

breakfast room. In this regard I want to emphasize that if any of these fine young men had to go into combat in the defense of their country I would want them to go with the best possible training and the best equipment our country could give them. In this way, I believe they not only would be of great service to their country but they would be able to defend themselves and to prevail against their enemies.

In conclusion, I should like to emphasize again that I hope the Congress and the people of America will bear in mind that our country, the United States of America, requests and demands a very high level of ability, knowledge, courage, and forceful determination from the men who wear the uniform of the United States Marine Corps. As a Nation, we expect them to do the impossible and the United States Marine Corps has never let this Nation down, for they have done the impossible time after time after time.

My plea today then is a plea of caution. Let us not be too hasty to form unwarranted conclusions. At the same time I extend to the families and loved ones of these young men my heartfelt sympathy and assure them these boys have contributed greatly to the efficiency and the quality that we respect so highly in the United States Marine Corps. Let us hold fast to the great qualities of the Marine Corps. Let us bring more and more wisdom into the training of our young men. Let us provide them with the knowledge, the ability, the assurance, together with the faith in themselves and their military service. Do not destroy that which has been nobly constructed out of the fury and fire of victory. May men continue to be proud—proud they are marines.

AGRICULTURAL ACT OF 1956—VETO MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 380)

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following veto message from the President of the United States:

To the House of Representatives:

I am returning herewith, without my approval, H. R. 12, designated as the Agricultural Act of 1956.

It is with intense disappointment and regret that I must take this action. I assure you my decision has been reached only after thorough consideration and searching my mind and my conscience. Our farm families are suffering reduced incomes. They had a right to expect workable and beneficial legislation to help solve their problems. This bill does not meet their needs.

I am disappointed at the long delays which this legislation encountered. My first special request in this session of the Congress was for prompt remedial farm legislation. A sound, constructive nine-point program to this end was submitted on January 9, with an urgent request for action. It was a program that came from the grassroots. Suggestions and criticisms from large numbers of farm people, in every type of agriculture, from every section of the country, were analyzed and used. It offered no magic

panacea because, we can all agree, there is none. It did strike directly at the root of the low-price low-income problem.

The problem is price-depressing surpluses. Excess stocks of certain farm commodities have mounted to market-destroying, price-depressing size as a result of wartime price incentives too long continued. Any forward-looking, sound program to meet the needs of farm people must remove the burden of these accumulations. They are depressing net farm income by many hundreds of millions of dollars a year.

H. R. 12 would not correct this situation. It would encourage more surpluses. It would do harm to every agricultural region of the country and also to the interests of consumers. Thus it fails to meet the test of being good for farmers and fair to all our people.

The bill is self-defeating. The soil-bank proposal has been incorporated. This would be constructive, had it not been encumbered by contradictory provisions. The soil bank would provide an income incentive to farmers to reduce production temporarily so that surplus stocks might be reduced. Other provisions of this bill, however, would result in an equal or greater incentive to increase production and accumulate more surplus.

Among the provisions which make this bill unacceptable are: (1) the return to wartime rigid 90 percent of parity supports for the basic commodities; (2) dual parity for wheat, corn, cotton, and peanuts; (3) mandatory price supports for feed grains; (4) multiple-price plans for wheat and rice. The effect of these provisions would be to increase the amount of Government control and further add to our price-depressing surpluses.

Specific objections relative to each of these provisions may be summarized as follows:

1. Price supports at wartime 90 percent of parity on basic crops were in effect in each year from 1944 through 1954. They were not responsible for the high commodity prices and high farm income of wartime and the immediate postwar years. Prices were then above support levels due to wartime inflation and the insatiable markets associated with war. Neither did 90 percent supports prevent prices from falling as postwar surplus stocks began to accumulate.

Price supports at wartime 90 percent on the 6 designated basic crops did encourage production of these crops relative to others. At the same time consumption was discouraged and the use of substitutes was stimulated. Market outlets shrank, and surplus accumulations mounted. Acreage controls had to be invoked, thereby rationing the right to produce. Wheat acreage was reduced from 79 to an allotment of 62 and then to the present 55 million acres. Cotton was cut from 25 to 20 and then on down to the present 17 million acres. These drastic reductions, forced by the application of the price-support law, penalized many farmers directly by resulting in shrunken volume and uneconomic farming operations. In addition, acreage diverted from the basic crops shifted surplus problems into many other crops

and livestock. Now almost every farmer is adversely affected, regardless of what crops or livestock he raises.

