RITCHIE: Last week we talked about Lee Metcalf and Mike Mansfield, and the problems of living in the shadow of another senator. It struck me that one team of Democratic senators who seemed to work it out pretty well for a long time was Warren Magnuson and Henry Jackson. Could you give me your observations of those two?

VALEO: That's very interesting, because now that you mention it I never remember seeing Magnuson and Jackson head-to-head planning anything anywhere in all the meetings that I went to. Both of them attended the chairman of the committee meetings, they usually sat in different parts of the room. I saw a lot of Magnuson. He used to drop into the office very frequently. Jackson never came in. I was friendly with both of them. I don't know how Jackson took to my views on the military and on Vietnam, which were somewhat different from his. Both senators in a sense were very silent people and both seemed to go their own ways.

Now, I'm sure they cooperated a great deal on matters that involved the state of Washington. They supported each other vigorously in state elections, that is elections to the Senate.
But when it came to actually putting their heads together and conniving in the Senate, there was no indication of that whatsoever. In part, I suppose, because they had somewhat different interests. Jackson was really the defense man, and Warren Magnuson was not. He went along with things in support of defense measures, particularly as they might involve Boeing, but he was not an advocate of large defense budgets as was Jackson.

Mansfield’s reactions to the two men were interesting. He got along very well with Magnuson, called him "Maggie," as did everybody else. Magnuson had a good sense of humor. He had a way of going on the floor at the very, very precise moment when he knew he could get a piece of legislation through and saying, "I've got this little old amendment," or this "little old bill that doesn't amount to much." Usually he was able to slip through a great deal of things involving the state which, if advanced by another member, might have been challenged. Everybody got a kick out of his technique. Every time Magnuson said, "I've got this little bill that doesn't amount to very much," everybody would start to laugh because they knew precisely what was coming. But very rarely was he opposed on those measures. He had a great deal of trouble with his legs as he got older. I used to talk with him about that, having had myself a similar problem at an earlier date. I used to urge him to do some exercises. Whether it ever really had an effect or not, I don't know. He was always good
in the meetings of the policy committee. He was a level-headed person, invariably supported Mansfield's leadership on: almost any issue, and that included Vietnam.

Jackson was not a member of the policy committee. He kept his own counsel largely, and he kept a distance from the leadership. He had a staff person, Dorothy Fosdick, who was his advisor on defense and national security. Her father (Happy Emerson Fosdick) was a famous minister in New York and, I think, a pacifist. He headed one of the major churches in New York. I remember him from my student days at International House. He was highly esteemed. She seemed almost to be apologizing for his pacifism by her vigorous embracing of a militaristic approach. She had this absolute one-track mind on anything involving the Russians, which again was quite in contrast to her father's in an earlier period.

Mansfield did not, down deep, like Jackson. He thought Jackson was the product of an overweening ambition to be president and Mansfield was very sensitive to anybody in the Senate who wanted to be president. He almost invariably knew who had the bug, long before it was evident to anyone else. Still, you couldn't help but admire Jackson. He was a very able, highly intelligent man. As a Democrat, he was a good one. I didn't agree with him on defense questions, and I think he helped to waste billions and billions of dollars by his readiness to swallow
whatever he got from the Defense Department, in much the same way Russell did. The
two in combination were probably the main angels of the Department of Defense and its
subdepartments and contractors. But Mansfield's particular objection to him was not so
much on that score as it was on his belief that Jackson was pushing too hard to be
president. Jackson opposed Mansfield's leadership on Vietnam until very much towards
the end of the war. Then he too got on board.

My first encounter with Magnuson was when I was in the Library. He asked for
someone who knew something about China to do a TV show. This would have been in
the early fifties. He had just come back from a trip to China. He had gone to Shanghai, I
believe, it was after the Communists had taken over. He was about the only member of
Congress who went out in that period. He came back pushing for trade with China. He
didn't want to cut it off. Seattle was a main port of embarkation for that kind of trade. I
didn't know him, but I was selected and I went on this talk show with him. He did most
of the talking. He told about his trip and what had happened. Tris Coffin was the
moderator. I guess a cousin of mine in New York happened to have the TV turned on
and took a picture of the screen and sent it down to me. I don't know what's happened to
that picture, it's probably somewhere in the collection, but it shows a much younger
edition of Magnuson.
Magnuson liked to tell an amusing story about Honolulu during the war. He was a naval officer assigned to Honolulu. He said at that time the city was full of prostitutes. They decided at one point to go on strike for some reason or other, and with thousands of naval men in the city, the city fathers were very disturbed about what it might do to the peace of the commonwealth. Magnuson mediated the strike between the spokesmen for the prostitutes and for the Navy and apparently got them some higher rates or something. But he was very proud of that achievement. He loved to tell that story. I liked him personally. I had a close personal relationship with him. I thought he was a very wily man, but he had decent instincts. On the Appropriations Committee he was a very strong supporter of Galludet College for the Deaf.

He was strongly for organized labor. He supported every measure that involved labor. If you recall the history of that period, Washington state in the World War II period and before, in the Roosevelt times, was one of the most radical states in the nation. I believe they actually had two members of the Communist party in Congress at one point in that period—or if they weren't members, everybody acknowledged that they were Communists and they never made any attempt to hide it. I suspected that part of Jackson's later almost-phobia of the Soviet Union may have come from earlier associations in that kind of a setting, where it would have been very natural for any Democratic senator to have
had, if not Communist allies, Communist acquaintances. This was Harry Bridges territory at the time. I had the feeling that maybe Jackson was anxious to put as much distance between himself and that early period of his political career as possible.

Overall the state of Washington was extremely well represented. I never shared Mansfield's view about Jackson's presidential ambitions. Although I'm sure he had them, I didn't think they were either more or less than many other members of the Senate whom I had known. I never saw any evidence of friction between Magnuson and Jackson, nor did I ever see any evidence of closeness between them. Between the two of them, I think they served the interests of their state extremely well. And I was very saddened to see Magnuson defeated. It would have been different had he decided not to run. Normally he won huge majorities in that state, nobody every really challenged him, so it was quite a shock to me when he lost. I don't know that I can add anything more on that combination. It was a good one.

