RITCHIE: Lyndon Johnson was famous for the word consensus"; he used it all the time and he considered it essential. By 1966 the consensus was beginning to come apart and the Foreign Relations Committee contributed to this through its series of highly publicized, nationally televised hearings in January and February of 1966. Since that was such a turning point, I wondered if you could give me some of the background to those hearings, how the committee decided to hold them, and what preparations were made for them?

HOLT: Well, I can give you some of it. I was not primarily concerned with it. In the fall of 1965, following the Dominican affair, Fulbright began to take a closer look at the situation in-Vietnam and he went through a considerable period of questioning what should the committee do about it, what should he do about it. I remember in the late fall, I guess it was, a snowy Saturday afternoon, I and Marcy and Jim Lowenstein sat around with Fulbright in his office in the Dirksen Building, kicking this thing around. As one consequence of that, Lowenstein put Fulbright in touch with Bernard Fall, the historian of that area.

I guess in December of ’65 Fulbright and a few other senators were going to Australia. I think it was to a meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, which the United States is not a member of but we traditionally have been invited for the international affairs and defense part of it. The White House--well, the Defense Department, but everybody up here thought it was the White House telling Defense what to do--refused to make a jet aircraft available, and Marcy really got upset about this, and screamed and yelled, to no avail. So they went to Australia in a propeller plane and Fulbright took along a bunch of books on Southeast Asia and the Far East generally, he had a lot of time to read! He came back just full of Chinese history and the incidents of the terrible way in which the West, principally the British, mistreated the Chinese, and decided that we were going to have some hearings, and so they were scheduled. Actually, I was out of town for part of them. I had to go to San Francisco with a bunch of Mexican congressmen, and then when I got back I got the flu or some damn thing and lay around at home for two or three days watching them on television. But this produced the first of many confrontations between Rusk and Fulbright.
As I recall, Fulbright at that time was not as firmly opposed or as outspoken in his opposition to American policy as he later became. He was more in the position of questioning it. Clark Clifford, much later, described the evolution of his own position with respect to Vietnam as moving from a doubt to an opinion to a conviction to an obsession. I think that's probably a fair way to describe the evolution of a lot of thinking about this. I think those initial hearings in early 1966 were significant in two respects. One, they contributed to, and in a sense they began, the erosion of support for the Johnson policy in the Senate. Up until that time the only people who had just flat opposed it were Morse and Gruening. You began to see people like Fulbright and Gore moving in that direction. The other significant aspect of it was that they made dissent respectable. The dissenters were no longer a bunch of crazy college kids invading deans' offices and so on; they were people of substance.

I don't remember the precise sequence of this, but later on anti-Vietnam war witnesses before the committee included very solid members of the establishment. I think they had the president of the Bank of America at one point, and General [David] Shoup, who was former Commandant of the Marine Corps, and such people as that. As a matter of fact, to skip over a couple of years, on the morning after

RITCHIE: It seems that the fact that those hearings were televised--or most of them, at least--had a lot to do with their impact on the public's consciousness. Did the committee have any role in encouraging the televising of the hearings? Or was that strictly up to the networks?

HOLT: Well, that was strictly up to the networks. You may recall at one point Fred Friendly left CBS in a huff because the network insisted on doing a rerun of "I Love Lucy" instead of the hearings. But, yes, the committee encouraged it. I didn't have anything to do with it, but Marcy would talk to people from the networks: "Would you be interested in televising it if we had a hearing with these witnesses on this day?" And the schedule of the hearings was fixed with television coverage in mind.

RITCHIE: From that period on, through the end of the Johnson administration, it seems that things got worse. The war escalated and the committee's relationship with the administration grew more distant and tense. What was the atmosphere like in the committee, and how were people responding to what was happening?
HOLT: It got pretty frigid before we were through. I think it's not exaggerating
to say there developed a Cold War between the committee on one side and the
State Department and the White House on the other. This led to other things as
the committee, mainly Fulbright but he had support from people like Morse,
McGovern, and Gore and to a considerable degree Javits and Case, the committee
cast around for other instruments which it could use as levers to bring pressure
on the administration. The chronology is not very clear in my mind, I'm not sure
whether some of these things happened during the Johnson administration or
Nixon's. But there was a series of amendments to foreign aid legislation
restricting this or that or prodding them in this direction or that. The basic
statute for the State Department was amended to require that it be reauthorized
annually, which opened the door to poking around into all kinds of things down
there. There was that kind of activity going on.

