

# A Bipartisan Foreign Policy 1953-1960


*April 28, 1986*

Mr. President, the late Francis Wilcox was an astute observer of the United States Senate's role in foreign policy, both from his posts as the first chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and as an assistant secretary of state in the Eisenhower administration. During his tenure with the committee and the Department of State, the foreign policy of the United States was frequently and correctly described as a bipartisan policy. Democrats and Republicans alike agreed that politics stopped at the water's edge. While there was still much criticism of individual policies and policymakers, a broad-based consensus in the government and in the country supported the fundamental objectives of the United States in those difficult early years of the cold war. Such bipartisanship lasted until the Vietnam War in the 1960's, when legislative-executive relations became intensely estranged. Having witnessed the rise and fall of bipartisanship, Dr. Wilcox once recorded what he considered the four essential conditions for a bipartisan foreign policy:

First, when the White House and the administration are controlled by one party, and the Congress is con-

trolled by the other party—as in the case of the 80th Congress—when cooperation becomes absolutely essential; the government can't function in that kind of a situation unless you have a bipartisan approach. Secondly, when there is a fairly good consensus in the country about the basic principles or goals of our foreign policy and the way it should be conducted. . . . Thirdly, the kind of leadership on Capitol Hill that can command the confidence of the Congress and the executive and be willing to deemphasize politics while working for the national interest. And fourthly the kind of strong leadership in the White House that is willing to accord Congress its rightful place in the constitutional scheme of things and is willing to consult frequently with Congress on important foreign policy questions.<sup>1</sup>

Today, in my continuing series of addresses on the history of the United States Senate, I should like to take Dr. Wilcox's opinions regarding the prerequisites for bipartisanship as a means of examining the Senate's role in the foreign policy of the United States between 1953 and 1960—a crucial eight years for this nation and this institution. It was a period of grave challenges and dramatic decisions affecting the survival of humanity on this globe. It was also a period when the executive branch used foreign policy as a means of strengthening presidential power



President Eisenhower received strong bipartisan support from the Congress in foreign policy matters. In 1953, he greeted newly elected House members at the White House, including freshman Representative Robert C. Byrd, *front row, third from left.*

*Dwight D. Eisenhower Library*

vis-à-vis Congress. This was an ironic situation because General Dwight D. Eisenhower had run for the presidency in 1952 deeply opposed to executive aggrandizement. Yet, as Professor Arthur Schlesinger has pointed out in his important book, *The Imperial Presidency*, by the end of his second term, Eisenhower had accelerated the transfer of power from Congress to the presidency. Schlesinger wrote, "Two things had happened: the belief that the world was greatly endangered by the spread of communism had generated a profound conviction of crisis in the United

States; and the conviction of crisis had generated a foreign policy that placed the separation of powers prescribed by the American Constitution under unprecedented, and at times unbearable, strain."<sup>2</sup>

In 1953, war still raged in Korea; the United States had 3.6 million men in uniform and was allocating billions of dollars for military expenditures. All of this enormously strengthened the president as commander in chief. Although critical of some aspects of strategy and policy, Congress still tended to defer to the president on matters of warfare

and national security. It is also important to remember that the two parties at that time fundamentally viewed the world situation in the same way. The Republican Eisenhower inherited his basic national security structure from the Democratic Truman and adopted the broad outlines of his policies.

