RITCHIE: Last week we discussed briefly your role in drafting the headquarters agreement for the United Nations, and it seems by coincidence that agreement has become front page news, with Andrei Gromyko's plane forbidden to land at Kennedy Airport, and the Soviets' charges against the United States. I was curious about your opinions of these events in light of your own role with drafting that agreement.

MARCY: As soon as this event occurred, and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko was being shunted to a military airport, I said to my wife, "For heaven's sake, where's a copy of that headquarters agreement?" Relevant portions have been in the press at one time or another. My recollection is that the idea of the headquarters agreement was to make it absolutely sure and positive that any representative of a foreign state could come to the UN headquarters without any hindrance whatsoever, and that the United States undertook to give them complete access. As we negotiated the treaty we were thinking then that at some future time there might be a war going on between the United States and another country. The question was: If there were a war going on, could the United States prevent the party from the other side, if a member of the UN, from coming to the UN?
headquarters? The whole concept was "no," that the right of access absolutely had to be guaranteed. Now, I suppose we can futz around with whether it’s access to provide landing rights at a military airport instead of at a civilian airport. But I think it’s clearly the case that the governors of New Jersey and New York were completely outside the law in denying the Soviet airline the right to bring the Russian delegation to the UN by normal means. Treaties are the supreme law of the land. I’m surprised that somebody in the Department of State didn't call up the two governors and say, "Watch it, withdraw your remarks." There is a fundamental constitutional proposition involved which has not been much discussed. I think it's unfortunate because the situation may arise again.

RITCHIE: In some respects it was counterproductive for the administration since it shifted the focus of the debate.

MARCY: I think it did, and I think that's unfortunate also. As a matter of fact, I've toyed with the idea of what the United States would have done if Mr. Gromyko or his entourage had said, "We are coming in, we're going to be on an Aeroflot airliner, and we are going to land at Kennedy Airport." What would we do? Shoot them down? Escort them? Or let them land? There might be a parallel to the KAL [Korean Air Lines] tragedy--a thought which intrigued me. Obviously it won't happen that way. The more we can do now to avoid confrontations, the better.

RITCHIE: I remember years ago in New York City there were great controversies whenever a Saudi official would come, because of the politics of the city it was usually to the advantage of the incumbent mayor to make some public slight of a prominent Arab delegation, that would renew the charges that the United States was a poor host for the United Nations.

MARCY: Yes.

RITCHIE: But that seems to have been relegated to the past. There hasn’t been a real flap like that for a long time, and then this whole incident exploded this week.

MARCY: That's a good example, but interestingly enough this is the first time since that headquarters agreement was negotiated that I have seen anything in the American press about it. I think maybe I mentioned earlier that every time I saw Judge Fahy he would say, "That headquarters agreement must be pretty good, it hasn't caused any trouble." Well, he’s gone to the happy hunting ground now, so he's not here to see this flap.
RITCHIE: Getting back to the Foreign Relations Committee, when you first joined it in 1950, I was wondering if you could describe a little bit about what you found when you came from the State Department; what the Committee was like, and the Committee staff, and what your impressions were once you started working here.

MARCY: Needless to say, I was delighted to have the opportunity to work for the Committee. I mentioned earlier how I talked with both Vandenberg and Connally prior to being put on the staff. Francis Wilcox was a very competent staff director. He ran the Committee with an easy hand. He was the main person who kept in contact with Vandenberg and with Connally, although the rest of us knew all the members very well. Francis at that time was very United Nations oriented, that was his main interest. As a matter of fact, he proposed that he and I write a book for the Brookings Institution. We did. The title was Proposals for Change in the United Nations. We wrote the book under contract with Brookings—one book of a Brookings series on the UN. Francis was the principal instigator of the project, and—with apologies for him if he reads this record—I think I was the one who did most of the work (at least it seemed that way!), which was done after 5:30 in the evening. I would settle down between 5:30 and 8:00 p.m. and line up all the proposals for change that had been made.

At that time there was a good bit of attention given to the role of the United Nations and its future. We had a subcommittee, of which Senator Elbert Thomas of Utah was chairman. He held hearings in various parts of the country. Senator Thomas and I often traveled together to these hearings. Sometimes there would be other senators along, sometimes it would be just Senator Thomas and me. I don't now recall that anything very significant came out of them. But they did provide opportunity for the people, in effect, to petition the Congress.

