBs down there?” He said, “Every GD one of them was a Republican until Joe Clark was elected mayor [in 1951].” And he said, “The day after the election they all became Democrats.” He said, “They’ve been here forever.” He said, “I don’t trust a one of them.” He said, “Your job is to stand over their shoulders and watch them open up every ballot and make sure it’s counted right.” I said, “Yes sir.”

**BIRKNER:** And did you do that?

**MURPHY:** For sixteen days. First of all I went back to Washington with Luda and then turned right around and came back to Philadelphia and I spent the next two weeks in the Ben Franklin Hotel. And every day I’d go over to City Hall for several hours overseeing, along with the Blatt people, the count of ballots. And sixteen days after the election Genevieve Blatt conceded.

**BIRKNER:** By rights she should have won the election.

**MURPHY:** She should have.

**BIRKNER:** But virtually everything that she did turned out bad and almost everything he did turned out right and that was the difference.

**MURPHY:** But you know what? Hugh Scott was very special. When he first became a senator—now of course this was before I started working for him, he was elected in 1958—Scott knew that he had a handicap. He was not known in western
Pennsylvania and he was very conscious of the fact that both Senators Joe Clark and Hugh Scott were from Philadelphia—in fact they were neighbors up there. Hugh Scott lived on Hillcrest Drive and Joe Clark lived nearby and they were also very close personal friends. They didn’t agree on a lot of things but they worked very closely. The two offices worked beautifully together. But in 1964 because Joe Clark of course was a strong backer of Genevieve Blatt in the primary campaign and he questioned Musmanno’s [Pennsylvania Supreme Court Judge Michael Musmanno] origins, as you may recall, and the spelling of his name and everything which brought the charge of bigotry. And I’m sure you’ve read the book entitled *Bigotry* by a political scientist [Maria Falco, *Bigotry* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980)].

BIRKNER: I know the book you’re talking about.

MURPHY: Yeah, her name was Falco I believe.

BIRKNER: Right.

MURPHY: And it’s a great book. Anyway that split redounded to Hugh Scott’s benefit because you know whenever he was asked by a journalist or someone about bigotry, all Scott had to say is “I’m against it.” But Joe Clark really threw himself into that campaign in the general election.

BIRKNER: Which is against the norm. Senators don’t tend to campaign against their colleagues.

MURPHY: Back in those days, fortunately; that’s changed now and I think that’s a tragedy because then senators just didn’t do that thing. In fact Gene McCarthy of Minnesota came into the state in 1960 campaigning for Kennedy and attacked Hugh Scott and Scott never forgot that. He told me about that because he could see McCarthy and I became good friends on the Senate floor. I’ve lost my train of thought.

BIRKNER: You were talking about Clark and Musmanno and Scott in 1964.

MURPHY: Yeah, and so after the election Joe Clark sort of congratulated Scott and then he and his wife went on a trip to Argentina. And the Scotts went to New
Zealand. It was Hugh Scott who originally came up with the idea of doing a joint [radio and television] program with Joe Clark.

**BIRKNER:** Right.

**MURPHY:** And his reason for doing it, his motivation for doing it was that it would give him exposure in western Pennsylvania and of course gave Clark exposure, too. The show [“Your Senators Report”] was on every other week. On Sundays it was a half-hour show and it was on every television station in Pennsylvania and every radio station in Pennsylvania and it always got news even nationally.

**BIRKNER:** And they were able to get the top people onto the show.

**MURPHY:** They’d get journalists on it. They’d get their colleagues on it. I remember the last show being filmed in the Senate [Recording] Studio—the last show before Scott announced his candidacy for re-election in ‘64. Hubert Humphrey was their guest and Scott and Clark were going at each other like this and poor Hubert was sitting there [as a spectator]. And he finally said, “Hey boys can you give me a chance to say something?” But so that was Scott’s calculation. But Joe Clark did a slow burn down in Argentina and Hugh Scott did the same because Ralph Widner, my counterpart in Clark’s office, he was writing speeches for Gen Blatt blasting Scott. Anyway they kissed and made up after the election. Joe Clark came to Hugh Scott and said, “Well, Hugh, why don’t we start up the show again?” Well, that broke the ice and they did their show again until Clark was defeated in 1968.

**BIRKNER:** Did you have any personal opinion of Blatt in ‘64 or any personal opportunity to see her in action?

**MURPHY:** No, I never met the woman and I never saw her.

**BIRKNER:** Because you were in Washington primarily doing your thing.

**MURPHY:** I was in Washington.

**BIRKNER:** She wondered who you were but you knew who she was but you didn’t spend any time with her.
MURPHY: That’s right.

BIRKNER: And do you, looking back on it, consider it somewhat miraculous that Scott won the election?

MURPHY: Absolutely, absolutely. If it hadn’t been for that Democratic primary, given the size of Lyndon Johnson’s victory, I don’t see how Hugh Scott could possibly have survived.

BIRKNER: Timing is everything in politics and that was an example where everything had to fall, fell into place for Scott. So that was a near death experience for Scott and yet he comes through it. And of course he’s going to play a major role in the Senate for years to come. We don’t have a whole lot of time left in the tape but I did want ask you about ‘65 which was the year of tremendous Democratic majorities in both houses and great ambitions on the part of Lyndon Johnson for a Great Society.

MURPHY: Absolutely.

BIRKNER: Tell me about Scott’s attitude about Lyndon Johnson and about what Johnson was trying to do.

MURPHY: Well, he had a good relationship with Johnson. And the interesting thing was–and Scott co-sponsored quite a few of the Great Society bills, the education bills, both the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and the Higher Education Act. Of course he was very much involved in the Voting Rights Act, as was I. And Johnson, you know, had a very effective lobbying operation going. I often would get calls from Nick Katzenbach. You know when told that the senator was out of the office he would say, “Well, let me speak to Dick Murphy.” And Mike Manatos, he was the White House liaison with the Senate. I had a good relationship with Mike. And the senator was invited down to the White House for signing ceremonies and of course later on you know for these briefings that Johnson would conduct on the Vietnam War. And he said to me one time, “You know, Dick, in eight years of Eisenhower’s administration I was in the White House twice.” And he said, “Every time I’m turning around I’m going down to the White House for this, that and another thing.”
BIRKNER: I find that odd, because I’ve been studying the Eisenhower presidency and his relationship with Congress and Ike had plenty of interaction in the White House with congresspeople.

MURPHY: Can I have a copy of your paper?

BIRKNER: Sure, I’ll send it to you but Eisenhower met with the Republican Senate and congressional leadership consistently and he met an awful lot with individual Republican congressmen so I find it very hard to imagine that Scott was telling it the wait was, that he was only invited to the Eisenhower White House twice. Eisenhower’s interactions with Republican Congresspeople were continual. It’s interesting to me that Scott had a perception which he expressed to you that LBJ was more interested in his company than Eisenhower.

MURPHY: Yeah, I mean he was going down there all the time, it seemed. And one time he went down there and it was one of Johnson’s briefings on the Vietnam War. You know he had a group of senators down there. And then after the briefing he invited Cliff Case, the Republican senator from New Jersey, and Hugh Scott up to the family quarters. Then he gave them the treatment up there. They went into the bathroom and Case sat on the toilet and Scott was leaning against the washbasin and Lyndon Johnson was moving in on them. You know that famous set of pictures of Johnson [when he was Senate majority leader] leaning on Senator Theodore Francis Green [of Rhode Island] [by George Tames of the New York Times].

BIRKNER: You’re saying the relationship was a working relationship and not a relationship the way we see with Senator McConnell and Obama. And that’s a sign of Johnson’s shrewdness, to see that Scott could be helpful to him on many bills. Would you say that your sense of optimism or your sense of pleasure in your job diminished in ‘65 and ‘66 because the Republicans were so much in the minority or did it not matter because you were still in the game?

MURPHY: I was still in the game.

BIRKNER: So you were doing your job and working the same way you had been. The fact that the Republicans had fewer members was really not a problem to you.
MURPHY: No and they started coming back in ‘66.

BIRKNER: That’s right.

End of the First Interview
RITCHIE: I really liked the first interview, because you really covered that material so well—you were talking about 1964 essentially.

MURPHY: Essentially.

RITCHIE: From when you joined the staff in January through Hugh Scott’s reelection in ’64. I thought that would be the place to start today. Lyndon Johnson wins by an enormous landslide and the Democrats have huge majorities in both the House and the Senate. Where did that leave the Republicans in the Senate to be such a minority party at that moment?

