

and unmanned weapon systems. The unmanned systems, represented by the ICBM's and the submarine-launched Polaris missile, have obvious advantages. They are so swift—covering intercontinental distances in half an hour—that in a surprise attack they give the victim only a few minutes warning, at best. Moreover, this same speed is baffling to the designer of defensive counter weapons. Some observers have been so carried away with these advantages that they have called the ICBM the "ultimate weapon."

But the ballistic missile also has some clear disadvantages which require us to deploy another, completely different, type of weapon to give our defense structure the most elementary insurance. One of these disadvantages is that the weapon and its base are vulnerable to preemptive attack. That is, if one thinks an enemy has unleashed an attack, one cannot get the missile up in the air and let it cruise around while the attack is confirmed. The missile, once well launched, cannot be called back.

For this reason we must operate on the assumption that it will have to ride out the attack. To this end we plan hardened and mobile bases for our most advanced type missiles. But the principle still holds that we cannot cut the rope on our missile until we have been hit.

With only this weapon in our strategic arsenal, our survival depends on the degree of success of an enemy's initial surprise assault. The effectiveness of our defense becomes a function of the enemy's efficiency, not of our own. We have lost control of our own defense.

Secondly, the ballistic missile offers no means of reporting back to our command centers on the results of our counter-attack. As a practical matter, once a nuclear war has begun we would have little or no intelligence about the enemy. We would not know where we have hit the enemy. We would not know where to hit him again. We would not know where his remaining shots are coming from. The only way we would know that he is still in business is by the punishment he would be delivering on us. This, I maintain, is a classic example of finding out the hard way. It could well mean that we would find out too late.

These are some of the reasons why our professional airmen insist upon manned weapons in our defense force. A manned bomber does not have to ride out an enemy attack. It can be up and away at the first warning, without waiting to find out whether the attack is the real thing, a feint, or an error. If the warning turns out to be false, the bomber can be recalled to its base.

Once the battle is joined, the bomber provides a means of firsthand observation over enemy targets. It can vary its attack to suit the situation. And it can report back on the remaining targets to be destroyed.

The value of these attributes of the manned bomber is not limited to actual warfare. Equally important to all of us is that they promise such a certain and

accurate retaliation that an enemy would be deterred from attacking us in the first place. For this reason the universal mobility of the bomber is especially important. Because it can be exercised throughout the world, potential aggressors as well as uncommitted peoples can see it. It is its own powerful argument for peace. As Gen. Thomas White has pointed out, it is not enough for us to say to other nations, "Oh, you should see the submarines we have under the sea and the missiles we have in these holes all over the United States." With the manned bomber, seeing is believing.

Now, if the manned bomber is an essential part of our deterrent force, are we seeing to it that we continue to maintain this deterrent in the future? The B-70 intercontinental bomber was conceived for just this purpose. With its curtailment to prototype status, where does that leave us? Gen. Thomas Power has told us that as a general rule of thumb, a bomber is obsolete in 10 years. He further said that the B-52 even with the improved capabilities that will be provided for it, will become obsolete any time in the mid-1960's. That is, the performance of Soviet interceptors and surface-to-air missiles will by that time be such that the B-52 will no longer be a serious threat.

It happens that, through the foresight and initiative of Air Force planners, the B-70 was programed to come into operation at about the time that the B-52 would become obsolete. In comparison to the B-52, the B-70 has an astounding performance. It will have a speed of mach 3 or 2,000 miles per hour—more than three times faster than the B-52. In contrast to our experience with other supersonic aircraft, it can maintain this mach 3 speed throughout its entire mission, while also maintaining an intercontinental range.

This speed is above the speed of the fastest Soviet interceptors that are coming into operation. Moreover, due to certain aerodynamic and thermodynamic problems, at such speeds, it is not likely that the Soviets can build an interceptor that could make the B-70 obsolete within the immediate foreseeable future.

So far as altitude is concerned, the B-70 flies above 70,000 feet, which is higher than the utmost reach of Soviet defenses—either interceptors or surface-to-air missiles. Moreover, the B-70 has a substantial growth potential to still higher altitudes, so that in this dimension, as well, it promises to hold up strongly as a retaliatory threat for many, many years.

