TOWARD A MODERN SENATE

FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE OPERATION OF THE SENATE

DECEMBER 1976
ORDER AUTHORIZING PRINTING OF REPORT AS SENATE DOCUMENT

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that upon completion of the report of the Commission on the Operation of the Senate that the report be printed as a Senate document.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMISSION ON THE OPERATION OF THE SENATE

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The Hon. Hugh Scott  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senators Mansfield and Scott:

Submitted herewith is the Final Report of the Commission on the Operation of the Senate.

We deem it a great privilege to have been asked to play a role in improving the effectiveness of the Senate as part of a greater movement to restore the legislative branch to its rightful place in the national government. As citizens from all parts of the nation, we undertook the task with enthusiasm but with a certain diffidence.

We are therefore deeply grateful to you both for the unstinting cooperation you have given us in your respective roles as majority and minority leaders. We also express our appreciation for the splendid assistance accorded to our labors by the officers of the Senate, individual Senators, and personal and committee staff. Senator John Culver of Iowa, whose early concern led to the initial suggestion for a study of Senate operations, has shown sustained interest in our efforts.

Senate Resolution 227, adopted on July 29, 1975, created the Commission "to make a comprehensive and impartial study of the organization and operation of the Senate." The Commission undertook the performance of its duties in October 1975. Composed of non-Senate members, the Commission elected former Senator Harold E. Hughes as its chairman and Archie R. Dykes, Chancellor of the University of Kansas, as vice chairman. By January 1976, a staff had been assembled and a workplan developed.

At early meetings, the Commission heard extensive testimony from a number of Senators, Congressman Richard Bolling of Missouri, and a broad sampling of Senate staff. As our duties and analyses progressed, we continued to hear from many who, directly or indirectly, are involved in the legislative process. We have also solicited the written views of all who desired to communicate with us.
Our priorities became those identified by the Senators themselves:

- To strengthen administrative services in order to improve the working environment;

- To find ways to conserve and use time more effectively, including scheduling floor and committee activities so as to avoid conflicts;

- To strengthen the demand for, and improve the supply of, research and analytical support for the development of legislation;

- To improve techniques and access to information for oversight.

In line with these priorities, the Commission directed a review of overall Senate administrative operations, the personal offices of the Senate, committee operations and procedures, Senate communications with the public, the congressional support agencies, overall policy analysis and evaluation, capabilities, the Senate leadership, and Senate relationships with the House, the executive branch and constituent groups.

Necessarily the priorities we established and the time constraints under which we served resulted in a few important subjects not receiving the attention they deserve. Methods of improving communication, coordination, and cooperation with the House of Representatives and the executive and judicial branches, quite frankly, are not addressed directly. We believe, however, that improvements of this kind can best be accomplished when the Senate itself has taken action with respect to its internal organization. The complex subject of lobbying remains untouched in this report. This difficult matter, systematic knowledge of which is sparse, does not lend itself to casual treatment.

Much of the Commission's work has consisted of sifting through studies that we instructed the staff to prepare. The numerous reports of our staff, consultants, and personnel in the supporting agencies of Congress—particularly the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress and the General Accounting Office—will be published separately.

In addition, Commission members, when possible, attended several staff seminars delving into such areas as oversight, cross-cutting policy problems, and the congressional support agencies. At these sessions, thoughtful and detailed exchanges took place among our own staff, consultants, agency representatives, Senate staff members and eminent scholars. Two roundtables—attended by Senators and Commission staff only—were held to discuss Senatorial problems, methods of decisionmaking, and information needs. The Commission as a whole had the privilege of listening to, and exchanging views with, more than a dozen Senators. Other Senators have shared their views with individual Commissioners. Commission deliberations were completed at its meetings in December 1976 when the final form of this report was determined.
We are pleased to submit the product of our labors. We are confident that it contains elements that can help to improve the effectiveness of the Senate, a preeminent legislative body.

Very truly yours,

Harold E. Hughes, Chairman

Archie R. Dykes, Vice Chairman

Willard L. Boyd

Robert R. Huefner

Guanita M. Kreps

Carl E. Sanders

William H. Scott

J. Mark Trice

Wilson W. Wyatt

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SUMMARY

Throughout its history the Senate has, with remarkable success, represented the vast array of interests in our society and helped to resolve the conflicts between these interests. In the last decade the Senate has enlarged its staff, created new support agencies, and upgraded existing ones to improve the many ways in which it responds to public needs. Confronted with new economic, social, and political problems, the Senate has begun to acquire the technical resources it needs to make better policy.

Our task has been to examine the Senate, to identify the problems that still hamper its operations, and to propose potential improvements. The central theme of our report is effectiveness, meaning improving legislation through better use of existing resources and the adoption of modern techniques. Secondary themes are efficiency, or getting the maximum benefit for what is spent (in time as well as dollars); fairness, or enhancing the role and contributions of all Senators; and accountability, or clarifying who acquires what resources, how they are used, and with what effect.

Our report begins with an examination of the increasing breadth, depth, and complexity of the tasks of Senators today. Next, it deals with internal administration of the Senate—the workaday, routine management of basic services. The availability and use of space, a pervasive problem for Members and staff, receives separate treatment. This is followed by a discussion of time, a critical and limiting resource for Senators faced with unpredictable and conflicting demands. The three subsequent sections are concerned with ways to improve the legislative process: how to strengthen the Senate’s foresight and oversight capabilities; how to use modern technology more effectively to provide information to Members; and how to improve the services provided by the congressional support agencies. Next comes a section dealing with how communication can be improved to permit balanced public understanding of the Senate’s performance as an institution. The recurring problems of compensation and ethics are considered in the penultimate section. Finally, certain ancillary topics are addressed.

A summary statement of the Commission’s broader recommendations is presented here for quick reference. Other specific recommendations are included in the body of the report.

ADMINISTRATION—SENATE-WIDE SERVICES

Finding

The administrative structure of the Senate is antiquated, fragmented, and lacking in clear lines of authority and responsibility.

Summary of Recommendations

The administration of all Senate services should be reorganized within a unified modern management structure having clear lines of
authority and responsibility. Specifically, an Administrative Council consisting of the majority leader, the minority leader, and the chairman of the Rules Committee should be created, with the Secretary of the Senate serving as the Council's executive secretary. A new position, that of Administrator of the Senate, should be charged with all routine management functions (pp. 9-12).

Within the new management structure and as detailed subsequently in this report, the Senate should:

- Reorganize and consolidate under the Administrator the administrative operations now apportioned among the Secretary of the Senate, the Sergeant at Arms, the Committee on Rules and Administration, the Architect of the Capitol, and the President pro tempore (p. 12).
- Monitor strictly and adjust, as necessary, joint House-Senate services such as those provided by the Architect of the Capitol, the Capitol Police Board, and the Government Printing Office (pp. 12-13).
- Develop new planning, technical assistance, personnel, and budgetary and accounting capacities for administrative purposes (pp. 13-14).
- Establish a modern personnel system (pp. 14-16).
- Set up a simplified and uniform system of budgeting and accounting in which funding requests of Senate committees and Senate-wide service units would be coordinated and compiled into a single comprehensive budgetary document (pp. 16-20).

**SPACE AVAILABILITY AND UTILIZATION**

**Finding**

The Senate and its staff are ill-housed in a complex that includes the north half of the Capitol and nearby office buildings (both owned and rented) which are inadequate and inefficiently utilized.

**Summary of Recommendations**

In order to plan space requirements and insure space availability when needed, the Senate should:

- Assign responsibility for the management, assignment, and control of space in the entire Senate complex to the Administrator (p. 22).
- Establish and maintain an up-to-date occupancy inventory for all space in the Senate complex (p. 22).
- Transfer all functions now being performed in the Senate wing of the Capitol to other space unless the transfer would substantially inconvenience Senators or the function's location near the Chamber is essential to the working of the body (pp. 22-23).
- Follow the same transfer procedure in regard to functions in all main Senate office buildings by relocating elsewhere any activity which does not have to be performed within the Senate complex (pp. 22-23).
- Put into effect a program which will improve the use of presently available space by providing advisory design personnel, a handbook on space use, and demonstrations of innovative space uses (pp. 23-24).
Increase Senate participation in the decisionmaking for major construction and acquisition in the Capitol area to assure full consideration of the Senate's future needs (pp. 24–25).

By reassignment or redesign, provide all Senators with a personal office in the Capitol as soon as feasible (p. 25).

Provide meeting rooms in the Capitol that would be generally available for Senate and conference committee use (p. 25).

TIME UTILIZATION

Finding

Demands on Senators' time are heavy, conflicting, and often unpredictable. A typical work day is 11 hours. While changes in Senate methods of operation might lead to some amelioration of the time problem, substantial improvements in the use of time must stem from changes in the operation of each Senator's office and changes in his or her personal scheduling.

Summary of Recommendations

Certain changes in Senate practices will contribute, at least incrementally, to improvement in the use of time. The Senate should:

Devote certain days of the week exclusively to committee business and other days exclusively to Senate floor sessions (pp. 31–33).

Establish a schedule of debates early in the session on subjects of major national interest. Use the floor debate schedule to provide guidance to committees when scheduling consideration of subjects within their jurisdiction (pp. 33–34).

Consider appointing someone not a Senator to preside over routine sessions at the request of the President pro tempore (pp. 34–35).

Establish a computerized clearinghouse for both the time and location of committee and subcommittee meetings (pp. 36–37).

Encourage innovative practices which may permit Senators to conserve time in committees and subcommittees—for example, panel formats in which several witnesses participate simultaneously (p. 38).

Organize the Senate at the earliest possible date and, if feasible, in advance of the convening of Congress. Organize all committees before the end of the first month of a session (pp. 38–39).

Assign office space to Senators by the start of the new session and assure that Senators are moved into their new offices no later than the end of the first month of the session. Alternative: Assign permanent suites for each state, taking into account such factors as state population (pp. 38–39).

Provide Senators-elect with administrative support during the period between election and the taking of office. Conduct special orientation programs for new Senators and their staffs (pp. 38–39).

Continue to schedule, annually, six periods of no less than a week when the Senate is not in session, or increase that number as necessary, to permit Senators to discharge their duties outside of Washington more effectively (p. 39).
IMPROVING LEGISLATION—FORESIGHT AND OVERSIGHT

Finding

Senate policymaking is too frequently either the product of routine incremental decisions or a reaction to crisis. It often produces unintended or unanticipated results. There is insufficient foresight with respect to emerging issues and insufficient systematic oversight of existing Federal programs.

Summary of Recommendations

The Senate needs more certainty that it will have the benefit of adequate information and analysis flowing from planned foresight and early identification of emerging national problems which cut across committee jurisdictions. It also needs to have the benefit of more systematic oversight of the programs and operations of the Federal Government. To these ends, the Senate should:

Establish in or through the Senate policy committees—restructured and staffed for the purpose—responsibility for assuring that appropriate standing committees identify and analyze major national problems before they become matters of public concern and hasty legislative action. (pp. 44–46).

Develop greater capability for systematic oversight by taking the following actions:

Obligate all committees to plan, schedule, and provide advance notice of oversight activity to the Senate; obligate standing committees to provide periodic reports to the Senate on oversight activity that has been conducted (pp. 48–49).

Lodge responsibility for monitoring Senate oversight activities in the Government Operations Committee; develop the capacity of the Government Operations Committee to provide technical assistance on oversight methods and program evaluation (p. 49).

Strengthen Senate staff capabilities to perform oversight and program evaluation by increasing GAO assistance to the Senate, establishing training programs for Senate staff, and encouraging the creation of interdisciplinary work groups (pp. 49–50).

Establish a Senate-wide system for collecting information from individual Senate offices which would help to identify problem areas requiring more intensive oversight activity (p. 50).

IMPROVING LEGISLATION—TECHNOLOGY

Finding

The Senate underutilizes modern technology in providing information on legislation and the legislative process to Members and committees.

Summary of Recommendations

In order to rectify this, the Senate should carry out a series of actions to provide better legislative information and improve the form in which it is presented. The Senate should:
Provide, through the Administrator, complete up-to-date information on legislative flow, using computerized techniques (pp. 51-53).

Develop a cost-effective, integrated printing management system for the entire Congress, if possible, and certainly the Senate (pp. 53-54).

Encourage committee staff directors to assume a greater coordination and leadership role in improving the quality and timeliness of legislative information for the Senate. Adopt more uniform formats for committee documents and examine the advantages of automated techniques for the preparation and dissemination of such documents (pp. 54-55).

Experiment with profiles of the information needs of individual Senators and methods of meeting those needs (p. 56).

Experiment with the following innovative techniques: televise floor proceedings for closed circuit purposes; provide running summaries of floor proceedings that can be transmitted to electronic displays in Senators' offices; use computers to display the text of all amendments, printed or unprinted, under consideration on the floor (pp. 56-57).

IMPROVING LEGISLATION--THE SUPPORT AGENCIES

**Finding**

Both inadequacies and duplications in the services provided by the support agencies of Congress result in inefficient use of the services. These agencies (namely, the General Accounting Office, the Congressional Research Service, the Office of Technology Assessment, and the Congressional Budget Office) are not substantively accountable through a single entity to Congress as a whole.

**Summary of Recommendations**

Because these agencies exist pursuant to enabling legislation of both the House and Senate, the Senate in conjunction with the House should endeavor to bring about the following:

Effective congressional supervision to improve administrative coherence, insure cooperation, and enhance initiative of the support agencies in providing services to Congress (pp. 59-61).

Strengthened capacities and adjusted procedures in the support agencies for the purpose of increasing the availability of high-quality information and analysis to Congress (pp. 59-61).

PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS

**Finding**

The Senate's communication with the public is incomplete and therefore distorted. As a result, it is difficult if not impossible for the public to make an objective and balanced judgment of the overall performance of the institution.

**Summary of Recommendations**

The Senate should attempt to bring about full participation by all types of public media in reporting Senate proceedings and should supply the media with more complete and accurate information. To these ends, the Senate should:
Conduct a full-scale experiment of audio and video broadcasting of Senate floor proceedings (pp. 67-68).

Begin the practice of holding formal briefings for the news media (pp. 68-69).

Provide general use summaries and background analyses of all key stages of action on major issues on the Senate agenda (pp. 69-70).

Establish a Senate briefing room operated under Senate control; improve media space as feasible (p. 70).

Assign staff to monitor, coordinate, and assist with Senate briefings and information materials (pp. 70-71).

**COMPENSATION AND STANDARDS**

**Finding**

The compensation of Members of the Senate is seriously inadequate in terms of their responsibilities and the requirements of the office and relative to positions of comparable standing inside and outside the Federal Government. At the same time, there are in the Senate (as elsewhere in the government) insufficient safeguards against conflicts of interest.

**Summary of Recommendations**

In order to preserve the integrity of the institution, the Senate should:

- Repass the public financial disclosure legislation for the Federal Government that was passed by the Senate in the 94th Congress but which died in the House of Representatives. In the event it does not become law, set an example for the Federal Government by incorporating the proposal's pertinent provisions in the Senate rules (pp. 73-74).

- Increase the annual compensation of Senators to $65,000 while at the same time prohibiting income from honoraria (pp. 74-75).

- Direct the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct, or an independent ethics commission created for the purpose, to prepare for Senate consideration a code of ethics which should include: definition of conflicts of interest; prohibition of the use of office for personal financial profit; restrictions on earned income from outside sources; and provision for advisory opinions (pp. 75-76).

**ANCILLARY TOPICS**

**Finding**

The Capitol Police force is an extremely large organization which seems to lend an unnecessary police presence to the entire Senate complex. Comprehensive remedies for this problem require further specialized study.

**Summary of Recommendations**

The Senate should:

- Initiate, through the Senate's representative on the Capitol Police Board, a careful study of the mission of the police force and its organization, management, and training, with an eye to consolidation of Senate and House details, substantial reduction in the size of the force, assignment of certain duties to civilian person-
nel, possible discontinuance of the Metropolitan detail, and negotiation of an interagency agreement with the National Park Police and contractual arrangements with the Metropolitan Police to supplement the Capitol force when necessary (pp. 77-78).
SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

The Senate is an extraordinary legislative body. Nothing quite like it exists anywhere in the world. Both as a counterbalance to the growing power of the Presidency and as a complement to the more specialized House of Representatives, the Senate represents a unique contribution of the United States to the art of self-government.

Change and continuity are equally characteristic of the Senate. While change is slow as a rule, coming quietly, it may also occur rapidly, sometimes dramatically. The image of the Senate changes with the long-term recasting of its protagonists and the gradual remolding of its procedures and structures. In the 19th century an era of great Senate statesmen yielded to less exalted times, bestrode by men more of privilege than of competence. In this century, a Senate once dominated—in Woodrow Wilson's phrase—"by a little band of willful men" gave way to willing cooperation down the line with Franklin D. Roosevelt in the first hundred days of his New Deal.

Once deemed "the world's most exclusive club," the Senate today welcomes Members from many disparate walks of life and involves them in myriad tasks to an unprecedented degree. Only for the most recent third of Senate history have Members been directly elected by the people. Only in the lifetime of many incumbent Senators has the concept of a majority party leadership existed. Only in the last twenty years has the Senate become the principal recruiting ground of Presidents. No one born after the two party policy committees were first created is yet eligible, by virtue of age, to serve in the Senate. Developments in recent years, such as the Congressional Budget Act and the War Powers Act, reflect a significant capability in the Senate for continuing adaptation to internal needs and external threats.

The survival of our democracy depends on the ability of our institutions to change in order to cope effectively with an increasingly complicated environment. In retrospect, one can more fully comprehend some of the changes in society to which the Senate adapted in the past. While many traditional activities continue, an array of new economic and social forces swell the volume and complexity of demands on the Senate's time and attention.

From one perspective, the role of a Senator has not changed greatly—to listen, to negotiate, to compromise, to decide on diverse issues, to make one's views known. Each Senator is elected by the citizens of his or her respective state. Each has a responsibility to listen and respond to the needs of that state.

However, Congress, particularly the Senate, is increasingly occupied with formulating and overseeing the implementation of policies designed to insure the welfare and security of a nation growing steadily more interdependent and complex. More than ever, each American community's well-being is linked with that of the nation and the world.
No longer simply a nation of neighborhoods, the United States is today a complex web of interpersonal relationships that are continental, even global in scope.

Yet, after almost 200 years, Senators still face, in principle, the same task assigned them by the founders of the Republic: forging policies for the nation, yet tempering them to state and local realities and diversities. In practice, the complex environment in which the Senate now operates and the sheer volume of demands on Senators may portend important qualitative changes in the role of the Senate.

THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

Five main factors underlie the increase in complexity and volume of the work of the Senate.

First is the sustained growth of the national economy which began after the Civil War. That growth has brought an increase in the size and number of large-scale institutions with the capacity to deploy many resources that may generate great benefits. They may also prove detrimental to large numbers of people. Big power plants, big land development, big transport systems, big nuclear weapons may all have undesirable effects. Legislating with respect to these large organizations requires more systematic forms of investigation and more lawmakers' time. Deciding when, how, and by what means to intervene legislatively in the public interest is an intricate and continuous process. Implementation, moreover, tends to require constant monitoring and adjustment.

Second, the economic and political successes that have raised standards of living and enhanced the public's expectations about the quality of life have increased rather than decreased the work of the Senate. An unanticipated result of the wider distribution of wealth, political power, and education is a growing social diversity. New occupational groups, revived ethnic cultures, new lifestyles of choice are manifest everywhere. Activist coteries with interests far more wide-ranging than mere economic well-being multiply and thrive. Within the older and more powerful pressure groups sub-specialization grows and complicates legislative concerns. Most new interest groups are anxious to make their views known; sooner or later they seek a hearing from government. Democracy encourages assertiveness on the part of citizens as well as recognition of all legitimate groups. The result, mirrored in the work of the Senate, is an intensified demand for services and a desire for more citizen participation in the legislative process.

Third, the remarkable growth of scientific and technical knowledge has complicated the process of policy formulation. "Getting the facts" about a problem is more time-consuming. As knowledge expands, more indirect effects of decisions become visible. An ever more critical audience is prepared to evaluate decisions, even as more complex solutions are attempted. The entire process requires the participation of more and more experts and of knowledge brokers who must try to translate the experts' contributions into the language of the lawmakers. Failures of communication are frequent. Carefully organized assistance for the Senate, both in acquiring and assessing the validity of knowledge relevant to public problems and proposed solutions, is far more essential today than even a decade ago.
Fourth, the size of government and the complexity of its policies have been changing. Expenditures of all governments in the country, expressed as a percentage of all the goods and services produced by the national economy, have risen from 26.5 percent of the gross national product in 1954 to 34.2 percent in 1976. State and local sector expenditures rose from 7.4 percent of the gross national product in 1954 to 11 percent in 1976; in the Federal sector, the rise was from 19.1 percent to 23.2 percent.

Civilian domestic expenditures, including social security, increased from 13.6 percent of the gross national product in 1954 to 26.8 percent in 1976. In 1970, for the first time in history, Federal domestic disbursements measured as a percentage of the gross national product exceeded all State and local governmental expenditures. Social security and Federal aid to state and local governments have been the fastest growing elements in the expanding Federal domestic sector.

These figures indicate the magnitude of the growth of governmental activity in relation to the American economy. They suggest the increase in legislative, budgetary, and administrative activities that must be taken into account by the Senate in the formulation and evaluation of public policies.

Along with this increase in governmental activity has come what seems to be a keener sense of the complexity of public policy problems. This may represent only a change in perception. It also may represent, however, a real change in the interrelationships among problems, in part related to the increase over the past two decades in the number, size, and scope of governmental activities. On the other hand, it may be that the interrelationships among certain new problems and concerns are particularly difficult to identify and analyze. Examples are energy versus environment, the changing composition of the work force versus the rising cost of social services, the global population explosion versus a changing balance of payments.