MURPHY: Well, they were really pretty much isolated. However, in the case of Hugh Scott, I think he cosponsored some of the administration’s bills. I couldn’t tell you which ones now, but I know he did cosponsor some of them. Probably some of the education bills. And you know, otherwise, what can a senator in the minority do? Well, he can propose bills. The bills may not go anywhere, but you know, we would offer bills. Get a little publicity on it. And beyond that, you know, just work in the committees. And there, of course, the committees were really quite congenial and they welcomed input from the minority . . . at least on the committees that I was familiar with.

RITCHIE: The Republican Party was pretty split then between its conservative and liberal wings. Did that give Scott more ability to maneuver because he was more in sympathy with what the Democrats were trying to do?

MURPHY: I think so. When—of course, this was right after Goldwater had taken such a shellacking that the right wing was discredited. So I think that gave the moderates more heft.

RITCHIE: And there was a lot more coalition-building, it seems to me. Less party-line voting and more coalition voting.
MURPHY: Exactly. And especially on civil rights. But even on some of the Great Society bills, I think you saw some bipartisanship.

RITCHIE: Well in your first interview you talked very extensively about the Civil Rights Act of ’64, but I thought maybe we could start by talking about the Voting Rights Act of ’65.

MURPHY: Right.

RITCHIE: Can you give me some of the background on that?

MURPHY: Well, as I recall, the president, he may have even come to a joint session of Congress to demand passage of a voting rights bill, and there was a big head of steam behind it. I believe the Senate took it up first. [Everett] Dirksen again, like he did in the Civil Rights bill, played a key role. But I remember we had an executive session of the Judiciary Committee in Dirksen’s office to mark up the bill. That was fascinating because back then the only staff people who were admitted to a Judiciary Committee meeting were the professional staff of the committee. The senators couldn’t bring their own people. And so I had never been in on an executive session of the Judiciary Committee. But each senator was entitled to bring his own guy in with him. So we were there and we sat around the table. [James] Eastland of Mississippi presided, but it was in Dirksen’s office. And of course, some of the southerners tried to offer some amendments to gut the bill. In fact, I remember [Jacob] Javits almost was going to vote for one and Hugh Scott tugged at his sleeve and said, “Hey, Jack, watch out.” [Laughing]

But Senator [Roman] Hruska of Nebraska—“the noble Roman” as we called him—he, for some reason, decided he had to filibuster because I think he felt this thing was being steam-rolled through the committee and the Senate. And so he asked for copies of the United States Code from the Senate Library. Somebody came down with a big pile of books and Hruska starts reading from the U.S. Code. So the rest of us all left the room. He was there by himself reading the Code. This lasted for several hours and then he finally relented and we all came back and ordered the bill reported. [Laughing] But we had a filibuster and we must have had three or four cloture votes. And Dirksen was—oh no, I’m sorry, I’m getting confused with another Civil Rights bill. We didn’t have cloture on this one. But those are the things I remember. Primarily that executive session in Dirksen’s office.
RITCHIE: Do you have any idea why they would hold a committee meeting in the Republican leader’s office? Just because he was such an influential player on that?

MURPHY: I don’t remember. It could have been because the Senate was going to take it up pretty darn quickly. Maybe it was just convenient to the chamber. I don’t know why.

BIRKNER: Was there any doubt that Dirksen would support the voting rights measure?

MURPHY: No. On that one, no. I don’t think there was. The next Civil Rights bill came and that was another story.

RITCHIE: That was the ’67 bill, some of which passed in ’68. Can you talk about that bill?

MURPHY: Yeah, that was a bill to protect civil rights workers and blacks attempting to exercise their federally protected rights down there in the South. To protect them against intimidation and violence. That bill had been a part of a package of measures that [President] Lyndon Johnson had proposed and which failed in the previous Congress. They couldn’t muster a cloture vote in the Senate on that. So this bill came over from the House and was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. That year, at the beginning of the year in ’67, Senator Scott had been invited by Oxford University to come over and give lectures on American politics. He went to Senators [Mike] Mansfield and Dirksen, the two leaders, and told them about it and said he wondered whether he could accept the invitation. And they said, “Oh yeah, go ahead, Hugh, because we’ll probably be out of session by that time.” Because I think we were talking about late September or early October.

So Scott went off to England. Well, a bill had come over from the House and I was over in the Senate Chamber one day and Senator Phil Hart came up to me and he said, “Dick, this bill is in the committee.” He said, “We’re going to have a meeting of the committee.” And he said, “The committee is deadlocked seven to seven. Hugh is the swing vote. Will he be here for the meeting?” I said, “Well, Senator, I would think he would be. I can guarantee how he’s going to vote. So he’ll be the eighth vote.” I said,
“But there’s a little problem. How are we going to get him here?” And I said, “It seems to me that since the president is pushing for this bill that the White House ought to provide transportation.” Hart said he’d look into it. And you know, nothing was happening. Hart kept talking to me, and Clarence Mitchell with the NAACP, the 101st senator, Clarence spoke to me about it and I kept saying the same thing, that if the White House will arrange for the transportation, I said, “You’ve got your man.” And nothing happened.

I remember the Friday before the vote, that would have been Friday, October 20, I got a call from Mike Manatos at the White House. He was the top Senate liaison guy for the president. Mike called me and he said, “Dick, what’s going on?” I said, “Mike, you ought to tell me what’s going on. Hugh Scott is sitting over there in England.” Incidentally, the only thing that Scott knew about this was that I sent him a memo by snail mail telling him about this when Hart first raised it with me. So he knew, but that’s the only communication I had with him. Anyway, I said, “Mike, you guys have got to get Hugh Scott a plane if you’re going to get his vote. If the president really wants this bill, I’m sure you guys can arrange for a plane.” Mike said, “Well, I’ll look into it.”

The next day was the day of the big anti-war march on the Pentagon. The defense of the Pentagon was entrusted to the assistant attorney general for civil rights, a fellow by the name of Steve Pollack. Steve was the commandant of the U. S. Marshals and the military police that were defending the Pentagon. So the weekend passed and that Monday evening my parents happened to be in town. My father was a pediatrician and he had been here for a meeting of the American Academy of Pediatrics. We went out to dinner with my parents and some of their friends at the Washington Hilton Hotel. We were in the restaurant there. And around nine o’clock the headwaiter came through booming out, “Mr. Richard Murphy. Mr. Richard Murphy. The White House is calling.” [Laughing]

**BIRKNER:** Your stock went way up in that place! [Laughing]

**MURPHY:** So I went to the phone and he said, “Murphy, this is Steve Pollack. I got you a plane.” And I said, “Good!” I had never met Pollack. I said, “Where will the plane be?” He said, “Such and such [Mildenhall] air force base. And I said, “Where’s that?” He said, “Hell, I don’t know.” You know, this is one o’clock in the morning London time, so I said, “How’s he going to get to the airport that you don’t know where?” He said, “I don’t know.” I just lashed into him and I said, “Look, you guys want
this bill. It’s time you get cracking on this thing! You find out where the plane is going to be and you arrange for the senator’s pick-up.” And then to me he said, “When I have that, then you call the senator.” I said, “No, you call him!” So he called the senator. It must have been around three o’clock in the morning. The senator thanked him very much, then he said, “You don’t have to send a vehicle for me. My good friend admiral so-and-so”—who was the top American naval officer in Britain—“he’ll take care of me.” [Laughing]

So Scott flew back and he came in Tuesday evening. We went up to Hart’s office the next morning and we had a big meeting there of the civil rights senators and Clarence Mitchell. And Pollack was there. I walked in there and I recognized him even though I had never met him. I walked over to him and I said, “Hi Steve, it’s good to see you.” I thought he was going to punch me in the nose. [Laughing] But anyway, Scott came and he was the swing vote on it. First, I think they had an amendment by Sam Ervin to, in effect, gut the bill. Scott voted against that. It was eight to seven against that and then they voted for the Hart version of the bill. Then the senator held a news conference and it was played up big in the New York Times and other newspapers. Then that afternoon he flew back to England to continue his lectures.

RITCHIE: Did they give him a military plane to go back as well?

MURPHY: Yeah, I think going back he went on a scheduled airliner.

RITCHIE: Okay.

MURPHY: But the White House paid for it. [Laughing]

BIRKNER: They got something out of it.