I'm diverting a bit, but one concept I have had for a long time and it continued to influence me during the time I was with the Committee was that provision in the Constitution which provides the right of the people to petition the Congress. That is a basic and very significant provision. It tends to be lost sight of, but it comes up in practical ways. For example: is it appropriate for a Senate committee to receive testimony from foreigners—to give time for non-citizens to petition the Congress? I always felt that one of the principal functions of a congressional committee was to receive petitions from the citizens. Many times we would hold hearings on different subjects, and there would be a number of private citizens who wanted to be heard—to testify. The attitude of many senators was to hear the principal witnesses, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and some well known people; but when the time comes to hear John Jones of Paducah,
Kentucky, or some other place, there was always the feeling, "Oh, it's a damn nuisance." And it was, in a way, it took time. But I was always insistent that any American citizen who wanted to be heard on a subject which was timely—that is in the sense it was a subject which was before the committee—had a right to be heard. Often, however, they were scheduled at the tail end on the last day of the hearings. Time limitations were imposed, and it was always difficult to round up a senator to come to hear the testimony of the Great American Public. The "person in the street" was seldom given the dignity I thought they should have, but nevertheless, their views were in the record. Would you like to go back to . . . .

RITCHIE: Back to a sense of how the Committee was set up and what your functions were as a staff member. You had just come from the State Department, a large organization, and now you were a member of a small committee staff. What was expected of you as a staff member at that time?

MARCY: One job was to handle the mail—Pat Holt was hired by Mr. Connally, in the first instance, to handle Senator Connally's mail from Texas. We prepared for hearings, pretty much the routine which still exists. We tried to prepare questions which would be useful to the senators (although we did a lot more of that in later years than we did in that earlier period of time). We corrected transcripts, followed up with the executive branch to get information which they said they would supply, and drafted Committee reports. Francis would assign different members of the staff to hearings, so we had fairly clear lines of responsibility. I mentioned before that I did serve with Senator Taft when he was looking into the Palestine Refugee problem. That involved a good bit of independent research. That's pretty much it. Maybe if I were reminded I would think of some very significant things, but I didn't view it as particularly—I guess I shouldn't say this—but as I look back on it, it didn't seem to me at that time to be a particularly challenging job. But I always liked to come to work in the morning, and to stay late at night. There was always something interesting going on. We were very conscious at that time of not loading the Committee with excess staff members, especially at hearings. When the MacArthur hearings were held, for example, I would have loved to be present at the hearings. There was so much interest in that subject that some of my former colleagues in the Department of State, in particular Chip Bohlen, were invited to sit with the Committee during executive hearings in order to immediately delete secret material from the transcripts so that there would be a sanitized version to be given to the press. I would certainly have liked to have been present at the MacArthur hearings, but as it was, Francis handled those with the assistance of another staff member. The
staff work was pretty well divided, not so much on the basis of what I would call
substance, but on the schedule and who was available.

RITCHIE: As a Committee staff member, did you serve all the senators? I know
you worked with Senator Thomas and Senator Taft—were there certain people you
were assigned to. Or was it just sort of a first-come-first-served basis?

MARCY: It was a case of first-come-first-served. We tried to serve all the
members of the Committee with equal attention. After all, they were senators and
we didn't think very much about whether they were Republicans or Democrats—
least I didn't. As you know, at that time the concept of a bipartisan or
nonpartisan approach to foreign policy was pretty well accepted by the
Committee members. That was reflected in the staff. I think Francis, for example,
was probably a Republican, but I'm not sure. He never made a point of it. I called
myself an Independent, but I did tend to be more oriented towards the
Democratic side.

I recall one incident that illustrates the relationships that existed. When General
Eisenhower was president, I remember Senator [Bourke] Hickenlooper, a
Republican, came to me one day and said, "I've got an inquiry from a Republican
county committee in Arlington, and they want to know whether you're a
Republican or a Democrat. They must be considering recommending you for
some position with the administration." I said, "Well, senator, just call me an
Independent." Hickenlooper said, "Well, that's fine with me. It doesn't make any
difference. You're doing a fine job." So I don't know what he told the Republican
committee. Nobody made me any job offer. And had they, I probably wouldn't
have been interested because I was enjoying very much what I was doing.