RITCHIE: The combination in the immediate adjourning state of Oregon never seemed to work: that was Morse and Neuberger, who were forever feuding.

VALEO: Both Neubergers! That was Morse. Morse was almost continuously feuding with everyone. It was his nature. He was about as strong aloner as I've known. Now most loners sort
of pull off to the background, but this was a loner who was determined to be out in front, beckoning to the rest of the country to follow him. Maybe someday we'll move in that direction. He might have been twenty or thirty years ahead of his time, it's hard to tell. Certainly he was one of the most brilliant members of the Senate. His capabilities for grabbing the nub of a subject were immense. Walter George spoke of him as the best constitutional lawyer that he had ever known in the Senate, and I think probably correctly so. He was really a brilliant lawyer and a brilliant advocate. The problem was that the distance between him and the rest of the members was so great in this respect that he could not build bridges to them.

He spoke mostly for the record, and he didn't really care whether anybody listened to him or not. He'd be up there in the evenings sometimes until seven, eight, nine at night, making a speech, which would start with the briefest of notes and go on literally for hours. His command of English was superb. His capabilities in penetrating to the real heart of issues was immense. I had only the greatest respect for him. As we've covered in an earlier meeting, I had a run-in with him which had nothing really to do with me, it was a misunderstanding completely, because I admired him greatly. I thought he added an enormous amount of yeast to the Senate. You need people like Morse. He doesn't let you sit on your complacency too long and
pat yourself on the back. He was always looking for the things that needed an honest searchlight on them. And he found them very often. Some of the issues he pursued very early on, more often than not, to the irritation of his colleagues, were eventually chickens that came home to roost. Vietnam, foreign aid, the China situation and our involvement with Chiang Kai-shek, were issues of this kind. There were also many domestic issues. I happened to be more concerned with his views on foreign policy.

There was the time when he shifted over from the Republicans to the Democrats. This was a little bit before my deep immersion in Senate affairs. He apparently had some kind of a run-in with his Republican colleagues and decided to leave that party. His first inclination was to go over to the Democrats. Johnson was leader at the time, and was a little skittish about taking him into the fold. He was such a hair shirt when he wanted to be. When Morse sensed the reluctance, he made it very clear that if the Democrats didn't want him to organize with them, he would organize as an independent, move his chair to the middle aisle, and do all of his committee work on the floor of the Senate. Well, that was enough to get him a place on the Democratic side, where I think he belonged. The Democrats, at least during the period I was there, tended to be the more innovative of the two parties, and if anything, Morse was the kind of person who pointed out where the innovation might be necessary. He was a great
senator, and I think if he’s treated with any fairness in history he’ll show up that way.

RITCHIE: What did you think about his colleagues Richard and Maureen Neuberger?

VALEO: Neither of them registered very strongly with me. I think Neuberger was a bright man. He was not the sort of personality I like. He tended to be a little bit deprecatory of people in a kind of sly way which I didn't really appreciate. Mrs. Neuberger never really made much of a mark. She stayed only briefly and then decided she’d had enough of it. It really wasn’t for her. Actually, I think Neuberger himself was not around long enough really to have shown what kind of senator he might have been. He came at a refreshing time, because I think it was somewhat after the McCarthy period and most of the people from the West were basically pro-McCarthy kinds of people, and Neuberger came in as a welcomed change from that.

RITCHIE: Continuing on about Morse, there was a group of independent, loner-type senators. I think of Paul Douglas, Joseph Clark, William Proxmire. Can you tell me about them? And what does the loner really do in an institution that’s usually fairly collegial?

VALEO: Well, I’d have to differ with your observations on Douglas and Clark. I think you're right when you talk of Proxmire
in these terms. In a way, Mansfield was a loner. We've mentioned Morse as still another.
Clark never wanted to be a loner; he wanted to be at the center of the stage, literally.
And the same thing with Douglas, he wanted really to be the center of the Democratic
party, both of them did. And they weren't. They happened to be somewhat on the left
side of the center, and they really wanted the party to move over to where they were so
that they would be the center. But it never worked that way while they were in the
Senate. As a result, both became very sharp thorns in the side of Lyndon Johnson when
he was leader. I remember some of the debates on the floor. Johnson would hunch over
in his chair and listen with much dismay written on his face because he was definitely
their target—in particular with Clark. He got along much better with Paul Douglas, I
think.

Paul Douglas was a highly emotional man. He never understood the
parliamentary manipulation that went on in the Senate. He didn't understand it, in a
way much to his credit, because the manipulation was usually something that was a little
underhanded and didn't belong really in the Senate. It was one of the things Mansfield
got rid of as far as he could. But Douglas was constantly victimized by that. It used to
make him furious. He was particularly angry with Bobby Baker. I came in after Bobby
Baker, and he began to treat me the same way, thinking automatically that I would be
the same kind of person that Baker was in that job.
That straightened out as time went on, but if he thought there was even the remotest chance that I was making some kind of snide attempt to undermine his position, he was up in absolute fury at it. He had a long-time assistant—who later went over to Proxmire, as a matter of fact. He just retired not too long ago. He was Proxmire's administrative assistant for a long time, Howard Shuman, who shared Douglas' views. They were both crusaders for righteousness, and like righteous people sometimes, they were extremely difficult.

Now, that was never true of Proxmire. He never saw himself as a righteous person. He happened to be my neighbor. We lived just a door apart and our kids went to the same camp in the summer. He had a son about my son's age, so they played a lot together. I had a great personal fondness for Proxmire, again one of these absolutely essential people in an ideal Senate, in my judgment, a leaven who moved the Senate to think in somewhat new ways. He was a Democrat, clearly, most of his votes were with the Democrats. But you’d never know it to talk with him. He had his own world that he lived in, that he does live in, and he works out of that world to put into the mainstream of American politics and government ideas which he believes in. I don’t know how much success he has had with that but it was a part of the genius of the Senate.
He used to feel fairly lucky when he got fifteen or twenty votes on an amendment that he might offer. He was one of the early advocates of taking a far closer look at the amount of money which was being spent on defense, an idea which I think is now coming into its own. He pushed for years—a speech a day—advocating our adherence to the Genocide Convention. Probably within the next few years we're going to have to face the defense cost problem as a very real one, as one of the sources of the nation's potential bankruptcy, again largely because we built this wall up during World War II of never challenging anything that had to do with the military because it was essential in that period for the conduct of World War II, or it was deemed to be essential, and that has carried over. It was interesting, in connection with a recent plane crash that the Defense Department said it was working under standards which had developed in 1952. When you have that kind of in-built thing, it takes some person like a Proxmire or like a Morse to get the ball rolling in a new direction. And the Senate is an ideal place to put that kind of a burr in the saddle, if you will, to begin to move it. That is because the Senate does allow for a great deal of flexibility, individual expression, among its members.

