RITCHIE: Last week we talked about the events in Vietnam and how they affected the Senate in the 1960s. I wondered also about all the other changes that were going on. After Johnson's election in 1964, and the big Democratic victory that year, the Congress changed very dramatically and all sorts of legislation that had been talked about for years got passed very quickly. Could you explain why all this happened, at least from where you stood?

VALEO: The great bulk of that legislation had been held up in the Senate. That was what, in the context of those times, would pass for liberal legislation, social legislation. The House tended always to be more liberal than the Senate, largely because of its representation of the larger population centers, which to some degree was reflected in the Senate, but not that much. The Senate, for example, held up Medicare for many years; but that came through in this period. The eighteen-year-old vote came through. The elimination of the poll tax. The Appalachian Redevelopment bill. There were many, many more. I can't begin to think of them all, but there are good references. The Democratic Policy Committee has excellent references on this whole period.
My own analysis of the reason for this was in part to paraphrase Dirksen, "they were ideas whose time had come." The mood was there for it. On top of that, I don't think you can overestimate the significance of the death of Kennedy and its impact upon all other politicians—and particularly after the death of Bobby Kennedy, where you had the whole family which was very much involved in this movement. In a sense they were the northern expression of populism. Even though both were essentially from what passes in the United States as an aristocratic family, they nevertheless were the essence of urban populism. The death of Kennedy left a kind of feeling: well, if he wanted it, let's pass it. It was never spoken of in these terms, necessarily, but I think it was an underlying factor: don't resist, or how can you resist what Kennedy wanted, after he's given so much to the country. I think that feeling was an extremely important one, that Johnson of course capitalized on in his own way.

He eased the Kennedy crowd out gradually and pleasantly. None of them went in a huff, with the possible exception of Bobby Kennedy, and even that one was not a sharp break, they didn't split the party on it. He eased them out and eased his own people in, and they were interested in proving again that Johnson was a legislative superman. So he gave his blessings to most of these items in one form or another. I don't think he ever did any great lobbying on the Hill for them in any way, nor did his people. But
the circumstances were ripe at this point for their passage, and he being in the White House, as I mentioned earlier, had a moderating effect on the southern Democrats who would normally have been opponents of much of this legislation. They still were, but they didn't go all out to defeat it. They just voted their own convictions.

Here you tie in with what Mansfield did in terms of giving the senior senators all kinds of privileges and rights beyond even what they had under Johnson, much more so, and paying great deference to them. Again, I don't think they wanted to offend Mansfield. When they opposed him, they opposed him reluctantlly rather than eagerly, as would have been the case had some other majority leader been there. That made a difference. It made a difference among the Republicans. By taking Dirksen into the Mansfield camp, you broke the back of the Republican southern Democratic conservative coalition which had for many years been the secret of holding up this legislation. There were enough Republicans always prepared, and enough southern Democrats always prepared to join with those Republicans in opposing social legislation of various kinds.

So I think these were the principle factors. One has to add the other one, which was again part of the Mansfield—for want of a better word—technique. I don't think he thought of it as a technique, it was just the way he was. His giving free hand
to the younger members in the Senate was a factor of great importance. For the most part these younger people tended to favor this kind of legislation. By encouraging them to express themselves, the case was made much more strongly for this legislation than might otherwise have been the situation. Mansfield dropped the idea that new senators should be seen and not heard. He urged the young senators to get talking from the very beginning. The subtle way in which this worked was not only that they became much more expressive of their own thoughts and their own feelings in response to many of the social problems of the country, that also influenced the press, and the press in turn then would have an influence on the rest of the body.

That's one way in which it worked; the other way was that committee chairmen, now having in a sense reached the full flowering of privilege, were also confronted with the concept that Mansfield was pushing just as hard the concept of one-man-one-vote in the Senate; the concept that all were equal. He knew what he was doing. They weren't all equal and he knew that, but he thought in terms of what really counts, the vote, and in that sense they were. It made the committee chairmen more conscious of the younger people on the committees, whereas in the past they could have ignored them pretty much and gone on in the ritualistic pattern that juniors were expected normally to vote with the chairman or the ranking minority member, as the case might be.
Under Mansfield, the committee chairmen had to be a little more careful; they wanted to be sure that these people who were expressing themselves and getting press attention were also with them. So they began to defer a little bit, in a way that was not done before, to the younger people on their committees.

I think these were some of the main differences that came with Mansfield. It began to cause a churning within the Senate of a lot of new sources of ideas, new sources of leadership, new sources of inspiration. Some people, of course, were perhaps more impressive in this way than others, but Mansfield made them feel that they were all impressive. This was a theme, the idea of equality among members, was a theme Mansfield kept coming back to. I don't know how many opening statements for caucuses and floor statements we worked in this theme.

Another development I want to touch on was the usage of the Majority Policy Committee. Up until the time of Kennedy’s death, the policy committee met regularly, but it did not take policy positions. It discussed legislation and the flow of legislation. There was something called the Legislative Review Committee, which was set up at the same time the policy committee was set up, or shortly after it, by Johnson, I believe. The members were usually freshman who sat with the policy committee without vote. The fact that they didn't have a vote in the early period didn't really mean very much, because Johnson never took a vote in the policy
committee; he merely said, "This is the policy." Those who didn't agree with it simply kept quiet and let it go at that.

But this was going to change with Mansfield, so the presence of these four younger members, who sat in with the policy committee but were really not of it, was a very significant factor. The problem was: what do you do with them? I mean, if you begin to put measures to a vote in committee, do they vote or don't they vote? The initial reaction of some of the older members of the policy committee was no, that's just a review committee, they're just here to go over the consent calendar. Technically, that was true. Their function was to make sure there wasn't any real highway robbery in any of those bills that go through automatically. That was one of their functions and it was a minor function; but Mansfield made it clear that as far as he was concerned, they were going to vote as full sitting members of the policy committee and the policy committee members, some grumbling, went along with it. Well, of course that gave a whole new thrust to the direction of the party in the Senate.

You brought in people like Muskie, Ted Moss, and others who were essentially liberal minded. The balance on the Policy Committee, as a result of that, became much more the prevailing view, I would think, of the center-left of the Democratic party nationally, whereas before it was, if anything, right-center, because of the weighting on the other side. Phil Hart came on at
that time; there were a number of people who in retrospect one would regard as the liberals of that period who became active members of the policy committee by virtue of their being members of the Legislative Review Committee.

After the fall out with Johnson over Vietnam, that became a significant factor. Up until that time there were really no major issues on which the committee took a public position at variance with the president, but after the fall out with Johnson, this became an increasingly significant factor. We prepared resolutions for the policy committee to adopt, and interestingly enough got near unanimous votes, because by that time the whole Senate had shifted pretty much on the issue of Vietnam. It became possible then to pass a policy committee resolution, go to the caucus with it, make some modifications in it, but then get a lot of guaranteed support, so to speak, when you took it to the floor. It became part of the whole technique of trying to end the war by way of the legislative body, rather than the more logical way, but in this case undoable way, of having it ended by the president. Those were some of the changes.

