REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY CENSURE CHARGES

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

Pursuant to the Order on

S. Res. 301

AND AMENDMENTS

A RESOLUTION TO CENSURE THE SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN, MR. MCCARTHY

November 8, 1954.—Ordered to be printed

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 1954
SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY CENSURE CHARGES

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REPORT ON RESOLUTION TO CENSURE

November 8, 1954—Ordered to be printed

Mr. Watkins, from the Select Committee To Study Censure Charges, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany S. Res. 301]

The Select Committee To Study Censure Charges, consisting of—

Arthur V. Watkins (chairman)
Edwin C. Johnson (vice chairman)
John C. Stennis
Frank Carlson
Francis Case
Sam J. Ervin, Jr.

to which was referred the resolution (S. Res. 301) and amendments, having considered the same, reports thereon and recommends that the resolution be adopted with certain amendments.

INTRODUCTION

On August 2 (legislative day, July 2), 1954, Senate Resolution 301, to censure the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. McCarthy, submitted by Senator Flanders on July 30, and amendments proposed thereto, was referred to a select committee to be composed of 3 Republicans and 3 Democrats and named by the Vice President. By said order the select committee was authorized—

(1) To hold hearings;
(2) To sit and act at such times and places during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Senate;
(3) To require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such correspondence, books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony as is deemed advisable.

The select committee was instructed to act and to make a report to the Senate prior to the adjournment sine die of the Senate in the 2d session of the 83d Congress.

The order of the Senate is set forth in the hearing record, page 1 et seq.
The Vice President, on August 5, 1954, acting on the recommendations of the majority leader and the minority leader, made the following appointments of members of the select committee: From the majority, the Senator from Utah (Mr. Watkins), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Carlson), and the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Case). From the minority, the Senator from Colorado (Mr. Johnson), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Stennis), and the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. Ervin). The select committee chose the Senator from Utah (Mr. Watkins) as chairman, and the Senator from Colorado (Mr. Johnson) as vice chairman.

The select committee, on August 24, 1954, served upon the junior Senator from Wisconsin, and other interested persons, a notice of hearings, setting forth 5 categories containing 13 specifications of charges from certain of the proposed amendments, establishing the general procedural rules for the hearings before the select committee, and formally requesting the appearance of Senator McCarthy. The notice of hearings will be found in the hearing record, page 8.

All testimony and evidence taken and received by the select committee was at public hearings attended by Senator McCarthy and his counsel, except the opinion of the Senate Parliamentarian which was obtained pursuant to Senator McCarthy's request.

The public hearings were held in accordance with said notice of hearings, on August 31, September 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 13, 1954. The entire testimony, evidence, and proceedings at said public hearings are in the printed record of the hearings.

At the commencement of the hearings, on August 31, 1954 (p. 11 of the hearings), the chairman stated:

**Statement of Purposes of Committee Made at Commencement of Hearing**

Now, at the outset of this hearing, the committee desires to state in general terms what is involved in Senate Resolution 301 and the Senate order on it, which authorized the appointment of the select committee to consider in behalf of the Senate the so-called Flanders resolution of censure, together with all amendments proposed in the resolution.

The committee, in the words of the Senate order was "authorized to hold hearings, to sit and act at such times and places during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Senate, to require by subpoena, or otherwise, the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such correspondence, books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony as it deems advisable, and that the committee be instructed to act and make a report to this body prior to the adjournment sine die of the Senate in the second session of the 83d Congress."

That is a broad grant of power, carrying with it a heavy responsibility—a responsibility which the committee takes seriously. In beginning its duties, the committee found few precedents to serve as a guide. It is true that there had been other censure resolutions before the Senate in the past, but the acts complained of were, for the most part, single occurrences which happened in the presence of the Senate or one of its committees. Under such circumstances, prolonged investigations and hearings were not necessary.

It should be pointed out that some forty-and-odd alleged instances of misconduct on the part of Senator McCarthy referred to this committee are involved and complex, both with respect to matters of fact and law. With reference to the true element, the incidents are alleged to have happened within a period covering several years. In addition, 3 Senate committees already have held hearings on 1 or more phases of the alleged incidents of misconduct. Obviously, with all this in mind, the committee had good reason for concluding it faced an unprecedented situation which would require adoption of procedures, all
within the authority granted it in the Senate order, that would enable it to perform the duties assigned within the limited time given by the Senate.

The committee interprets its duties, functions, and responsibilities under the Senate order to be as follows:

1. To analyze the charges set forth in the amendments and to determine—
   (a) If there were duplications which could be eliminated.
   (b) If any of the charges were of such a nature that even if the allegations were established as factually true, yet there would be strong reasons for believing that they did not constitute a ground for censure.

2. To thoroughly investigate all charges not eliminated under No. 1 in order to secure relevant and material facts concerning them and the names of witnesses or records which can establish the facts at the hearings to be held.

In this connection the committee believes it should function as an impartial investigating agency to develop by direct contacts in the field and by direct examination of Senate records all relevant and material facts possible to secure.

When Senate Resolution 301 and amendments offered were referred to the committee, the committee interprets this action to mean that from that time on the resolution and charges became the sole responsibility of the Senate. To state it another way, the Senator, or Senators, who offered Resolution 301, and proposed amendments thereto, have no legal responsibility from that point on for the conduct of the investigations and hearings authorized by the order of the Senate. The hearings are not to be adversary in character. Under this interpretation, it became the committee's duty then to get all the facts and material relevant to the charges irrespective of whether the facts sustained the charges or showed them to be without foundation.

The foregoing statement seems to be necessary in view of a widespread misunderstanding that the Senator who introduced the resolution of censure into the Senate and the Senators who offered amendments thereto, setting up specific charges against the Senator from Wisconsin, are the complaining witnesses, or the parties plaintiff, in this proceeding. That is not true, as has been explained. However, because of the fact that they had made some study of the situation, the committee did give them an opportunity to submit informational documentation of the charges they had offered. Also they were asked to submit the names of any witnesses who might have firsthand knowledge of the matters charged and who could give relevant and material testimony in the hearings.

Since matters of law also will be involved in reaching evaluation of the facts developed, pertinent rules of the Senate and sections of law, together with precedents and decisions by competent tribunals, should be briefed and made a part of the hearing record, the committee believes.

3. To hold hearings where the committee can present witnesses and documentary evidence for the purpose of placing on record, for later use by the Senate, the evidence and other information gathered during the preliminary investigation period, and for the development of additional evidence and information as the hearings proceed.

The resolution of censure presents to the Senate an issue with respect to the conduct and possible punishment of one of its Members. The debate in the Senate preceding the vote to refer the matter to a select committee made it abundantly clear that the proceedings necessary to a proper disposal of the resolution and the amendments proposed, both in the Senate and in the select committee, would be judicial or quasi-judicial in nature, and for that reason should be conducted in a judicial manner and atmosphere, so far as compatible with the investigative functions of the committee in its preliminary and continuing search for evidence and information bearing on all phases of the issues presented.

Inherent in the situation created by the resolution of censure and the charges made, is the right of the Senator against whom the charges were made to be present at the hearings held by the select committee. He should also be permitted to be represented by counsel and should have the right of cross-examination. This is somewhat contrary to the practice by Senate committees in the past, in hearings of this nature, but the present committee believes that the accused Senator should have these rights. He or his counsel, but not both, shall be permitted to make objections to the introduction of testimony, but the argument on the objections may be had or withheld at the discretion of the chairman. The Senator under charges should be permitted to present witnesses and documentary evidence in his behalf, but, of course, this should be done in compliance with the policy laid down by the committee in its notice of hearing, which is a part of this record.
In general, the committee wishes it understood that the regulations adopted are for the purpose of insuring a judicial hearing and a judicial atmosphere as befits the importance of the issues raised. For that reason, and in accordance with the order the committee believes to be the sentiment of the Senate, all activities which are not permitted in the Senate itself will not be permitted in this hearing.

4. When the hearings have closed, to prepare a report and submit it to the Senate. Under the order creating this committee, this must be done before the present Senate adjourns sine die.

By way of comment, let me say that the inquiry we are engaged in is of a special character which differentiates it from the usual legislative inquiry. It involves the internal affairs of the Senate itself in the exercise of a high constitutional function. It is by nature a judicial or semijudicial function, and we shall attempt to conduct it as such. The procedures outlined are not necessarily appropriate to congressional investigations and should not, therefore, be construed as in any sense intended as a model appropriate to such inquiries. We hope what we are doing will be found to conform to sound senatorial principles and traditions in the special field in which the committee is operating.

It has been said before, but it will do no harm to repeat, that the members of this committee did not seek this appointment. The qualifications laid down by the Senate order creating the commission, said the committee should be made up of 3 Democrat Senators and 3 Republican Senators. This was the only condition named in the order. However, in a larger sense the proper authorities of the Senate were charged with the responsibility of attempting to choose Members of the Senate for this committee who could and would conduct a fair and impartial investigation and hearing. Members of the committee deemed their selection by the Senate authorities as a trust.

We realize we are human. We know, and the American people know, that there has been a controversy raging over the country through a number of years in connection with the activities of the Senator against whom the resolution is directed. Members of this committee have been conscious of that controversy; they have seen, heard, and read of the activities, charges, and countercharges, and being human, they may have at times expressed their impressions with respect to events that were happening while they were happening.

However, each of the Senators who make up this special select committee are mature men with a wide background of experience which should enable them to disregard any impressions or preconceived notions they may have had in the past respecting the controversies which have been going on in public for many years.

We approach this matter as a duty imposed upon us and which we feel that we should do our very best to discharge in a proper manner. We realize the United States Senate, in a sense, is on trial, and we hope our conduct will be such as to maintain the American sense of fair play and the high traditions and dignity of the United States Senate under the authority given it by the Constitution.

As the investigations and the hearings progressed, the committee found that the period of time allotted to perform the task assigned would not be sufficient if all the charges were given thorough investigation and hearings were held thereon. The committee also was aware of the practical situation that required that its task be completed sufficiently early to permit the Senate to consider its report before that body must adjourn sine die.

**PROCEDURE FOR COMMITTEE HEARINGS ESTABLISHED IN NOTICE OF HEARINGS**

All testimony and evidence received in the hearings shall be such as is found by the select committee to be competent, relevant, and material to the subject matters so under inquiry, with the right of examination and cross-examination, in general conformity to judicial proceedings and in accordance with said order of the Senate.

The select committee will admit, subject to said order, as competent testimony for the record, so far as material and relevant, the official proceedings and pertinent actions of the Senate and of any of its committees or subcommittees, taking judicial notice thereof, and using official reprints when convenient.
Senate tradition, witnesses may be examined by any member of the committee, and they may be examined or cross-examined for the committee by its counsel. Witnesses may be examined or cross-examined either by Senator McCarthy or his counsel, but not by both as to the same witness.

Senator McCarthy was permitted to and made an opening statement in his own behalf at the commencement of the first hearing, on condition that it be relevant and material, and not to be received as testimony (hearing record, p. 14).

By unanimous vote of the members of the select committee taken after the issuance of the notice of hearings, it was decided to proceed with hearings only upon the 13 specifications set forth in the 5 categories contained in the notice of hearings, to which reference is hereby made (hearing record, p. 8).

I

CATEGORY I. INCIDENTS OF CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE OR A SENATORIAL COMMITTEE

A. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

The evidence on the question whether Senator McCarthy was guilty of contempt of the Senate or a senatorial committee involves his conduct with relation to the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. An analysis of the three amendments referring to this general matter (being amendment (3) proposed by Senator Fulbright, amendment (a) proposed by Senator Morse, and amendment (17) proposed by Senator Flanders) reveals these specific charges:

(1) That Senator McCarthy refused repeated invitations to testify before the subcommittee.
(2) That he declined to comply with a request by letter dated November 21, 1952, from the chairman of the subcommittee to appear to supply information concerning certain specific matters involving his activities as a Member of the Senate.
(3) That he denounced the subcommittee and contemptuously refused to comply with its request.
(4) That he has continued to show his contempt for the Senate by failing to explain in any manner the six charges contained in the Hennings-Hayden-Hendrickson report, which was filed in January 1953.

We have decided to consider and discuss in our report under this category the incident with reference to Senator Hendrickson, since the conduct complained of is related directly to the fact that Senator Hendrickson was a member of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections. This incident is referred to in the amendment proposed by Senator Flanders (30), the specific charge being:

(5) That he ridiculed and defamed Senator Hendrickson in vulgar and base language, calling him: "A living miracle without brains or guts."

The report referred to as the Hennings-Hayden-Hendrickson report is the report of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections to the Committee on Rules and Administration, pursuant to Senate Resolu-
tion 187, 82d Congress, 1st session, and Senate Resolution 304, 82d Congress, 2d session, filed January 2, 1953, and appears in part II of the hearing record. The select committee admitted in evidence the Hennings-Hayden-Hendrickson report for the limited purposes of showing the nature of the charges before that subcommittee, as bearing upon the question of jurisdiction of that subcommittee, and what was the subject matter of the investigation (pp. 55, 121, and 524 of the hearings).

As stated by the chairman (p. 17 of the hearings), the select committee did not construe this category as involving in any way the truth or falsity of any of the charges against Senator McCarthy considered by that subcommittee. These charges, as shown by its report and as stated briefly by the chairman, Senator Hennings, in a letter to Senator McCarthy under date of November 21, 1952 (Hennings-Hayden-Hendrickson report, p. 98), were:

Pursuant to your request, as transmitted to us through Mr. Kiermas, we are advising you that the subcommittee desires to make inquiry with respect to the following matters:

1. Whether any funds collected or received by you and by others on your behalf to conduct certain of your activities, including those relating to "communism," were ever diverted and used for other purposes inuring to your personal advantage.

2. Whether you, at any time, used your official position as a United States Senator and as a member of the Banking and Currency Committee, the Joint Housing Committee, and the Senate Investigations Committee to obtain a $10,000 fee from the Lustron Corp., which company was then almost entirely subsidized by agencies under the jurisdiction of the very committees of which you were a member.

3. Whether your activities on behalf of certain special interest groups, such as housing, sugar, and China, were motivated by self-interest.

4. Whether your activities with respect to your senatorial campaigns, particularly with respect to the reporting of your financing and your activities relating to the financial transactions with, and subsequent employment of, Ray Kiermas involved violations of the Federal and State Corrupt Practices Acts.

5. Whether loan or other transactions which you had with the Appleton State Bank, of Appleton, Wis., involved violations of tax and banking laws.

6. Whether you used close associates and members of your family to secrete receipts, income, commodity, and stock speculation, and other financial transactions for ulterior motives.

The evidence taken by the select committee under this category consisted of letters and documents, oral testimony by Senator McCarthy and oral testimony by Senator Hayden, and by the Parliamentarian. As to the statement regarding Senator Hendrickson, there is the testimony of a reporter. There is no material contradiction in any of the testimony relating to this category. The sending and receipt of the correspondence is admitted. There is no contradiction of the verbal testimony of Senator McCarthy with reference to his conversations with Chairman Gillette, or of that of Chairman Hayden with reference to the constitution of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections and the filing of its report, or of that of Parliamentarian Watkins, discussed fully hereinafter.

The evidence shows that the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections was proceeding to investigate and report on Senate Resolution 187; that Senator McCarthy was invited to appear to testify before the subcommittee on five separate occasions extending from September 25, 1951, to November 7, 1952, and formally requested to appear by letter and telegram of November 21, 1952; that Senator McCarthy could
not appear at the times specified in the request because of his absence in Wisconsin; that Senator McCarthy did not appear before the subcommittee in answer to the matters under investigation regarding his own conduct, but did appear on one occasion in support of his Senate Resolution 304 directed against Senator Benton; that Senator McCarthy accused the subcommittee of acting without power and beyond its jurisdiction, of wasting vast amounts of public money for improper partisan purposes, of proceeding dishonestly, of aiding the cause of communism, and that these accusations were directed toward an official subcommittee of the Senate. The uncontradicted testimony further shows that Senator McCarthy directed and gave to the press an abusive and insulting statement concerning Senator Hendrickson, calculated to wound a colleague, solely because Senator Hendrickson was a member of the subcommittee and performing services required by the Senate.

Senate Resolution 187, introduced by Senator Benton, was not voted upon by the Senate, but when the jurisdiction of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections and the integrity of its members was attacked, the Senate by its vote of 60 to 0 in Senate Resolution 300, affirmed and ratified both.

Counsel for Senator McCarthy advanced the contention that these specifications relating to "Incidents of contempt of the Senate or a senatorial committee" were legally insufficient on their face as a predicate for the censure of Senator McCarthy because (1) there has never been a case of censure upon a Member of Congress for conduct antedating the inception of the Congress which is hearing the censure charges (p. 18 of the hearings), and (2) because the subcommittee acted unlawfully and beyond its jurisdiction (pp. 53 to 58 of the hearings).

B. FINDINGS OF FACT

From the evidence and testimony taken with reference to the first category, the select committee finds the following facts:

1. On August 6, 1951, Senate Resolution 187, 82d Congress, 1st session, was introduced by Senator Benton and referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration (p. 20 of the hearings).

2. In turn, this resolution was referred by the Committee on Rules and Administration to its Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections (p. 280 of the hearings).

3. This resolution provided, inter alia, that whereas "any sitting Senator, regardless of whether he is a candidate in the election himself, should be subject to expulsion by action of the Senate, if it finds such Senator engaged in practices and behavior that make him, in the opinion of the Senate, unfit to hold the position of United States Senator,"; Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate is authorized and directed to proceed with such consideration of the report of its Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections with respect to the 1950 Maryland senatorial general election, which was made pursuant to Senate Resolution 250, 81st Congress, April 13, 1950, and to make such further investigation with respect to the participation of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy in the 1950 senatorial campaign of Senator John Marshall Butler, and such investigation with respect to his other acts since his election to the Senate, as may be appropriate to enable such committee to determine whether or not it should initiate action with a view
toward the expulsion from the United States Senate of the said Senator Joseph R. McCarthy.

It will be noted that this proposed resolution authorized and directed such investigation as may be appropriate "with reference to his other acts since his election to the Senate."

4. Senator McCarthy was elected to the Senate in the fall of 1946, and took his seat in January 1947.

5. Among the charges pending before and investigated by that Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections, charges (1), (2), (3), and (4) related to matters since Senator McCarthy's election to the Senate in 1946, and charges (5) and (6) may or may not have referred to matters since his election to the Senate, or to matters both before and after his election.

6. Senator Guy M. Gillette was chairman of that Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections until his resignation on September 26, 1952 (p. 22 of the hearings).

7. By letter of Senator McCarthy to Chairman Gillette dated September 17, 1951, Senator McCarthy stated that he intended to appear to question witnesses and that the subcommittee, without authorization from the Senate was undertaking to conduct hearings in the matter (p. 280 of the hearings).

8. By letter of September 25, 1951, Chairman Gillette notified Senator McCarthy that the Benton resolution (S. Res. 187) would be taken up by the subcommittee on September 28, 1951, and that Senator McCarthy could be present to hear Senator Benton in executive session and make his own statement also, if time permitted (p. 23 of the hearings).

9. Senator McCarthy did not reply to this letter.

10. By letter of October 1, 1951, Chairman Gillette advised Senator McCarthy that Senator Benton had appeared and presented a statement in support of his resolution looking to action pertaining to the expulsion of Senator McCarthy from the Senate, that the subcommittee had taken action to accord to Senator McCarthy the opportunity to appear and make any statement he wished to make concerning the matter, and that the subcommittee "will be glad to hear you at an hour mutually convenient," before the 10th of October, if Senator McCarthy desired to appear (p. 23 of the hearings).

11. Under date of October 4, 1951, Senator McCarthy wrote to Chairman Gillette, in reply to the latter's letter of October 1, 1951, that "I have not and do not even intend to read, much less answer, Benton's smear attack" (p. 23 of the hearings).


(a) That the "Elections Subcommittee, unless given further power by the Senate, is restricted to matters having to do with elections.

(b) That "a horde of investigators hired by your committee at a cost of tens of thousands of dollars of taxpayers' money, has been engaged exclusively in trying to dig up on McCarthy material covering periods of time long before he was even old enough to be a candidate for the Senate—material which can have no conceivable connection with his election or any other election."

(c) That the "obvious purpose is to dig up campaign material
for the Democrat Party for the coming campaign against McCarthy.

(d) That "when your Elections Subcommittee, without Senate authorization, spends tens of thousands of taxpayers’ dollars for the sole purpose of digging up campaign material against McCarthy, then the committee is guilty of stealing just as clearly as though the Members engaged in picking the pockets of the taxpayers and turning the loot over to the Democrat National Committee."

(e) That "if one of the administration lackies were chairman of this committee, I would not waste the time or energy to write and point out the committee’s complete dishonesty."

(f) That instead of obtaining the necessary power from the Senate, "your committee decided to spend tens of thousands of dollars of taxpayers’ money to aid Benton in his smear attack upon McCarthy."

(g) That "I cannot understand your being willing to label Guy Gillette as a man who will head a committee which is stealing from the pockets of the American taxpayer tens of thousands of dollars and then using this money to protect the Democrat Party from the political effect of the exposure of Communists in Government."

(h) That "to take it upon yourself to hire a horde of investigators and spend tens of thousands of dollars without any authorization from the Senate is labeling your Elections Subcommittee even more dishonest than was the Tydings committee."