In June 1953, President Eisenhower convened a six-week, top-secret policy meeting held in the penthouse solarium of the White House. Known as Operation Solarium, the study group drafted the policy statements that guided the next eight years of American foreign policy initiatives under Eisenhower. Only recently were the records of Operation Solarium declassified, and they make most interesting reading. We find, for instance, that Eisenhower rejected the 1952 Republican campaign promise of rolling back Soviet control of Eastern Europe and, instead, decided to concentrate his efforts on building a position of strength so that other nations would respect American interests and see the United States as a source of support. This strategy required that the United States use any means possible, from conventional ground troops to nuclear weapons, to deter aggression. The United States and its allies would strengthen themselves to prevent political or military gains by the Communists and to diminish Soviet influence in the world. Essentially, this was a continuation of the policies forged under Harry Truman.<sup>3</sup>

Eisenhower began his presidency with a broad national consensus on foreign policy and strong bipartisan support in the Congress. The greatest difficulty he encountered was not from the opposition party but from critics within his own party. In a previous address, I discussed the peculiar crusade of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, whose hunt for Communists in government deeply shook the Department of State, driving competent, independent-minded men out of policy-making positions and severely depressing

the morale of those who remained. Opposition came also from Senator William Knowland, who, in the summer of 1953, became the Republican Majority Leader. Knowland's close attachments to the government of Chiang Kai-shek had won him the sobriquet of "the senator from Formosa." A man of principle, Knowland was willing to fight even the titular leader of his own party if they disagreed on an issue.

But it was the silver-maned senator from Ohio, John Bricker, who made the most direct assault on Eisenhower's foreign policy leadership. In 1951, Senator Bricker began introducing an amendment to the Constitution which would prohibit the United States from entering into any international agreements that might affect the rights and freedoms of the people or the character and structure of the government. What motivated Bricker was a concern that American participation in the United Nations Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights covenant might somehow override American laws. As it evolved, however, the main thrust of the Bricker amendment came to be, "Congress shall have power to regulate all executive and other agreements with any foreign power or international organization."

Many Republicans saw the Bricker amendment as a vehicle for preventing presidents from entering into unsupervised executive agreements such as the one Roosevelt reached with Stalin and Churchill at Yalta. Mrs. Phyllis Schlafly, already a political activist in 1953, called the Bricker amendment "the most important and necessary legislation that the present Congress can pass." The amendment also won support from such groups as the American Bar Association, the United States Chamber of Commerce, and the Daughters of the American Revolution.<sup>4</sup>

When Senator Bricker reintroduced his amendment at the beginning of the Eighty-third Congress, he had sixty-two cosponsors,



Senator John W. Bricker, *center*, who sponsored the Bricker amendment, met with the press in the President's Room at the Capitol. *U.S. Senate Historical Office*

including forty-five of the forty-eight Senate Republicans. The amendment frightened many experts in the State Department. Some interpreted it as meaning that future treaties would have to be ratified by each of the states. Seeing the amendment as a congressional attempt to reduce the powers of the president over foreign policy, Eisenhower was determined to block that effort. He and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles met with Senator Bricker but could not budge him, for Bricker, as Eisenhower noted, had "gotten almost psychopathic on the subject." The president became so frustrated over his dealings with the senator that he once remarked to his press secretary, "If it's true that when you die the things that bothered you most are engraved on your skull, I am

sure I'll have there the mud and dirt of France during the invasion and the name of Senator Bricker." <sup>5</sup>

As the Eisenhower administration fought desperately to delay and defeat the Bricker amendment, it turned to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee for help. The chairman, Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin, suffered badly by comparison with his predecessors, Arthur Vandenberg and Tom Connally. An amiable politician, he simply lacked the knowledge, interest, and prestige to handle that job competently. Secretary Dulles found it impossible to discuss substantive issues of foreign policy with Senator Wiley. But Wiley was an administration loyalist, and he fought tooth and toenail in opposition to the Bricker amendment. Pat Holt,

a member of the Foreign Relations Committee staff and later its director, recalled:

There were *endless* hours spent fooling around with words [on the Bricker amendment], . . . what hypothetical situations would this particular formulation apply to, and so on. In this process there were a good many meetings in the White House with Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles and various senators who were interested in it. Wiley's principal function in these meetings was to stiffen the spine of the Eisenhower administration and keep them from agreeing to something which they would probably later regret.

