RITCHIE: A week ago I was in Boston for the first time in a decade, and I was curious about where in Boston you grew up.

FERRIS: Dorchester, on the South Side of Boston. When I grew up and one was asked “Where do you come from,” you didn’t say Dorchester. You said you came from St. Mark’s or St. Ambrose. There were about eight, nine, ten parishes in Dorchester itself. Almost everyone identified with their parish. Dorchester was mostly Irish and Jewish. The Italian enclaves were in East Boston and the North End. Everybody else was sprinkled in between.

RITCHIE: What kind of a neighborhood was that?

FERRIS: It was a working-class neighborhood. My dad worked for the MTA, the transit authority that was then known as the “El.” I went to St. Mark’s parochial school run by the Notre Dame sisters. I went to Boston College High School, and then on to Boston College immediately after high school.

RITCHIE: Were you the first in your family to go to college?

FERRIS: My older brother was first. He went to Georgetown. My younger brother went to Georgetown as well. But, yes, we were the first generation of the Ferris clan to go to college.

RITCHIE: You grew up during the Depression in Boston, but your father had a job.

FERRIS: Yes, but my father lost his job in 1940. He worked, after finishing high school in the teens until that time, for a company which ran a ferry across Boston Harbor, which then connected to a narrow-gage railroad that went up the North Shore—this was before the Callahan Tunnel. That’s how people commuted then. In 1940, with the construction of the tunnel under Boston Harbor, the company went. Dad was out of work then for probably...
a year, maybe a little more, before he was hired by the transit authority.

My mother had always worked during their marriage. She was a telegrapher for the Western Union. She was a key operator originally. She and my dad worked shifts. My mother would go to work at 5:00 in the morning and come back about 2:00. My dad had the 3:00-11:00 P.M. shift. They worked so hard and sacrificed so much for their kids.

That’s about the extent of it. I thought life was great. It was a great childhood. I don’t look back and say, “Boy, was I lucky to get out of there!” I didn’t feel getting out of there was something that was a goal of my life.

RITCHIE: How did you decide on Boston College? I know you started with the high school.

FERRIS: I went to B.C. High School and then just applied to the college. Actually, I applied for the business school at Boston College. My older brother was two years ahead of me and he always made sure that I was measuring up. I applied for the business school and he said, “What are you going to a business school for? That’s nonsense.” So I switched to arts and sciences. I was going to be a math major. But in my junior year I switched to physics. To this day, I still think the reason I switched was because that physics was the one subject that gave my older brother a problem, and I’d get him off my back if I majored in physics. I think I’ve magnified that in my mind and imagination more over the years.

I went to Boston College as a “day hop.” Boston College at the time was almost exclusively commuters. They had no dormitories on campus. Then in my senior year I interviewed for jobs and was hired by Sperry Gyroscope, which was in Great Neck, New York. It ultimately morphed into Sperry Rand and then Unisys, as the years went by. That was an interesting experience. I remember being interviewed and hired by a Japanese American named Kyo Tomiyasu, who was one of the most intellectually honest and fair men I ever met.

There were fifteen hundred engineers and scientists at Sperry, in Great Neck, New York, at the time. Dr. Tomiyasu put me in his section, which was doing fundamental, basic research in microwave propagation. It was 1954. I don’t know how I got into that group with a bachelor’s degree. There were about six other people in that section, all had Ph.D.’s
in applied physics. One had a Master’s degree but intuitively was a genius in the lab. And there was me with an A.B. in physics. I thought I was there to tell them if we were at war or peace, or whether it was baseball or football season.

For my first assignment, I inherited a research project from Wes Matthews, who was a recent doctorate from Harvard in applied physics. He gave me his work book on this research project in which he had exhausted almost every alphabet known to man in the first ten pages. I couldn’t understand a thing about what he was doing. So I visited with Dr. Tomiyaso and said, “Kyo, I’ll resign so you don’t have to fire me, but I have no idea what Wes is doing here on this project.” And Kyo said, “No one else here knows what Wes is doing either. Don’t worry about it. You’re an investment, we don’t expect you to be producing for a couple of years.”

Well, I never found out whether two years would have been enough. The Korean War had not officially ended. The draft into the Army was still very active. Sperry tried to get me a deferment but they were unsuccessful. So I applied for Navy OCS and eventually reported to Newport, R.I.

Volunteering for the Navy provided me with my first interaction with politics. I applied for Navy OCS—I always wanted to be in the Navy—and was accepted in late Fall 1954. I had simultaneously applied for Coast Guard OCS. The Coast Guard accepted me, right after I had accepted and was sworn in by the Navy. But my Navy class didn’t start until March of 1955. In that period of time, late ‘54, President Eisenhower declared that the Korean War would officially end on January 31, 1955. Anyone who got in before that would be a Korean War veteran. So I went back to the Navy and said, “Could you send me to boot camp or anything so I can get in before that date.” Congressman [Olin] Teague of Texas, who was chairman of the House Veterans Committee, introduced a bill immediately upon President Eisenhower’s declaration that anyone who was on active duty by January 31, 1955, would get the full G.I. Bill. I wanted to go back to school when I got out of the Navy. So I pleaded with the Navy to take me in so I could qualify. The Navy said, “No, we can’t do that.”

I was frustrated, so I went down to the Coast Guard—I had never responded to their OCS acceptance—and asked them. The Coast Guard said, “We’ll be glad to take you in.” However, I had already been sworn in by the Navy and lost the opportunity to do that. So
I wrote a letter in late December or early January to Representative John McCormack, who was my congressman. I had never met John McCormack. I wrote him a letter explaining the situation, that I thought it was unfair because people were enlisting during this window and qualifying for the G.I. Bill. Just because I went in the Navy and my class didn’t start until March ‘55, I wouldn’t get the G.I. Bill. It seemed to me that something should be done about it. I didn’t hear from him. Then in late January I wrote to Senator [John F.] Kennedy and Senator [Leverett] Saltonstall. Senator Saltonstall was on the Armed Services Committee. I sent them the same letter, and I didn’t hear from them either.

I believe the 31st of January was a Monday. The Wednesday before the 31st I had to get someone to at least read my letter. So I sent a telegram to all three of my elected representatives in Washington which simply and cryptically said, “Reference my letter of January 31st, cut-off date next Monday, please reply.” It didn’t say anything more, but someone was going to have to pull out the letter and read it. On Friday I got a call from the Navy and also from John McCormack’s office to report on Monday, January 31st, to the U.S. Naval base in Newport. The Navy offered everyone who had been accepted to my class the same opportunity, and fifty-five people in that class showed up at Newport, courtesy of John McCormack. Two or three weeks later, I got a letter from John McCormack, saying, “I hope you have a good Navy career. I was delighted to be able to help you.” Of course, I got letters back from Saltonstall’s and Kennedy’s offices, “We think you made a case and if remedial legislation comes up we’ll take it into consideration”—the type of letter I had expected from all three offices.

It was a beautiful exercise of responsive government. The service that some Members of Congress provide their constituents is extraordinary. This was a great example of that. It was my first interaction with government in Washington, and it was a very positive one.