13. Chairman Gillette replied to Senator McCarthy by letter of December 6, 1951 (p. 26 of the hearings), stating that the subcommittee did not seek its unpleasant task, but that since Senate Resolution 187 was referred by the Senate to the Committee on Rules and Administration, and by it to its Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections, its duty was clear and would be discharged "in a spirit of utmost fairness to all concerned and to the Senate."

14. In the same letter, Chairman Gillette informed Senator McCarthy, "your information as to the use of a large staff and the expenditure of a large sum of money in investigations relative to the resolution is, of course, erroneous."

15. By letter from Senator McCarthy to Chairman Gillette dated December 7, 1951, information was requested of the number and salaries of employees of the subcommittee (p. 26 of the hearings).

16. Chairman Gillette gave this information to Senator McCarthy under date of December 11, 1951 (p. 27 of the hearings).

17. Under date of December 19, 1951, Senator McCarthy wrote to Chairman Gillette stating that: "the full committee appointed you chairman of an Elections Subcommittee, but gave you no power whatsoever to hire investigators and spend vast amounts of money to make investigations having nothing to do with elections. Again, may I have an answer to my questions as to why you feel you are entitled to spend the taxpayers’ money to do the work of the Democratic National Committee" (p. 27 of the hearings).

18. In the same letter, Senator McCarthy stated: "You and every member of your Subcommittee who is responsible for spending vast amounts of money to hire investigators, pay their traveling expenses, etc., on matters not concerned with elections, is just as dishonest as
though he or she picked the pockets of the taxpayers and turned the loot over to the Democratic National Committee.”

19. In the same letter, Senator McCarthy stated: “I wonder if I might have a frank, honest answer to all the questions covered in my letter of December 7. Certainly as a member of the Rules Committee and as a Member of the Senate, I am entitled to this information. Your failure to give this information highlights the fact that your subcommittee is not concerned with dishonestly spending the taxpayers’ money and using your subcommittee as an arm of the Democratic National Committee” (p. 28 of the hearings).

20. On December 21, 1951, Chairman Gillette wrote Senator McCarthy, advising him as follows:

(a) “I shall be very glad to give you such information as I have or go with you, if you so desire, to the rooms occupied by the subcommittee and aid you in securing any facts that are there available, relative to the employees of the subcommittee or their work,” and stating further that:

(b) Previous correspondence had been printed in the public press, even before receipt by Chairman Gillette.

(c) That it was improper to discuss matters pertaining to pending litigation in the public press.

(d) That a meeting of the subcommittee was being called for January 7, 1952, to consider the Benton resolution.

(e) That if Senator McCarthy cared to appear before the subcommittee, he would be glad to make the necessary arrangements as to time and place.

(f) That he would be glad to confer with Senator McCarthy personally as to matters concerning the staff and the work of the subcommittee.

(g) That neither the Democratic National Committee nor any person or group other than an agency of the United States Senate has had or will have any influence on his duties and actions as a member of the subcommittee, and that no other member of the subcommittee has been or will be so influenced (p. 28 of the hearings).

21. Senator McCarthy wrote to Chairman Gillette on January 4, 1952, asking: “the simple question of whether or not you have ordered the investigators to restrict their investigation to matters having to do with elections, or whether their investigations extend into fields having nothing whatsoever to do with either my election or the election of any other Senator” (p. 29 of the hearings).

22. Chairman Gillette replied to Senator McCarthy by letter dated January 10, 1952, informing him that the staff of the subcommittee had just submitted a report on the legal question raised by Senator McCarthy, that this was being studied, and the subcommittee would then determine what action, if any, they would take (p. 29 of the hearings).

23. Because Senator McCarthy questioned the jurisdiction of the subcommittee, the subcommittee adopted a resolution, approved by a majority of the Committee on Rules and Administration, that Senator McCarthy be requested to bring to the floor of the Senate a motion to discharge the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections (p. 30 of the hearings).

24. Senator Hayden, chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration, informed Senator McCarthy that the purpose would
be to test the jurisdiction and integrity of the members of the sub-
committee (p. 30 of the hearings).

25. Under date of March 21, 1952, Senator McCarthy wrote to
Senator Hayden, chairman of the parent Committee on Rules and
Administration, that he thought it improper to discharge the sub-
committee for the following reasons:

The Elections Subcommittee unquestionably has the power and, when com-
plaint is made, the duty to investigate any improper conduct on the part of
McCarthy or any other Senator in a senatorial election.

The subcommittee has spent tens of thousands of dollars and nearly a year
making the most painstaking investigation of my part in the Maryland election,
as well as my campaigns in Wisconsin. The subcommittee's task is not finished
until it reports to the Senate the result of that investigation, namely, whether
they found such misconduct on the part of McCarthy in either his own cam-
paigns or in the Tydings campaign to warrant his expusion from the Senate.

I note the subcommittee's request that the integrity of the subcommittee be
passed upon. As you know, the sole question of the integrity of the subcom-
mittee concerned its right to spend vast sums of money investigating the life
of McCarthy from birth to date without any authority to do so from the Senate.
However, the vote on that question cannot affect the McCarthy investigation, in
that the committee for a year has been looking into every possible phase of
McCarthy's life, including an investigation of those who contributed to my
unsuccessful 1944 campaign.

As you know, I wrote Senator Gillette, chairman of the subcommittee, that
I considered this a completely dishonest handling of taxpayers' money. I felt
that the Elections Subcommittee had no authority to go into matters other than
elections unless the Senate instructed it to do so. However, it is obvious that
insofar as McCarthy is concerned this is now a moot question, because the staff
has already painstakingly and diligently investigated every nook and cranny
of my life from birth to date. Every possible lead on McCarthy was investi-
gated. Nothing that could be investigated was left uninvestigated. The staff's
scurrilous report, which consisted of cleverly twisted and distorted facts, was
then "leaked" to the left-wing elements of the press and blazoned across the
Nation in an attempt to further smear McCarthy.

A vote of confidence in the subcommittee would be a vote on whether or not
it had the right, without authority from the Senate, but merely on the request
of one Senator (in this case Senator Benton) to make a thorough and complete
investigation of the entire life of another Senator. A vote to uphold the sub-
committee would mean that the Senate accepts and approves this precedent and makes
it binding on the Elections Subcommittee in the future.

A vote against the subcommittee could not undo what the subcommittee has
done in regard to McCarthy. It would not force the subcommittee members to
repay into the Treasury the funds spent on this investigation of McCarthy. A
vote against the subcommittee would merely mean that the Senate disapproves
what has already been done insofar as McCarthy is concerned, and therefore,
disapproves an investigation of other Senators like the one which was made of
McCarthy. While I felt the subcommittee exceeded its authority, now that it
has established a precedent in McCarthy's case, the same rule should apply to
every other Senator. If the subcommittee brought up this question before the
investigation had been made, I would have voted to discharge it. Now that the
deed is done, however, the same rule should apply to the other 95 Senators.

For that reason, I would be forced to vigorous oppose a motion to discharge
the Elections Subcommittee at this time.

I hope the Senate agrees with me that it would be highly improper to discharge
the Gillette-Monroney subcommittee at this time, thereby, in effect, setting a
different rule for the subcommittee to follow in case an investigation is asked of
any of the other 95 Senators (p. 30 of the hearings).

26. In view of Senator McCarthy's refusal to make the requested
motion in the Senate, Chairman Hayden, of himself, and for the other
four members of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections (Sen-
ators Gillette, Monroney, Hennings, and Hendrickson), submitted
Senate Resolution 300, 82d Congress, 2d session, on April 8, 1952 (p. 31
of the hearings).
27. Senate Resolution 300 provided that whereas Senator McCarthy in a series of communications addressed to Chairman Gillette between December 6, 1951, and January 4, 1952, had charged that the subcommittee lacked jurisdiction to investigate such acts of Senator McCarthy as were not connected with election campaigns, and attacked the honesty of the members of the subcommittee, charging that in their investigation of such other acts, the members were improperly motivated and were guilty of stealing just as clearly as though the members engaged in picking the pockets of the taxpayers, and whereas the subcommittee adopted a motion, as the most expeditious parliamentary method of obtaining an affirmation by the Senate of its jurisdiction of this matter and a vote on the honesty of its members, that Senator McCarthy be requested to raise the question of jurisdiction and of the integrity of the members of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections, by making a formal motion on the floor of the Senate to discharge the committee, and that unless Senator McCarthy did so, the chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration or the chairman of the subcommittee would present such a motion, and since Senator McCarthy in effect had declined so to do, therefore, to determine the proper jurisdiction of the Committee on Rules and Administration and to express the confidence of the Senate in its committee in their consideration of Senate Resolution 187, be it resolved that the Committee on Rules and Administration be, and it hereby is, discharged from the further consideration of Senate Resolution 187 (p. 31 of the hearings).

28. The Senate voted upon this resolution on April 10, 1952, and the resolution was rejected by a vote of 0 to 60, with 36 Members not voting (p. 32 of the hearings).

29. Senator McCarthy is recorded as not voting but he stated in the Senate that he could not wait for the vote and if present would have voted against the discharge of the subcommittee (p. 378 of the hearings).

30. Chairman Gillette wrote to Senator McCarthy on May 7, 1952, fixing May 12, 1952, as the time for public hearing on Senate Resolution 187, informing him that the first charge to be heard would be the matter concerning the Lustron Corp. booklet, and extending to Senator McCarthy “the opportunity to appear at the hearings for the purpose of presenting testimony relating to this charge. The hearings in this case will probably continue for several days, and we shall make whatever arrangements for your appearance as are most convenient for you” (p. 32 of the hearings).

31. Under date of May 8, 1952, Senator McCarthy wrote to Chairman Gillette, acknowledging receipt of the letter of May 7, 1952, asking on what point the subcommittee desired information, and giving a statement of facts with reference to the Lustron Corp. booklet, in argumentative fashion, and charging the subcommittee with knowingly allowing itself to serve the Communist cause, and stating:

The Communists will have scored a great victory if they can convince every other Senator or Congressman that if he attempts to expose undercover Communists, he will be subjected to the same type of intense smear, even to the extent of using a Senate committee for the purpose. They will have frightened away from this fight a vast number of legislators who fear the political effect of being inundated by the Communist Party line sewage.

If you have evidence of wrongdoing on McCarthy's part, which would justify removal from the Senate or a vote of censure by the Senate, certainly you have
the obligation to produce it. However, as you well know, every member of
your committee and staff privately admits that no such evidence is in existence.
It is an evil and dishonest thing for the subcommittee to allow itself to be used
for an evil purpose. Certainly the fact that the Democrat Party may tempo-
rarily benefit thereby is insufficient justification. Remember the Communist
Party will benefit infinitely more (p. 32 of the hearings).

32. Senator McCarthy again wrote to Chairman Gillette on the
same day, May 8, 1952, demanding expeditious action in the Benton
case (p. 35 of the hearings).

33. Chairman Gillette wrote to Senator McCarthy under date of
May 10, 1952, informing him that the subcommittee had concluded to
take testimony on May 12, 1952, and that it was the courteous thing
to do to invite him to attend, to present evidence in refutation or
explanation, and that the opportunity would continue to be that of
Senator McCarthy to present such matter as he might wish in connec-
tion with the hearing and to attend if he so desired (p. 43 of the
hearings).

34. On May 11, 1952, Senator McCarthy wrote to Chairman Gil-
lette, Senator Monroney, and Senator Hennings jointly, a sarcastic
letter, the meaning and intention of which can be understood only
by reading it in its entirety (p. 43 of the hearings).

35. The chief counsel for the subcommittee wrote to Senator Mc-
Carthy on November 7, 1952, inviting Senator McCarthy to appear
before a subcommittee in executive session, in connection with Senate
Resolution 187, during the week of November 17, 1952, and asking to
be advised of the date of Senator McCarthy’s appearance (p. 44 of
the hearings).

36. The administrative assistant to Senator McCarthy replied for
Senator McCarthy by letter of November 10, 1952, stating that Senator
McCarthy was away and that he did not know when he would return
to Washington, stating, however, that if the subcommittee would let
him know what information was desired, he would be glad to try to
be of help (p. 45 of the hearings).

37. Chairman Hennings, of the subcommittee, then wrote a letter to
Senator McCarthy under date of November 21, 1952, which because of
its importance is set forth in full:

Dear Senator McCarthy: As you will recall on September 25, 1951, May 7,
1952, and May 10, 1952, this subcommittee invited you to appear before it to give
testimony relating to the investigation pursuant to Senate Resolution 187.
Under date of November 7, 1952, the following communication was addressed
to you:

"Dear Senator McCarthy: In connection with the consideration by the
Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections of Senate Resolution No. 187, intro-
duced by Senator Benton on August 6, 1951, as well as the ensuing investiga-
tion, I have been instructed by the subcommittee to invite you to appear before said
subcommittee in executive session. Insofar as possible, we would like to respect
your wishes as to the date on which you will appear. However, the subcom-
mittee plans to be available for this purpose during the week beginning November
17, 1952.

"It will be appreciated if you will advise me at as early a date as possible
of the day you will appear, in order that the subcommittee may arrange its
plans accordingly.

"Very truly yours,

"Paul J. Cotter, Chief Counsel."
On November 14, 1952, the subcommittee received the following communication, dated November 10, 1952:

"Dear Mr. Cotter: Inasmuch as Senator McCarthy is not now in Washington, I am taking the liberty of acknowledging receipt of your letter of November 7. I have just talked to the Senator over the telephone and he does not know just when he will return to Washington. It presently appears that he will not be available to appear before your committee during the time you mention. However, he did state that if you will let him know just what information you desire, he will be glad to try to be of help to you.

"Sincerely yours,

"Ray Kiermas,"

"Administrative Assistant to Senator McCarthy."

The subcommittee is grateful for your offer of assistance, and we want to afford you with every opportunity to offer your explanations with reference to the issues involved. Therefore, although the subcommittee did make itself available during the past week in order to afford you an opportunity to be heard, we shall be at your disposal commencing Saturday, November 22, through but not later than Tuesday, November 25, 1952.

This subcommittee has but one object, and that is to reach an impartial and proper conclusion based upon the facts. Your appearance, in person, before the subcommittee will not only give you the opportunity to testify as to any issues of fact which may be in controversy, but will be of the greatest assistance to the subcommittee in its effort to arrive at a proper determination and to embody in its report an accurate representation of the facts.

Pursuant to your request, as transmitted to us through Mr. Kiermas, we are advising you that the subcommittee desires to make inquiry with respect to the following matters:

1. Whether any funds collected or received by you and by others on your behalf to conduct certain of your activities, including those relating to "communism," were ever diverted and used for other purposes inuring to your personal advantage.

2. Whether you, at any time, used your official position as a United States Senator and as a member of the Banking and Currency Committee, the Joint Housing Committee, and the Senate Investigations Committee, to obtain a $10,000 fee from the Lustron Corp., which company was then almost entirely subsidized by agencies under the jurisdiction of the very committees of which you were a member.

3. Whether your activities on behalf of certain interest groups, such as housing, sugar, and China, were motivated by self-interest.

4. Whether your activities with respect to your senatorial campaigns, particularly with respect to the reporting of your financing and your activities relating to the financial transactions with and subsequent employment of Ray Kiermas, involved violations of the Federal and State Corrupt Practices Acts.

5. Whether loan or other transactions which you had with the Appleton State Bank, of Appleton, Wis., involved violations of tax and banking laws.

6. Whether you used close associates and members of your family to secrete receipts, income, commodity and stock speculation and other financial transactions for ulterior motives.

We again assure you of our desire to give you the opportunity to testify, in executive session of the subcommittee, as to the foregoing matters. The 82d Congress expires in the immediate future and the subcommittee must necessarily proceed with dispatch in making its report to this Congress. To that end, we respectfully urge you to arrange to come before us on or before November 25, and thus enable us to do our conscientious best in the interests of the Senate and our obligation to complete our work. We would thank you to advise us immediately, so that we may plan accordingly.

This letter is being transmitted at the direction and with the full concurrence of the membership of this subcommittee.

Sincerely yours,

Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., Chairman.

(P. 45 of the hearings.)

38. This letter was delivered by hand to the office of Senator McCarthy in Washington on November 21, 1952 (p. 47 of the hearings).
39. On the same day, November 21, 1952, Chairman Hennings sent the following telegram addressed to Senator McCarthy at Appleton, Wis.:

"Today you were advised by letter delivered by hand to your office of the principal matters which the subcommittee desires to interrogate you in furtherance of your express desire transmitted to the committee by your administrative assistant, Mr. Ray Kiermas, under date of November 10. The subcommittee appreciates your willingness to help in the completion of the work in connection with the investigation of Resolution 187 and the investigations predicated thereon. Your prompt appearance before the subcommittee can save the Government much effort and expense. We are sure that you want to be of help to us in arriving at a proper determination of the issues in controversy. We are therefore at your disposal in executive session and for your convenience suggest that the subcommittee is available to you commencing with tomorrow, Saturday, November 22, but not later than Tuesday the 25th, to enable the committee to hear you and allow time thereafter to prepare the subcommittee report. Senator Benton has also been notified to appear by similar communication. This action is being taken at the direction and with the full concurrence of the committee members (p. 47 of the hearings)."

40. The copy of the telegram in the H-H-H Report, designated "Exhibit No. 42" at page 99 thereof, was not sent to Senator McCarthy and was inserted as an exhibit by error in place of the foregoing telegram of November 21, 1952, as shown by the fact it is not dated and as appears in the index of appendix, page 55, wherein exhibit No. 42 is described as "Telegram dated Nov. 21, 1952, from Senator Hennings to Senator McCarthy . . . Page 99" (p. 51 of the hearings).

41. On November 21, 1952, Senator McCarthy was deer hunting in northern Wisconsin (p. 208 of the hearings).

42. Senator McCarthy wrote to Chairman Hennings on November 28, 1952, stating that he had just received the wire of November 22, and that, as Senator Hennings had been previously advised, Senator McCarthy was not expected to return to Washington until November 27, on which date he did return (p. 49 of the hearings).

43. Senator McCarthy did not see the letter or telegram dated November 21, 1952, until November 28, 1952 (p. 299 of the hearings).

44. Senator McCarthy wrote to Chairman Hennings under date of December 1, 1952, stating as follows:

"Dear Mr. Hennings: This is to acknowledge receipt of yours of November 21 in which you state that your object is to reach an "impartial and proper conclusion based upon the facts" in the Benton application which asks for my removal from the Senate.

I was interested in your declaration of honesty of the committee and would like to believe that it is true. As you know, your committee has the most unusual record of any committee in the history of the Senate. As you know two members of your staff have resigned and the public statement that their reason for resignation was that your committee was dishonestly used for political purposes. Two Senators have also resigned. One, Senator Welker, in the strongest possible language indicted your committee for complete dishonesty in handling your investigation. Senator Gillette also resigned without giving any plausible reason for his resignation from the committee. Obviously, he also couldn't stomach the dishonest use of public funds for political purposes. For that reason it is difficult for me to believe your protestations of the honesty of your committee.

I would, therefore, ordinarily not dignify your committee by answering your letter of November 21. However, I decided to give you no excuse to claim in your report that I refused to give you any facts. For that reason you are being informed that the answer to the six insulting questions in your letter of No-
vember 21 in "No." You understand that in answering these questions I do not in any way approve of nor admit the false statements and innuendoes made in the questions.

I note with some interest your reference to my "activities on behalf of certain special-interest groups, such as housing, sugar, and China." I assume you refer to my drafting of the comprehensive Housing Act of 1946, which was passed without a single dissenting vote in the Senate, either Democrat or Republican. Neither you nor any other Senator has attempted to repeal any part of that Housing Act. Or perhaps you refer to the slum-clearance bill which I drafted and introduced in 1948, which slum-clearance bill was adopted in toto by the Democrat-controlled Senate in 1949.

When you refer to sugar, I assume you refer to my efforts to do away with your party's rationing of sugar, as I promised the housewives I would during my 1946 campaign. If that were wrong, I wonder why you have not introduced legislation in the Democrat-controlled Senate to restore sugar rationing. You have had 2 years to do so.

I thought perhaps the election might have taught you that your boss and mine—the American people—do not approve of treason and incompetence and feel that it must be exposed.

You refer to the above as "special interests." I personally feel very proud of having drafted the Housing Act in 1948 which passed the Congress without a single dissenting vote—a Housing Act which contributed so much toward making it possible for veterans and all Americans in the middle- and low-income groups to own their own home. Likewise, I am proud of having been able to fulfill my promise to American housewives to obtain the derationing of sugar. I proved at the time that rationing was not for the benefit of the housewives but for the commercial users.

I likewise am proud of the part I played in alerting the American people to your administration's traitorous betrayal of American interests throughout the world, especially in China and Poland.

You refer to such activities on my part as "activities for special interests." I am curious to know what "special interests" you mean other than the special interest of the American people.

This letter is not written with any hope of getting an honest report from your committee. It is being written merely to keep the record straight.

Sincerely yours,

Joe McCarthy.

(P. 51 of hearings.)

45. Senator McCarthy appeared before the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections once only, on July 3, 1952, in connection with his charges against Senator Benton under Senate Resolution 304, without requiring a subpoena (pp. 52, 290, and 375 of hearings).

46. Senator McCarthy did not appear before that committee, at any other time, nor make any explanation in defense, except as shown in the foregoing correspondence, in connection with the charges pending against him, either before or after the Senate action in Senate Resolution 300 (pp. 52 and 375 of hearings).