There was another kind of evolution going on up here during those years as well,
the opposition in Congress to the Vietnam war really developed in the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. For a while the committee view was a minority in
the Senate as a whole and a good many things the committee proposed or wanted
to do were not supported by the Senate. Then the Senate came around and
started supporting these, but the House wouldn't go along with

them. Then eventually in the House this opposition developed also. There was
that sort of progression.

RITCHIE: I was wondering about the relationship between various senators.
Johnson was encouraging his supporters to respond to Fulbright's speeches, and
I was wondering if there was any tension created by the strong difference of
opinions. The Foreign Relations Committee were out in advance, they were
attacking the incumbent president, who was a member of the majority party. Did
disrupt the way things were done around the Senate in that period or have any
consequences on personal relations in the Senate?

HOLT: I don't recall any. You know the Senate, with respect to things like this, is
a rather peculiar institution. I think it's one of the glories of the Senate and why it
works as well as it does that senators very rarely let their personal feelings to
ward each other get in the way of carrying out the Senate's business, or vice versa.
You know, there were some rather close friendships and working relations
between senators who disagreed with each other about most questions of public
policy. At the other extreme there were senators who didn't like each other very
much who usually voted the same way.
RITCHIE: On that line, I was wondering what was Fulbright's relationship to the growing group of doves, especially those on the committee, people like McGovern, Eugene McCarthy, Gore, Cooper, and Church? A lot of the anti-war legislation has other names on it, people went to the forefront on it. Fulbright always seemed a little more skeptical. Was he a leader of that group, or was he aside from it?

HOLT: Well, I guess he was neither a leader nor aside from it. He became sort of a hero to the anti-war movement generally, but he was quite content for people like Church, McGovern, Cooper, so on, to be out front on these things in the Senate. Fulbright, I think, was for a long time basically more skeptical of the efficacy of things like the Cooper-Church Amendment. He kept saying, "Well this is a great idea if you can get the votes, but I don't think the votes are there." His approach, I don't know that he ever articulated it quite this explicitly but I have the impression that what Fulbright was doing was--well, first he tried to turn the administration around by persuasion, and it pretty early became evident that wasn't going to work. And then he thought the public is where this battle has to be fought, both in terms of pressure on the administration and in terms of changing votes in the Senate.

Fulbright was always, in connection with this other thing, a great believer in what he called educational hearings. If you have enough hearings which attract enough attention, then people will learn something from them. The whole thing about "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free," or "give people the light and they will find their way," or something of that sort. He didn't have much patience for charging windmills in the Senate, offering amendments which were going to get defeated 72 to 10 or something like that.

RITCHIE: Did the committee have very much relationship with the anti-war movement outside of Congress?

HOLT: Yes. You know, some of them were witnesses at these hearings one time or another. Some of them used to come down and meet privately with Fulbright or other members of the committee. Because of the time pressures on senators there was even more of this done with respect to the staff, Moose and Lowenstein primarily. Some of these people were a source of information. There was a group in New York, I can't remember names, which at one Point actually got some of its people into North Vietnam and the reports on what they found there were useful. They were also a source of ideas, you know, "why don't you do this, why don't you do that." Some of them the committee used, and
some they didn't. I don't remember specifics now. The best sources for the committee's role in this whole Vietnam affair would be Moose and Lowenstein or Carl Marcy. Both Moose and Lowenstein may be more available in a couple of months than they have been lately [Richard M. Moose was assistant secretary of State for African Affairs, and James G. Lowenstein was ambassador to Luxembourg in the Carter administration].

RITCHIE: Skipping ahead, but this really covers the period we're talking about, the Pentagon Papers covered the period up to 1969. When they came out did the revelations come as a surprise to you and the members; of the committee, or had you reached the same conclusions?

HOLT: As a matter of fact, the Pentagon Papers had come into the committee's possession a year or two before they appeared in the New York Times.

RITCHIE: How was that?

HOLT: Well, somebody gave them to the committee, in the hope, I suppose, that the committee would treat them like the New York Times did. Norville Jones, who was also involved in a lot of the Vietnam staff work, looked at them and decided there really wasn't very much there that would be helpful, and in addition to that the circumstances under which they came into the committee's possession were such that the committee felt some constraints about how it used them. I didn't know this, as a matter of fact, until after the damn things were published and Norville said to me one day, "You know, I've had these in my safe down here for a year or two." Once they were published, a cry arose that the committee do something about them.