Thirdly, the B-70 would carry a full complement of the most advanced defensive countermeasures known, in order to confuse and divert enemy weapons. It also contains provision for substantial increase in electric power capacity, so that it can make use of new advances in the countermeasure state of the art.

As a result of its superior performance, the B-70 would obsolete the present Soviet defensive system. If the Soviets wanted to build a system that

would be at least competitive with the B-70, they would have to spend a far greater amount than the cost to this country of the B-70 program.

In short, the B-70—as it was planned—offers assurance that it can get through to enemy targets in the period following the obsolescence of the B-52. As Gen. Nathan Twining has told us, it is the only manned weapon system that was programed for this role. There is no substitute. But since last December, the B-70 has been removed from the role.

There has been no denial on the part of the administration of the considerations that I have just discussed. Instead there has been only a vague and unsupported explanation that the B-70 is in competition with four ballistic missile programs. This explanation, Mr. President, is deliberately vague. It cannot get specific. If it does, it has to face up to the fact that our retaliatory force needs an effective manned intercontinental bomber, and that the only effective intercontinental bomber planned for the future is the B-70.

If we do not provide such a weapon, are we keeping faith with the brave crewmen who will have to fly our bombers in case of war? As Gen. Thomas Power has told us, "I think if men are going to have to go over there with the sophisticated defenses, this country owes it to them to give them a modern piece of equipment so it can survive."

Mr. President, I call for a reinstatement of the B-70 to its full weapon system program, and to this end, the provision of adequate funds in the 1961 budget.

#### AREA REDEVELOPMENT BILL—VETO MESSAGE (S. DOC. NO. 95)

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the veto message by the President of the area redevelopment bill be laid before the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BYRD of West Virginia in the chair) laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, which was read and, with the accompanying bill, was ordered to lie on the table and be printed:

*To the Senate of the United States:*

I return herewith, without my approval, S. 722, the area redevelopment bill.

For 5 consecutive years I have urged the Congress to enact sound area assistance legislation. On repeated occasions I have clearly outlined standards for the kind of program that is needed and that I would gladly approve.

In 1958 I vetoed a bill because it departed greatly from those standards. In 1959, despite my renewed urging, no area assistance bill was passed by the Congress.

Now in 1960, another election year, a new bill is before me that contains certain features which I find even more objectionable than those I found unacceptable in the 1958 bill.

The people of the relatively few communities of chronic unemployment—who want to share in the general prosperity—are, after 5 years, properly becoming increasingly impatient and are rightfully desirous of constructive action. The need is for truly sound and helpful legislation on which the Congress and the Executive can agree. There is still time, and I willingly pledge once again my wholehearted cooperation in obtaining such a law.

S. 722 is seriously defective in six major respects which are summarized immediately below and discussed in detail thereafter.

1. S. 722 would squander the Federal taxpayers' money where there is only temporary economic difficulty, curable without the special Federal assistance provided in the bill. In consequence, communities in genuine need would receive less Federal help for industrial development projects than under the administration's proposal.

2. Essential local, State, and private initiative would be materially inhibited by the excessive Federal participation that S. 722 would authorize.

3. Federal financing of plant machinery and equipment is unwise and unnecessary and therefore wasteful of money that otherwise could be of real help.

4. The Federal loan assistance which S. 722 would provide for the construction of sewers, water mains, access roads, and other public facilities is unnecessary because such assistance is already available under an existing Government program. Outright grants for such a purpose, a provision of S. 722, are wholly inappropriate.

5. The provisions for Federal loans for the construction of industrial buildings in rural areas are incongruous and unnecessary.

6. The creation of a new Federal agency is not needed and would actually delay initiation of the new program for many months.

#### I

The most striking defect of S. 722 is that it would make eligible for Federal assistance areas that don't need it—thus providing less help for communities in genuine need than would the administration's proposal. S. 722, as opposed to the administration bill, would more than double the number of eligible communities competing for Federal participation in loans for the construction or refurbishing of plants for industrial use—the main objective of both bills. Communities experiencing only temporary economic difficulty would accordingly be made eligible under S. 722 and the dissipation of Federal help among them would deprive communities afflicted with truly chronic unemployment of the full measure of assistance they so desperately desire and which the administration bill would give them.