47. Senator McCarthy did make an explanation of the Lustron matter on the floor of the Senate, on August 2, 1954 (p. 53 of hearings).

48. Senate Resolution 187, introduced by Senator Benton, was not voted upon by the Senate, although it was considered by the Senate in its vote on April 10, 1952, upon Senate Resolution 300 to test the jurisdiction of the subcommittee and the integrity of its members.

49. The vote of the Senate upon Senate Resolution 300 notwithstanding any previous question of the jurisdiction of the Hennings subcommittee, was a grant of authority to that subcommittee to proceed with its investigation of the charges pending against Senator McCarthy, since his election to the Senate.

50. Senate Resolution 187, introduced by Senator Benton, confined the subcommittee to activities of Senator McCarthy subsequent to his election in 1946.
51. Senator McCarthy's position was that he would not appear before the Hennings subcommittee upon the charges pending against him unless he was ordered to appear (p. 288 of hearings).

52. Senator McCarthy did not say in any of the correspondence relating to the hearings and his appearance, that he would not appear before the subcommittee unless he was ordered to do so, but testified that he so notified Chairman Gillette orally (p. 288 of hearings).

53. Senator McCarthy advised Chairman Gillette that unless he was given the right to cross-examine, that he had no desire to appear before the subcommittee but that he would appear if ordered to do so (p. 288 of hearings).

54. At the hearings before the select committee, Senator McCarthy testified that the subcommittee knew that a witness was mentally incompetent "and they were going to call him solely for the purpose of doing a smear job" (p. 293 of hearings).

55. At the hearings before the select committee, Senator McCarthy testified that the insertion of the undated telegram, exhibit No. 42 in the Hennings report (found by this select committee to be a clerical error), "was completely dishonest," insisting upon this conclusion when the chairman asked whether it could not have been a mistake (pp. 299, 384, and 385 of hearing record).

56. Senator McCarthy told Chairman Gillette "that I would not appear unless I was ordered to appear or subpoenaed. I forget which word I used. I told him I had no desire to appear before that committee and that his extending an opportunity meant nothing to me" (p. 305 of the hearing).

57. The report of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections was filed January 2, 1953 (p. 306 of the hearings).

58. On that day, Senator McCarthy, according to his own testimony, called Senator Hendrickson, a member of that subcommittee, by telephone and told him that it was completely dishonest to sign a report that was factually wrong (p. 306 of the hearings).

59. That evening Senator McCarthy gave a statement to the press regarding Senator Hendrickson, a member of that subcommittee, stating:

"This report accuses me either directly or by innuendo and intimation of the most dishonest and improper conduct.

"If it is true, I am unfit to serve in the Senate. If it is false, then the three men who joined in it—namely, Hendrickson, Hennings, and Hayden—are dishonest beyond words.

"If those 3 men honestly think that all of the 4 things of which they have accused me, they have a deep, moral obligation tomorrow to move that the Senate does not seat me as a Senator.

"If they think the report is true, they will do that. If they know the report is completely false and that it has been issued only for its smear value, then they will not dare to present this case to the Senate.

"This committee has been squandering taxpayers' money on this smear campaign for nearly 18 months. If they feel that they are honest and right, why do they fear presenting their case to the Senate?

"I challenge them to do that. If they do not, they will have proved their complete dishonesty.

"I can understand the actions of the leftwingers in the administration, like Hennings and Hayden. As far as Hendrickson is concerned, I frankly can bear him no ill will.

"Suffice it to say that he is a living miracle in that he is without question the only man in the world who has lived so long with neither brains nor guts" (pp. 67 and 68 of hearing record).
60. By letter of September 10, 1952, Chairman Gillette of the subcommittee wrote to Chairman Hayden, of the Committee on Rules and Administration, suggesting that the membership of the subcommittee be reduced from 5 members to 3, as it was originally, to facilitate the work of the subcommittee (p. 294 of the hearings).

61. Senator Welker resigned as a member of the subcommittee on September 9, 1952 (p. 291 of the hearings).

62. Chairman Gillette resigned as a member of the subcommittee on September 26, 1952 (p. 294 of the hearings).

63. After consultation with the Parliamentarian, Senator Hayden, chairman of the parent Committee on Rules and Administration, decided it was unnecessary to appoint 2 Members of the Senate to take the places of those who had resigned, because it was a committee of 5 with a majority of 3, and because the Senate not being in session, it was very difficult to obtain Senators who were members of the Committee on Rules and Administration (p. 361 of the hearings).

64. Senator Monroney, who was in Europe, resigned as a member of the subcommittee, on November 20, 1953 (p. 361 of the hearings).

65. On November 20, 1952, Senator Hayden made it a matter of record by writing to the clerk of the Committee on Rules and Administration that he was appointing himself a member of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections in place of Senator Monroney (p. 362 of the hearings).

66. The subcommittee, with Senator Hennings as chairman, and Senators Hendrickson and Hayden as members, continued to function until January 16, 1953 (pp. 362 and 367 of the hearings).

67. Since January 1953 the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections has had but three members (p. 362 of the hearings).

68. The suggestion of Senator Gillette that the membership of the subcommittee be reduced to three members was given consideration by both the Committee on Rules and Administration and the subcommittee (p. 362 of the hearings).

69. Senators Hennings, Hayden, and Hendrickson signed the subcommittee report pursuant to Senate Resolution 187 and Senate Resolution 304 (p. 363 of the hearings).

70. It was the opinion of Chairman Hayden, of the Committee on Rules and Administration, that without reducing the subcommittee to 3 members, the subcommittee could continue to function as a committee of 5 with but 3 members (p. 365 of the hearings).

71. It was the opinion of Chairman Hayden, that the Senate not being in session, it was not necessary for him as chairman of the parent committee to obtain confirmation by the parent committee of appointments to the subcommittee (p. 365 of the hearings).

72. Chairman Hayden testified that there was immediate important work for the subcommittee to do and that there was no one other than himself on the Committee on Rules and Administration who could be appointed to the subcommittee (p. 365 of the hearings).

73. This manner of conducting the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections was consistent with its practice since before the 81st Congress and did not violate any rule of the parent committee (p. 366 of the hearings).

74. Chairman Hayden continued as chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration, and Chairman Hennings of the Subcom-
mittee on Privileges and Elections continued in office until about January 16, 1953 (pp. 367 and 369 of the hearings).

75. At the hearings before the select committee, Senator McCarthy testified when asked whether he had any evidence to support his written statements that the subcommittee was spending tens of thousands of dollars and as guilty as though engaged in picking the pockets of the taxpayers to turn the loot over to the Democrat National Committee, that he had produced this evidence in letters to the subcommittee (p. 377 of the hearings).

76. No such evidence appears in the letters.

77. When asked whether he had any evidence that the subcommittee had spent tens of thousands of dollars illegally, Senator McCarthy testified that, "They were spending a vast amount of money illegally, I don't know the exact figure" (p. 378 of the hearings).

78. When asked whether he knew that the matters pending before the subcommittee reflected seriously upon his character and activities and were of sufficient moment ordinarily to justify making some reply, Senator McCarthy testified that: "They were six insulting questions asked by the committee—by a Senator, not by a legal committee. I answered his questions. I told him the answer was 'No'." (p. 383 of the hearings). (But note that the above answer was contained in a letter from Senator McCarthy to Senator Hennings dated December 1, 1952, addressed to the latter as chairman of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections) (pp. 51-52 of the hearings).

79. At page 384 of the hearings, Senator McCarthy was asked whether it was his position that when matters of that serious nature are pending against a Member of the United States Senate, instead of appearing and making an answer, he can call them "insulting" and need not appear, and Senator McCarthy testified in reply that: "They are no more 'matters' than the 46 statements made by Senator Flanders."

80. On January 2, 1953, Senator McCarthy bitterly criticized Senator Hendrickson with reference to the latter's work with the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections, and then gave to the press a statement that Senator Hendrickson was "a living miracle in that he is without question the only man who has lived so long with neither brains nor guts" (pp. 66 and 425 of the hearings). (See also Finding of Fact No. 59.)

81. At the hearings before the select committee, when given the opportunity by Senator Case to withdraw or modify his remarks about Senator Hendrickson, a member of the subcommittee, Senator McCarthy indicated he had no desire to change his position (p. 425 of the hearings).

C. LEGAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN THIS CATEGORY

Several legal questions are involved and were considered in this part of the inquiry. They may be stated briefly as follows:

1. Is the Senate a continuing body?
2. Does the Senate have the power to censure a Senator for conduct occurring during his prior term as Senator?
3. Was it necessary for Senate Resolution 187 to be adopted by the Senate?
4. Was the Gillette-Hennings subcommittee acting beyond its power and jurisdiction?
5. Was it a lawfully constituted subcommittee?
6. Was it necessary for that subcommittee to subpoena Senator McCarthy?
7. Was Senator McCarthy repeatedly invited to appear?
8. Was it the duty of Senator McCarthy to appear without an order or subpoena to appear and was his failure to appear obstructive?
9. Was the request to Senator McCarthy to appear a legal basis for contempt, and was his reply contumacious?
10. Was Senator McCarthy's conduct toward that subcommittee contemptuous, independently of his failure to appear?
11. Did Senator McCarthy "denounce" the subcommittee?
12. Has the conduct of Senator McCarthy been contumacious toward the Senate by failing to explain the six charges contained in the subcommittee's report?
13. Did the reelection of Senator McCarthy in 1952 make these matters moot?

**DISCUSSION OF LEGAL QUESTIONS**

1. **The Senate is a continuing body**

   The fact that the Senate is a continuing body should require little discussion. This has been uniformly recognized by history, precedent, and authority. While the rule with reference to the House, whose Members are elected all for the period of a single Congress may be different, the Senate is a continuing body, whose Members are elected for a term of 6 years, and so divided into classes that the seats of one-third only become vacant at the end of each Congress. Senate Document No. 99, 83d Congress, 2d session, Congressional Power of Investigation, page 7.

   Senate rule XXV (2) provides that each standing committee shall continue and have the power to act until their successors are appointed. That rule was followed in the case of the committee in question. The testimony taken in the hearings of the select committee shows that Senator Hayden, chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration in the 82d Congress, certified the payroll for that committee for the first month of the 83d Congress.

   The continuity of the Senate was questioned at the beginning of the 83d Congress, and the issue was decided in favor of the precedents. Congressional Record, Senate—January 6, 1953, pages 92-114. For further discussion see Senate Document No. 4, 1953, 83d Congress. The rule that the Senate is a continuing body has been recognized by the Supreme Court, in *McGrain v. Daugherty* (273 U. S. 135, 182 (1927)), where the Court said:

   This being so, and the Senate being a continuing body, the case cannot be said to have become moot in the ordinary sense.

2. **The Senate has the power to censure a Senator for conduct occurring during his prior term as Senator**

   The contention has been made by Senator McCarthy that since he was reelected in 1952 and took his seat for a new term on January 3, 1953, the select committee lacks power to consider any conduct on his part, occurring prior to January 3, 1953, as the basis for censure. His counsel based this contention on several cases cited as authority for this.
proposition (p. 19 of the hearings), being _Anderson v. Dunn_ (6 Wheat. 204); _Journey v. McCracken_ (294 U. S. 125); and _U. S. v. Bryan_ (339 U. S. 323). The argumentative basis for this contention is that the power to censure is part of the power of the Senate to punish for contempt, and that any limitations on the latter power must necessarily limit the power to censure. This contention is without foundation for at least two reasons: (1) The power to censure is an independent power and may be exercised by the Senate for conduct totally unrelated to any act or acts which may be contemptuous; and (2) even assuming that the power to censure is limited to the extent of the power to punish for contempt, the authorities cited do not sustain the proposition advanced.

The case of _Anderson v. Dunn_ (6 Wheat. 204 (1821)) was an action in trespass for an assault and battery and false imprisonment against the Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court held that the defendant Sergeant at Arms had a proper and lawful defense by showing that he acted under the orders of the Speaker and had taken the plaintiff into custody for a high contempt of the dignity of the House. The only possible relevancy of the opinion to the matters now pending before the select committee appears in the opinion by Mr. Justice Johnson, at page 231, that the duration of the imprisonment for contempt of the House is limited when the legislative body ceases to exist on the moment of its adjournment, and the imprisonment must terminate with that adjournment. It is clear that this was dictum, applies to the House and not to the Senate, does not involve a case of censure of a Member of the Senate, and was the law only until Congress by statute made contempt of either House a criminal offense.

In the case of _Journey v. MacCracken_ (294 U. S. 125 (1935)) the defendant, a lawyer, was arrested by the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate, pursuant to a resolution of the Senate, for contempt in failing to produce and permitting the removal and destruction of certain papers, after they had been subpoenaed by the special Senate committee investigating ocean and airmail contracts. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the defendant's writ of habeas corpus holding that where the offending act was of a nature to obstruct the legislative process, the fact that the obstruction has since been removed or that its removal has become impossible is without significance; that the enactment of Revised Statute 102 did not impair the right of Congress to punish for contempt; and that whether a recalcitrant witness has purged himself of contempt is for Congress to decide and cannot be inquired into by a court by a writ of habeas corpus. It is evident that this case does not deal with any question of censure or punishment of a Member of the Senate. MacCracken did contend that the Senate was absolutely without power itself to impose punishment for a past act, and that such punishment must be inflicted by the courts, as for other crimes, and under the safeguard of all constitutional provisions, but this contention was dismissed by the opinion of the Supreme Court, delivered by Mr. Justice Brandeis, at page 149.

The case of _United States v. Bryan_ (339 U. S. 323 (1950)) involved a criminal trial for contempt of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, and the refusal of the defendant to produce certain records under subpoena from that committee. In the opinion of the
Supreme Court, by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, mention is made of Revised Statutes, section 102 (2 U. S. C., sec. 192), enacted in 1857. It is clear that one of the purposes of the act was to permit the imprisonment of a contemnor beyond the expiration of the current session of Congress. The Supreme Court states unequivocally that the judicial proceedings under the statute are intended as an alternative method of vindicating the authority of Congress to compel the disclosure of facts which are needed in the fulfillment of the legislative function. The select committee was advised by its counsel that this case has no apparent bearing upon the contention of Senator McCarthy in these proceedings with reference to his failure to appear before the Gillette-Hennings subcommittee. Counsel further advised that it is inappropriate to cite cases of criminal contempt as the basis for the law of censure by the Senate of one of its Members.

It seems clear that if a Senator should be guilty of reprehensible conduct unconnected with his official duties and position, but which conduct brings the Senate into disrepute, the Senate has the power to censure. The power to censure must be independent, therefore, of the power to punish for contempt. A Member may be censured even after he has resigned (2 Hinds' Precedents 1239, 1273, 1275 (1907)). Precedents in both the Senate and House for expulsion or censure for conduct occurring during a preceding Congress may be found in Hinds (op. cit., 1275 to 1289). Precedents in the House cannot be considered as controlling because the House is not a continuing body.

In this connection, it must be remembered that the report of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections was filed on January 2, 1953, and since the new Congress convened the next day, there was not time for action in the prior session.

While it may be the law that one who is not a Member of the Senate may not be punished for contempt of the Senate at a preceding session, this is no basis for declaring that the Senate may not censure one of its own Members for conduct antedating that session, and no controlling authority or precedent has been cited for such position.

The particular charges against Senator McCarthy, which are the basis of this category, involve his conduct toward an official committee and official committee members of the Senate.

The reelection of Senator McCarthy in 1952 was considered by the select committee as a fact bearing on this proposition. This reelection is not deemed controlling because only the Senate itself can pass judgment upon conduct which is injurious to its processes, dignity, and official committees.

In the Senate on April 8, 1952 (Congressional Record, Senate, April 8, 1952, p. 3753), at the request of Senator Hayden, there were ordered printed Senate Expulsion, Exclusion, and Censure Cases Unconnected with Elections, 1871–1951.

A résumé of precedents on expulsion, exclusion, and censure cases since the organization of the Committee on Privileges and Elections is printed at page 73 of the Hennings-Hayden-Hendrickson report. Another collection of Senate precedents appears in the Congressional Record, Senate, August 2, 1954, page 12861, being a study prepared by William R. Tansill, of the Government Division of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, printed on motion
of Senator Morse. In election cases, the Senate, of course, considers conduct occurring before the commencement of the term of the Senator involved. Senator Morse, in the same day, had printed in the same Congressional Record at page 12371 certain pertinent material from Hinds' Precedents, and at page 12373 certain pertinent material from Cannon's Precedents.

From an examination and study of all available precedents, the select committee is of the opinion that the Senate has the power, under the circumstances of this case, to elect to censure Senator McCarthy for conduct occurring during his prior term in the Senate, should it deem such conduct censurable.

3. *It was not necessary for Senate Resolution 187 to be adopted by the Senate*

Senate Resolution 187, introduced by Senator Benton on August 6, 1951, was not actually a resolution for the expulsion of Senator McCarthy. In the resolution paragraph, the Committee on Rules and Administration is authorized to make an investigation—

*as may be appropriate to enable such committee to determine whether or not it should initiate action with a view toward the expulsion from the United States Senate of the said Senator, Joseph R. McCarthy.*

In the regular order of Senate business, after this resolution was introduced, it was referred by the President of the Senate, without a vote by the Senate, to the Committee on Rules and Administration.

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, in section 102, which incorporates rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate, provides that among the standing committees to be appointed at the commencement of each Congress, with leave to report by bill or otherwise, there shall be a Committee on Rules and Administration, to which committee shall be referred all proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to * * * credentials and qualifications. By section 134-A of the same act, each standing committee of the Senate, including any subcommittee of such committee, is authorized to hold such hearings, to sit and act at such times and places during the sessions and adjourned periods of the Senate, to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses * * * as it deems advisable. It is further provided in the same section that each such committee may make investigations into any matter within its jurisdiction and report such hearings as may be had by it.

As stated by Senator Case (at p. 61 of the hearings) reference is made on page 71 of the Hennings report, being the report of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections to the Committee on Rules and Administration pursuant to Senate Resolutions 187 and 304, that investigations with reference to alleged misconduct by a Senator may be undertaken by the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections with or without specific Senate authorization or direction. That report states at the page indicated:

*The old Committee on Privileges and Elections was presented with five cases of expulsion or exclusion unconnected with an election. In three of these cases, those of Smoot, Burton, and Gould, the Senate adopted resolutions directing an investigation of the charges against the respective Senators. In the other two cases, those of La Follette and Langer, the petitions and protests of private*
citizens were referred by the presiding officer to the Committee on Privileges and Elections, which then conducted investigations without obtaining resolutions of authorization from the Senate.

These precedents indicate that the legal power of the subcommittee to conduct investigations of its own motion is not subject to question; and, also, that the subcommittee may act under a resolution formally adopted by the Senate.

It is the opinion of the select committee, in addition to the conclusion made evident by the foregoing precedents, that the vote of the Senate on April 10, 1952, upon Senate Resolution 300, 82d Congress, 2d session, introduced by Senator Hayden for himself and Senators Gillette, Monroney, Hennings, and Hendrickson, to obtain the sense of the Senate upon the right and power of the Committee on Rules and Administration and its Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections to proceed with the investigation of Senator McCarthy under Senate Resolution 187, and to obtain a vote of confidence from the Senate in the integrity of the committee members, carried all the implications, and was to the same effect, as if the Senate by vote had directed that committee and subcommittee, on August 6, 1951, to proceed with the investigation sought by Senate Resolution 187.

It is, therefore, the opinion of the select committee that it was not necessary for Senate Resolution 187 to have been adopted by the Senate.

4. The Gillette-Hennings Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections was not acting beyond its power or jurisdiction

The action of the Senate upon Senate Resolution 300 must be considered as an affirmance that as of April 10, 1952, when the actions of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections and the integrity of its members were ratified and approved by a vote of 60 to 0, the committee and subcommittee were acting within its power and jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections was not limited to the conduct of Senator McCarthy connected with elections only but extended to acts totally unconnected with election matters, but which were relevant in inquiries relating to expulsion, exclusion, and censure. The debate in the Senate and the vote of the Senate makes this abundantly clear. (See Congressional Record, Senate, April 8, 1952, pp. 3701, 3753-3756.) One of the principal purposes of the introduction of Senate Resolution 300 was to affirm or deny the contention of Senator McCarthy that the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections lacked jurisdiction to investigate such acts as were not connected with elections and campaigns. Senate Resolution 187, introduced by Senator Benton, provided for an investigation with reference to the other acts of Senator McCarthy since his election to the Senate (in the fall of 1946), as might be appropriate to carry out the purposes of the resolution. It is clear, therefore, that the subcommittee had the right and power to investigate the acts of Senator McCarthy at least since January 1947. While Senate Resolution 187 did not itself specify any charges against Senator McCarthy, the charges pending upon the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections were known to Senator McCarthy and were disclosed to him in detail in the correspondence between him and the chairman of the subcommittee. Most of the six charges referred clearly to activities of Senator McCarthy after January 1947. It may be, although this select committee is not in a position to so decide, that some parts of the investigations and proceedings of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elec-
tions were concerned with matters arising before January 1947, but it is the judgment of this select committee that this extension of power and authority did not ipso facto nullify the power and jurisdiction of that subcommittee to proceed with its lawful duties and powers.

It is, therefore, the judgment of the select committee that for purposes of the present inquiry, it can be stated that the Gillette-Hennings Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections was not acting beyond its power and jurisdiction so far as forming a basis for the possible censure of Senator McCarthy by reason of his conduct in relation with and toward that subcommittee.