I got my commission in the Navy and was sent to a destroyer in the Pacific out of San Diego, after first going to Glenview Naval Air Station for CIC, Combat Information Air Controlling training, for three or four months prior to assignment. Then I traveled to pick up my new home, the USS Brinkley Bass (DD887). It was over in WESTPAC, so they flew me to Tokyo, connecting by train to Kobe, Japan. We flew on a propeller plane with bucket seats, but when you were young it wasn’t a hardship! It was an adventure. I had never flown on a plane prior to joining the Navy.
After two years on the destroyer, I got a set of orders from Washington, BUPERS (Bureau of Naval Personnel), transferring me to the Naval Academy to teach. I hadn’t put in for any change of duty, and I had just taken over as the chief engineer. My captain wrote back, “If you take Ferris, you’ve got to send me another chief engineer, because I don’t have anyone qualified.” And the Navy said, “You’ve got to qualify your own people on destroyers, we don’t send laterals in to take on operational responsibility.” So I didn’t leave the ship. I don’t believe I would have decided to leave the ship. It was my decision because going to the Naval Academy would have required me to extend my service obligation for an additional year. I loved being aboard the ship but it was nice to be asked. The next year I was scheduled to get out of the Navy, and damned if the same set of orders weren’t sent to me if I would extend for two years to go to the Naval Academy and teach. I had decided by then to go to law school. When you’re young, you are particularly brash. I wrote a letter back saying, “I will extend if you send me to Harvard to teach.” They sent me back a set of orders sending me to Harvard to teach ROTC. So I was able to attend Boston College Law School at night while I taught at Harvard during the day. I was in the Navy five and half years on active duty, and that’s how I got through law school.

RITCHIE: The G.I. Bill paid the way?

FERRIS: The G.I. Bill paid the way.

RITCHIE: What did you teach at Harvard?

FERRIS: I taught marine engineering in the Fall semester and celestial navigation in the Spring semester. I enjoyed teaching up there so much. The kids were so bright, so eager to learn, and you could go at a good pace with them. It was a great experience.

RITCHIE: And ROTC was much more extensive at that point, I’m sure.

FERRIS: Oh, yes, it was 1958, ‘59. They had ROTC scholarships then, and also non-scholarship volunteers who joined and received their commissions as well upon graduation. I taught three sections, three times a week. My students were in their junior year; there were thirty-five to forty in each section. On drill day they wore their uniforms. There was no squeamishness or embarrassment about wearing their Midshipman uniforms on campus. That sentiment didn’t surface until the late ‘60s. It was a good experience for
them, and a good experience for me.

**RITCHIE:** When you went to law school, did you have any thoughts about what kind of law you wanted to practice?

**FERRIS:** None whatsoever. I was a romantic. Back in the ‘50s when you dreamt of being a lawyer, you wanted to be Atticus Finch. I wanted that experience. I had that idealism and romanticism. I had no specialty at all in mind, although I wanted to do trial work. I thought I’d like to be a trial lawyer.

In my senior year at law school, I had a fear of public speaking. I was very good in moot court, but somehow I thought that was different. Preparation for argument took all the fear out of oral presentation. I somehow equated being glib on your feet with being a good public speaker. So during my senior year, I went to Dale Carnegie to get some confidence in speaking on my feet. I could always tell a story, and they encouraged me to tell stories. They taught you how to link several stories together, how to ask yourself ten questions about the subject of your speech, answer those and that became your speech. I don’t know what good it did, but at least I was making an effort to overcome something I thought was a shortcoming.

In my senior year at law school, the Justice Department interviewed me on campus for a recently started honors program. You had to be in the top ten percent of your class to apply. They picked a couple from BC each year. It was a marvelous program. I started working at Justice immediately, even though the results of the bar exam would not be out until November. I was sworn in in Boston in November and two days later I was sent to Philadelphia for a trial because one of the other attorneys in our section was sick. It was a small trial but to me it was the Scopes Trial. It was a great environment at Justice. I would have been content to make a career there. It is now obvious to me that I gave very little attention to plotting my career path.

I thought I was going to make a career in the Navy, because I loved the Navy. And then one summer when I was at Harvard, I took the midshipmen out for their six-week cruise on an aircraft carrier. A full commander was the chief engineer aboard the aircraft carrier, and his plant was the same plant I had on my destroyer. He had four screws and eight boilers. I had two screws and four boilers. Otherwise the same 600 PSI power plant. And
the junior officers on the carrier had full-time jobs which were collateral jobs aboard a destroyer. I said, “Boy oh boy, it wouldn’t be nearly as exciting making a career in the Navy if I had to serve on anything but a destroyer where one was always in the middle of action.” I didn’t even think about what it would be like to be at a desk as a naval officer. Well, I was experiencing law school while still in the Navy, and law school liked me and I liked it, so it had the makings of a good marriage.

RITCHIE: You were in Boston during the 1960 election, did you get involved in it in any way?

FERRIS: Didn’t get involved politically at all. I was never involved politically in Boston other than for state rep. Every street in Dorchester had a representative running and my next door neighbor, Bill Fitzsimmons, ran and was elected. I remember passing out literature at the polls for him when he was up for election during the ‘50s. But I was never involved in politics in Boston at all. Remember that when I was in law school, I was also on active duty in the Navy and political activity was not permitted.

RITCHIE: Of course, Kennedy didn’t need much help in Boston in 1960.

FERRIS: That’s true, he didn’t need much help in Boston, but he wouldn’t be coming and looking for someone like me anyway. But I followed it with tremendous interest and enthusiasm, being a Catholic. It was a breakthrough election because there was a glass ceiling for Catholics for national office, and he broke that. I think an awareness of that probably later on was a factor that explained my tremendous empathy on civil rights, a sensitivity to a class structure not based on merit that I never quite bought into or accepted.

I followed the campaign in great detail. I read the New York Times for political coverage every day and looked forward to the columns of Scotty Reston and Walter Lippmann. That fall was just magnificent from the standpoint of following politics on a day-to-day basis. But I was offered my job at the Justice Department in early November of 1960. It was a career job, not a political job. I started in the summer of 1961, during the Kennedy administration. Robert Kennedy was the Attorney General when I reported, but I was actually hired during the Eisenhower administration. But that didn’t make any difference, the politics of the attorney general did not have any impact upon the working attorneys in the various divisions.
RITCHIE: But I would imagine there was a certain amount of excitement at the beginning of the Kennedy administration.

FERRIS: Oh, I’m telling you, it was marvelous. I remember vividly when I received the call at the law school from Bill Gillfoyle, who was the Deputy Assistant Attorney General. “Mr. Ferris, I’d like to offer you a job.” I thought, this is a prankster, one of the clowns in my class, and I said, “Well, thank you very much, Mr. Gillfoyle. I’d appreciate it very much if you would send the offer to me in writing.” He said, “I’ll be glad to do that.” [laughs] But he also said, “I’m thinking in terms of putting you in the admiralty section of the civil division.”