When measures got to the floor, it soon became clear that Mansfield would not attempt to battle a determined resistance to a bill, except by the route of cloture. People began to take a second look at the cloture rule as a result of that. It began to be used much more commonly. The full distortion of it as a result
of the parliamentarian's casual advisory during the Civil Rights cloture in 1964 had not yet taken root. That came gradually over a period when people figured out ways to get around the intent of cloture even after its adoption. But at that point the question was: can you get cloture, and do you have to wait till you get sixty-seven votes? Well, there were a lot of advocates, particularly on the liberal side, who favored majority cloture. Mansfield said he would never support that, and he didn't. So far as I know he never supported it. But he gradually accepted a cutting down of the number that were required for cloture, until you come to your present sixty—which compared with sixty-seven in the Senate is a very, very significant change. I still think it hasn't gone far enough, but I think even more important now is the question of making cloture mean what it says after its adoption.

My own personal view is there's some virtue in permitting a prolonged debate on a measure, but there is absolutely no constitutional basis for claiming that you can delay a measure indefinitely, a measure that is constitutionally subject to a majority vote. If there were a constitutional basis, such as treaty ratification, it would have been written into the Constitution. I don't think that if there is ever a court test of that in some way that the courts could find other than that. The right to vote in the Senate is a sacred one, or in any legislative body for that matter. The frequent use of the cloture procedure under
Mansfield, again, was a change. In a sense it made the senators face the fact that they couldn't shift the blame. If the Senate didn't act on a measure, it wasn't going to be because the supporters or proponents of the bill were too lazy to be there, or the usual subterfuges that were used to cover up the fact that filibusters were preventing the Senate from doing its business. So people began to be a lot more careful about how they opposed measures. A lot of the clowning went out of consideration of serious issues.

Again, I think one has to consider Mansfield's personality here. He was leaning over so far backwards to accommodate members, and in self-effacement, that very few of them had the stomach for opposing him by tricks. I mean, they had reason for opposing measures, but not by tricks. It was almost like a Gandhian attempt to run the Senate by Gandhi's non-violent methods. It was a fascinating experience. It could have only happened under Mansfield. I can't think of another member who would have been capable of trying that trick—or trying that approach. I shouldn't use the word "trick," I don't think he used it as a trick. I think it was his nature. He was that way, and as a result the Senate became another way. It was a brief kind of moment in Camelot, if you will, in the Kennedy words. Not quite the same kind of thing, maybe a moment in New Delhi might be closer to it. But it was a different experience.
And when you combine Mansfield with all these other factors, I think you begin
to understand why you had this enormous outpouring of legislation, which in its
significance probably exceeded even that of the New Deal, although the New Deal in its
time was far more critical. There were items here that could have waited another two,
four, six years, or might have been done somewhat differently without destroying the
country, whereas in the New Deal days, it was a matter of life and death on those early
measure. But allowing for that difference, the outpouring of social legislation during the
Mansfield years was about as great as any in the history of the country, if not the
greatest. I think any objective analysis will show that. And it makes the so-called
Johnson record—again, comparisons may be odious, but only to correct the record—it
makes what happened under the Johnson period, if you look at it carefully, really a
minor moment having to do with some personalities in the Senate, but having very little
to do with the long-range significance of the role of Congress. Again, I repeat, the
hold-up had been in the Senate, and then the block gave way in the Senate. This
legislation, much of which had started in the House in one form or another and had
been sort of culled and consolidated by the Kennedy people when they first came down,
began to find a way through the Senate.

In the meantime, another thing was happening. Mansfield was under a great deal
of pressure to put more people on the policy
committee staff. They felt it should be used more politically than it was. He resisted this all the time. We had two or three lawyers down there. I guess Charlie Ferris and Dan Leach, and maybe one or two others from time to time. But that was the policy committee staff on the substantive end. He used them on the floor. He wanted them on the floor at all times with legislation. He resisted efforts to expand that beyond those numbers. The result was he turned back a great deal of money from the funds of the committee every year. His reasons were very simple, and they grew in part out of his Montana experience and part out of the fact he thought the senators should run the Senate and not staff, which I think was a very appropriate idea. But the most significant part of the idea was that it compelled senators, because they didn't have the staff assistance that they wanted or thought they wanted, to look at problems from a different level and to see not so much of the details of a piece of legislation or the details of a policy, but to see the larger and the broader implications of it, which in the last analysis is the only way that a legislator really ought to look at it.

It reminds me a little bit of Toynbee in the Outline of History in which he said—I'm paraphrasing, but he said there are a number of ways of looking at a situation. If you imagined yourself being in an airplane or a helicopter and looking at the earth from a five hundred foot level, you would see an immense amount of
land features and detail, but the horizons would be rather limited from that level. And, he said, if you then went to ten thousand feet, you would see far less detail of the landscape, but your horizons would be immensely enlarged. Of course, at fifty thousand feet that would be even more the case. Well, fifty thousand feet in this analogy might be for the social dreamers and the poets, but I think the appropriate legislative level, using the analogy, is somewhere around ten thousand feet, because when you get down to five hundred feet—the realm of the technicians and bureaucrats—there is no way, considering the number of questions which flow into a senator as a central rock of the republic, the number of ideas which flow into him, the number of pressures which flow into him, as well as the pressures of getting reelected, if that's his inclination, are such that if to look at issues at five hundred feet there are only two courses: you'll either fall apart in the effort to keep up with them all, or you'll get a lot of staff to do the looking for you, and then give it to you at what they think is the five thousand foot level.

This is basically the problem of staff in the Congress. We go back to our earlier discussions about Ernest Griffith. I think that the La Follette-Monroney bill was an essential thing. It made it possible for senators to come down from a fifty thousand foot level, which belongs to poets, to about ten thousand feet, where they could see the nation's problems at about the level in
which they ought to be seen by legislators. Once you brought it down, as it has now happened in the Senate, where you are looking at problems at five hundred feet, it is very doubtful in my judgment, that many members of the Senate can keep up with the real business of the Senate, which is to draw legislation on many subjects that is good not only for this moment but which has some kind of significance for the country beyond that.