5. The Gillette-Hennings Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections was a lawfully constituted committee

As shown by the testimony taken in this proceeding, the subcommittee originally had five members. After the resignations of Senators Welker and Gillette, and the reduction of the number of acting members to 3, Senator Hayden, chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration, the parent committee, decided that it was not necessary to fill the 2 vacancies, and that the work of the subcommittee would be better performed by the smaller number. After that time, Senator Monroney resigned, and Senator Hayden then appointed himself to that vacancy, so that the subcommittee continued with three members.

Senator Hayden testified that there was no rule of the parent committee or subcommittee which was contrary to the procedure adopted in this case, and that the procedure was consonant with the practice both before and after 1952. As a matter of fact, the subcommittee since 1952 has consisted of three members.

With the approval of Senator McCarthy and his counsel, testimony was taken from Charles L. Watkins, the Senate Parliamentarian, upon the status and legality of the Gillette-Hennings subcommittee. This testimony appears on page 535 of the hearings, and may be epitomized as follows:

1. The three-member subcommittee, as constituted by Senator Hayden, after the resignation of Senator Monroney, by appointing himself as the third member, was a legal committee for the discharge of regular business under the rules and precedents of the Senate.

2. There was no mandatory requirement for a chairman to fill a vacancy on a subcommittee.

3. Chairman Hayden of the parent Committee on Rules and Administration had the right to appoint himself a member of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections, without submitting the appointment to the Committee on Rules and Administration, for prior approval or subsequent ratification.

4. This was particularly true when the Senate was not in session.

5. Chairman Hayden had the right to recognize Senator Hennings as chairman of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections, and had the right to appoint the chairman of the subcommittee.

6. The subcommittee of 3 members had the right to designate 1 member as a legal quorum for the purpose of taking testimony.
7. The subcommittee of 3 members was authorized and had the duty to make a report to the full committee, signed by its members, Senators Hennings, Hayden, and Hendrickson, and file the report with the full Committee on Rules and Administration, with Senator Hayden as chairman.

8. In a quasi-judicial proceeding such as an expulsion matter, although 3 of the original 5 members of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections have resigned, although 2 of the vacancies have not been filled, and the chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration has appointed himself to the third vacancy on the subcommittee, that subcommittee of 3 members had the right to file a valid legal report with the parent committee, when less than half of its original 5 members have heard the evidence.

6. It was not necessary for the subcommittee to subpoena Senator McCarthy

A question has been raised in these proceedings whether it was necessary for the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections to subpoena Senator McCarthy to appear before it.

According to his testimony, he had no desire to appear before the subcommittee and advised the chairman that he would not appear before it to answer the charges made against him and pending before that subcommittee, unless he was ordered so to do. The provisions of the Legislative Reorganization Act, above referred to, make it clear that the subcommittee had the power and right to require the attendance of Senator McCarthy for purposes of investigation and examination "by subpoena or otherwise." It can be stated, therefore, categorically, that it was not necessary for the subcommittee to issue its subpoena for him. Section 134–A of the Legislative Reorganization Act does refer to "requiring" the attendance of witnesses, and the select committee is of the opinion that an invitation to appear, is not such action indicating a requirement to appear as is contemplated by the act. It is the opinion of the select committee that a request to appear, such as the letter and telegram from the subcommittee to Senator McCarthy dated November 21, 1952, was sufficient (aside from any question whether Senator McCarthy received them in time) to meet the requirements of the law. The related questions whether Senator McCarthy was repeatedly invited to appear, and whether he should have appeared even without invitation and without request or subpoena, are considered hereinafter.

7. Senator McCarthy was repeatedly invited to appear

The select committee has carefully considered all the letters in evidence between Senator McCarthy and the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections, and all the testimony relating to his appearance before the subcommittee. The facts relating to whether or not Senator McCarthy was repeatedly invited to appear before that subcommittee in order to make answer to the very serious charges against his character and his activities in the Senate have already been found by the select committee and incorporated hereinabove as finding of fact. This evidence and this testimony, upon analysis, has convinced the select committee that Senator McCarthy was invited by that subcommittee to appear before it in order to aid its investigation and to give
answer to the charges made against him and pending before that subcommittee. It must be remembered that Senator McCarthy wrote to Chairman Gillette under date of September 17, 1951, stating that he intended to appear to question witnesses (see finding of fact No. 7). Senator McCarthy was invited to appear before the subcommittee by letter of September 25, 1951 (finding of fact No. 8), by letter of October 1, 1951 (finding of fact No. 10), by letter of December 21, 1951 (finding of fact No. 20), by letter of May 7, 1952 (finding of fact No. 30), by letter of May 10, 1952 (finding of fact No. 33), and by letter of November 7, 1952 (finding of fact No. 35).

8. It was the duty of Senator McCarthy to accept the repeated invitations by the subcommittee and his failure to appear was obstructive of the processes of the Senate, for no formal order or subpoena should be necessary to bring Senators before Senate committees when their own honor and the honor of the Senate are at issue.

The matters against Senator McCarthy under investigation by the Gillette-Hennings subcommittee were of a serious nature. Apparently, Senator McCarthy knew the nature of these matters since he testified:

I know all about this matter: I have been living with it. It had been under-way. They had been going far beyond the resolution, investigating things they had no right to investigate; going back beyond the time that I was even old enough to run for Senator, investigating the income-tax returns of my father, who died before I was elected. So I knew those facts (p. 385 of the hearings).

Furthermore, Chairman Gillette specified one of the matters against Senator McCarthy (that of the Lustron payment), in his letter of May 7, 1952, to Senator McCarthy (p. 32 of the hearings), and Chairman Hennings specified all six of the matters in his letter to Senator McCarthy of November 21, 1952 (p. 45 of the hearings).

The mere reading of these matters (p. 46 of the hearings) without deciding or attempting to decide whether they are true or not, makes it clear that the honesty, sincerity, character, and conduct of Senator McCarthy were under inquiry. It is the opinion of the select committee that when the personal honor and official conduct of a Senator of the United States are in question before a duly constituted committee of the Senate, the Senator involved owes a duty to himself, his State, and to the Senate, to appear promptly and cooperate fully when called by a Senate committee charged with the responsibility of inquiry. This must be the rule if the dignity, honor, authority, and powers of the Senate are to be respected and maintained. This duty could not and was not fulfilled by questioning the authority and jurisdiction of the subcommittee, by accusing its members of the dishonest expenditure of public funds, or even by charging that the subcommittee was permitting itself to be used to serve the cause of communism. When persons in high places fail to set and meet high standards, the people lose faith. If our people lose faith, our form of Government cannot long endure.

The appearance which we believe was necessary was before a subcommittee of the Senate itself, to which subcommittee the Senate, through its normal processes, had confided a matter affecting its own honor and integrity. In such a case legal process was not and should not be required.
9. The request of November 21, 1952, to Senator McCarthy to appear did not form a legal basis for contempt, but his reply of December 1, 1952, was, in itself, contumacious in character.

As appears from the findings of fact, Senator McCarthy was formally requested to appear by letter and by telegram from Subcommittee Chairman Hennings, dated November 21, 1952. The request was that he appear before the subcommittee between November 22 and November 25, 1952 (p. 46 of the hearings).

Senator McCarthy testified that he was in Wisconsin, on a hunting trip, and that he did not see the letter or telegram until November 28, 1952 (p. 298 of the hearings). The select committee accepts this testimony as true.

Considering this request as a formal request, and Senator McCarthy being unable to appear in the dates fixed because he did not know of the request in time, we believe that this request, considered independently, would not be contempt in the ordinary legal sense, but we think the letter which he wrote in reply to the request was contumacious in its entire form and manner of expression when directed at a committee of the Senate seeking to act upon a matter referred to it (p. 51 of the hearings).

10. The conduct of the junior Senator from Wisconsin toward the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections was contumacious, independently of his failure to appear

We have considered carefully all of the correspondence and all the conduct, relation, and attitude of Senator McCarthy toward the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections. We believe it fair to say on the evidence in this record that the junior Senator from Wisconsin did not intend to appear before that subcommittee for examination.

He first questioned the jurisdiction of the subcommittee to inquire into any but election charges. Later he contended that the subcommittee was investigating conduct preceding his election to the Senate, and that, therefore, its activities were illegal.

He also stated that he would not appear unless he were given the right to cross-examine witnesses. We feel that this right should have been accorded to him and that upon proper request, either to the Committee on Rules and Administration, of which Senator McCarthy was a member (p. 27 of the hearings), or to the Senate itself, he could have obtained this right, but that in any event, this cannot be a justification for contumacious conduct.

The letters of Senator McCarthy to the respective chairmen of the subcommittee dated December 6, 1951 (p. 24 of the hearings), December 19, 1951 (p. 27 of the hearings), March 21, 1952 (p. 30 of the hearings), May 8, 1952 (p. 32 of the hearings), May 8, 1952 (p. 35 of the hearings), May 11, 1952 (p. 44 of the hearings), and December 1, 1952 (p. 51 of the hearings), are clearly contumacious, disregarding entirely his duty to cooperate, ridiculing the subcommittee, accusing these committee officers of the Senate with dishonesty and impugning their motives, and making it impossible for them to proceed in orderly fashion, or to complete their duties.

The same attitude was expressed in the statement given to the press by Senator McCarthy on January 2, 1953 (p. 68 of the hearings).

The letters to Senator McCarthy from Chairman Gillette, later from Chairman Hennings, and the letter from Chairman Hayden,
were uniformly courteous and cooperative, as one Senator should have
the right to expect from colleagues. There is no justification in this
record for the harsh criticisms directed by Senator McCarthy to the
subcommittee, in letters apparently sometimes given to the press be-
fore receipt by the person to whom directed (p. 27 of the hearings).
It is the opinion of the select committee that this conduct of Sen-
ator McCarthy was contemptuous, independently of his failure to
appear before the subcommittee.

11. The junior Senator from Wisconsin did "denounce" the Senate
Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections without justification

We feel that the fact that Senator McCarthy denounced the Sub-
committee on Privileges and Elections is established by reference to
a few of the letters in the exchange of correspondence. In his letter
of December 6, 1951 (p. 24 of the hearings), to Chairman Gillette,
Senator McCarthy states that when the subcommittee, without Senate
authorization, is "spending tens of thousands of taxpayers' dollars
for the sole purpose of digging up campaign material against Mc-
Carthy, then the committee is guilty of stealing just as clearly as
though the members engaged in picking the pockets of the taxpayers
and turning the loot over to the Democrat National Committee." Such
language directed by a Senator toward a committee of the Senate pur-
suing its authorized functions is clearly intemperate, in bad taste,
and unworthy of a Member of this body.

These accusations by Senator McCarthy are continued and repeated
in his letter to Chairman Gillette dated December 19, 1951 (p. 27 of
the hearings). Under date of March 21, 1952 (p. 30 of the hearings),
Senator McCarthy wrote to Senator Hayden, chairman of the parent
Committee on Rules and Administration that: "As you know, I wrote
Senator Gillette, chairman of the subcommittee, that I consider this
a completely dishonest handling of taxpayers' money." Similar lan-
guage is used in Senator McCarthy's letters down to the last dated
December 1, 1952 (p. 51 of the hearing).

If Senator McCarthy had any justification for such denunciation
of the subcommittee, he should have presented it at these hearings.
His failure so to do leaves his denunciation of officers of the Senate
without any foundation in this record.

The members of the subcommittee were Senators representing the
people of sovereign States. They were performing official duties of
the Senate. Every Senator is understandably jealous of his honor
and integrity, but this does not bar inquiry into his conduct, since the
Constitution expressly makes the Senate the guardian of its own honor.
It is the opinion of the select committee that these charges of politi-
cal waste and dishonesty for improper motives were denunciatory and
unjustified.

In this connection, attention is directed to the charges referred to
this committee relating to words uttered by the junior Senator from
Wisconsin about individual Senators.

It has been established, without denial and in fact with confirma-
tion and reiteration, that Senator McCarthy, in reference to the official
actions of the junior Senator from New Jersey, Mr. Hendrickson, as
a member of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections, questioned
both his moral courage and his mental ability.
His public statement with reference to Senator Hendrickson was vulgar and insulting. Any Senator has the right to question, criticize, differ from, on condemn an official action of the body of which he is a Member, or of the constituent committees which are working arms of the Senate in proper language. But he has no right to impugn the motives of individual Senators responsible for official action, nor to reflect upon their personal character for what official action they took.

If the rules and procedures were otherwise, no Senator could have freedom of action to perform his assigned committee duties. If a Senator must first give consideration to whether an official action can be wantonly impugned by a colleague, as having been motivated by a lack of the very qualities and capacities every Senator is presumed to have, the processes of the Senate will be destroyed.

12. The conduct of Senator McCarthy has been contumacious toward the Senate by failing to explain three of the questions raised in the subcommittee's report

The report of the subcommittee was filed on January 2, 1953. Since that time Senator McCarthy has given to the Senate, on the Senate floor, an explanation of the Lustron matter only. Of the other 5 matters, mentioned in the November 21, 1952, letter by Chairman Hennings, 3 are of a serious nature, reflecting upon Senator McCarthy's character and integrity, and have not been answered either before the Senate or before any of its committees.

It is our opinion that the failure of Senator McCarthy to explain to the Senate these matters: (1) Whether funds collected to fight communism were diverted to other purposes inuring to his personal advantage; (2) whether certain of his official activities were motivated by self-interest; and (3) whether certain of his activities in senatorial campaigns involved violations of the law; was conduct contumacious toward the Senate and injurious to its effectiveness, dignity, responsibilities, processes, and prestige.

13. The reelection of Senator McCarthy in 1952 did not settle these matters

This question is answered in part by our conclusions that the Senate is a continuing body and has power to censure a Senator for conduct occurring during his prior term as Senator, and in part by the fact that some of the contumacious conduct occurred after his reelection, notably the letter of December 1, 1952. The Senate might have proceeded with this matter in 1953 or earlier in 1954 had the necessary resolution been proposed.

Some of the questions, notably the use for private purposes of funds contributed for fighting communism, were not raised until after the election. The people of Wisconsin could pass only upon what was known to them.

Nor do we believe that the reelection of Senator McCarthy by the people of Wisconsin in the fall of 1952 pardons his conduct toward the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections. The charge is that Senator McCarthy was guilty of contempt of the Senate or a senatorial committee. Necessarily, this is a matter for the Senate and the Senate alone. The people of Wisconsin can only pass upon issues before them; they cannot forgive an attack by a Senator upon the integrity
of the Senate's processes and its committees. That is the business of the Senate.

D. CONCLUSIONS

It is therefore, the conclusion of the select committee that the conduct of the junior Senator from Wisconsin toward the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections, toward its members, including the statement concerning Senator Hendrickson acting as a member of the subcommittee, and toward the Senate, was contemptuous, contumacious, and denunciatory, without reason or justification, and was obstructive to legislative processes. For this conduct, it is our recommendation that he be censured by the Senate.

II

CATEGORY II. INCIDENTS OF ENCOURAGEMENT OF UNITED STATES EMPLOYEES TO VIOLATE THE LAW AND THEIR OATHS OF OFFICE OR EXECUTIVE ORDERS

A. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

The committee, pursuant to the category 2, "Incidents of encouragement of United States employees to violate the law and their oaths of office or Executive orders," received evidence and took testimony regarding:

1. Amendment proposed by Mr. Fulbright to the resolution (S. Res. 301) to censure the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. McCarthy, viz:

   (5) The junior Senator from Wisconsin openly, in a public manner before nationwide television, invited and urged employees of the Government of the United States to violate the law and their oath of office.

2. Amendment proposed by Mr. Morse to the resolution (S. Res. 301) to censure the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. McCarthy, viz:

   (e) Openly invited and incited employees of the Government to violate the law and their oaths of office by urging them to make available information, including classified information, which in the opinion of the employees could be of assistance to the Junior Senator from Wisconsin in conducting his investigations, even though the supplying of such information by the employee would be illegal and in violation of Presidential order and contrary to the constitutional rights of the Chief Executive under the separation-of-powers doctrine.

This category involves alleged statements of Senator McCarthy made at and during the hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations for the Committee on Government Operations of the United States Senate pursuant to Senate Resolution 189, and reveals the following specific charges:

1. That Senator McCarthy openly, in a public manner before nationwide television, invited, urged, and incited employees of the Government to violate the law and their oaths of office.

2. That he invited, urged, and incited such employees to give him classified information.

3. That the supplying of such classified information by such employees would be illegal, in violation of Presidential orders and contrary to the constitutional rights of the Chief Executive.
The committee received documentary evidence in the form of excerpts from the printed record of the testimony taken and published by the Special Subcommittee on Investigations for the Committee on Government Operations, oral testimony by Senator McCarthy in his own behalf, and received documentary evidence offered by him from the reports of the Internal Security Subcommittee and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate wherein Government workers were invited to supply certain information to congressional committees.

From the aforementioned relevant and competent evidence and testimony so adduced, the select committee regards the following as having been established:

That at the hearings of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations for the Committee on Government Operations, following an attempt by Senator McCarthy to question Secretary Stevens about the “2½-page document,” and following questioning by certain members of that subcommittee, relative to the legality of his receiving and using the document, the Senator made the replies or statements which are the subject of this category of charges.

At those hearings Senator McCarthy took the position that:

• • • I would like to notify those 2 million Federal employees that I feel it is their duty to give us any information which they have about graft, corruption, communism, treason, and that there is no loyalty to a superior officer which can tower above and beyond their loyalty to their country • • • (hearing record, p. 87).

Again, I want to compliment the individuals who have placed their oaths to defend the country against enemies—and certainly Communists are enemies—above and beyond any Presidential directive • • • (hearing record, p. 87).

• • • I think that the oath which every person in this Government takes, to protect and defend this country against all enemies, foreign and domestic, that oath towers far above any Presidential secrecy directive. And I will continue to receive information such as I received the other day • • • (hearing record, p. 87).

• • • that I have instructed a vast number of these employees that they are dutybound to give me information even though some little bureaucrat has stamped it “secret” to protect himself (hearing record, p. 87).

I don’t think any Government employee can deny the people the right to know what the facts are by using a rubber stamp and stamping something “secret” (hearing record, p. 89).

• • • while I am chairman of the committee I will receive all the information I can get about wrongdoing in the executive branch (p. 89 of the hearings).

I think that oath to defend our country against all enemies foreign and domestic, towers above and beyond any loyalty you might have to the head of a bureau or the head of a department (p. 90 of the hearings).

I am an authorized person to receive information in regard to any wrongdoing in the executive branch. When you say “classified documents,” Mr. Symington, certainly I am not authorized to receive anything which would divulge the names of, we will say, informants, of Army Intelligence, anything which would in any way compromise their investigative technique, and that sort of thing. • • • (p. 91 of the hearings).

• • • no one can deny us information by stamping something “classified” (p. 92 of the hearings).

Any committee which has jurisdiction over a subject has the right to receive the information. The stamp on the document, I would say, is not controlling • • • (p. 92 of the hearings).

• • • anyone who has evidence of wrongdoing, has not only the right but the duty to bring that evidence to a congressional committee (p. 92 of the hearings).

That the Senator, at the hearings of the select committee, admitted making some of the foregoing statements charged against him (pp. 261–263 of the hearings), and did not deny having made the
Others. At these hearings, Senator McCarthy took an affirmative position relative to the following question of Senator Ervin:

Senator, when you made the statement which Mr. de Furia characterized as an invitation to the employees of the executive departments, did you mean to invite those employees to bring to you, as chairman of the investigating subcommittee, information relating to corruption, wrongdoing, communism, or treason in Government, even though such employees could find such information only in documents marked “classified” by the department in which such employees were working?


In addition to the foregoing, which the committee believes to have been established, the select committee received the following additional evidence and testimony:

Senator McCarthy testified in his own behalf that—

* * * I was not asking for general classified information. I was only asking for evidence of wrongdoing. I was asking these people to conform with the criminal code which requires they give that evidence (p. 262 of the hearings).

* * * When I invited them to give the chairman of that committee evidence of wrongdoing, I am inviting them not to violate their oath of office * * * (pp. 263 and 264 of the hearings).

I confined this information with regard to illegal activities on the part of Federal employees. It did not include general classified material * * * that as chairman of the Government Operations Committee and the investigation committee, if I did not try to get that information, then I should be subject to censure (p. 265 of the hearings).

* * * I feel very strongly that if someone in the executive knows of wrongdoing, of a crime being committed, and they do not bring it to someone who will act on it they are almost equally guilty * * * and let me emphasize again I am not asking for general classified information; I am merely asking for evidence of wrongdoing. I maintain that you cannot hide wrongdoing by using a rubber stamp, stamping “Confidential,” “Secret,” or “Top Secret”—I don’t care what classification they stamp upon it—as long as it is evidence of wrongdoing (p. 266 of the hearings).

I am referring here, obviously, to valid information (p. 394 of the hearings).

The Senator contended that the following statutes permitted, even imposed a duty upon, Federal employees to give to him the information so requested:

Title V, United States Code, section 652 (d) (p. 264 of the hearings).

Title XVIII, United States Code, section 4 (p. 265 of the hearings).

Title XVIII, United States Code, section 798 (p. 395 of the hearings).