If wartime rigid 90 percent supports were the answer to the problem of our farm families, there would now be no problem.

Farm incomes have declined in every year except one between 1947 and 1954, and in all these years 90 percent supports were in effect.

Farmers are not interested in price alone. What they really want for their families is more net income, which is affected by volume and costs as well as by price. The 90 percent of parity approach focuses on support price alone.

To return now to wartime 90 percent supports would be wrong. Production would be stimulated. Markets would be further destroyed, instead of expanded as must be done. More surplus would accumulate—and surpluses are price depressing. Regimentation by ever stricter production controls would be the end result.

It is inconceivable that we should ask farm families to go deeper into this self-defeating round of cause and effect.

2. The provision for dual parity would result in a permanent double standard of parity for determining price supports. Four crops would receive preferential treatment out of 160 products for which parity prices are figured. There is no justification in logic or in equity for such preferential treatment.

Particularly is this true because, under the working of the modernized parity formula enacted by the Congress, increasing the parity prices of some commodities automatically lowers the parity prices of all other commodities. If parity prices for wheat, corn, cotton, and peanuts are to be higher, then parity prices of the other products must be lower.

To whatever degree prices would be further artificially raised there would be a corresponding stimulus to production, more controls on farmers, reduced consumption, increased accumulations, and lower prices in the market. Such a device for parity manipulations could destroy the parity concept itself. It places a potent weapon in the hands of opponents of all price supports for farmers. We have no right to place the welfare of our farm families in such jeopardy.

3. The provision for mandatory supports on the feed grains would create more problems for farmers. The market for feed grains would shrink as livestock production would come to depend more on forage and less on grain. The flow of feed grains into Government stocks would increase and production controls would necessarily be intensified. Price relationships between feed, livestock and livestock products would be distorted. Producers of feeder cattle, feeder lambs, and feeder pigs would be faced with downward pressure on prices. An imbalance would develop between feed crops and livestock products, with all its adverse consequences.

4. The multiple-price plans for wheat and rice would have adverse effects upon producers of other crops, upon our re-

lations with friendly foreign nations, and upon our consumers.

There are other serious defects in the bill such as certain provisions found in the section dealing with the dairy industry. Still other features are administratively bad and would require the hiring of thousands of additional inspectors and enforcers.

I recognize that the restoration by H. R. 12 of wartime mandatory 90 percent price supports applies only to 1956 crops. This, in combination with other objectionable features of the bill, would put us back on the old road which has proved so harmful to farmers.

Bad as some provisions of this bill are, I would have signed it if in total it could be interpreted as sound and good for farmers and the Nation.

After the most careful analysis I conclude that the bill is contradictory and self-defeating even as an emergency relief measure and it would lead to such serious consequences in additional surpluses and production controls as to further threaten the income and the welfare of our farm people.

Because the good features of the bill are combined with so much that would be detrimental to farmers' welfare, to sign it would be to retreat rather than advance toward a brighter future for our farm families.

We now have sound and forward-looking legislation in the Agricultural Act of 1954. Neither that act, nor any other, can become fully effective so long as it is smothered under the vast surpluses that have accumulated. We imperatively need remedial legislation to remove this burden and enable the fundamentally sound program provided in the act of 1954 to become workable. Such remedial measures were proposed in my message of January 9.

I am keenly mindful that the failure of the Congress to enact a good new farm bill can have unfavorable effects on farm income in 1956, unless prompt administrative efforts to offset them are made immediately. Particularly, the failure to enact a Soil Bank before planting time this year makes such administrative efforts imperative.

Consequently, we are going to take prompt and decisive administrative action to improve farm income now. I have conferred with the Secretary of Agriculture and the administration is moving immediately on four major fronts:

1. In 1956, price supports on five of the basic crops—wheat, corn, cotton, rice and peanuts—will be set at a level of at least 82½ percent of parity. Tobacco will be supported as voted in the referendum in accordance with existing law.