Senator Wiley, according to Pat Holt, "had a gut feeling that it would do violence to the Constitution." Wiley showed considerable political courage, lined up against most of the senators from his own party and in the face of a substantial mail campaign in favor of the treaty. "I've got 10,000 letters supporting the Bricker Amendment," he once commented, "but three million people voted in Wisconsin in the last election, and I haven't heard from the other 2,990,000 of them." <sup>6</sup>

In addition to help from Senator Wiley, the Eisenhower administration looked to Senate Democrats. In January 1954, Eisenhower and Dulles met with Senator Walter George, ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, to find a way to prevent passage of the amendment. Senate Democratic Leader Lyndon Johnson welcomed this opportunity to help save the president from isolationists in his own party. Senators Johnson and George and the Democratic Policy Committee thus began drafting an alternative resolution. This one stated that "an international agreement other than a treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only by an act of the Congress." Even this version, however, raised objections from the Department of State as restricting presidential authority. In February, the Senate rejected the Republican version of the Bricker amendment by a 42 to

50 vote (not obtaining a majority, let alone the necessary two-thirds) but then came very close to passing the Democratic substitute. Eisenhower marshaled all of his lobbying skills to persuade members to vote against the George substitute and managed to defeat it by a single vote. It was the late Senator Harley Kilgore of West Virginia who cast that decisive vote. The Bricker amendment was finally dead. <sup>7</sup>

In July 1953, the United Nations and North Korea signed an armistice at Panmunjon, ending the Korean War. Immediately, American concerns were focused on another Asian trouble spot, Indochina. There, the French were holding an increasingly precarious position against nationalist forces led by Ho Chi Minh. In his first appearances before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary Dulles drew special attention to this region:

In some ways it is more dangerous, I would think, than any other situation in the world, because the loss of Indochina would probably have even more serious repercussions upon the Indian-Asian population than even the loss of South Korea and, also, because what is going on in Indochina has very serious repercussions in Europe and upon the mood of France, and the willingness of the French to move in partnership with Germany toward the creation of unity and security in Europe. <sup>8</sup>

Senate concern over the course of events in Indochina became evident during the debate over President Eisenhower's request in 1953 for an additional \$400 million in military aid for that region. The House passed the bill with little opposition, but the Senate engaged in a sharp debate on the matter. Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona introduced an amendment requiring the French to set a target date for the complete independence of Indochina. Senator Goldwater argued that, unless the political aspirations of the people of Indochina were met, the United States

would inevitably be drawn into military conflict in the region. The only way to "prevent many of our boys from ending up in the jungles of southeast Asia," said Senator Goldwater, was "to ask France . . . to grant independence and the right of freedom to those people who have fought so long for their independence and freedom."

Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts agreed with Senator Goldwater that the war could never be won unless "large numbers of the people of Viet-Nam are won over from their sullen neutrality and open hostility to it and fully support its successful conclusion." This could never be done, Kennedy asserted, unless the people of Indochina were assured of their independence at the conclusion of the war. Kennedy, however, wanted to avoid "an ultimatum" to the French and offered a substitute for Goldwater's amendment, that all mutual security funds spent in Indochina would be administered in such a way as to encourage the freedom and independence of the people there. Even this measure was considered too drastic, and the Senate defeated Kennedy's proposal by a 17 to 64 vote. Considering the roles they would later play in the Vietnam War, it is interesting to note that Senators Goldwater and Kennedy sponsored these cautionary amendments and Senator Lyndon Johnson voted against them.

Congress voted the \$400 million for Indochina, but the French immediately asked for another \$385 million, warning that without it, they might have to withdraw from the area. The Eisenhower administration agreed to the increase, and Thruston Morton, then assistant secretary of state for congressional relations, came to Capitol Hill to brief the influential Senator Richard Russell. Morton later recalled that Senator Russell told him: "You are pouring it down a rathole; the worst mess we ever got into, this Vietnam. The president has decided it. I'm not going to say a word of criticism. I'll keep my mouth



Senator Richard B. Russell considered Vietnam "the worst mess we ever got into."