Senator McCarthy further stated that the position which he took was not new or unprecedented, but that the Vice President (then Congressmen), Nixon, took a position much stronger, and the then Senator Hugo Black in 1934 took a similar position to the one presently taken by him (p. 267 of the hearings). He introduced into the record excerpts from a report of the Committee on the Judiciary, 1951. “Subversive and Illegal Aliens in the United States,” wherein the subcommittee invited the employees of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to report to the subcommittee laxity in enforcement of immigration laws or other matters affecting national security; and also parts of a report of the Internal Security Subcommittee, “Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments,” wherein Government workers were invited to supply information of subversion to the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the congressional committees (pp. 418 and 419 of the hearings).
B. LEGAL ISSUE INVOLVED

The select committee believes that the charges in this category, and the evidence and testimony thereunder adduced, give rise to the following legal or quasi-legal question:

Whether Senator McCarthy openly invited, incited, and urged employees of the Government of the United States to report to him information coming to their attention without distinction to whether or not contained in a classified document; and thereby to violate (a) their oath of office, (b) the law of the United States, (c) Executive orders and directives.

Senator McCarthy contended at the hearings of the select committee, and by a brief submitted to the committee by his counsel, that he had not requested “classified” information, but only information relating to “graft, corruption, Communist infiltration and espionage” and that such information “could not be insulated from exposure by a rubber stamp.” He asserts that by statute (U. S. C., title V, sec. 652 (9)) Federal employees are not precluded from furnishing such information to a Member of Congress; indeed, by virtue of United States Code, title XVIII, section 4, such employees have a duty to give such information. He further contends that as chairman of the Committee on Government Operations, a duty is imposed upon him by the Senate itself to get such information, and that in seeking this information he was doing no more than had been done in the past by other Senators and senatorial committees.

The committee believes that from a reading of the entire section 652 of title V, it will appear that this portion of the Civil Service Act of 1912 does no more than affirm that Federal employees do not lose or forfeit any of their rights merely be virtue of their Federal employment. A study of title XVIII, section 4, by the committee leads it to the conclusion that it applies only to persons possessing actual personal knowledge of the actual commission of a felony, as distinguished from information obtained by reviewing files.

As to the alleged precedents of other Senators and senatorial committees, the committee has taken note of the statements contained in the reports of certain senatorial committees cited by Senator McCarthy, as expressing the official opinion of the members of such committees. The committee was of the opinion that any similar statements of other Senators are expressions of individuals and do not establish senatorial precedent unless confirmed by official action.

The charges contained in this category involve the right of the legislative branch of the Government to investigate the executive branch and to be informed of the operations of that branch. This committee believes that the principles, frequently enunciated by the Senate and its committees, sustaining the right of the Congress to be informed of all pertinent facts with respect to the operations of the executive branch should not be relaxed; and any contrary view is hereby disavowed. These principles certainly embrace information of wrongdoing in the executive branch of a general nonclassified nature, and the right of employees to inform the Congress of the same.

The precedents do show with certitude, however, that the Congress has the constitutional power to investigate activities in the executive branch to determine the advisability of enacting new laws directed to such activities, or to determine whether existing laws directed to
such activities are being executed in accordance with the congressional intent. To these ends, the Congress may make investigations into allegedly corrupt or subversive activities in executive agencies or departments. The power to investigate such activities necessarily carries with it the power to receive information relating to such activities.

By the Reorganization Act of 1946, the Congress conferred upon the Senate Committee on Government Operations express authority to study "the operation of Government activities at all levels with a view to determining its economy and efficiency," and also that "Each such (standing) committee may make investigations into any matter within its jurisdiction."

In so doing, Congress delegated, in part, to the Senate Committee on Government Operations its constitutional power to make investigations into alleged corruption or subversion in executive agencies or departments. The Senate Committee on Government Operations elected to exercise this delegated power through its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, whose chairman was Senator McCarthy.

The committee is immediately concerned with the conduct of Senator McCarthy rather than with the conduct of employees of the executive branch. The President no doubt has power to safeguard from public dissemination, by Executive order or otherwise, information affecting, for example, the national defense, notwithstanding that the regulations might indirectly interfere with any secret transmission line between the executive employees and any individual Member of the Congress. But the President, we think, cannot (nor do we believe he has sought by any order or directive called to our attention) deny to the Congress, or any duly organized committee or subcommittee thereof, and particularly the Committee on Government Operations of the Senate, any information, even though classified, if it discloses corruption or subversion in the executive branch.

This, we think, is true on the simple basis that the Congress is entitled to receive such information in the exercise of its investigatory power under the Constitution. The Congress, too, is charged with the responsibility for the welfare of the Nation.

What the executive branch may rightfully expect is that the coequal legislative branch, or its authorized committees, will inform the President, or his specially designated subordinate (ultimately the Attorney General) of the request, and that the desired information will be supplied subject to the protectives customarily thrown around classified documents by such committees.

In receiving such information, however, the Congress should refrain from thwarting or impeding the proper efforts of executive agencies, charged with duties incident to discovering, prosecuting, or punishing corruption or subversion in Government, or charged with safeguarding secrets involving the national defense.

However, the committee is equally of the view that the manner of approaching this important aspect of investigation in the light of the peculiar dangers of this hour, must be taken into account. The executive branch is initially peculiarly charged with inquiry into and suppression of insidious infiltrations of subversives into its own departments and agencies; this responsibility is a delicate and necessarily confidential one, because it involves the clearing of loyal personnel as well as the identification and elimination of disloyal em-
ployees. It also involves techniques of investigation which must be kept secret to be effective.

For this reason, there has been developed, under pressure of necessity, a system by which certain information, involving the national security, is protected in the executive branch by a machinery of classification, to insure that such information will remain confidential, as against unauthorized revelation or publication by employees, officers, or other agents of the executive branch.

If this system, which has expanded during recent years to keep step with the danger, were to be presented to the Congress as an iron curtain, denying to properly authorized agencies or persons (in which class the Congress and its committees are to be placed first) any right of access, a situation would be presented against which this committee would protest with all its power, as other committees have protested in the past. This we would regard as a challenge to the coequal powers of the legislative branch.

If on the other hand the Executive has recognized the prerogatives of the Congress, and incidentally other agencies of Government, even in the executive department itself, to be informed of classified material or information, by orderly and formal application to responsible heads of departments or to the Presidential office itself, then the committee believes another problem of orderly constitutional government may be presented, and that the Senate itself would be the first to respect the necessary right of the Executive to protect its special functions, so long as the equally important powers of the legislative branch are not unduly impeded thereby.

We would be of the view that for the executive department, even the President himself, to deny to a properly constituted committee or subcommittee of the Senate or any Senator operating with authority in the matter, facts involving wrongdoing in any executive department, might well offer a proper ground for challenging such decision, on the broadest and soundest constitutional grounds. But by the same token, a failure of the Congress or any Member to adapt itself or himself, to reasonable regulations by the President or his authorized department heads (for example, the Department of Defense or the Federal Bureau of Investigation), with respect to matters involving national security, might readily expose the Congress to an equally sound criticism.

In this connection, it is apparent that Congress itself, by specific legislation, has expressed an intent to protect documents relating to national security, and to prevent unauthorized disclosures of such information contained therein. At the same time, the executive branch, by departmental orders and Presidential directives ("not inconsistent with law") has expressed a cooperative attitude, by providing an orderly method of disclosing such information to proper authorities, including, of course, the Congress, in a reasonable prescribed manner, not harmful to the Nation's interest.

(For a further consideration and discussion of these authorities by this committee, reference is made to the legal discussion contained in pt. III, category III-B of this report.)

If the invitation of Senator McCarthy to the Federal employees is a mere solicitation of general information of wrongdoing, this committee would believe that he was within his senatorial prerogative, as
there appears to be no law or Presidential order prohibiting employees of the Federal Government from giving such information to the Congress or members thereof. Indeed, there is law which affirmatively imposes a duty upon such employees to disclose to proper authorities any actual knowledge of the commission of a felony.

A more difficult legal question is presented if the invitation of the Senator goes beyond general information of wrongdoing, and includes within its scope classified information and documents, such as the 2 1/4 page document and the information contained therein. The law hereinbefore mentioned and Presidential orders would seem to prevent the receipt or disclosure of such information or documents except through established orderly procedures.

The task of considering the allegations embodied in category II is a perplexing one because of the ambiguity of the statements made by Senator McCarthy as well as because of the difficulty of distinguishing between the constitutional power of the Congress to investigate the executive branch and the constitutional power of the President to withhold information from the Congress.

The statements of Senator McCarthy are susceptible of alternative constructions.

The first construction is that Senator McCarthy merely invited employees of the executive branch to bring to him as chairman of the Senate Committee on Government Operations and as chairman of its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, information acquired by them in the ordinary course of their employment having a logical tendency to disclose corrupt or subversive activities in governmental areas.

The second construction is that Senator McCarthy in effect urged employees of the executive branch to ransack confidential files of executive agencies or departments regardless of whether they had lawful access to those files, and bring to him classified documents the confidential retention of which in those files was necessary to enable the executive agencies charged with such duties to discover, prevent, or bring to justice persons guilty of corrupt or subversive activities in governmental areas.

If his statements were susceptible of the second construction alone, Senator McCarthy might well merit the censure of the Senate upon the allegations embodied in category II, for the conduct reflected by the second construction would evince an irresponsibility unworthy of any Senator and particularly of a Senator occupying the chairmanship of the Senate Committee on Government Operations and its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

Since his statements admit of the alternative construction set out above, however, the select committee feels justified in giving Senator McCarthy the benefit of the first or more charitable construction.

In receiving information relating to corruption or subversion in the executive branch under the circumstances delineated in the first construction, that is, without irregular and possibly illegal use of classified documents, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Government Operations and of its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations would be exercising the investigatory power vested in the Congress by the Constitution. This would be true even though employees of the executive branch should communicate such information to him in disobedience to Presidential orders.
The committee does not overlook the allegation that the statements of Senator McCarthy were tantamount to incitement to employees of the executive branch to violate the provisions of the Espionage Act embraced in 18 United States Code 793 (d) (e), which are couched in this language:

(d) Whoever having lawful possession of any information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States, willfully communicates the same to any person not entitled to receive it, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

(e) Whoever having unauthorized possession of any information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States, willfully communicates the same to any person not entitled to receive it, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

These statutory provisions do not define who is entitled to receive information relating to the national defense. Moreover, the code leaves to conjecture the question whether the definition embodied in 18 United States Code 798 (b) applies to 18 United States Code 793 (d) (e). Since it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that statutes defining crimes are to be construed strictly against the Government and it does not appear that the chairman of the Senate Committee on Government Operations and its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations is a “person not entitled to receive” information relating to the national defense, within the purview of 18 United States Code 793 (d) (e), the select committee is of the opinion that the statements of Senator McCarthy cannot assuredly be deemed, under all the facts before us, to constitute an incitement to employees of the executive branch to violate the provisions of the Espionage Act embraced in 18 United States Code 793 (d) (e).

C. FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE

After carefully considering, evaluating, and weighing the evidence and testimony presented at the hearings, and construing the applicable legal principles involved, the select committee is of the opinion—

1. That insofar as Senator McCarthy invited Federal employees to supply him with general information of wrongdoing, not of a classified nature, he was acting within his prerogative as a United States Senator and as head of an investigative arm of the United States Senate, and was not inviting such employees to violate their oath of office, Presidential orders, or any law.

2. That the invitation of Senator McCarthy, made during the hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, and affirmed and reasserted at the hearings before the select committee, is susceptible to the interpretation that it was sufficiently broad by specific language and necessary implication to include information and documents properly classified by executive department heads as containing information affecting the national security.

3. However, the select committee is convinced that the invitation so made, affirmed, and reasserted by Senator McCarthy was motivated by a sense of official duty and not uttered as the fruit of evil design or wrongful intent.
4. That were the invitation as made, affirmed, and reasserted
to be acted upon by the Federal employees, as to classified material
affecting the national security, the orderly and constitutional func-
tioning of the executive and legislative branches of the Govern-
ment would be unduly disrupted and impeded, and this select
committee warns such employees that such conduct involves the
risk of effective penalties.

D. CONCLUSIONS

The select committee feels compelled to conclude that the conduct
of Senator McCarthy in inviting Federal employees to supply him
with information, without expressly excluding therefrom classified
documents, tends to create a disruption of the orderly and constitu-
tional functioning of the executive and legislative branches of the
Government, which tends to bring both into disrepute. Such conduct
cannot be condoned and is deemed improper.

However, the committee, preferring to give Senator McCarthy the
benefit of whatever doubts and uncertainties may have confused the
issue in the past, and in recognition of the Senator's responsibilities
as chairman of the Committee on Government Operations and its
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, does not feel justified in
proposing his acts in this particular to the Senate as ground for
censure.

The committee recommends that the leadership of the Senate en-
deavor to arrange a meeting of the chairman and the ranking minority
members of the standing committees of the Senate with responsible
departmental heads in the executive branch of the Government in an
effort to clarify the mechanisms for obtaining such restricted infor-
mation as Senate committees would find helpful in carrying out their
duly authorized functions and responsibilities.

III

CATEGORY III. INCIDENTS INVOLVING RECEIPT OR USE OF CONFIDENTIAL
OR CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT OR OTHER CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
FROM EXECUTIVE FILES

A. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

The evidence adduced before this committee relating to this charge
was evolved from the testimony before the Special Subcommittee on
Investigations for the Committee on Government Operations (Mundt
committee), together with some testimony taken at hearings of this
select committee.

The charge is based upon the specifications contained in amendment
(d) proposed by Senator Morse (hearing record, p. 3) and amendment
(18) proposed by Senator Flanders (hearing record, p. 6).

The charge or charges inherent in these specifications are—

1. That Senator McCarthy received and used confidential in-
formation unlawfully obtained from an executive department
classified document, and failed to restore the document.

2. That in so doing he was in possible violation of the Espionage
Act.
3. That he offered such information to a Senate subcommittee in the form of a spurious document.

The evidence supporting these charges was in part derived in documentary form from the record of the Mundt subcommittee hearings held in April, May, and June 1954 and in part oral testimony presented before the select committee.

It is the opinion of the select committee that competent, relevant, and material testimony has been submitted before the committee to support the charge that Senator McCarthy, before the Mundt subcommittee, produced what purported to be a copy of a letter from J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Major General Bolling, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Army, bearing the typed words “Personal and Confidential via Liaison,” asserting it had been in the Army files (hearing records, pp. 95 and 96) and suggesting this was one of a series of letters from the FBI to the Army complaining “about the bad security setup at” the Fort Monmouth Signal Corps Laboratory, and giving information on certain individuals (hearing record, p. 96); that Mr. Hoover, after examining the “letter,” which was dated January 26, 1951, declared that the “letter” was not a carbon copy or a copy of any communication prepared or sent by the FBI to General Bolling (hearing record, p. 99) but that “the letter” contained information identical in some respects with that contained in a 15-page interdepartmental memorandum from the FBI to General Bolling of the Army, dated January 26, 1951, marked “Confidential via Liaison”; also that Mr. Hoover had stated that “confidential” was the highest classification that could be put on a document by the FBI (hearing record, p. 110). It is also established that Senator McCarthy urged that the document, 2½ pages in length, which he had received from an Army Intelligence officer be made available to the public (hearing record, p. 111).

It is further established that Attorney General Brownell on May 13, 1954, advised Chairman Mundt by letter that the 2½-page document was not authentic; that portions of the 2½-page document which were taken verbatim from the 15-page interdepartmental memorandum are classified “confidential” by law; this means they must not be disclosed “in the best interests of the national security ** *. It would not be in the public interest to declassify the document or any part of it at the present time” (hearing record, p. 116). The Attorney General further stated that “if the ‘confidential’ classification of the FBI reports and memoranda is not respected, serious and irreparable harm will be done to the FBI” (hearing record, p. 116).

Despite the fact that the Attorney General had ruled that the document was a classified document, Senator McCarthy insisted that all security information had been deleted from it, and a request was made by his attorney as follows:

Mr. Williams. I want to read it, sir, because there is no security information in it.

The Chairman. Are you offering it in evidence?

Mr. Williams. Yes (p. 314 of the hearings).

but Senator McCarthy suggested that the names contained in the document be deleted (p. 326 of the hearings). This committee received the document into the possession of the chairman, without
making public the contents (p. 327 of the hearings) upon the advice of the Attorney General that the document was a security document and could not be declassified (p. 327 of the hearings). This committee thereupon ruled that the 2½-page document is a security document and that the information contained in it should be kept classified (p. 328 of the hearings).

Clifford J. Nelson, of the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice, testified that in January 1951 the word "confidential" was the only classification officially recognized by the FBI (p. 510 of the hearings); and that there was no regulation requiring any particular way of imprinting the classification designation on the document or paper (p. 511 of the hearings); and that it was not necessary for Government agencies “to go through their files and **** declassify restricted information” when a new classification order was promulgated (p. 513 of the hearings).

Senator McCarthy's position was that the names contained in the document were not security information (p. 389 of the hearings); he requested that, in accordance with the rule of his committee, the names be deleted if the document be made public, “unless **** the individual named can appear **** and answer the charges against him” (p. 389 of the hearings). His position also was that he had presented the document to the Mundi committee in good faith believing it was a copy of a letter in the Army files, it being self-evident that certain information had been deleted (pp. 397 and 417 of the hearings). Finally he insisted that the document and the information contained therein were not classified until Attorney General Brownell “classified it during the McCarthy hearings”; and “that it was not classified from the time I received it until the time that Brownell either classified it or attempted to classify it” (p. 432 of the hearings); “It did not disclose any secrets of our national defense of any kind” (p. 433 of the hearings).

B. LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVED

1. What were the statutes, Executive orders, and directives applicable to the 2½-page letter or document?
2. Was the 2½-page letter or document or the information therein classified?
3. Was it proper for Senator McCarthy to attempt to make the 2½-page letter or document public?

Congress has long recognized the need for providing legislation authorizing the heads of executive departments to make regulations relative to records and papers within their departments. As early as the act of June 22, 1874 (R. S., sec. 161, U. S. C., title 18, sec. 22), the Congress authorized the heads of executive departments to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, controlling the conduct of its officers and clerks, and the custody, use, and preservation of its records and papers.

This early act is cited by the Department of Justice Order No. 3229, filed May 2, 1946 (11 Fed. Reg. 4920, 18 Fed. Reg. 1368), protecting official files, documents, records, and information in the offices of the Department, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as “confidential,” by providing that “no officer or employee may
permit the disclosure or use of the same for any purpose except in the discretion of the Attorney General."

To the same effect, Presidential directive of March 13, 1948, 13 Federal Register 1359, which was apparently in effect in May and June 1955; and the subsequent Executive Order No. 10290 of September 24, 1951, setting up a system of classification "to the extent not inconsistent with law." The regulations promulgated by such order expressly apply only to classified security information, which term is restricted to official information which requires safeguarding in the interest of national security. It restricts the dissemination of classified information outside the executive branch, but authorizes the Attorney General on request to interpret such regulations, in connection with any problem arising thereunder.

Of particular import is the Department of Justice order of April 28, 1948, directed to the "Heads of all Government Departments, Agencies and Commissions" (see testimony of Clifford J. Nelson, of the Department of Justice, hearing record, p. 512) providing as follows:

As you are aware, the Federal Bureau of Investigation from time to time makes available to Government departments, agencies and commissions information gathered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation which is of interest to such departments, agencies or commissions. These reports and communications are confidential. All such reports and communications are the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and are subject at all times to its control and to all privileges which the Attorney General has as to the use or disclosure of documents of the Department of Justice. Any department, agency or commission receiving such reports or communications is merely a custodian thereof for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the documents or communications are subject to recall at any time.

Neither the reports and communications nor their contents may be disclosed to any outside person or source without specific prior approval of the Attorney General or of the Assistant to the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General acting for the Attorney General.

Should any attempt be made, whether by request or subpoena or motion for subpoena or court order, or otherwise, to obtain access to or disclosure of any such report or communication, either separately or as a part of the files and records of a Government department, agency or commission, and reports and communications involved should be immediately returned to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in order that a decision can be reached by me or by my designated representative in each individual instance as to the action which should be taken.

This order, providing that all reports and communications are confidential and shall remain the property of and in the control of the FBI, was effective in January of 1951.

Executive Order 10501, dated November 5, 1953, also undertakes to safeguard official information in the interest of national defense, and also commits to the Attorney General the interpreting of the regulations in connection with the problems arising out of their administration.

We mention in this connection the Espionage Act of June 25, 1917 (ch. 645, 62 Stat. 736; 18 U. S. C., secs. 793 (d) and (e); also ch. 645, 62 Stat. 736, 18 U. S. C. 792; also 18 U. S. C. sec. 4, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 684; also ch. 645, 62 Stat. 811, amended May 24 1949, ch. 139, sec. 46, 69 Stat. 96, 18 U. S. C. 2387). (a) (1) (2) and (b) (cited in the brief of committee counsel, supplement to the record, p. 545 of hearing record) as showing a legislative intent to protect documents relating to national security, to prevent concealment of felonies; to forbid publications or disclosures not authorized by law by any officer
or employee of the United States of information coming to him in the course of his employment or official duty.

These statutes are referred to here as affirmative evidence of congressional cooperation with the Executive, in a common effort to discourage unauthorized disclosures of confidential documents or information relating to the national defense, or obtained in the course of official duties; and to prevent interference with or impairment of the loyalty or discipline of the Armed Forces.

