“…the all-night sessions would have worked against the passage of the strongest bill possible.”
Charles Ferris discusses Majority Leader Mike Mansfield’s decision not to hold around-the-clock sessions during the civil rights debate, and the “wisdom” of the Senate’s cloture rule.
FERRIS: Hubert Humphrey was the Senate Whip, and intellectual leader, and the spiritual elected leader on civil rights over the years. He had tremendous ties to the entire civil rights community. And they had a great sense of trust in Hubert. The White House wasn’t divorced from any of this, and the communication with the White House was complete, but I don’t recall a great deal of “programming.” Larry O’Brien was still the chief liaison, and Mike Manatos was the Senate liaison from the White House. Both had very good relationships with Mansfield. I think the communications were shared on a continuing basis. I don’t think there was any anxiety at the White House, except on the ‘64 bill there was anxiety once we got the bill before the Senate, and the debate was underway, and all the other work of the Senate was stopped, that at some point Mansfield might say, “Enough is enough.” Okay, we’ve gone four months and we’ve done nothing else, are we going to accept the fact that the session can end without anything happening? That was an anxiety that I know Hubert Humphrey and some of his staff had. I don’t think Mansfield would seriously have contemplated a unilateral decision to abandon something of this magnitude.
But it was probably good that there was a little anxiety about it, because it made everyone realize that time was of the essence the advocates could not be passive and say, “We’ll wait them out,” especially since Mansfield refused to hold around-the-clock sessions.
RITCHIE: Can you explain that? I know Johnson wanted round-the-clock sessions.
FERRIS: Johnson had done that back when he was Senate leader. The filibuster rules do protect the minority, but more importantly they put a greater burden on the majority that seek change by the passage of legislation. If the leader decides to go around the clock, those that oppose the issue being debate, the minority only has to have one person on the Senate floor giving a speech. When he finishes, he puts in a quorum call. The opponents of the legislation don’t have to show up. They prefer that it take as long as possible to assemble 51 Senators to come to the Senate chamber to answer the call for a quorum. All those who are for the bill have to contact and assemble fifty-one Senators. So you have to get everyone out of their beds and come in to answer a quorum call. It doesn’t seem to make too much sense to wear down your own side of the issue. In a filibuster you test the intensity and resilience of those on either side, but when you go around the clock you wear down the people that support the legislation. Mansfield said he didn’t want to kill Senators in acts of futility, whether it was Carl Hayden or one of the other old timers. He just thought it was senseless to do it, and ineffective in passing the legislation. There is a natural rhythm to an event of this magnitude and the all-night sessions would have worked against the passage of the strongest bill possible. It also demeaned the dignity of the Senate.
The real validity and wisdom of Rule 22, which then required a two-thirds vote to invoke cloture, was that a transitory majority cannot impose its will on the minority by a hasty simple majority vote. A minority, if they considered the issue to be of such importance and held a contrary view with such intensity as was the case on the 1964 Civil Rights legislation, could prevent a vote. The opponents were primarily from the South. The cloture rule afforded them the opportunity to make the majority listen to every argument they had as long as 34 Senators agreed that the debate should not be precipitously cut short. You don’t make the case that the minority has had sufficient time to make the majority at least consider their point of view by round-the-clock sessions. Every Senator opposed to the bill was afforded every opportunity to speak on the Senate floor, as many times as they wished, on every aspect they could think of, to explain the drastic impact passage of this bill would have upon their local society. Every Senator opposed would establish that their opposition was without compromise. Ultimately you reach the point, which in effect says, “We have required the Senate to listen fully and to reflect on the impact of this legislation in my state.” Then when the Senate acts it is not a surrender by those opposed but a judgment made by a super majority after enduring endless repetition of the opponents’ views that the legislation still must become law.