Mansfield was at five thousand feet, and the Senate in the Mansfield period—except in the case of the Vietnamese War—was at five thousand feet. The only reason why it went to five hundred feet in connection with the Vietnamese War, was because the people who should have been looking at it from five hundred feet were not looking at it from five hundred feet. If you were going to end the war, you had to get into the details. Everything else became secondary. You had to try to do it through legislation, which was obviously the most ridiculous way to end the war, by telling the administration that you can't bomb somewhere or you have to stop doing it on such and such a date while they're fighting a war. The place where it should have been ended was, of course, by the president, who could have done it in five minutes, if that was his inclination, by one order. Generally, I thought the five thousand feet level was the greatest level for the Senate. I thought at that level, you could have a pretty good output of meaningful actions in the Senate.
RITCHIE: At the end of 1965, after all those major bills were passed, Senator Mansfield wrapped up that session by saying that we didn't perfect everything this year, we passed the enabling legislation; the main work from now on is going to be to tighten up on some of these bills. Was the real thrust of 1965 just getting people to accept the concepts of Medicare and aid to education in principle rather than in perfecting the system?

VALEO: Yes, I think so. I think there were new concepts of social legislation which most advanced democracies had long since accepted. I mean, you go back to Medicare and the concepts of Medicare have been accepted everywhere, even in Mexico. I shouldn't say that in a disparaging sense, but we tend to look at Mexico as a somewhat underdeveloped country. But they had accepted it years ago. We say, well it didn't help the Indians in Mexico; still, the concept was there. Their ability to deal with it perhaps was far more limited than ours, but at least they accepted the concept, that a nation has a responsibility to promote the health of everyone who lives within its boundaries. These certainly were concepts that Germany, and the United Kingdom, and France, and Italy had long since adopted, not to speak of the Communist countries who had also accepted this a long time before. Even China had accepted it with minimum resources. They found ways to do the best they could within that concept. But we hadn't even accepted the concept at this point.
I doubt that the current administration accepts the concept. It goes along with it because it's on the books, but I don't think that it has actually accepted the concept that there is a responsibility for a nation to see that all citizens get the best they can possibly be given in terms of health care, with some kind of rough equality of treatment. It doesn't have to be precise, but you can't leave anyone out. That's the point in that kind of a concept. And when you legislate, you don't, in theory at least, leave anyone out. It was the same thing with civil rights. Of course it was a long way from perfection. I don't even know that it was a problem of legislation; it was learning to live with legislation. Again you go back to Asia and you see that in India, for example, the constitution outlaws the caste system, but it's been forty or fifty years and they're still trying to eliminate it in places. I don't think there's any crime in that; I don't fault people who are trying to do the right thing and are unable to do it; it's when you ignore what is, from my judgment, at least the way I see it, the moral responsibility which you have as a member of any social group. This is what basically Mansfield was leading the Senate to put into the national computer with all that legislation.

RITCHIE: Up until 1964 there was a lot of writing in the newspapers and among scholars that Congress was structurally unable to deal with major legislation like this, it just hadn't
done anything in such a long period. And then all of a sudden, everything changed very dramatically, and then it sort of went back.

VALEO: Yes.

RITCHIE: Does it tend to work in these bursts? Is that natural?

VALEO: I think that's part of it. I think you have to consider that the setting in which it worked has changed. I don't think, as I said before, that the Mansfield leadership would necessarily have been relevant in any other set of circumstances. I think of it as a kind of recessive gene in the constitutional system, which suddenly appeared in the years 1960 to 1980, over the two decades, roughly, a gene that had long since laid dormant. But it came out, and it came out at a time when it was very essential. I think if the civil rights situation in the country had not reached the point of crisis, which it reached in the '60s, it wouldn't have happened. If the Vietnamese War had not occurred, it wouldn't have happened. If the Kennedys had not been assassinated, it would not have happened. I think all of these factors were an essential part, but I don't think you can leave out the relevance of the Mansfield approach to the Senate as an element in this process.
People who write about this period do not see it in those terms. I don't think they quite understand the Senate, and why things pass or don't pass, and the significance of the mood in the Senate, if I can put it that way, as to whether or not things move or don't move. So it's much easier to be glib about it and say, well, we had the best legislative technician the country's ever had in the White House—even Mansfield said it—so obviously it became much easier to pass this legislation. Again, I'm not trying to deprecate Johnson—well, I am trying to deprecate the role which has been assigned to Johnson and which, because of the nature of his personality, he had an inclination to believe to be accurate. So I am deprecating him, because I don't think his legislative skill goes anywhere near to the heart of the explanation of the legislative output from 1963 on. By the time he left the White House over Vietnam, that was pretty evident. It was easier to end the war with Nixon than it would have been to end it with Johnson. He couldn't; he was tied into it by that point.

RITCHIE: You had mentioned that in 1964 Johnson really didn't take that much of an active role in legislation. He sent people like Bobby Kennedy up on the Civil Rights bills. In '65 after he had won his reelection, he seems—at least on the surface—to have gotten more involved. Did you feel his physical presence?
VALEO: No. Not really, not really. That legislation was destined to pass, and it was passed almost without significant debate. I think occasionally he'd make a call, maybe on a foreign aid bill or something, as he called me once as I mentioned. And he'd call people on a piece of legislation that he was particularly interested in. But his real significance in the passage of the legislation was virtually nonexistent.

RITCHIE: I've heard people say that they saw more of him on Capitol Hill than they saw of other presidents, that he would come to see Dirksen and others.

VALEO: Well, he'd come up occasionally, but not that much. He'd come up for a party once in a while. He'd come up for a ceremony. But he didn't by any means hang around the Hill; no, not at all.

RITCHIE: How would you describe in that period his congressional liaison? Were they the well-oiled machine that they're generally seen as?

VALEO: Of course, I saw it mostly through Mike Manatos, who covered the Senate for him. I guess he had Larry O'Brien for a while with overall responsibility on it, and then I can't even remember who he replaced him with—that's how significant it was. I remember Mike Manatos, who was there all the time as he was during the Kennedy administration. Mike was good for that work,
but again Mike was no genius on legislation. He got an order to try to persuade some
senators to vote for it, and he'd come down. He knew how to read the votes and he'd
know who he'd have to talk to and who he could count on for support, and so forth. He
did it, and he did it well. I think Mike Manatos deserves a lot of credit for it. But again
just as I was, just as he was, and in a sense just as any individual member was, we were
really relatively minor figures in this process compared with the circumstances which
created it.

I go to Tolstoy on that, and Tolstoy's view of what happened in the defeat of
Napoleon in Russia in his book War and Peace. He points out that everybody would give
credit to this general or that general for this or that amazing military feat, and then by
searching the records he would come up with the fact that the general's tactical orders
were never even heard down in the places where presumably they were decisive. I think
that, not officials or congressmen but basically the sweep of events had forced us to a
certain point. Then, by this fortuitous combination of emotional factors, the Kennedy
death, the Atlanta riots and the Mansfield handling of the Senate, among others, and
most of all the fact that the country was ready for these things at this point, I think these
are the elements that go furthest in explaining why there was this outpouring of social
legislation in this period.
**RITCHIE:** Up to this point, the Congress had really been run by a coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats . . .

**VALEO:** At least the Senate was; the House to a lesser degree. That's why a lot of this legislation got through the House. John McCormack was in office for a good deal of this period. McCormack was basically extremely conservative on foreign policy questions, tended to defer completely to the president, but he also had that same—it's almost a quasi-Catholic view of social responsibility. He carried that, just as I think Mansfield carried it, that sense that you owe something to the group and you have to take care of the people in the group. It's a Catholic concept—not only a Catholic concept—but I think that both of them may have derived their feelings on this subject from the same source, and perhaps I did too. So McCormack was a positive element in the passing of social legislation in the House, where for the most part it went through without any great problems. It was the Senate where you ran into the difficulties.

**RITCHIE:** Well, after the '64 election there were very few Republicans left in the Senate. I think it was a 2:1 margin of Democrats over Republicans. So that reduced their influence. But what about the southern Democrats, they were still chairmen of committees, men like Eastland, and Stennis, and Russell. Did they put up any resistance?
VALEO: This is where the Mansfield leadership became very important. They did not hold up legislation. He could ask them about a bill, which he would do occasionally at committee chairmen luncheons, or in person sometimes—he would do it not a lot, but he would do it on a bill that he felt was stymied in committee—and he would usually get a positive response. They knew they couldn't hold it up, or they didn't want to hold it up, even though they personally might oppose it. We used to get that at policy committee meetings. Every once in a while, Russell or someone else would say, "Well, I don't really go along with that, but I'll get it out shortly," or something to that effect. The idea that a committee chairman could hold up a measure became a thing of the past. The last time that was tried was Jim Eastland on the Civil Rights bill, up until about '62 or '63, but after Kennedy's death he would have been the only one who would have felt strongly enough, or indifferent enough, to do it. So he was bypassed, and after that there were no more holdups to speak of.

There's an interesting angle to that. Eastland was scheduled to become the president pro tem by reason of seniority. The question came up in the caucus about his election, because the president pro tem, although he is elected by the Senate, is named by the majority caucus. That's one of the few things that the caucuses bind themselves on, the election of officers of the Senate. Of course, Eastland's name was put in by Mansfield, again.
deferring to the traditional role of the longest serving member being president pro tem. Phil Hart opposed it. Phil Hart was on the Judiciary Committee. He got up and made quite a speech, saying that on a personal level he liked Jim Eastland, he thought he was a great fellow, and that he was not concerned about his treatment. His personal treatment by Eastland on the committee had left absolutely nothing to be desired, the chairman had leaned over backwards, he said, to accommodate him. But when he saw Jim Eastland possibly sitting in the White House as president of the United States, which of course was possible under the succession law, he said he had horrors and nightmares and he couldn't possibly accept it. Of course, everybody including Eastland roared with laughter. But only Hart opposed his nomination.

It was again a reflection of Hart's character and explains why many members felt great sympathy for him and why this building is named after him. He was one of the least successful of senators, in my experience in the Senate, and he knew it. Towards the end of his life, I think, it really partly embittered him, that he had been so—what he thought—ineffective. He really wasn't that ineffective, but he thought that he had been a total failure in the Senate.

RITCHIE: Because he had set his goals so high that he couldn't reach them?
VALEO: I don’t know what the reason was. I don’t know him that well. I don’t know what Hart wanted. It seemed to me that the legislation that poured out of the Senate in that period would have been precisely the kind of thing that Hart would have wanted, and yet he was so discontented with his own role in it. I can’t quite understand why, but it was clear that something troubled him deeply. I think the other members of the party knew it, and they liked him greatly and felt very sympathetic towards him. That would be the whole party, not just liberals, I don’t think that was an important element in it.

RITCHIE: Did the conservative southern Democrats object when Mansfield began to move liberals into the policy committee and really take over things that had traditionally been their domain?

VALEO: No, oddly enough. They didn’t for two reasons. First of all, he had treated them so well that they could hardly have any objections to his throwing a bone, if you will, to other people in the Senate. As a matter of fact, they tended to go along with it, in most instances. The second reason was that he had deferred to them so much they felt that on a question of this sort they would defer to him. This again would be their normal reactions in any event. A leader who was good for them had to know what he had to do to keep the party in line. I think most of them understood that if you were going to have a party which embraced people all the way from Jim Eastland to Phil Hart, if
you will, you just had to make some adjustments, otherwise you wouldn't have that party. And their own positions, of course, depended upon keeping that party in the majority because it's the Senate that elects its committees, not any one else. There's no rule of seniority, that's a custom. So that their own survival in a sense depended upon a unified party, which probably Mansfield kept as well as anyone in the history of the Senate. The Democrats were a unified party under Mansfield. He unified a few Republicans into it as well!

**RITCHIE:** Well, after the burst of legislation in '65, in '66 people started talking about "guns and butter," and Vietnam started entering into this. Did it have an effect of slowing down the changes and making people more conservative about what they were voting on?

**VALEO:** I have a feeling that by '66 most of what we were going to get through in terms of innovative legislation was pretty well gone. There were other measures that came after that, but the great burst of it had come by '66. By then the Kennedys, I don't know when Bobby died, but Bobby was never as significant as Jack.

**RITCHIE:** He was there until '68.

**VALEO:** When I said the Kennedys, it really was Jack Kennedy that was involved in the emotional underpinning of this
legislative outburst. When Bobby Kennedy's death came, I think everybody was about ready to throw their hands up in despair over what was happening to politics in the United States. But again the Kennedy mystique was beginning to recede by '66, '67. Johnson was getting carried more and more into the question of winning the war, or how you got out of the war, or how he looked in the war. So the pace of legislation slowed down.

I think it was somewhere around this point that Mansfield and I discussed where the Senate should be really moving. We discussed the role of the Senate in oversight, which we thought was an unexploited role of the Senate, one that should be used to the full if the Senate was going to play its proper role in the government. We always tried, in the opening speech to the caucus in a new Congress, we tried to put an overriding concept of the main activities of the Congress for that session, and at one point we raised for the first time in considerable significance the question of oversight. We got into it on the need to develop this as a proper committee function. I'm trying to think of other things that were perhaps innovative. I think that [Lee] Metcalf was working in this period on a congressional reorganization, trying to improve the procedures of the Congress. Sometime thereafter, we got into the question of the budget process, which was a major question. We were already beginning to see the difficulties of trying to continue in the same procedures that we
were using up to that point, which was simply an authorization and then an appropriations bill, with each committee acting without consideration of the whole.