We chewed for a while on the problem of what to do and we finally got some extra money, I guess, from the Senate and hired three people to review, the things and write analyses and so on. They worked away for a year or two, not very much really came of it. One of them, a fellow named Bob Blum--who at that point was a graduate student at the University of Texas, doing his Ph.D. under Walt Rostow of all people!--did a report which had to be classified "Top Secret" and I'm not clear now as to why that was, since the damn papers had been published anyway. I guess maybe he had some other stuff in it. And there was a long controversy with the executive branch about declassifying the damn thing; they never agreed to do it and the committee just sort of backed away from fighting about it. The committee did go so far as to have the GPO print a limited number of top secret copies, and I guess they're locked up in a safe around the place somewhere still. You know, at this point I don't even remember the point of the damned report.
RITCHIE: One comment by Fulbright on reading the Pentagon Papers was that the only time that Congress was mentioned at all in them in the administration’s deliberations over the war was either how to manipulate Congress, or Congress was a troublesome nuisance. Was this just an inevitable outgrowth of past policies, or was this something unique to the Johnson administration?

HOLT: No, I think that’s fairly constant of any administration. The executive branch historically--in my experience anyway--has always taken the view that Congress is an obstacle to be overcome, either through manipulation or pressure or whatever. That attitude, sometimes subconscious, is inherent in the executive branch approach to the Congress. It is one of the things that inhibits the executive branch from real consultation with Congress because they take the view down there that they don't want to get Congress involved in it until they have gotten all their own ducks in a row and reached a bureaucratic consensus as to what they want to do. Then they approach Congress as salesmen rather than as partners or as consultants. You know, I was amused this morning to see stories about [Ronald] Reagan's visit to the Hill yesterday and how he wasn't going to make the mistakes that Carter had made. Well, my God, at about this time in 1976, or maybe a little bit later, Carter also came up here.

As a matter of fact he did something which was unprecedented in my experience, and Sparkman said it was unprecedented in his, and his goes back a lot longer than mine: Carter as president-elect sought a meeting with the Foreign Relations Committee. We sat down there in S-116 for an afternoon while Carter and the committee talked about the world situation and how things were going to be done and so on. Carter was very eager to establish rapport. He gave the committee his private telephone number in Plains. He gave them his private post office box number where they could get to him without going through the Secret Service opening the mail. And he said that before the Inauguration he would like to spend a whole day with the committee and some other people on the Hill really going over the whole world, a tour d'horizon and so on. He said, "We'll work out a date. I don't know where it will be. I'd like to do it at Camp David, but maybe I can't get to Camp David before the Inauguration." It turned out he couldn't, so in January we all went down to the Smithsonian and literally spent the whole damn day. He had his Cabinet designates there, Brezezinski was there, and there was a very extensive discussion. I don't know of any president-elect who has gone to such lengths, and then sure enough after the Inauguration things started going downhill!

RITCHIE: So it's something inherent in the office.
HOLT: Yes. I think so. I think probably the founding fathers intended it that way.

RITCHIE: There were some interesting people on the committee in the 1960's, and one who is especially identified with the Vietnam war but who is still a very hard person to figure out, is Eugene McCarthy, who came on the committee in '65 and challenged Johnson in '68 and became a major figure in the anti-war movement. Did you work with McCarthy in that period, and do you have any assessment of him?

HOLT: Well, you said it correctly when you said he was hard to figure out. Yes, I worked with McCarthy some. I'd known him casually for a number of years, going back I'd guess to when he was in the House. I guess my closest association with him came in connection with his efforts to create an oversight committee to the intelligence community. I drafted the resolution which he introduced on that. It went through several drafts, both before he introduced it and during the committee's consideration of it. Fulbright was also very interested in that, as was John Sherman Cooper, who was one of the few senators who had had direct experience with the intelligence community in the executive branch. Held been ambassador to India. But McCarthy's a very complex man.

In the summer of 1967 the committee's frustration over Vietnam took the form of the questioning and reexamining the authority of the president to get the United States involved in the extent that it was, and as a part of this there were hearings and one of the witnesses was Nicholas Katzenbach. I've forgotten whether he was still attorney general at the time or had become under secretary of State, but in any event he expounded a very extreme view of the president's constitutional powers, relying mainly on his power as commander-in-chief. The committee was really shocked to hear this. I was not present at that hearing, but that afternoon the committee had some piece of legislation on the Senate floor and I was over there helping with it and McCarthy came in and said, not in the Senate but just to me and I guess Fulbright was there, he said, "Somebody's got to take these guys on, and I'm going to run for president." We said, "Well, good luck," or something like that. He has a very sardonic sense of humor and he said, "The Catholic church has now abandoned the doctrine of Papal infallibility. The Johnson White House has taken it up." After McCarthy got heavily involved in the presidential campaign I did not see a great deal of him, casual meetings here or there, and you know he voluntarily went off the Foreign Relations Committee after that, something which I hated to see happen.