All the cited statutes, Executive orders and directives are applicable to the 21/4-page letter or document.

In determining whether the letter or document was classified or contained classified information, reference must be made to the facts which have been established that the contents of this letter or document were taken from the 15 page interdepartmental memorandum dated January 15, 1951, from the FBI to the Army marked and classified confidential; that the letter or document in some respects contained identical language with that of the 15-page memorandum; and that Senator McCarthy knew in May of 1953 when he acquired the 21/4-page letter or document that it had been in part extracted from a document containing security information and, therefore, a classified document. It must be admitted, and in fact was so admitted by Senator McCarthy’s counsel, that the material copied from a classified document retains the same classification as the document from which it is copied (hearing record, p. 753). It follows that the 21/4-page document retains the character of a classified document. While Senator McCarthy contends that the deletion of certain information from the 21/4-page document renders it an unclassified document, this position overlooks the legal necessity that declassification can only be effected by a legally constituted authority. Furthermore, the Attorney General has formally ruled that the document still contains security information. The committee, after examining the document, likewise has agreed that the 21/4-page document contains security information.

Apart from these considerations, the established facts show that Senator McCarthy attempted to make public over nationwide television the contents of a document which he believed emanated from the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the Intelligence Department of the Army regarding possible espionage in a defense installation and which bore a classified or confidential marking. This conduct on his part shows a disregard of the evident purpose to be served by such a document and overlooks the serious import which attaches to a document affecting the national defense, and the dangers flowing from causing such information to become public knowledge. This transgression is nonetheless grave even though the Senator personally may have been, as he contends, of the opinion that the document did not contain security information. This disposition on the part of Senator McCarthy to determine for himself what is or is not security information regardless of the evident classified marking on a document, confirmed by the opinion of a duly constituted agency authorized to make such a ruling, evidences a lack of regard for responsibility to the laws and regulations providing for orderly determination of such matters. This conduct on the part of Senator McCarthy is all the more serious when considered in the light of the act of June 25, 1948 (ch. 645, 62 Stat. 736, title 18, sec. 793 (d) and (e)) which
provides that whoever having lawful or unauthorized possession of any document relating to national defense or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States, attempts to communicate the same to persons not entitled to receive it, is an offender against the criminal laws of the country.

We believe under the facts and our conception of the law that the 2½-page document was a legally classified document entitled to the protection and respect legally surrounding such a document, and binding on all civil and military officers of the Government, as well as on all employees of the Government.

Such a conclusion is not inconsistent with the further view that representatives of the legislative branch have a complete legal right to obtain access to such documents by using the methods available to them to get such information by formal request to the classifying agency or to the Attorney General or to the President himself. It is only when such orderly methods are rebuffed that an issue between two coequal branches of the Government can or should develop.

It follows that any attempt to make public the contents or any portion of this 2½-page document, affecting national security, would be a transgression upon authority. When Senator McCarthy offered to make public this document, which he knew involved information irregularly obtained and which on its face carried a classification of “confidential” by the FBI, it was an assumption of authority which itself is disruptive of orderly governmental processes, violative of accepted comity between the two great branches of our Government, the executive and legislative, and incompatible with the basic tenets of effective democracy.

C. FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE

1. During the hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, Senator McCarthy, in the course of the development of his defense, offered to make public the contents of a document bearing the markings of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Personal and Confidential via Liaison,” which contained classified information relating to the national defense. This offer was not accepted by the committee.

2. In offering to make the contents of the document public, Senator McCarthy acted in the bona fide belief that the document was a valid rather than a spurious instrument and offered it in evidence as such.

D. CONCLUSIONS

The committee concludes that in offering to make public the contents of this classified document Senator McCarthy committed grave error. He manifested a high degree of irresponsibility toward the purposes of the statutes and Executive directives prohibiting the disclosure to unauthorized persons of classified information or information relating to the national defense. He should have applied in advance to the Attorney General for express permission to use the document in his defense under adequate safeguards, or to the committee to receive its contents in evidence in an executive rather than an open session. The committee recognizes, however, that at the time in question Senator
McCarthy was under the stress and strain of being tried or investigated by the subcommittee. He offered the document in this investigation, which was then being contested at every step by both sides. The contents of the document were relevant to the subject matter under inquiry, in our opinion.

These mitigating circumstances are such that we do not recommend censure on the specifications included in category III.

It is the opinion of this committee that it will not serve the necessary purposes of this inquiry to make public the 21/4-page document or any part of the contents thereof. If the committee had been of different opinion, the chairman would have been authorized, in light of the opinions of the Attorney General, still adhered to by the latter officer (p. 116 of the hearings), to direct a request to the President for authority to declassify the same. Pending the final action of the Senate in this matter, the committee has directed its chairman to retain physical possession of this document, in confidence. Unless the Senate otherwise directs, it will be surrendered to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for such disposition as shall be proper after the Senate has concluded its consideration of Senate Resolution 301.

IV

CATEGORY IV. INCIDENTS INVOLVING ABUSES OF COLLEAGUES IN THE SENATE

A. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

Pursuant to the category designated by the select committee, "Incidents Involving Abuses of Colleagues in the Senate," it received evidence and took testimony relating to—

Amendment proposed by Mr. Flanders to the resolution (S. Res. 301) to censure the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. McCarthy, viz:

(30) He has ridiculed his colleagues in the Senate, defaming them publicly in vulgar and base language (regarding Senator Hendrickson—"a living miracle without brains or guts"; on Flanders—"Senile—I think they should get a man with a net and take him to a good quiet place").

Amendment proposed by Mr. Morse to the resolution (S. Res. 301) to censure the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. McCarthy, viz:

(b) Unfairly accused his fellow Senators Gillette, Monroney, Hendrickson, Hayden, and Hennings of improper conduct in carrying out their duties as Senators.

The alleged abuses of senatorial colleagues, considered in this category, result from certain oral and written statements of Senator McCarthy directed by him to and about certain fellow Members of the Senate, and center around the following specific charges:

1. That Senator McCarthy publicly ridiculed and defamed Senator Hendrickson in vulgar and base language by calling him "** a living miracle without brains or guts."

2. That Senator McCarthy publicly ridiculed and defamed Senator Flanders in vulgar and base language by saying of him, "Senile—I think they should get a man with a net and take him to a good quiet place."
3. That Senator McCarthy unfairly accused Senators Gillette, Monroney, Hendrickson, Hayden, and Hennings of improper conduct in carrying out their senatorial duties.

As relating to this category, the select committee received documentary evidence in the form of correspondence between Senator McCarthy and the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections, testimony taken before and published by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, being part of the Army-McCarthy hearings, the testimony of two reporters, certain other record evidence, and the testimony of Senator McCarthy in his own behalf.

We point out that for convenience, and by reason of related subject matter, the select committee has already considered and disposed of two of the charges contained in this category, being the charge that Senator McCarthy publicly ridiculed and defamed Senator Hendrickson, in vulgar and base language, being No. 1 above-mentioned, and the charge that Senator McCarthy unfairly accused Senators Gillette, Monroney, Hendrickson, Hayden, and Hennings of improper conduct in carrying out their senatorial duties, being No. 3 above-mentioned. These two charges have already been considered and reported upon in this report under I—"Incidents of Contempt of the Senate or a Senatorial Committee." The discussion under this category IV, therefore, will be restricted to the one charge contained in the amendment proposed by Senator Flanders (30), that Senator McCarthy publicly ridiculed and defamed Senator Flanders, in vulgar and base language, by calling him "senile."

The evidence shows that on June 11, 1954, Senator Flanders walked into the Senate caucus room where Senator McCarthy was testifying before a vast television audience in the Army-McCarthy hearings, and unexpectedly gave Senator McCarthy notice of an intended speech attacking Senator McCarthy which he proposed forthwith to deliver on the Senate floor; that shortly thereafter Senator McCarthy was asked by the press to comment on Senator Flanders' intended speech; that Senator McCarthy thereupon made this remark concerning Senator Flanders:

I think they should get a man with a net and take him to a good quiet place; and that on occasions prior to that time Senator Flanders made provocative speeches in respect to Senator McCarthy on the Senate floor.

B. CONCLUSIONS

The remarks of Senator McCarthy concerning Senator Flanders were highly improper. The committee finds, however, that they were induced by Senator Flanders' conduct in respect to Senator McCarthy in the Senate caucus room, and in delivering provocative speeches concerning Senator McCarthy on the Senate floor. For these reasons, the committee concludes the remarks with reference to Senator Flanders do not constitute a basis for censure.
V

CATEGORY V: INCIDENT RELATING TO RALPH W. ZWICKER, A GENERAL OFFICER OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

A. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

This category refers to the question whether Senator McCarthy should be censured for his treatment of Gen. Ralph W. Zwicker, in connection with General Zwicker's appearance before the Senator as a witness.

The pertinent proposed amendments are that of Senator Fulbright:

(4) Without justification, the junior Senator from Wisconsin impugned the loyalty, patriotism, and character of General Ralph Zwicker;

and that of Senator Morse:

(c) As chairman of a committee, resorted to abusive conduct in his interrogation of Gen. Ralph Zwicker, including a charge that General Zwicker was unfit to wear the uniform, during the appearance of General Zwicker as a witness before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations on February 18, 1954;

and that of Senator Flanders:

(10) He has attacked, defamed, and besmirched military heroes of the United States, either as witnesses before his committee or under the cloak of immunity of the Senate floor (General Zwicker, General Marshall).

The select committee restricted its hearings to the case of General Zwicker. Its reasons for not inquiring into the case of remarks made against General Marshall appear in part VI of this report.

In his capacity as chairman on the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senator McCarthy held hearings to determine whether there were espionage activities in the radar laboratory at Fort Monmouth. General Zwicker was summoned as a witness and appeared on February 18, 1954, at a hearing held in New York, N. Y.

The evidence on this phase consisted of the records of both a public and executive hearing, the testimony of William J. Harding, Jr., who was a spectator at the public hearing, the testimony of Senator McCarthy and of General Zwicker, the testimony of Gen. Kirke B. Lawton, and of Capt. William J. Woodward, a medical officer who accompanied General Zwicker to the hearings, and of James M. Juliana and C. George Anastos, of the staff of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

There is no dispute concerning the reported testimony of General Zwicker and the questions, statements, and comments of Senator McCarthy during the hearings. General Zwicker attended a public hearing, as a spectator, in the morning of February 18, 1954, and testified as a witness at an executive session late that afternoon. There is dispute as to the attitude and truthfulness of General Zwicker, the statements made to and about him by Senator McCarthy at the conclusion of the executive session, and concerning alleged utterances of General Zwicker prior to his testimony.

Gen. Kirke B. Lawton testified to a conversation which he had with General Zwicker at Camp Kilmer sometime before General Zwicker was called as a witness. It was charged that General Lawton was "gagged" by his military superiors, but after General Lawton testified,

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it became clear that his inability to give details of his conversation with General Zwicker was not the result of any military secrecy order but was the result of his inability to remember any of the details of the conversation. General Lawton testified that General Zwicker gave him the impression of being generally opposed to Senator McCarthy or the Senator's method in investigation. He could not remember any words used by General Zwicker but was permitted to testify to his general impression and conclusion as to the effect of General Zwicker's remarks.

William J. Harding, Jr., who was a spectator at the morning public session of the hearing held by Senator McCarthy in New York on February 18, 1954, testified that he was seated near General Zwicker. In the morning session, General Zwicker also was a spectator. Mr. Harding stated that Senator McCarthy addressed a question to General Zwicker, who was then seated in the audience, and that General Zwicker replied to the question. As General Zwicker seated himself, after replying to the Senator's question, Mr. Harding testified that the general muttered under his breath the letters "S. O. B." with reference to Senator McCarthy.

James M. Juliana and C. George Anastos, members of the staff of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, were called as witnesses by the select committee. Mr. Juliana testified that he saw General Zwicker at Camp Kilmer on February 13, 1954, 5 days before the appearance of General Zwicker as a witness before Senator McCarthy in New York. On February 13, 1954, Mr. Juliana received from General Zwicker a copy of the Army order directing the honorable discharge of Maj. Irving Peress. In the New York hearing, Senator McCarthy tried to establish who was responsible for the advancement of Peress from captain to major, and who was responsible for his separation and discharge from the military service, the latter having occurred after he had claimed the protection of the fifth amendment as to his Communist connections and activities, at a hearing before Senator McCarthy. (The separation order was read into the record at these hearings before the select committee.) Mr. Juliana also testified that his copy of the Peress separation order was produced at the hearing of February 18, 1954, and handed by him either to Senator McCarthy, or to Roy M. Cohn, counsel for the subcommittee.

Under examination by counsel for Senator McCarthy, Mr. Juliana stated that when he talked to General Zwicker, General Zwicker said that he had been in contact with Washington, prior to discharging Major Peress on February 2, 1954, relative to the Peress matter, and that he, Mr. Juliana, had so informed Senator McCarthy prior to February 18, 1954.

C. Georges Anastos testified that he talked with General Zwicker about the Peress case, by telephone on January 22, 1954. General Zwicker gave him the name of Peress, and stated that the file showed there was information that Peress and his wife were or had been Communists, and that in August 1953 Peress had refused to answer a loyalty questionnaire. There was reference made also, according to Mr. Anastos, to an Army effort to get Peress out of the service. This testimony is in contrast with that of General Zwicker that he did not give to Mr. Anastos any information contained in the Peress classified personnel file. The next day, according to Mr. Anastos, General
Zwicker called him voluntarily and told him of the Peress separation order.

Major Peress was examined by Chairman McCarthy on January 30, 1954. He had been promoted on November 2, 1953. He received an honorable discharge on February 2, 1954.

It was the contention of Senator McCarthy that General Zwicker was most arrogant, very irritating, and evasive, that he was untruthful in his testimony, and that he was "covering up" for his superiors. General Zwicker stood upon his testimony and contended that he had been truthful in all respects and as frank as he could be in view of the military restrictions upon his testimony. General Zwicker also contended that Senator McCarthy had full knowledge of General Zwicker's attitude and conduct with reference to the Peress case, and that this made Senator McCarthy's treatment of him unjustified and unwarranted. General Zwicker appeared as a witness at the invitation of the select committee.

B. FINDINGS OF FACT

From the evidence and testimony taken with reference to this fifth category, the select committee finds the following facts:

1. In connection with this incident, Senator McCarthy was acting as chairman of the Senate Committee on Government Operations and chairman of its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (pp. 69 and 182 of the hearings).

2. Ralph W. Zwicker is a brigadier general of the Army of the United States, a graduate of West Point Military Academy, and an Army officer since 1927 (p. 80 of the hearings).

3. From July 1953 to August 1954, General Zwicker was the commanding officer at Camp Kilmer, an Army separation center (pp. 70 and 81 of the hearings).

4. Senator McCarthy began looking into the Peress matter in November 1953 (p. 182 of the hearings).

5. In late November or December 1953, General Zwicker had a conversation with Gen. Kirke B. Lawton, and gave General Lawton the impression that he was antagonistic toward Senator McCarthy (p. 438 of the hearings).

6. On January 22, 1954, C. George Anastos, a member of the staff of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, talked to General Zwicker by telephone; the general gave him the name of Peress and made some reference to the latter's Communist connections (p. 519 of the hearings).

7. This information was reported to Roy Cohn and Frank Carr of the subcommittee staff (p. 519 of the hearings).

8. On February 13, 1954, General Zwicker talked to James C. Juliana, another member of the subcommittee's staff, and gave to Mr. Juliana a copy of the Peress separation order (p. 515 of the hearings).

9. This copy was available to Senator McCarthy at the New York hearing of February 18, 1954 (pp. 79, 515, and 516 of the hearings).

10. On the same date, General Zwicker also told Mr. Juliana that he was opposed to giving Peress an honorable discharge and had been in touch with Washington about the matter (p. 517 of the hearings).

11. This was reported by Mr. Juliana to Senator McCarthy some days before February 18, 1954 (pp. 188, 189, 333, and 517 of the hearings).
12. Major Peress was summoned to appear before the permanent subcommittee by request made on January 26, 1954, and appeared on January 30, 1954 (p. 183 of the hearings).


14. They had a pleasant social conversation during the lunch inter- mission (p. 456 of the hearings).

15. There was a public hearing during the morning of February 18, 1954, attended by General Zwicker as a spectator (p. 455 of the hearings).

16. During this morning session, William J. Harding, Jr., testified, after General Zwicker had answered a question of Senator McCarthy, that he heard General Zwicker mutter under his breath, “You S. O. B.” and (turning to his companions) said, “You see. I told you what we’d get” (p. 179 of the hearings).

17. General Zwicker testified he had no recollection of and knew of no reason for making such an utterance (p. 456 of the hearings).

18. Senator McCarthy did not know of the Harding incident when he examined General Zwicker (p. 204 of the hearings).

19. General Zwicker was called as a witness at an executive session before Senator McCarthy, sitting as a subcommittee of one, about 4:30 p.m. on February 18, 1954 (pp. 69 and 190 of the hearings).

20. At the beginning of the hearing, under examination by Mr. Cohn, General Zwicker testified that if he were in a position to do so, that he would be glad to tell what steps he took “and others took at Kilmer to take action against Peress a long time before action was finally forced by the committee,” and that the information would not reflect unfavorably on General Zwicker or “on a number of other people at Kilmer and the First Army (p. 70 of the hearings).

21. Senator McCarthy then took over the examination of General Zwicker in an effort to bring out that the general’s information, if given in evidence, “would reflect unfavorably on some of them, of course” (p. 70 of the hearings).

22. Senator McCarthy then ordered the witness to reply to the question whether somebody kept Peress on, knowing he was a Communist, and General Zwicker responded that he respectfully declined to answer since he was not permitted to do so under the Presidential directive (p. 70 of the hearings).

23. General Zwicker tried unsuccessfully to have this Presidential directive read at the hearing before Senator McCarthy (p. 354 of the hearings).

24. Senator McCarthy stated that he was familiar with the provisions of the Presidential directive (p. 354 of the hearings).

25. The Presidential directive of March 13, 1948, provided:

* * * in order to insure the fair and just disposition of loyalty cases * * * reports rendered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other investigative agencies of the executive branch are to be regarded as confidential * * * and files relative to the loyalty of employees * * * shall be maintained in confidence * * *.—HARRY S. TRUMAN.

(P. 457 of the hearings.)

26. Senator McCarthy then asked General Zwicker whether he knew on the day an honorable discharge was signed for Peress that Peress had refused to answer certain questions before the subcommittee, and General Zwicker replied: “No, sir; not specifically on answer-
ing any questions, I knew he had appeared before your committee" (p. 70 of the hearings).

27. When asked whether he “knew generally that he (Peress) had refused to tell whether he was a Communist,” General Zwicker replied: “I don’t recall whether he refused to tell whether he was a Communist” (p. 71 of the hearings).

28. General Zwicker testified that he had read the press releases about Peress, and knew that Peress had taken refuge in the fifth amendment, but that he did not know specifically that Peress had refused to answer questions about his Communist activities (p. 71 of the hearings).

29. Senator McCarthy then told the witness: “General, let’s try and be truthful. I am going to keep you here as long as you keep hedging and hemming” (p. 71 of the hearings).

30. The following then occurred:

General Zwicker. I am not hedging.

The CHAIRMAN. Or hawing.

General Zwicker. I am not hawing, and I don’t like to have anyone impugn my honesty, which you just about did.

The CHAIRMAN. Either your honesty or your intelligence; I can’t help impugning one or the other, when you tell us that a major in your command who was known to you to have been before a Senate committee, and of whom you read the press releases very carefully—to now have you sit here and tell us that you did not know whether he refused to answer questions about Communist activities. I had seen all the press releases, and they all dealt with that. So when you do that, General, if you will pardon me, I cannot help but question either your honesty or your intelligence, one or the other. I want to be frank with you on that.

Now, is it your testimony now that at the time you read the stories about Major Peress, that you did not know that he had refused to answer questions before this committee about his Communist activities?

General Zwicker. I am sure I had that impression.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you aware that the major was being given an honorable discharge * * *.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you also read the stories about my letter to Secretary of the Army Stevens in which I requested or, rather, suggested that this man be court-martialed, and that anyone that protected him or covered up for him be court-martialed?

General Zwicker. Yes, sir. (Pp. 71 and 72 of the hearings.)

31. As to the Peress discharge, General Zwicker testified:

The CHAIRMAN. Who ordered his discharge?

General Zwicker. The Department of the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Who in the Department?

General Zwicker. That I can’t answer.

Mr. Cohn. That isn’t a security matter?

General Zwicker. No. I don’t know. Excuse me.

Mr. Cohn. Who did you talk to? You talked to somebody?

General Zwicker. No; I did not.

Mr. Cohn. How did you know he should be discharged?

General Zwicker. You also have a copy of this. I don’t know why you asked me for it. This is the order under which he was discharged, a copy of that order.

And also:

The CHAIRMAN. Did you take any steps to have him retained until the Secretary of the Army could decide whether he should be court-martialed?

General Zwicker. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did it occur to you that you should?

General Zwicker. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you have taken such steps?

General Zwicker. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, there is nothing you could have done; is that your statement?

General Zwicker. That is my opinion (p. 72 of the hearings).
32. The Peress discharge order was dated January 18, 1954, was received by General Zwicker on January 23, 1954, and provided:

a. That Peress be relieved from active duty and honorably discharged.
b. That this be at the desire of Peress "but in any event not later than 90 days from date of receipt of this letter" (p. 454 of the hearings).