Then the admiralty bar was a separate federal bar. In 1967 the Supreme Court merged the federal rules of civil procedure with the admiralty rules in the federal courts. The admiralty rules were primarily the set of procedural requirements to invoke the admiralty jurisdiction of the court which, if successfully invoked, provided some extra remedies. There was a mysterious myth of complexity encouraged by the Admiralty practitioners that was really sort of a hoax, it was a way of keeping the riffraff out. The substantive law was essentially the same, once you invoked the jurisdiction of the admiralty court. There were twelve attorneys in the admiralty section. About six did trial work. We had a West Coast field office and a New York field office, but from Washington we handled Norfolk, New Orleans, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Houston, Boston, Portland, Maine, and all stops in between.

I can remember traveling to Houston very early in my career for a case that I had inherited one that was traditionally assigned to the most junior attorney. It had already been passed through several junior attorneys. It was called the Pacific Thunder, which was the name of the ship. It involved the PL 480 program [“Food for Peace”] where our surplus grain was shipped to poorer countries overseas who would pay the U.S. in their local currency that would not be converted or spent outside the recipient country’s borders. But in this case, the grain was rotting in the hold of Pacific Thunder and the ship never sailed. Whose responsibility was it? Was it the stevedores, the shipowner, the U.S. or the grain owner? The case had been dormant for years while discovery proceeded. There must have been thirty-five lawyers involved in this case; the file a foot thick. Even though the case had been dormant for so long, a pre-trial conference was announced by the trial judge in Houston. A new judge had been assigned to the case. He must have been the junior judge in the
District as I was the junior attorney in the Admiralty section. I was just out of law school and there were twenty-five to thirty lawyers in the courtroom where the pretrial conference was held. The judge said, “What’s this case about?” Someone got up and tried to say something, and someone else tried to say something, and he said, “Wait a minute. Who here represents the United States?” I got up and said, “I represent the United States, your honor.” I’m telling you, that was a fantastic feeling to be able to stand up and say, “I represent the United States, your honor.”

The Kennedy administration brought back nobility to public service. Washington was a proud and lively city again. To work as a civil servant was a noble pursuit. I’ve noticed through the years since, that politicians like to pistol whip civil servants. Justice didn’t get too much of that abuse, but I remember when I subsequently went over to the FCC [Federal Communications Commission], what a great disservice was paid to civil servants. They work their tails off, they don’t get overtime, and they always get pistol whipped by the people in the Congress. They don’t deserve it. I have a very high regard for civil servants.

**RITCHIE:** Did you do admiralty law the whole time you were in the Justice Department?

**FERRIS:** The whole time I was there, for two and a half years. Ken Teasdale came into the Honors Program at Justice the same year I did. He was in the antitrust division, but his office was just down the corridor. We didn’t have sufficient contact to become fast friends but we had a good rapport. After six months, he went up to the Senate Democratic Policy Committee and over the next couple of years we socialized on a few occasions. A couple of times he notified me about jobs in Senators’ offices that he wanted me to consider. I had no interest in leaving Justice and no burning desire to move to Capitol Hill. But he kept telling me about his job with the Policy Committee, “I was talking to Walter Heller this morning, and then I was over....” He was talking to cabinet officers in the afternoon, different subject matters. I thought, “Boy, oh boy, that’s the job that I’d be willing to entertain leaving the Justice Department for.” It was like life aboard a destroyer in the Navy; more problems than could be solved but no possibility of ever being bored.

Then in October of 1963, the Bobby Baker scandal surfaced publicly and Baker left his position as Senate Majority Secretary and Harry McPherson left the Policy Committee to become Assistant Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon. There was an opening on the
Policy Committee staff. Ken called me and said, “Would you come up and talk to [Mike] Mansfield about this job?” I said absolutely. So I had to quickly get a resume together. This was on a Wednesday or Thursday and I was scheduled to see Senator Mansfield on Monday at 11:00 o’clock. It’s sort of interesting, I had no real understanding of what the job was about. I didn’t know whether I had any talents for it, and I wasn’t unhappy where I was. I didn’t know Senator Mansfield and didn’t know what to expect. This was the first time I met the man. It was just the two of us in his back office. For twenty-five minutes he gave me a vigorous third degree. I thought this might have been just his personality, but he obviously was probing for something.

Then he said, “All right, Charlie, when will you start?” I thought, whew, we covered some light years in there that I missed! I told him that I had a couple of small trials over the next month so I needed to give about six weeks notice. He said, “No, you are going to start next Monday. And I’ll call Kennedy and tell him.” I said, “Senator, Robert Kennedy doesn’t know I exist. If you think it’s necessary, I’ll tell my people down there that you think it’s necessary and therefore I’ll leave.” That was it. In the interview he talked about how the House had passed the civil rights bill and it was coming over to the Senate where the Judiciary Committee had been the black hole of civil rights legislation, and he was trying to figure out how to handle it. It was too big an issue nationally to let Jim Eastland just consume it as he had other bills over the decades. He was concerned about that, but I had no idea how I could be of any value to him on that. I just told him, “If you want me, I’ll do my best. I don’t know anything about the nature of the problem or whether I can be of any help, but I’ll do my best. I’ll give you my best shot.” So that was it.

When we got into the civil rights bill in 1964, for some reason Hubert Humphrey, then the Majority Whip, took a liking to me. It must have been a personality fit, but Hubert always wanted to include me in sessions that he had on strategy on the civil rights bill. Of course, that was just such a privilege. Hubert Humphrey was one of the great human beings in the world. My ex-wife and I once went over to his house on a Sunday afternoon in early 1964 and he cooked hamburgers out on the grill. There were no more than eight, ten people there, and my ex-wife, who was not at all interested in politics, came away from that and said, “If that man could have personal contact with the people in this country, no one could vote against him.” He just had that enthusiasm of life and ideas. So to my great good fortune we had a very good relationship from the beginning.
The Majority Leader’s staff was an interesting mix. Stan Kimmitt had been the Army liaison officer to the Senate. When he retired from the Army he came onto Mansfield’s staff. Frank Valeo, who had been a researcher at the Library of Congress, was detailed to the Foreign Relations Committee staff in 1957, working primarily for Mansfield, and then went on Mansfield’s staff when he became Majority Leader, and was elected Secretary for the Majority in ‘63, when Bobby Baker resigned. When [Felton] “Skeeter” Johnston retired, Frank became Secretary of the Senate and Stan took the Secretary for the Majority’s job. It was an interesting sorting out of activities the way Mansfield worked it. He had a perspective that was magnificent. He knew where he was going and what he was doing.

Stan Kimmitt is a very capable guy and had tremendous communication with the Democrats (especially the Democratic conservatives). I was more the liberal on the leader’s staff. I became visible on the civil rights legislation and, because of the Hubert Humphrey working relationship, was perceived as the link to the liberal wing of the Senate. Other liberals had no discomfort with Stan, and Stan used to make sure that I was stamped as the “super liberal,” and all that sort of stuff. We were competitors, but we’re dear friends today. But when you’re young and energetic it matters. And Frank Valeo obviously was very able as a foreign policy analyst and a speech writer, extraordinarily able, and he had been interested in history. He certainly hit a resonance with Mansfield from the standpoint of being able to understand where Mansfield wanted to go and be able to articulate it very well. But Frank really had no capacity at all to communicate with the Senators or to read the Senate as a body. The Senate had a life and a rhythm that was complex and fascinating. The logrolling and back scratching prevented the back stabbing that would have made the institution dysfunctional. It was a Shakespearean play without end. To be able to observe it from within was a privilege that would alone make one’s life worthwhile.