RITCHIE: I never understood that.
HOLT: I never did either. At one of these casual meetings I had with McCarthy, I ran into him in the Monocle down here at lunch one day and he introduced me to his companion. He said, "This is Doctor So-and-So, he was the campaign psychiatrist." I think it would take a psychiatrist to explain McCarthy's behavior after 1968. I think one thing happened might have been that after having come so close--and indeed he did achieve one objective of dethroning the president--after the horror of the Democratic convention in Chicago in 168., he just sort of withdrew into a shell. You know, he got off the Foreign Relations Committee, he left the Senate, his marriage broke up, he ran again in '76 in a really quixotic move. I haven't seen him now for quite some time.

RITCHIE: To go back, we've been talking about Vietnam in the late 1960's, but you took a sabbatical from the committee some time in the mid-sixties.

HOLT: No, no it was earlier, '61 and '62.

RITCHIE: I'm sorry, I thought it was later. You published a book about that, didn't you?

HOLT: Well, a couple of books. The sabbatical in '61 and '62 was to be a fellow of the Institute of Current World Affairs, a small private foundation in the business of supporting young people for living abroad, not for formal study. I was forty at the time I became a fellow and I was the oldest one they'd ever had. This idea originated with the Institute and their thought was that they would support seriatim three staff members from the Foreign Relations Committee for living would be so abroad, with the hope that this experience valuable that the committee would pick it up and finance it itself and make it a regular part of sort of mid-career staff training, and indeed that it might spread to other committees on the Hill. There's no reason why Banking shouldn't send one of its people to the London School of Economics. Well, they ended up taking four people from the committee but the seed never flowered as was originally hoped. Anyway, I spent my fellowship in Latin America, most of it in Columbia. The only responsibility of an Institute fellow is to write a newsletter at intervals of approximately a month, dealing with really whatever he wants to deal with. These are circulated to a mailing list of journalists, bureaucrats, academics. Mine came to the attention of Frederick Praeger and after I got back he asked me would I turn them into a book, and I did. That was published in '64. Then later on, Allyn and Bacon asked me to write a high school textbook on foreign policy and I did that. It was published I guess in the early 170's.
RITCHIE: I brought that up to ask about what was happening in the committee concerning Latin American affairs in the late ‘60’s. Vietnam gets the headlines and all the attention. Did the administration and the Congress begin to neglect Latin America again after a period of focusing on it? What was happening on the Latin American front?

HOLT: Well, not very much really. I remember fussing about it around here. You never could get any time on the committee’s calendar to have a hearing on Latin America. But, oh, I guess around 1969 or so Church, who by that time was chairman of the Latin American subcommittee, decided he wanted to do something about the AID public safety program, which we’ve talked about, so we got back into Latin America that way.

RITCHIE: It seems as though the committee and the Congress only focus on Latin America when there is a crisis there, Cuba or Chile. Is that particularly true of Latin America or is that true of foreign policy in general?

HOLT: Congress tends to follow the headlines with respect to its interests in foreign policy. I think it’s true generally. You haven’t heard anything—at least I haven’t heard anything—from up here about Africa in some time, for example. Or even about western Europe,

beyond an occasional something with respect to beefing up NATO, or putting Neutron bombs in western Europe, or something like that. With respect to Latin America, I think this is true also of the upper levels of the executive branch. I don’t think Latin America attracts very much attention above the assistant secretary unless there is trouble somewhere. And that also may be true worldwide in the executive branch.

RITCHIE: So, wrapping up the Johnson administration at this point, Johnson announced in March 1968 that he wasn’t going to run again, that he was going to devote himself to negotiating a settlement in Vietnam. At the same time, two of his Defense secretaries, McNamara and Clark Clifford, both began to reevaluate their positions on Vietnam, and the administration seemed in some respects to be responding to the type of pressure that the Congress had put on it. Was there any kind of thaw in relations between the administration and the Foreign Relations Committee in the last year of the Johnson administration?

HOLT: I don’t recall any, no.

RITCHIE: Things had just gotten too hostile?
HOLT: Yes, and there was a feeling up here also that the administration wasn’t really pushing those negotiations as hard as it might, that it was too sensitive to the views of the South Vietnamese, too accommodating to those views, and that American policy with respect to Vietnam was really hostage to the government in Saigon. You know, the prolonged quibbling over the shape of the negotiating table in Paris just drove people up the wall around the Senate.

RITCHIE: Was there much direct contact between the members of the committee and South Vietnam? Did the staff and members of the committee make visits, or were they trying to get around the administration to do any research on their own?