Within this range of price support flexibility, the administration intends to set minimum support levels that will result in a national average of:

Wheat at \$2 a bushel.

Corn at \$1.50 a bushel.

Rice at \$4.50 per hundred pounds.

A separate support for corn not under acreage control in the commercial corn area will be announced at an early date.

Price supports on cotton and peanuts have not yet been announced but will be at least 82½ percent of parity.

The Secretary of Agriculture will announce shortly the details of the new cotton export sales program.

2. For this year the support price of manufacturing milk will be increased to \$3.25 per hundred pounds. The support price of butterfat will be increased to 58.6 cents a pound.

3. We will use Department of Agriculture funds, where assistance will be constructive, to strengthen the prices of perishable farm commodities. We will have well over \$400 million for that purpose for the year beginning July 1.

These actions the administration will take immediately.

I now request Congress to pass a straight soil-bank bill as promptly as possible. It should be in operation before fall seeding for next year's crops. It is vital that we get the soil bank authorized in this session of the Congress. There is general agreement on it. I am ready to sign a sound Soil Bank Act as soon as Congress sends it to me. That can be accomplished in a very few days if the leadership in Congress will undertake the task.

This combined program of administrative action and legislative enactment will begin now to improve the income and welfare of all our farm families.

Here is a challenge for both the legislative and executive branches of the Federal Government.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, April 16, 1956.

The SPEAKER. The objections of the President will be spread at large upon the Journal, and without objection the bill and message will be ordered printed. There was no objection.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the further consideration of the message be postponed until Wednesday next.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

CONSENT CALENDAR

The SPEAKER. This is Consent Calendar day. The Clerk will call the first bill on the Consent Calendar.

DISPOSAL OF LANDS UNDER BANK-HEAD-JONES FARM TENANT ACT

The Clerk called the bill (H. R. 6815) to provide for the orderly disposition of property acquired under title III of the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act, and for other purposes.

Mr. ASPINALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill may be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Colorado?

There was no objection.

AMENDING THE FEDERAL PROPERTY ACT OF 1949

The Clerk called the bill (S. 2364) to amend the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, and for other purposes.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill may be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa? There was no objection.

WILLFUL DESTRUCTION OF AIR-CRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES

The Clerk called the bill (H. R. 319) to punish the malicious destruction of aircraft and attempts to destroy aircraft.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill may be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

NATIONAL MOTTO

The Clerk read the resolution (H. J. Res. 396) to establish a national motto of the United States.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

Resolved, etc., That the national motto of the United States is hereby declared to be "In God we trust."

The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

TRANSFER OF LAND TO MUSKOGEE, OKLA.

The Clerk called the bill (H. R. 7679) to provide for the conveyance of certain lands by the United States to the city of Muskogee, Okla.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs is authorized and directed to convey by quitclaim deed to the city of Muskogee, Okla., all the right, title, and interest of the United States in and to a tract of land containing approximately nine acres located north of the existing Veterans' Administration hospital reservation situate in Muskogee County, State of Oklahoma, likewise being a portion of certain lands conveyed to the United States by the city of Muskogee by warranty deed dated March 17, 1945, recorded in the office of the clerk of Muskogee County on June 23, 1945, in book 839, pages 432 to 434, the exact courses and distances of the perimeter of which shall be determined and approved by the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs. The city of Muskogee shall pay the cost of surveys as may be required by the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs in determining the required legal description.

Sec. 2. There shall be reserved to the United States all minerals, including oil and gas, in the lands authorized for conveyance by section 1, and the deed of conveyance shall continue such additional terms, conditions, reservations, and restrictions as may be determined by the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to be necessary to protect the interests of the United States.

Sec. 3. The deed of conveyance shall provide that the tract of land authorized to be conveyed by section 1 of this act shall be used by the city of Muskogee, Okla., for such purposes as will not, in the judgment of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs or his designate, interfere with the care and treatment of patients in the Veterans' Administration Hospital, Muskogee, Okla., and that if such