Frank Valeo read Mansfield, and read him well, but had no similar capacity to communicate with the others or to read the Senate as a vibrant pool of egos. He really was not a good man for the Secretary for the Majority’s job. Stan Kimmitt, who succeeded Frank when Frank moved up to Secretary of the Senate in 1966, had the requisite skills to perform that job well, which he did while in that position until 1977. The Secretary of the Senate is more ceremonial and administrative, and you can survive with a politically tin ear, unlike the Secretary for the Majority and the Staff Director of the Senate Policy Committee where it was critical that the capacity to accurately read where the Senate is going and make sure you are out in front of them. Stan was good at that job. He understood the Senate as a vibrant
and ever changing body for the making of national policy. Stan and I had the imbedded political instincts to be able to perceive the subtle changes as they occurred, to read their meaning and to provide advice to the Majority Leader that would keep him ahead of the wave.

I didn’t know Ted Kennedy or Bob Kennedy before I went to the Senate. I met Bob Kennedy during the ‘64 civil rights bill when as Attorney General he came up occasionally to [Everett] Dirksen’s back office and with the Senate leaders put their imprimatur on the staff’s work product. But I never really got to know him until after his election to the Senate. I suspect that Burke Marshall, with whom I worked very closely on drafting the 1964 civil rights bill, and who was very close personally and professionally to Bob Kennedy, told him that I could be trusted and relied upon. It might have been that Bob didn’t think I talked funny, being from Massachusetts. We had this nice, easy relationship. I always considered it part of my job for Mansfield to establish trusting, working relationships with Senators on both sides of the aisle.

During the fourteen years I worked for Mansfield I don’t think I saw him three times sit in the cloakroom with the other Senators, listening to the chatter and the buzz. He didn’t like gossip. He used to have breakfast each morning with George Aiken, and Aiken was a big vacuum cleaner for gossip, although not a gossip himself. Mansfield used to get his fill of what was going on from George Aiken at breakfast. But the Aiken-Mansfield relationship was one that was not based upon quid pro quo. Aiken didn’t require a return flow of gossip. If he had, the breakfast meetings would have broken off early. Aiken and Mansfield were two small-state unflashy politicians who enjoyed each other’s company. Sometimes awareness of those personal things has an impact on who can make a deal with whom, or what’s holding up a deal with whom. So they can be very important.

I think Stan and I together had the Senate covered very well. Now, I’m leaving Ken out of this. Ken I think was a lot more conservative than I was and his personality probably wasn’t as outgoing. I think that Ken probably was hurt that Hubert Humphrey took a liking to me when I was number two. I didn’t control that relationship with Humphrey. I suspect but don’t know that Ken was unhappy with my relationship with Humphrey. But Ken left at the end of the session in October 1964. I never had a communication with Ken to find out really how he felt, although in March 1965, Senator Mansfield told me he received a letter from Ken volunteering to come back during the preparation of the Voting Rights Act.
Senator Mansfield asked if I would object to that. I told him that I would because it would undermine the perception of the leader’s confidence in me with the duties of the first chair. He said okay, he would tell him no.

RITCHIE: You prefaced this by saying that this was just when Bobby Baker had left in the Baker scandal. Senator Mansfield, during his first couple of years as leader had relied on Baker and the structure that Lyndon Johnson had left, and it had embarrassed him badly by the fall of 1963. I get the sense that he was trying to put together a working team of people to be his team rather than Johnson’s.

FERRIS: Oh, yes, I think that’s right. He inherited from Johnson, like Johnson inherited from President Kennedy a staff that got Johnson into a lot of trouble. You know, [McGeorge] Bundy, [Walt] Rostow, [Robert] McNamara, were all very bright, but Kennedy would have been able to say no to them. Johnson didn’t have the self-confidence to be able to do that. Mansfield, who didn’t thirst for the job as Majority Leader—it was thrust upon him—he also inherited the infrastructure, and it did embarrass him. There’s no doubt he had a grand scheme. Bobby Baker was a big fund raiser and collector of campaign cash, and he was also deeply involved in the legislative process. One hand fed the other. Mansfield wanted to separate that completely. I didn’t realize at the time what he was doing, but in retrospect I see exactly what he was doing. The policy was all down in my shop. The politics would be in Stan’s shop. Stan came to Policy Committee meetings but was never active in policy. I used to have to give the presentations on the legislation. And I never got involved with the Campaign Committee, even in the internal politics of the Senate, which were really manifested mostly in the Steering Committee and the assignments of Senators to committees, where there is an awful lot of internal politics going on. Stan had those responsibilities.

Mansfield sorted it out rather nicely. He knew where he wanted to go. It took him a little time to get there. But he got where he wanted to be.

RITCHIE: And after Bobby Baker was gone, there was never a scandal again while Mansfield was there?

FERRIS: Never a scandal, no. He was a magnificent human being. I always say that when you’re young you really don’t know how to size up situations. You have energy
but you don’t have much wisdom yet. You don’t realize that when you go to work for a Senator how little you know. “I’m going to do this, I’m going to do that for him,” but the flow of knowledge is from the principal to you. You think you’re providing something of value for him, but you’re actually absorbing from your principal his values. If you had more wisdom and less enthusiasm, you would try to learn the inside of your principal. You do eventually learn your principal’s instincts and values if you are a good staff person. It permits you to make the decisions when he’s absent because you know what decision he would make, and those might not be the ones that you would make if you had not been educated by his values. You naturally try and analyze exactly what drives him, and what are the policy premises that drive him. That makes you a better staff person. Being a staff person, people say, “Well, you cannot establish your own identity.” But what you do is so much more important than your ego. You’ve got to suppress your own ego for what you’re working on. The member is the one who has to go out and get reelected. I remember Mansfield coming around in September before his election and saying, “You’ve got the best job. You don’t have to go and campaign.” [laughs] He had to go back and campaign! You can just take some time off.

We in the leadership staff never got involved in his campaigns. He separated his Montana office from his leadership office. Stan came from Montana, but I don’t think he got involved in his campaigns. And Frank didn’t get involved in his campaigns. But the people in his Montana office, led by Peggy DeMichele, did. But he had scoped out where each party belonged and he held to it.

RITCHIE: He had also come in for a lot of fire from the Democratic Senators in the fall of ’63 because they didn’t think he was being an active enough leader. They were getting nostalgic for Lyndon Johnson. Tom Dodd and a few others really assailed him on the floor.

FERRIS: I was down on the floor when Senator Dodd gave his speech.

RITCHIE: Did you get the sense that he was trying to make a more effective leadership at that point?

FERRIS: I think Mansfield was trying to redefine the leadership. The leadership that he inherited was a leadership that consulted with the large barons in the Senate, whether it was the [Robert] Kerrs or the [Richard] Russells, but Mansfield had this egalitarian sense
about the Senate. Maybe coming from a small state he was sensitive to that. In his mind there were no Senators with special preferences and prerogatives; all were the same; all had a contribution to make. I think that drove him.