So I obviously think very highly of Proxmire. I sent him a small contribution in one campaign after I left the Senate, and he
sent it back to me with a note saying, "Thank you, but I never take any contributions for my campaigns. I'd be delighted to take yours if I were going to do it, but I don't do it."

RITCHIE: Hubert Humphrey as a senator was criticized for compromising too much. Would you say that these people didn't compromise enough as senators, this group of liberal, more independent-minded men?

VALEO: I think in a way they didn't listen enough. They were not difficult men in terms of their basic decency and their willingness to recognize other points of view. I don't think that that was the issue. If you have that sort of person, he ought to be able to compromise. But I think they were so determined, particularly after you had had this recession of liberalism from the time of Roosevelt—it had moved pretty far by the time they were in the Senate in the early 1950s. You had the whole McCarthy period in there, which was almost a negation of everything that had happened under Roosevelt from the liberal end. McCarthy was the first negation; Reagan is the second. The Senate liberals of the fifties were so determined to hang on to what they had that they didn't really hear the sounds that were coming up around them. So it was impossible for them to compromise, not because they were uncompromising men, but because they were so determined to try to protect the advances which they saw were an essential contribution of the Roosevelt period and the people who had
supported Roosevelt. I think that's really the explanation of their difficulty.

Now, Proxmire was not in that category. Proxmire simply has his own kind of idea-factory, and he works out of that factory. It's impervious to criticism either on the left or right, it doesn't make any difference to him. He just is going to do it; in much the same way Morse did the same thing. They work out of an inner thrust, let's put it that way, rather than by the forces that are around them. No, I would not speak of any of these people, certainly not Douglas, or Proxmire, or Morse, as ineffective in terms of their own lights and in terms of what they may in the long run have contributed to the country. Ineffective in the sense of somebody who gets legislation through the way they want it, yes they were ineffective in that sense. But they were not meant to get a lot of legislation through. That wasn't their primary function in the Senate, as I see it in retrospect.

RITCHIE: Joe Clark took on the Senate establishment, and wrote a number of books on reforming the Senate. Did you see any value in the suggestions he was making, or any possibility of change?

VALEO: He had young political scientists who worked with him—Bernard Norwitch, I believe, and others—who did most of that writing. It was strictly a political scientist's viewpoint of
the Senate. I can't remember now the content of his ideas on organizing the Senate. I remember thinking, at the time, of it being really irrelevant more than anything else, sort of unrooted in the realities of the Senate. But I 'm sure there were some worthwhile things in his approach. I just didn't see any prospect of anything happening as a result of it. He did a whole series of speeches on reform of the Senate, as I recall. Those were things that gave Lyndon Johnson the shivers. When Clark would be speaking Johnson listened very closely, I must say.

**RITCHIE:** Another maverick senator in that period was Estes Kefauver, and I wondered what your impressions were of him?

**VALEO:** I didn't know him well. I met him a few times and I supported him when he made the effort to run for the presidency. I thought he was a great populist in the same—I go on hesitantly—tradition as Jimmy Carter, but after having seen what Carter did in the presidency, I'm not so sure that Kefauver as president would have done very much more. He was a very honest and very courageous man. He voted his convictions. I recall there was one vote, I think he was the only one who opposed McCarthy on one of the anti-Communist votes McCarthy won without even trying. He took him on. He was a quiet man. I remember him best for those crime hearings which he ran for a while. I thought he was very effective. I can't remember which campaign that was, but at that point I thought he would have made a great president.
He didn't carry that much esteem among his colleagues. They did not think that much of Estes Kefauver.

He was teamed up with one of the real problems of aging in the Senate, Kenneth McKellar, at that time. Of course, he was youth as contrasted with McKellar's age. McKellar, I didn't know him, but the stories were that he used to fall asleep during the hearings all the time and was almost nonfunctional, but clung to his chairmanship. Of course the same problem arose with Green of Rhode Island and others. There have been some advocacies of setting a maximum constitutional limit on age for the Senate. I have never supported that view. I think the Senate can tolerate a McKellar once in a while, or a Green, without it being disastrous. But I think that to put a limitation in terms of age on the Senate would be a mistake. That's a judgment that should be left to the constituencies, and the effort to impose an age limit is a prejudice and a mistake. As it is now you get somebody from time to time who is eighty years old or more and is very, very capable. We can see that in the case of the chap over in the House, who is kind of "Mr. Aging."

RITCHIE: Claude Pepper.

VALEO: Yes. I think Claude Pepper is one of the outstanding members of the House. If I picked the dozen outstanding members, I'd pick him among them. And you would have lost that if
you had an age limitation. So I never favored that. I thought it would be wrong to do it. I 
thought it was a judgment that should be left to voters. Especially with TV the voters can 
see if a man's aged too much to do the job. That's very possible.

**RITCHIE:** Older candidates always could run on the platform that they had 
seniority in the Senate, and that the system rewarded age.

**VALEO:** Yes, but that they don't have that so much anymore. That isn't as 
valuable as it used to be. Maybe TV will do what a constitutional amendment would not 
necessarily have done so well. The TV is a pretty revealing machine and it makes it very 
possible to make that determination.

**RITCHIE:** Except that Milton Young in his last reelection campaign combated 
the age issue by breaking a board with his hand in a karate chop on a television 
program.

**VALEO:** What did he have, balsam? He was a good guy, Milton Young, a very 
pleasant man. I met him once abroad. I was traveling with Bourke Hickenlooper and he 
asked to join up with us, so we traveled together for about a week in Asia. He was a 
typical Plainsman. I don't know that he made any great contributions to the country, but 
he represented what his state needed at that point, and they didn't need to make any 
great contributions to the country. There weren't that many of them to begin
with. The other one from North Dakota, Langer, I only remember slightly. I was on the Foreign Relations Committee staff when he was a member of that committee. I think I told the story about Langer and Rockefeller, if I'm not mistaken.