MURPHY: Yeah. But that bill—of course, that was the first session of the Congress. I think it was on the day that Congress adjourned, Mansfield quietly arranged to make it the pending business coming back in January 1968 so that they didn’t have to have a filibuster on the motion to take up. It was the pending business. So we had a filibuster. Then the question of open housing came up, and of course, open housing was one of the things the Johnson administration and the civil rights people wanted. Scott was all for it. And Clarence Mitchell was urging that they attach an open housing bill to this
bill. Some of the civil rights senators had great reservations about it. Mansfield was against it because he felt he didn’t have the votes to include an open housing measure. Dirksen was against it. Hart had some doubts. I remember we were in a meeting of the civil rights senators where Ted Kennedy expressed doubts. Scott told him, “Don’t worry, Ted, this thing will pass. It may take some doing, but it’s going to pass.” We had, I think it was four cloture votes on that measure. On the second vote, I think the Republicans were evenly split. On the third vote, at which point Dirksen started to reconsider his position on open housing, a plurality of the Republicans voted for cloture. It fell something like six or seven votes short. And Dirksen executed one of his marvelous 180-degree turns and came up with a compromise. I think [Walter] Mondale was the one who was pushing the open housing bill. Everybody was just ecstatic when Dirksen did his turnaround. He did the same thing in 1964. Of course, this was a time when there was a lot of unrest in the cities and Dirksen noted that. Anyway, we finally got cloture on the bill and it passed.

I think it passed right around the time of Martin Luther King’s assassination. And the day the president signed the bill, that morning, Lyndon Johnson went to Barefoot Sanders, who was one of his aides, and said, “Barefoot, I want a signing ceremony in the East Room and you take care of it.” And we had a big signing ceremony in the East Room that afternoon with something like 400 people packed in there. I remember I was standing in the back with Edward Bennett Williams and it was quite a big occasion.

RITCHIE: That was right after the riots in Washington?

MURPHY: That’s correct, right.

RITCHIE: So Johnson wanted to show business as usual and his success as well?

MURPHY: Yes, exactly. This was after he had announced he was not going to run for reelection.

BIRKNER: I want to ask a quick question that sort of stems from the byplay between Dirksen and the Republican senators. Did you ever notice any jealousy on Scott’s part about Dirksen being the top dog? Did Scott feel that he should have been in that role or did he just accept the fact that he was a role player elsewhere in the Senate and Dirksen would get the limelight?
MURPHY: Well, I think it was the latter while I was there. He never indicated to me that he had higher ambitions than the Senate. However, that summer in 1968, Senator [Thomas] Kuchel, who was the Republican whip, was defeated by Max Rafferty in the Republican primary out there in California. Within hours Hugh Scott was off and running for whip. Within a day or two he had contacted every Republican senator and gotten commitments from most of them. And Roman Hruska of Nebraska, he wanted to be whip. I think he thought that they would just fall in his lap because he was in tight with Everett Dirksen. But Scott got a head start on him and he won the contest. That’s how he came in the leadership. Then, of course, about nine months later in September of ’69, which was after I left the senator, he became the leader when Dirksen died.

RITCHIE: The Republican Party was pretty evenly split, as you mentioned, before that. There were a lot of Eisenhower Republicans as well as Goldwater Republicans at that point.

MURPHY: Oh, yeah.

RITCHIE: So Scott had a lot of support within the party.

MURPHY: Sure. At that point, Dick Schweiker was a new Republican senator from Pennsylvania. He was a moderate. And we had [Charles] Percy and Javits and Ed Brooke and—

BIRKNER: [Clifford] Case.

MURPHY: Yeah, Cliff Case.

RITCHIE: The 1966 election had expanded the Republican ranks at that point. But more moderate Republicans came in at that election than conservatives.

MURPHY: Yeah, that’s correct. That’s correct. Howard Baker was a moderate basically.

RITCHIE: Well, you mentioned a lot of your discussions about civil rights legislation. What was Scott’s relationship like with the southern senators? They were all
the powerful chairmen of the committees but they were on the other side at least on all the civil rights issues.

**MURPHY:** Well, he had good relationships with them, particularly with [Richard] Russell. I remember, and I think I told you this, Michael, that he wanted me to tell him how to vote on matters in the Senate floor. But he said, “There are certain senators that I follow on certain issues.” He said, “On defense matters, I’ll invariably follow Dick Russell.” They had a good relationship. I don’t think he thought much of Strom Thurmond, particularly when Thurmond became a Republican. I don’t think he was particularly close to [Sam] Ervin, but they got along. But Russell he had a very good relationship with.

**RITCHIE:** Then there’s James Eastland, who chaired that Judiciary committee.

**MURPHY:** Well, Eastland was a special case. We got some staff people. Eastland would give some Republicans some staff people to keep them quiet, basically. [Laughing] He knew he couldn’t keep them quiet on civil rights, but you know, that was a sop to the Republicans. There was Scott on the Senate side, and Tom Curtis on the House side, who were pushing for more minority staff for members, and Eastland would give the Republicans some on the Judiciary Committee.

**RITCHIE:** One other senator I wanted to ask you about was Russell Long. I’ve heard that you have a wonderful story about Russell Long.

**MURPHY:** [Laughing] Yes. I don’t think Hugh Scott and Russell Long were terribly close particularly. But Russell Long had a bill to finance presidential campaigns with money out of the general revenue, and he was pushing it hard in the Senate. One evening the senator and I had had dinner in the senators’ dining room and I think Scott had had a couple of drinks beforehand. We got over there on the Senate floor and Russell Long was in his cups and he was waving his arms and haranguing the nearly empty chamber on the virtues of his bill, and Scott was opposing it. The two of them got into an awful shouting match. I mean, it really was unbecoming of both of them. Finally, Long just stomped out of the chamber. Scott stood there for a minute looking bewildered and then he walked out another exit. I’m standing there with Will Leonard who was Long’s guy, and I said, “Oh boy, that was something, Will. What are we going to do?” He said, “Well, let’s go in the back room,” where the shorthand reporters were, “and let’s take a
look at the transcript.” We both looked at the transcript. I think it was Will who said, “Let’s delete it.” I said, “Good, let’s do it.” We never told our senators about it. I told Hugh Scott about it years later. He said, “You did the right thing, Dick.” [Laughing]

RITCHIE: You were telling that story about the *Congressional Record* and I was thinking there are a few senators who woke up the next day and found that their remarks had made it into the *Record*, but they could still take it out before it went into the permanent *Record*.

MURPHY: Yeah.

RITCHIE: We have a few of the daily *Records* that contain some unusual speeches that you will not find in the permanent *Record*. I’m sure Senator Scott was very pleased that his dialogue with Senator Long didn’t get in the *Record*.

MURPHY: Well, and Scott usually spoke extemporaneously on the Senate floor and you really did make a few minor edits in his remarks because he was very good about that. But I remember you had to be a little careful in that back room there because sometimes Roger Mudd [CBS News correspondent] was there. [Laughing] But I don’t think there were any journalists there that night that Will and I excised the colloquy from the *Record*.

RITCHIE: Now you worked with him on the Civil Rights Act in ’64 and Voting Rights Act in ’65, and the other Civil Rights Act in ’67-’68. Was that essentially a major area of your time? Did he divide up his staff in such a way that you specialized?

MURPHY: Well, no we didn’t. Back when I was with him I didn’t specialize in anything. The first year I was with him I was it. Me and my secretary. And after the election, I went into Bob Kunzig, our administrative assistant, and I said, “Bob, I need some help.” He and I interviewed a couple of people and we hired a guy to help me. Eventually we had another fellow, Ken Davis, who later became the senator’s administrative assistant in the leader’s office, after Bill Hildenbrand became secretary of the minority. That was after I had left the senator. But we didn’t really have all that much specialization in that thing. I handled all of his floor stuff, so I had to be an instant expert on everything. Thank God for people over there in the Senate Chamber who I could turn to. Just like senators turn to certain senators, I’d turn to certain staff people because often
I didn’t have time to read a committee report. But thank God for *Congressional Quarterly*. That was indispensable.

**RITCHIE:** So you handled anything that was going on on the floor no matter what the subject matter?

**MURPHY:** Everything. That’s right, and that was back before the senators would have to ask unanimous consent to have a staff person on the floor. Javits often had as many as three people on the floor at once. It was like a three-ring circus with Javits. But I was it for Scott. Lamar Alexander, he spent a lot of time on the floor. He was [Howard] Baker’s guy. And Mitch McConnell was Marlow Cook’s guy. So we three were often all on the floor together.

**RITCHIE:** Would you sit in the back on the couches?

**MURPHY:** On the couches. When I wasn’t with the senator, I’d be on the couch. Gene McCarthy liked to come over and engage in what were very enigmatic conversations. [Laughing]

**RITCHIE:** That was in the days before there was any way to finding out what was happening on the floor, unless you were on the floor. There was no squawk box. There was no TV.