33. Major Peress asked for his discharge on February 1, 1954, and he was discharged the next day (p. 483 of the hearings).

34. Senator McCarthy had read the Peress discharge order, and knew about it on February 2, 1954 (pp. 199 and 333 of the hearings).

35. Senator McCarthy then examined General Zwicker as follows:

The Chairman. Let me ask this question. If this man, after the order came up, after the order of the 18th came up, prior to his getting an honorable discharge, were guilty of some crime—let us say that he held up a bank or stole an automobile—and you heard of that the day before—let’s say you heard of it the same day that you heard of my letter—could you then have taken steps to prevent his discharge, or would he have automatically been discharged?

General Zwicker. I would have definitely taken steps to prevent discharge.

The Chairman. In other words, if you found that he was guilty of improper conduct, conduct unbecoming an officer, we will say, then you would not have allowed the honorable discharge to go through, would you?

General Zwicker. If it were outside the directive of this order?

The Chairman. Well, yes; let’s say it were outside the directive.

General Zwicker. Then I certainly would never have discharged him until that part of the case—

The Chairman. Let us say he went out and stole $50 the night before.

General Zwicker. He wouldn’t have been discharged.

The Chairman. Do you think stealing $50 is more serious than being a traitor to the country as part of the Communist conspiracy?

General Zwicker. That, sir, was not my decision.

The Chairman. You said if you learned that he stole $50, you would have prevented his discharge. You did learn something much more serious than that. You learned that he had refused to tell whether he was a Communist. You learned the chairman of a Senate committee suggested that he be court-martialed. And you say if he had stolen $50 he would not have gotten the honorable discharge. But merely being a part of the Communist conspiracy, and the chairman of the committee asking that he be court-martialed, would not give you grounds for holding up his discharge. Is that correct?

General Zwicker. Under the terms of this letter, that is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. That letter says nothing about stealing $50, and it does not say anything about being a Communist. It does not say anything about his appearance before our committee. He appeared before our committee after that order was made out.

Do you think you sound a bit ridiculous, General, when you say that for $50, you would prevent his being discharged, but for being a part of the conspiracy to destroy this country you could not prevent his discharge?

General Zwicker. I did not say that, sir.

The Chairman. Let’s go over that. You did say if you found out he stole $50 the night before, he would not have gotten an honorable discharge the next morning?

General Zwicker. That is correct.

The Chairman. You did learn, did you not, from the newspaper reports, that this man was part of the Communist conspiracy, or at least that there was strong evidence that he was. Didn’t you think that was more serious than the theft of $50?

General Zwicker. He has never been tried for that, sir, and there was evidence, Mr. Chairman—

The Chairman. Don’t you give me that doublespeak. The $50 case, that he had stolen the night before, he has not been tried for that.

General Zwicker. That is correct. He didn’t steal it yet.

The Chairman. Would you wait until he was tried for stealing the $50 before you prevented his honorable discharge?

General Zwicker. Either tried or exonerated.

The Chairman. You would hold up the discharge until he was tried or exonerated?
General Zwicker. For stealing the $50; yes.

The Chairman. But if you heard that this man was a traitor—in other words, instead of hearing that he had stolen $50 from the corner store, let's say you heard that he was a traitor, he belonged to the Communist conspiracy; that a Senate committee had the sworn testimony to that effect. Then would you hold up his discharge until he was either exonerated or tried?

General Zwicker. I am not going to answer that question, I don't believe, the way you want it, sir.

The Chairman. I just want you to tell me the truth.

General Zwicker. On all of the evidence or anything that had been presented to me as Commanding General of Camp Kilmer, I had no authority to retain him in the service.

And also:

The Chairman. You say that if you had heard that he had stolen $50, then you could order him retained. But when you heard that he was part of the Communist conspiracy, that subsequent to the time the orders were issued a Senate committee took the evidence under oath that he was part of the conspiracy, you say that would not allow you to hold up his discharge?

General Zwicker. I was never officially informed by anyone that he was part of the Communist conspiracy, Mr. Senator.

The Chairman. Well, let's see now. You say that you were never officially informed?

General Zwicker. No.

The Chairman. If you heard that he had stolen $50 from someone down the street, if you did not hear it officially, then could you hold up his discharge? Or is there some peculiar way you must hear it?

General Zwicker. I believe so, yes, sir, until I was satisfied that he had or hadn't, one way or the other.

The Chairman. You would not need any official notification so far as the 50 bucks is concerned?

General Zwicker. Yes.

The Chairman. But you say insofar as the Communist conspiracy is concerned, you need an official notification?

General Zwicker. Yes, sir; because I was acting on an official order, having precedence over that.

The Chairman. How about the $50? If one of your men came in a half hour before he got his honorable discharge and said, "General, I just heard downtown from a police officer that this man broke into a store last night and stole $50," you would not give him an honorable discharge until you had checked the case and found out whether that was true or not; would you?

General Zwicker. I would expect the authorities from downtown to inform me of that or, let's say, someone in a position to suspect that he did it.

The Chairman. Let's say one of the trusted privates in your command came in to you and said, "General, I was just downtown and I have evidence that Major Peress broke into a store and stole $50." You wouldn't discharge him until you had checked the facts, seen whether or not the private was telling the truth and seen whether or not he had stolen the $50?

General Zwicker. No; I don't believe I would. I would make a check, certainly, to check the story (pp. 73–74 of the hearings).

36. The examination then proceeded on a further hypothetical basis as follows:

The Chairman. Do you think, General, that anyone who is responsible for giving an honorable discharge to a man who has been named under oath as a member of the Communist conspiracy should himself be removed from the military?

General Zwicker. You are speaking of generalities now, and not on specifics—is that right, sir, not mentioning about any one particular person?

The Chairman. That is right.

General Zwicker. I have no brief for that kind of person, and if there exists or has existed something in the system that permits that, I say that that is wrong.

The Chairman. I am not talking about the system. I am asking you this question, General, a very simple question: Let's assume that John Jones, who is a major in the United States Army—
General Zwicker. A what, sir?
The Chairman. Let's assume that John Jones is a major in the United States Army. Let's assume that there is sworn testimony to the effect that he is part of the Communist conspiracy, has attended Communist leadership schools. Let's assume that Maj. John Jones is under oath before a committee and says, "I cannot tell you the truth about these charges because, if I did, I fear that might tend to incriminate me." Then let's say that General Smith was responsible for this man receiving an honorable discharge, knowing these facts. Do you think that General Smith should be removed from the military, or do you think he should be kept on in it?

General Zwicker. He should be by all means kept if he were acting under competent orders to separate that man.

The Chairman. Let us say he is the man who signed the orders. Let us say General Smith is the man who originated the order. General Zwicker. Originated the order directing his separation?
The Chairman. Directing his honorable discharge. General Zwicker. Well, that is pretty hypothetical.
The Chairman. It is pretty real, General.

General Zwicker. Sir, on one point; yes. I mean, on an individual; yes. But you know that there are thousands and thousands of people being separated daily from our Army.
The Chairman. General, you understand my question——

General Zwicker. Maybe not.
The Chairman. And you are going to answer it.

General Zwicker. Repeat it.

The Chairman. The reporter will repeat it.
(The question referred to was read by the reporter.)

General Zwicker. That is not a question for me to decide, Senator.
The Chairman. You are ordered to answer it, General. You are an employee of the people.

General Zwicker. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. You have a rather important job. I want to know how you feel about getting rid of Communists.

General Zwicker. I am all for it.
The Chairman. All right. You will answer that question, unless you take the fifth amendment. I do not care how long we stay here, you are going to answer it.

General Zwicker. Do you mean how I feel toward Communists?
The Chairman. I mean exactly what I asked you, General; nothing else. And anyone with the brains of a 5-year-old child can understand that question. The reporter will read it to you as often as you need to hear it so that you can answer it, and then you will answer it.

General Zwicker. Start it over, please.
(The question was reread by the reporter.)

General Zwicker. I do not think he should be removed from the military.
The Chairman. Then, General, you should be removed from any command. Any man who has been given the honor of being promoted to general and who says "I will protect another general who protected Communists," is not fit to wear that uniform, General. I think it is a tremendous disgrace to the Army to have this sort of thing given to the public. I intend to give it to them. I have a duty to do that. I intend to repeat to the press exactly what you said. So you know that. You will be back here, General (pp. 75 and 76 of the hearings).

37. At page 77 of the hearings, the following occurred:

The Chairman. Did you at any time ever object to this man being honorably discharged?
General Zwicker. I respectfully decline to answer that, sir.
The Chairman. You will be ordered to answer it.

General Zwicker. That is on the grounds of this Executive order.
The Chairman. You are ordered to answer. That is a personnel matter.

General Zwicker. I shall still respectfully decline to answer it.
The Chairman. Did you ever take any steps which would have aided him in continuing in the military after you knew that he was a Communist?

General Zwicker. That would have aided him in continuing, sir?
The Chairman. Yes.

General Zwicker. No.
The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever do anything instrumental in his obtaining his promotion after knowing that he was a fifth-amendment case?

General ZWICKER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever object to his being promoted?

General ZWICKER. I had no opportunity to, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever enter any objection to the promotion of this man under your command?

General ZWICKER. I have no opportunity to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you did not; is that correct?

General ZWICKER. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And you refuse to tell us whether you objected to his obtaining an honorable discharge?

General ZWICKER. I don't believe that is quite the way the question was phrased before.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, answer it again, then.

General ZWICKER. I respectfully request that I not answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. You will be ordered to answer.

General ZWICKER. Under the same authority as cited before, I cannot answer it.

38. At the hearings before the select committee, Senator McCarthy testified that General Zwicker was evasive (p. 193 of the hearings), that he changed his story (p. 192 of the hearings), that he was difficult to examine (p. 192 of the hearings), that it was "a long, laborious truth-pulling job," and that he was "most arrogant" (pp. 193 and 204 of the hearings).

39. As stated by the chairman and other members of the select committee, these were matters of argument (p. 195 of the hearings).

40. The transcript of the New York hearing shows that Senator McCarthy said to General Zwicker: "Then, General, you should be removed from any command. Any man who has been given the honor of being promoted to general and who says, 'I will protect another general who protected Communists,' is not fit to wear that uniform, General," and Senator McCarthy testified he was referring to the uniform of a general (pp. 202 and 332 of the hearings).

41. General Zwicker did not make any such statement.

42. Senator McCarthy testified that General Zwicker had said in effect: "It is all right to give Communists honorable discharges" (p. 202 of the hearings).

43. There is no testimony in this record which justifies such a conclusion.

44. When asked to give the facts on which he based his testimony that General Zwicker was an unwilling witness, arrogant and evasive, Senator McCarthy reiterated his conclusion that: "All I can say is, the full attitude was one of complete arrogance, complete contempt of the committee" (p. 204 of the hearings).

45. Senator McCarthy testified that he was justified in his treatment of General Zwicker solely by the latter's conduct at the hearing in New York (p. 330 of the hearings).

46. He testified further that he had not criticized General Zwicker and it was: "just a method of cross-examination, trying to get the truth" (p. 331 of the hearings).

47. Senator McCarthy refused to draw any inference but that General Zwicker was not telling the truth (specifically excluding perjury, p. 337 of the hearings), as follows:

Mr. DE FURIA. Now, assuming, Senator, that for the sake of this question, anyhow, that General Zwicker did testify in what we might call a stilted fashion, don't you think that the fair inference, rather than to say that the general was deliberately telling an untruth, or stalling, or distorting facts, that the fair,
judicious inference was that he couldn't do very much else in the face of the Presidential orders and the other orders of his superiors; isn't that the fair way to look at it, Senator?

Senator McCarthy. No, Mr. de Furia. When a general comes before me first says, "I didn't know this man refused to answer any questions," then after he is pressed under cross-examination, he says, "Yes, I knew he refused to answer questions, but I didn't know he refused to answer questions about Communist activities"—then, after further cross-examination, he says, "Yes, I know that he refused to answer questions about Communist activities"—I can't assume that is the result of any Presidential directive. We cannot blame the President for that.

48. Before examining General Zwicker, Senator McCarthy knew that General Zwicker was opposed to giving Peress an honorable discharge (p. 342 of the hearing) and Senator McCarthy had received a long letter from the Secretary of the Army giving a full explanation of the Peress case (pp. 459 and 462 of the hearing).

49. Senator McCarthy contended at the hearings before the select committee that matters in the Peress personnel file could be revealed by General Zwicker (p. 344 of the hearing) and that General Zwicker was not relying on any Presidential order (p. 344 of the hearing).

50. Later, Senator McCarthy testified that General Zwicker was relying on Presidential and Executive orders, and that he, Senator McCarthy, had copies of them (pp. 347 and 354 of the hearings).

51. Immediately after General Zwicker had testified in New York, Senator McCarthy gave to the press his version of what had occurred at the executive hearing (p. 348 of the hearing).

52. Senator McCarthy could not recall whether he told the press that the Zwicker hearing had been held principally for the benefit of Secretary of the Army Stevens, did not think so, was reasonably certain he had not said so (p. 348 of the hearing).

53. On his right to reveal to the press what had been testified to at the Zwicker executive hearing, Senator McCarthy testified:

Mr. De Furia. Senator, were you authorized by either the major committee or your Subcommittee on Permanent Investigations to reveal what transpired at the Zwicker executive hearing?

Senator McCarthy. I discussed the matter with the representatives of the two Senators who were present and we agreed, in view of the Stevens' statement, it should be released.

Mr. De Furia. You say you discussed it with the representatives of the two Senators?

Senator McCarthy. That is correct.

Mr. De Furia. In spite of the rules of your own committee that all testimony taken in executive session shall be kept secret and will not be released or used in public session without the approval of the majority of the subcommittee?

Senator McCarthy. I felt that the two men who were present were representing the Senators and they constituted a majority. There were only four Senators on the committee at that time.

Mr. De Furia. In a matter involving a general of the United States, then, you permitted an administrative assistant to exercise the prerogatives of the United States Senate?

Senator McCarthy. I think I have recited the facts to you (pp. 349 and 350 of the hearings).

And also:

Senator McCarthy. May I say further, Mr. de Furia, in answer to your question, that General Zwicker had already released a distorted version of the testimony, through Bob Stevens, in affidavit form. I felt under the circumstances that the correct version should be released.

Mr. De Furia. Why, Senator, you released this first 2 or 3 minutes after your hearing concluded, did you not?
Senator McCarthy. No; I did not. It was the transcript.
Mr. de Furia. You called in the press, did you not, right away?
Senator McCarthy. I did not.
Mr. de Furia. To tell them what had happened in the executive session?
Senator McCarthy. Mr. de Furia, if you want to know what the practice was here, and what the practice is—
Mr. de Furia. I do not want the practice.
Senator McCarthy. I did not release the transcript.
Mr. de Furia. I am not talking about the transcript. But you did tell the press what happened in the closed executive session, within a few minutes after that session ended?
Senator McCarthy. I gave them a résumé of the testimony; yes.
Mr. de Furia. Sir, I am asking you, upon what authority, or by what right, you did that?
Senator McCarthy. Because that has been our practice.
Mr. de Furia. In spite of the rule of your own committee?
Senator McCarthy. That has been the practice of the committee.
Mr. de Furia. General Zwicker's affidavit was not made until 2 days later; isn't that right, Senator? It is dated February 20.
Senator McCarthy. I don't know what date it is dated, but the transcript was not released until after the distorted version of the testimony given by Zwicker.
Mr. Williams. Do you have the rule, there, Mr. de Furia?
Mr. de Furia. Yes, I have the rule, and I would like to have it in evidence, if the chairman please.
The Chairman. It will be received (p. 350 of the hearings).

54. The rules of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, adopted January 14, 1953, provided:

6. All testimony taken in executive session shall be kept secret and will not be released or used in public session without the approval of a majority of the subcommittee (p. 352 of the hearings).

55. At that time the subcommittee consisted of seven members (p. 353 of the hearings).

56. During the executive session, Senator McCarthy said with reference to General Zwicker: "This is the first fifth-amendment general we've had before us" (p. 451 of the hearings).

57. After the executive session, Senator McCarthy said to General Zwicker:

    General, you will be back on Tuesday, and at that time I am going to put you on display and let the American public see what kind of officers we have (p. 451 of the hearings).

58. The facts concerning Peress' Communist connections were known to General Zwicker's superior officers when he was directed to discharge Peress (p. 492 of the hearings).

59. General Zwicker was not responsible in any way for promoting or discharging Peress and was very much opposed to both (pp. 505 and 506 of the hearings).

60. Major Peress was not in a sensitive position so far as intelligence, or classified information or material was concerned (p. 505 of the hearings).

C. LEGAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN THIS CATEGORY

The legal questions arising with reference to the incident relating to General Zwicker may be stated briefly as follows:

1. Is there any evidence that General Zwicker was not telling the truth in testifying before Chairman McCarthy?

2. Is there any evidence that General Zwicker was intentionally irritating or evasive or arrogant?
3. What is the law governing the treatment of witnesses before congressional committees?
4. Was the conduct of Senator McCarthy toward General Zwicker proper under the circumstances?

1. There is no evidence that General Zwicker was not telling the truth in testifying before Chairman McCarthy

We have analyzed carefully the testimony of General Zwicker, of Senator McCarthy, and of the other witnesses relating to this question. We have concluded that General Zwicker, when he appeared as a witness before Senator McCarthy, on February 18, 1954, was a truthful witness. We feel that it was evident that his examination was unfair, and that General Zwicker testified as fully and frankly as he could do, in view of the Presidential and Army directives which restricted his freedom of expression. These directives were known to his examiners, and however much they may have been out of sympathy with the directives, the fact remains that this was no excuse for berating General Zwicker and holding him up to public ridicule.

General Zwicker testified before the select committee. He underwent a vigorous and taxing cross-examination from Senator McCarthy's counsel. A reading of his testimony and examination makes it clear that in no material respect was it necessary for General Zwicker to modify or change his testimony from that given on February 18, 1954, and that the double exposure of his evidence under searching examination revealed no distortion of fact or untruth.

2. There is no evidence that General Zwicker was intentionally irritating, evasive, or arrogant

General Zwicker was initially examined at the New York hearing by Mr. Cohn, counsel for the subcommittee. It is evident that this examination was mutually courteous and satisfactory. Mr. Juliana and Mr. Anastos, of the staff of the subcommittee, both found General Zwicker to be cooperative and helpful. Even in his examination by Senator McCarthy, the record shows that the general was courteous and respectful throughout the hearing. We find in the record no single instance which supports the conclusion that he was intentionally irritating. Some questions General Zwicker refused to answer and in his answers to some of the questions, apparently, he meticulously sought to avoid the disclosure of material or information in the classified personnel file of Perez, or involving intra-Army discussions and policies, which he was under orders not to reveal. It should not have been difficult to meet this situation in a fair and reasonable way. Senator McCarthy said he was familiar with the Presidential order and the Army directives. A few moments could have been taken to analyze them, and so frame the questions propounded to the witness as to avoid any difficulty. The insistence that the witness answer long hypothetical questions and questions that are not clear even upon careful inspection and reflection, was much more the source of any resulting irritation on the part of the examiner than any conduct on the part of the witness.

Moreover, when he was before this committee, General Zwicker was subjected to a long and vigorous cross-examination and manifested great patience and candor and a complete lack of any tendency toward arrogance or irritability.
3. The law governing the treatment of witnesses before congressional committees

The law and precedent on this subject has been stated many times. Senate Document No. 99, 83d Congress, 2d session, 1954, on Congressional Power of Investigation gives an excellent summary of the law and procedure. Pertinent articles in current legal literature on the subject may be found in American Bar Association Journal, September 1954 at page 763, The Investigating Power of Congress: Its Scope and Limitations; Ohio Bar, August 9, 1954, at page 607, A Comparison of Congressional Investigative Procedures and Judicial Procedures With Reference to the Examination of Witnesses; and Federal Bar Journal, April–June 1954, page 113, Executive Privilege and the Release of Military Records. These articles are mentioned only as source material and do not necessarily express or contain the views of the select committee.

There are no statutes and few court decisions bearing on the subject (Dimock, Congressional Investigation Committees, p. 133 (1929)). There are few safeguards for the protection of the witness. His treatment usually depends and must depend upon the skill and attitude of the chairman and the members. Since an investigation by a committee is not a trial, the committee is under no compulsion to make the hearing public.

We call attention to three cases in the Federal courts discussing this subject. Barkes v. United States (167 F. (2d) 241 (1948)) was a prosecution for failure to produce records before a congressional committee pursuant to subpoena. The court stated at page 250:

(14–17) Appellants press upon us representations as to the conduct of the Congressional committee, critical of its behavior in various respects. Eminent persons have stated similar views. But such matters are not for the courts. We so held in Townsend v. United States, citing Hearst v. Black. The remedy for unseemly conduct. if any, by the Committees of Congress is for Congress, or for the people; it is political and not judicial. "It must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts." The courts have no authority to speak or act upon the conduct by the legislative branch of its own business, so long as the powers of power and pertinency are not exceeded, and the mere possibility that the power of inquiry may be abused "affords no ground for denying the power." The question presented by these contentions must be viewed in the light of the established rule of absolute immunity of governmental officials, Congressional and administrative, from liability for damage done by their acts or speech, even though knowingly false or wrong. The basis of so drastic and rigid a rule is the overbalancing of the individual hurt by the public necessity for untrammeled freedom of legislative and administrative activity, within the respective powers of the legislature and the executive.