RITCHIE: Yes, you did.

VALEO: Well, it was a classic story, really.

RITCHIE: One other senator from that period that I really have to ask you a question about, especially now that Dick Baker has published a book about him, is Clinton Anderson. What were your impressions of him?

VALEO: I didn't know him well. He was an irritable man. He was diabetic, of course, and his health was not good. It never was any good during the period I knew him in the Senate. He definitely carried weight on environmental issues and hydropower. There was no question, people listened to Clint Anderson, including Johnson, on issues involving the west. In some ways you might have, in his period, called him "Mr. West." He really understood the problems of water and power in the West and was regarded by everyone as one of the two or three really outstanding members on those issues. But I didn't know him well enough to know. Then as he got older and he got on that drug, L-DOPA, and there were stories about how he had this revision in his sex life and he was chasing the women around again, an effect which apparently comes
from taking the drug. He was constantly on medication. For years it went on. Everybody always would say, "Poor Clint, he's on death's door again," and then he'd go on for another couple of years and then it would start all over again: he's about to die. But he lasted a long time.

RITCHIE: Is the best strategy for a senator to concentrate on one issue, the way Anderson did on conservation issues?

VALEO: It depends on what your objective is. If you're running for the presidency, the answer would be no. If you want to make a mark in the Senate as such, you pick one or two main issues that interest you deeply and which have some national significance as well as local significance, and you concentrate on them. That is one of the formulas, as far I know, that brings you to the forefront in the Senate. How much that will be changed by the increased relevance of TV on what happens in American politics, I'm not yet sure. Maybe you have to be on five now, maybe you have to be six issues, and you have to be known on all of them. I don't know that for sure but certainly in the period we're talking about, those senators who picked a couple of issues which were of overwhelming importance to their state, and great importance to the nation—here you have the Mansfield example where he picked foreign relations. We were able to draw up the concept that it was damned important to Montana what happened in China or what happened in Europe. If you could do that sort of thing with a
national issue and make it meaningful to your own state; if you could combine that with a great concern about your state's immediate and unique problems, then I think you had the basis for a highly successful member of the Senate.

I think this was part of the problem with Metcalf, which we mentioned last time. He would have liked to do that, and he did it to a degree in the House after Mansfield had left the House. Metcalf had succeeded him, if I'm not mistaken, and Metcalf did much the same thing there. He was making a mark for himself in foreign policy, but there wasn't room for two of them in the Senate, and that was part of his difficulty.

**RITCHIE:** That he couldn't carve out a separate sphere.

**VALEO:** You really have to carve out a separate sphere. We talked earlier about Jackson and Magnuson. There was never any real conflict between them. Obviously they both overlapped on many issues, but Magnuson you didn't identify with foreign policy. You identified him with commerce and appropriations, he was very important in those spheres. But in the case of Jackson you identified him with defense and foreign policy and anti-Sovietism, he had very strong views on that.

**RITCHIE:** I wanted to ask you next about the group that was elected as the "Class of '58," but before I do, I wanted to ask whether there is much of an identity of a class of senators. Do
people think of them as a group? Is there some significance in the fact that people all come in at the same time, especially a large group?

VALEO: I never noticed it. The press makes a big to-do about it. They usually come in on a wave in the country—in the case of the group that came in in '58 it was an anti-Eisenhower economics group. We were in the midst of something of a recession which was blamed largely on the Republicans who were in the White House. That's usually when it happens. You have the group, more in the House than in the Senate, who came in on the Vietnamese wave. I'm thinking now of the Democrats. Then you have the anti-Carter wave that came in on the Republicans as the last major wave as far as I can see. There are a lot of other elections in between in which you don't really have that kind of sharp swing. But I don't think people in the Senate think of themselves strongly as a member of a particular class or year of the Senate except insofar as it involves their seniority. I saw no evidence of that. Only to the extent that very often their closer friends are chosen from that group because they were all in the same boat when they came in and they had much the same problems. They had a lot of shared interests, but only in that sense. They very quickly move out in different direction depending on what other interests drive them.
RITCHIE: I’d like to ask you about some of those people. Running down the list by seniority, Stephen Young is first.

VALEO: When I think of Steve Young I think of Little Napoleon. He was a very aggressive man, and he had a chip on his shoulder, as very often happens with men of shorter stature. They make up for it by their press forward, so to speak. He took offense very easily. Sometimes he didn’t hear correctly and he took offense unnecessarily. But basically he was bright; in a classic liberal sense he certainly belonged with Douglas and Clark and people of that sort. His views were very liberal. He was a strong supporter of labor. He was quarrelsome. He took no nonsense from anyone, including his constituents. I don’t think he really cared that much about getting reelected. He used to write the most stinging letters; if he got an offensive letter from a constituent he wrote one back that was just about as offensive as the one he got. He didn’t try to palliate or salve the constituent. He never did that.

I thought he was unique person, and I liked him personally. When he left, I took one of the people from his staff, I’m trying to remember which one it was, one of the fellows that he had had as a driver for himself, I took him into the secretary’s office. I liked Steve Young. He was a man who didn’t hear anything around him, much the same way as Clark. He heard only himself and he was so obsessed with projecting his own views that he was a man who
obviously couldn't compromise, not because he didn't want to necessarily—although in this case even more so than in the case of Clark. He was uncompromising. He didn't really like to compromise. When John Glenn first tried to challenge him, he came out slugging which I thought was indicative. He took on an astronaut, and taking on an astronaut in that period was a little difficult, because Glenn was a national hero. But it didn't phase Young; he was ready for it; he was always ready for a fight.

RITCHIE: That was mostly a Democratic class, but there were a few Republicans, including Hugh Scott and Kenneth Keating.