Later on, during Vietnam, we got into the question of a better utilization of the confirming power of the Senate. We were attempting to develop the full constitutional powers of the Senate, which in some ways had been neglected partly as a result of the Roosevelt period, partly through the growth of practice, which then became absorbed into the accepted way of doing things. On appointments, the general theory was: if the president wants him, why, let him have him. But the departments were becoming bigger than just something that the president wanted. The departments were beginning to have a life of their own, quite distinct from what the president might want. So we felt there was a need to look very carefully at the people that the president selected for major jobs—primarily, I think, growing out of Vietnam. I think we got the caucus to pass a resolution on the need for committees to examine closely the qualifications—well, this didn’t really happen till the Nixon period. One of the reasons at that time was, I think, one of the cabinet members said he didn’t want to appear, or declined to appear before one of the committees. We felt that this was an impermissible kind of behavior on the part of anyone who would have to be confirmed by the Senate. So in facing that question we got into the whole business of having to
develop the confirming power of the Senate in a fuller way than it had been before that. Especially this got involved with foreign policy.

**RITCHIE:** About foreign policy and its influence on domestic policy, when Johnson was still president, the leading opponents of the war in Vietnam were Democrats, and the leading proponents of the war were Democrats. You had George McGovern and Scoop Jackson, and you had John Stennis and Wayne Morse. What effect did this have on the party and especially on Mansfield's efforts to keep the party unified?

**VALEO:** Well, it made you move very cautiously. In the early period of trying to end the war, most of the statements had to do with calling on the president to end the war as soon as possible; they were as innocuous as that. The divisions in the party made it very difficult to draw up the kind of instruments that the Senate was capable of doing, constitutionally. Well, nobody objected to ending the war, but there were a lot of people who said we want the war ended in sixty days, at that point, so you had to find the words which would begin to convey to the president the great unease, the malaise which was being felt in the Senate at that time over the war. It was a concern that extended all the way from one end of the Senate to the other, particularly on the Democratic side. To convey that took words which made the point but which really had no force in them
whatsoever. They were mostly sense of the Senate resolutions. I think once we suggested bringing up Vietnam in the U.N. and things of that sort, trying a number of devices which would again convey to Johnson that he really should not continue on the path that he was on, that there were grave risks that were being felt in the country and were being communicated to the Democratic members of the Senate.

The same concern was also being communicated to the Republican members, and some of them had already begun to shift by this time. They were usually the ones who voted with the majority of the Senate Democrats on social legislation. They felt the same way about the war. There was one long period where we were trying to get one of these resolutions into a piece of legislation. It was still essentially innocuous, but it had perhaps more force than theretofore. It might have called on the president much more directly. I can't quite remember which resolution it was. But the Republicans undertook to give that one a hard time. It was tacked as an amendment on to a bill that they probably didn't care about anyhow. Dole was one of the people, and Bob Griffin of Michigan was the other, and they kept up quite a—it wasn't a filibuster but it was a prolonged, drawn out debate on the relevance of the amendment. I don't know whether we eventually got it or not, but the Republican minority in some ways had no desire to get the Senate into the matter. They probably figured
that Johnson was in his own stew. They were prepared to let him stay there and to keep the Congress out.

Mansfield and other members on the Democratic side were getting mail that was running extremely heavy from all over the country, because they were making speeches beginning to question the whole war situation and our involvement in the war. They were getting very, very heavy turn-outs of mail coming in generally in support of the position which they had taken. But this was towards the end of the Johnson administration, probably just before he decided he wasn't going to run again.

RITCHIE: That was when the public opinion polls really started to change.

VALEO: Well, the problem of the public opinion polls—and I don't know if we discussed this the last time—was the character of the graph.

RITCHIE: Oh, yes.

VALEO: I think we did discuss this last time, yes.

RITCHIE: In that Johnson period, what was Mansfield's relations to the doves of the Senate. Fulbright made his switch at that point, but others like McGovern, and Morse and Gruening, had been outspoken critics of the war.
VALEO: Morse and Gruening were in the vanguard, even before Mansfield, one had Morse and Gruening. But neither of them carried any real weight in the Senate. They made long speeches on the war, but they didn't get much press on them. They got support from anti-war groups very quickly, but they carried very little weight in the Senate. I guess it was Mansfield and Cooper on the Republican side who were the first of the senators who were taken seriously by their colleagues, who began to deal with this question. Then after that, Church came in on it. Fulbright came later. I always kind of had a feeling that the Foreign Relations Committee finally came in on this because they didn't like to see the thunder stolen somewhere else. That may be unfair. Let's say they began to feel it a little later.

I'm only expressing my own opinion on this, and I don't know how much value it has, but I think by this point Fulbright had given up any expectations of becoming secretary of state under Johnson. Then his mood began to change, along with his concern over the war. I think Fulbright had always nourished the hope of being secretary of state under Kennedy, and his position on Israel I think was the thing that prevented that. Otherwise, he might very well have been secretary of state under Kennedy. Then he had hoped to be secretary of state under Johnson. Johnson used to call him "my secretary of state" when he was majority leader, so if Fulbright had some feelings along that way, they had been
deliberately encouraged by Johnson at one point. But when Johnson got into power, for whatever reasons, maybe the same ones that Kennedy might have had, he was not tapped for it. Johnson obviously intended to stay with Rusk.

I don't think that this was true in the same sense with Mansfield. I don't know whether he ever nourished any desires to be secretary of state. I doubt it myself. I did think that he had thought, as I mentioned earlier, in terms of the vice presidency; although he never told me that, I felt that that was involved. But certainly by this point he was not thinking in terms of secretary of state. He was deeply, seriously concerned with the war and what it was going to do to the country, and quite correctly.

**RITCHIE:** Fulbright's break with Johnson was a very public one. It was very obvious after the Dominican intervention and the "educational" hearings on Vietnam. Mansfield appears to have tried at least to maintain Johnson's good graces.

**VALEO:** He felt he had to work with him; and that was also his style. I think Fulbright's hostility on the Dominican intervention really traced back to his reaction to the Tonkin Gulf resolution. I think Fulbright's willingness to go with the Tonkin Gulf resolution, which as I recall came very shortly after Johnson's second inauguration, right?
RITCHIE: Tonkin Gulf resolution? No, it was before. It was during the summer of '64 right after the conventions.

VALEO: Right. Okay, that would support my view of what happened here, at least from my point of view. I think Fulbright nourished expectations of being secretary of state in the second Johnson administration. He felt that it would be logical for Johnson to keep on the Kennedy people since he played it that way, including the secretary of state, up until the second inauguration, but then Johnson would do it more and more his own way in the second administration. Fulbright supported the Tonkin resolution fully; so did Mansfield. I don't know whether Fulbright had any reservations about it or not but I do know Mansfield already had some, but he said, "we have to do it; there's no other way." So he went with it. When Johnson did not change his secretary of state in '65, then I think that was the beginning of the break with Fulbright. Then when he misread what both Fulbright and Mansfield thought they were doing in the Tonkin resolution, when he began to talk of it as the equivalent of a declaration of war, then they were both outraged. I think there was the added factor in the case of Fulbright that there was not going to be Fulbright as secretary of state. I think these two factors probably explain Fulbright's reactions here.