Finally, recognition of the need for Congress to organize to counter the expanding power of the Presidency and the executive branch, an expansion that recently threatened to upset the constitutional separation of powers, is a major influence in the operation of the Senate. While momentarily checked, the problem of executive power and accountability is likely to persist in some form. The growing interdependence of the United States and the rest of the world seems likely to enhance executive power; the challenge is to insure effective executive accountability. In recent years, the Senate has gradually moved to reassert the responsible role assigned to it by the Constitution. During the 1970's, a considerable portion of its substantially increased staff resources has been devoted to monitoring the performance, and improving the accountability, of the executive branch.

In summary, the environment in which the Senate operates is becoming more complex and more demanding as reflected by manifold increases:

- in the scale of societal institutions,
- in the diversity of interest groups,
- in the explosion of scientific and technical knowledge,
- in the scope of activities of the Federal government, and
- in the power of the Presidency and executive branch.

All these factors tend relentlessly to increase the pressure on the time and attention of Senators as they strive to formulate sound national policies while simultaneously adapting them to state and local realities.

How individual Senators spend their days is, of course, extremely varied. Demands on their time are relatively unpredictable. Still, a typical pattern that helps in understanding the growing pressures on Senators' time is discernible.

First, the formal and informal functions of the Senate as an institution—responsibilities making a primary claim on Senators—are requiring more time and attention. These include floor activity, committee and subcommittee meetings, and meetings with committee staff, the leadership and other Senators.

Illustrative of the volume of activity is the number of Senate committees and subcommittees—now more than 200. In 1975, during the first session of the 94th Congress, Senate committees and subcommittees held 2,734 meetings. This number exceeds the total for the entire 84th Congress (1955-56). Per Member, the Senate schedules nearly three times as many meetings as does the House. During the 93rd Congress, for example, 4,067 meetings were held for the 100 Senators, compared with 5,888 meetings for the 435 House Members. During 1975, Senators listened to the testimony of more than 8,000 witnesses, of whom about 2,000 were executive branch officials. Each year Senate committees and subcommittees produce more than 500,000 printed pages of hearings and reports. Senators have long found it impossible to read all the materials relevant to the decisions they must make. Today, their expanded staffs report that they, too, seldom have the time to seek out, sift, and read all the relevant material for a particular task.

Complexity is a consequence of both an increase in the number of active participants in the policymaking process and an intensified awareness of linkages among issues hitherto dealt with separately. The growing complexity of the legislative process is suggested by the tendency of the Senate to spend more days and hours in session despite a number of new timesaving innovations. Procedural changes have improved the efficiency of floor operations (e.g., unanimous consent agreements). There has been a decline in the number, albeit an increase in length, of public bills that achieve final passage. However, it would be wrong to imagine that the formal and institutional processes of the Senate account for all the pressure on the time and attention of a Senator. Perhaps only half, or even fewer, of the demands on his time originate in this way.

Much of a Senator's day is devoted either to discussions with personal and committee staff or in reading material the staff has prepared or organized. The number of personal and committee staff, as well as staff of the support agencies (CRS, GAO, CBO, and OTA), has of course been increasing rather dramatically. During the 1960's, nearly 1,500 persons were added to the Senate staff and roughly the same number have been added since 1970. Today, the Senate has more than 6,500 employees. While resources have been greatly expanded to cope with the increased volume and intricacy of Senate activity, however,
little systematic attention has been given to how reorganization of these resources might make the Senate more efficient and effective.

Myriad requests originating outside the Senate are another source of claims on the time and attention of individual Senators. Many come from constituents and interest groups—local, state, or national—seeking opportunities to present their views. Increasing social diversity and mobility, as well as sheer population growth, have intensified these pressures. (Today, on the average, each Senator has as many constituents and some have nearly 10 times as many as all Senators combined had in the 18th century.)

Thousands of citizens write to Senators each year to extend invitations to participate in events, to speak, or to perform some ceremonial role. Millions write their Senators to express their views about legislation or to ask for one or another constituent service. Each Senator decides for himself which constituents and interest groups he can see, which events he will attend, what speeches he will make and where. All must make sure their correspondence is answered promptly and sensitively, no simple task in light of the fact that the Senate Post Office handled more than twenty million pieces of incoming mail in 1975.

Dealing with the press is a related function. Altogether, meetings and events, correspondence and press relations, on the average, take up more than one-fourth of the long day of a Senator. Of course, variations in Senators' official daily activities may be very broad.

In sum, the Senate at this juncture is feeling the cumulative effects of massive quantitative changes in the nation and the world. Sooner or later, these changes will require qualitative changes in how responsibility is allocated and how accountability is achieved.

STRENGTHENING THE SENATE INSTITUTION

Each Senator is recognized as possessing the right to play a serious part in the operation of the Senate. By this means the Senate achieves openness and responsiveness to new ideas; power is shared, partisan policy alternatives are delineated, and widely differing views are accommodated.

There are many admirers of the Senate, especially those who assess its performance from inside, who oppose any strengthening of leadership and institutional processes. Any such strengthening, they hold, must necessarily threaten the virtues of openness and responsiveness.

But the Commission's perception is that further integration of the Senate as an institution is necessary. The times require a different internal balance. What is to be done?

The Commission believes that the Senate must strengthen its institutional processes in a way that will improve its ability to address the nation's priority problems coherently, comprehensively, and with all deliberate speed. The answer does not lie in a rigid hierarchical leadership structure to prescribe what the Senate shall do. Instead, it lies in formalizing and improving the processes by which the Senate, as a body (a) selects priorities and sets its agenda, (b) establishes a general timetable for its work, (c) integrates the activities of its component units, (d) conducts its communications, both intramural and
external, and (e) provides effective Senate-wide administrative services.

If these processes are understood to be mechanisms by which Senators and Senate subgroups cooperatively order their work, the role of the leadership then becomes that of a catalyst. The essential responsibility of the leaders is to assure that the coordinative processes are working, not to direct their results.
SECTION II

ADMINISTRATION—SENATE-WIDE SERVICES

The Commission's study confirms the premise of S. Res. 227: an inadequate administrative structure is one of the Senate's most severe problems. While planning and administration of support services to keep the body functioning are secondary to the great institutional tasks of the Senate, they are nonetheless important. Improved administration would greatly facilitate the substantive activities of the Senate.

Approximately 1,500 men and women are employed by the Senate in administrative support capacities. These services can be better coordinated. Better planning is required. Confusion and unnecessary complexity surround functions not assigned to administrators in related and coordinated ways. Duplication of functions and procedures occurs. There is no uniform and systematic budgeting or accounting in the Senate. Those charged with making spending decisions sometimes lack vital information. Some examples illustrate these problems:

The Dirksen Senate Office Building is now being expanded (Hart addition) at a cost of $83 million. Yet no current inventory of Senate space use now exists, the last such survey having been completed in 1973. No clear priorities for space have been set and publicly reviewed. Most of the space in the Dirksen addition will be used for large new office suites, presumably freeing space in the existing buildings for committee and other needs and, as a consequence, involving major renovations.

It is often difficult for committees and subcommittees to find rooms to hold meetings at desired times. Simultaneously, other rooms stand vacant because of the possibility that meetings might be called. If history is any indication, it will be at least six months before the 17 new Senators elected this fall are settled in their permanent offices.

A short while before the delivery of an expensive new computer, the Senate was debating where space could be found to put it.

The House of Representatives is well-launched with operating computer systems for reporting on bill status, committee scheduling and the status of floor activities. Similar computerized information systems have existed in state legislatures for years. Senate systems, however, are still in the planning stage.

Despite rules to the contrary, Senate committees still submit to the Government Printing Office so-called dummies of reports, without content, so that they may be given numbers and be scheduled for printing.

The printing process for congressional material often uses linotype machines so obsolete that spare parts must be acquired
through the purchase of old machines at auctions or liquidation sales.

As of early 1976, the officer of the Senate in charge of parking had no list of those assigned parking spaces. Planning and construction of some new parking facilities were underway because there is a perceived shortage of parking space. Yet there have been no clear priorities for the assignment of space nor any systematic efforts to recover the parking stickers of those who have left the Senate.

Carpentry shops are maintained by both the Architect of the Capitol and the Sergeant at Arms for different, though sometimes overlapping, purposes.

Senate offices in need of certain new business machines have the choice of requesting authorization from either the Subcommittee on Computer Services or the Sergeant at Arms; some offices submit requests to both.

Certain portions of allowances for paper must be spent at the stationery store, while other paper must be secured elsewhere. Envelopes are supplied to offices as a part of an allowance "in kind."

The Commission learned that some offices which had used up the maximum paper allowance for their duplicating machines had been told they could obtain no more. In order to obtain more paper they then requested unnecessary new machines.

The Senate restaurants, operated by the Architect of the Capitol, ostensibly required a FY 1975 subsidy of $239,000 to make up for operating losses. In reality, when all expenses for the restaurants contained in the separate Architect's budget are included, the operating loss was closer to $800,000.

Commission review revealed many instances where official job descriptions no longer reflect actual duties but continue to appear in Senate reports. At the time of our study, for example, barbers were described as laborers. The nominal assistant chief telephone operator was, in reality, the chief maid. In numerous instances committee employees are listed for budgeting and accounting purposes as temporary when in fact they are permanent employees. In one case, a committee staff director was unable to distinguish between temporary and permanent employees without consulting the files and, in fact, misguessed as to which was which. No employment files or evaluation statements are normally prepared to help a Senate employer assess applicants previously employed in the Senate.

These, and a much lengthier list of anomalies that could be compiled, are features of a system that has grown haphazardly and outlived its usefulness.

Administrative responsibilities for the Senate as a whole have been assigned to the Senate Secretary and Sergeant at Arms, the Architect of the Capitol, and, in a few cases, the Committee on Rules and Administration, referred to subsequently as the Rules Committee. Assignment of particular tasks has been more or less random, depending on the relative roles of the incumbents. These officers are expected to preside over a confused array of functions, but they are not normally viewed principally as administrators. However well or poorly the
Architect performs, his appointment and removal lies only with the President. This is an historical anomaly, harking back to the time when the Capitol was under construction.

Overlaying the division of responsibilities among the Secretary, Sergeant at Arms, and Architect is the role of the Rules Committee. Under the rules of the Senate, the Committee is charged with considering matters related to the organization and administration of the Senate and to management of office space. Perhaps because of the division of responsibilities and the position of the Architect as a Presidential appointee, the Rules Committee has been drawn into administrative detail as opposed to policy determination and guidance.

Thus the Architect of the Capitol administers the Senate’s cafeterias, but he does so with some involvement of the Rules Committee. While the Secretary of the Senate administers the stationery store, each item included in its inventory must be approved by the Rules Committee. The Computer Center, under the Sergeant at Arms, uses equipment selected by the Subcommittee on Computer Services of the Rules Committee. The installation of computer terminals and some other equipment in committee and senatorial offices requires approval of this subcommittee on a case-by-case basis, and specific programs, as well as priorities for the development of computer-assisted systems, are selected by the subcommittee. Supplemental training for Senate employees, authorized by law, requires approval of the Rules Committee on a case-by-case basis. This list could be much longer. To a remarkable degree, the Rules Committee is involved in the daily administration of the Senate’s routine tasks.

The Senate needs a unified modern management system. All of the following recommendations are intended to achieve such a system.

**Recommendation**

*Establish a unified modern management system for the Senate.*

Specifically:

- Establish an Administrative Council to oversee Senate administration (see figure 1).
- Create the post of Administrator of the Senate, charged with routine management.
- Reorganize and consolidate certain offices and functions.
- Improve supervision of joint services.
- Develop new administrative capacities.
All those who perform Senate-wide services should be accountable to the Senate as a whole through a Council consisting of its leaders. Alternatives that spread authority among offices, committees or individuals result in the dispersion of authority apparent in the present system. There is no effective substitute for accountability to those chosen by the Senate as its leaders. The Council would be composed of the majority leader, the minority leader, and the chairman of the Rules Committee, with the Secretary of the Senate as executive secretary.

The presence of the chairman of the Rules Committee on the Administrative Council would serve an important purpose. The chairman would serve as a link between the committee—whose jurisdiction includes most measures dealing with Senate rules and administrative policy—and the Council, which would be the final authority in administrative matters. The Rules Committee should be freed to deal with its significant legislative workload. The importance of its internal policymaking role, however, requires familiarity on the part of the chairman with administrative operations.

The Secretary of the Senate would retain his traditional functions and would serve as executive secretary to the Council. The Secretary would act as the representative of the Council to guide the professional administrative staff on the needs of the Senate. All direct administrative duties of the Secretary, however, would be reassigned to appropriate offices in the reorganized administrative structure.

*This figure illustrates the proposed administrative structure only; other officers and employees such as the Chaplain and the Sergeant at Arms are not shown.

**Council composed of the Majority Leader, Minority Leader and the chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration.
The Administrator would assume the task of managing all the administrative services now apportioned among the Secretary, Sergeant at Arms, Architect of the Capitol, Committee on Rules and Administration, and President pro tempore. The Administrator should be committed to providing equitable, efficient and effective routine services to all Members and committees.

The post would be a professional one. Successful administrative experience in an operation of comparable size and complexity would be a prime requisite for the Administrator, and adaptability to the unique nature of legislative operations would be equally important. The Administrator should be selected without regard for party. The job of the Administrator would be to provide the best possible services equally to all Senators. Proper political accountability, however, must also be insured. The Administrative Council would have that responsibility by exercising authority over the selection and retention of the Administrator. Recruitment should be performed by the Secretary, subject to Council approval.

The Administrator's authority should be agreed upon at the outset, although certain details would necessarily be subject to adjustment. The following ingredients should be fixed: (1) the Administrator would serve indefinitely, subject to removal by the Council; (2) the Administrator would have authority over personnel policies and decisions for Senate-wide services, subject to the review of the Secretary of the Senate; and (3) the Administrator would have authority over the internal organization of administrative operations, subject to concurrence by the Secretary.

As executive secretary to the Administrative Council, the Secretary of the Senate would serve on behalf of the Council to insure the adequacy of Senate services. The Administrator would report to the Council through the Secretary.

Because virtually all of the important administrative responsibilities of the Senate would be assigned to the Administrator, the office of Sergeant at Arms, which currently has many such duties, would be left only with traditional and ceremonial tasks. Nevertheless, the Commission believes that the office should be retained and that the Sergeant at Arms should continue to be elected by the Senate as a whole.

For a transitional period the Sergeant at Arms could be designated to act as Administrator as well, recognizing that the two positions are separate and ought to remain so. There would be two practical advantages in such an interim arrangement. The Sergeant at Arms now has partial responsibility for many of the duties to be assigned to the new Administrator. Consequently, an incumbent Sergeant at Arms would have the statutory and rules authority to perform necessary tasks prior to comprehensive statutory revisions fully setting forth the powers of the Administrator. Equally important, his knowledge and control of administrative operations would be valuable in the transition period. Since no new Administrator could be expected to have as complete a grasp of the current complex arrangements.
Such understanding is needed to serve as a bridge to a modern administrative system.

Recommendation

Take the steps necessary for reorganization, supervision and creation of new capacities as follows:

- Reorganize and consolidate under the Administrator the administrative operations now apportioned among the Secretary of the Senate, the Sergeant at Arms, the Committee on Rules and Administration, the Architect of the Capitol, and the President pro tempore.
- Monitor strictly and adjust, as necessary, joint House-Senate services such as those provided by the Architect of the Capitol, the Capitol Police Board, and the Government Printing Office.
- Develop new planning, technical assistance, personnel, and budgeting and accounting capacities for administrative purposes.

REORGANIZATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS

As previously noted, the numerous offices now performing administrative functions for the Senate have developed with little reference to any logical scheme of management and coordination. An initial task of the Administrator would be to consolidate the current assortment of existing activities into logical administrative units, grouped by related functions. Each unit would be headed by a professional manager selected on the basis of relevant training and experience. Scattered functions should be brought together in basic units, such as (1) administrative services, (2) communications services, and (3) fiscal services. Other combinations are possible.

While there is no perfect way to organize the administrative activities of the Senate, there is value in dividing responsibilities logically. Grouping certain related services into single units should maximize cooperation. It would also limit span-of-control problems since no single supervisory officer would be in charge of more subordinates than he or she could reasonably be expected to oversee carefully. Reorganization also should make it easier for those served by the system to identify those responsible for each service. Reorganizations planned by the Administrator and approved by the Administrative Council would help fix authority and responsibility in the hands of the Administrator. He would then have the organizational authority to carry out administrative duties and would be held responsible for how they were performed.

JOINT SERVICES

Some administrative support tasks of the Senate are performed jointly by entities also serving the House of Representatives. The Architect of the Capitol, for instance, supervises janitorial and maintenance operations in the Senate office buildings. Food services in the Senate are supervised by the Architect, with the Rules Committee retaining the right to reclaim the function (the House operates its own food services). Planning, remodeling, and new construction for both Houses also rests with the Architect. The Capitol Police Board (the Architect and the Sergeants at Arms of each House)
supervises the Capitol Police force. The Joint Committee on Printing exercises a role in oversight of legislative printing, although with limited administrative authority. The Joint Committee on Congressional Operations maintains a joint placement service and has an advisory capacity in office management.

The Commission was charged with examining other areas where jointly administered services would be feasible and would offer some advantages in quality of services, economy, or both. It was relatively easy to identify areas where improvements through joint administration might be possible. Unfortunately, no effective structure exists in the Congress for joint administrative action. The usual expedient of establishing a joint committee with a rotating chairmanship is not viable, nor is assignment of legislative responsibilities to an appointee of the Executive. Equally weighty, in our view, is the fact that economies of scale disappear beyond a certain point.

The view of the Commission is that an effective system of administration for the Senate itself is the most logical next step. But we can and do urge that House and Senate administrators share information and cooperate in every possible way.

More substantively, we suggest that the new Administrator should carefully evaluate all jointly administered services, in conjunction with appropriate House personnel, where possible. When such services are found to be performed poorly, the Senate Administrator should insist on improvements or be prepared to recommend that the Senate reclaim its right to separate administrative authority. Good service is more important than the appearance of cooperation. The Administrator should be prepared to explore alternatives, such as contracting with independent vendors for operation of food services, maintenance and other services, if his oversight reveals inadequacies that cannot be remedied quickly. Similarly, where placement or printing services are jointly administered but unsatisfactory, the Administrator should be prepared to recommend that the Senate establish its own administrative alternative.

NEW ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES

Planning, personnel administration, and budgeting and accounting are all elements of the type of effective management structure that the Commission recommends for the Senate. Together they are the necessary glue which holds systematic administration together.

Recommendation

Develop new planning and technical assistance capacities to:

- Prepare studies and plans in such areas as long-range computer needs, office and parking space needs, and other problem areas.
- Assist Senators' offices, on request, in organizing constituent service activities, and the organization and management of offices.
- Assist committees in administrative organization and management, on request.

Part of the task of the Administrator would include evaluation of current services and a continuing analysis of the needs of the Senate. A management staff could assist in that task. Many of the most serious and recurring administrative problems of the Senate have involved such elementary needs as office and parking space. Long-range
careful analysis of these problems has been lacking. Similarly, the Senate has moved into the computer age with tentative, ad hoc steps. The absence of organizational planning that is based in part on cost assessments is one of the most critical deficiencies of current Senate administration.

There are, in addition, opportunities to improve functions that are tied more closely to the activities of individual Senators and committees. The offices of the 100 Senators separately provide a variety of services to constituents. This single-office, single-constituent approach results in failure to recognize that some constituent problems are regional or even nationwide in scope. It also reduces the opportunities for Senate staff aides to learn about improved service techniques in other offices. Alternative patterns of management in regard to such things as division of workload and lines of authority should be made available to help Senators and committees get the most from their staff assistants.

Recommendation

Establish a modern personnel system.

Any personnel system for the Senate must be tailored to the institution's uniqueness and the different categories of Senate employees. But even subject to such qualifications, a system is still necessary. The benefits of a modern personnel system are lacking in the Senate. Job descriptions, uniform, equitable pay policies, and other improvements should be instituted wherever it is possible to do so without interfering with the flexibility or intrinsic political nature of the body. Careless or unexplained variations in personnel practices subject the Senate and its employees to unfair criticism. They cloud the Senate's ability to oversee its own operations. They hamper the effectiveness of those with administrative responsibility.

Changes must be made, bearing in mind that there are substantial differences among three levels of employees. Each Senator's personal staff (the first level) is an extension of the Senator. The basic constraints on the personnel in each Senator's office should continue to be that the staff not be used for direct campaign activities while they are on the government payroll, and further, that they not carry out personal business of the Senator as part of their job. Beyond that, each Senator must have flexibility in assigning duties to his personal staff, although it might be noted that Commission studies showed similarities of functions in all Senate offices.

Employees of Senate committees constitute the second level. Since lawmaking and oversight are political matters, committee employees can hardly be regarded as nonpartisan civil servants. Their tasks often involve reconciling technical and political considerations and finding a means of carrying the will of the policymakers into effect. Unless committee staff members are answerable to the majority or minority on a committee, their services lose some value and relevance. By the same token, unless staff members have some degree of professional skill as well as knowledge of the committee's subject matter, there is little justification in hiring them. For that reason, the personnel practices of committees need to be more structured than those of individual Senators. Recordkeeping should be made detailed; statements of skills
sought should be more explicit; job descriptions and comparability studies on pay for equivalent work are in order; and equal opportunity for qualified persons should be assured.

The hiring of administrative employees of the Senate (the third level) should much more closely follow merit system procedures while avoiding hampering rigidities. Loyalty to the task and insulation from partisan considerations should be the norm. The vestiges of the patronage system should be removed. The minority should be assured that the political affiliation of applicants for employment will not be a consideration. Recommendations from a Senator or staff aide should carry no more weight than any other recommendation. The qualifications of the prospective employee should be, as nearly as possible, objectively examined. Equal pay, equal benefits for equivalent work, and equal promotional opportunities should be standard practices.