VALEO: Yes, of course I knew Hugh Scott very well, and I knew Ken Keating quite well. As a matter of fact, he was the first congressman who ever came into my house. He came with Nancy Dickerson. I gave a party, and I guess she was hostess for that party. She was then Nancy Haunchman and worked at the Foreign Relations Committee. She brought Ken Keating as I recall. I liked him. He was a sound Republican, one might say a Republican liberal in the context of Dewey and Rockefeller, that sort of person. He was a warm person. He had a family problem. I think his wife had some very serious illness for a long, long time. I don't think she came to Washington. Keating was a progressive legislator, no great shakes, but he was a good senator. As far as Hugh Scott is concerned, I've already said I think he was an extremely able man and made some major contributions to the country.

VALEO: The only thing I really remember about Clair Engle is that vote on cloture, the decisive vote on the Civil Rights Bill of '64, the condition he was in when he cast that vote. He couldn't speak, but he cast the vote with a gesture. It was very moving. He had a look of total satisfaction on his face when he did it. I thought that was indicative of him. He was clearly a man who had some deep motivations. There was a problem with his wife, afterwards she didn't want to move out of his office. They treated her very gently at the time. But it was not an easy problem.

RITCHIE: Eugene McCarthy.

VALEO: I can never think of McCarthy without thinking of that nominating speech for Stevenson, which I think was one of the great convention speeches of our times, when he placed Stevenson's name in nomination. It was a powerful, moving speech, and I think it was the highwater of his public career. From then on I think it was mostly downhill for Gene McCarthy. He again was a person suffering in the same sense that Metcalf suffered, from being in the shadow of a bigger light. He was in Humphrey's shadow, so his efforts to project himself as a political leader were constantly being fuzzed by this larger, looming figure in front of him. I think he suffered from that. He had an almost winsome sense of
humor, pixyish even. It was certainly a subtle thing, and not necessarily one that you
warmed to. It left you with a feeling that he was a little odd, or something to that effect.
He would come up and talk to me on the floor once in a while, and I would experience it.
After he left the Senate I didn't see very much of him until the *Buckley v. Valeo* Supreme
Court case, when he was aligned with Buckley. Both for different reasons were opposed
to the law. Down deep I was also dubious about it too, but also for my own different
reasons.

**RITCHIE:** Were you surprised when he became the leading antiwar candidate in
the '68 election?

**VALEO:** Yes, I was. He had never given any indication of strong feelings about
war or about peace. I just never thought of him in those terms. Then all of a sudden he
emerged in that. My first reaction was, well, he sees a road into the limelight, a way of
getting back into political activism. But I think his feelings were deeper than that; I don't
want to take that away from him. I don't think it was just a gimmick that he saw and
wanted to ride. He felt deeply about the war, and I didn't realize that at first. It never
came across in his earlier period in the Senate. That's why I was really quite surprised
when he came out as the key figure in it.

**RITCHIE:** Harrison Williams was also in that group.
VALEO: Yes, that was a great sadness for me to see him in trouble. Apparently it had a lot to do with liquor. I remember first hearing about Harrison, or "Pete" as he was called in the Senate, Williams when he was either just entering the Senate or still in the House. A very dear friend of mine at the Library of Congress, Howard Piquet, one of my guides and mentors, had been called over to do some trade work for Williams. He spoke very highly of him, spoke about what a decent kind of person he was. His votes in the Senate were always good votes from my point of view. I thought his was a sound Democratic position, somewhat left of center, but basically a sound Democratic position in his votes. He never got involved much in debate. You didn't see him much on the floor. He came out for the votes, but he didn't hang around the floor a lot. Rarely spoke, and when he did it was in a voice that you could hardly hear. He had difficulty holding staff, which surprised me. He didn't strike me as the kind of person who should have that. I remember he had a series of people who worked for him, and they didn't last very long. So he may have been a totally different man in a private situation.

I remember, I was in Japan when the word of that scam came out. I was interviewed in Japan for a magazine article and I was asked about it. I said that I knew one or two of the people, and at least one of them I would be convinced would not be deliberately involved in something like that. Of course I had Harrison
Williams in mind. When I realized later the way it was done I thought that a very, very, serious misuse of police power by the F.B.I. There was no clear-cut picture of why they picked certain members of the Congress to pursue. It’s a little bit like disguising a policeman as a potential customer and then getting a prostitute to proposition him and then arresting the prostitute. My own view of that is that the one who puts on a disguise and does that is really the culprit, not the prostitute. But in the case of Williams, I have no knowledge that would counter the facts as the court found them.

I still find that a very serious matter, because it took out of public life a man who on the whole, in terms of what you contribute in public life, had done a very creditable job, quite apart from his personal life. I just think it’s wrong to tempt someone like that. We don’t want saints in our Congress, we want decent human beings who are subject to temptation like anyone else, and who might have slightly more resistance than the rest of us. You expect that, but you don’t expect them to be absolutely perfect in their resistance. If you do that, you’re going to get a Senate which is so totally at variance with the way the nation is, I don’t know what it will represent at that point. Represent some sort of ideal? That’s not the place to do it, not in the Congress. My sympathies were entirely with Williams in that situation, and I think that the Senate report which came out later
made it very clear that those methods that were being used by the F.B.I. in that situation were very debatable methods, I think properly so.

RITCHIE: What was your impression of Vance Hartke?

VALEO: He was one of the people Mansfield thought very lowly of. He just didn't hold him in any esteem. I didn't share Mansfield's view of him.

RITCHIE: Do you have any idea why?

VALEO: No, I don't know. I don't know what brought it on. I knew Hartke reasonably well. We went to a couple of parliamentary meetings together. You usually get to know people fairly well that way. He was personally somewhat offensive. He was somewhat arrogant and overbearing and deeply opinionated. But apart from that, I thought his votes on most issues were ones that I wouldn't quarrel with. I didn't know that he was using his office in any way for more profit than any of the others were doing. So I had no real reasons to dislike him, although I can't say that I liked him greatly as a person. I thought he was a run of the mill senator, usually what you get from Indiana, except once in a while you get an exception like Birch Bayh, who was I thought an outstanding person.