**MURPHY:** We depended—if I was back in the office, I wasn’t always on the floor. I was back in the office and Edie Skinner was the senator’s executive assistant. Whenever the bells would start ringing, she’d pick up the phone and call me wanting to know what it was. I’d tell her, “Don’t worry, Edie, it’s not a live quorum call, not a vote.” I said, “I’ll let you know when.” My source of what was going on on the floor was either Mark Trice, the secretary of the minority, Bill Brownrigg, his assistant, or the guys in the cloakroom. I’d call over there.

Well, in I think this would have been around ’66 or something like that, there was a fellow I’d gotten to know from the then-Legislative Reference Service, Bob Chartrand, who was their expert on computers. Bob had come to the library from IBM and there was a small group of us staff guys that were trying to stimulate interest in getting computers for the Senate: Steve Horn, who was Senator Kuchel’s legislative assistant; Bill Welsh,
who was Senator Hart’s administrative assistant, they were kind of the ring leaders of this little group. And we’d meet with Bob Chartrand and talk and bat around ideas for how computers could better serve the Senate. Well, one day I was in my office and Bob came by. He stuck his head in the door and he said, “Dick, I’m running off to lunch, but call this number.” It was a number over in the House. He left already. I called the number and I get a recorded announcement from the House Republican Cloakroom telling you what was going on. Well, I called up Bob and I said, “This is the greatest thing since sliced bread! We ought to have something like this in the Senate.” And he said, “Yeah, you should. Your man is on the Rules Committee, isn’t he?” I said, “Yeah.” He said, “Well, why don’t you get him interested in this thing?”

So I told the senator about it and he went to the Rules Committee and I went with him. The Rules Committee, Senator [B. Everett] Jordan of North Carolina was the chairman. Bill Cochrane was his guy. The Rules Committee meetings always were pretty quiet and sedate. So Scott raised this issue. Well, everybody thought that was a good idea: “Yeah, let’s do it.” Not long after that, I think the same day, Mark Trice called me up and he said, “Dick, what is your senator doing anyway?” I said, “What do you mean, Mark?” And he said, “He wants to have recorded phone announcements from the cloakroom.” He said, “This will be an absolute disaster!” You know, knowledge is power. [Laughing] He said, “I’m going to fight it!” I said, “Well, you’re welcome to fight it, Mark, but I think it’s a done deal.” And it was. That was our first modern information technology in the Senate.

RITCHIE: We still have it.

MURPHY: Yes, exactly. And I’m sure there are many other ways of finding out what’s going on on the floor, but back then, you know, I had to call Mark or the cloakroom to find out what was going on.

RITCHIE: People have told me that’s one reason why people spent a lot of time in the chamber as well.

MURPHY: Exactly. On a major bill, particularly.

RITCHIE: Or at least in the vicinity of the chamber if you weren’t in the chamber.
MURPHY: Yeah, and oh, I was in the chamber.

RITCHIE: Now I understand that Senator Scott gave you sort of leeway to think up some legislation as well for him when he was in that second term.

MURPHY: Yeah, he did. He just kind of gave me carte blanche. He said, “Any good ideas you can come up with for legislation, be my guest.” There were a couple of bills in that regard that I came up with. One, by way of background, concerning this one, the Comprehensive Planning and Development Act [S.799], about which I was not a specialist by any means. But up in Harrisburg there was a body called the Pennsylvania State Planning Board. I think it might have been started by Governor Bill Scranton. This was a group to advise the governor on state planning. And the chairman of it was a fellow by the name of Jack Busby, who was chief executive of Pennsylvania Power and Light. Both senators were on the committee but I don’t think either one ever attended a meeting of it because, you know, it conflicted with stuff down here. So Ralph Widner, who was Clark’s legislative assistant, and I, would sit in for the senators. Other people on the commission included some members of the governor’s cabinet and, I remember, the president of the Pennsylvania State AFL-CIO was on it. It was a combination of private citizens and state officials. And it was quite interesting some of the things that they talked about. I got to know the executive director of the commission, Irving Hand.

So I became quite interested in this whole business of planning. I thought, well, I’d gotten to know folks from the National League of Cities and the National Association of Counties and The American Institute of Planners, and there was a fellow down in the Bureau of the Budget, Bill Brussat, and we got together and batted this thing around and we came up with this Comprehensive Planning and Development Act of 1967, which the senator introduced early that year. The bill was pretty complex, but essentially it was to provide governors and local elected officials with the tools and some federal assistance to pull together the functional planning of various agencies of their governments into kind of a comprehensive planning strategy for the state and for the metropolitan areas and cities and whatnot. Not exactly a politically sexy topic, but it was of quite a bit of interest to the state and local governments and people in the planning profession. We introduced the bill.
The senator, of course, knew less about the subject than I did, which wasn’t much. But he was invited to give a speech to the American Institute of Planners at the Shoreham Hotel at a luncheon. And with the help of a couple of guys, I wrote his speech. I remember he hated to read speeches. He just hated to do it. But he knew in this case that he had to. And he got down there and he started off ad-libbing. He quoted from the book of Genesis something about the hand may be that of—

RITCHIE: Is this the Jacob and Esau story?

MURPHY: Yeah, the Jacob and Esau story. “The hand may be that of Jacob, but the voice is that of Esau.” Which was his way of saying, “This speech was ghost-written.” [Laughing] That kind of broke the ice, you know, and warmed the audience up. He read the speech, but as was typical, he would ad-lib in the course of the speech, which was sort of his way of telling his audience, “Hey, I may know more about this than you think I do.” But it was a bill that really wasn’t going to go anywhere, but we did what we could. I remember I said, “Boy, it’d be great if we could get [Edmund] Muskie as a cosponsor.” Because Muskie was the chairman of the intergovernmental relations subcommittee, former governor of Maine, you know? So I approached Senator Muskie through Don Nicoll, his administrative assistant, but they said "no thanks" because at that point the administration, the new secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Robert Weaver, was dead-set against this bill. The reason was that this particular program would be administered by a unit of the Executive Office of the President. This was the idea of our friend from the Bureau of the Budget. And boy that raised a big red flag with HUD because they administered a program called Urban Planning Assistance Grants and they didn’t want anybody messing around in their turf. It never went anywhere but we offered it as an amendment to another Muskie bill. I gave talks before legislative meetings of the National League of Cities and the National Association of Counties. I tried to sell it, and they were all for it. But it didn’t go anywhere, although eventually I think the Office of Management and Budget was able to implement some of the ideas that were in this bill. They were able to do it executively.

That was one bill. The other was a bill that never was introduced. I was always looking around for ideas and late in 1967, I think the Senate was out of session, we got a letter from the editor of the *Titusville Herald* in Titusville, Pennsylvania, which is somewhere up in the northwestern part of the state. This man wrote a letter supporting a proposal made by a distinguished blue ribbon panel of the Organization of American
Historians to restore the National Archives as an independent agency, because the Archives was under the thumb of the General Services Administration. Well, I thought that was a great idea. Then about that time the New York Times came out with an editorial endorsing it. So I sent a memo off to the senator. I was a history major as an undergraduate so I was really interested in it and I proposed that we introduce the bill. Well, I’d also heard that Congressman [Charles] "Mac" Mathias of Maryland was also interested. I got a hold of his legislative assistant, Carrie Johnson, and we both got together on it and we agreed that we’ll have a bill introduced in both houses and I would arrange to have it drafted by the Office of Legislative Counsel over here. Scott and Mathias put out a press release announcing that they were going to introduce this bill. Well, no sooner had the press release got out I got a call from Bob Griffin, who was an assistant administrator at GSA. He was their legislative guy. I didn’t know Bob at all. He said, “I want to see you.” So he came up to see me and he said, “This bill is an absolute disaster. If Scott introduces this bill, we will destroy it! We’ll come up and testify against it and we’ll bury it!” I said, “Okay, thank you.”

I went ahead and contacted the legislative counsel. The guy who handled it was a fellow by the name of Blair Crownover. Well, Blair was a Pennsylvanian—in fact, he was from the Main Line of Philadelphia—and Blair was a bit of a snob. But a delightful guy and very, very sharp. So I told him what I wanted, which was very simple. Just draft a bill making it an independent agency. Well, Blair called me up and he said, “Dick, there are some policy questions here that we’ll need to resolve. One of them is how do you separate the archival function from the records management function?” I said, “Beats me.” He said, “Well, you know there is a records management thing. Is this going to go with the Archives too or is it going to stay with GSA?” I said, “I don’t know, but maybe we ought to get the chairman of this commission to meet with us and give us his recommendation.” Well, the chairman was a very distinguished professor at Princeton by the name of Julian Boyd, who was the editor of the Thomas Jefferson Papers. He came down and we met in Blair’s office. Carrie Johnson and Blair Crownover and Julian Boyd and I. And he was very, very distinguished. Blair started peppering him with questions and Boyd didn’t have an answer. He said, “I’ll have to convene the committee so that we can discuss the matter.” Well, that ended the whole thing. [Laughing] We talked about that the last time.