Recommendation

Create a personnel unit under the Administrator. It should:
- Develop staff placement and training programs.
- Institute a personnel records system.
- Establish a counseling capacity for administrative employees.
- Create an internal personnel evaluation system.

The nature of the operation of the personnel unit and the services provided would differ for the various levels of employees mentioned above.

Training and orientation programs should be established for members of Senators’ personal offices. These programs would focus on the expressed needs of staff members to help them fulfill their specific responsibilities. These programs should emphasize the development of such valuable skills as office management, bill drafting, office procedures, and data processing. Similar training opportunities would be appropriate for committee staff members. In addition, emphasis should be placed on the continuing education of the professional staff of committees. Few employees have been able to take advantage of existing law that authorizes advanced training for Senate employees.

Staff training for Senate-wide service and administrative employees should focus on the acquisition of technical or managerial skills and on learning to use new equipment or procedures. Such training might be made a prerequisite for advancement.

Members of the personal staffs of Senators should be required to provide to the Senate only basic information, such as educational and professional background, descriptions of skills, and emergency medical data. But Senators should be encouraged to establish more comprehensive personnel evaluation systems in their offices. A larger amount of information (on forms created by the personnel unit) should be kept on committee employees, including periodic evaluations by the committee staff director. Administrative employees of the Senate should be subject to substantially the same kind of recordkeeping that is used by government agencies and private businesses, including mandatory periodic evaluation.

The personnel counseling services to be provided would range from explanations of employees’ pay and benefits to career guidance and suggestions of training programs to fit each employee’s aspirations. The personnel unit would also, on request, counsel employees whose
performance was substandard and serve as a neutral third party in situations where employees were experiencing personal problems or had personal conflicts with their supervisors.

Finally, the personnel unit would undertake the evaluation and development of pay classification, benefit and leave policies, and fair employment practices for employees engaged in providing Senate-wide services. It would also develop minimum personnel information requirements for committee employees and assist committees and Senators, on request, to develop pay, benefit and leave policies for staff.

BUDGETING AND ACCOUNTING

Budgeting and accounting in the Senate are not well developed. The guiding principle of the Commission's recommendations in this area is that these devices should be used as decisionmaking tools. We believe that the cost of every Senate activity should be determined so that decisions can be made with full knowledge. The Senate's recording studio, dining facilities, and barbershops are subsidized. We believe that these subsidies should be disclosed and that the Senate should then use its judgment as to whether or not to continue them and, if so, on what basis. Our primary concern is that the true cost of these activities be understood.

On this same principle, we call attention to the fact that substantial portions of the Legislative Appropriations Act include noncongressional expenses that should be reassigned to the executive branch. Major parts of the annual budgets of the Botanic Gardens, the Library of Congress (which serves the President and public as well as Congress), the Government Printing Office, the General Accounting Office, the Tax Court, and the Federal Elections Commission should be excluded from the budget of the legislative branch. In fact, it has been conservatively estimated that more than $140 million of the current $950 million legislative budget should be assigned elsewhere.

Recommendation

Establish a simplified and uniform system of budgeting and accounting. The system should:

Operate with four general appropriation categories (salaries and expenses): Senators' offices, committees, administrative services, and leaders of the Senate.

Consolidate all funds for each Senator's office and each committee into a single amount for each.

Consolidate funding of each administrative service unit into one amount for each unit.

Appropriate one sum for majority and minority leadership purposes.

Require budget requests from committee and administrative units to follow a uniform format and include prescribed justification data.

Consider requests for each unit as a whole and hold the appropriate individual in each unit accountable for expenditures.

Abolish the Contingent Fund and replace it with a bona fide emergency fund under close controls.

Budget for two-year periods.
Establish an accounting and auditing system that will describe how funds have been spent.

There are several reasons why the Senate should consider adopting a simplified, coordinated, modern budgeting system. The reasons rest on the inadequacy of the present budgeting system to provide what a budget should—namely, the information necessary to plan the work of the Senate.

While legislative expenditures constitute only a small fraction of the total budget of the Federal Government (about $450 billion), they are no longer inconsiderable. For the Senate, the sum involved is $160 million. The Senate's budgeting process, however, remains to a critical degree open-ended. Efforts to hold down costs have been strong but not systematic. The President and the executive branch agencies submit to the discipline of having their budgets approved by Congress. Both Houses owe it both to themselves and the nation to exercise self-discipline in appropriating funds for congressional activities.

Second, it seems likely that few, if any, Senators have a full understanding of how money is spent for Senate operations. If so, this vitiates the argument that those with the power of the purse are close enough to legislative operations to judge the real value of all expenditures. The scope of legislative activity is large and complex; it has outrun the mechanisms available for review and control.

Third, "budgeting," as it is presently performed for the Senate, has relatively little value in assisting the Senate to plan its work effectively. Budget justifications should include a description of planned activities and their estimated cost in terms of personnel and supplies. In the case of committees, some of the costs stem from the simple fact that they exist, and this, of course, must be recognized in the budget process. But regular justification should be required for the bulk of committee expenditures and for all Senate-wide operations.

Fourth, accountability for expenditure of Senate funds is unclear and inadequate. Under standard management practice officials receiving appropriated funds are held accountable for them. To achieve accountability, however, officials receiving appropriations must be clearly designated and must have control over the funds for the activities they are charged with managing.

This frequently is not the case in the Senate. Funding for each Senator's office is currently determined primarily by a system of variable allowances, depending on such factors as state population and distance from home state to Washington. Allotments are based on formulas for specific expenses, such as telephone, travel and other items. There are limitations on salaries and state office expenses. Some allowances, such as that for envelopes, are "in kind" rather than dollar amounts. The practice of funding services separately came into use so that increases in expense allowances could be justified by specific increases in costs.

The Senate has already achieved considerable progress in consolidating office accounts. In this respect it has moved ahead of the House. Completion of the consolidation process would not involve major changes. Of course, attempts to raise allowances by tying increases to increased costs for specific items will have to be resisted. Instead, a collective cost index should be established, with the total allowance automatically increased or decreased on the basis of this
This could be accomplished by averaging the current cost of supplies and services used by all offices and comparing present with future costs at three-month or six-month intervals.

Under a new and simplified budget system, salaries and expenses of Senators' offices would be included in one budget category. That is, each Senator would receive a single allotment for salaries and expenses. The specific allowance system now used, including provision for differences based on population and other factors, would continue to control the total amount. However, these factors should be evaluated periodically.

Opportunities also exist for further simplification. Control over expenditures would be achieved through complete recordkeeping and regular auditing. Ceilings on that portion of the allotment used for staff salaries could be relaxed if the Senate wished.

Committees, at present, are partly funded by a basic allowance for a fixed number of staff members and partly funded through the Senate's contingency fund. Few committees have more than the standard number of “permanent” staff. The Rules Committee reviews and approves requests for disbursements from the contingency fund. However, a review of the justifications provided by committees for expenditures indicates that little information is provided. A typical request may describe the scope of the legislation to be considered by the committee, but rarely is there a discussion of the activities the committee plans to undertake in exploring the measures. Developing useful information to justify requests is not easy and cannot be accomplished merely because it would be useful. Nonetheless, the establishment of reasonable and flexible standards is necessary.

Currently, committee budget requests may list the number of “temporary” employees, which tends to be relatively constant even though the records show that the number listed were not actually employed in previous years. Nor, in many cases, do committees specify the portion of funds requested for subcommittee activities, despite the legal requirements of the Legislative Reorganization Acts of 1946 and 1970. The current budget procedures are not effective in cases where subcommittees utilize the bulk of committee resources.

Bona fide committee budgeting would permit comparisons of the funding of various Senate activities and would insure that the most urgent and important were adequately supported. Obviously, sufficient information would have to be provided to enable those charged with considering committee requests to perform more than a nominal review. Lacking guidelines for review, the Rules Committee apparently follows a policy of allowing what are deemed to be “reasonable increases.”

Senate-wide administrative services are funded in part with appropriations reviewed by the Legislative Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee. Other funds come through the contingency fund. Requests for such funds tend to be uncoordinated and are often ad hoc. The information on which the Legislative Subcommittee must act sometimes appears to be incomplete, obsolete or misleading. The units considered for budgeting purposes are sometimes incomprehensibly isolated, with little regard for their missions. Some units receive portions of their funds both from the legislative appropriation directly and from the contingency fund.

The contingency fund itself is a serious and recurring source of confusion in Senate budgeting. It is a primary reason for the reduced
coherence of the Senate's activities. While some items in the contingency fund are earmarked, $14,184,000 in the FY 1976 fund was for "miscellaneous" items. In previous years this money has been spent for travel, office equipment, linen rental, and a variety of other purposes that would more logically be found in the budgets of committees and administrative units. In addition, there are true contingencies—unanticipated outlays for special and temporary committees and new activities—which, if they persist, are provided for in legislative appropriations bills.

If the Contingent Fund were abolished it obviously would be necessary to provide a small reserve for new or unanticipated activities of the Senate as a whole, or for major new duties assigned to existing units. A logical approach would be for the Administrative Council to have temporary authority to commit reserve funds for the limited purposes mentioned above. But expenses that can reasonably be anticipated, or those extending beyond a single budget period, should not be met from the reserve funds.

A somewhat less weighty problem is the practice of funding various activities over uneven periods. Some of the operations and expenditures of committees are based on the standard Federal Government fiscal year, while committee investigative funds are budgeted for a different, "investigatory" year. The logic of this division is based on the temporary nature of some committee activities and staff. Currently, requests for investigatory funds are reviewed by a separate process. But in fact there are few truly "temporary" employees, and "investigations" change in subject but persist.

Since the Senate operates on a biennial cycle, its budgeting should correspond. New Members take office in the odd-numbered years. For that reason, among others, the work of the body gets underway relatively slowly. In the second year of a Congress, the even-numbered year, the deadline for completion of the work of that Congress is approaching. Most of the floor action on important legislation takes place then. Also approaching are the Senate elections, affecting one-third of the Members. From late spring, when primary elections begin, until late fall, when the general election is held, delays due to the absence of Members are frequent. Disruptions are even more severe in the years when Presidential nominating conventions are held. Thus, realistic budgeting should take into account this two-year cycle.

Effective accounting and auditing systems are not only desirable for their own sakes. They are also essential ingredients in intelligent budgeting. At present, however, Senate accounting and auditing are inadequate.

Accounting is severely fragmented in the Senate. The Secretary, the Sergeant at Arms, the Architect, each committee, and each Member keep separate uncoordinated records. Appropriations are accounted for on a cash basis. There is no ready way to ascertain at any particular moment the exact amount of Senate assets and liabilities because they are not centrally recorded. Costs are not reported by organizational unit, nor are costs grouped under standard categories—travel, fees, mechanical equipment, etc. Accounting should also cover such resources as furniture and equipment; the Senate should identify the status and uses of inventories. It would then have an adequate basis for planning future acquisitions.
Cyclic periods of accounts and reports should be uniform. Information should be reported in a manner that allows identification of the Senate units incurring the costs. Obligated expenditures should be included in the regular accounting. Information on previous years' expenditures should be available for budgeting purposes. At present, no formal monthly, or even quarterly, reports are issued on expenditures of appropriated funds or remaining balances.

In order to control expenditures and reduce dependence on supplemental funding, each Senate unit should have a clear picture of the status of its funds. Without more coordinated accounting, it is difficult—to say the least—to understand the relationship of costs to services. The Senate should not only have a far clearer picture of the costs of each of its units, but also of the activities and programs of each.

So far as is known, the financial operations of the Senate have not been touched by dishonesty. Neither have most Senate operations been audited periodically by independent auditors. The Stationery Room, for example, was last independently audited in 1957; its annual gross receipts are now approximately $1 million. Although internal Senate controls seem adequate, normal business practice as well as mere prudence dictate regular independent auditing across the board.

Recommendation

Create a budget staff responsible to the Administrator. The budget staff should undertake the development of uniform procedures and formats:

- in which committee and Senate-wide service unit requests for funds would be submitted.
- for coordinating such requests and compiling them in a single comprehensive document.

This proposed budget staff would provide a coordination and management service for the Senate. It would have no policy authority. However, the consolidated budget would provide a means for coordinating the work of the various Senate-wide administrative units and for planning improved administrative and technical services.

The budget process, primarily coordinated by the budget staff, would also serve as a tool to permit all Members to obtain a comprehensive picture of the Senate's agenda. For these purposes, the budget unit would be required to play a coordinating role. The budget staff's function of developing uniform procedures and formats for the justification of fund requests would be of critical importance, since more than casually enforced requirements will be necessary to insure that the Senate operates on a budget. Nothing in the operation of the budget staff, it should be noted, would restrict committees in terms of the scope or nature of their activities. But if the Senate is to have a budget that is useful to Members in understanding planned activities, the necessary information about committee endeavors must be forthcoming.

Appropriate legislative committees need accurate budget information first in their consideration of Senate plans, and then in seeing the role of each unit in the larger scheme. Maximum usefulness will only be possible if the budget also contains the history of previous expenditures and plans. For that purpose the previously recommended changes in the present accounting system of the Senate are essential. Items requested in the current budget should be compared with the requests and expenditures of previous years.
SECTION III

SPACE AVAILABILITY AND UTILIZATION

Approximately two million gross square feet of building space are presently available to the Senate. This space includes the floor areas, regardless of present use, in the Capitol, two permanent office buildings, and five temporary office buildings. So grossly inadequate and poorly utilized is this space, however, that the great majority of the Senate's more than 6,500 employees must endure substandard working conditions that seriously curtail their effectiveness and productivity.

Because a continuously updated space inventory is not now maintained, current figures on the amount of space allotted to various categories of employees are not available. But the most recent space inventory, conducted by the Architect of the Capitol in 1973, found that personal staff members had an average of 65 square feet of working space (slightly more than eight feet by eight feet) and committee staff members 75 to 80 square feet. The degree of overcrowding today is probably roughly the same as it was in 1973; although the size of the Senate staff has grown, the acquisition of temporary buildings has provided enough space to keep the ratio relatively constant.

Sixty-five square feet per employee means just about enough space for a desk, a chair, a filing cabinet, and perhaps a narrow bookcase. It also means another employee a few feet away. It means that staff aides have no decent-sized room in which to meet a citizen with business to transact. It can mean six busy people in a single small room and a working environment that is never quiet. Although the General Services Administration has never set a minimum space allowance for Capitol Hill (and has not been asked to do so), GSA has established 100 square feet per employee as the space allowance for state congressional offices.

The Senate's scramble to house its ever-growing staff has led to staff fragmentation. A decade ago virtually all staff members were housed, with Senators occupying contiguous suites of offices, in two buildings (Dirksen and Russell). Today, Senate staff members are dispersed among seven buildings (excluding the Capitol), and it is not at all unusual for the staff of a single Senator or committee to be housed in two or three different locations. This dispersion impedes communication, creates supervision problems, and undermines morale.

The Philip A. Hart Senate Office Building, which will adjoin the Dirksen Building on the east, is now under construction. Its completion, scheduled for 1979, will substantially change the space situation. Its one million square feet of net space will increase by 50 percent the usable space available to personal and committee staffs. Based on figures provided by the Architect of the Capitol, our estimate is that the opening of the Hart Building will increase the office space per personal or committee staff member to at least 150 square feet. It is not true, as some have contended, that the Hart Building will be crowded the day
it opens (although available space per employee will obviously depend on the rate of staff growth); instead, the Hart Building will provide, for the first time in recent memory, reasonable working room for the entire Senate community.

Meanwhile, how can the Senate ease the pressure on space until the opening of the Hart Building? And further, how can the Senate prevent space shortages from developing once the Hart Building comes into use?

The general answer to both questions involves a combination of increases in available space and limitations on increases in staff size, but the particular methods used to achieve those ends will vary over time.

In the short run the alternatives are more limited, especially in terms of available supply of space. The ongoing construction of the Hart Building argues against any attempt to acquire and refurbish another existing building adjacent to the Senate complex. The only other ways to increase supply are to improve the use of existing space and to transfer certain functions to space outside the Senate complex.

Recommendation

Assign responsibility for the management, assignment and control of space in the entire Senate complex to the Administrator.

There is a clear need for systematic, coordinated consideration of space problems. The Administrator should have the authority to take the steps necessary to assure rapid assignment of space on a rational priority basis. Similarly, the Administrator should set aside some meeting space which would be available for a variety of purposes.

Recommendation

Establish and maintain an up-to-date space occupancy inventory for all space in the Senate complex.

Good space management involves decisive problem-solving and careful innovation, as well as equitable treatment of space users. A necessary precondition for improvement is detailed, current information about how Senate space is being used. An occupancy inventory is not difficult to compile or computerize. It would prove of enormous help in determining space problems and identifying new types of demands. The Administrator should assign the inventory task to an administrative office in charge of space management.

Recommendation

Relocate low-priority space users.

Transfer all functions now being performed in the Senate wing of the Capitol to other locations unless the transfer would substantially inconvenience Members or the location of the function near the Chamber is essential to the working of the body.

Follow the same procedure in regard to the main Senate office buildings by relocating any activity which does not have to be performed within the Senate complex to other locations.

Some of the Senate functions now performed in the Capitol and main office buildings need not occupy such premium space. They remain where they are because of sheer inertia and because they are not considered collectively and in light of all priorities.
Those seeking to retain space in the Capitol or Senate complex should have the burden of showing, through a detailed written presentation, that a particular function falls within the convenience or operational exceptions to the relocation rule. Justifications for retaining space should be submitted and passed upon by June 1, 1977. Senate officers and entities should be authorized to lease space outside the Senate complex so long as they relinquish comparable space within the Senate complex immediately after they occupy leased space.

The objective of the foregoing recommendation is to free space within the Senate complex and improve the use of premium space. In some instances—the Senators’ Dining Room, for example—the justification will doubtless be a formality. Since a systematic justification process has not been used in the past, however, it seems advisable to adopt a “zero-base” approach and thus avoid prejudicing particular cases.

The recommended policy creates a responsibility for passing upon the justifications. Because of the long-established location of various offices and because of the disagreements likely to be aroused by new space assignments, a temporary panel to pass on requests for exemptions should be appointed to advise the Administrator. The panel should be composed of three members—one appointed by the majority leader, one by the minority leader, and the third by the chairman of the Rules Committee.

Recommendation

Provide immediate assistance to enable Senators and committees to use their limited space more effectively.
Provide advisory design personnel.
Prepare a handbook on space use.
Demonstrate innovative uses of space.

Given the constraints of existing space and the Senate’s lack of expertise in planning and visualizing space use, there is a strongly expressed need for help in designing office arrangements. Offices are encumbered by a limited selection of often oversized furniture; the size and arrangement of rooms, and the locations of wall openings, tend to discourage easy solutions.

Still, effective space use in Senate offices has largely been a neglected subject, and whatever improvements have occurred have been mostly due to the resourcefulness of the persons working there. Senator Hatfield’s office, for example, was studied by experts from an interior design and furniture manufacturing firm. Work stations were designed and installed with a new set of office furnishings, and both staff and designers agree that the transformation has been a signal success.

The utilization of existing space in Senators’ offices could also be improved by better use of room dividers, rearrangement of closets and plumbing facilities, and use of acoustical materials throughout. Quite different office layouts are possible, since many walls within Senate offices are not part of the building structure. The firms recently retained to conduct design demonstrations should consider these and other possibilities. The technical assistance service recom-
mended by the Commission should be made readily available to Sen-
ators and committees.

Preparation of a "do-it-yourself" handbook on office space planning
would be a valuable aid for those so disposed. It would reduce the
need to have a large staff available within the Senate's management
unit and assist each individual office in meeting its unique needs. No
document now available satisfactorily fills this need.

Within the discretion of Senators, better use of personal staff space
might be achieved by sharing copying machines, computer terminals,
and other equipment. Assuming that a group of Senators agreed, "joint
service centers" might be established for duplicating and reference
activities, storage of basic office supplies, and so on. This would free
space in each office.

Committee rooms present special space problems. Most committee
rooms have high ceilings that leave considerable room for the con-
struction of mezzanines that would provide additional floor space.
Glass doors, which would let people look in without entering, would
make for less interruption of work. Formal and fixed arrangements—
such as the horseshoe-shaped table which is a hearing room trade-
mark—could be redesigned or eliminated so that hearing rooms could
serve a variety of purposes.

None of these measures would eliminate the Senate's need for the
new building now under construction, but each offers benefits. Use of
existing space in the best manner is the least expensive method of
adding more space.

Recommendation

Increase Senate participation in decisionmaking for major construc-
tion and acquisition projects in the Capitol area to assure full con-
sideration of the Senate's future needs.

In 1974, the Congress took the laudable step of enacting legislation
requiring the preparation of a master plan for the entire Capitol com-
plex, including the Supreme Court. Work on this plan, which seeks
to restore some of the coherence that marked L'Enfant's laying out
of the capital city itself almost 200 years ago, is well underway and
is expected to be completed some time next year. Further Senate con-
struction and space acquisition should be coordinated with this Capitol
Hill Master Plan and be based on a coherent forecast of the future
needs of the Senate. As already noted, no inventory of current space
use is now available. Planning for future construction or acquisition
should be based on such an inventory combined with a list of priority
needs.

When the plan is completed, it should be reviewed in public hearings,
modified if necessary, and Senate development policy adapted to it.
Once this plan is put into effect, all Senate building projects should
be consistent with it unless and until it is amended. Neither Senators
nor staff should depend on the planning process to produce desirable
results without their active involvement. Planning works best when
users actively make their views known.

