for everything they need, they have an incentive which we cannot prevent so long as we practically force them to do that.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Why did the people of Poznan revolt? It was because they were hungry. Were they shouting when they marched arm in arm against the Soviet tanks? They were shouting "bread, bread."

Mr. AIKEN. They were desperate.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is another reason why we should ship surplus wheat to those afflicted countries.

Mr. AIKEN. There is no reason why we should ship surplus wheat to countries under Communist domination. In fact, Canada is endeavoring to do that. She has already entered into an agreement to sell wheat to Poland. That will help to reduce our surplus, too.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

TEMPORARY APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1957

Mr. HAYDEN. Mr. President, I ask that the Senate consider, now, the Senate House Joint Resolution 671.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate a joint resolution coming over from the House of Representatives, which will be acted upon by title for the information of the Senate.

The joint resolution (H. J. Res. 671) making temporary appropriations for the fiscal year ending on June 30, 1957, for other purposes was read twice by its title.

Mr. HAYDEN. I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of the joint resolution.

Mr. HAYDEN. That is correct. The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the distinguished chairman of the committee if it is not a fact that this joint resolution provides for a period of only a few days.

Mr. HAYDEN. That is correct.

Mr. HAYDEN. The joint resolution was ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

SUSIE LEE SPENCER—VETO MESSAGE (S. DOC. NO. 134)

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SCOTT in the chair) laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, which was read, and, with the accompanying bill, referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and ordered to be printed:

To the United States Senate:

I return herewith without my approval S. 2152, "for the relief of the estate of Susie Lee Spencer."

The enrolled bill would direct the Secretary of the Treasury to pay $7,500 to the estate of Mrs. Spencer in full settlement of all claims against the United States for her death, sustained in an accident at the Norfolk Navy Yard on December 11, 1943.

Mrs. Spencer was employed by the Navy Department as a civilian truckdriver at the Norfolk Navy Yard, Norfolk, Va. On December 11, 1943, she was assigned to deliver a truckload of material to building 384 at the navy yard. She approached her destination at approximately 1:30 a.m., and drove slowly through the area when they saw a man they thought was the person they were seeking and Mrs. Spencer stopped her truck. At this point the vehicle was directly across the spur line of the railroad system of the Norfolk Navy Yard.

Simultaneously, a locomotive of the shipyard assigned to remove cars from the rear of building 384 began backing along the spur. There was a sharp curve in the track as the spur cut from the main line alongside the warehouse building. The normal procedure was for a member of the train crew to station himself at the crossing to warn traffic and to signal the train if there were danger of a collision, but it was not followed in this case.

Mrs. Spencer was seriously injured when the train rammed her truck. Despite emergency surgery, she died in the Norfolk Navy Hospital at 9:55 p.m. on December 11, 1943.

The deceased was survived by a husband but by no children or other dependent relatives. Her husband made application for compensation under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (39 Stat. 742, as amended) on account of the death of his wife. By the terms of the act, however, compensation for death, except burial allowance, is payable only to the dependent members of the family. As there was no showing of dependency upon his wife, Mr. Spencer's claim was denied. The specified burial allowance of $200, however, was paid in this case.

The provisions of the act are identical to those of H. R. 1026, 81st Congress, and S. 1045, 82d Congress, which were returned to the Congress without approval.

I am compelled to withhold my approval of this measure.

Although I can appreciate the motives of equity and fairness which prompted Congress to seek to make amends for the negligence of a Government employee by private bill, I believe that sympathy and equity must be subordinated to the overriding considerations of sound public policy and equality before the law. That is to say, the principles of dependency requirements and the exclusive remedy provisions of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act. When Congress passed the 1949 amendments to the act, those provisions of the act which limit the right of a surviving husband to compensation were reaffirmed. This general policy should not now be weakened by singling out a particular individual for treatment not accorded to others similarly situated.

If Congress is of the view that there are sound and justifiable reasons for departing from the policy of this act, to this approach is wise. It has referred to a nondependent husband of a Federal employee, it should do so through general legislation rather than by making individual exceptions through the enactment of private relief measures which are discriminatory against the general class of persons subject to the Federal Employees' Compensation Act.

In this connection, I have been informed that, on the average, 200 claims for death compensation are filed each year under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act. Of these, some 15 per cent are allowed, and deny payment of dependency. In my judgment, it would be inequitable in the face of such statistics to approve a bill for a single beneficiary.

In disapproving this bill, I am aware that the Congress has treated it as action upon a petition for redress of grievance rather than as an exception to the Federal Employees' Compensation Act.

There are many circumstances in which the approach of this bill is not logical. In words of the Judiciary Committee, in
However, in the following year, he additively indicating he had suffered no serv-
physical disability in 1946, after affirm-
from active duty for reasons other than
disability. The beneficiary was relieved
found no evidence of any incapacitating
same year
He was subsequently examined in the
when he parachuted over enemy terri-
retained injuries to his neck and shoulders
failure of the then War Department to
adjudicate the claim of Capt.
standing any limitation on its jurisdic-
tion on the Court of Claims, notwith-
the provisions of the act of April 3, 1939,
as amended.

The excluded bill would confer jurisdic-
tion on the Court of Claims, notwith-
standing any limitation on its jurisdic-
tion, to adjudicate the claim of Capt.
William E. Stone arising out of the failure of the then War Department to
retire him for physical disability.

The beneficiary of this measure sus-
tained injuries to his neck and shoulders
when he parachuted over enemy terri-
tories in the South Pacific. He was
held as a prisoner of war by the
Germans until his liberation in 1945. He
was subsequently examined in the same
medical officers who
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