BIRKNER: Are you saying that the fact that Boyd didn’t have quick answers really undermined your effort?
MURPHY: Yeah, I mean Carrie and I just dropped it at that point. However, later on, Mac, at this point, was a senator, in fact I think he was the chairman—was he the chairman of the Governmental Operations Committee?

RITCHIE: He was chairman of the Rules Committee in the ’80s.

MURPHY: Yeah. Well, this thing would have been in Government Operations, but anyway, Mac was the guy who did it. I think the Mathias bill was enacted around 1984, which was 16 years later.

RITCHIE: Right. The Senate Historian, Richard Baker, was very active and there was a group of historians here in Washington who were trying to push it through. Senator Mathias was the great sponsor of that.

MURPHY: Yeah, he was your horse.

RITCHIE: It did become independent and it absolutely needed to be so.

MURPHY: Absolutely.

BIRKNER: I think your history background in college served you well and the country well.

MURPHY: Yeah. [Laughing]

RITCHIE: But did Julian Boyd ever come back with answers to the questions?

MURPHY: He never did. He never did. Never heard another thing from him.

BIRKNER: He was busy writing 200-page footnotes. [Laughing]

RITCHIE: When you were promoting legislation like this, did you go out looking to get media support? Did you try to get newspapers to write stories about it or try to work with reporters who might be sympathetic to what you were doing?
MURPHY: No, I didn’t. I probably should have. Frankly, it didn’t occur to me. And I knew quite a few journalists, too. I mean, I knew David Broder, who was with the Washington Star, and Roger Mudd of CBS, and John Averill of the Los Angeles Times, and Bob Albright of the Washington Post. There was a great—Bob Albright. He was an elderly fellow and Bob was a very soft-spoken guy. Bob used to come by every now and then. Come by my office just to chew the fat and find out what’s going on. He was very low key.

BIRKNER: Did you know about him, Don?

RITCHIE: I never met him, but I’ve heard a lot about him.

MURPHY: Yeah, he was a predecessor of—I think he was there before Spencer Rich. Spencer was covering the Senate for quite a few years.

RITCHIE: And Albright had been there for decades.

MURPHY: Yeah.

RITCHIE: I think maybe since the 1930s, and was still there in the ’60s.

MURPHY: Yeah. So he was up in years at that point, yeah.

RITCHIE: He’d covered Joe McCarthy very extensively.

BIRKNER: I’d like to see his papers.

RITCHIE: I don’t know where they are.

BIRKNER: Did you know Richard Wilson, who covered the Senate and Washington for the Cowles publications?

MURPHY: No. I knew Andy Glass, who was with the New York Herald Tribune. But I never tried to promote with journalists, unfortunately.

RITCHIE: Did Senator Scott have a press secretary in those days?
MURPHY: Yes, he did. His press secretary for my first two or three years was Eugene Cowen. Gene and I worked very closely together. We were kind of hand and glove in terms of whenever I’d come up with a bill, Gene would do the press release on it. We didn’t get along as well when he became the administrative assistant. Gene tried to have his hand in everything. He was too controlling for me. But nonetheless, he didn’t interfere with my direct relationship with the senator. But, well, we didn’t get along that well, did we? [Looking at Mrs. Murphy and laughing]

RITCHIE: All of this is going on in the backdrop of the Vietnam War, starting with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in ’64 and throughout the whole period that you’re there.

MURPHY: Yeah.

RITCHIE: I’ve always found it interesting that Hugh Scott was on the side of a Democratic president in the ’60s and skeptical of a Republican president in the ’70s on the same issue. I wondered if you could tell me a little bit about where Senator Scott stood on the Vietnam War.

MURPHY: Well, I think he was very deferential of the executive on foreign and defense issues. On Vietnam, he was right down the line with LBJ. All the way with LBJ. And I, who had studied East Asia in graduate school, including Southeast Asia, I was all the way with LBJ on it. In fact, I never disagreed with any of the senator’s positions on anything. We just had a complete identity of views. But on Vietnam, he supported the president. Of course, he was in the overwhelming majority of senators who voted for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. I spent the whole time on the Senate floor on that and observed the debate and [J. William] Fulbright, who was the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was the floor manager of it. Fulbright made some very strong declarations in support of the resolution authorizing the president to use whatever means necessary. But over the course of time, there was a groundswell of opposition to the war. We saw it in Pennsylvania. Groups would come down from Pennsylvania. Sometimes the two senators met with some. I remember there was one group, Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam. The two senators met with them in a hearing room. But usually it was I who met with people—groups of people or individuals—to hear their opposition.
I remember one was a very nice and earnest professor from a college up in Pennsylvania. It might have been Swarthmore. He came down and he and I had a long conversation on it. He was a Quaker. We had a very pleasant, reasoned discussion. I was explaining why the senator and I supported the war effort. I felt like I was having a one-man graduate school seminar with this gentleman. He wrote the nicest letter to the senator afterwards complimenting me on hearing him out. He was impressed with my reasoning and all of this sort of thing. I was really flattered and touched by it. And I remember meeting one time with a group from Women Strike For Peace. Our office was in 260 of the Russell Building—there was a dead end over there. There was an elevator and there was a little alcove there and I hopped up on this ledge there and these women were meeting with me outside my office. One of them was from Arlington, Virginia, and she was really haranguing me on the subject.

But obviously spent a lot of time meeting with people on Vietnam and following it and all of that. The senator went down to the White House from time to time. Lyndon Johnson would have these briefings down there on the Vietnam War. One time the senator went down and Lyndon Johnson invited Hugh Scott and Cliff Case up to the family quarters. He was up there giving them the treatment. Cliff Case sat on the toilet with the seat covered, and Hugh Scott was leaning against the wash basin. And Lyndon Johnson was moving in on them. [Laughing] But in 1967 the Senate Republican Policy Committee staff came out with a report which was quite critical of the war. I don’t remember now what the report said, but I do remember reading it and I was quite upset by it, that our Policy Committee was taking a different position now, the staff. I got on the phone with those guys, Martin Clancy and Bill Hatch, and I wrote up an analysis on this report, pointing out what I thought were its flaws and I gave that to the senator. The report got quite a bit of attention in the media.

I forget who initiated the idea, but [Charles] Percy was a new senator. Percy’s thing on the war, which he used in his campaign was he said, “We’ve got to get more Asian countries to participate in the war.” The Thais and the Koreans and whatnot, that was his thing. Javits was increasingly turning against the war. So one of those guys, I think it might have been Javits’s staff guy, Les Gelb, who later became president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Les got together with Scott Cohen of Percy’s staff and me and we talked about coming up with a joint statement outlining our common position on the war. We came up with this thing and we were going to give it to our senators at the
BIRKNER: I want to ask you a question about this issue of Scott and the war from one particular angle. One of his most prominent constituents was living in Gettysburg at the time, and I’m talking about Dwight Eisenhower. Although Eisenhower, we all know, had his private misgivings about the war, Johnson worked hard to bring Eisenhower in on the side of the war. And as the years went on, certainly by the years you’re talking about, Eisenhower was increasingly stridently in favor of the war. Did he ever talk with Scott, to your knowledge, impressing on him the need to stay the course in Vietnam and support Johnson’s policies?

MURPHY: I don’t know. If he did, I wasn’t aware of it. He and Eisenhower were very close, so I wouldn’t be surprised if they had talked together. But I wasn’t aware of it.

BIRKNER: Clearly Scott had been a very good ally of Eisenhower in ’52 and helped him get drafted, if you will.

MURPHY: Absolutely.

BIRKNER: So Eisenhower had good feelings for Scott?

MURPHY: Oh yeah, and the two of them tried to drag Bill Scranton into running for governor in 1962.

BIRKNER: And succeeded.
MURPHY: Yes.

BIRKNER: And of course, there was the whole misunderstanding in ’64. But you’re not aware that Eisenhower spoke to Scott on the Vietnam issue, per se?

MURPHY: Right, I’m not aware of it, no.

BIRKNER: What about the issue of briefings and propaganda aside from the president himself. Did Johnson make quote “experts” available to Scott and other Republicans, or even to the staff like yourself, to bolster them as supporters of the war? Or did you guys just work independently?

MURPHY: I worked on it independently. I never was approached by anybody in the administration. I was on some other issues. I remember when Nick Katzenbach was undersecretary of state. He called me several times, I think, on foreign aid issues. But I never heard from anybody on Vietnam. And Johnson did a lot of this himself. Now he invited senators’ administrative assistants to the White House at least once, I know. I think it was Bob Kunzig who went down there. I remember Johnson, at that briefing—Bob told us about it afterwards—that Johnson attacked Wayne Morse and said that he was a hypocrite and he said he didn’t have the guts to vote against the Tonkin Gulf resolution.