In 1971, Congress authorized $50,000 for the Architect to conduct
a design study of a parking garage on Square 724 (bounded by C, D,
First and Second Streets, N.E.), but the money has not yet been spent.
There is no immediate need for such a facility. The Senate parking
situation is tight but is not nearly as pressing a problem as the office space situation. There are fewer than 2.5 daytime employees per parking space in the Senate, whereas the ratio in many executive branch agencies runs six to one or higher. The rapid transit subway line serving the Senate side of the Capitol will extend to the Maryland suburbs in the near future, and this should reduce the demand for parking. In addition, the garage in the Hart Building will increase the number of Senate parking spaces by more than 10 percent.

Early in 1976, the Commission contracted for a summary report on the parking situation in the vicinity of the Senate office buildings. A number of recommendations of that study have already been implemented by the Sergeant at Arms. Lots have been redesigned to increase capacity, more bulk space is available, and special provision has been made for car pools. Additional capacity might be encouraged by the creation of some pay parking in the vicinity. While further improvements are possible, large capital outlays are not justified in the absence of the completed master plan.

Recommendation

*Take steps to meet priority space needs of Senators.*

*Provide all Senators with an office in the Capitol.*

*Provide generally available meeting rooms in the Capitol for Senate and conference committee use.*

*Equip all Senators' office suites with conference rooms.*

*Establish small meeting facilities outside Senators' office suites in corridor alcoves of the Senate office buildings.*

At present 56 Senators (37 Democrats and 19 Republicans) have offices in the Capitol. Although they are small, these offices increase a Senator's working time, especially when the Senate is in session and roll call votes are being held. Discussions with constituents and interest group representatives, and work with staff, can take place in closer proximity to the Senator's principal responsibility of the moment.

It is therefore reasonable to assume that all Senators would find such offices beneficial, and simple considerations of equity argue strongly for providing Capitol offices to all Senators. It would take at least 10,000 square feet of space—a significant portion of the 130,000 square feet of net usable space in the Senate wing—to provide the necessary 100 offices. Relocation of low priority activities would no doubt be required, but such a step appears to be feasible.

Meeting rooms for conference committees and general Senate use should also be created in the Capitol. The Commission commends the inclusion of conference rooms in the planned remodeling of offices in the Dirksen and Russell Buildings, as well as their inclusion in the suites planned in the Hart Building. Given both the frequency and the brevity of most Senators' meetings with constituents and interest group representatives, a smooth flow of visitors in and out of the office is essential. The existence of a location other than Senators' personal offices for meeting purposes will enhance the opportunity for Senators to meet with more than one group of visitors, thus saving time. It should also reduce the frequency with which staff have to impose upon Senators' personal offices for want of other meeting space.
SECTION IV

TIME UTILIZATION

There are few things more precious to a Senator than time. Members of the Senate face many unpredictable and conflicting demands, and effective management of time is a prerequisite for effective performance as a legislator and elected official. Yet the unpredictable and conflicting nature of the demands on a Senator's time are inherent in the traditions of the Senate. Two traditions, in particular, are fundamental.

The first is the prerogative of any Senator to focus the attention of the full Senate, or a committee, on a specific issue. This is manifested in the principle of unlimited debate and in the right of any Senator to call for a record vote or a quorum, or to block a unanimous consent agreement. The second is the belief that the public must have access to its elected officials. As a result of these two traditions, Senators must juggle appearances on the floor and at committee and subcommittee sessions, meetings with constituents, interest groups, and the press, conferences with staff, and time devoted to preparation. Some conflict in the use of Senators' time is a necessary consequence of all these demands. As a result, Senators will often be frustrated by lack of time.

Perhaps none of the Commission's tasks has been more difficult than developing recommendations to help alleviate the scheduling problems faced by all Senators. The recommendations in this section are intended to maximize effective use of the collective time of 100 Senators while at the same time honoring the traditional rights of any individual Senator both to affect how the time of the Senate is spent and to make his own decisions on the use of his own time.

THE USE OF TIME

It is clear that effective and efficient use of time is a prominent concern of Senators. Of the items presented to Senators in the Commission's efforts to determine the priority of topics to be studied, finding ways "to avoid conflicting demands on Senators' time" was singled out as the most important. The Commission therefore believed it essential to discover more precisely the dimensions of the scheduling problem and how Senators' time is actually used. In addition to discussions with a number of Senators and interviews with scores of staff members, two studies were undertaken.

The first was a determination of how each Senator allocated time among various activities. These data were compiled from time logs kept by Senators' appointment secretaries. This study, the first of its kind, was conducted from February to May, 1976.
The second study was a quantitative examination of conflicts in the meeting times of committees and subcommittees on the one hand, and between floor and committee activities on the other, during 1975.²

The studies highlighted the nature of Senators' days—long, fragmented, and unpredictable. On the average, Senators put in an 11-hour day. On over half of the days the Senate was in session, it did not adjourn until 6 p.m. or later. Yet despite their length, each senatorial day was a scheduler's nightmare. There were constant interruptions, specific activities took an unanticipated amount of time, and seldom were there blocks of time of sufficient duration to permit Senators to follow through to their satisfaction on the matter at hand.

The Commission's sampling found that only one third of Senators' time, on the average, was spent either on the Senate floor or in committee. About two hours were consumed at functions outside the office, with another two hours being taken up with mail, press relations, and related matters. The two and one-half hours with staff overlapped in part with time spent in the other categories. Table I presents the average allocation of time among major activities.

**TABLE I.** *Allocation of Time (hours and minutes) Among Major Activities*¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Average Allocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Senate Chamber</td>
<td>1:35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In committee/subcommittee</td>
<td>2:25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>4:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking with constituents and interest groups</td>
<td>1:40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events outside of office (meetings, speeches, etc.)</td>
<td>2:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail and public information</td>
<td>2:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with staff and reading staff papers</td>
<td>2:35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Due to overlap among these activities, the total time exceeds the 11-hour average day of Senators. These time figures are based upon accounting for entire days in Washington.

A frequent complaint is that Senators have too many committee and subcommittee meetings scheduled at the same time. The Commission's analysis showed that while there is frequently an overlap in meeting times, the more serious problems appear to be conflicts between committees and floor activities, and between those legislative responsibilities and other commitments.

**CONFLICT BETWEEN COMMITTEE AND FLOOR RESPONSIBILITIES**

One of the most bothersome conflicts for Senators is that between committee meetings and the demands of the Senate Chamber. Recorded votes and quorum calls in particular are demands on Senators' time over which they seldom have much control.

The conflict appears to be the most pronounced in the morning: more than three fourths (78.7 percent) of committee and subcommittee meetings in 1975 were held in the morning, while 70 percent of the days the Senate was in session the convening hour was before noon.

However, two factors suggest that the greatest conflict between significant floor and committee business comes in the afternoon. First, most of the recorded votes and quorum calls come later in the day. Sec-

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¹ Constraints of time and staff resources, as well as the difficulty of collecting meaningful data on a partial session (as would have been the case if some 1976 data had been included) were the basis for the decision to work with 1975 data only. While the 1975 data give a valid indication of the dimensions of the scheduling problem, data from several sessions would be very desirable to provide a firm empirical base for scheduling decisions.
ond, the "morning hour" is seldom taken up with consideration of specific bills or resolutions.\(^2\)

One recurring suggestion is to divide the Senate's work into certain blocks of time specifically designated for floor activity and other blocks set aside specifically for committee and subcommittee meetings. Such a division might conceivably allocate months within a session, weeks within a month, days within a week, or hours within each day. The committee and floor business of the Senate, however, is too interdependent for an allocation of time on a monthly or weekly basis, and division of the legislative day into floor hours and committee hours also seems problematical. Table 2 shows that the distribution of committee and floor activity (including recorded votes and quorum calls) is relatively even throughout the week.

**Table 2.—Committee Versus Floor Activity by Day of the Week**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Percent of total time Senate is in session</th>
<th>Percent of total number of record votes and quorum calls</th>
<th>Percent of total number of committee meetings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monday</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuesday</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wednesday</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thursday</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friday</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday/Sunday</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Where there does appear to be a difference in cycles of activity is month to month. Table 3 indicates that a much larger proportion of floor business (both time in session and number of record votes and quorum calls) was concentrated in the latter months of the year, whereas committee meetings were more evenly distributed throughout the year.

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\(^2\) In fact, experience with a resolution introduced by Sen. Dale L. Bumpers of Arkansas supports this conclusion. Passed by the Democratic Caucus in April, 1976, the resolution explicitly limited Senate sessions in the morning and afternoon committee meetings during floor sessions; subsequently, the majority leader advised committee and subcommittee chairmen of the resolution and its intent. Although the resolution was adhered to, except for one lapse, for approximately two weeks, after mid-May the Senate itself quite regularly met before noon, when committees and subcommittees also were meeting. The Senate found it feasible to comply with the Bumpers resolution for only 24 percent of its sessions between May 3 (when it became effective) and July 2. The Senate convened at noon only twice after May 17; 64 percent of the time between May 3 and July 2 the Senate convened before 11 a.m.
Table 3.—Senate Floor and Committee Activity (1975)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Percent of total time Senate was in session</th>
<th>Percent of total number of record votes and quorum calls</th>
<th>Percent of total number of committee and subcommittee meetings</th>
<th>Percent of all bills introduced and referred to committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January to April</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May to August</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September to December</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most bothersome conflict shown by these figures is that between committee meetings and record votes. Chart 1 summarizes the monthly trend for 1975 in the number of committee and subcommittee meetings and the number of record votes and quorum calls. The curves follow more or less the same pattern through August, but then diverge as the number of committee meetings holds to a higher relative frequency through November.

Chart 1

Pattern of Committee Meetings and Record Votes and Quorum Calls for 1975
Chart 2 illustrates an alternative pattern, which if adopted would reduce conflict between committee meetings and record votes and quorum calls while at the same time taking into account the requirements of the budget cycle and the customary push of legislation prior to an August recess and at the end of the year.

**CHART 2**

*Alternative Pattern of Committee Meetings and Record Votes and Quorum Calls*

In view of the foregoing, a division of the work week should be considered.

**Recommendation**

*Devote certain days of the week exclusively to committee business and other days exclusively to Senate floor sessions.*

Some flexibility is obviously required. For example, it is possible that at certain periods the entire week should be spent in the Senate Chamber, whereas for other weeks committee work should be the major activity. Based on the current pattern of committee and floor activity as well as the requirements of the budget process, the Senate should consider adopting the following division of the days of the week from month to month:
A division of the week into floor days and committee days should help alleviate scheduling conflicts. If, on occasion, there are days when both floor and committee sessions are scheduled, there should be a clear separation between the time allotted to each activity.

The incidence of conflict between committee and floor obligations tends to increase as the calendar year progresses and the Senate is pressing to dispose of legislation on the floor. However, several trends evident in the Senate's conduct of business are helping to ease this year-end rush. One has been imposed by the newly instituted budget cycle, with its requirement that all authorizing measures must be completed by committees by May 15. The committees have achieved substantial compliance with this timetable. The Commission's study of 1975 patterns of committee meetings highlighted a distribution of types of committee activity that appears quite compatible with the year-end press of business. Table 4 shows that the largest number of oversight hearings are held early in the legislative session. Internal committee business is also heavily concentrated in the early months. Where there is an indication of potentially serious conflict between committee meetings and floor activity is in bill markups, which tend to occur later in the year. Also to be considered are conference committee meetings with Members of the House, which also tend to come later in the year. A division of the week into floor and committee days, on a flexible basis, should be compatible with the present pattern of the Senate workload.

### Table 4.—Purpose of Committee Meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>January to April</th>
<th>May to August</th>
<th>September to December</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oversight</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee internal busi-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ness</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriations</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markups</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One of the main sources of conflict between floor and committee work is the unpredictable nature of demands from the floor. Several initiatives could be taken.

One approach would be to plan and announce well in advance a schedule of debate on major issues. During each year legislation is considered that deals with a number of the most significant national problems. For example, legislation is considered on defense and foreign policy (including foreign assistance), the state of the economy, new programs in the President’s budget, and special problems, of which the space program, housing, energy, and health care are typical examples.

While the executive branch develops—or at least seeks to develop—a set policy on each subject, Congress does not. In each subject area it considers specific legislation, tempers it by accommodating as many of the views of Members as possible, and passes it. The outcome may be substantially what the President has requested; more likely, it will be either a modification of the executive proposal or substantially different legislation reflecting the realities of power in the House and Senate.

The President’s proposal is likely to be the standard against which the congressional enactment will be judged. In essence, Congress allows the President to create the agenda for national action and reacts to it. To cope with that fact, the leaders of the two Houses, along with the caucuses or policy committees, have worked to establish a legislative agenda. Most Americans, however, remain unaware of this congressional initiative.

Another means must be found to give salience to the significance of Congress in identifying and addressing national problems. Congress should set its own agenda.

**Recommendation**

*Establish a schedule of debates early in the session on subjects of major national interest.*

*Allot time for each party.*

*Focus debate on a resolution embodying the agreed general principles of the majority party.*

*Use the resolutions to guide committee scheduling of subjects within their jurisdiction.*

The advantages of general policy debates, focused as specifically as possible on subjects and principles of action, are numerous. A well-prepared debate which sets out in principle the general aims which the majority intends to pursue helps restore public perception of the Congress as a significant institution which is capable of making policy. This is opposed to the widely current notion that Congress is a body which either supports or obstructs the President and takes many vacations. It also points up differences in the parties’ positions.

Congressionally-enacted resolutions are expressions of the will of the majority. As such, they should provide guidance to committees in terms of priorities and legislative content. Far from merely absorbing more of the time of the Congress, general policy debates would substantially assist the Senate to manage its time. Policy resolutions would provide priorities for all of the work of the Senate.

While the prerogative of individual Senators to accelerate or delay the pace of legislation is longstanding, steps could also be taken to
insure that major measures are considered on a more predictable basis. The present majority leadership already attempts to adhere to a general schedule. Setting definite priorities would enable Senators to plan their own time in a more satisfactory way.

Recommendation

Notify all Senators in the event of proposed changes in the announced floor schedule (as contained in the Whip Notice).

Such notification could be accomplished by means of the CRT (Cathode Ray Tube) terminals that most Senators have in their offices. The Commission frequently heard the complaint that measures are called up on the floor before Senators have had adequate time to consider their merits.

Recommendation

Adhere, as far as possible, to a layover period after committee reports on bills have been printed and are available for distribution.

Adherence to a layover period for reported bills would help Senators plan their schedules and also would reduce confusion about floor activity.

Present efforts to schedule some roll call votes at announced times, and to arrange some of the roll calls back-to-back, should be continued. A series of roll calls requires less time than the same number of roll calls scattered throughout the day. Suggestions have been made that all record votes be taken regularly at a predetermined time, such as between 3 p.m. and 5 p.m. daily. A fixed schedule for record votes, however, might shortly become more of a problem than a solution. Debate may be affected by a record vote (which under a fixed schedule would not occur); legitimate legislative strategies might also be affected. Nevertheless, agreement on a voting hour, and on the specific legislation to be voted on, would be both possible and helpful to Senators in scheduling their time. Only when several rollcall votes are scheduled back-to-back would there be any likely value in an electronic voting system for the Senate.

A number of factors contribute to requests for record votes. Conferees want the strongest possible support for the Senate position, Senators want a record on an issue, there is genuine uncertainty as to what the final vote will be, and Congress-watchers judge senatorial performance in part in terms of the percentage of rollcall votes cast. Reasonable individuals will occasionally differ as to what constitutes a justifiable or a frivolous demand for a record vote. Given the startling increase in the number of record votes in recent years, however, ways to decrease them should be examined.

Recommendation

Consider appointing someone not a Senator to preside over routine sessions at the request of the President pro tempore.

Under the Constitution, the Vice President of the United States is designated President of the Senate and, as such, is its principal presiding officer but has no vote except in case of a tie. At a very early point the Senate recognized the need to provide for a substitute presiding officer through the election of a President pro tempore and instructed the Secretary of the Senate to preside, when necessary, until such time as a President pro tempore has been elected. In addition,
Senate rules permit the President pro tempore to name a Senator to perform the duties of the chair in the absence of the President pro tempore.

A temporary presiding officer of the Senate could serve at the request of the President pro tempore. Such a person would merely give the Senate an additional option in the conduct of its floor business which would in no way impinge on the rights and duties of the Vice President, the President pro tempore, or individual Senators to preside when that is desirable or necessary for parliamentary purposes. Having an appointed or elected temporary presiding officer available for the many hours of routine Senate sessions would, the Commission believes, conserve time for individual Members and alleviate scheduling problems. This function might be assigned to the Sergeant at Arms.

CONFLICTS IN THE SCHEDULING OF COMMITTEE MEETINGS

A frequent complaint voiced to the Commission by Senators was that there was too much overlap in the scheduling of committee and subcommittee meetings. Examples were cited of Senators having three and four meetings scheduled at the same time.

As a result, the Commission analyzed the incidence of schedule conflicts. Taking Senators' committee and subcommittee assignments into account, the Commission examined the frequency of simultaneous meeting obligations of all Senators during 1975. Two computer files were created, one containing all committee and subcommittee assignments, the other the time and date of all committee and subcommittee meetings. Careful analysis of these data provided the Commission with a detailed picture of the committee scheduling problem.

TABLE 5.—Average Incidence of Committee Meeting Conflict for Senators in 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average number of scheduled meetings</th>
<th>Percent of days with more than 1 scheduled meeting</th>
<th>Percent of days with more than 2 scheduled meetings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morning</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afternoon</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Obviously the averages presented in Table 5 subsume higher and lower degrees of meeting conflict. On some mornings several Senators had as many as eight scheduled meetings. Other Senators had mornings when no meetings at all were scheduled. The number of morning meetings ranged from an average high of 2.7 to an average low of 1.2. The extent of conflict tends to be associated primarily with the number of assignments a Senator has, rather than with party or seniority.

In the view of some Senators, some overlap in committee/subcommittee meetings is a good thing. Legislative interests differ, and a modest range of choice among simultaneously scheduled meetings gives a Senator greater opportunity to spend committee time as he chooses. Obviously, however, there is a limit as to how much of this
overlap is beneficial. The point, however, is that overlap does not necessarily mean inefficient use of a Senator's time.

The Commission's analysis of 1975 committee meetings shows that over half (59.2 percent) of all committee and subcommittee meetings were meetings at the subcommittee level, with the proportion being particularly high for the Appropriations Committee (97.3 percent), the Judiciary Committee (78.5 percent), the Labor and Public Welfare Committee (76.3 percent), the Public Works Committee (70.5 percent), and the Armed Services Committee (65.1 percent).

When the types of committee and subcommittee meetings are examined, it is clear that cutting back on the proportion of subcommittee work would affect both the hearing and markup process negatively.

**Table 6.—Percentages of Committee and Subcommittee Meetings by Type of Meeting in 1975**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full Committee</th>
<th>Subcommittee</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hearings</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business meetings</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markup sessions</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination hearings or meetings</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Closely related is the finding that much of the exploratory, legislative, and oversight work of committees is also done at the subcommittee level. Table 7 underscores the important role of subcommittees in the transfer of information to Senators.

**Table 7.—Percentages of Committee and Subcommittee Meetings by Purpose of Meeting in 1975**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full Committee</th>
<th>Subcommittee</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oversight and investigative</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriations, rescissions, and deferrals</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploratory</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Resolution of the basic problem appears to lie in distributing meeting times through better scheduling so as to minimize those days on which Senators have an excessive amount of conflict.

**Recommendation**

Establish a computerized clearinghouse for both the time and location of committee and subcommittee meetings.

A computerized system is now being developed that will enable committees and subcommittees scheduling meetings to learn about already scheduled meetings and thus discover the extent of potential conflict. This system is expected to be operational in 1977. There should be required reporting of scheduled meetings and frequent updating of the
system, and every effort should be made by committees and subcommittees to minimize conflicting schedules. Committees and subcommittees should be asked to anticipate, insofar as possible, the number of meetings that will be involved in a particular set of hearings, markups, etc.

One question that arises is whether sanctions should be applied in the event that conflict would result if a proposed meeting were scheduled. One option might be to stipulate that the proposed meeting could not be held if a specified number of committee members would experience a schedule conflict. Another option would be to stipulate that committee meetings have priority over those of subcommittees, that markups have precedence over hearings, and so on. A third option, which the Commission deems most satisfactory, is to demonstrate in practice that easily accessible scheduling information serves the interests of all Senators, thereby contributing to a more rational distribution of meeting times. Such a step would not require the establishment of sanctions, which are difficult to adhere to and which might be construed as arbitrary constraints upon the prerogatives of committee and subcommittee chairmen.

Public access to the information in the scheduling clearinghouse should be assured, both to reduce committee staff time now devoted to answering queries and to underscore the Senate's commitment to accountability. As corollaries, the Senate meeting clearinghouse should also list the location of meetings, and committees and subcommittees should be expected to release hearing and meeting rooms under their control when they are not needed for committee business. Many committee and subcommittee rooms are kept vacant even when meeting space is needed by others.

Additionally, some meeting rooms in the Hart Senate Office Building should be set aside for use by all committees. Their allocation should be managed by a central coordinating office rather than specific committees.

Other recommendations that follow relate to committee and subcommittee schedules and practices.

Recommendation

Establish target schedules in each committee and subcommittee at the start of each session, revising them periodically as necessary. These targets should include firmly scheduled business meetings, hearings, and insofar as possible, time for markup sessions.

Although it is difficult at the start of a session to anticipate all matters with which a committee or subcommittee may be concerned, it should be possible to identify major concerns and to allot time accordingly. Some committees now work out such a schedule for the year. Deadlines set by the new budget process affect to some degree the time frame within which the committees operate and should enhance attempts to schedule committee work in advance.