I remember the Dodd incident. It occurred in the early evening, after the then customary Scotch cocktail hour. Senator Dodd made an impassioned plea to be led, “tell me what to do.” Mansfield didn’t think that was the job of a Senator, to be led. Every Senator was encouraged to make every input. They should be listening to each other. But they were not used to that under Lyndon. It was really a magnificent transition that Mansfield performed during his tenure. Whether you would call it logrolling or back scratching, the members used to talk to each other. They used to respect each other in certain areas because they felt a particular Senator spent a lot of time in his committee studying this subject matter and when his judgment had been proven to be good, and when there was that coincidence of judgment, a Senator would be comfortable with you. There were hundreds of different relationships, depending upon the issues, the Senators, and the parochial interests, all sorted out. It was an endless and continuing process to find out which Senators followed which colleagues on every set of issues. When members came onto the floor, you had only a few seconds to communicate quickly what the issue was and how the leadership was voting, but it was very effective to convey to each Senator how a colleague that you knew he traditionally followed on these issues was voting. That would give him additional comfort. It was not just that the Majority Leader wanted you to vote this way. Each Senator had to exercise or at least was invited to exercise his or her own judgment. It was different.

But in the early ’60s there was frustration because the legislative achievements were not big. You had the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, that probably was the most significant accomplishment. Then you had the civil rights bill coming, but it wasn’t yet there. The Tom Dodd incident was a reflection of the lack of legislative activity but it was also a sense that a larger change was developing in the functioning of the Senate.

RITCHIE: Senator Mansfield was going to give a speech about leadership, but it was the day Kennedy was assassinated.

FERRIS: It was a response to Dodd, although he didn’t mention Dodd.
RITCHIE: That was the first month you were up there.

FERRIS: That’s right, but I saw Dodd make his remarks on the floor. I came in October of ’63 and the assassination was in November, so it was during that window. But Mansfield did not have an ego that needed to be fed. He had tremendous pride and had a real sense of values but he had no vanity. I really think he felt, “You could have this job of Majority Leader, and I will not feel as if you have taken away my personality by taking away my title.” Not everyone up there had that same sense of self worth. But after the assassination of JFK, with Lyndon Johnson in the White House, LBJ’s strength having been the Congress, and having inherited a preformed agenda, the two forces converged. Even with the surge of legislation that resulted, I think that Mansfield was true to the premise of egalitarianism, in the sense that he never took credit for any of the Senate’s accomplishments. He always put other Senators in the forefront. He would give credit to them. He always gave credit to someone else, who justly deserved credit, but he didn’t try to share in any of if it. In the long term, I think that helps. Members like it. No one likes a skimmer, and Mansfield wasn’t a skimmer.

RITCHIE: Could you tell me about the Democratic Policy Committee itself? What was the Policy Committee? Did it actually meet as a committee?

FERRIS: It met as a committee. It met at lunchtime, at the call of the chairman, usually every two weeks. The agenda was not a published agenda. Mansfield always wanted to clear the calendar. Lyndon Johnson used to keep things on the calendar because it was some Senator’s special bill and he’d make that Senator come up and ask if he could get it scheduled, so it was a “you owe me” thing. Mansfield wanted to get things through. Clear it off. If you leave it there it collects flies. He felt if it comes out of the committee, it should be brought up on the floor for disposition.

The first thing we did was to review the calendar. I’d go down and give a review of each bill’s content, to see if the members of the Policy Committee had any input. Most of the bills were non-controversial bills, like swapping a piece of government property for another piece of government property, but on the significant pieces of public policy legislation there would be a good discussion. The members of the Policy Committee would have views, pro and con. Mansfield made the membership of the Policy Committee very representative of the Senate. It was a good sounding board. You had a geographic and
ideological spectrum represented on the Policy Committee, so the discussion behind closed doors was something that would give Mansfield great intelligence from the standpoint of what he should expect when he got out on the Senate floor. That took the place in part of some of the gossip that he didn’t pick up.

The meetings were all behind closed doors. There were no press conferences after the meetings. And there was never a leak from Policy Committee deliberations. That was very important because the members of the Policy Committee felt safe in what they said. It was not going to come back and bite them in the tail. Therefore you got very honest evaluations from members who politically couldn’t say some of the things they were able to say in the Policy Committee because there would be political repercussions back in their states. So that made the meetings worthwhile. Senators on the Policy Committee who were in town came to the Policy Committee meetings. It was given priority. They were there, and that would not be the case unless they felt it was worth being there. That’s in capsule what the structure was like.

RITCHIE: Were they in a sense an advisory committee to the leader?

FERRIS: Well, yes, it provided valuable input to the leader’s thinking. It is interesting how much power the Democrats gave their leader. The Democrats historically had always concentrated the leadership in one person. The floor leader was the chairman of the Conference, the chairman of the Policy Committee, the chairman of the Steering Committee. The Republicans fractured their leadership. They gave more people a source of patronage, but Senator Dirksen as floor leader did not have the benefit, as did Mansfield, of using his Policy Committee and his Conference as a sounding board or a vehicle to communicate with the Republican members.

I remember Ed Beach, the staff director of the Republican Policy Committee. He was a marvelous guy, who had been a nuclear submarine captain–I probably had an affinity for him because he was a Navy man–but he was not in the flow of legislative policy among Senate Republicans.

Senator Bourke Hickenlooper chaired the Policy Committee rather than Everett Dirksen. Dirksen had to gather the sense of his group in a very different way. The responsibilities of their leadership positions were separate and not interrelated. They had
Conference luncheons, chaired again by a third Republican Senator, independent as well; and probably the discussion there gave Dirksen a sense.

RITCHIE: Of course, Senator Dirksen only had thirty-five members to deal with, and you had sixty-five.

FERRIS: Yes, and you’ve got greater discipline when you’re in the minority. Well, you can look now. The Democrats in the Senate today have much greater discipline than we ever had. You have a sense of responsibility to govern when you’re in a majority. It’s much easier to be cohesive and take a shot at what the majority is doing when you’re in the minority. It’s a different dynamic, I think. I never experienced the minority side, but I just can assume what it was like.

RITCHIE: You had a big majority, but it was an ideologically divided majority.

FERRIS: Yes, and everything then was done on a bipartisan basis. I don’t remember one thing in my fourteen years that was ever passed on a strictly partisan basis. Never. It was always bipartisan. In the Class of ‘66 you had Chuck Percy and Ed Brooke. [Charles] Mac Mathias, Bob Dole, Mark Hatfield, etc., I think came in with that class. The center of gravity of the Democratic Party was more liberal than the Republican Party, but they both had this full ideological spectrum in each party. That made for better communications across the aisle, and that’s so much healthier.

RITCHIE: Today every vote in the Congressional Record begins [Daniel] Akaka or [Lamar] Alexander, and you know most of the names that will follow because the party’s vote together almost all the time.

FERRIS: That’s sad, because it’s ideology driving the conclusions. I’ve always said that ideology is the lazy man’s way to replace thinking. You have a set of conclusions. Okay, these are my conclusions, what’s your question? I don’t think that’s really the way it should be.