RITCHIE: Could you tell me a little about Birch Bayh?
VALEO: Yes. He was a person I would have supported for the presidency. He thought about making the run at one time and he certainly would have been my candidate had he done so. I would have had no trouble whatsoever in supporting him. He was extremely bright, an able lawyer. He had a short fuse in much the same way that Muskie had. He could be easily riled, that was his weakness. But in terms of his knowledge of the Constitution, I thought he made some major contributions, particularly in the presidential succession laws. They were carefully done amendments. I think their value will be enduring. I was very sorry to see him defeated. I thought he still had a great deal to contribute. Beyond that, I don't know that I can say much about him. I was at a dinner not too long ago at NYU and he was there. It was given by the president, another Indiana congressman, what was his name?

RITCHIE: John Brademas.

VALEO: Brademas gave the dinner, and they obviously had a long-time close association in Indiana politics, very warm, a kind of mutual aid relationship. They worked together well, obviously, in Indiana politics. Brademas' discussion of that in his speech, he made a brief speech about those earlier days in Indiana, suggested typical small town, middle class America, industrial America. Sherwood Anderson, the writer did that in *Winesburg, Ohio*, that type of America. They were both very
clear cut expressions of that, and both excellent products of that background.

RITCHIE: You compared his temper to Ed Muskie's, and Muskie was a member of that class.

VALEO: Yes. He was one Mansfield thought very early would be president, or could make the presidency. Amazing, again I have no basis for explaining his perception, but he'd already decided years before Muskie made the run that he had the characteristics of somebody who could be president, long before it was even discussed. The thing I remember best about Muskie—I've just finished working with him on a job, on a study we've done on the president and Congress in foreign relations—but in that period the thing I remember best was that he was on one of the Mansfield trips to Vietnam. The trip went all the way around the world and got to Vietnam by a very circuitous route, which included Warsaw, Poland. We stopped there and it was fiercely cold. It must have been either in early December or late November. It was the first time I'd really watched Muskie as a politician. We had a dinner with some Polish officials, and after dinner Muskie made the speech. Mansfield asked him to make the speech, again using that very sharp judgment of picking the right person for the occasion. So Muskie got up and made this speech. He had me in tears along with all the Poles! He was talking about his father coming from a small town, a tailor from a small town in Poland, and how hard he
had worked when he came to America. Well, there was nothing more calculated to move the Poles, who obviously almost everyone had a relative in the United States somewhere.

His ability to move them was extraordinary. He had the warmth of language and he has this sonorous voice which just rolls out. He really had them literally in the palm of his hand by the time he was done. He was an extremely able member of the Senate, and he made some major contributions in environmental issues. I don't know that he was really cut out to be secretary of state, or that his interests in foreign affairs were such that it would have justified Carter's appointment of him. I don't know why he chose Muskie for that, but again, he did a credible job there. And he would have made a good president.

RITCHIE: People always talk about his temper. Do you think that helped or hindered him as a senator?

VALEO: He had a temper, very definitely, and not a good temper. That would hurt you in the Senate, although I don't think it was that severe that it did him irreparable damage. He was highly regarded. He used to meet with the Democratic Policy Committee and always made, I thought, significant contributions to the discussions. No, I think he was one of the outstanding people in this whole period.
RITCHIE: There are a whole series of senators who are remembered for being temperament, having a strong temper and being short-fused. Do you think that people used that politically, in a sense, that kind of reputation? Was it just natural that people blew up, or did they see some sort of calculated political advantage in being known that way?

VALEO: I think it was a mixture of both. Most of it was natural. Occasionally it would be used as a device, sure. I'm trying to think of who might have used it that way. I'm really hard pressed to say who you could say would use it as a device. I think most of it came very naturally.

RITCHIE: The Senate perhaps attracts more temperament people.

VALEO: And it should. If you conceive of the Senate in its original concept, it should have temperament people in it. They should not be cut out of the same clay. One of the problems in the contemporary Senate is more and more with TV they're cut out of the same clay because that's the easiest way to get elected, when TV is the main medium of communication with your constituents.

RITCHIE: A couple of people whom I don't think of as temperament, who were elected in '58, were Frank Moss and Gale McGee.
VALEO: Again, Moss was a person who Mansfield always felt hostile towards. I didn't know why, maybe because both were from the West, or whatever. I didn't share this feeling. I wasn't a close friend of Moss or anything like that, but I always thought he was a solid Democrat and the kind of person you'd want in your party. I'm not saying that Mansfield didn't think that too, but he had other reasons which I never could quite fathom for his judgments of people, and he had some reservations about Moss that I did not feel. I thought Moss on the whole was a good, solid member of the Senate, and performed in that way. His votes left little to be desired. He handled his constituent business, his state business, I thought, well without overpushing it. He liked to travel, but then so did many of the others. I saw no problems with that. It was interesting, he had been governor of Utah at one point, and one of his complaints was: "God, you get no perks when you're in the Senate! When you're governor you get a car, you get a plane, you get a boat," on Salt Lake, I guess, but he said, "but as a senator you don't get anything." Maybe that might have bothered Mansfield, I don't know. But he really complained about that.

As far as Gale McGee was concerned, I first ran into Gale McGee right after the war. I was then, in the Library as a junior researcher and he was teaching at Wyoming University, I think. We were at this conference together in Illinois. I was impressed
then by his ability to express himself so articulately, which I had never been able to do. I was tremendously impressed by his ability. Of course, he's a real stem winder. When he takes off on a speech he's extraordinarily good. His main problem was that he didn't want to work hard. He liked the pleasures of being a senator, but he didn't really want to work very hard. He was caught up in that political scientist's one-sided view of the government's foreign policy as being exclusively in the executive branch's province. He fought that battle for the State Department much to Mansfield's irritation, on many occasions. He fought for the State Department's viewpoint. He was, I would say, the prime spokesman of the State Department's bureaucratic position as sometimes somewhat distinct from the White House's position. He became one of the department's prime advocates in the Senate. Beyond that I don't think he left any strong mark one way or the other. He had a good sense of humor. Nobody disliked him per se.

I remember talking to Mike Manatos about him, Mike Manatos was from Wyoming too. Manatos had worked for O'Mahoney before he went downtown with Kennedy. He was very worried about Gale McGee's tendency to neglect state business. He thought he would be in trouble politically if he continued to do that. He continued and eventually he was beaten. But then the State Department took care of him by putting him in that OAS [Organization of American States] position. I still see him occasionally in
connection with the work for the Former Members of Congress Association. He's still about the same, still interested in international affairs. McGee is probably someone who could have done a lot more if he had worked harder. He had the natural ability.