*U.S. Senate Historical Office*

shut, but I'll tell you right now we are in for something that is going to be one of the worst things this country ever got into." What a tragedy that Richard Russell's prophetic warning was not heeded!

In addition to increased financial aid, the Eisenhower administration wanted to send two hundred aircraft technicians to assist the French. Senator Mike Mansfield, who had traveled through Indochina and who was as familiar with that region as any member of the Senate, approved the sending of these troops but warned that it was up to the people of Indochina, rather than the United States, to fight the war. Senator John Stennis voiced similar concerns. "I am afraid we will move to a point from which there will be no return," he cautioned.<sup>9</sup>

In March 1954, the Viet Minh attacked the French garrison at Dienbienphu. Some observers feared that the loss of Dienbienphu might mean the loss of all of Indochina. Should the United States intervene militarily to save the French? Secretary of State Dulles and Admiral Arthur Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, leaned toward intervention. In a press conference, Eisenhower made his famous analogy of falling dominoes to describe the situation: if the Communists knocked one over, all the rest would fall. By April 1, the situation had so deteriorated that policy planners were considering an American air strike to aid the French garrison. The administration drafted a joint resolution empowering the president to use American forces to resist aggression in Southeast Asia. On April 3, Secretary Dulles called congressional leaders to the State Department for a briefing. There, Radford and Dulles warned of the consequences of a Communist victory and urged that the president be given congressional support to use military power.

Senate Republican Leader William Knowland supported the venture, but Democratic leaders were skeptical. Senator Earle Clements questioned Admiral Radford about the proposed American air strike at Dienbienphu. "Does this plan have the approval of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?" "No," Radford replied. "How many of the three agree with you?" "None," said the Admiral. "How do you account for that?" Clements demanded. "I have spent more time in the Far East than any of them and I understand the situation better," Radford insisted. Senator Lyndon Johnson then asked whether Secretary Dulles had consulted with other nations who would be allies in the intervention. Dulles said he had not. By the end of the meeting, congressional Republicans and Democrats alike advised Dulles to seek allies for the intervention

and not to plan on unilateral American action.<sup>10</sup>

Back at the Capitol, Senator Lyndon Johnson met with a small group of Democratic senators and gave them "a vivid, muscular and athletic recounting" of the meeting with Dulles. When the support of the congressional leaders had been solicited, Johnson told them he had pounded on the desk to emphasize his opposition. It was clear from such displays that the administration could not count upon uncritical congressional support unless it could demonstrate strong pledges of assistance from American allies. On April 6, for instance, Senator John Kennedy, in a speech in the Senate, stated that he favored a policy of united action by many nations. "But to pour money, materiel, and men into the jungles of Indochina without at least a remote prospect of victory," he said, "would be dangerously futile and self-destructive." Senator Stennis declared: "I do not believe that Congress would ever vote, or should vote, to have the United States go in on a unilateral basis. It would have to be a united effort; not a token effort, but a real united effort."

Secretary Dulles flew to London to persuade the British to join in a united front in Indochina, but to no avail. British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden recalled in his memoirs that Prime Minister Winston Churchill had decided it would be a mistake for the British to join the United States in sending troops into Indochina. "Sir Winston summed up the position by saying that what we were being asked to do was to assist in misleading Congress into approving a military operation, which would in itself be ineffective, and might well bring the world to the verge of a major war." The British refusal to intervene undercut Dulles' efforts and convinced Eisenhower not to involve the United States militarily at Dienbienphu. "Without allies and associates," the president told his staff,



Left to right, Senate Republican Leader William F. Knowland, House Republican Leader Joseph W. Martin, Senate Democratic Leader Lyndon B. Johnson, and House Speaker Sam T. Rayburn met with President Eisenhower at the White House. *U.S. Senate Historical Office*