BIRKNER: I thought he did.

MURPHY: Morse? No, he did not.

RITCHIE: Morse and [Ernest] Gruening were the two dissenters on that.

MURPHY: Was Morse a dissenter?

RITCHIE: Yes.

MURPHY: Oh, he might have been attacking Fulbright.

BIRKNER: Yeah, he probably was attacking Fulbright.
MURPHY: He was probably attacking Fulbright. That’s right, yeah. I’d forgotten Morse was against it, because he held up Gruening. He said "Gruening and Morse had the guts to vote against me on that one."

BIRKNER: Yeah, he was probably attacking Fulbright.

MURPHY: Yeah. But those were interesting times. And then we had, in early ’68, General [William] Westmoreland, the commander in Vietnam, had made a recommendation for a substantial increase in the number of troops in Vietnam and it was reported on page one of the New York Times. Westmoreland wanted something like 206,000 more troops. And that afternoon we had the closest thing I’ve ever seen to a debate in the Senate on an issue that was not a pending legislative issue. There must have been close to 50 senators on the floor. Robert Kennedy was the one who started it. I remember the one who disagreed strenuously with Kennedy was John Tower of Texas, a Republican. I remember saying to Scott, “Well, senator, you ought to say”—I didn’t tell him what to say, but I said—“You ought to say something on this.” And he said, “No, Dick,” he said, “look at Dick Russell over there. He’s just sitting there and listening.” And he said, “That’s what I’m going to do.” [Laughing] But it was a spirited debate. The only other time that there was something like that—and I wasn’t present—back in ’67, I think. It must have been in the evening when Senator Percy and Senator [Gale] McGee of Wyoming, they got into a debate. There were probably very few senators on the floor. I remember reading it in the Congressional Record. I mean, it was really a good back and forth between the two of them. But you didn’t often see something like that in the Senate, where usually you have set speeches.

BIRKNER: Well, in the old days I guess you did but not so much in the ’60s.

MURPHY: No.

RITCHIE: Every once in a while, a debate accidently breaks out.

MURPHY: Yeah, accidentally.

RITCHIE: But things were becoming much more divisive at that stage. People were having to reevaluate their positions.
MURPHY: Yeah, but it wasn’t until after I left, because you know, when the rubber met the road on the Defense appropriations bill, Congress gave the administration what they wanted. And it was only in 1968 when we had a tax bill up where the administration asked for a surtax on income taxes.

RITCHIE: Right.

MURPHY: That was the first attempt to pay for the war. And that was my last full year with the senate. But it was after I left when the efforts really started to—

BIRKNER: Yeah, Cooper-Church.

MURPHY: Cooper-Church, exactly. And at that point I had left the Senate.

RITCHIE: It’s a backdrop to everything else that’s going on. The Vietnam story was just there.

MURPHY: Exactly.

RITCHIE: And it’s an issue the senators could not dodge. They had to confront it at some point.

MURPHY: Right.

RITCHIE: You mentioned that you had the groups of antiwar people who were coming to see you. Did you talk to constituents on many issues when they came to town with some problem with the senator?

MURPHY: Oh yeah, all the time, it seemed like. I spent a lot of time meeting with people. Of course, Pennsylvania is close by and people would just hop in the car and come down. I remember one guy—I can’t remember what it was he came to see me about—but he was from Philadelphia, and he kept saying, “You tell Hughie. . . .” [Laughing] There were some Republicans up there in Philadelphia that insisted on calling him Hughie. And he’d blanche if somebody called him Hughie. But there was an occasion where I was offered a bribe. Some guy, he said he had invented something, I think, to make cars much safer. I can’t remember what this thing was that he made. He
drove down from Pennsylvania in a driving rainstorm to meet me. And this was early in the evening the day when he came down. And he was just an ordinary Joe. He brought this visual aid with him to explain this thing and he wanted the senator. Detroit wasn’t interested, and he wanted Hugh Scott to lean on Detroit to accept this invention that was going to make cars much safer and all that sort of stuff. And he promised me that—he said, “Do you have any children?” And I said, “Yes, I have a daughter,” who at that point was two years old. He said, “Well, I will finance her college education if you will get the senator to do what I want him to do.” And I said, “No thank you.” [Laughing]

But yes, we did. Of course, I met with lobbyists all the time: labor union lobbyists and business lobbyists and other lobbyists. But we had quite a few constituents coming down. There was one matter which was kind of moving, I thought. The Old Order Amish wanted to be exempt from the Social Security tax, and from Social Security. And a delegation came down from Pennsylvania led by Bishop Fisher, who was a delightful gentleman. And they met with Ralph Widner, Clark’s legislative assistant, and me, in Senator Scott’s office. And from the Treasury Department, we had Gabe Rudney. [Turning to Mrs. Murphy] Remember Shirley Rudney? Yeah. Gabe Rudney, and from the Social Security Administration, there was Hugh Johnson. These men made a plea to be exempt from Social Security. Well, Rudney saw all kinds of problems with that. But they both listened very respectfully and attentively to these people. Afterwards, I invited everybody down to the Dirksen Building cafeteria for ice cream. So we all went down there and I bought everybody ice cream and we had a great old time there. Well, I think it was Dick Schweiker, after he became a senator, who got the exemption for the Old Order Amish. That would have been probably in the early ’70s. But I’m pretty sure it happened.

BIRKNER: That’s a nice story.

MURPHY: Yeah.

RITCHIE: When you had groups like this, was it your main objective to listen to them and deflect them away from the senator? What did you do when you had a group coming to town?

MURPHY: Well, I would listen to them and I would tell them that I would bring their views to the senator’s attention—and I would.
RITCHIE: You were essentially the surrogate for the senator?

MURPHY: Yeah, I was the surrogate for the senator. He would make me a surrogate sometimes to go up to the state. Once I went up to the state to accept an award for him at a dinner in Allentown. Another time, in 1967—all invitations that would come to the senator would go to Edie Skinner and she would send it into the senator, indicating whether his calendar was free for the occasion or not. On occasion, he would pass it on to me. He would just write, “Dick?” He was on the Surface Transportation Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee, and he had been invited to give an address on the topic of new directions in transportation policy on April 1, which was a Saturday, at Kutztown State College in Kutztown, Pennsylvania, which is up in kind of the northeastern part of the state. So he wrote on the letter, “Dick?,” and passed it back to me. Well, I took it as an order. I didn’t know much about transportation legislation. So I called up the Transportation Department, which was then a brand new department. Their legislative guy came up to see me and I told him what I was going to talk about. I said, “Can you send me any material that you think would be useful?” Well, they sent me a bunch of speeches by Alan Boyd, who was the first secretary of transportation, and I read them. Then I did some other research and got some stuff from the Library of Congress, and I discovered that there was an awful lot of stuff there. I ended up writing a lecture that was 50 minutes long. I mean, there was an awful lot of waterfront to cover there.

When I finished drafting it, I shared it with Stan Sender, who was the transportation counsel on the Commerce Committee, for his comments. He had a few comments, relatively minor. He said he thought it was a good speech. And let me tell you, going to Kutztown, Pennsylvania, on a Saturday, or anytime, was quite a trip. I think I flew out of Baltimore to Lancaster. Then I went over to Reading and I rented a car and drove over to Kutztown and I gave my talk before lunch and stayed for the luncheon. Then I had to come back to Washington because we had dinner that night at Gene Cowens’ house, and it was about a four-hour drive as I recall. But I gave the talk. It was a talk to the Eastern Traffic Manager’s Conference at Kutztown State College. [Laughing]

RITCHIE: Could you describe what a typical day in Senator Scott’s office would have been like in the ’60's when you were there. What were your routines of the day?

MURPHY: Well, I was usually in before eight o’clock. I’d come in around eight o’clock and I was the first person there and that was a time when I could quickly look at
the headlines of the papers, take a quick glance at the Congressional Record, go down to the Dirksen cafeteria to have coffee with Bill Hildenbrand and some other guys. We’d do that every day. I’d be back in the office around nine o’clock and then all hell broke loose for the rest of the day. You know, the phone was constantly ringing. I was meeting with people coming in. It was very hard. Of course, I handled the legislative mail, too. We only had robotype typewriters in those days down in the basement of the Russell Building. For volume mail, I would draft the senator’s response and I’d send it in to him and he would make some edits or changes in it and then we’d send it down to the robo room. So we were able to dispose of quite a bit of mail that way, but there were a lot of individual letters that I would dictate responses to. Then we’d have the signature machine sign them.