**RITCHIE:** Another Western Democrat in that class was Howard Cannon.

**VALEO:** Yes, I never knew what to think of Howard Cannon. He never did very much, he never spoke very much. I appeared before the Rules Committee when he was chairman to urge them not to move too fast on setting up a campaign contributions commission, Federal Elections Commission, but got nowhere. He and I always had a pleasant enough personal relationship, but I think somewhere in there, that's when the Rules Committee began to make it more difficult to move the changes that I was trying to make in the staff underpinning of the Senate. Bill Cochrane moved down there at just about the same time Cannon became chairman and the committee took on a totally different complexion. Up until that time it had done virtually nothing. Internal affairs had been handled by Lyndon Johnson out of the majority leader's office, and that practice continued under Mansfield for a while, as long as Everett Jordan was chairman. After that it began to develop as a new and independent force in the Senate substructure. I think Cannon came under suspicion sometime around the time of the Bobby
Baker thing, but I never really knew much about that and whether that was warranted in any way or not. I really didn't have a close relationship with him, or one that would give me any insights into his personality.

**RITCHIE:** It was also that time that the four senators from Alaska and Hawaii were added: Gruening and Bartlett from Alaska and then Fong and Long and eventually Inouye from Hawaii.

**VALEO:** Yes, I remember them all. Gruening belonged with Clark more than with Morse. He was an innovator in the Morse tradition, but he was nowhere near as competent as Morse. He also heard his own voice and didn't listen to what was happening. He was, I would think on the whole, a highly ineffective senator and did not, in the same sense as Morse, make individual contributions which might later have some great significance in American history. Gruening was an old man by the time he got elected. He had made significant contributions in Puerto Rico, where I first ran into his name. He had a sort of mixed reputation in Puerto Rico. Everybody in the new group that came in with Luis Munoz Marin at that time of the establishment of the commonwealth were of two minds on Gruening. On the one hand they knew that he had done some very constructive things for them, but at the same time they felt they didn't like him as a personality. He was all over the lot. He moved to Mexico after that, and did some things on Mexico, and then went to Alaska. He was a great advocate of
Alaskan statehood and had pushed for it for many years. He was one of the people who moved it eventually. But as a member of the Senate he was not effective. He did very little. I admired his stand on Vietnam, but that was only on a personal basis, not that it meant anything very much in the Senate.

Bartlett was a little different. He was a team player and got along well with Johnson. He was an authentic liberal, in the western sense of the term. He was for public power, he was for conservation and water development and so forth. I liked Bartlett personally. He was a pleasant person. He had a lovely wife who was right out of the plains of Alaska. She was really the salt of the earth and obviously had been a very positive influence in his life.

As far as Inouye and Long were concerned, Long came in only for a brief period of time. A very nice man, and a good Democrat. I don't think that I can say anything more about him. Inouye, I think, is an extremely important figure. I've already mentioned the great speech he made once in the caucus on the Vietnamese War as being one of the turning points on that issue. Inouye's a very, very smart man. There are some rumors now apparently that he may be the next Democratic leader. He knows, as Mansfield knew before him, that the only way you'd ever be that is not to try to be it, and he has done that so far perfectly. So if there is going to be a change, I would say he's well positioned to be the
person to do it. If I'm not mistaken, he was a leader of the Hawaiian house or senate, or whatever body he was in there, and he was chosen that after a period of time in it. He has the characteristics that would make a good leader.

As for his Japanese background, he's been at great pains to keep the Japanese at arms' length. I remember when I was lobbying for the UN university I had heard that the Japanese had gone up in a prior period—I heard this from Jim Hester—to talk to Inouye. They presumed on his Japanese heritage and he just about threw them out of his office. These were Japanese from Japan. He gave them a hard time and refused to support the university. He was very reluctant to support it. We had to undo that in our efforts to get the contribution. Finally we brought him around to the position where he made a speech in support of it. I think he would make an excellent leader if he were chosen. He has some of the characteristics of a Japanese which Mansfield also has, and I think I have probably to some extent. It's the ability to keep your peace until you can move effectively. He has that, very definitely. He's been a very, very positive influence on the Senate in the years he's been here.

I always like to think I had something to do with the birth of his son—in a rather indirect way! He came into the Senate when my son was about two or three years old. I had lunch with him one day. He had no children at that point. He was older, and
I had been older as a parent. We got talking about it. He asked me all kinds of questions revealing his anxieties about parenthood. I gave him reassurances out of my own experience. I told him how great it was to have a son, even though you were older it didn't make a difference. And, by God, within a year or two he had a son.

**RITCHIE:** You served as a role model.

**VALEO:** Yes, I think maybe that was it.

**RITCHIE:** Did you have any observations on Hiram Fong?

**VALEO:** Yes, I've seen him in Honolulu a couple of times in recent years. The first time I met him was on a Mansfield mission plane. We picked him up in Honolulu and brought him back with us. His family background, of course, was Chinese. He was a down-the-line Republican. He's a wealthy man, of great wealth in Hawaii, and a kind of straight-forward person from that part of American life, from a Chinese-Hawaiian background. He always voted the straight Republican line, whatever the majority position was he went along with it. He wasn't a great senator, and I don't think he'd make any pretenses of being one. He was an organization man and found himself very comfortable in the Republican setting.

**RITCHIE:** Did you find that senators from Alaska and Hawaii tended to be Asian-oriented in general?
VALEO: I don’t think that you could say Fong was Asian-oriented at all. He rarely talked about Taiwan. I think his Chinese ties if he had any would be with Taiwan. I remember being on a plane with him. I talked with his wife in Chinese, and he said, "God, this guy talks better Chinese than I do!" The Chinese part of Hawaii is interesting. It gets faded into the Hawaiian setting very quickly and doesn’t have quite that uniqueness any more. That’s true of the Japanese as well. No, I think they were oriented as Hawaiians rather than as Chinese or Japanese in much the same way that Long would have been oriented.

RITCHIE: A senator who came in about that time, but not in that class, was Claiborne Pell, who is in line to be chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee when the Democrats are in the majority. What were your observations of him?