HOLT: Well, going back even to the fifties, Mansfield had made Southeast Asia a particular subject of interest and went out there I guess just about every year for a good long time, usually accompanied by Francis Valeo. I don’t recall Mansfield going very much after things really got sour, but I don’t recall any senators from the Foreign Relations Committee anyway. We tried to persuade some, specifically Fulbright, but he never would do it. He didn’t want to expose himself to "brainwashing," for what George Romney got in trouble for calling "brainwashing," although it was an accurate description. But the committee did send staff out there at frequent intervals. In the beginning it was Dick Moose and

Jim Lowenstein, and then after Lowenstein left the staff in ’74, I guess, Chuck Meisner went with Moose. Meisner had served in Vietnam as an Army intelligence officer and was a damned good economist, and contributed a lot. I think by the time of the American withdrawal Moose told me that he’d been to Vietnam twelve times. The Moose-Lowenstein reports were highly prized by the committee. A good many of them were sanitized somewhat and published, and had an impact. To skip ahead a little bit, when things really began to unravel out there, in the winter or early spring of 1975, the committee had before it a request from the Ford administration for something like a billion dollars in supplemental aid for Vietnam, about which the committee was profoundly skeptical. In connection with its consideration of it, Moose and Meisner were sent back to Vietnam for what turned out to be their last trip. They were very excited by—might almost say horrified by what they found out there, which was that the situation had deteriorated greater than anybody in Washington thought. So much so that they reported back even before they returned home. I’m not clear now whether they did it by telegram or telephone, seeking an early meeting of the committee on their return to consider this. They also talked directly to Mansfield, who I think was the fellow who told me to arrange the meeting.
Mainly in consequence of the Moose-Meisner report, although there were some other things like the media and instincts and so on that contributed to this, the committee in those last days of April 1975 became very exercised that the United States should get Americans out of Vietnam as promptly as possible. One of the things that underlay this position the committee came to was the feeling that Graham Martin, who was then our ambassador in Saigon, had a plan to hang on there until things became so bad that a considerable operation in force would be needed to protect and evacuate the embassy, and that this in turn would provide an entree for the United States to reinject itself into the fighting, notwithstanding that by this point the executive branch was operating under a statutory injunction not to involve American forces. But the thought we suspected was that in order to save Americans this would be waived, and as a matter of fact, Ford had a legislative proposal up here to allow him to do it. This view or suspicion was reinforced by some evidence Moose and Meisner found that Martin was changing some of the reporting that came from his staff before he sent it on to Washington. We felt that in some respects we were better informed than was the State Department and the White House.

As the committee’s concern about this grew, it sought a meeting with the president himself, and the president responded very promptly. [Clifford] Case, the ranking Republican, phoned the White House during a committee meeting aid, “Yeah, come on down one morning and the president’s at four o’clock this afternoon.” So the committee and Moose and Meisner and I and John Glenn, who had sort of injected himself into this, went down there and sat around the table in the Cabinet Room with Ford and Kissinger, and I guess whoever was chairman of the JCS. The members of the committee speaking as individuals were pretty firm in telling the president to get these people the hell out. The president was pretty firm that he wanted to use as much time as he could to get out as many Vietnamese, who had really put themselves at great risk in helping us, out as well. That was the dilemma they faced. You know, in the end, the situation in Saigon just collapsed, but I think this activity of the committee contributed to pushing the administration towards withdrawal.

There’s an interesting little post-script to all of this. After the evacuation, Martin was back in Washington and was nominated to be United States negotiator with respect to the status of the trust territories of the Pacific Islands, with the rank of ambassador. The position of negotiator did not require Senate confirmation, but the rank of ambassador did. I guess if Martin hadn’t been so sensitive to matters of rank the matter would never have come up, but the committee did not want to confirm Martin. Indeed, even before the final days out there he had done some things that
vastly irritated some members of the committee, particularly [Jacob] Javits. There was one instance in which Martin had written a very critical and sarcastic letter about Javits to somebody who lived in New York. You know, you just don't do things like that if you expect them to come to light. Anyway, the committee had a hearing and then later in executive session began to wrestle with this problem. It was clear that they were not going to confirm him, but neither could they bring themselves to take the step of actually rejecting him. So somebody had the thought that there was something in the record that required further investigation or more information and they seized on this like a gift from heaven and said, "Well, let's direct the staff to provide this additional information and postpone further consideration until we have it." They said, "Is that clear, Pat?" I said, "Yes, it's very clear, and just to make it clearer, I'm not sure how long it will take the staff to do this." Two or three people said, "Oh, don't hurry!" McGovern said "Suppose we say the Fourth of July, 1990."