In Townsend v. U. S. (95 F. (2d) 352 (1938)), the defendant was convicted of failure to appear before a congressional committee.

In affirming the conviction, the court said at page 361:

(14–17) A legislative inquiry may be as broad, as searching, and as exhaustive as is necessary to make effective the constitutional powers of Congress. McGrain v. Daugherty (273 U. S. 135, 47 S. Ct. 319, 71 L. Ed. 580, 50 A. L. R. 1). A judicial inquiry relates to a case, and the evidence to be admissible must be measured by the narrow limits of the pleadings. A legislative inquiry anticipates all possible cases which may arise thereunder and the evidence admissible must be responsive to the scope of the inquiry, which generally is very broad. Many a witness in a judicial inquiry has, no doubt, been embarrassed and irritated by questions which to him seemed incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, and impertinent. But that is not a matter for a witness finally to decide. Because a witness could not understand the purpose of cross-examination, he would not
be justified in leaving a courtroom. The orderly processes of judicial determination do not permit the exercise of such discretion by a witness. The orderly processes of legislative inquiry require that the Committee shall determine such questions for itself. Within the realm of legislative discretion, the exercise of good taste and good judgment in the examination of witnesses must be entrusted to those who have been vested with authority to conduct such investigations. *Hearst v. Black*, 66 App. D. C. 313, 87 F. 2d 68.

Under these authorities, the Senate alone can review this record and determine, in justice to itself and to General Zwicker, whether the bounds of propriety, consonant with the lawful purpose of the subcommittee's investigation and fair and reasonable standards of senatorial conduct, were transgressed by Senator McCarthy in his examination of the general at New York on February 18, 1954, and later in his testimony before this committee.

The select committee is of the opinion that the very fact that "the exercise of good taste and good judgment" must be entrusted to those who conduct such investigations places upon them the responsibility of upholding the honor of the Senate. If they do not maintain high standards of fair and respectful treatment the dishonor is shared by the entire Senate.

4. The conduct of Senator McCarthy toward General Zwicker was not proper under the circumstances

In the opinion of this select committee, the conduct of Senator McCarthy toward General Zwicker was not proper. We do not think that this conduct would have been proper in the case of any witness, whether a general or a private citizen, testifying in a similar situation.

Senator McCarthy knew before he called General Zwicker to the stand that the Judge Advocate General of the Army, who was the responsible person under the statutes, had given the opinion that a court-martial of Major Peress would not stand under the applicable regulations and that General Zwicker had been directed by higher authority to issue an honorable discharge to Peress upon his application.

Senator McCarthy knew that General Zwicker was a loyal and outstanding officer who had devoted his life to the service of his country, that General Zwicker was strongly opposed to Communists and their activities, that General Zwicker was cooperative and helpful to the staff of the subcommittee in giving information with reference to Major Peress, that General Zwicker opposed the Peress promotion and opposed the giving to him of an honorable discharge, and that he was testifying under the restrictions of lawful Executive orders.

Under these circumstances, the conduct of Senator McCarthy toward General Zwicker in reprimanding and ridiculing him, in holding him up to public scorn and contumely, and in disclosing the proceedings of the executive session in violation of the rules of his own committee, was inexcusable. Senator McCarthy acted as a critic and judge, upon preconceived and prejudicial notions. He did much to destroy the effectiveness and reputation of a witness who was not in any way responsible for the Peress situation, a situation which we do not in any way condone. The blame should have been placed on the shoulders of those culpable and not attributed publicly to one who had no share in the responsibility.
D. CONCLUSIONS

The select committee concludes that the conduct of Senator McCarthy toward General Zwicker was reprehensible, and that for this conduct he should be censured by the Senate.

VI

CHARGES NOT INCLUDED IN THE PUBLIC HEARINGS

Senate Resolution 301 provides that the committee—

shall be authorized to hold hearings, to sit and act at such times and places during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Senate, to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such correspondence, books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony as it deems advisable, and that the committee be instructed to act and make a report..."

At the outset of our deliberations, the committee decided, preliminarily, that it was advisable to proceed with hearings upon 13 of the charges in the various proposed amendments, classified into the 5 major categories outlined in the notice of hearing. The other charges, however, remained pending before the committee and its staff. We have studied them in the light of the law and testimony developed in the hearings and have also investigated the evidence suggested in the charges. The committee thereafter confirmed its tentative decision not to conduct hearings on these other items. The committee believes it desirable under the resolution from which its powers and duties stem, to express its reasons for determining that formal hearings need not be conducted on these remaining charges.

The committee eliminated some of the charges for reasons of legal insufficiency, having concluded that the particular conduct charged was not in its judgment a proper basis for Senate censure. The determination of what constituted "legal insufficiency" in the context of a charge intended to support a proposed motion to censure a Member of the United States Senate was the most difficult task imposed upon this committee. No precedents found by the committee were particularly helpful in connection with this task. The path is narrow and the guideposts few.

Only three Senator have previously been censured by the Senate. Two, Senators McLaurin and Tillman, in 1902, for abusive and provocative language and engaging in a physical altercation on the floor of the Senate. The third, Senator Hiram Bingham, was censured in 1929 for having brought into an executive session of the Finance Committee's meeting on the tariff bill, as his aide, the assistant to the president of the Connecticut Manufacturers Association. The Senate found this action by Senator Bingham, "while not the result of corrupt motives" to be "contrary to good morals and senatorial ethics * * * (tending) * * * to bring the Senate into dishonor and disrepute * * *." The very paucity of precedents tends to establish the importance placed by the Senate on its machinery of censure.

Obviously, with such limited precedents the task of this committee in undertaking to determine what is and what is not censurable conduct by a United States Senator was indeed formidable. Individuals differ in their view and sensitivities respecting the propriety or impropriety
of many types of conduct. Especially is this true when the conduct and its background present so many complexities and shadings of interpretations. Moreover, it is fairly obvious that conduct may be distasteful and less than proper, and yet not constitute censurable behavior.

We begin with the premise that the Senate of the United States is a responsible political body, important in the maintenance of our free institutions. Its Members are expected to conduct themselves with a proper respect for the principles of ethics and morality, for senatorial customs based on tradition, and with due regard for the importance of maintaining the good reputation of the Senate as the highest legislative body in the Nation, sharing constitutional responsibilities with the President in the appointment of officials and judges through advice and confirmation and participating in the conduct of foreign affairs through the ratification of treaties.

At the same time we are cognizant that the Senate as a political body imposes a multitude of responsibilities and duties on its Members which create great strains and stresses. We are further aware that individual Senators may, within the bounds of political propriety, adopt different methods of discharging their responsibilities to the people.

We did not, and clearly could not, undertake here to establish any fixed, comprehensive code of noncensurable conduct for Members of the United States Senate. We did apply our collective judgment to the specific conduct charged, and in some instances to the way a charge was made and the nature of the evidence preferred in support of it. And on the basis of the precedents and our understanding of what might be deemed censurable conduct in these circumstances, we determined whether, if a particular conduct were established, we would consider it conduct warranting the censure of the Senate.

In concluding that certain of the charges dropped were legally insufficient for Senate censure, we do not want to be understood as saying that this committee approves of the conduct alleged. Yet disapproval of conduct does not necessarily call for official Senate censure.

The decision to eliminate any of the charges was arrived at only following extremely careful and thorough consideration. Unquestionably, one consideration underlying the elimination of these charges was the overall time factor. Under Senate Resolution 301 the select committee was directed by the Senate to hold its hearings and file its report prior to the sine die adjournment of the Senate in the 2d session of the then 83d Congress. And it was expressly contemplated that the Senate should be able to meet and consider such report at an appropriate time prior to such adjournment.

In order to abide by this direction and conform to such purpose it was necessary to narrow and confine the scope of its deliberations, and particularly of its formal hearings. The committee's study developed 12 major reasons which, singly or cumulatively, led to the elimination of these other charges from the committee's formal hearings. Only a few of these reasons, in addition to the ground of legal insufficiency, involved the passing of judgment upon the merits of any particular charge. The other reasons deal with the feasibility of the committee's attempting to investigate, document, and receive suitable testimonial evidence upon such specifications.
We set forth here the 12 general grounds upon which the other charges were dropped. Following that will be set forth, and appropriately identified, each charge eliminated, with the reasons for the omission of that particular charge indicated by a number or numbers in the right margin of the page. The numbers in the right margin correspond to the numbers of the 12 reasons for eliminating charges.

The 12 reasons applied as appropriate for eliminating particular charges are—

1. Charges which, even if fully supported and established, would not in the judgment of the committee constitute censurable conduct.

2. Charges which, even if fully supported and established after investigation, would in the judgment of the committee be of doubtful validity as a basis for censure.

3. Charges which are too vague and uncertain, or which were too broad in apparent scope to justify formal hearings by the committee.

4. Charges reflecting largely personal opinion rather than delineating specific, concrete conduct upon which a judgment of censure could properly be based.

5. Charges which, in order to determine properly, would have required more time to investigate, document, and take testimony upon, than was practically available to this committee.

6. Charges which were substantially covered or duplicated by other charges upon which the committee actually held hearings and received evidence.

7. Charges concerning statements made on the floor of the Senate about public officials, with which statements we may disagree, but which, if held censurable, would tend to place unwarranted limitations on the freedom of speech in the Senate of the United States.

8. Charges involving such matters as the receipt by a member of a committee of payments not corresponding to the value of services rendered, from persons subject to the jurisdiction of such committee (which might be reprehensible if true, because of some implication of improper influence), but which the committee believed were not susceptible of satisfactory proof in this forum.

9. Charges of improper treatment of a particular committee witness who is presently undergoing confidential security investigation by the executive department.

10. Charges involving misconduct of the staff of a standing committee of the Senate, over which that committee as a whole has jurisdiction and primary responsibility.

11. Charges concerning matters over which other committees have already acquired jurisdiction.

12. Charges on which no substantial evidence was submitted and none could be found by the committee.

The charges eliminated, and the reasons therefor, are:

Amendments proposed by the Senator from Arkansas, Mr. Fulbright:

(1) The junior Senator from Wisconsin, while a member of the committee having jurisdiction over the affairs of the Lustron Co., a corporation financed by Government money, received $10,000 without rendering services of comparable value.

(2) In public hearings, before the Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee, of which he was chairman, the junior Senator from Wis-
cousin strongly implied that Annie Lee Moss was known to be a member of the Communist Party and that if she testified she would perjure herself, before he had given her an opportunity to testify in her own behalf.

(6) The junior Senator from Wisconsin in a speech on June 14, 1951, without proof or other justification made an unwarranted attack upon Gen. George C. Marshall.

Amendments proposed by the Senator from Oregon, Mr. Morse:

(f) Attempted to invade the constitutional power of the President of the United States to conduct the foreign relations of the United States by carrying on negotiations with certain Greek shipowners in respect to foreign trade policies, even though the executive branch of our Government had a few weeks previously entered into an understanding with the Greek Government in respect to banning the flow of strategic materials to Communist countries; and

(g) Permitted and ratified over a period of several months in 1953 and 1954 the abuse of senatorial privilege by Mr. Roy Cohn, chief counsel to the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Government Operations of which committee and subcommittee the junior Senator from Wisconsin is chairman. Mr. Cohn's abuse having been directed toward attempting to secure preferential treatment for Pvt. David Schine by the Department of the Army, at a time when the Army was under investigation by the committee.

Amendments proposed by the Senator from Vermont, Mr. Flanders:

(1) He has retained and/or accredited staff personnel whose reputations are in question and whose backgrounds would tend to indicate untrustworthiness (Sarine, Lavinia, J. B. Matthews).

(2) He has permitted his staff to conduct itself in a presumptuous manner. His counsel and his consultant (Messrs. Cohn and Schine) have been insolent to other Senators, discourteous to the public, and discreditable to the Senate. His counsel and consultant traveled abroad making a spectacle of themselves and brought discredit upon the Senate of the United States, whose employees they were.

(3) He has conducted his committee in such a slovenly and unprofessional way that cases of mistaken identities have resulted in grievous hardship or have made his committee, and thereby the Senate, appear ridiculous. (Annie Lee Moss, Lawrence W. Parrish, subpoenaed and brought to Washington instead of Lawrence T. Parish.)

(4) He has proclaimed publicly his intention to subpoena citizens of good reputation, and then never called them. (Gen. Telford Taylor, William P. Bundy, former President Truman, reporters Marder, Joseph Alsop, Friendly, Bigrant, Phillip Potter.)

(5) He has repeatedly used verbal subpoenas of questionable legality. (Tried to prevent State Department granting visa to William P. Bundy on ground that he was under "oral subpoena.")

(6) He has attempted to intimidate the press and single out individual journalists who have been critical of him or whose reports he has regarded with disfavor, and either threatened them with subpoena or forced them to testify in such a manner as to raise the possibility of a breach of the first amendment of the Constitution. (Murray Marder of Washington Post, the Alsops, James Wechsler.)

(7) He has attempted "economic coercion" against the press and radio, particularly the case of Time magazine, the Milwaukee Journal, and the Madison Capital Times. (On June 16, 1952, McCarthy sent letters to advertisers in Time magazine, urging them to withdraw their advertisements.)

(8) He has permitted the staff to investigate at least one of his fellow Senators (Jackson) and possibly numerous Senators. Such material has been reserved with the obvious intention of coercing the other Senator or Senators to submit to his will, or for the purpose of inhibiting them from expressing themselves critically. (Cohn said he would "get" Senator Jackson.)—Washington News, June 14, 1954.
Reason why eliminated

(9) He has posed as savior of his country from communism, yet the Department of Justice reported that McCarthy never turned over for prosecution a single case against any of his alleged "Communists." (The Justice Department report of December 18, 1951.) Since that date not a single person has been tried for Communist activities as a result of information supplied by McCarthy.


(12) He has disclosed restricted security information in possible violation of the espionage laws. (McCarthy has made public portions of an Army Intelligence study, Soviet Siberia, which compelled the Army to declassify and release the entire document.)

(15) He has used his official position to fix the Communist label upon all individuals and newspapers as might legitimately disagree with him or refuse to acknowledge him as the unique leader in the fight against subversion. (Deliberate slips such as calling Aldai Stevenson "Alger"; saying that the American Civil Liberties Union had been "listed" as doing the work of the Communist Party; calling the Milwaukee Journal and Washington Post local "editors of the Daily Worker").

(16) He has attempted to usurp the functions of the executive department by having his staff negotiate agreements with a group of ship owners in London; and has infringed upon functions of the State Department, claiming that he was acting in the "national interest."

(18) He has made false claims about alleged wounds which in fact he did not suffer. (Claims he was a tailgunner when, in fact, he was a Marine Air Force Ground Intelligence officer *** claims he entered as buck private, when he entered as commissioned officer.)

(19) His rude and ruthless disregard of the rights of other Senators has gone to the point where the entire minority membership of the Permanent Investigating Subcommittee resigned from the committee in protest against his highhandedness (July 10, 1953).

(20) He has intruded upon the prerogative of the executive branch, violating the constitutional principles of separation of powers. (Within a single week (February 14–20, 1953) McCarthy's activities against the Voice of America forced the State Department three times to reverse administrative decisions on matters normally considered internal operating procedures:

(1) The Department had authorized the use of certain writings by pro-Communist authors as part of their program to expose Communist lies and false promises. McCarthy compelled the State Department to discontinue this practice; (2) the Department authorized its employees to refuse to talk with McCarthy's staff in the absence of McCarthy himself. It was compelled to cancel this directive; and (3) John Matson, a departmental security agent who had "cooperated" with McCarthy, was transferred so as to be put out of reach of the Department's confidential files. McCarthy compelled the Department to return Matson to his original position.)

(21) He has infringed upon the jurisdiction of other Senate committees, invading the area of the Internal Security Subcommittee and other committees of the Congress.

(22) He has failed to perform the solid and useful duties of the Government Operations Committee, abandoning the legitimate and vital functions of this committee.

(23) He has held executive sessions in an apparent attempt to prevent the press from getting an accurate account of the testimony of witnesses, and then released his own versions of that testimony, often at variance with the subsequently revealed transcripts, and under circumstances in which the witness had little opportunity to correct or object to his version.
(24) He has questioned adverse witnesses in public session in such a manner as to defame loyal and valuable public servants, whose own testimony he failed to get beforehand, and whom he never provided a comparable opportunity for answering the charges.

(25) He has barred the press and general public from executive sessions and then permitted unauthorized persons whom his whim favored to attend, in one case, a class of schoolgirls, thus holding the very principle of executive sessions up to ridicule.

(26) His conduct has caused and permitted his subcommittee to be incomplete or incapacitated in its normal work for approximately 40 percent of the time that he has been its chairman. (During his 19 months as chairman of the subcommittee, his refusal to recognize their rights—later acknowledged by him—caused the minority members to leave the subcommittee on July 10, 1953, and they did not return until January 25, 1954. His personally motivated quarrel with the United States Army necessitated the interruption of the subcommittee's work and its exclusive preoccupation with the Army-McCarthy hearings from April 22, 1954, to June 17, 1954.)

(27) He has publicly threatened publications with the withdrawal of their second-class mailing privilege because he disagreed with their editorial policy. (Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Time magazine.) Letter to Postmaster General Sumnerfield made public August 22, 1953. See Washington Post, August 23, 1953.

(28) He has exploited his committee chairmanship to disseminate fantastic and unverified claims for the obvious purpose of publicity. (McCarthy's hint that he was in secret communication with Lavrenti P. Beria and would produce him as a witness when Beria was on the verge of execution in Moscow.) Washington News, September 21, 1953 (announcement of plan to subpoena Beria).

(29) He has denied Members of Congress access to the files of the committee, to which every Member of Congress is entitled under the Reorganization Act (title II, sec. 202, par. d).

(31) He has announced investigations prematurely, subsequently dropping these investigations so that the question whether there was ever any serious intent to pursue them may be justifiably raised, along with the inevitable conclusion that publicity was the only purpose. (Central Intelligence Agency, Beria, and so forth.)

(32) Checking through hearings, one will note that favorable material submitted by witnesses will usually have the notation "May be found in the files of the subcommittee," whereas unfavorable material is printed in the record.

(33) He has permitted changing of committee reports and records in such a way as to substantially change or delete vital meanings. (Senator Margaret Chase Smith felt compelled to object to the filing of his 1953 subcommittee reports without their first being sent through the full committee.)

VII

BUSH AMENDMENT

Senate Resolution 301 submitted to the select committee for consideration contains not only the charges for censure, but also contains the amendment proposed by the Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Bush, in regard to proposed changes in rules and procedure for Senate committees.

The select committee is aware of the fact that the Subcommittee on Rules of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration has held extensive hearings on this subject.

Many witnesses appeared before that subcommittee, including Senator Bush, and we are advised that this committee expects to have a report ready for the opening of the next session of Congress.
It is the firm conviction of the select committee that this is a subject which requires much study before affirmative action is taken on a general change in the rules and procedure of committees and subcommittees of the Senate. However, after hearing the evidence and the testimony presented at the hearing before our committee, we are of the opinion that had certain rules of committee procedure been in effect, much of the criticism against investigative committee hearings would have been avoided. For this reason, we report a separate resolution on the subject of the Bush amendment, to read as follows:

Resolved, That subsection 3 of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"(c) No witness shall be required to testify before a committee or subcommittee with less than two members present, unless the committee or subcommittee by majority vote agrees that one member may hold the hearing, or the witness waives any objection to testifying before one member.

"(d) Committee interrogation of witnesses shall be conducted only by members and authorized staff personnel of the committee and no person shall be employed or assigned to investigate activities until approved by the committee.

"(e) No testimony taken or material presented in an executive session shall be made public, either in whole or in part or by way of summary, unless authorized by majority vote of the committee.

"(f) Vouchers covering expenditures of any investigating committee shall be accompanied by a statement signed by the chairman that the investigation was duly authorized and conducted under the provisions of this rule."

And we recommend that this amendment to the rules be approved by the Senate to be effective January 3, 1955.

VIII

Recommendations of Select Committee Under Senate Order Pursuant to Senate Resolution 301

For the reasons and on the facts found in this report, the select committee recommends:

1. That on the charges in the category of "Incidents of Contempt of the Senate or a Senatorial Committee," the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. McCarthy, should be censured.

2. That the charges in the category of "Incidents of Encouragement of United States Employees To Violate the Law and Their Oaths of Office or Executive Orders," do not, under all the evidence, justify a resolution of censure.

3. That the charges in the category of "Incidents Involving Receipt or Use of Confidential or Classified or Other Confidential Information From Executive Files," do not, under all the evidence, justify a resolution of censure.

4. That the charges in the category of "Incidents Involving Abuse of Colleagues in the Senate," except as to those dealt with in the first category, do not, under all the evidence, justify a resolution of censure.

5. That on the charges in the category of "Incident Relating to Ralph W. Zwicker, a general officer of the Army of the United States," the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. McCarthy, should be censured.

6. That with reference to the amendment to Senate Resolution 301 offered by the Senator from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, this
report and the recommendations herein be regarded as having met the purposes of said amendment.

7. That with reference to the amendment to Senate Resolution 301 offered by the Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Bush, that an amendment to the Senate Rules be adopted in accord with the language proposed in part VII of this report.

The chairman of the select committee is authorized in behalf of the committee to present to the Senate appropriate resolutions to give effect to the foregoing recommendations.
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