“the leader is just an adventurer, like Genghis Khan.” On May 7, 1954, the garrison at Dienbienphu fell to the Communists. This set in motion the independence of Indochina from France and its partition, at the Geneva Conference, into Laos, Cambodia, and North and South Vietnam.<sup>11</sup>

President Eisenhower has received commendation from historians for his decision not to intervene at Dienbienphu. In light of subsequent events in Vietnam, he clearly made the right decision. When we consider that Secretary Dulles had in his pocket a draft resolution calling for American military intervention and that Vice President Richard Nixon was suggesting that American troops might need to be sent to Indochina if the French withdrew, Dwight Eisenhower was the model of a cautious, rational, pragmatic national leader. However, we should keep in mind that strong congressional opposition to unilateral intervention had exerted a moderating influence on the administration and re-

minded it of the need to seek allies. This was the conclusion of veteran *Washington Post* correspondent Chalmers Roberts’ famous article on “The Day We Didn’t Go to War.” Congress had helped the administration face reality.

In 1954, Democrats won majorities in both the Senate and the House, and, for the rest of Eisenhower’s administration, the Republican president had to deal with a Democratic Congress. In some ways, Eisenhower had an easier time with Congress after the Democrats took charge. No longer did he need to agonize over John Bricker’s amendment or McCarthy’s harassment of the State Department and the army. Now he dealt with Lyndon Johnson rather than Bill Knowland as Majority Leader, with Sam Rayburn rather than Joe Martin as Speaker of the House.

Recalling one of Francis Wilcox’s precepts with which I began this talk, control of the presidency and Congress by different parties



Eisenhower's efforts to build links to Congress paid off in the bipartisan support he won. Here the president trades quips with House Speaker Rayburn and other members of Congress. *U.S. Senate Historical Office*

may seem, in some cases, to promote a bipartisan approach to foreign policy. Arguably, this may force both sides to act responsibly and with some degree of mutuality. However, I am not persuaded that a politically divided government will normally better promote bipartisanship in foreign policy.

President Eisenhower wanted to open "lines of communication" with Congress. We often forget, when considering his military background, that, in the early 1930's, Eisenhower had served as General MacArthur's aide-de-camp and had handled congressional relations for the army. He was no stranger to Washington's ways. Secretary Dulles was also aware of the example of his predecessor Dean Acheson's poor relations with Congress, and Dulles went out of his way to consult with congressional leaders on major issues. The Eisenhower administration created the first legislative liaison unit in the

White House with regular liaison officers assigned to work with the Senate and House. President Eisenhower wrote that he "early embarked on a program of discussing issues, in a social atmosphere, with groups of Congressmen and Senators of both parties, in the hope that personal acquaintance would help smooth out the difficulties inherent in partisanship."<sup>12</sup>

Eisenhower's and Dulles' efforts to build links to Congress paid off in the bipartisan support they were able to win, fairly consistently, during the 1950's. Take, for example, the crisis that developed in the Formosa Straits in 1954 and 1955. In September 1954, the Chinese Communists commenced artillery shelling of the island of Quemoy, which was occupied by the Nationalist Chinese under Chiang Kai-shek. Occasionally, artillery fire was supplemented by air attacks, and an invasion from mainland China seemed im-


minent. In a message on January 24, 1955, President Eisenhower invited Congress "to participate now, by specific resolution, in measures designed to improve the prospect of peace," including "the use of the Armed Forces of the United States if necessary to assure the security of Formosa and the Pescadores."<sup>13</sup>