RITCHIE: Considering that Mansfield was known among his Senate colleagues to be opposed to what was going on in Vietnam,
and yet publicly he was unable to make the same break that Fulbright did, was there very much pressure on him within the Senate to speak out more, to take more of an opposition role to the administration?

VALEO: Oh, no. He was not under pressure. He was recognized as being in the opposition to the war, almost from the very beginning. Perhaps not as soon as Morse and Gruening, but not too long thereafter he was recognized as the obvious leader of the effort to bring the war to a conclusion as quickly as possible But Mansfield was a very strong believer in not wasting your energy in trying to do things that you couldn't do in the Senate. He knew at that point that there would be no way that you could turn Johnson overnight on this question, and that the best hope of doing it would be over a period of time in which you could gradually work from within on Johnson, as well as keeping a distance from him publicly. I'm sure many times Johnson thought he had finally persuaded Mansfield, and just then Mansfield would make a speech about his outrage over some event in Vietnam, and Johnson would probably pull whatever hair he had out of his head, trying to figure out what would satisfy this Mansfield. Every time he thought he had him, something else would develop and he would prove not to be safely and solidly in his camp. Again, that was Johnson’s way of working. He even thought he had Walter Lippmann on this at one point.
**RITCHIE:** Did Mansfield encourage, or was he interested in, or involved in any way in the challenges to Johnson's candidacy in 1968?

**VALEO:** No, not at all. He stayed completely out of that. I don't know that he publicly endorsed Johnson, but I'm sure that he would have felt that there was no way you could change horses. So at most he would have stayed out of it. He would not have made any speech on behalf of any of the other candidates. I'm certain he wouldn't have done that. He might have been a little reluctant to do one on behalf of Johnson too, but from my own recollection he did not have to. So he was pretty much in the clear. We went to Eastern Europe during the election, if I'm not mistaken!

**RITCHIE:** Do you think that he had any particular respect for Eugene McCarthy or Robert Kennedy as reasonable alternatives?

**VALEO:** I think he was more amused by McCarthy than impressed by him. In the case of Bobby Kennedy, I think he wanted to keep the Kennedys away from the presidency after the assassination of President Kennedy. He just thought they were an ill-starred family, and that they were only looking for trouble, that they kept chasing it.

**RITCHIE:** What kind of a senator was Bobby Kennedy. You saw him for about four years.
VALEO: Not a major factor; nowhere near the importance of Ted Kennedy. I don't think he was really interested in the Senate. It was not his way of working. Basically, both he and Jack needed a little more authority. I don't mean to suggest they were authoritarians, but they liked some power that you could use, and in the Senate the best way to use power is not to use it. That kind of approach did not really appeal to them as people. I didn't know Bobby Kennedy very well. He used to sit in the chair as presiding officer once in a while. He always seemed like a rather shy man to me, and pleasant enough, but I didn't really know him.

RITCHIE: I wanted to ask you a little bit more about your own role in these years. In '65 you were still the Democratic majority secretary. With a 2:1 majority, did that make your work easier or harder?

VALEO: As secretary for the majority I handled almost all of the votes on the floor during this whole period. That's why I can speak with some certainty when I say that they were not difficult votes. My own job on the floor was reduced to figuring out the vote, trying to estimate the vote beforehand, calling in absent members on close votes and then during the vote handling it from the back of the floor, briefing people on amendments as they came in for a vote. Again, I never used any pressure on any member. I never had to. At that point I used to even have
Republicans come to me and ask me what the amendment was, or how did someone vote on it, or that sort of thing. I won't say it was a non-partisan Senate, but it had very little partisanship in it. People either voted for the measure on the merits, or opposed it, but it was not usually for partisan reasons. The job was relatively easy.

Then of course I'd take the notes for the party conferences. We began to use fuller and fuller coverage of the caucuses. When Bobby Baker did the job, his notes on a meeting were maybe a half-page long. Then I used to do something much more elaborate on it, but still primarily in the form of taking notes. Then finally Mansfield wanted an actual verbatim record of it, so we began to bring in the reporters of debates. I think he was also angry at the salaries the reporters of the debates were being paid and the amount of time they had off, and he thought we ought to use them more fully. So they would then come in and cover the procedures verbatim.

RITCHIE: Was that also so you could have an exact record of what was said?

VALEO: That was his doing. I didn't feel it was necessary to do it that fully, but he felt it was necessary, particularly after the Vietnamese thing became very heated. He wanted, I think, a full record of that.
**RITCHIE:** I was thinking that the Vietnam War must have been at the root of that.

**VALEO:** I would think so.

**RITCHIE:** I also wondered if you had anything to do with, or knew anything about, Mansfield and Dirksen's efforts, around the end of 1964, to get Charles Watkins to retire as parliamentarian?

**VALEO:** I didn't have anything to do with that. I was glad they did it, because Charlie really should have retired at the time, should have retired a little bit sooner, preferably before that '64 Civil Rights bill. I think we would have had a lot different experience on cloture if that had been the case. But it was time for him to retire. I ran into the same problem with Doc Riddick later on. He always wanted to retire but not retire. I kept telling him, "Look, you can stay as long as you want, Doc, but when you retire, that's it." I often said, "You really need to quit; everybody needs to do that at some point." And I said, "It's time to do it fully when you're ready." I think he was looking for some way in which he could be on without being on. I would not give him any opportunity to do that. At that time I really had full authority over who was going to be appointed. Mansfield would have given me complete support on that. So I could speak with authority, and I did. Finally, I got him to retire fully, and then somebody made some motion about making him
"Parliamentarian Emeritus," whatever that means, and then somebody else gave him a job on the Rules Committee, which I thought was outrageous, in all honesty. I felt it was demeaning of the job of parliamentarian of the Senate. But that's what happens with some people in the Senate, they don't know when to leave it.

RITCHIE: Watkins was in his eighties at the time he stepped down.

VALEO: Yes, certainly over eighty. I don't know how much, but he was over eighty.

RITCHIE: Was he just not performing well?