#### II

Lasting solutions to the problems of chronic unemployment can only be forthcoming if local citizens—the people most immediately concerned—take the lead in planning and financing them. The prin-

cipal objective is to develop new industry. The Federal Government can and should help, but the major role in the undertaking must be the local community's. Neither money alone, nor the Federal Government alone, can do the job. The States also must help, and many are, but in many instances and in many ways they could do much more.

Under S. 722, however, financing of industrial development projects by the Federal Government—limited to 35 percent under the administration's proposal—could go as high as 65 percent, local community participation could be as low as 10 percent, and private financing as little as 5 percent. Furthermore, although S. 722 conditions this assistance on approval by a local economic development organization, if no such organization exists one can be appointed from Washington.

#### III

S. 722 would authorize Federal loans for the acquisition of machinery and equipment to manufacturers locating in eligible areas. Loans for machinery and equipment are unnecessary, unwise, and costly. Much more money would be required and unnecessarily spent, much less money would find its way into truly helpful projects, and manufacturers would be subsidized unnecessarily vis-à-vis their competitors.

#### IV

S. 722 would authorize further unnecessary spending by providing both loans and grants—up to 100 percent of the cost—for the construction of access roads, sewers, water mains, and other local public facilities.

Grants for local public facilities far exceed any appropriate Federal responsibility. Even though relatively modest at the start, they would set predictably expensive and discriminatory precedents.

With regard to loans for such purposes, exemption from Federal income taxes makes it possible today for local communities in almost every case to borrow on reasonable terms from private sources. Whenever such financing is difficult to obtain, the need can be filled by the existing public facility loan program of the Housing and Home Finance Agency—a program which S. 722 would needlessly duplicate and for which an additional \$100 million authorization has already been requested.

#### V

S. 722 would make a minimum of 600 rural counties eligible for Federal loans for the construction of industrial buildings in such areas. The rural development program and the Small Business Administration are already contributing greatly to the economic improvement of low income rural areas. Increasing the impact of these two activities, particularly the rural development program, is a preferable course.

#### VI

Finally, S. 722 would also create a new Federal agency and would, in consequence, mean many unnecessary additions to the Federal payroll and a considerable delay in the program before the new agency could be staffed and

functioning effectively. None of this is necessary, for all that needs to be done can be done—much better and immediately—by the existing Department of Commerce.

Again, I strongly urge the Congress to enact new legislation at this session—but without those features of S. 722 that I find objectionable. I would, however, accept the eligibility criteria set forth in the bill that first passed the Senate even though these criteria are broader than those contained in the administration bill.

Moreover, during the process of developing a new bill, I would hope that in other areas of past differences solutions could be found satisfactory to both the Congress and the Executive.

My profound hope is that sound, new legislation will be promptly enacted. If it is, our communities of chronic unemployment will be only the immediate beneficiaries. A tone will have been set that would hold forth, for the remainder of the session, the hope of sound and rewarding legislation in other vital areas—mutual security, wheat, sugar, minimum wage, interest rates, revenue measures, medical care for the aged, and aid to education to mention but a few.

Only this result can truly serve the finest and best interests of all our people.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, May 13, 1960.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, one of the difficulties in our American political system is that the President is at once the ceremonial head of our Government and the Chief of State, and also the Chief Executive and the leader of his party. When one criticizes the President, therefore, one is always accused of belittling the ceremonial head of the Government or the Chief of State. Nevertheless, if the President, as party leader, writes a message which is ignorant, unduly unctuous, and hypocritical, the message cannot escape criticism because of the fact that the man who signed his name to it also happens to be the ceremonial Chief of State.

Of course, President Eisenhower, in all probability, did not write this message. This was written for him either by someone in the executive office, or, as is more probable, by someone in the Department of Commerce.

I have a real liking for the President. It is in no personal sense, therefore, that I repeat, this message betrays ignorance, it is unctuous and hypocritical, and it is greatly mistaken in its attitude toward what is happening in this country.

The President says that he is for area redevelopment. My reply is that one can only tell whether a person is for area redevelopment or not by his actions and not by his words.

I should like very briefly to summarize some of the things which have been happening in the last 4 or 5 years.

In 1955 I introduced a bill to provide for area redevelopment. The administration opposed that bill. We passed the bill through the Senate, in the concluding days of that Congress. The bill went to the House. Informal requests were