And then I’m trying to keep up with what’s going on over on the Senate floor. We didn’t really have staff meetings. The senator didn’t believe in staff meetings. So we were all kind of working independently; the press office and the administrative assistant and whatnot. I think I told Michael before that Bob Kunzig told me at the very outset, he said, “Dick, you’re the legislative assistant. You deal directly with the senator.” He said, “Now and then, I’ll ask you what’s going on.” When Bob would ask me what’s going on, I’d tell him to wait a few minutes and I’d find the most recent Congressional Quarterly, which had a good rundown on everything that was going on in Congress. I’d take it in to him and I’d say, “Bob, read this, and if you have any questions, I’ll be glad to answer them.” [Laughing]

But I think it was around ’67, the senator finally managed to share a hideaway in the Capitol with Thruston Morton of Kentucky. It was right off the Rotunda. Thank God for that, because I would go over there. I’d tell my secretary, “I’m going over to the hideaway.” She had the phone number and she was the only one that had it. And I said, “If anybody’s looking for me, if Edie Skinner is looking for me, let me know.” So I would go over there. That was the one place where I found some peace and quiet, where I could do a little studying. But other than that, I was going back and forth to the floor with the senator, if I wasn’t over there already. When you went with the senator, he was a very fast mover. I had a hard time keeping up with him to go over there and back. But it seemed like every day was a new day and there was always something different.

BIRKENER: I have to ask this question. Given that aides like yourself had access to the floor, how did you know when to let the senator just go and do his talking with his
peers and how did you sort of . . . did you have a sixth sense about when you should be trailing him and when you should give him space?

**MURPHY:** You mean on the floor?

**BIRKNER:** Right, on the floor of the Senate. My image of the Senate is always of these senators sort of whispering in each other’s ears or telling jokes or whatever they’re doing, but you don’t tend to think of the aides. Maybe because they’re deliberately meant to be obscure. But did you have a sixth sense about when you should be right on his tail and when you should be just somewhere else in the building?

**MURPHY:** Oh yeah. If he went over to talk with some colleagues, you know, I just stayed behind. I wouldn’t go unless he asked me to.

**BIRKNER:** Unless he asked you to join him, okay.

**MURPHY:** Yeah, exactly. I remember one day in 1968, Gene McCarthy was running for president and I had gotten to know McCarthy, if you can say one could ever get to know that guy. Because I was kind of a foil for him over on the Senate floor when I was sitting on the couch. He’d have these little witticisms and everything like that. But he was a total enigma to me, and I wanted to know what made this guy tick. So after the Senate had adjourned for the year, this would have been back in ’65 or ’66, I called McCarthy’s office one day and asked if we could have lunch. He said, “Yeah.” He always called me Murphy. So he and I went over to a restaurant beyond the Monocle over there on D Street. There was a restaurant on the next corner. And we had lunch for two hours and we talked about an awful lot of things. I walked him back to his office and then I went back to my office and I sat there trying to figure out what it was we had really talked about.

Anyway, when he announced his candidacy for president over there in the Senate Caucus Room, I went over. I was in the audience. He saw me there. Some weeks after that, I was in the chamber and Scott was over talking with Jim Pearson of Kansas. Well, it just so happens that McCarthy, in campaigning up in New Hampshire, had announced who some of the members of his cabinet were going to be, and one of them was Jim Pearson. He was going to be his secretary of agriculture, much to the surprise of everybody, including Pearson. But anyway, Scott and Pearson are standing talking, and
they were very close personal friends, and in comes Gene McCarthy. He comes in and he drapes his arms around Scott’s and Pearson’s shoulders. Then he beckons me over, and he said to Scott, “Hugh,” he said, “look at Murphy. He’s my secret agent.” [Laughing] I felt like sinking into the carpet. McCarthy was a man that Scott had little use of because in 1960, when McCarthy came into the state to campaign for Jack Kennedy for president, he attacked Hugh Scott. That is something, in those days at any rate, no senator ever did—and Scott never forgot it.

**BIRKNER:** That’s a great story.

**RITCHIE:** Speaking of relations of senators, I was curious about the relationship of your office, Senator Scott’s office, with the office of the other senator from Pennsylvania. You had Joe Clark, a Democrat, there for the time that you were in.

**MURPHY:** Right. Joe Clark, who was a liberal Democrat. He and Hugh Scott were very close friends. They both lived near each other in Philadelphia, up there I guess near Germantown. Anyway, they were very close friends. They disagreed on a lot of things, but it was a very close relationship and that relationship was reflected right throughout the staff. I worked very closely with my counterpart in Clark’s office, Ralph Widner. Clark's administrative assistant was a fellow by the name of Bernie Norwich. A great guy. We just had very, very cordial relationships. Joe Clark, who was quite a snob himself, and was like a bantam rooster sometimes, and he did not endear himself to many of his colleagues. He was a great reformer in the Senate among the Democrats. But I always liked Joe Clark, I guess because he liked me a lot. But he was always very kind and generous with me.

That changed in the ’64 campaign because the Democrats had a very bitter primary contest for the senatorial nomination between Judge Michael Musmanno of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Genevieve Blatt, who was the secretary of internal affairs of the Commonwealth. She had strong political ties with the local officials all around the state, and she was a protégée of Senator Clark. Joe Clark was zealous in his support for her, especially against Musmanno. He questioned Musmanno’s origins and all of that sort of stuff. And he attacked Scott some during the campaign. Well, after the election was all over, the two senators did a little show. They had had this joint radio and television program that was on twice a month on Sundays up in Pennsylvania on all TV stations and radio stations. It was a real news maker program. Of course, they stopped it
once Scott had announced his candidacy for reelection. But Senator Clark wrote a congratulatory letter to Senator Scott, but it was pretty tepid. Clark and his wife went down to Argentina after the election on vacation. And the Scotts went down to New Zealand on their vacation. So things were a little tense between the two offices there for a few months. But then, after the Senate came back in session, Clark made the overture and said, “Well, Hugh, are we going to do the show again?” And Scott said, “Sure.” So they kissed and made up and our relationships were back to normal again. But it was a very close, cooperative relationship.

RITCHIE: There was no rivalry between the staffs?

MURPHY: None whatever. None whatever. It was really a delightful relationship, because we often heard of other cases where there were other states where senators from the same party didn’t get along and that was reflected down the line in their staffs, too. But not in our case.

BIRKNER: So what happened in ’68 when Clark was up for reelection? Did Scott return the favor and attack him?

MURPHY: No. Matter of fact, in the race for the Republican nomination, Scott took a neutral position, publicly, at any rate. He told Gene Cowen and me—Gene, at that point, he was the administrative assistant—and he said, “If either candidate comes to you,” (and the two principal candidates that year for the nomination were [Congressman Richard] Schweiker and John Tabor, who had been secretary of commerce under Scranton and secretary of labor and industry under Governor Ray Shafer). He said, “If either one of them come to you for advice, give it to them. Cooperate with them any way you wish.” He never told us who he favored. I think his personal preference was probably John Tabor, but he never gave any indication whatever. Not even a hint of what his own personal preference was on it. I knew Schweiker very well and liked him a lot. I knew Tabor very well from the Pennsylvania State Planning Board thing.

In the autumn of 1967, the two candidates were going to make an appearance in Harrisburg before the Pennsylvania Council of Republican Women. John Tabor called me and said, “I’d like to meet with you.” I went up to Camp Hill at that hotel up there at Camp Hill, on the hill, I can’t remember which one it was. I spent the night there.
BIRKNER: I think it’s a Hilton, but I don’t want to hold myself to that.

MURPHY: Yeah. John Tabor and I met for four hours. He grilled me on issues of foreign policy—Vietnam, NATO, you name it. John was a lawyer. He reminded me of Howard Baker in that regard. I sat in on a session with Baker one time where he was grilling an expert. I mean, these guys had a tremendous ability to elicit information from people. It was a great session I had with John Tabor. I liked him so much. If I could have voted in that election, I would have voted for John. Nothing against Schweiker. I liked him tremendously. But as far as I know, the relationship between the two senatorial offices with Schweiker was the same as it was with Clark.

RITCHIE: I saw that you said in the previous interview that the hours were pretty killing, really, on the job. There was lots of late nights.

MURPHY: Yes, there were.

RITCHIE: And you couldn’t predict your schedule and all the rest. When did you decide that you wanted to hang it up? When did you think that the time was coming to change positions?