VALEO: No, he was all right. Charlie was all right. His mind was perfectly all right. The problem with Charlie was that he didn't realize that to interpret the rules the way he was doing assumed that the Senate had infinite time and that every member would take only his fair share of infinite time, whatever that might be. The net result was that every ruling he made was to lean over backwards to protect the individual member, even at the expense of the whole body. You could do that in certain circumstances, but by the time the Senate reached 1960, you could not do that and expect a viable legislative body. The only reason why it worked with Mansfield was because Mansfield was the kind of person he was and because of the circumstances in the decade of the sixties.
Even he had to make some modifications. One of them was the double-track system, which became almost an accepted practice. If you have a measure up before the Senate, and it's the prevailing measure—I'm trying to remember how it developed, but it came just kind of strictly out of the blue. I think Mansfield asked whether or not they would be prepared, since the Senate was tied up on a potential filibuster, would they be prepared to leave the pending business until three o'clock, or four o'clock and take up another measure in the interim. Well, technically that is not feasible under the Senate rules, unless you have unanimous consent. But he got unanimous consent, again because he was the kind of person he was, because people realized what was happening on the measure, that it was a hold up on it, and because it became a practical way of dealing with the situation. It became a precedent, and so far as I know that double-track system, as it's called, is being used even today.

But it was one of the ways of getting around what are really some of the idiocies in the Senate rules. They're not idiocies, again, if you assume that time is infinite and all members will use only their fair share of it.

**RITCHIE:** Well, Watkins had been on the staff since the 1920s. Was that a sign that the institution had just changed so drastically by the 1960s that it had to adopt new measures if it was going to get any business done?
VALEO: Yes, I think so. Again, Charlie Watkins in the context in which he operated was a perfectly honorable man, and a perfectly good parliamentarian. He knew everything the Senate had done in other situations. He had a marvelous memory for it. But it's just that times had changed and the Senate was being called upon to do the kinds of things which it was never called on to do in the '20s, or '30s.

RITCHIE: I get a sense from talking to people who spent a long time on the staff that until the 1960s, the Senate was a very old-fashioned institution. You know, Bill Ridgely talks about the fact that they had no computers, they handed out pay in cash.

VALEO: Well, if you want to get into that, I'll tell you some of what was involved. When I took over as secretary of the Senate, I found that the Disbursing Office was virtually beyond the control of the secretary. Theoretically he was the responsible person, he was bonded for the funds handled in the Disbursing Office, he was responsible for the Senate's finances, but he had no real control over them. This had a rather interesting history. The Disbursing Office originally had been in the secretary's conference room; that had been, I believe, where they paid people off in cash in that room; then it had moved around the corridor. There was a scandal in the early '50s. A disbursing officer committed suicide. He shot himself, due I think primarily to worry over the lax ways in which they had been running the
Disbursing Office. He was being challenged for having permitted it. I don't think he absconded with funds or anything of the sort; he had just not given that much attention to the way it was done.

The net result of that was to bring Bob Brenkworth in as the Financial Clerk. He tightened up greatly on the regulations under which they operated. Bob Brenkworth was a great one for going through the rules books. Every time a senator uttered some new idea on the floor, and nobody objected to it, he made it a part of the rules, in effect, or at least the precedents of the Senate which reduced completely any kind of political control over the Disbursing Office. To a degree, that was warranted, but the fact remains if you are going to have a responsive organization, you've got to have someone who is accountable to somebody, and the disbursing officer no more than anybody else should be a dictator, or completely trusted on his own authority. I think you have to come back to the Senate being responsible, and the only way the Senate could have that responsibility would be through some elected officer. In this case, it was the secretary of the Senate who they had properly designated a number of decades before as the chief financial officer of the Senate.

Well, Bob Brenkworth was a consummate bureaucrat, and knew how to build up his own authority. I asked him how he recruited people. He said he put an ad in the newspapers and then picked
people from that. Well, there were no black people in the Disbursing Office at that point; as far as I know there were no Jews. I mean, he had his own concept of what made for a desirable non-partisan Disbursing Office. I noted that myself. Occasionally people would come and say, "I know an accountant, would you consider putting him on the Disbursing Office?" I'd say, "Well, I'll send him over to see if he has the qualifications. But I let them do their own hiring over there. I don't hire for the Disbursing Office." I did that, and this of course immediately became "political interference" from Brenkworth's viewpoint, and he began to spread the idea that there was political interference in the Disbursing Office. Well, this frightened everybody, because they remembered the suicide and what might have been political influence at that time. He would use tricks like that. Then I noticed that all of the envelopes of the Disbursing Office, even though they went out under the secretary's frank, did not have "The Office of the Secretary" on them. So I ordered a change in that, to make it clear that the responsibility lay with the secretary. Brenkworth's answer to that was to try to get the Disbursing Office out from under the Senate secretary by writing a provision into law making it an independent entity under the president pro tem.
Oh, there was one other question, that of paying in cash. Except for senators who were paid only once a month, everybody else had to be paid in cash. If you wanted your payment every two weeks, you had to get it in cash. There was no other way the Disbursing Office could figure out how to do it by check. We did have some politically appointed cops at the time, and one of them sat outside the Disbursing Office on payday. I don’t think he could have stopped a flea trying to get into the Disbursing Office, if there was going to be a hold-up. It frightened me greatly that on paydays we had so much cash in the Senate. I could just see some bold thieves coming in there and just pushing the guy over—he used to sit with his seat back on two legs of the chair—just give him a little push and he would have gone over, and they would have gone in and robbed the Disbursing Office. So I was determined that as a first thing I would get that changed. Believe me, I ran into all kinds of problems trying to get people paid just in checks rather than in cash. I did a lot of research on it, and I had to testify before the Appropriations Committee which was where Brenkworth also served as an advisor or budgetary matters.

He presented the budget for the whole secretary's office, and of course took care of the Disbursing Office in this process. I told him I wanted to appear in person. Well, this was somewhat unprecedented. My predecessor had not gone down for ten years or
something like that to appear before one of the committees. I told him as the responsible officer, I wanted to appear on the budget for the entire office. When I got to the Appropriation Committee, I asked for provision to be made—because I had spoken to Bob Brenkworth, and he said, "Well, it can't be done without the Appropriations Committee's consent, in any event, and it can't really be done anyhow." So when I testified I said I had studied the practices of the federal government and found there was only one other place in the federal government where people were still being paid in cash, and that was at an army outpost in Alaska, where they were still being paid in silver dollars! Well, that was enough to get that corrected. But I could not get him to look at any idea on automation of the Disbursing Office's procedures; he still insisted there was no way in which this could be done.

Bob began to feel the pressure from me, and then decided his answer would be to get out from under the secretary's office altogether. Since he had very good friends on the Appropriations Committee staff, they knew him, and because very few senators can add two and two correctly, they trusted anybody who could. He went to the Appropriations Committee and tried to get the legislation rewritten so that the Disbursing Office would be an independent office of the Senate under the president pro tem. Well, this was precisely the opposite way in which I thought the staff structure should go in the Senate. I had visions of the House situation
which has four or five different offices—even the doorkeeper is elected separately over there. I went to the majority leader and I told him what was happening. He went to Russell who was chairman of the committee, and Russell had gone along with the change, he didn't know one thing from the other, he didn't care that much. "Oh," he said, "no, if you don't want it, that's all right. I just thought it was something that it would be all right to do."