When possible, subcommittee meetings should be scheduled at times when the full committee is not meeting. Not all committee and subcommittee schedule conflicts can be anticipated or eliminated. When a subcommittee has scheduled a hearing and a full committee must unexpectedly mark up a bill, there may be no solution to the conflict. However, every effort should be made to avoid this kind of conflict.
Recommendation

Initiate innovative practices which may permit Senators to conserve time in committees and subcommittees. Encourage committees to adhere to the requirement that prepared statements of witnesses be submitted in advance of hearings. Encourage committees and subcommittees to expand the use of the panel format, in which discussion takes place among several witnesses and committee members.

Changes in committee practices would relieve demands on Senators’ time and improve the efficiency with which Senators acquire the information needed to fulfill their legislative responsibilities.

Receipt of witness statements prior to committee hearings enables Senators and staff to familiarize themselves with the material to be presented and can expedite questioning of witnesses on specific issues and matters of concern. The receipt of statements in advance would also preclude the need for time-consuming reading of statements.

As an alternative to the more time-consuming formal hearing format, with seriatim testimony and questioning of witnesses, several committees have used the panel format. It offers the opportunity for examination of a variety of viewpoints at the same time, thus expediting the hearing process.

FLOOR AND COMMITTEE VERSUS OTHER COMMITMENTS

Sizable amounts of time are spent with constituents, representatives of interest groups, and the press, as well as at receptions and other functions outside the office. Achieving economies of time in these matters ultimately rests with each Senator. However, there are a number of steps that can be taken to help individual Senators conserve their time.

Recommendation

Organize the Senate at the earliest possible date, and, if feasible, in advance of the convening of Congress.

Organize committees by the end of the first month of the session.
Assign office space to Senators and their personal staffs by the start of the new session and assure that Senators are moved into their new offices by the end of the first month of the session.
(Alternative: Assign permanent suites for each state, taking into account such factors as state population.)
Provide Senators-elect with administrative support during the period between election and the taking of office.
Conduct special orientation programs for new Senators and their staffs.

Organization of the Senate prior to the January convening date would enable committees and subcommittees to organize and begin work promptly. At present, committee work on legislation often begins slowly. December organization of the Senate would permit orientation for newly elected Senators and staff to occur simultaneously, thereby expediting the work of the Senate.

Data on committee and subcommittee meetings indicate that the peak activity occurs in the early months of each session. Again, early Senate organization would allow a number of administrative and housekeeping matters to be settled before the session formally convened, with a
resultant opportunity to move promptly to legislation and policy matters.

Assignment of office space is a biennial problem for the Senate and in the past often has not been resolved until much of the first session has passed. The Rules Committee’s recent efforts to begin the time-consuming process of assigning office space immediately after the November election, as well as its efforts to impose a 24-hour time limit on senatorial space choices, are commendable.

New Senators must organize an office, deal with a backlog of mail, and acquire information about Senate procedures and services. Assistance is needed if they and their offices are to be able to function effectively when the new session gets underway.

Senators-elect should be given temporary office space and funds to cover some basic expenses during the interim period between the election and the day they take the oath of office. Providing office space and funds equal to some fraction of the monthly office allowance and clerk hire for the state would allow the Senator-elect to hire temporary secretarial assistance, interview applicants for staff positions, and otherwise prepare for the upcoming session.

Senators-elect also should receive assistance on both operational and substantive matters in order to be ready to participate fully in the ongoing work of the Senate as soon as the session begins. New Senators and their staffs must now devote considerable time in the early months of a session simply to learning the ropes; although this “learning period” is to some degree inevitable, some assistance prior to the session would help to shorten it.

Thus, new Senators and their staffs should be briefed on personal employment information (pay and benefits, tax regulations, financial disclosure, records, for example), office organization (organizing the office, recruiting, available services), Senate procedures, the legislative process, press and communications, the role of the parties, and available information resources.

Recommendation

Continue to schedule, annually, six periods of no less than a week when the Senate is not in session, or increase the number as necessary to permit Senators to discharge their duties outside of Washington more effectively.

Senatorial time is used more effectively when periods outside Washington can be scheduled in advance. Commitments in the home state or trips on committee business can, for the most part, be planned ahead. Scheduled periods when the Senate is not in session have met with virtually unanimous approval from Senators and help to improve attendance during floor sessions at other times. At least a week’s duration for such periods facilitates the scheduling of travel and state commitments.

The Commission deplores the erroneous connotation of the word “recess” as a “vacation.” Such periods are essential to enable Senators to return to their states or travel on Senate business, to conduct field hearings, meet with constituents, and generally perform as elected public officials as well as legislators. The Senate should consider increasing opportunities for these activities. Furthermore, service in the Senate is now a full-time job. During the 93rd Congress (1973–74), for instance, the Senate was in session 24 months. During the 83rd Congress (1953–54), in comparison, the Senate was in session only 16 months.
The quality of legislation is dependent upon many things. Certainly one of the foremost is the quality and relevance of the information that underlies the legislation. The surveys and other inquiries conducted by the Commission found concern on the part of Senators with the nature and quality of the information and analysis available to them for legislative purposes. Some Senators expressed concern about a lack of adequate and timely information when the Senate is deliberating on policy alternatives. Others suggested that the problem is not so much a lack of information as it is its synthesis and translation into a form which is useful.

The concern with better information has been demonstrated in recent years by major legislative initiatives taken by the Congress as a whole, including: (1) the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, which laid upon both the Congressional Research Service and the General Accounting Office major new responsibilities to provide increased analytical capability both with respect to executive branch implementation of programs and new legislative initiatives; (2) the Technology Assessment Act of 1972, which created the Office of Technology Assessment for the purpose of providing assessments of possible future developments, primarily those of a scientific and technological nature; and (3) the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which created the Congressional Budget Office and further upgraded GAO responsibilities for monitoring and evaluating Federal programs. These steps, together with substantial additions to personal and committee staff and the development of computerized information systems, have considerably improved Senators' abilities to acquire information and analysis.

Despite these actions, however, there are a number of continuing concerns:

One is that there should be adequate foresight capacity to identify major problems in time to permit knowledge resources to be fully mobilized, a critical requirement if Congress is to be a full partner with the President in formulating national policy.

A second, given the necessity of broad delegations of authority to the executive branch, is the necessity of devising new methods of obtaining systematic oversight information in order to monitor program results.

A third, recognizing the fast-moving and fragmented nature of the legislative process, is that of having all relevant scientific and technical knowledge available at critical moments of decision-making. As the process now works, the assessment of effects, intended and unintended, especially in matters that cut across committee jurisdictions, is often seen as inadequate.
Finally, there is a widely expressed desire for more timely and more uniform legislative information for operating purposes within the Senate. The need is especially acute in the case of Senators who are not members of the committee directly concerned with a given piece of legislation. A related issue is full and cost-effective use of information technology.

These continuing concerns are addressed in this and the following two related sections of the report.

Structural and procedural changes to strengthen the foresight and oversight capabilities of the Senate and their contribution to improved legislation are discussed first. The leadership, in our view, has a key catalytic role to play in this task.

Subsequently, in Section VI the use of technology and improved procedures to provide timely, high-quality information to all Members is addressed. The need to weigh results in terms of both effectiveness and cost criteria (touched on with respect to printing technology) is no less applicable to the evolving electronic technology now being made available to the Senate.

The congressional information support agencies (GAO, CRS, OTA, and CBO) are discussed in Section VII. Of the many sources of information and analysis, these agencies are the most answerable to the needs of the Senate as a whole. The Commission identified many steps these agencies individually could take to improve their services. However, if they are to achieve their full potential, congressional supervision is also necessary.

WHY FORESIGHT AND OVERSIGHT?

Among the many reasons that can be adduced for strengthening the Senate’s foresight and oversight capabilities, three are most significant.

The first is the expansion over the past half century in the powers of the Presidency, an expansion that occurred at the expense of the legislative branch. Congress became a junior partner, both in practice and in the public mind. If the Congress is to regain its historical role in determining major policy, more coherent internal structures and processes, as well as new relationships between the Senate and House and improved public understanding of congressional proceedings, will all be essential.

The legislative process as it presently operates appears to be organized primarily for incremental decisionmaking rather than addressing major problems in a comprehensive manner. Usually the process begins with the subcommittee that incubates a bill. Preliminary checking on available policy research, discussions with experts, and consultations with the support agencies are constrained by the schedules of the Senate and the subcommittee chairman. At some early point advocacy tends to take over from objective inquiry. Delineation of the problem, acquisition of related knowledge, discovery of interested parties, committee markup, and floor consideration follow one upon another. Bargaining and accommodation with both hostile and friendly interests helps shape the bill.

Amendments on the Senate floor and changes emerging from conference committee meetings with House Members often modify the language approved by the standing committees, but the major work has
been completed before most bills are acted upon by the Senate as a whole.

In this context, the institutional structures for bringing into play and for assimilating high-quality information are insufficient. There is no reliable machinery for anticipating major emerging problems in time to deal with them in an orderly manner. Manifold microdecisions are made which are inconsistent with others.

Second are the increasingly complex considerations involved in reaching sound public policy decisions. Many recent developments, including newly realized interrelationships among major issues, the growing scarcity of raw materials, rising public expectations of what government is to provide, increasing sophistication of government services, and the expansion of multinational corporations have altered the environment in which government works. Programs have become more complicated, involving many levels of bureaucracies, providing a variety of services, and seeking to regulate private activity in many fields. Broad delegations of authority to the executive branch have therefore been unavoidable, and there is considerable evidence that oversight as presently practiced by the Congress generally cannot provide adequate feedback as a basis for judgments about the continuation or modification of ongoing programs of the Federal Government.

Third is the exponential growth of scientific and technical knowledge in this century. There is a widespread perception that everything is touched by science and technology—our tools of work, our means of transportation and communications, our national safety and leisure, the quality of our life and death. There is also a growing conviction that new developments in science and technology should be more carefully reviewed for their implications for society. Moreover, there is increasing awareness that an adequate knowledge base is of critical importance in the interdependent political tasks of defining public problems and formulating solutions.

Two worlds must be bridged in the attempt to bring greater knowledge to bear on the political process. The first is the world of academic disciplines and new technologies; the second is the world of policymaking and legislation. Communication between them requires two acts of translation. The first is the translation of a problem from the world of practical policymaking into the world of scientific or technical method. The second is a translation of scientific and technical analyses of problems into language meaningful in the world of policy action. If either translation is faulty, even the best analysis cannot be effective. For the process to work, experienced “translators” who have an appreciation of the political process and are committed to the use of knowledge are required on both sides.

In sum, the demands of its constitutional role, the complexity of the policymaking environment, and the obstacles to grounding action on knowledge argue for new measures to strengthen the Senate’s capacity to anticipate future developments and to assess the effectiveness of past actions. The Commission recommendations that follow are largely aimed at improving legislation by strengthening the demand within the Senate for timely high-quality information that can be used for policymaking and operations.
FORESIGHT—EARLY IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF MAJOR PROBLEMS

Recommendation

Establish in or through the majority and minority policy committees responsibility for foresight—early identification and analysis of major policy problems. These committees should:

1. Stimulate inquiry by appropriate standing committees of emerging problems before they become matters of public concern and hasty legislative action.

2. Insure that legislation coming to the floor is accompanied by sufficient analysis to illuminate all relevant considerations.

Existing Senate procedures should be improved to fill two gaps in the present process. Systematic efforts are needed (1) to provide more knowledge than is now available at critical moments when decisions of major importance are being made, and (2) to better integrate work related to cross-cutting policy issues.

Neither of these objectives are attainable for the Senate as a whole without a stronger policy role being undertaken by party leaders and without a willingness on the part of Members to furnish leaders with the necessary resources to do so.

The three main tasks are: (1) early identification of major problem areas; (2) stimulation of systematic analysis and research efforts; and (3) translation of the results into concise syntheses setting forth the pro’s and con’s of major policy alternatives.

Early identification of major policy problems requires both political acumen of a high order and the systematic scanning of social, economic, and political indicators. All policy bodies face the increasing difficulty of dealing with the future in a world of growing interdependencies. Systematic monitoring of key external factors, such as the state of the national and world economies, critical developments on the frontiers of science and technology, the changing capacities and intentions of other nations, and shifting public expectations at home and abroad is necessary. But it is equally important to cultivate a habit of thinking ahead, of seeking to identify emerging problems before they appear on the Senate calendar and necessitate immediate decisions. A capacity is needed to call up analysis of long-term as well as short-term problems, recognizing, of course, the uncertainties inherent in basing actions on estimates of what the future will bring.

The multicommittee scope that such an exercise must have is evident. A few committees may now concern themselves with trying to foresee problems, but unless the practice is widespread it will not benefit the Senate as a whole.

Given the identification of an important policy problem well before it comes up for legislative action, the Senate will have time to stimulate systematic research and analysis. This work would be done by standing committee staffs, support agencies, and outside resources. The role of the policy committees would be to provide focus and initiative for the common effort, not to undertake the research and analysis.

The right questions—the relevant questions on which available knowledge may throw some light—should initially be defined by the policy committees. These questions should lead to an examination of the range of policy options, to an assessment of the practical constraints on action, to an analysis of potential benefits, and to general
estimates of the costs and unintended effects as well. Moreover, gaps in knowledge should be identified and research started so that it will be available during subsequent cycles of the policymaking process.

After review and discussion of this intelligence—that is, information organized on the basis of explicit criteria of relevance—the policy committees would determine its significance and the need to proceed further. To stimulate and direct further work, an ad hoc working group drawn from appropriate committee staffs might be established. Help would then be obtained from the support agencies and, when feasible, from the outside knowledge community. Establishment of such task force groupings would follow naturally as the need for more information became clear. All such activity might warrant one or more reviews by the policy committees and party caucuses to consider the options of further inquiry or immediate action by the standing committees. Policy analysis developed in this way could include a carefully designed and timed oversight plan to evaluate existing program experience. In order to facilitate formal proceedings, temporary ad hoc committees might be instituted across committee jurisdictions, thus providing flexibility in developing legislation not easily accommodated under existing practices.

Regular meetings of the policy committees (such as those held by the minority committee each week at lunch) could be the occasion for presentations of research and analysis to be used in problem identification. Information that appears to expose long-range problems on which the parties have not yet taken positions could be the subject of dual (majority and minority) committee consideration. In other respects, it is assumed that each policy committee will continue to work with its party contingent on standing committees.

It is possible that more party positions on specific proposals will emerge from the policy committees' work. There are many reasons, historic and contemporary, why partisan positions within and outside the Congress have been approached with great caution, a major one being regional divisions. But in the Senate, at least, there are forces at work which make regional considerations less divisive. It is possible in the case of some issues for positions to develop along party lines, particularly if the respective policy committees stimulate use of analysis for laying out the options that can lead in turn to policy decisions that can be supported with greater cohesion and confidence.

The policy committees presently facilitate the scheduling of legislation for floor action. For the most part, this is done to accommodate the standing committees. When a bill is ready, it is usually sent to the floor. Given a policy committee's involvement in a policy formulation process such as that described above, it could modestly be expected that the scheduling of legislation would also take account of the priorities given to major policy problems. Indeed, assuming that about half a dozen major policy issues would be given precedence in each session of Congress, work on these issues could be scheduled over an entire session of the Senate. No schedule, however, should be set in concrete. It should always be responsive to political dynamics inside the Senate and events unfolding in society. And at any time, for want of necessary information or because a projected analysis had not been completed, action on a problem might be delayed.
Policy committee concentration on cross-cutting issues may help resolve certain questions about committee jurisdiction. The reorganization Act of 1946 was the last completed attempt by the Congress to deal with the thorny problem of jurisdiction. Since 1970 the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations has been assigned the task of making recommendations on jurisdiction to both Houses of the Congress, on the theory that any changes should be simultaneous so that the subject areas of “opposite” committees would remain substantially the same; to do otherwise would be to complicate the work of resolving differences between House and Senate versions of bills. The House in the 93rd Congress made a largely unsuccessful effort to reassign subject areas following an ambitious program of study and hearings by a select committee. The Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee System is now examining the jurisdiction problem.

The Commission, by its charter, was specifically excluded from considering jurisdictional problems. But the experience that will be gained by the policy committees, if they are to play a central role in the process of policy formulation, should be utilized. Work with standing committee staffs on major policy matters that cut across committee lines appears to be the best preparation for negotiating on jurisdictional overlaps and preventing (or at least making the effort to prevent) duplication of subcommittees.

Recommendation

Restructure the policy committees to enable them to perform a more demanding role in foresight and comprehensive analysis.

The two policy committees already have many of the attributes required to play a more active policy planning role and, in doing so, to be accepted by Members of the Senate. The makeup of the two committees is such that they represent the divergent interests of geographical regions and of other Senate committees. Thus they are the most likely of existing institutions to assume policy leadership. It is, of course, essential that, as in the past, they should be so constituted that they can speak for their respective caucuses, and that committee chairmen or ranking minority members can play a strong role.

While the policy committees require continuity, they must also remain representative of the parties if they are to perform a constructive role. Changes in membership may be necessary from time to time, and the processes for nominating and electing members should provide opportunity for changes.

The Commission views the foresight needs it has identified as being of critical importance. The new responsibilities recommended for the policy committees will increase demands on the time and attention of Members. While it is essential that the leadership of the Senate be fully committed and involved, it may be necessary to delegate certain responsibilities to groups of Senators who can act in and through the policy committees.

Recommendation

Equip the policy committee staffs to enable them to support the committees’ new role.
The tasks of the policy committee staffs could be the following:

Identify emerging problems requiring policy decisions, utilizing various techniques.

Assemble and correlate foresight and oversight information bearing on major policy areas.

Arrange for the presentation of syntheses to the members of the policy committees.

In accordance with policy committee instructions, develop plans for policy analysis and research with the standing committee staffs.

Negotiate, with staffs of the standing committees, plans for carrying out needed analysis, identifying cross-cutting interests and potential political conflicts.

Advise the policy committee and Senate leadership of alternative mechanisms for carrying out policy analysis and research (e.g., ad hoc committee, congressional commission, inter-committee work group, etc.).

Report to the policy committees on analysis and developments affecting policy formulation. (For example, discoveries and events having a bearing on analysis in process.)

Provide the policy committees with the basis for defining party positions, as requested.

Organization of the policy committee staffs into two units, one concerned with current legislative activities and the other concerned with longer range problems, might be useful. As they carry out the proposed tasks, the staffs will be interacting with those of the standing committees, and delicate adjustment of roles, careful recognition of jurisdictional concerns, and awareness of personal sensitivities will be necessary.

How much change is proposed? How much will the role envisaged for the policy committees differ from that which now prevails? Perhaps very little, and certainly no more than what Senators will permit as they see the benefits of better policy information. The agenda of the Senate will still be largely determined by bills reported by standing committees. The difference will be that the policy committees will be engaged in a series of initiatives on behalf of their respective parties in the Senate to foster earlier problem identification, to raise questions that might not otherwise be asked, and to stimulate the necessary inquiries when possible. Throughout, the goal is to achieve a future-oriented and integrated examination of major policy alternatives. Under the revised procedure proposed here, open discussion would be encouraged at an early stage in order to identify the probable effects and effectiveness of policies. It may be objected that such open discussion will stimulate additional conflict among Senators. It is very likely, however, that Senators still will be able to resolve their doubts but at a higher level of understanding.

OVERSIGHT

As used in the legislative branch the term "oversight" lacks a common definition. The term may refer to a narrow investigation of a specific instance of perceived wrongdoing, inefficiency, or failure to act within a government agency. Or it may involve a broad undertak-
ing intended to change bureaucratic behavior. In recent years a good deal of oversight has tended toward supervision of program implementation by the executive branch.

For Congress as a whole a most important form of oversight involves systematic assessment of the extent to which given programs are effective in alleviating the problems which the enabling legislation addressed. Since such oversight must be systematic, it is often tedious. Nevertheless, effective conduct of such oversight is a matter of concern to many within the Senate. Oversight's importance derives from the light that it may throw on the question of whether policies or programs should be continued and, if so, in what form.

Currently, Senators and staff members engage in a large number of oversight activities. During 1975, for example, Senate committees and subcommittees held nearly 500 meetings recorded as concerned with oversight or related investigatory matters. In addition, of course, many legislative and appropriations hearings have oversight aspects.

Many oversight activities are ad hoc and nonsystematic: a response to a crisis, a newly important issue, or recently perceived malfeasance. But in other instances oversight activity is planned in advance and targeted with considerable care. There is a growing awareness on the part of Senators and staff of the need for a more systematic basis for oversight and evaluation of agency policies and programs. In both the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 and the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Congress sought to strengthen the oversight function. The 1970 Act directed committees to review administrative actions on a continuous basis and submit reports at the end of each Congress summarizing their oversight activities. GAO's role in program review was expanded. The 1974 Act strengthened the authority of committees to conduct analysis and evaluation and further strengthened the role of GAO in review and evaluation of programs. The GAO staff was enlarged, and a program analysis division was established.

Committees are beginning to reserve time periods for oversight. Senators and staff aides are becoming more familiar with sophisticated techniques for program evaluation. There is a growing perception that careful allocation of limited resources among competing demands is essential. And there is skepticism about creating new programs when there has been no systematic evaluation of those already established.

Nevertheless, the Senate oversight process needs to be strengthened in at least three respects. First, the coordination and leadership role of the Senate as a whole ought to be more actively asserted and widely accepted. Careful planning and scheduling of oversight activities and advance notice of such activities to the Senate is needed. Second, monitoring of oversight activities and increased technical assistance are required to insure improvements in the process. Third, staff capacities to perform oversight and program evaluation should be improved by training and new working arrangements.

Recommendation

Develop more effective processes for systematic oversight by the Senate.

Obligate committees to plan and schedule oversight activity and provide advance notice of such plans to the Senate.
Require committees to provide periodic reports on past oversight activities to the Senate.

Lodge responsibility for monitoring Senate oversight activities in the Government Operations Committee.

Develop the Government Operations Committee's capacity to provide high-quality assistance to other committees with regard to methods and information resources for oversight.