RITCHIE: Was Senator Mansfield using the Policy Committee to forge consensus, to try to get the sides of the party together on an issue?
FERRIS: Well, certainly on Vietnam he did something like that, because a delegation went down to the White House, I think it was in ‘67, with a unanimous Policy Committee recommendation on Vietnam. That had Dick Russell and Bill Fulbright on the committee at the same time, and both of them agreed on it. Generally, however, I think he used it much more as a sounding board because I don’t think he personally was trying to be the capstone on competing sides of legislation. Dirksen always was the capstone, and Mansfield always encouraged him to be the capstone, because he always felt, certainly on civil rights, that you needed Dirksen to bring his Republican cohorts with him on cloture. I think the great legislators are the people who put capstones on other Senators’ competing positions. You go back and look; and I don’t think you’ll find too many bills that Wilbur Mills ever introduced into his [House Ways and Means] committee. Other people used to introduce competing proposals, and they’d have hearings, and then he would put a capstone on it and it would come out of his committee. Now everyone is rushing to get their name on a bill. It seems more important to say it is my bill than to discuss the virtue of the legislation. It’s bypassing the legislative process if the bill is written before it is introduced and compromises are made to get people to join in its introduction but then the hearings and the markups are perfunctory. So it’s a totally different dynamic now, and I don’t think a healthier one.

RITCHIE: Mansfield presumably chaired these lunches.

FERRIS: Yes.

RITCHIE: Was it open free-for-all or was there some structure?

FERRIS: He usually had some opening remarks that would start the discussion, but he didn’t pass out an agenda beforehand. At some point, usually as the meeting began, the discussions were much more like a conversation at dinner than a committee in session. There was tremendous respect for Mansfield. No one on that committee ever tried to overshadow him or undercut him. He had what is the most important ingredient of leadership, he had the trust of the people he led, the absolute trust of the people he led. No one wanted to abuse that or affect their relationship with him on that basis. So he could encourage a free flow in the discussion and people would still listen to him. No one would try to dominate or try to prevail one way or the other. If they did, he thought fine that’s just because they felt strongly about an issue, that’s great, that’s how it’s supposed to be. I never
saw him upset by any of the discussions that took place in the Policy Committee. I don’t recall any real angry moments in the Policy Committee. You’re sitting over lunch and it’s not for public consumption so you don’t have to posture.

RITCHIE: Would you invite other Senators in for these lunches or was it just the members of the Policy Committee?

FERRIS: Just the members of the Policy Committee. At times, but infrequently, outsiders would be invited. Averill Harriman came back and spoke when he was over in Paris for the Vietnam peace overtures. During the Nixon administration [Henry] Kissinger came up and spoke on the Vietnam negotiations. Charlie Schultze, who was OMB [Office of Management and Budget] used to come up each year and give an overview. Charlie was a great communicator. He was a teacher and he could really put things in the common man’s language. But I don’t recall anything notable from the standpoint of other Senators coming in. He used the caucus for that. Sometimes he would go to a Policy meeting and talk about something and then he’d have a caucus and talk to all the members about it. That was the virtue of having a centralized leadership.

RITCHIE: They wouldn’t vote in the Policy Committee, would they?

FERRIS: No, it was all by consensus. If anyone said, “I’ve got a problem with that piece of legislation we’re dealing with,” that’s it. That legislation would go through a further period of gestation. That problem would be noted. We used to keep the daily calendar with the holds on it, and we wouldn’t publicize names associated with the holds. It was amorphous in the sense that we would share it with Dirksen’s floor assistant [Oliver] Dompierre. He would give me his calendar, what bills his Senators had problems with, and then I’d give him where ours were. They wouldn’t publicize ours, we wouldn’t publicize their’s. But if things started getting heavy and hot, and pressure started to build on a piece of legislation, the system would bend. A hold wasn’t forever. It was a testing of intensity. Someone wanted more time to get ready for a bill. But if someone said, “You’ve got to at least confront the issues,” you’d have to tell the other Senator “It’s not open ended, you’re going to have to get ready by” some date. I thought it worked very well because it was non-public and it was really for the management of the agenda on the Senate floor by the two leaders. It was that process that really determined what the schedule of legislation was going to be over a period of weeks.
RITCHIE: How would you define the job of the staff of the Policy Committee? What kinds of responsibilities in general were you assigned?

FERRIS: The Policy Committee staff was very limited. Pauline Moore was the chief clerk of the Policy Committee. She was from Illinois. I think she came with Scott Lucas back in the ‘40s and was there through Lyndon Johnson. Lyndon Johnson really liked her very much. He would call her about the status of legislation after he went to the White House. Pauline never participated in any of the floor activities. She started to compile under Lyndon Johnson the status of every piece of legislation that was on the president’s agenda, whether it was mentioned in his annual State of the Economy, the annual budget or the State of the Union, etc.; each phrase would be associated with a piece of legislation and Pauline kept that record each Congress. She used to update it every week. She’d call the appropriate staff person on every committee and get this update. It was a big weekly undertaking.

I think Lyndon Johnson used that information as president as well as when he was Majority Leader, much more than Mansfield ever did. It was a way of keeping abreast of where everything was, and that was very helpful to us. She would say, “Gee, I just spoke to Stewart McClure on Public Works and this is the problem they have there,” so it was good information. Keeping it up was very good, even though I don’t think Mansfield personally used the print-out of it. Lyndon Johnson, who had a tendency to micromanage when in the Senate, continued to do so in the White House. He got a copy every week—it was sent down to his legislative people. The Policy Committee, through Pauline, was the legislative memory of the Senate.

Then Ken and I constituted the remaining professional staff, and when Ken left I brought in Dick Streeter, who was then a trial lawyer at the Justice Department. Then Dick went back to Cleveland to private practice after a year or two; then Dan Leach, who was a trial lawyer at the Justice Department with me, who left Justice to go into private practice back in Detroit, but he returned to take a job on the Policy Committee staff. Late in the ‘60s or early ‘70s, Dick Russell asked Mansfield if he could have someone on the staff. Mansfield said “Certainly,” and Mack Ferguson from Georgia came on board for a couple of years. I think after 6-7 years of Civil Rights and other Great Society legislation, Senator Russell probably perceived that we were too efficient facilitating the liberal agenda—at least I hope that was his reasoning.
We used to rotate on the floor. One of us was on the floor at all times when the Senate was in session. The leader couldn’t always be on the Senate floor, so we were his representatives on the floor, there to protect his interests and to convey to Senators what had been or would be going on for the remainder of the day. The staffs of the various committees would also rely upon us to give them a sense of when their legislation might be ripe for consideration.

RITCHIE: So you didn’t do reports on policy or background papers for the Senators?

FERRIS: No we didn’t. We did very little written material. Writing gets you in a lot of trouble. I remember preparing memos for Mansfield, whether about a tactical thing on civil rights or some other issue. I’d be writing it for Everett Dirksen, because as soon as I’d give it to Mansfield, Mansfield would go around and show it to Dirksen. He’d say, “Now, Everett, what do you think about this?” So you’d have to write it so it could be shown to the other side. That’s fine, you knew that was his predisposition. His disposition was not to hide things from anyone but to be open. And he had a very good working relation with Everett Dirksen. They were very close. They trusted each other, and they never undercut each other. It was nice to see. All it changed was the language and the tenor of the written memo.