So Russell changed positions, and then after that, Brenkworth knew he had to resign. He did, and Bill Ridgely was next in line, but there was nothing automatic; I had to appoint him. He came in and I talked with him and I told him I would appoint him on one condition. I had already hired Lan Potter and Marilyn Courtot to study the procedures of the secretary's office, with a view to bringing them up to date. I told Bill Ridgely I would be glad to appoint him, I had no problems with him as a person, but I wanted one promise in return, and that was he would make a good faith effort to modernize the procedures in that office and use Marilyn Courtot in connection with that. He agreed to do that, so our relationship thereafter was a very good one. We never had any problems, and the office was of course brought up to date.

RITCHIE: In 1970 you had Orlando Potter do a study of the Disbursing Office.
VALEO: Yes, I brought him in to do a study of all the procedures in the secretary's office. He in turn, I think, recommended Marilyn Courtot, or brought her over in connection with another project we were concerned with. No, I asked him to bring Marilyn Courtot from the Library because she had done some excellent work there, and I knew about it, largely in connection with the new campaign contributions law, which was then going into effect, which involved a good deal of record-keeping that we were not equipped to do. So Orlando Potter, whom I had met earlier and was impressed with, he came I guess by way of Pell's office, and Marilyn Courtot were the key people in changing the procedures. Orlando Potter was mostly concerned with the campaign contributions law then, and then Marilyn took Potter's basic study and began to try to apply it in detail in the different departments in the secretary's office.

Since we're on the subject we might as well stay on it a little longer, and get to the establishment of the Curator's office, which came in somewhere in this period. Actually, it started when Jackie Kennedy tried to get the chandelier, which I mentioned in a previous conversation. It occurred to me, I had been reading some articles that said that so much in the way of historic artifacts and art had disappeared from state capitols, and I had to assume that the same thing was happening in our own Capitol, especially when Lyndon Johnson set up his library in
Texas and was sending things down there for storage. When I heard about the ballot boxes—you know, the ballot boxes which carry the Electoral College votes over to the House, I understood they made a new set every election. Somebody just grabbed the boxes after each ceremony, they were lovely boxes, and they were of course historic artifacts. I assumed that there must be some real problems in things disappearing and that really should not be the case. So I talked with Mansfield about it. He said, "Well, why don't we get somebody to keep tabs on it and see what's involved." We decided what we really needed was a curator.

Theoretically, the Architect of the Capitol had some authority over this, and also the sergeant at arms, but neither of them looked at it from a historic point of view. He said, "Go ahead, let's see if we can get a curator set up for the Capitol." He wanted it for the whole Capitol rather than just for the Senate. We tried it that way, I guess three or four successive years. We got unanimous approval in the Senate right away, but couldn't get the House to go along with it, largely because the architect, George Stewart, didn't really want it. He didn't want any more authorities wandering around on the House side. That was one aspect of it. Then he agreed to trade it: he'd do it if we would get him money to extend the west front! The bill came up in our Rules Committee and in our Appropriations Committee both. Well, they didn't want to do the west front, so it was kept hanging.
Then Mansfield said, "Well, let's just forget the House. Just do it for the Senate."
And we did; that's the way the Senate Curator's Office was set up.

I had a great deal of difficulty finding someone for the job. There was a fellow
named Joseph W. Dougherty, I guess, he was on the Library of Congress Station. I tried
to get someone through the Library of Congress, thought that would be a logical place to
look for a candidate. He came in to see me about the job, and he had some relevant
experience. I think I tried Jim Ketchum, who was then at the White House and was
recommended by a friend of Mansfield's who had some connections with the White
House, but he wasn't ready to leave the White House at that time. I guess I tried Dick
Baker, and he preferred to be an historian elsewhere rather than a curator in the Senate.
I could find no one that seemed more suitable, so I got Dougherty, and he had a stroke
about two weeks after I hired him, so the problem was extremely difficult. Then finally
Jim Ketchum came back; he'd had some sort of altercation at the White House and
offered then to take the job, and that's the way the office got started. As you know, we
wrote it up so the secretary became the executive director of the Commission on Art and
Antiquities, and it was totally bipartisan. By this time, I guess Scott was already minority
leader, and so the thing worked very well.
It became a key factor in getting the two historic rooms of the Capitol restored, both the Old Supreme Court Chamber and the Old Senate Chamber, which had languished in the Architect’s office for years. They could never get the money for it. But then with the support from the Commission on Art and Antiquities, we were able to finally get the committees to go along with providing the funds to finish that job.

The Historical Office didn't come directly out of that, but at about the same time. It started in another way. The person who was in charge of the Documents Room at the time came to see me and said, "I've got all these old documents going back to the nineteenth century, and I don't know what to do with them. Nobody wants them anymore. Can't we get rid of them in some way?" I said, "What are they about?" He brought me a sampling of them, some of them sounded like very interesting questions, Indian questions and all sorts of things of regional interest. So it occurred to me that one way you might dispose of them would be to send them to historic groups in the states where they were most relevant. Sure enough, we made it known to members of the Senate that we had these old documents that had particular reference to their states, would they be interested in distributing them and could they recommend a repository in their state. The response was very good. So we sent out a lot of these documents at that time. That was the start of it.
Then it occurred to us that we really needed someone to keep a close eye on what was happening in the Senate and to study what had happened in the Senate. I proposed a Senate historian to the Appropriations Committee, because then I was testifying regularly for the secretary's offices. I guess it was Fritz Hollings who was chairman of that subcommittee at the time, and he saw the virtue of the idea immediately. So that's the way the Historical Office got started. And then I heard through Jim Ketchum that Dick Baker was ready perhaps to come up to the Senate. I wanted him, and we got him.

**RITCHIE:** And you got Arthur Scott as the photohistorian.

**VALEO:** Yes, he came in to see me. He was a nice fellow, although an odd fellow. I think he really had some sort of a mental problem. But he was very amiable as a photographer. He had been the Republican photographer, if I'm not mistaken, and had always been very accommodating, very helpful. He wanted that job badly. I guess it was his idea originally. I talked to Dick about it at the time, and Dick thought we might use something like that. The problem was that Scott fell apart. He couldn't stand working for anyone, and he had no sense of working in an organization. He was an artist with a camera, but I guess he just didn't understand anything beyond that, so it became a very difficult personnel problem. I really felt a little sorry for him at that point. I knew that he was having some kind of mental
problem, I could see that. But then it got straightened out and he decided it was time to quit.

**RITCHIE:** Well, I have a lot of questions to ask about the period when you were secretary of the Senate, but I think maybe we should hold those for next time.

**VALEO:** Are we at a stopping place, my goodness!

**RITCHIE:** Well, it's twelve o'clock and I should give you a break.

**VALEO:** Yes, that's enough!

**End of Interview #10**