The press afterwards was very curious about when Sparkman said, "We're waiting for a staff report"--and the press said, "Well, when will you have it?" Sparkman turned to me and I said, "I don't know yet, I don't know how long it will take." They said, "Who on the staff is going to be in charge of it?" And I said, "I am." That was the last that was heard of that, except that Martin kept pressing the White House and Kissinger to press the committee to move on this thing, and as a matter of fact I had a very private phone call from State asking the question of "if they wrote a letter urging confirmation of Martin would it have any effect?" I said, "Not if you take care to deliver it to me." And they said, "In that case, we will do so." The State Department didn't want the guy in there either, but they had to give the appearance--or felt they had to give the appearance.

RITCHIE: To go back to the end of Johnson's administration, when the Nixon administration came in and when William Rogers became Secretary of State and Henry Kissinger became National Security Advisor, did the relations between the committee and the State Department change appreciably?

HOLT: Initially. Fulbright went down to the White House to see Nixon and Kissinger to urge them for God's sake to liquidate this mess. As he was leaving Kissinger walked out with him and said, "We're going to end this senator, we're going to end it." And Fulbright felt pretty good about that, but you know it didn't last very long. Rogers had a rather different experience. He also said to the committee that they were going to end it,
and the committee kept taking him to task about it and bringing up things that
his predecessor had done, and Rogers found this somewhat exasperating. He
said, "Look, you're talking about the past. I didn't do those things. I'm here now.
I'm going to do thus and so." But it was bone which the committee was very
reluctant to stop chewing on. I remember John Stevenson, who was the legal
advisor at the State Department, came up here once to testify on some relatively
minor United Nations treaty and ran into a buzzsaw of criticism about Vietnam,
which left him totally nonplussed.

RITCHIE: I understand that while Kissinger did not testify before the
committee as National Security Advisor, he did try to cultivate relations with
Fulbright and other committee members through lunches and things like that.
Did he make himself available to the staff and to the senators?

HOLT: Not to the staff. He, as had Rostow, refused to deal with the committee
formally on what I think are spurious grounds of executive privilege. But anyway
that's the rule that's been established. But he was amenable to private meetings.
Members of the committee and Kissinger, it wasn't a committee meeting, met at
Fulbright's house one night, for example. Marcy was there, nobody else from the
staff was there. And

there were contacts like that. But they were not very productive and Fulbright
never liked them very much because he thought it was an evasion of the ways
things ought to work, that Kissinger ought to be over there in the Caucus Room.

RITCHIE: It seemed clear after a while that Rogers was not the most influential
foreign policy advisor in the Nixon administration, but he was the main one you
could get. It must have created a great deal of frustration that the man who really
had the president's ear was off-limits for formal questioning.

HOLT: Oh, yes.

RITCHIE: Was there any talk about trying to change that?

HOLT: Oh, yes. I guess that was the genesis of the proposal which has surfaced
up here from time to time to make the National Security Advisor subject to
Senate confirmation.

RITCHIE: But it never was able to gain enough support?

HOLT: Well, I think as a matter of fact it passed the Senate once or twice but it
always failed somewhere in the House, or in conference.
It's interesting that one of the principal opponents of that thing was Charles Percy, who is now coming to new eminence.

RITCHIE: Looking at the whole fabric of the Nixon foreign policy, detente with the Soviet Union and opening up relations with the People’s Republic of China, it seems like the committee was in agreement with him on those major issues.

HOLT: Yes.

RITCHIE: But it's just that Vietnam kept bubbling in the pot.

HOLT: Yes, I think that's right. You know, after Kissinger became Secretary of State the relationship changed markedly because one of Kissinger's priorities when he became Secretary was to carry out a policy of detente with the Foreign Relations Committee. He came up here with some frequency, both in public and in executive session. There was a new warmth and forthcominess from the Department. The committee, or Fulbright had argued with Rusk and Rogers for years to get them to validate my Passport to travel to Cuba and they were awfully stubborn about it and finally we just let the damn thing drop after everybody had repeated himself endlessly. When Kissinger became Secretary wereopened the question and Kissinger said Okay. There were things like this happening.

Then in '74, as a part of the unraveling of Watergate, the business of wire-tapping of National Security staff members while Kissinger was in the White House came to light, and Kissinger had that emotional press conference in Vienna, or wherever the hell he was on his way to the Middle East with Nixon, that you know he would resign if the Senate didn't clear him of the scandalous accusations and so on. So we were forced into an investigation of Kissinger's role in this. It was complicated by the fact that one of those whose phone was tapped was Dick Moose, who was on the NSC staff before he came to work for the committee. Another was Tony Lake, whose tap was left in place even after he had departed the NSC staff and gone to work for Muskie in connection with Muskie's presidential campaign of '72, and Muskie didn't like that one damn bit! So we had a lot to do with Kissinger during the summer of '74.