Mansfield’s relationships with Howard Baker and Hugh Scott were the same, but Scott had a little edge. I always thought that something happened to a Senator when they became Chairman of their party. Scott was Chairman of the Republican Party at one time. Henry Jackson was Chairman of the Democratic Party. Bob Dole was Chairman of the Republican Party. There’s a little streak that gets into them, when they have that party chairman responsibility, you have to be quick and cutting to get listened to because no one pays attention to the chairman of the party for too long, so you have to make your point quick and make it tart. There was a little of that in Hugh Scott, generally. But I think Hugh Scott and Mansfield also had a good relationship. They went to China together. Mansfield had good relations with all the Republican leaders he served with.

The usual day in the Senate would start on the Senate floor at noon. Earlier in the morning, we’d go up and have a cup of coffee with the leader. No agendas. We’d just sit and talk about what was in the newspaper. It was marvelous. Mansfield used to come in
every Saturday, even though the Senate was hardly in session any weekend. Of course, we came in on Saturday because he came in on Saturday. On Saturdays a tradition started that any press that wanted to talk to the leader could come in midmorning and have a cup of coffee with him. It was always Walter Mears and Steve Gerstel, one AP, one UPI, and maybe a couple of others, but most reporters weren’t there on Saturday. It wasn’t like the press conference in the well of the Senate before each session. It was just sort of a conversation back and forth. He was very good at that. He was very at ease in that environment. He never tried to hide or conceal things in any forum, and therefore he could be very comfortable. If you tell the truth you never have to worry about what you said.

**RITCHIE:** You said that someone from the Policy Committee was on the floor all the time, but you also had Stan Kimmitt there as the Majority Secretary. What was the relationship between the Policy Committee and the Majority Secretary when you were on the floor?

**FERRIS:** We were on the floor all the time. We were sort of the parliamentarians for the Majority Leader. We learned parliamentary procedure. That was something that few Senators knew. It was an impossible task to try and get your arms around it, but once you did, there was a rationality and rhythm to it all. It was a framework. There were checks and balances within it that worked, and fit, and made sense. So we were there all the time because parliamentary shenanigans would happen in the still of the night. Stan was on the floor much more than Frank ever was, but Stan was more comfortable with the Senators and more aware of the rhythms of the Senate. But he could come and go as he pleased. We had to be there because people could make motions and make parliamentary moves. Stan could be in the cloakroom chatting, and sometimes we were in the cloakroom chatting, since there was more than one of us.

Those chats were very important, because that was intelligence gathering. You pick up more with little chats about what is necessary, and what’s going to happen, or why someone is going to take certain action. Mansfield didn’t participate in that. He knew that it was valuable and that we were doing it, that we had communications with the members on that basis, because we’d tell him what was going on. We overlapped. Stan had much closer ties generally to the Southern Democrats and I did to the Northern liberals, although there was a great overlap with each of us. Lister Hill, Bill Fulbright, and John Sparkman were a few from the South with whom I had most enjoyable and fruitful relationships. But you
usually gravitate to where your comfort is, and Stan was a military officer and had the characteristics and discipline, and the need of order that the military have an affinity for, and I was wild and undisciplined [laughs], so I fit the other side. I think it worked very, very well.

RITCHIE: Did you do any head counting to try to predict what the votes were going to be?

FERRIS: Yes, certainly.

RITCHIE: How did that work?

FERRIS: Well, we did our own head counting. Stan would do his head counting. I’d be collecting it from several Senators who would be doing their own head counting. It wasn’t just my intelligence, it was their intelligence. I’m sure Stan was doing the same thing. Stan was much more of a good soldier in the sense that he wouldn’t do a head count unless the leader asked him to do it. And Mansfield didn’t like the perception of twisting someone’s arm by asking them how they were voting. I did it informally. I wasn’t getting a head count for the leader, I was just trying to find out what needed to be done to reach final passage. I never would tell someone, “I’m doing a head count. How are you going to vote?” I’d get it indirectly. It worked.

RITCHIE: I interviewed Bill Hildenbrand [Republican Secretary] and he said that the one thing he learned about head counting was that you could never take anyone’s vote for granted.

FERRIS: That’s what Tip O’Neill used to say. The first time he ran for reelection in Massachusetts, he asked his next door neighbor, “Did you vote for me, Mrs. O’Malley?” She said, “Tip, you didn’t ask.” So you always have to ask. Don’t assume anything about anyone. That’s a good lesson in life, really.

RITCHIE: You mentioned also that you were specializing in parliamentary procedures. Did you work closely with the parliamentarian as a result.
FERRIS: Yes, we did work closely with the parliamentarian. But the first year, from ‘63 through the civil rights bills of ‘64 and ‘65, that’s when we were struggling with it. Things like Rule 14, Paragraph 4 was the idea of putting things directly on the calendar after the second reading. Charlie Watkins, the parliamentarian, was one of the most incredible human beings I ever met. Charlie Watkins started out as the journal clerk in 1912. There was no parliamentarian in the Senate except for the presiding officer. But they were always looking for help and Charlie kept the journals and had an accumulation of knowledge on what had been done, and would advise them. Finally they moved him over and made him the Senate parliamentarian. He was eighty-three or eighty-four years old when I first met him, and his mind was as good as anyone’s thirty years younger.

I remember going over to him one time with a harebrained scheme—you always came up with harebrained schemes when you didn’t know what you were doing. We’d go over there in the morning and just walk in. “Charlie, you got a moment?” “Sure, sure.” “What about doing this?” Charlie would say, “That’s never been done before, but let’s see if we can do it.” I said to myself, “God, if I can only have an open mind like that when I’m fifty, let alone when I’m eighty-four, that I can always learn something new.” What a marvelous state of mind and sense of self-worth and confidence that he had in his own job. He was saying: There might be something I haven’t thought about before, I might learn something new. It turned out he never did learn anything new from me, but he was a marvelous human being and I learned so much more from him than parliamentary procedure. I was sorry to see him retire.

Floyd [Riddick] learned to master the rules, but with Charlie it was in his blood. Floyd mastered what had been done before him. But it seemed the rules and Charlie started simultaneously. Charlie was so unlike Lew Dreschler on the House side, who was a dictator. Nothing was written down. It was just what Dreschler said. Charlie wrote down the precedents over the years and put out this manual of procedures. Floyd was always very helpful, but it is very difficult to succeed a legend. Just the personality of Charlie, he was a great lesson in life.