The Congress, which had cautioned President Eisenhower against intervention in Indochina, was not eager to initiate any action which might lead to war with the People's Republic of China. In addition, as Senator John Sparkman recalled: "There was on the [Foreign Relations] Committee at this time a profound distrust of Chiang and his intentions. Dulles did his best to allay these fears, telling the Committee that he had explicit commitments from Chiang not to undertake a return to the mainland without U.S. approval." The Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees met jointly in closed session to hear Secretary Dulles' justification of the proposed resolution. The resolution was "absolutely necessary," said Dulles, because "there is at least doubt as to whether or not the President could, without congressional authorization, take the kind of action which I am talking about. The area of authority as between the President and the Congress in these matters is admittedly a shady one." The venerable Alben Barkley, former Majority Leader and vice president, now returned for his last term in the Senate, asked the question on everyone's mind: "Would it be fair to describe this resolution as a predated declaration of war?" Secretary Dulles replied that "the President does not interpret this as a declaration of war, and if there were a situation to arise which in his opinion called for a declaration of war, he would come back again to the Congress."<sup>14</sup>

With such assurances, both the Senate and House quickly approved the Formosa Resolution. At that time, I was a member of the

House Foreign Affairs Committee. By asking Congress for a joint resolution when the government faced the possibility of military engagement overseas, President Eisenhower did what President Truman had decided against doing after the Korean invasion. Professor Arthur Schlesinger has noted that, in contrast to earlier resolutions in American history which authorized use of military force, the Formosa Resolution ordered no action and named no enemy. "Rather it committed Congress to the approval of hostilities without knowledge of the specific situation in which the hostilities would begin." But Congress was in no mood to challenge the assumptions of presidential leadership in foreign and military affairs. As Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson said, "We are not going to take the responsibility out of the hands of the constitutional leader and try to arrogate it to ourselves."<sup>15</sup>

The president returned to Congress with a similar request two years later, this time dealing with the Middle East. In 1956, Great Britain, France, and Israel had invaded Egypt to seize the Suez Canal. The United States had opposed the invasion and forced its allies to withdraw. In the process, Great Britain, upon whom we had relied as the chief bulwark against Soviet intervention in the Middle East, lost its prestige and influence in the region. Secretary Dulles, perceiving a dangerous power vacuum that the Soviets would be tempted to exploit, sought some means of injecting the United States into the Middle East, a region in which this country had long played only a peripheral role. The difficult question was how we could replace the British bulwark without taking on the hated mantle of colonialism. With these issues in mind, President Eisenhower appeared before a joint session of Congress on January 5, 1957, to request authority to send American armed forces to the Middle East, if necessary, to preserve the territorial inde-



Madame Chiang Kai-shek, promoting her country's interests, met with, *left to right*, Senators Dirksen, Sparkman, Mansfield, Russell, and Case. *U.S. Senate Historical Office*

pendence of nations there from international communism.

Once again the question of a "predated declaration of war" was raised, this time by Senator Hubert Humphrey. Secretary Dulles objected to the term, attributing the peaceful outcome of the Formosa crisis to the authority granted by the Formosa Resolution. "I would call it a declaration of peace rather than a declaration of war because I think that without this we are in great danger of getting into war," Dulles observed. But, unlike the Formosa Resolution, which rushed through Congress with minimum debate, the Middle East Resolution, or "Eisenhower Doctrine" as the press called it, was the subject of extensive Senate scrutiny. The House approved the resolution by a wide margin on January 30. However, the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees held

joint hearings in public and executive sessions, and the Senate debated the resolution for twelve days before passing it on March 5.<sup>16</sup>

Mr. President, I would like to read some of the comments made by members of the Senate in the closed-door hearings on the Middle East Resolution. These hearings were classified and closed until 1979 when they were published by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as part of its historical series. I am pleased that the committee has opened and published its executive-session transcripts for all of the Eisenhower administration and that it is currently publishing volumes covering the Kennedy years. This series, which the committee launched in 1973, has been praised by diplomatic historians as a critical research tool for understanding the historic role of Congress in the for-



The Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees met jointly to consider President Eisenhower's Middle East Resolution. *U.S. Senate Historical Office*

mulation of American foreign policy. I commend the members of the Foreign Relations Committee for this important public service.