A good deal of oversight is now tied to legislation at the budget, appropriations, or reauthorizations stage. With the assistance of the support agencies, committees are beginning to lay the groundwork for effective oversight in advance of work on specific legislation. Among the steps that can be taken in planning and scheduling oversight activity are the following: (1) scheduling reauthorizations sequentially in regular cycles to permit committees to balance their workload from year to year; (2) development of programs of systematic data collection for program assessment; and (3) advance scheduling of oversight hearings to be held throughout a session.

Both the obligation of committees to provide the Senate with oversight plans in advance and the monitoring of oversight work by the Government Operations Committee would help to achieve a coordinated overview and strengthen the oversight function. It would reveal any areas that might have been overlooked. Relating oversight to major Senate activities should be one objective of reporting and coordination procedures. Periodic reports would enable the policy committees to suggest additional lines of inquiry and possible action by the Senate as a whole.

The Government Operations Committee would, of course, have to prepare its staff to provide technical assistance to the standing committees. In particular, the development of staff knowledge of program analysis and evaluation, including the design of evaluation studies, would be required.

Systematic procedures for conducting oversight include determining the types of information and information systems needed, establishing a regular cycle of deadlines for receiving information, and developing procedures for analyzing and applying the information received. Some committees have successfully developed systematic oversight techniques like these, which are used to identify emerging problems as well as to monitor those already marked for attention. The utility and potential availability of policy-oriented management information systems should also be explored.

The nature of the legislative process, as well as the scope of government activity, often makes an unambiguous statement of goals and objectives difficult. However, a relatively precise statement of this type is needed to provide the basis for program review and evaluation. If objectives are not provided in a piece of legislation, there is need for all those involved in the program review process to work out agreed criteria for program review and evaluation.

Recommendation

Strengthen Senate staff capabilities to perform oversight and program evaluation. Specifically:

Expand GAO assistance to the Senate through such techniques as working with committees at the early stages of studies, pro-
Aiding information on new evaluation capabilities and studies, and assisting in the establishment of information criteria for budget and program analysis.

Establish training programs for Senate staff.

Encourage the creation of interdisciplinary oversight work groups, drawn from the support agencies and committee staffs.

Program review and evaluation offer opportunities for Senators to ask fundamental questions. Is the program working? Is it achieving the intended results? Increased technical assistance by GAO could facilitate the work of the Senate in program review and evaluation, and a strengthened Senate capability for directing and using program evaluation would in turn contribute to more effective oversight.

Participants have found seminars conducted by the support agencies to be helpful in strengthening their own oversight work and valuable as training opportunities. The new budget process has familiarized committee staffs with information needs and sources and with various techniques of program review and evaluation; familiarity has led to increased interest and use. If training opportunities for improving professional competence are increased, more effective oversight should result.

The primary purpose of the interdisciplinary work groups would be to assist committees and subcommittees in identifying and analyzing critical issues to be addressed in the authorization-appropriation process, or during special oversight hearings and investigations. They would serve committees and subcommittees for a specific period of time.

Recommendation

Establish a Senate-wide system for collecting information from individual Senate offices which would help to identify problem areas requiring more intensive oversight activity.

Casework, like federal projects work, is carried on primarily by the personal staffs of Senators. Although casework and federal projects provide opportunities to monitor the performance of agencies and of programs, each Senatorial office can only link casework to policy as time and inclination permit. A Senate-wide casework and federal projects information system, classifying casework and projects activity by program category, would enable committees to monitor agencies and programs under their jurisdiction more fully. Such a system should include information relating to program regulations and procedural problems that may be widespread. It would thus enable Senate committees to more readily identify problem areas requiring more systematic oversight and possibly more general remedial action.
SECTION VI

IMPROVING LEGISLATION—TECHNOLOGY

This section of our report is concerned with the techniques by which information is transferred. Knowledge of Senate floor and committee activities, information on the content of evolving legislation, and information relevant to policymaking are three of many types of knowledge needed by Senators. Our studies suggest that there are both technical changes and changes of format that can help Senators make better law by providing them with more timely information.

The use of modern information technology is uneven in the Senate. While major computer facilities as well as most of the needed human skills are available, progress in making these resources meet the reasonable needs of Senators has been slow. Closed-circuit television is not yet used for information purposes. Printing, though widely used, has not benefited from cost-effective technological innovations to the degree possible, notwithstanding the Government Printing Office's recognition of the problem.

The form and content of much substantive information could also be improved. Committee reports and other legislative documents are uneven in form and content. Greater cooperation among committee staff directors is needed to improve the value of committee material to Senators and to increase the usefulness of technical systems by which this material can most effectively be transferred.

LEGISLATIVE OPERATING INFORMATION

Senators need operating information to carry out their legislative tasks. Operating information includes timely, reliable, and concise information on the scheduling of meetings and votes on bills, the status and content of pending bills, activities on the floor and similar procedural matters. Although the technology exists to provide this operating information, the Senate has yet to take full advantage of it. Similar uses of the technology are more advanced in several state legislatures.

Recommendation

Provide, through the Administrator, complete up-to-date information on legislative flow, using computerized techniques. To do this the Administrator should:

Identify and involve users of information services.

Establish orientation and training programs to acquaint current and potential users with the possibilities of computer use.

Develop an ad hoc advisory group to aid in anticipating and adapting new uses of computers.

Establish a regular joint working group of House and Senate staff personnel responsible for computer activities.
Develop designs for a committee-based information and data center network.

Prepare a flexible master plan.

Adhere to the priorities of an approved master plan for at least the first two years of its existence.

The Senate has access to the equipment and programming skills necessary to develop a computerized information system. Development of such a system has been impeded (especially in the Senate) by lack of cooperation between Senate and House, lack of planning, and a tendency to react to initiatives from several directions. While there has been some progress toward a good information system, past progress provides no assurance that the best use will be made of available resources. The Senate needs highly skilled and experienced personnel to plan the best possible information system.

Potential users of a better information system include the standing committees, officers of the Senate, individual Senators' offices, and the policy committees. Representatives of these potential users should meet regularly for two purposes. The first would be to learn more about the various types of computer equipment and what it can do. The second would be to permit users to express their problems and needs, since they are the primary judges of the value of any system.

Training programs for users should be established. These programs should include broad descriptions of the nature and capabilities of computerized information systems and the basic requirements for establishing new services, as well as regular training in the operation of computer equipment.

The creation of a knowledgeable ad hoc advisory group would also be helpful. Members of this group would include experts from the private sector as well as selected individuals from the Library of Congress, the General Accounting Office, the Government Printing Office, and other congressional support agencies. The purpose of this group would be to offer a broad perspective on computer usage that would be helpful to Congress, and to promote development of the computerized information system.

Good coordination is also vital. This could be achieved by the joint working group of House and Senate staff members, which would strive to minimize duplication, exchange information, and encourage the acquisition of compatible hardware and programs by all offices in the information network. Representatives of the Library of Congress and other legislative support agencies would be asked to participate.

Senate committees are potentially major users of computer-based information. The formulation of fiscal policy, as expressed in the budgetary process, is already dependent on computerized data and models. Those who work on energy, environmental protection, health, and welfare are scarcely less dependent. Design of committee-focused data centers that are interconnected is feasible and ought to be undertaken in cooperation with interested committee staff.

The preparation of a master plan for a Senate information system is difficult but essential. Each of the groups mentioned previously should have an opportunity to help develop the plan. Once developed, the plan (with appropriate implementation schedule and budget) should be made available to all Senators, committees, and Senate officers. Each of the groups mentioned above should be asked to review
and comment on the plan. It should cover the next five years, with heaviest emphasis on the next two years.

Modifications of the plan should follow a reasonably orderly procedure; the energies of the Senate should not be dissipated in responses to irregular requests or frequent changes in priorities.

**Management of Printing**

Printed material, in large quantities, is an indispensable tool in the Senate's operations. It is estimated that Congress will require more than 750,000 pages of printing in FY 1977. A considerable part of the bills, resolutions, amendments, hearings, committee reports, and calendars printed by the Government Printing Office for the Congress are the responsibility of the Senate. So is a major portion of the Congressional Record. Management of the Senate's printing can be improved considerably. In a special study by an outside specialist that the Commission requested, more than $15 million in potential annual savings in printing costs were identified.

**Recommendation**

Take the lead in developing a cost-effective, integrated printing management system for Congress as a whole, if possible, and for the Senate, for certain. This requires the following steps:

- Establish a printing management unit in the administrative office.
- Revise customary practices to allow prefiling of bills.
- Reevaluate the format of bills, stock quality, print and margin sizes, strikeover procedures, and other features.
- Convert to use of machine-readable copy from all Senate sources to the printing plant.
- Submit most edited copy to the printer through typewriter terminals.
- Institute quality and production controls.

The printing work assigned by the Senate to the GPO is steadily soaring in volume. The Congressional Record has grown dramatically. Both the number and length of bills printed have also increased. While the GPO is aware of technological improvements in the printing trade and has acquired much modern equipment, many of the basic processes (particularly with respect to management of the Senate's printing) are unchanged from earlier years. Printed formats seldom change; tradition is strong, and inertia is prevalent. As in many other aspects of the Senate's operations, the absence of any individual officer charged with responsibility for printed matter and its improvement has retarded modernization. The Joint Committee on Printing is not assigned the task of printing administration, nor has it become deeply involved in GPO operations.

GPO officials have modernized some phases of the Congress's printing process. Essentially, however, they print what they are given in the form expected. The initiative for large-scale improvement must come from Congress. The volume of Congressional printing has become so great that what only a few decades ago were minor extra expenses (the use of very expensive paper for routine printing, spacious typefaces, extra-wide margins, to name only a few) now mean very substantial costs. Extraordinarily brief turnaround demands—regardless of the
fact that the printing office has long complied with such demands—create high costs. Observers of the legislative printing process have long marveled at the superb quality of the Congressional Record, invariably printed overnight and delivered early each day. Since copy for the Record is not prepared in machine-readable form, the cost is very high, too.

In short, Congress demands much unusual service in its printing. It necessarily requires very short turnaround times. It supplies a good deal of semilegible copy and expects high-quality printing in an extremely expensive format. To some degree, its requests can be justified. Congress must trade some extra costs for precious time. But careful evaluation and certain reforms are now necessary. Very substantial savings of money are possible, with all due allowance for the legitimate needs of the Congress.

**IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION ON PENDING LEGISLATION**

Few Senate problems cause as much readily expressed dissatisfaction as lack of complete information concerning pending legislation. This information must be easily understood, quickly assimilated, and therefore clearly framed for decisionmaking in view of the pace of legislative activity in the Senate. The format in which such information is presented represents a technology apart from the medium by which it is conveyed.

Each Senator, of course, participates in the legislative process. Each Senator has the responsibility of representing his state and his constituents. To perform these tasks effectively, a Senator must not only have operating information but also knowledge of the content of the legislation evolving in committees and access to the information developed and gathered by the committees for use in decisionmaking.

Most, if not all, of this information is available through the various Senate offices, but the Senate as an institution does not assure that it is universally supplied in a usable form. It is usually controlled by the committees charged with specific legislative responsibility.

Committee calendars, committee reports, Congressional Record inserts, policy committee fact sheets, and whip notices are available to Senators. These various items provide information on the status of bills, what the bills contain, and contemplated action. The dissatisfaction frequently expressed about these items reflects the unevenness to be found in the availability and quality of information.

Some committees, through their chairmen or subcommittee chairmen, try to keep the Senate apprised of their work through regular statements on the floor, insertions in the Congressional Record, press releases, or committee publications. They recognize the fact that the business of their committee or subcommittee is the business of the Senate. The Commission commends these efforts and recommends that the Senate encourage greater use of these practices.

**Recommendation**

Encourage committee staff directors to assume a greater coordinating and leadership role in improving the quality and timeliness of legislative information for the Senate.

A great deal of factual information is acquired and then remains under the control of Senate committees. Opportunity for exchange of
information on procedures and techniques is provided by the regular meetings of staff directors of the standing committees, who have first-hand knowledge of the work of their committees and subcommittees. Thus, staff directors as a group offer the opportunity for better coordination of the form in which information is presented.

Recommendation

Adopt more uniform formats for committee documents and examine the advantages of automated techniques for the preparation of such documents.

Much of the information needed by the Senate is provided through such traditional documents as committee reports and calendars. But the formats of Senate reports and calendars are as varied as the committees and their jurisdictions. Variations in style of presentation will doubtless continue to exist because of diversity of subject areas and differing degrees of complexity.

However, certain standard information is now required for reports, such as front-page notice of additional, supplemental, or minority views, Congressional Budget Office cost computations, and roll call votes. Further standardization is feasible and desirable. A standard report format should include a table of contents, a summary statement of purpose and the means of carrying out the legislation’s goals, and a listing of amendments and their sponsors, whether accepted or rejected. Many reports now include these facts. All reports should. Stress should be placed on clarity and understanding.

Committee calendars contain many important details, but the format of each depends largely on the judgment of whoever prepares it. Some calendars list the number, title, popular title, senatorial sponsor, date of introduction, and proposed amendments to pending legislation. Some note all committee activity, including requests for agency comments, subcommittee action, committee votes on amendments, and markup. Most, however, are less detailed.

The Senate is presently equipping its committees with computers to help produce their calendars. A fully computerized information system, as discussed in the previous section, would make it unnecessary to print committee calendars at the GPO, except perhaps for historical purposes.

Regardless of how calendar information is provided, use of a uniform calendar format should be encouraged. In questions of format, as in content, committee staff directors are best placed to explore and initiate helpful changes. All such changes should take account of the possible application of modern automated techniques for the preparation and dissemination of information.

TAILORING INFORMATION TO SENATORS’ NEEDS

Computerized information systems are not only useful for speeding up and improving the handling of large amounts of information. Through proper controls, they can also be used to meet the narrower needs of particular users. In other words, they can get the exact information needed to a Senator without overloading him or her with large amounts of useless or marginal material.
Recommendation

Experiment with profiles of the information needs of individual Senators and methods of meeting those needs.

There are significant differences in the principal interests of different Senators, in the importance of different issues, in the purposes for which information is used, and in the ways it is acquired. Some Senators acquire information chiefly by reading, others chiefly by listening; some are technically oriented, others are not. In varying degrees, staff members are equipped to meet specialized information needs. Some may be experts in particular fields. Others, while not experts, may have acquired considerable skill in assessing the credibility of information. Frequently, however, they are not fully equipped to judge the validity and reliability of scientific and technical knowledge, to understand the characteristics of multiple sources of information, or obtain swift and selective access to these sources.

The aim of the proposed experimental effort would be to discover how individualized assistance by information experts could assist Senators in the acquisition and presentation of information. The intent, of course, is to supplement, not displace, normal sources of information. The objective is to find ways of conserving the scarce time of Senators while at the same time improving the information they use in reaching decisions. Our recommendation is that the technical staff of the Administrator attempt to prepare such profiles and examine the technology needed to answer the demands for individual Senators requesting the service.

PROMISING APPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGY

There are manifest opportunities to make use of closed-circuit television and cathode ray tube (CRT) screens to enable Senators to be better informed of events taking place on the Senate floor. The Senate has already experimented with one unsatisfactory floor summary system, while the House has a floor summary system in operation. Though difficulties may be encountered, the Senate should continue to experiment with alternative systems.

Recommendation

Experiment with the following innovative techniques:

- Televise floor proceedings for closed-circuit purposes even if they are not televised for public consumption.
- Provide running summaries of floor proceedings that can be transmitted to the CRT terminals in Senators' offices.
- Use computer technology to display the text of all amendments, printed or unprinted, under consideration on the floor.

Senators and their staffs must coordinate attendance at committee meetings and other activities with the demands of the Senate floor. To do so requires knowing what is taking place there. Later in this report the Commission recommends that the Senate experiment with public broadcasts of its proceedings. Closed-circuit broadcasts for internal purposes would be a valuable precursor to this public airing.

But complete television coverage has disadvantages for the purpose of following floor events. The time of someone assigned to monitor floor proceedings is as fully consumed before a screen as in the gallery.
Summaries transmitted by computer, however, would make it possible for staff aides to check developments at intervals, refer to reports of events which had already transpired, or be alerted to the particular question on which a floor vote is being taken.

Understanding the substance of amendments is the key to the lawmaking task and to understanding events on the floor. Every effort should be made to improve Senators' knowledge of the pending business when they are being called to the floor for a vote.

Compiling Data for Future Decisions

Computerized information systems can be used to provide better data on which to base future changes in procedures and schedules.

Recommendation

Compile information about floor sessions, committee business, and bill flow on a systematic and continuing basis.

The LEGIS system now being implemented in the Senate will provide comprehensive information on bill status and bill flow. The committee meeting scheduling system under development should provide for storage and retrieval of information about committee meetings. In addition, records of floor activity—including the times of record votes and quorum calls—should be automated. Material from these three sources should be consolidated by the central administrative unit recommended previously. This material would help to provide a greater understanding of scheduling problems and the implications of specific changes which may be recommended from time to time.
SECTION VII

IMPROVING LEGISLATION—THE SUPPORT AGENCIES

Of the many external sources of information and analysis of the Senate, the congressional support agencies—the Congressional Research Service, the General Accounting Office, the Office of Technology Assessment, and the Congressional Budget Office—are the most answerable to the needs of the Senate as a whole. They are also the most flexible in responding to changing Senate needs.

Considered in combination, the information and analysis services of these four agencies tend to be coextensive with many of the functions that the Senate performs. They provide services for congressional constituencies, for individual Members, and for committees. These services may range from supplying specific information to an individual Senator to carrying out sustained analyses for oversight, appropriations, or authorization purposes.

The four agencies are unique. Unlike most Federal agencies, they are not a part of the executive branch—although the head of one (the GAO) is appointed by the President. Yet, paradoxically, they receive little supervision from Congress, which created them for its own purposes.

The agencies have a combined annual budget of approximately $186 million and employ approximately 6,000 persons.* They are technical and nonpolitical. The agencies have the capability to provide the Congress with skilled policy analysis of a very high order. However, if the agencies are to fulfill the purpose for which they were created they must find ways to supply the Congress with knowledge and analysis in a form that is both timely and intelligible to Members.

Each of the agencies has been organized in a unique way, but all have in common the fact that they are funded through the legislative appropriations subcommittees of the House and Senate. However, this process does not seem to have significant bearing on the scope or nature of their work.

The success of the agencies in meeting the continuing needs of Congress is variable. Members frequently speak of the need for nonpartisan policy analysis; in fact, they may be seeking reliable material for partisan debate. The agencies have struggled to enlarge their competence to analyze policy, but today they find themselves submerged in meeting short-term, rush deadline demands for factual material.

Recommendation

Since these agencies serve both Houses, the Senate in conjunction with the House of Representatives should seek to bring about the following (when necessary, by amending the enabling legislation):

*Two-thirds of the more than 5,000 employees of GAO are primarily engaged in auditing the accounts of executive branch agencies.

(59)
Effective congressional supervision, to improve administrative coherence, insure cooperation, and enhance initiative of the support agencies in providing service to Congress.

Strengthened capacities and adjusted procedures in the support agencies for the purpose of increasing the availability of high-quality information and analysis to Congress.

Each agency, for different reasons, falls short of its potential for serving the Senate.

All four have serious internal operating problems, although not necessarily identical ones. These include a confused sense of mission, inadequate direction, staffing problems, serious lack of space, and communication difficulties, both intramural and with congressional staff.

The support agencies collectively suffer from the absence of a central authority charged with providing direction and coordination to their activities. Responsibility for their performance is diffused among many different power centers, most of which have little immediate concern for the total agency product and little interest in how agency output may relate to Congress as a whole. As a result, each agency charts its own direction, identifying and satisfying its congressional clients as best it can.

The agencies are, in the main, without political protection from attack by those who disagree with their work. They are largely defenseless when their products become embroiled in controversy. Nor can they defend their areas of competence when other agencies undertake duplicative functions. Because each support agency exists by virtue of different enabling legislation, the Senate cannot by itself effect changes without the cooperation, or at least the acquiescence, of the House.

The problems of duplication and overlap are felt by each of the support agencies. It can be argued in some cases that this duplication is healthy because it leads to competition, improved competence, and a better product. Since there is more than one side to a policy controversy, differing analyses—with differing emphasis, source material, and conclusions—are of great value in the accommodation process by which policy issues are resolved. While analysis of the same issue by different agencies may produce contradictory results, this may nonetheless prove valuable to the Senate as it works its will.

This argument, however, ignores the fact that duplication is likely to involve waste. Good work is not used; good minds remain hidden and frustrated. Adequate ways of pinpointing overlap, gaps, and deficiencies are needed, as well as procedures to handle such problems.

In order to obtain an evaluation of the agencies and the extent of their use, the Commission conducted a survey among both personal and committee staffs. In addition, studies of each agency and a composite study of all four were undertaken. The focus of the Commission's inquiry was on the following questions: How well does the information and analysis provided by each agency meet the needs of the Senate? What changes in the way each agency operates would enable it to serve the Senate more effectively?

In this section of our report a brief overview of each agency and a series of recommendations drawn from the studies initiated by the Commission is provided. The recommendations, addressed to the individual support agencies, are intended to help them improve their
effectiveness and responsiveness to the needs of the Senate. If implemented, the recommendations would enhance the competence and utility of the support agencies. What is less certain, of course, is whether better information and analysis will be better used. This will depend on whether senatorial demand for such material can be strengthened along the lines suggested in the previous sections that deal with foresight and oversight policy leadership, and whether congressional supervision that reflects those perspectives is actually provided.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

The General Accounting Office assists Congress through a wide range of functions. It assists in organizing hearings, comments on proposed legislation, clarifies budget terminology, conducts extensive audits and investigations and, to some extent, evaluates Federal programs. The audit, however, is at the heart of GAO's work. The GAO's concept of auditing goes beyond examination of another agency's accounts for legality, accuracy, and format; it extends to analyzing efficiency and economy of operations, and reviewing results in the light of legislative objectives.