MURPHY: I think it was after the . . . it was probably sometime in ’67, maybe, that I started thinking about it. And I sought the advice of a gentleman who later hired me when I went with Merck and Company, a fellow by the name of Ed Carroll. His title was Director of Economic Research for the company. Indeed, at one time, that’s what he did. But Ed also knew a lot of folks in Washington and so he’d come down here and meet with senators and congressmen. I used to see Ed quite a bit, and I told Ed one time, “Sometime when you’re in Washington, I’d like to get together with you. I’d like to get your advice on career opportunities.” So we talked about education. The Higher Education Act had passed and colleges and universities had a great interest in that. He said, “You might want to consider representing a college or a university here in Washington.” I started looking into it. I remember the University of California Berkeley had an office here and I met with their guy to find out what they do. Well, of course, basically what they were looking for were all the federal grant programs and that sort of thing.
Ed knew a trustee of the University of Pennsylvania. Well, I was acquainted with Gaylord Harnwell—he was the president—because he was on the Pennsylvania State Planning Board. So Ed and I took a flyer at Harnwell through this member of the board of trustees, who was a good friend of Ed’s, to see if Penn would be interested in opening up a Washington office. Harnwell said no. He said, “I have a guy on my staff here and Philadelphia being so close to Washington, we don’t need to open an office down there.”

Then Ed said, “Well, we might want to consider forming a consortium of smaller colleges up in Pennsylvania and represent them here in Washington.” Well, we looked at that and didn’t get very far on that. Then, finally, he offered me a job with Merck. I wasn’t looking for a job with a company, particularly, but he offered me the job with Merck and so I took it. The hours at the Senate were very long and we had a baby girl at that point. But it wasn’t because of flagging interest in the work at all. I loved what I was doing. My five years with Hugh Scott were the best years of my career. I just loved the senator and we became very dear friends right until his death in 1994. Had I stayed with him, I might have ended up being secretary of the Senate. Who knows?

RITCHIE: Did he turn to you for advice after you left? Did he ever consult with you on things?

MURPHY: Well, he and I would get together for lunch from time to time. We would just talk about a lot of things, politics and—

BIRKNER: Did he ever talk to you about Nixon?

MURPHY: Yes, he did. Right after the ’68 election, he and I had lunch one day in the Senate dining room. He was so enthused about Nixon’s election as president. He said, “At last we have a Republican president who’s going to really do his darndest to build up the party.”

BIRKNER: Forlorn hope.

MURPHY: He said, “Eisenhower didn’t do it, but Nixon will.” He was so confident of it. Of course, that never happened.

RITCHIE: What did you think of his role as leader? Did you think he was an effective leader when he got to the position?
MURPHY: I think so. He was a consensus guy within the party. Howard Baker ran against him for the leadership position, I think, even in ’69 he ran against him. But Scott was pretty shrewd. He lined up some conservatives to support him. I know Len Jordan of Idaho was one of them. Milton Young of North Dakota and Gordon Allott of Colorado were others. I mean, these were traditional conservatives, not the wacky ones that you have nowadays. [Laughing] In fact, I think Carl Curtis may have been one of his supporters, too.

BIRKNER: Can’t get much more conservative than Carl Curtis.

MURPHY: Yeah, right. So I think he was quite effective. He wasn’t a yes man for the White House, that’s for sure. He couldn’t abide [H.R.] Haldeman and [John] Erlichman. He and Mansfield became very, very close personal friends. So close, in fact, that when Hugh Scott was reelected in 1970, not long after the election he met with Mansfield and he told Mansfield that this was going to be his last term in the Senate. Mansfield was the only person he told. He didn’t even tell that to Mrs. Scott. So it was a well kept secret. I remember in 1975, there were several guys that were looking at that seat in the event that Hugh Scott decided not to run. John Heinz being one. Arlen Specter being another. George Packard, who was executive editor of the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, was another one. Packard had not had any political experience whatever. I remember Packard called Scott in 1965 and point blank asked him, “Hugh, are you going to run?”

BIRKNER: Seventy-five maybe?

MURPHY: Yeah, “Hugh, are you going to run for reelection?” And the senator said, “Well, George, I haven’t made up my mind, but you’ll be the first to know.” [Laughing] He took great umbrage at that. He didn’t believe in disclosing his intentions. In 1966, when John Sherman Cooper was reelected as senator from Kentucky, the very next day he announced that he was not going to run again in 1972. Scott was so shocked he called up John Cooper and said, “Are you out of your mind, John?”

RITCHIE: You just make yourself a lame duck when you do that.

MURPHY: Yeah, right.
RITCHIE: You had such an intimate relationship with the senator and Senate for that time period from ’64 to ’68. Now looking at the Senate, looking back 40 years, how different a place was it then than it is today, from your perspective?

MURPHY: Well, of course, with the Senate nowadays, I only know what I read in the papers, but the Senate was a much more collegial institution. I think the members probably had greater respect for the institution than some of the members here do now. I may be wrong on that. You’re in a better position to judge that than I, Don. But there really were good relationships across the aisle. I don’t recall any personal attacks on other senators. I realize that that’s not allowed under the rules anyway. But no, it was much more congenial than it is now.

RITCHIE: It’s interesting that it was more congenial, but the party divisions were more internal in those days.

MURPHY: Yes.

RITCHIE: The Republican Party was divided between liberal and conservative wings. The Democratic Party was divided between its northern liberal and southern conservative wings. But despite the four political factions in the Senate, there was more overall harmony among the senators.

MURPHY: Absolutely. You could get things done, even with those divisions. I think on that Civil Rights bill we talked about earlier, the one that was enacted in 1968, I think Dirksen could see that he was losing control of his Republicans on those cloture votes in 1968. When it got to the point where more Republican senators voted for cloture than against, I think that’s probably one of the reasons that he executed one of his famous 180-degree turns.

RITCHIE: There’s a political cartoon of Dirksen as a ringmaster standing on top of two elephants. One says liberal Republicans and the other says conservative Republicans. They’re going in opposite directions but he’s maintaining his poise between the two.

BIRKNER: And there it is.
MURPHY: Yeah.

RITCHIE: He was very deft in his leadership of the party.

MURPHY: Yeah. I had lunch not too long ago with a friend who had worked with Javits. I think he worked there after I left the Senate. No, I take that back. But he said that Javits and Dirksen had an excellent relationship. Javits was the most liberal Republican of the lot, but they had a very good relationship.

RITCHIE: Interesting friendships and personalities. One thing that I remember Bill Hildenbrand telling me was that when he was counting heads in the Senate Chamber, he never took a vote for granted, because there are all these interpersonal relationships and personal backgrounds and everything else that would confound a vote. That you would assume that someone was going to vote very conservative or very liberal and they would surprise you because of some personal connection that they’d had.

MURPHY: Yeah, exactly. Sort of like the Supreme Court, you know? We have friends who say, “Well, that Republican judge, you know, they’re always going to vote this way.” You can’t tell how these people are going to vote. Some of it is based on personal relationships.

RITCHIE: Well, this has been fascinating. Is there anything else that you’d like to add?

MURPHY: I don’t think so. [Laughing]

BIRKNER: I have to say, I said this to Don. I think your ability to bring one really back to the scene and recall dialogue is one of the things that, as historians, we both really appreciate very much. Because not everybody has that gift. And your ability to remember specifics as you do is a testament to your good memory, among other things, which I see slipping away from me. But it’s great to be able to do this.

MURPHY: Well, thank you very much. I do pride myself on my memory and things like that.
**BIRKNER:** And Don can testify that the stuff gets used and it will be for a long time. There’s always going to be new articles and books written about the Senate in the 1960s and you’re going to be in some of those books, I think, down the line. You don’t know this, but I’m proud to say that one of my former students, who was one of my worst students, recently won a prize for a book on the Senate, for the southern Democrats’ opposition to civil rights legislation over 30 years. If you had told me that this fellow would write a prize-winning book—I wrote a blurb for it, in fact—I would have said you were crazy. But when people are 19 years old, they’re not necessarily the same people when they’re 28 or older. But he must have, presumably, used some of these collections to write that.

**MURPHY:** Had he gone on for a Ph.D.?

**BIRKNER:** He did. He did. And he teaches at a Louisiana University now.

**MURPHY:** Yeah, marvelous.

**BIRKNER:** So surprise, surprise. But it’s an example of the kind of work that can shed new light on the Senate.

**MURPHY:** Yeah.

**RITCHIE:** Exactly. Well, thank you so much for coming in today.

**MURPHY:** Well, Don, thank you very much. I’ve enjoyed it immensely.

**RITCHIE:** Very good. We will send you a transcript just as Michael did and you’ll have a chance to revise and extend your remarks.

**MURPHY:** Well, I will be very discreet. [Laughing]

*End of the Second Interview*
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