RITCHIE: The rules of the Senate do seem so arcane when you first encounter them, and it’s amazing to find that they actually do work, once you begin to understand them!
FERRIS: Absolutely. In getting into them, where do you start? They seem to have no beginning and no end. How do you start working on these rules? But the presumption of who has the right of recognition, and the order of motions, it all has a fairness to it in the scheme of things. It takes you about six months of total immersion and you don’t know where you are, and finally you surface and say, “Whew, hey! This has a pattern and a rhythm to it.” There were a few members of the Senate who knew the rules. Dick Russell was the great parliamentarian. Jim Allen of Alabama was a great parliamentarian. He had been lieutenant governor of Alabama and presided over their Senate. It was like the old pre-Charlie Watkins days, he had to be the parliamentarian and he learned the rules. He was a very smart guy, Jim Allen. Then when Bob Byrd came in as Whip, he learned the rules. He immersed himself in the rules and became well versed in them. But there weren’t too many others, because it took an awful lot of effort to get your arms around it. Bob Byrd had the intensity to do that. Dick Russell had the experience to do it. He was like an elected Charlie Watkins. And Jim Allen had it by his experience down in Alabama.

For the leadership, it all comes down to one trump card. The rules provide that the first Senator to seek recognition gets recognition. But when two Senators seek recognition and one of them is the Leader, the tradition of the Senate specified that the Leader gets recognition. Nothing was explicitly stated in the Senate rules about the Leader’s priority of recognition. That little edge is like 00 in the roulette wheel: the house gets the edge with that priority of recognition. Because you have the right to commence the process of motions. Jim Allen used to use the rules, and he knew them well, and he knew that we knew them well. And he knew when we had him checkmated. He’d smile, he respected that. But it was like having a good adversary. I liked Jim Allen. Did you get to know him?

RITCHIE: I just overlapped with him very briefly. He died a year or two after I got there.

FERRIS: I used to love to go to speak at colleges. A friend of mine from the Navy, who was dean at one of the schools at Auburn, used to invite me down to talk to classes. On one visit, at the faculty dinner the night before a Saturday football game, the president asked if I would like to be their guest at the next day’s game against Alabama. He said, “We’re playing Alabama tomorrow in football, have you ever been to a Southeast Conference football game?” I said, “I’ve been to football games in the Northeast.” He said, “it’s very different down here.” So I agreed to stay over. The game started at noon, but we got there
at 11:00 A.M. and the whole stadium was filled. They were practicing their cheers! The Winnebagoes were all over the campus. People used to come in Friday night for the Saturday games. This was a real social event.

The wife of the president of the university came up to me at the dinner the evening before and said, “Mr. Ferris, you’re going to be sitting next to Senator Allen. I’ve had great difficulties with him at dinner parties because he’s very hard to have a conversation with.” I thanked her very much for her thoughtfulness and concern. Senator Allen and I were sitting about five removed from the president and his wife. This was back when Louise Day Hicks was stirring up problems with school desegregation in Boston. Jim Allen and I were sitting together, and there was a place where some African Americans had assembled in one corner of the stadium and he pointed to them and said, “You see, Charlie, how we handle our race problems down here? Now you guys in Boston have to do better.” And we’re going back and forth with our banter, and I saw the president’s wife looking down perplexed at this animated conversation between this Boston Irishman with this immutable Southern Senator. I left at halftime to catch my plane from Augusta, and I never spoke to her again, but she probably never knew why I struck such a resonant cord with Jim Allen. But we had a good relationship up in the Senate and I liked the man. His views on race never openly surfaced in the Senate to my recollection, but he was elected under George Wallace and that limits your flexibility. It’s survivability. But I thought he was very smart and I liked him. And I never detected any malice in his heart.

The Senate used to adjourn in those days around the beginning of October. The head of the Senate dining room in the Capitol came to my office in the early fall and said, “Charlie, you know all the waitresses and staff in all the Senate dining rooms get laid off until January when the next Congress convenes.” I said, “You’re kidding me. Let me see what I can do about that.” Almost all employed in the dining rooms were African Americans. I went up to see Mansfield, who was unaware of this practice. “We can’t lay these people off, they’re right at the edge of economic survival when they are employed.” Jim Allen was chairman of the Administration Subcommittee of the Rules Committee. Mansfield said, “Go talk to Jim Allen and see if he can do something about that.” So I went to Jim Allen and said, “Senator, the leader wanted me to talk to you about this. These people are going to be laid off when we adjourn sine die, and be without pay for three months. Can’t we do something about that?” He said, “Well, if the leader wants to do something about that, we’ll do something about that. We’ll keep them on and find other tasks for them
to undertake during the recess period.” There was no push back. He went to the phone in the back of the Senate chamber and made a call and the matter was resolved. That says a lot about the man. You can’t always tell about Senators by their voting profiles.

RITCHIE: I got there just in time to see him leading the post-cloture filibusters in ‘77 and ‘78, when he tied the institution into knots. At that point it was a battle of wits between Robert Byrd and James Allen.

FERRIS: Oh, he knew the rules. He probably knew the rules better than Bob Byrd did at that point. Jim Allen was a formidable competitor.

RITCHIE: Well, I think this is a good break for today, but what you’ve told me really explains a lot about Senator Mansfield, who he chose, why he chose them, and how they worked together.

FERRIS: You’ve never gotten that from any of the others?

RITCHIE: Oh, yes, but I’ve gotten it from their perspective, and I’m interested to hear it from your perspective. I talked with Frank Valeo, for instance, but he talked more about foreign policy than what was going on on the floor.

FERRIS: Well, he didn’t know too much about what was going on on the floor, and I don’t know if he cared too much about what was going on on the floor. He was a foreign policy wonk, and he was good at it. He wrote clearly about it. That was the job he should have had. I always think it’s very unfair to put someone in a job that they really don’t have the talents for. The only thing is, Frank wouldn’t have been a good staff director for the Committee on Foreign Relations either because Frank had communication with Mansfield only. He had no horizontal communication skills at all, and in the Senate you need the horizontal communication. That’s what Stan and I had. We communicated with all of the members and we were always talking to all of the members, and Frank didn’t know how or to see the value in that.

RITCHIE: The other reason why this is so important is that every Majority Leader since Mansfield has said publicly that Mansfield was the model of the Majority Leader. Every single one of them, including Trent Lott and Bill Frist, has said that Mansfield set the
model for the way leadership should be conducted in the Senate. Anybody looking at the history of the Senate in the twentieth century is going to need to deal with Mike Mansfield.

**FERRIS:** He’s a good model. I don’t think there are going to be many people who will have the personal attributes of integrity and patience and forbearance that he had to be able to perform the way he did. But it’s nice to strive toward something like that.

He had a remarkable career. Coming out of the mines, running away at twelve, and be able to end up with the strength of character and discipline of mind that he had. I was in love with the guy. He was my mentor, he was a great man. We grew fond of each other over time. It was when he came back from Japan that our friendship grew so strong. I visited him every day that I was in Washington. His office was just three blocks up the street, in the old Evening Star building. I used to walk up there every day and we’d eat lunch and talk for an hour and a half about everything and nothing. His secretary, Barbara Hickey, and his driver, Fred Wilson, who were very loyal to him, found him inscrutable in many ways. They’d say he’d be in there as mute as a sphinx, and then I’d come in and we’d be jabbering back and forth and they’d say, “What the hell is going on in there?” It was almost like Jim Allen and I at the football game. But it was good for him that he had an outlet—a safe and sympathetic ear and heart—and it was great for me because he was someone that I admired so much and so fully. I was hoping for osmosis.

**End of the First Interview**