GAO is the primary field investigation agency available to Congress and is generally regarded as a reliable source of audit, review, and related services. But it has been criticized for what some Members of Congress perceive as an inability to evaluate programs in terms of their social effects—e.g., improvements in reading ability, actual improvements in housing, and the like. Moreover, GAO is slow in responding to requests, possibly in part because of rather elaborate clearance procedures. GAO also apparently has a serious problem in recruiting and retaining the interest of "nonaccountant" professionals, since it is predominantly supervised by managers with accounting backgrounds.

In order to serve the Senate more effectively, the General Accounting Office should:

Improve its communications with Congress by (1) placing additional emphasis on consultations with committees, their staffs, and individual Members; committee and staff briefings and participation in committee hearings; and (2) reducing dependence upon formal reports, which require extended internal processing, and instead accelerating the trend toward greater utilization of memoranda, issue and staff papers, and other less formal documents that can be produced quickly.

Strengthen its program evaluation capability and continue to develop strong oversight-related technical capabilities, including those for the design of program review and evaluation studies and the design of policy-oriented management information systems.

Establish a more realistic balance between accuracy of reports and the delays often involved in making GAO output available to its congressional constituency.

Restrict its "privileged status" classification to exceptional cases that clearly justify this type of special treatment.

Rethink GAO's ability to enhance Congress's expanding budgetary role. Properly conceptualized, GAO assistance in the budg-
eting area should: (a) complement, rather than duplicate, the work of the Congressional Budget Office; and (b) assist congressional oversight.

Intensify GAO’s efforts to strengthen the multidisciplinary makeup of its staff in terms not only of numbers but also leadership positions occupied by representatives of the various disciplines.

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

The Congressional Research Service has the widest range of functions among the support agencies. Its name was changed from “Legislative Reference Service” to “Congressional Research Service” in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970; Congress thus symbolized its intent that CRS should provide more extensive policy analysis to Congress and should work more extensively than it had previously with congressional committees. To a far greater extent than GAO, the Congressional Research Service works with individual Members of Congress; therefore, it is considered to be the major source of information for Congress as a whole.

Despite the fact that CRS has substantial analytical capability and undertakes analyses on a regular basis, it continues to be widely regarded as primarily a reference service, no doubt in part because of its connection with the Library of Congress. CRS is viewed as a reliable source of specific factual information, very versatile, and usually quick to respond. Its work is valued but considered variable in quality. CRS has suffered from the uncertainties of interim management for nearly two years since its last appointed director announced in December 1974 his intention to retire. CRS’s ability to recruit and retain first-class scholars, either temporarily or for the long-term, has fallen short of the expectations aroused by the 1970 Act. Crowded conditions, inadequate research facilities, and a shortage of clerical assistance no doubt have aggravated this deficiency.

In order to capitalize on its versatile and evolving capacities, the Congressional Research Service should:

- Develop its capabilities to conduct interdisciplinary research that addresses policies as a whole and, in order to undertake such research, organize project teams on a permanent basis.
- Confine the activity of senior specialists to major projects.
- Devote a significant portion of its resources to the development of methodologies for policy analysis.
- Make more use of contracts with outside experts to obtain information needed by congressional committees and to supplement CRS personnel.
- Institute policies to increase its interaction with other elements of the national research community.
- Receive authorization to make a more substantial investment in the development of its research staff than it has been allowed to make in the past.

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

The Office of Technology Assessment was established in 1972 to provide early indications of the probable effects of technological changes. The Office was designed to undertake studies of a prospective
nature and, by inference, has a responsibility for forecasting the future. It has made extensive use of contracts and panels of outside experts in carrying out its work.

The Commission's studies showed that, compared to CRS and GAO, the Office of Technology Assessment and its mission are poorly understood by Senate Members and staff. There has been a controversy about the role of its Advisory Council and about what kind of work OTA should perform. OTA has leaned toward answering "quickie" inquiries—in the manner of CRS—rather than toward husbanding its resources for major studies with a long-term perspective. The latter, however, constituted the rationale for OTA's creation. The science community appears to be dissatisfied with OTA's performance; at the least, there is a wide variety of judgments concerning the value of its work.

To enhance the scientific and technological knowledge base for legislation, the Office of Technology Assessment should:

- Demonstrate a commitment to, and capability for, high-quality policy studies which will be well-regarded both inside and outside the Congress, and of optimum use to the Senate.
- Focus on areas of interest that substantially involve science and technology, but without hard and fast boundaries.
- Shift from the current predominance of quick responses to committee requests to a balanced program of studies that includes more long-term analyses that trace the consequences of technological development.
- Demonstrate its ability to enlist highly qualified individuals from the outside technology community in the conduct of its work. This would firmly establish OTA's uniqueness and help enable Congress to operate on an equal footing with the executive branch.
- Make better use of its Advisory Council, which is mandated to advise its congressional Board. The Council should also perform an oversight function by evaluating the quality of, and congressional reaction to, OTA studies.
- Revamp its management structure, a highly compartmentalized vertical organization that lodges excessive responsibility at the top.
- Assess the reasons underlying mixed staff competence, such as recruitment procedures, salaries and working conditions. The importance of a high-quality OTA staff that matches those of outside institutions dictates prompt attention to this situation.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE

The Congressional Budget Office is the newest of the support agencies, established by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. The first director was appointed in February, 1975. The Congressional Budget Office is responsible to the Budget Committees in the Senate and the House. More particularly, it is responsible for keeping score of congressional authorizations in terms of their budgetary implications, estimating the costs of legislation authorizing particular programs, assessing the economic outlook of the country and the impact of alternative fiscal and other major policy
options on the economy, estimating receipts from existing and proposed revenue legislation, and related tasks.

CBO has had some difficulty in developing effective working relationships with both Budget Committees, but more particularly that of the House. The agency has been criticized for utilizing its highly professional and skilled staff to write reports unrelated to legislative activities, and thus not providing sufficient prompt attention to the needs of the Budget Committees. The general conclusion of the Commission is that it is too early to form a comprehensive judgment about these matters. These criticisms should, however, be reviewed by CBO.

The Congressional Budget Office should:

Utilize its Program Analysis Division to aid its Budget Analysis Division in meeting annual deadlines with high-quality work.

Actively seek to meet the expectation of members of the Budget Committees that they can look to CBO for the help they need to carry out their committee duties.

Establish clearer and stronger links with other support agencies—especially GAO, and, to a lesser extent, OTA.
SECTION VIII
PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS

Information flows in profusion from the Senate to the American people. Senators periodically express their ideas and opinions on all the assorted and contending preoccupations of the nation. Up to 200 reporters cover the Senate regularly, and hundreds more are on hand for special occasions. The representatives of dozens of special interest organizations monitor the Senate’s proceedings and report on them to their members. Senators themselves mail many newsletters and reports to their constituents.

Nonetheless, most citizens do not have a good idea of the institution’s role and processes, and seldom is the public given an adequate picture of the senatorial dialogue taking place on a current issue. In order to understand what happens in the Senate, the public must get more information than it gets now from those who choose to speak out or those the news media selects on the basis of their own criteria. The legislative story, in short, requires more comprehensive and balanced treatment if it is to be communicated effectively.

Some would argue that much of what the Senate has been doing in recent years simply has not been of any great public interest. Without disputing the fact that the nature of events has considerable bearing on their newsworthiness (or, in this case, pointing to Senate action regarding involvement in Angola, oversight of intelligence agencies, “sunshine in government,” energy policy, air and water pollution, termination of military aid to Indochina, and so on), it is necessary to look for answers to the problem by examining the communications practices of the Senate and the characteristics of the communications channels.

Senate communications are an accumulation of the efforts of individual Senators, each of whom is free to address any particular problem and to seek to accomplish any one of a number of purposes. Sometimes they speak as state representatives, sometimes as national leaders, and sometimes as institutional agents of the Senate.

Moreover, Senators communicate with the public through a variety of channels, each of which imposes certain conditions on how messages are prepared and what audiences are reached. These communications channels include the following: (a) national news media; (b) local news media; (c) specialized news media; (d) Senators’ direct mail reports; and (e) private organizations’ newsletters and publications.

Senators typically rely on local news media (local newspapers and radio and TV stations) and use their own mailings to carry on a dialogue with their state’s constituents—to provide certain service information, to focus attention on state and local problems, and to marshall support for proposed legislation to address those state and local problems. In this they are performing their representative functions.

(65)
Local news media willingly serve these purposes because they are generally open to all news of direct interest to local citizens even if it is otherwise undramatic or lacking in urgency. The local news media see their state's Senators first as personalities of particular interest to their local audiences.

When they perform the role of national leaders Senators inevitably turn to the national news media (wire services, broadcast networks, news magazines), the specialized news media (magazines and other publications covering limited subject areas), and the private organizations that distribute reports on national issues throughout the country.

The national news media, of course, reach the largest audience. Moreover, they increasingly have come to influence public perception of what the chief national problems and issues are. The specialized news media and private communications channels reach certain cross-sections of the national audience.

As agents of the Senate as an institution—some frequently, others only occasionally—Senators help to explain the processes and achievements of the Senate and, in doing so, again rely on these channels of communication, particularly the national and specialized news media.

Members of the Senate do not attempt to perform each of these roles in a similar manner. Some pay little attention to institutional matters; others spend less time on national issues.

Nor do all Senators devote a comparable amount of time and energy to communicating with the public, whatever functions they each may deem most important. They do not all issue press releases and newsletters, and those who do employ different standards and communicate with different frequency. Certain Senators who spend much time on national issues do not seek—and may even try to avoid—national coverage.

The conditions imposed on Senate communications by the various media are frequently dissimilar.

The national news media, for example, focus on what is remarkable, urgent, or dramatic. Although national news reporters cover the Senate intensively, their stories must compete for print space or broadcast time with everything else that is happening in the nation and the world on the same day. Anyone who seeks to use them, therefore, is prompted to cast his or her message in the most striking or colorful terms.

Local news media, on the other hand, will ordinarily use a large quantity of information from a Senator if it focuses on local problems, the local impact of congressional proposals, the local share of Federal funding, and so forth. Local news media do not cover the Senate with their own staff, in most cases; instead, they rely heavily on information produced and distributed by Senators' offices.

The specialized news media and private organizations are the most consistent in reporting developments in their specific areas of interest, but in both cases they reach only small, select audiences. Moreover, the private organizations generally interpret events in terms of their own particular interests.

The newsletters and other mailings of Senators, of course, usually reflect their own particular interests and views. They relay information about small problems as well as large ones and address issues that are not before the Senate as well as those that are. Some go to known sup-
porters, some to a random sample of constituents, some to hundreds of thousands of homes statewide.

Given the practices of Senators and the characteristics of the various types of communications channels, a number of key problems can be identified:

- Reporting of Senate activities that extend over a period of time is likely to be erratic, with significant developments overlooked or overshadowed on any given day by other events.
- Alternative views on major matters may not receive equal attention, and some may not be heard at all.
- Complex problems or proposals may be fragmented and their pieces reported on separately, without concern for larger purposes.
- Attention is diverted from substantive matters when Senate actions are reported in sensational terms, or the focus is on personalities and incidentals.

Each time a Senator addresses a matter to which the Senate as a whole gives a high priority, he serves the institution’s central purposes and contributes a piece to the full Senate story. However, there are no guarantees that he will do so frequently and effectively—much of his time may go to lesser concerns. Nor is there now any adequate means of assuring that all pieces of the essential story will emerge.

This is regrettable, since the Senate is a forum for the peaceful resolution of conflicting views and contending interests by negotiation and compromise. Its story is usually one of confrontation, struggle, and consensus.

Thus, if the Senate story is to unfold in a consistent way, is not to be one-sided, is not to be fragmented, and is not to be obscured by sensationalism—in short, if the story is to be told with authority that can match that of the President’s—its telling cannot be left to chance. The Senate as a body must take steps to coordinate and improve its communications with the public. The recommendations that follow indicate how that can be done.

**BROADCASTING FLOOR PROCEEDINGS**

The Senate Chamber is the institution’s center stage. It is here that Senate debate and decisionmaking are seen in full force. It is here, finally and formally, that views are delineated, ideas are challenged, courses of action are defended, and agreements and compromises are realized.

**Recommendation**

Conduct a full-scale experiment of audio and video broadcasting of floor proceedings.

Although the Senate Chamber has been open to reporters since 1794, it is still closed to broadcasting, even though radio and television provide the most immediate and pervasive form of communication with the public. This ban might be described as atypical.

The televising of floor proceedings, in some form, is permitted in the legislatures of more than 20 nations, including France, West Germany, the Scandinavian countries, and Japan. The United Nations also broadcasts its floor proceedings, and some kind of televised floor coverage is permitted in the legislatures of 44 states. The Senate itself permits the broadcasting of committee proceedings.
In 1974 the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations urged an end to the congressional ban on broadcasting, concluding that the medium afforded the “most practical, immediate, direct way to enhance public understanding.” Later the same year the Twentieth Century Fund’s Task Force on Broadcasting and the Legislature concluded its independent study with the same basic finding.

The Commission realizes that broadcasting from the Senate floor raises many difficult questions. Perhaps the most important is whether it can be done in a way that assures fair treatment of individual Senators and the institution as a whole. Senators talk privately to colleagues and staff members during debates. The cameras may photograph behavior that appears to be curious, if not bizarre. Much business is conducted when few Members are on the floor. Many floor sessions are unexciting.

There are other questions as well. Will broadcasts that pick up floor action in mid-course be intelligible, or adequately explained by commentators? Will the purpose and significance of particular actions be understood? Will cameras, microphones, lights and wiring get in the way?

It is the Commission's judgment that the advantages of broadcasting floor proceedings would outweigh the disadvantages, and it believes that questions about television’s impact on Senate proceedings can only be resolved by conducting an actual test.

The Commission therefore recommends that such an experiment be conducted for an extended period under the supervision of the joint leadership in conjunction with the Committee on Rules and Administration. The experiment’s purpose would be to provide practical answers to questions regarding the lighting and technical facilities required, the positive and negative effects on the work of the Senate, and the rules that would be required to govern both audio and video broadcasting from the Chamber.

Following the example of the United Nations, the Senate itself should control the cameras and microphones during the test period, determining what activities will be broadcast and in what manner. Rules and procedures could be changed periodically so that the effects of different rules could be determined.

A primary use of television coverage is for internal Senate purposes (discussed in Section III of this report). For these purposes, coverage must be largely confined to the presiding officer and the Senator who holds the floor. Once the technical problems of televising Senate floor proceedings were solved, the first public broadcasts could, if found desirable, be based on that closed-circuit system.

Broadcast services could be obtained by contracting with a private or nonprofit source. The experience gained from this trial would help the Senate determine whether broadcasts should be provided by an in-house system, a pooling arrangement operated by the major private broadcast networks, the public broadcasting system, some other outside organization, or not at all.

**NEWS BRIEFS AND MATERIALS**

Information about major sequential actions on high-priority legislation on the Senate’s agenda should be precisely detailed, carefully
balanced, and widely distributed. These legislative matters are often the most complex in terms of precipitating causes or solutions or both, and Senate attention to these matters is likely to extend over long periods.

Recommendation

Begin the practice of holding formal briefings for the news media.

The White House and most of the executive agencies systematically brief the news media on major activities. The Senate does not. Nor does the Senate have a central facility designed for regular, all-media briefings on major actions.

While Senate leaders do hold informal meetings with the press at the beginning of each daily session, briefings on legislative developments are left to others more immediately concerned (e.g., committee chairmen, sponsors of bills, etc.). As a consequence, the Senate's total activity remains only partly illuminated. No systematic and reliable procedure exists for the full dissemination of information to busy reporters.

Briefings should be scheduled, on a regular basis, to report progress on all significant matters on the Senate agenda. The briefings should focus on each sequential action on major legislative proposals, investigations, and oversight activities, including the introduction of bills, negotiation of agreements and compromises, reporting of bills by committees, offering of amendments on the floor, and final enactment of measures.

These briefings should be conducted by Senate leaders, committee chairmen, sponsors and floor managers, or individual Senators representing ad hoc groups of their colleagues, depending on the subject. They should be centrally coordinated to assure that they are scheduled in a timely manner and provide an opportunity for the presentation of alternative views.

Recommendation

Provide general-use summaries and background analyses at all key stages of action on major issues on the Senate agenda.

Background reports and summaries of Senate legislation and proceedings are produced at random and often are not suitable for use by the news media or the public. Many are released too late to be of use to reporters.

Bills are not self-explanatory, yet they are not necessarily accompanied by concise summaries of their purposes and methods. Senate committees employ quite different standards and practices with regard to providing summaries of their activities; some provide very little information of any kind.

Experienced reporters frankly admit that even after years in the Senate they cannot always interpret and explain bills, amendments, reports and other Senate documents, particularly within the short time available to them.

Thus, clear and useful information should be summarized and distributed by committees, subcommittees, and Senators' offices at each stage of the legislative process. With respect to priority issues, these efforts should be coordinated to assure that they are as comprehensive and timely as possible. When appropriate, background summaries and
analyses should also be produced by the congressional support agen-
cies or outside analysts.

This information should be available before action is taken by com-
mittees and on the floor, and reports should also be produced promptly
following action at each significant stage.

Ideally, committees should report on hearings in progress on an
immediate basis. Committee reports should be printed and released no
less than 72 hours before bills are to be voted on.

In addition, information should be prepared to explain Senate proc-
esses and procedures, on a case-by-case basis. Again, this should be
done as far as possible in advance of Senate action.

COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES

The Senate provides space and limited facilities for the news media
in the galleries and office buildings, but it has not permanently allo-
cated space for its own communications purposes (other than the re-
cording studio in the Capitol).

Recommendation

Establish a Senate briefing room to be operated under Senate con-
trol and improve media space as feasible.

Senators must stage press conferences in the best space available
at the time. Committee hearing rooms may be used, or areas assigned
to the news media, or hallways in the Capitol or office buildings, or
a Senator's office, or other facilities elsewhere in Washington. The
space available, however, is often too small to permit all the reporters
from the broadcast, newspaper and periodical media to attend, along
with cameramen and other auxiliary personnel.

The proposed Senate briefing room would ideally be located in the
Capitol, in close proximity to the Senate floor and the media galleries.
If this were not possible, the new multi-purpose room to be constructed
in the Hart Office Building could be used.

The briefing room should be reserved for press briefings and asso-
ciated uses, and should be large enough to accommodate representa-
tives of all the news media. It should be comparable to similar facili-
ties at the White House and the major executive departments, such
as Defense and State.

The room should be designed to provide booths and spaces which can
be assigned to the major networks, wire services, newspapers and
periodicals in accordance with the general custom. This would relieve
pressure on the media galleries, particularly the overcrowded radio-
TV gallery.

Existing media rooms in the Russell and Dirksen Office Buildings
should be refurbished and equipped with closed-circuit monitors for
broadcasts from the Senate floor as soon as that becomes possible.

INFORMATION COORDINATION

The scheduling and staging of formal Senate news briefings and the
preparation of information materials on priority Senate actions will
require central coordination by assigned staff.

Recommendation

Assign staff members to monitor, coordinate, and assist with Senate
briefings and the preparation of information materials.
A central information staff should advise committee chairmen, bill sponsors, and appropriate Senators when briefings have been scheduled, assist those who will participate, notify the news media, and make other arrangements. It might also provide general management of the briefing room.

This staff should also monitor information being communicated on all priority issues, coordinate the work of committees and individual Senators in this regard, and provide general assistance. Information on legislative, investigative, and other actions would emanate directly from committees and Senators' offices.

In addition, the Secretary of the Senate should make staff members available to provide information on the processes and procedures of the Senate. This function relates to formal rules, regulations and procedures, not to substantive matters. Background information would be provided directly to the news media and other interested parties.
Americans demand much of those they choose to represent them. This obligation should be reciprocal. While public officials should be held to standards of conduct more rigorous than those demanded of others, they also should be adequately and equitably compensated for their services.

Senators, of course, as elected officials, hold a position of special trust. Their responsibility and their authority are based on the assumption that they will faithfully and honestly promote the public welfare. Moreover, they must not only be trustworthy, but also must be perceived as trustworthy by the public. While the ultimate judgment with respect to the conduct of Senators rests, in the view of the Commission, with the citizens who elect them, the Senate also has a stake in preserving public respect for the integrity of the institution. At present there are in the Senate, as elsewhere in the government, insufficient safeguards against conflicts of interest. Three specific actions could contribute to increased public confidence in the Senate.

The first would be enactment of public financial disclosure legislation. The initiative demonstrated by the Senate in the passage of such legislation (not approved by the House of Representatives) during the 94th Congress deserves to be commended. Mandatory financial disclosure by individual Senators is one of the more realistic ways of fostering public confidence.

The second would be straightforward provision of adequate compensation for Senators, so that they need not feel compelled to seek outside income. The current compensation of Members is seriously inadequate in terms of their responsibilities and the requirements of their office.

The third action needed is the development of an explicit standard of senatorial conduct, a code of ethics. The following recommendations address in turn each of these areas.

**Recommendation**

*Repas the public financial disclosure legislation for the Federal Government that was passed by the Senate in the 94th Congress but which died in the House of Representatives; in the event that the legislation does not become law, set an example for the Federal Government by incorporating the pertinent provisions in the Senate Rules.*

Although the Senate passed a financial disclosure bill, the 94th Congress adjourned before House action was completed. The Senate should make enactment of financial disclosure legislation a matter of high priority in the 95th Congress.

Whether by law or Senate rule a requirement should be established for the filing of yearly statements with the Secretary of the Senate and the General Accounting Office which list the amount and source
of any significant item of income, reimbursement for any expenditure, and any gift or aggregate of gifts.