As one of Fulbright's swan songs in the Senate--held been defeated in that Arkansas primary in June--he wanted to have some hearings on detente and Kissinger agreed to lead them off, and they were scheduled for early August. One of the problems we had with Kissinger was that although he always professed a willingness, even eagerness, to appear before the committee, he had great difficulty when it came to finding a time to do so. We had nailed down, or thought we had nailed down this date in August,
and a day or two before Larry Eagleburger on Kissinger's staff called me and said, "The Secretary won't be able to take that date." I just blew tip. I said, "For Christ's sake, Larry, we've gone through all of this. It's all set, what the hell is it? He has to." "Well, he really puts great importance on the statement and he just doesn't have time to prepare a proper one." And I said, "Oh, nonsense, for Christ's sake, we won't take that as an excuse." He said, "Well, don't you dare tell anybody, but I think here's something brewing at the White House and maybe the committee won't want to have a hearing that day anyway." That was the first solid information I had that a presidential resignation was forthcoming, and I reported this to Fulbright, without referring to the possibility of action at the White House. I just said, "Kissinger's backed out gain." And Fulbright said, "Well, I'm not surprised, I think the president's about to resign."

**RITCHIE:** Nixon's main focus as president seemed to have been on the Soviet Union and China, Vietnam has been described as a "grotesque sideshow" of his foreign policy, and Latin America seems to have been neglected very sharply, with one striking exception. That as what was happening in Chile. I wondered how the committee responded to that and what your role was at that time?

**HOLT:** Let me see, Nixon was inaugurated in January of '69. There was a presidential election scheduled for Chile in September 1970. The problem of Chilean politics at that time was that Eduardo Frei, under the constitution, could not succeed himself, and there didn't seem to be anybody else of comparable stature who would provide Chile with a government in the Frei tradition. The front runner was widely assumed to be Salvador Allende, a Socialist who had come pretty close to defeating Frei in '64. There were some conservative Chileans who came through Washington, I guess in late '69, early '70, who came to see me to express their concerns about the prospect of the election of Allende. Whether they saw any senators I don't know, I didn't arrange for them to. And that's about the only thing that I recall that happened up until September of 1970 when Allende won a plurality but not a majority. Under the Chilean constitution in those circumstances, the president was to be elected by the Congress in October. Historically the Congress had never failed to elect the candidate with the Plurality, although it had the freedom to elect somebody else. Shortly after that election in early September, Fulbright phoned me one time and said, "Have you heard anything about the CIA being up to monkey business in Chile?" And I said, "No, I hadn't." "Well, would you like to?" he said. I said, "Well, if they are, I sure would like to." And he said, "Well come down to my office." So I did. He had in his possession some Xeroxed
memoranda from various people in the office of I. T. & T. [International Telephone and Telegraph] in Washington, which indicated very clearly that I.T.T. was going to great efforts to inspire some kind of activity on the part of the CIA. There was no indication that they were getting a positive response from anybody, but this was pretty startling stuff. Kissinger had reacted in public to the Allende election rather excitedly. Held said something in Chicago about how if Chile had a communist government it would affect Argentina and Peru-- anybody who knew anything about Latin America knew that was nonsense, but anyway that was what Kissinger said.

The circumstances under which these documents came into our possession were such that we couldn't really use them, so Fulbright and I pondered what to do about it and decided that the best thing would be for Fulbright to talk to [Richard] Helms. An appointment was made for Helms to come up to see Fulbright. I prepared a list of what I thought were pretty careful questions for Fulbright to ask Helms, which if we got truthful answers I thought would tell us what we wanted to know one way or the other. Fulbright and I considered whether I ought to be present or not and finally decided that the chances for Helms to be really forthcoming would be improved if I were not. There was a little trade-off there, because I knew more about the background in Chile than Fulbright did, but any way I think it was my suggestion that I not be there. Fulbright reported to me on the conversation later that Helms was very categorical in denying any involvement and what seemed to make it particularly persuasive, was Helms was very frank in saying, "Look, we don't have any means to accomplish this even if we wanted to." Which it turned out later was substantially what he had also said to Nixon, who told him to do something about it. But we didn't know that at the time.