VALEO: I know Pell quite well. We went on several trips together and one round-the-world trip. I think it was the same one with Muskie, no it was an earlier one. I got to know him very well on that trip. He was so much like Green. He was a younger edition of Green. It was almost as though they came out of the same mold, really. He took essentially, in foreign policy, the bureaucratic State Department position that came up, and I think he still does the same thing. If he gets to be chairman of that committee, that will be the greatest boon to the State Department that they’ve had in many, many years, since long before Fulbright.
You have to go back to Connally's time, and not even that. Maybe even before that. Pell does not tend to deviate from what you might call the bureaucratic position on foreign policy.

He's motivated, as some wealthy men from his period were motivated, to do some good for the country and to use his wealth constructively. And he has done that in his support for such institutions as the Smithsonian, and also his grants-in-aid program for many of the colleges for very constructive kinds of things that he's sponsored. I think he's been an extremely constructive influence in the Senate, a unique person. My only quarrel with him is that I wish he would not feel that he had to toe the State Department line so much. Of course, he had that background: he was a Foreign Service officer for a brief period of time. That may explain it, and most of those friends probably came from that setting. He probably still is influenced by them on many foreign policy problems. Pell belongs in the Senate. There are some people you can just see that they belong in the Senate, and he does. There's no question about that.

RITCHIE: Also in '58 the two senators from West Virginia were elected—Jennings Randolph and Robert Byrd.

VALEO: Yes, I think I mentioned Byrd earlier, the initial reactions from the majority leader's office. I don't have a strong opinion on Jennings Randolph. He was a man who was
extremely emotional and easily influenced. He was a pleasant man, at least ostensibly pleasant, but I don't think he'll be long remembered. Byrd's a little different. I don't think Byrd will ever grow much more than he is now, and where he is now is about what the Democratic party needs as a leader in the Senate. They don't need much. They're not ready for something else. They're not ready for bigger responsibilities. Until they are, he'll serve well. I don't want to get into my personal reactions to him. I found him a very enigmatic man in personal dealings. He would not have been my selection for leader of the Senate. I'm not sure who would have been, but he wouldn't have been, but then I was looking at a different time. I don't know that I've got anything more to say about him. I just don't know him that well. All I can say is that in my judgment he doesn't have the kind of approach which I feel the Senate has got to have if it's going to play something more than a state legislative role in the affairs of the nation.

RITCHIE: What was your opinion of Thomas McIntyre of New Hampshire?

VALEO: He was a personal friend. I liked him immensely as a person. He was a damn good senator. He was courageous on a lot of defense things at a time when it was not easy to be courageous on them. I think New Hampshire should be ashamed of itself for electing what they elected to replace McIntyre. He was a
dedicated public servant and an outstanding senator in every way. He also was another one of these short-fused people. I never felt it, but a lot of people did. He could be irritated very easily. Maybe he was suffering some sickness at that point. Later on he had a cancer situation. I don’t know what’s happened to him, I haven’t seen him in several years. I lost contact with him right after he recovered from that first operation. I thought very, very highly of him, and I was sorry to see him defeated. I thought it was a tragedy.

RITCHIE: That brings up New Hampshire, and I realize we never got around to talking about the Wyman-Durkin controversy. You made a facial expression when I mentioned New Hampshire, do you have any comment about the state? It's a strange state.

VALEO: It is a strange state and I think it's got a lot to do with that crazy newspaper publisher up there, William Loeb. That must explain it, because there's no reason for it to be behave the way it does otherwise. They've had some real lulus in the Senate from that state. That probably is so on both sides of the aisle, but mostly Republicans because they mostly elect Republicans. Winston Prouty came from the state and Prouty was a nice guy and a good senator—no, Prouty was from Vermont, I'm sorry. But Norris Cotton came from New Hampshire, and Cotton was an enigmatic figure. He was hard to judge because he had been a page and people who have been pages, even though they later
on get elected in their own right, have that earlier experience which kind of throws them off. I kind of enjoyed him on the floor, but he was a complete Republican. At one time he played footsie with McCarthy, but he got off that at a reasonable time. You also had Styles Bridges, who was another real character out of that state.

The Wyman-Durkin dispute was discussed widely in our own Democratic circles—how to handle it. What had happened was that the governor had sent in a certification of Durkin's election, and then requested that I return it. The election certificates go into the secretary's office and I had possession of the certification of Durkin. This was brought up at a policy committee meeting. We decided that we would not give back the statement, that there was no way we could do that. So the governor came down and we had a confrontation for the benefit of television, when he came to my door and demanded the return of the statement and I politely refused to give him the statement. He wanted to know if that was my final word, and I told him yes, that the only way that the certificate could be released would be by leave of the Senate, that I personally could not give it back to him. Having once come into my custody as a Senate paper, there was no way in which I could give it back without the permission of the Senate. So he left. The matter was debated at great length here. I remember it being debated on the floor, but I don't remember the details
of how it was finally resolved and how they finally decided to run that election over again.

RITCHIE: Why was it that the Democrats put up such a long drawn-out fight on it? They had such a majority anyhow, they didn't need the one more vote to organize the Senate.

VALEO: Was that the way it worked out? They resisted having the election re-done?

RITCHIE: Eventually Durkin decided to run.

VALEO: On his own, that's what I thought.

RITCHIE: But that was after months of debate.

VALEO: Well, I can't remember what the circumstances were surrounding that. My role in it was strictly as the custodian of the governor's certification of Durkin's election, as to whether to give it back to him or not. I think the Rules Committee handled that, if I'm not mistaken. I didn't get directly involved in the prolongation.

RITCHIE: Some of the Republicans argue that Wyman-Durkin was actually good for their party because it pulled them together, and gave them party discipline, and that perhaps the Democrats did them a favor by being so intransigent.
VALEO: Could be. My only other recollection is that Durkin's father-in-law was a doctor and he'd operated on me for appendix about ten years before that.

RITCHIE: Wyman-Durkin was one of those great battles, but the Senate really isn't in a good position to decide issues like that.

VALEO: No, it really isn't.

RITCHIE: Almost of necessity it becomes a partisan issue, and once it becomes a partisan issue

VALEO: You can't budge it. No, you can't budge it at that point. It's rare enough that they become that way, but when it does it's hard to break it.

End of Interview #18