One of those most skeptical of the Middle East Resolution was Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas. Although not yet chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Fulbright was already recognized as the Senate's leading expert in international relations. Senator Fulbright had supported the Formosa Resolution but now had his doubts. In a speech in the Senate on February 11, 1957, Fulbright charged that there had been

no real prior consultation with Congress, nor will there be any sharing of power. The whole manner of presentation of this resolution—leaks to the press, speeches to specially summoned Saturday joint sessions, and dramatic secret meetings of the Committee on Foreign Relations after dark one evening before the Congress

was even organized, in an atmosphere of suspense and urgency—does not constitute consultation in the true sense. All of this was designed to manage Congress, to coerce it into signing this blank check.<sup>17</sup>

In the closed sessions, other senators expressed similar concerns about the resolution. Senator Richard Russell objected that it left Congress "as an appendage of the executive branch of the Government in dealing with this very vital and important matter." Senator Russell continued:

In my opinion, the Congress of the United States is being treated as a group of children, and very small children, and children with a very low IQ at that, in the manner that this resolution has been presented to us. . . .

. . . I think that the Congress, if it is going to preserve its own self-esteem, ought to have more information than we have on it. . . .

. . . I don't wish to pose as a prophet, but I unhesitatingly say that if we pass this resolution in this fashion, that from here on out we will never get back in control of your program in this area. . . .

It may be going for the next 25 or 30 years, and the Congress will never regain control of it. It will from here on out be in the hands of the executive branch of the Government.<sup>18</sup>

Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina counseled:


. . . the Constitution of the United States, as I construe it, contemplates that the Armed Forces of the United States will not be put into an offensive war, . . . without the consent of Congress; and here this first part of this resolution says that the President can put our Armed Forces against some enemy which has not yet been selected, in the Middle East.

This resolution is not directed against Russia; it is directed against the nations which we fear will become Communist in the Middle East . . . and it is a perfect invitation for another Korea, with Russia furnishing arms, and us furnishing the boys to do the dying."<sup>19</sup>

Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon argued:

Now you have got a resolution here which, for the first time, suggests that the President of the United States can exercise his discretion to proceed to protect the territorial integrity of some other country somewhere in the world attacked by some Communist country, because he thinks that eventually that may involve the security of the United States, and I think that is an absurd stretching of that alleged emergency power on the part of the President, and I think it would be a clear violation of the constitutional power of the President.<sup>20</sup>

The members of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees wrestled long and hard with what Richard Russell called the "shadowland" between the president's authority to use military forces and the need for a declaration of war. They finally amended the Middle East Resolution to strike out the idea of a congressional authorization and to leave the resolution as more of a declaration of U.S. policy in the Middle East. "The effect on Eisenhower,"



Chief of Staff Francis Wilcox outlined the essential ingredients for a bipartisan foreign policy.

*John O. Hamilton/U.S. Senate Historical Office*

Professor Schlesinger has noted, "was to convince him less of the need for serious consultation with Congress than of his inherent authority to employ armed forces at presidential will." The next year, when the president sent American troops to Lebanon, he did not invoke the Middle East Resolution or ask Congress for any approval but, instead, acted under his authority as commander in chief.<sup>21</sup>

There is a historical postscript to this fascinating debate over the Middle East Resolution. As I pointed out, the two committees deliberated for several weeks on this issue and made significant changes in the text of the resolution. In contrast, when President Lyndon Johnson presented the Congress with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964, there was neither protracted nor significant

debate in committee or on the floor. Why so much attention to one and not to the other? It is hard to say for sure, but, perhaps, the force of so many resolutions in support of presidential use of armed forces, from Formosa in 1955 to the Middle East Resolution in 1957 and the Cuba and Berlin resolutions in 1962, helped lull the Congress into inattentiveness. The constitutional scruples that members had agonized over earlier were put aside in 1964, much to the later regret even of the resolution's sponsors. Reading through these observations by Senators Fulbright, Russell, and Ervin over the Middle East Resolution, one might wish that they had raised the same warning flags over Vietnam. Only Senator Wayne Morse was consistent in his suspicion of both measures.