Well, in point of fact, the concern at that time was over whether or not the Chilean Congress could be persuaded to elect somebody besides Allende. There was an elaborate scenario as to how this might be done, but hell it didn't work. There was no evidence in public that anybody except I.T.T. and some other corporate friends had even tried to make it work. And so Allende was elected by the Congress and took office, and things in Chile promptly began to go downhill. The Nixon administration never made any secret of its dislike of Allende. You know, there was a freeze on aid, there was a freeze on Ex-Im loans, the United States used its veto or influence to stop loans from international financial institutions, private banks cut off credit. As far as the banks were concerned the explanation was that Chile is a very poor credit risk, which God knows was true.
In the spring, I guess it was March of 1972, the Senate Judiciary Committee was having hearings on the nomination of [Richard] Kleindienst to be Attorney General, and the nomination would probably have been handled routinely except for the fact that sometime before Jack Anderson had published some I.T.T. documents indicating some kind of hanky-panky as between John Mitchell and Kleindienst on the one hand and I.T.T. on the other about an anti-trust action. So the Judiciary Committee was inquiring into this, and lo and behold during those hearings Anderson followed up by publishing some of the I.T.T. documents from September 1970 dealing with Chile. At that point there was an enormous hue and cry and the Foreign Relations Committee felt called upon to involve itself in this. Frank Church, for about eighteen months at that point, had been fretting about the problem for American foreign policy posed by multi-national corporations and I had done some preliminary work on this. I’d even gone to a conference in Rome. But neither Church nor I had brought the thin to a focus. Well, the Anderson revelations brought it to a focus and the committee chewed on this for about two months I guess. After much hemming and hawing it created a subcommittee on multi-national corporations to do two things: one was to investigate the specific role of I.T.T. in Chile; and the other was to investigate or study the general role of multi-national corporations in the world at large. The committee was strangely reluctant to involve itself in this situation. Hugh Scott particularly had some qualms about it. I think he was the one guy who voted against it, as a matter of fact. Anyway, the committee brought itself to do this and I set about organizing it, I guess even before the subcommittee was appointed.

In the best Fulbright tradition I rounded up I think it was four academics who had established reputations as students of the multi-national corporation. They came to Washington and we spent an afternoon listening to them say how they thought we ought to go about it and what we ought to look for and so on. The subcommittee was appointed and I spent most of the summer of 1972 looking around for people to staff it. My part in it anyway was done by August. I presented Church with a list of six names. It had been my thought that held choose-two of them and that would be the staff. He did interview all of them. He only chose one, namely Jerry Levenson. After that, Levenson and the people he recruited did the work while I was sort of looking over their shoulders. They started with I.T.T.

I went to Chile in December, I guess it was, of ’72, as part of a longer trip to Latin America and was aghast at what I found. I have rarely seen a country so screwed up. But the Church-Levenson hearings on I.T.T. were held in March of ’73, I guess Levenson was ready to go maybe in
February, he could not have been ready much sooner. They were held up until after congressional elections in Chile in March, because we didn't want to intrude on that situation. The hearings were very well prepared and explosive and spectacular with what they revealed, although the finger was all pointed at I.T.T. Executive branch witnesses all took the position that "we didn't do anything." That was the first time that we had ever been permitted formally to question anybody in CIA other than the director. We insisted and did question Bill Broe who, in 1970, had been in charge of western hemisphere affairs for the CIA. And we questioned Helms. John McCone, a former director of the CIA, who at that point, God help us, was a director of I.T.T., testified. He had had some conversations with the CIA during I.T.T.'s upset about this. Well, the hearings were held and we thought it was a closed book.

Oh, one other thing I ought to mention. Going back to September 1970, even before we received in confidence the material from I.T.T. that I described, I had been tipped off by a newspaperman that Ed Korry, then our ambassador to Chile, was in the words of my informant reacting like a "crazy man" to the September election, and conjuring up visions of Prague in 1948--where I guess he had been as a newspaperman himself. Anyway, this led me to ask the State Department for Korry's reporting from Chile, and I think we also asked for the instructions that had been sent to Korry, They refused to give it to us, which sort of increased our suspicions. But then Fulbright had that conversation with Helms. As a matter of fact, during this period we had a letter from Korry, which was a little unusual because our ambassadors are supposed to send those things through the Department, in which Korry was expounding the virtues of a policy of non-intervention, and we patted him on the back and said, "That's right, Ed."

Well, all right, back to '73. In September of '73 Allende was overthrown and assassinated and all hell broke loose in Chile. There were the usual charges of covert CIA involvement, which led Gale McGee, who by that time was chairman of the Latin American subcommittee, to think that we ought to do something about it. I'm going to have to stop now, but I think this is a convenient breaking point and we can resume with the long, sad saga of Chile.

RITCHIE: Okay, fine.
[End of Interview #7]