These financial disclosure reports should be made public and would make a contribution to maintaining public confidence in the Senate as an institution.

Recommendation

Increase the annual compensation of Senators to $65,000 while at the same time prohibiting income from honoraria.

A Senator's job is a full-time responsibility, and a complex and demanding one as well. If democracy and the public interest are to be well served in a free society, compensation for Federal elected officials must be adequate in comparison with salaries for private employment, state and local office, and appointed Federal office.

This is not the situation today. The position of Senators involves great responsibility and substantial additional expenses. Senators are required to make decisions that affect the direction of the country and the economy. They must determine priorities in multi-billion-dollar Federal budgets. They run serious career risks. They put in long hours of sustained effort.

Senate salaries now stand at $44,600 per annum. The President is paid $200,000 a year, and both Cabinet members and Supreme Court justices receive $63,000 annually. The Commission understands the difficulties the Congress faces because it must establish salary levels for itself. It recognizes that Members are sensitive to the fact that the present salary is well above the national average income. The Commission believes, however, that the present salary level is unrealistically low in light of a Senator's responsibility to the American people, and in terms of comparability with other occupations whether they be in business, labor, government or the professions.

A major part of the problem is that the salary of a Senator has remained almost stationary over the last seven years while the cost of living and the expenses associated with elective office have gone up dramatically. Since 1969 the cost of living as measured by the Consumer Price Index has gone up over 60 percent, while the salary of Senators has gone up only 5 percent.*

Increases in the cost of living are especially hard on Senators. They must maintain two residences, pay the high cost of living in Washington, and help meet the costs of election campaigns. More importantly, though, the Senate is a representative institution that should be open to all Americans regardless of financial status. Current salary practices tend to favor a comparative few who have independent financial resources. Raising salaries would enable more people without independent wealth to serve.

In light of these factors, the Commission recommends that the Senate increase the compensation of Senators to $65,000 a year, while at the same time prohibiting income from honoraria. At present, under Public Law 94-283, Senators are prohibited from accepting an honorarium of more than $2,000 and total honoraria of more than $25,000 in any one calendar year. The proposed increase in salaries would permit the Senate to bar Senators from accepting fees for public services.

speaking. Federal executive officials cannot take honoraria for speaking engagements; such activity is considered a responsibility of the position. The same principle should hold for Senators. Raising Senators' salaries would free them from the need to travel all over the country giving speeches to increase their income. A Senator's right and responsibility to address the public would not be restricted, but the financial aspect of this activity would be eliminated.

While the salary increase we recommend is greater than that recommended by the Commission on Executive, Legislative and Judicial Salaries, we believe that the refusal of Congress to accept an earlier pay increase proposed by that Commission may have discouraged it from proposing a more substantial increase this year. However, in line with the recommendation of the Salary Commission we support the premise that Senators, as well as judges and officials of the executive branch, should be prohibited from receiving any outside earned income which might have, or seem to have, an influence on the conduct of the public's business.

The Senate should take an active role in developing a meaningful code of ethics and effective enforcement mechanisms. Devising a code of ethics, including definitions of conflicts of interest, for elected officials is especially difficult. The distinction between proper representation of the public interest and improper representation of personal or special interests is often hard to make. When attempts are made to draw these distinctions, the principle of senatorial conduct, as expressed in the Standing Rules of the Senate, must be clear:

The ideal concept of public office, expressed by the words, 'A public office is a public trust,' signifies that the office has been entrusted with public power by the people; that the officer holds this power in trust to be used only for their benefit and never for the benefit of himself or of a few; and that the officer must never conduct his own affairs so as to infringe on the public interest. All official conduct of Members of the Senate should be guided by this paramount concept of public office.

Recommendation

Direct the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct, or an independent ethics commission created for the purpose, to prepare for Senate consideration a code of ethics for senatorial conduct. This code should include:

- Definition of conflicts of interest.
- Prohibitions on use of position for personal financial profit.
- Restrictions on outside sources of earned income.
- Provision for advisory opinions.

By establishing a clear and comprehensive code of ethics for its Members, the Senate would set a standard for public evaluation. This code should include restrictions on the use of a Senator's official position for direct or indirect personal benefit and restrictions on holding significant economic interests which may be affected by committee assignments.

The principles of public ethics should, of course, apply to all public officials. In this regard, the Commission also supports proposals to have the Justice Department and the Civil Service Commission compile and evaluate current conflict-of-interest regulations in the execu-
tive branch. A report of the findings of that study should be submitted to the Senate for a general analysis of governmental codes of ethics. That effort could parallel the Senate's and would be useful in developing high standards for all government officials.

Codes of ethics, no matter how high-minded, are meaningless and ineffective without adequate review and enforcement mechanisms. First, there should be a review of existing regulations in the Senate. Statutory provisions on the use of the frank should be evaluated. Troublesome issues, such as the acceptance of monetary gifts, transportation and accommodations, and entertainment, ought to be addressed directly. Second, an ethics review committee or commission should, on request, continue to issue advisory opinions to Senators on questions of this kind. Ethical judgments are often difficult to make. By confronting these issues and lending advisory assistance, there should emerge a standard of conduct conducive to public trust.

Finally, the Commission calls attention to the present inappropriate and unsatisfactory arrangements for the use of military aircraft by Members of Congress on urgent legislative business. The Commission's recommendations in this area are intended to eliminate the presumption of discretionary authority on the part of the Department of Defense to determine the purposes for which planes will be made available to Senators and to provide a decision point within the Senate for authorized use.

Recommendation

Require the majority leader and minority leader to sanction as necessary for Senate purposes the use of military aircraft or any other flights provided by the executive branch for Senators and, at the same time, act to eliminate any presumed authority on the part of the Defense Department or any other executive agency to provide such services on a discretionary basis.

The Defense Department provides free use of planes to Senators when it is "in the interest" of the DOD. The use of these planes should be on a general need basis as determined by the Senate and should not be at the discretion of the Department of Defense. The law presently allows congressional travel on military aircraft when necessary and when no civilian aircraft are available. Use of the 89th Airlift Wing, stationed at Andrews Air Force Base, is generally dominated by executive branch officials and employees. At the same time, the planes assigned to the Wing remain underutilized. Permission for Senators to use these aircraft should be determined by the Senate leadership, generally taking into account the recommendations of committee chairmen.
The Capitol Police force is under the direction of a three-member board, consisting of the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate, the Sergeant at Arms of the House, and the Architect of the Capitol. The two Sergeants at Arms alternate annually as chairman of the board. The chief of the force and most of his upper echelon assistants are police officers of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department. The principal mission of the force is to protect the security of the Congress, its staff and buildings, and visitors. The force has more than 1,100 members, including a detail of 50 officers from the D.C. department, and is divided into almost equal-sized House and Senate contingents. Its annual operating cost is more than $17 million.

In sheer numbers, the Capitol Police force is larger than the great majority of metropolitan police forces in the United States. Its management, organization and training, however, have been largely exempt from the scrutiny accorded most police departments of comparable size.

The Commission requested a preliminary survey of the Capitol force by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). That survey indicated some serious problems, and the Commission's recommendations basically are a call for a more thorough study of problem areas uncovered by the IACP report. We believe that, at a minimum, the visible presence of so many armed, uniformed police in the Senate complex should be reduced. It is clear that many functions now performed by such officers, especially services for the general public and congressional visitors, could be performed equally well by unarmed civilians without police uniforms.

Recommendation

Initiate, through the Senate's representative on the Capitol Police Board, a careful study of the mission of the force and its organization, management and training, with an eye to the following specific changes:

- Consolidation of the Senate and House police details.
- Substantial reduction in the size of the force.
- Assignment of certain duties to civilian personnel.
- Possible discontinuance of the Metropolitan detail.
- Negotiation of an interagency agreement with the National Park Police, and contractual arrangements with the Metropolitan Police, to supplement the Capitol force when necessary.

The existence of the Capitol Police force has been valuable to the Senate. Security, even in the most unsettled times, has been maintained. Other duties of the force, such as escorting and transporting, parking
control, and other personal assistance activities, have been effectively carried out.

Nonetheless, the mission of the force should be reexamined. Important considerations in the reexamination should be the changing nature of threats to security, the availability of assistance to the force at peak risk periods, and the annual cost of the force.

In addition to a clearer definition of the force’s mission, there needs to be increased professionalization. This should include more practical organization of the force and the adoption of modern management techniques. Patronage as a method of recruitment, still a practice on the House but not on the Senate side, should be eradicated. Promotions should be made on merit, free from political intervention and in accordance with accepted police standards. Friction caused by the fact that many positions above the rank of sergeant have been available only to members of the Metropolitan Police contingent could thus be reduced.

Changes that seem promising, but which we feel should be more closely examined, include a smaller, more professional force limited to security duties, the use of supplementary personnel from other police agencies when necessary, and employment of civilian personnel to perform non-security functions. Adoption of these changes, if fully warranted, should result in large savings.

PAGE SYSTEM

The page system brings a relatively small number of young people to Washington, where many are left unsupervised during off-duty hours. The stipend, on an annual basis, is more than $9,000. Some pages are as young as 14. Most of those who become pages have good academic credentials and a high degree of maturity, and former pages rate the experience a valuable one. But present pages describe the page school (inevitably, perhaps, in view of the small number of students and their diverse ages) as inferior to their previous schools. The problems invited by lack of off-duty supervision for pages have caused many Senators to decline making their share of appointments.

Recommendation

- Replace the page system with a regular messenger service, or modify it by putting recruitment on a merit basis and increasing supervision.

In view of the present cost of the page program and the additional costs that would be necessary to make the program viable, the Senate’s messenger functions would be performed more efficiently by adult employees working full time. Such a system would reduce or eliminate most of the problems of the current program. Senators would not be responsible for supervising pages when they are not working, and turnover and time lost in training would be reduced. Furthermore, substantial savings could be achieved by closing the page school. Alternatively, through selection of pages on a merit basis similar to the practice of the service academies, and other modifications, the program could be retained as a legitimate educational activity. If this were done, the minimum age of pages should be increased to at least 16. Their terms should be limited to one year, and resident supervision should be provided. The stipend should be substantially reduced.
APPENDIX A

Special Research Assistance for Commission Studies

Robert G. Bell, Congressional Research Service.
Louis Fisher, Congressional Research Service.
Harrison W. Fox, Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee System.
Herbert N. Jasper, Congressional Research Service.
Robert Keith, Congressional Research Service.
Marvin Kornbluh, Congressional Research Service.
Walter Kravitz, Congressional Research Service.
Dennis Little, Congressional Research Service.
Keith Marvin, U.S. General Accounting Office.
Richard Moraski, Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee System.
Daniel Mulhollan, Congressional Research Service.
Jeanne B. Nicholson, Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee System.
Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Research Service.
William L. Renfro, Congressional Research Service.
Allen Schick, Congressional Research Service.
Arthur G. Stevens, Congressional Research Service.
C. Braxton Valentine, Jr., Joint Committee on Congressional Operations.

APPENDIX B

Consultants

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Clement Bezold, Assistant Director, Center for Governmental Responsibility, University of Florida.
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Frank L. Capps, Former Deputy Assistant Commissioner, General Services Administration.
William M. Capron, Associate Dean, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
James D. Carroll, Director, Department of Public Administration, The Maxwell School, Syracuse University.
Ross D. Davis, Attorney, Davis & Simpich, Washington, D.C. Former Federal official.
Hugh G. Gallagher, Former Administrative Assistant to Senator E. L. Bartlett of Alaska.
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G. Calvin Mackenzie, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Public Affairs, The George Washington University.
Harry C. McPherson, Attorney, Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard, McPherson and Alexander, Washington, D.C.
Arthur S. Miller, Professor of Law, National Law Center, The George Washington University.
Roderick W. Nichols, Vice President, The Rockefeller University, New York City.
Morris S. Ogul, Professor of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh.
Norman J. Ornstein, Assistant Professor, Department of Politics, The Catholic University of America.
Joseph Pois, Professor Emeritus of Public Administration, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh.
Nelson W. Polsby, Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley.
Randall B. Ripley, Chairman and Professor, Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University.
Donald Allen Robinson, Associate Professor of Government, Smith College.
David W. Rohde, Associate Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University.
Richard Royce, Former Staff Director, Senate Public Works Committee.
Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Director, Center for International Studies, and Professor, Political Science Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
James N. Smith, Former Deputy Program Director, National Commission on Water Quality.
Jack L. Walker, Director, Institute of Public Policy Studies, University of Michigan.
Edward Wenk, Jr., Director, Program in Social Management of Technology, University of Washington.

APPENDIX C

LIST OF COMMISSION PAPERS

ABERBACH, Joel D., Report on Oversight.
ABRAMS, Albert J., Strategies for Management Improvement in the United States Senate.
———, Printing Management in the United States Senate.
ALLEN, Len, Makeup of the Senate Press.
———, Television from the Senate Floor.
BELL, Robert G., A Record of the CRS Seminar on "Congress and National Security Policy."
BEZOLD, Clement, Senate Committee Foresight.
BOSLEY, Charles E., Senate Communications with the Public.
———, Senate Media Galleries.
BRESLIN, Janet E., Constituent Services.
———, Orientation and Training.
BRYHAM, Maija A., Present Administrative Functions of the Secretary of the Senate, Sergeant at Arms, Architect of the Capitol, and the Rules Committee.
CANTRILL, Albert H.; HAMMOND, Susan Webb; O’DONNELL, Thomas J.; and STEVENS, Arthur G., Legislative Activity Sourcebook: U.S. Senate.
CAPPS, Frank L., Senate Vehicle Parking Report and Recommendations.
CAPRON, William M., The Congressional Budget Office.
CHLAN, Frank, Observations on Accounting and Fiscal Management in the Senate.
CONDON, Gayle, Citations of Statutory Authority.
———, History of the Senate Appropriations.
———, Funding Provisions for Senators.
———, The Committee Budgeting Process.
———, The Senate Budgeting Process.
DAVIS, Ross, Urban Policies in Metropolitan America.
FISHER, Louis, Relationships Between the Senate and the Executive Branch.
———, The Senate’s Legislative Power.
GRIFFITH, Ernest S., Four Agency Comparative Study.
HAMMOND, Susan Webb, The Operation of Senators' Offices.
HAMMOND, Susan Webb; FOX, Harrison W., Jr.; MORASKI, Richard; and NICHOLSON, Jeanne B., Senate Oversight Activities.
HAYES, Federick O'R., The Uses for Policy Analysis in the United States Senate.
JASPER, Herbert, Scheduling of Senate Business.
JONES, Charles O., Senate Party Leadership in Public Policy.
KEITH, Robert, The Use of Unanimous Consent in the Senate.
KORNBLUH, Marvin; LITTLE, Dennis L.; and RENFRO, William L., Some Questions and Answers on the Tools of Futures Research.
KRAVITZ, Walter, Relationships Between the Senate and the House of Representatives: The Party Leadership.
LONG, Richard, Computer Applications for Analysis of Decision Intelligence—Information for the United States Senate.
MACKENZIE, G. Calvin, Committee Coordination and Policy Integration in the Senate.
MARVIN, Keith, Status and Potential of Program Evaluation for the Congress.
MULHOLLAN, Daniel P., An Overview of Lobbying by Organizations.
NICHOLS, Rodney W., R & D Outlook: Selected Issues on National Policies for Science and Technology.
ORESZIK, Walter J., Overview of Senate Committee System.
ORNSTEIN, Norman J.; and ROHDE, David W., Resource Usage, Information and Policy Making in the U.S. Senate.
RIDLEY, Richard, Space Use Problems in the Senate and Short-Range Suggestions for Improvement.
RIPLEY, Randall B., Party Leaders, Policy Committees, and Policy Analysis in the United States Senate.
ROBINSON, Donald A., If the Senate Democrats Want Leadership: An Analysis of the History and Prospects of the Majority Policy Committee.
ROYCE, Richard, Consideration of Policy Analysis and Formulation in the Senate.
SAMUELSON, Betsy, An Overview of Committee Procedures in the U.S. Senate.
SCHICK, Allen, Complex Policymaking in the United States Senate.
SKOLNIKOFF, Eugene B., The Office of Technology Assessment.
VALENTINE, C. Braxton, Jr., The Office of Legislative Council, U.S. Senate.
WALKER, Jack L., Setting the Agenda in the U.S. Senate.
WALSH, Samuel L., Personnel Practices and Policies of the Sergeant at Arms, the Secretary of the Senate, and the Architect of the Capitol.

APPENDIX D

RESOLUTION To establish a temporary Commission on the Operation of the Senate

Whereas the responsibilities of Members of the Senate and the Senate have increased many-fold in recent years, as have expenditures of Federal funds to sustain these responsibilities;

Whereas the administrative machinery, facilities, and other elements in the structure and practices of the Senate which support the discharge of these responsibilities have been expanded and adjusted in a piecemeal and uncoordinated fashion;

Whereas the support structure, facilities, and administrative practices of the Senate have never been subjected to an overall independent examination; and

Whereas the modernization and improvement of the cost-effectiveness of the administrative machinery, facilities, practices, and support-services of the Senate can be facilitated by an impartial, overall study conducted by a group independent of the Senate; Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That (a) there is hereby established a Commission on the Operation of the Senate (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the "Commission"), which shall be composed of nine members appointed from private life and two ex officio members who are presently officers or employees of the Senate and who shall participate without vote. All Commissioners shall be appointed by the President of the Senate upon the joint recommendations of the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader of the Senate.

(b) Any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.

(c) The Commission shall elect a Chairman and a Vice Chairman from among its members.

(d) Five members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum but two members may conduct hearings.

Not more than two former Members of the Senate may serve as members of the Commission and no individual whose relevant experience is preponderantly in the executive branch of the Government shall be appointed as a member of the Commission.

Sec. 2. (a) It shall be the function and duty of the Commission to make a comprehensive and impartial study of the organization and operation of the United States Senate. Such study shall include, but not be limited to—

1. the functioning of Members, officers, and employees of the Senate in the light of the responsibilities of the Senate in the areas of lawmaking, representation, and oversight;
2. conflicts in the programming of business;
3. office accommodations and facilities;
4. information resources; and
5. internal management administrative support structures (including electronic and technical aids, foresight capacity, accommodation for and coverage by the news media, workload, lobbying, and allowances, and conflicts of interest).

Such study shall not include an examination of the question of the jurisdictions of the committees of the Senate over subject matter.

(b) The Commission shall also study ways of improving Senate communication, cooperation, and coordination with the House of Representatives and with the executive and judicial branches of the Government, giving due consideration to the separation of powers provided by the Constitution.

Sec. 3. Members of the Commission shall receive, for each day on which they are engaged in the performance of their duties as members of the Commission, compensation at a daily rate equal to the per diem equivalent of the highest rate of gross compensation which may be paid to an employee of a standing committee of the Senate; and shall be entitled to reimbursement for transportation expenses and to receive a per diem, in lieu of subsistence, at the same rate as is payable to employees of the Senate, for each day on which they are away from their homes or regular places of business or employment and are engaged in the performance of their duties as members of the Commission or in traveling to or from the place where such duties are to be performed. Ex officio members of the Commission shall serve without pay.

Sec. 4. (a) The Commission shall appoint, prescribe the duties and responsibilities of, and fix the compensation of a staff director, an associate staff director, and such other employees as may be necessary to enable it to carry out its functions and duties. The staff director and associate staff director may each be paid at a maximum annual rate of compensation not exceeding the maximum annual rate which may be paid to the two committee employees of a standing committee of the Senate referred to in section 105(e)(3)(A) of the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1968, as amended and modified, and other employees of the Commission may be paid at a maximum annual rate of compensation not exceeding the maximum annual rate which may be paid to the four committee employees of a standing committee of the Senate referred to in such section.

(b) The Commission is authorized to procure the temporary or intermittent services of individual consultants, or organizations thereof, in the same manner and under the same conditions as a standing committee of the Senate may procure such services under section 202(1) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.

(c) Subject to the provisions of section 7, the Commission is authorized to make such expenditures from the contingent fund of the Senate as may be necessary to carry out its functions and duties.
SEC. 5. (a) The Commission is authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the Office of the Secretary of the Senate, the Office of the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate, the Office of the Secretary for the Majority, the Office of the Secretary for the Minority, the Library of Congress, and the General Accounting Office; and the Secretary of the Senate, the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate, the Secretary for the Majority, the Secretary for the Minority, the Librarian of Congress, and the Comptroller General of the United States are authorized to furnish such services, information, facilities, and personnel as may be requested by the Commission.

(b) Office space and office furniture, furnishings and equipment shall be provided to the Commission in the same manner as other offices of the Senate.

SEC. 6. (a) The Commission shall submit an interim report to the Majority Leader and Minority Leader of the Senate not later than March 31, 1976, and shall submit a final report to the Majority Leader and Minority Leader of the Senate not later than September 30, 1976, which shall set forth the results of the study made under this resolution, together with its findings and recommendations. The Commission may submit such other reports to the Majority Leader and Minority Leader of the Senate as they may request or as the Commission deems advisable. The Majority Leader and Minority Leader shall transmit to the Senate all reports received by them under this subsection.

(b) Sixty days after the date of submission of its final report under subsection (a), the Commission shall cease to exist.

SEC. 7. The expenses of the Commission, which shall not exceed $500,000, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers signed by the Chairman of the Commission and approved by the Majority Leader or the Minority Leader of the Senate, except that vouchers shall not be required for the disbursement of salaries of employees paid at an annual rate.

[S. Res. 423, 94th Cong., 2d sess.]

RESOLUTION Extending the date for submission of the final report of the Commission on the Operation of the Senate

Resolved, That section 6(a) of Senate Resolution 227, Ninety-fourth Congress, agreed to July 29, 1975, is amended by striking out “September 30, 1976” and inserting in lieu thereof “December 31, 1976”.  

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