Mr. President, I think it is clear from my discussion of such issues as the Formosa and Middle East resolutions that President Eisenhower received strong support and helpful advice from the Congress during the 1950's. But, despite the bipartisan endorsement of our foreign policies and the administration's efforts to build and maintain strong links to Congress, there remained significant areas where the administration acted independently without consulting or informing Congress of its activities. We know now, as we did not know then, that the Eisenhower administration made unprecedented use of covert activities to shape American foreign policy. We know now, as we did not know then, that the Central Intelligence Agency helped overthrow the government of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran in 1953 and helped the Shah of Iran return to power. We know now, as we did not know then, that the CIA organized the revolution in Guatemala that overthrew the government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in 1954. There was no congressional oversight of intelligence activities at that time. The only member of the Senate regularly informed of CIA activities

was Senator Richard Russell, chairman of the Armed Services Committee and senior member of the Department of Defense Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee. During the 1950's, Senator Mike Mansfield began to call for a special committee to oversee the CIA, but this call went unheeded for another twenty years.

There was a price to pay for Congress' lack of involvement in intelligence issues, and the price included such avoidable blunders as the U-2 affair in 1960 and the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. The CIA had used its high-flying U-2 planes to gather extraordinary information about the closed Soviet society but continued the flights to the very eve of President Eisenhower's summit meeting with Premier Nikita Khrushchev. When the plane piloted by Francis Gary Powers was shot down on May 1, 1960, the Eisenhower administration was caught in a clumsy lie, pretending it had been a weather flight. Eventually, the president conceded the intelligence-gathering nature of the flight but refused to apologize to the Soviets, and Khrushchev stormed out of the summit meeting. We also know now, but did not know then, that, in March 1960, President Eisenhower gave the CIA authorization to begin training Cuban refugees for an invasion of Cuba, which, a year later, at the beginning of John Kennedy's administration, ended in complete failure at the Bay of Pigs. Had a congressional intelligence committee existed at that time or had congressional leaders been at all consulted in advance, one suspects that cautionary warnings would have been raised that could have saved the administration from international embarrassment.

By the end of Eisenhower's second term, a sense of congressional disenchantment with the administration's foreign policies had developed. In 1959, Senator Hubert Humphrey was complaining that "the slogan of 'bipartisanship' has too often been invoked to

muzzle criticism of administration mistakes." One study by the Foreign Relations Committee noted that "as the President's second term ran out, public debate, in its preoccupation with the U-2 incident and missile-gap controversy, had begun to show some signs of the development of the kind of 'credibility gap' that had plagued President Truman in his last years."

Mr. President, I began my remarks today with Dr. Francis Wilcox's ingredients for an ideal bipartisan arrangement on foreign policy. In brief, he believed these were: (1) Congress and the presidency should be controlled by opposite parties; (2) there should be national consensus on foreign policy; (3) there should be leadership on Capitol Hill that commands respect in both Congress and the executive branch and that is willing to deemphasize politics; and (4) there should be a presidency that is willing to recognize Congress' constitutional role in foreign policy

and to consult with it frequently on important international matters.

To a remarkable degree, these conditions existed during the 1950's while Dwight Eisenhower was president and Lyndon Johnson was Senate Majority Leader. And yet, despite the national consensus, despite the inherent congressional support for presidential leadership in foreign policy, despite the president's good intentions of opening communications links with Congress, the bipartisanship of the Eisenhower years did not produce entirely satisfactory results. As one Foreign Relations Committee study concluded: "On balance [there was] little to indicate that Congress had become anything like an equal partner in the making of foreign policy or given access to the inner councils. Good intentions, it would seem on the basis of this evidence, were not enough in themselves to lower the barriers to an open executive-legislative relationship." <sup>22</sup>