RITCHIE: You were hired when the Democrats were in the majority, although
in that period the majorities weren't very large, the Senate was pretty evenly
divided. But in 1952 the Republicans won the election and in January 1953 they
became the majority in the Committee. Did you wonder if you would be
continuing on, or if they were going to change the staff at all?

MARCY: No, I don't recall that that bothered me at the time. Perhaps it did
because I do remember that at the first organizational meeting when Senator
[Alexander] Wiley was chairman, he said: "The first thing I want to do is to move
that the Committee make no changes whatsoever in the staff. They've done a
good job and I want to keep it that way." So I guess I breathed a little easier. But
then I also remember the next thing that he said, "Now, I do have my
administrative assistant. I want him to have a more active role with the
Committee, so I propose that he be put on the staff." I think there was a bit of

United States Senate Historical Office -- Oral History Project
wwwсенат.gov
hassling, a tug-of-war, between Julius Cahn and Francis Wilcox. How deeply that went, I don't know. I don't recall any great to-do about it. As far as I was concerned my relationships with Senator Wiley were absolutely superb. About that time, and I could be off a year or two, Senator Wiley married a British citizen, Dorothy, I forget her maiden name. Francis came to me one day and said, "You know, Senator Wiley and Dorothy want to go to Europe this summer. They'd like to have you and Mildred go along." Well, my wife was at that time homekeeping and working as a volunteer with the League of Women Voters, and I guess our children were something like four and eight. We shipped them to my parents on the west coast, got aboard the United States with the Wileys, and sailed for Europe. I don't remember how long we were there, but it must have been a period of four to six weeks. With Senator Wiley as chairman of the Committee, the Air Force assigned him a DC-3 and a crew of six. I must say that if the word "junket" is applied--I always resented that word--I would argue that if anybody had a right to go abroad, it ought to be the chairman and the members of the Foreign Relations Committee--but I must say that we had quite a tour of most of the European capitals.

The Wileys were wonderful people to travel with. There were just the four of us, served by a crew of six or eight Air Force officers and enlisted men, who took us all over. Wiley was the commander. I spent most of my time airborne trying to figure out something appropriate for him to say when we would land in the next country, something appropriate to say about United States-Soviet relations. Senator Wiley and I always had serious conversations with our embassy people and foreign officials. We filed an extensive report on Wiley's trip. Here is another diversion from your main question. I do remember an experience with Senator Wiley, after he was no longer chairman. He came to see me one day and he said, "Carl, I wish you would take over drafting my press releases. For some reason I used to be able to say something and put out a statement and the press would pay a great deal of attention to it. But they don't anymore. I think if you would draft some press releases for me, maybe I could get some attention." I said to him, "Well, senator, it was a big difference when you were chairman of the committee. Then you could say almost anything and you would be covered in the press. But you're no longer chairman of the Committee." I added that I could draft a press release that would get a headline, but, I said, nit would probably need to be some wildly irresponsible statement that you wouldn't really want to associate yourself with." That was the end of the conversation. But it makes a point which is important: if
you're chairman the press pays attention; if you're not chairman, you're not as newsworthy.

**RITCHIE:** Just going back to when you mentioned Julius Cahn. I came across him at one point in connection with a controversy on the staff in the mid-1950s. Apparently he had made a speech at a Republican organization defending John Foster Dulles, or whatever, but it was considered to be a political speech, and it caused quite a stir in the Committee. Do you remember that incident?

**MARCY:** Oh, I hadn't thought of that for years. I can give a rough sketch. You're right—and it illustrates how non-political,

---

non-partisan the staff members were expected to be. Julius said something to the effect that John Foster Dulles was the greatest Secretary of State we've ever had, or maybe even stronger than that. At that time, Julius must still have been on the Committee payroll. I remember Senator Fulbright was absolutely—well, I was going to say infuriated, that's too strong—but Senator Fulbright was very disturbed that a staff member would go out and make a political statement like that. He raised the question, as I recall, with Senator Wiley, and again my recollection is that at a subsequent time Julius did the same thing again and Fulbright got him fired. I may have the sequence wrong. Julius made a speech somewhere in the midwest that had political overtones, and was warned that he should be discreet, and then the second speech he made was to a small women's club in Maryland, where nobody would expect any press attention at all, but he got press attention, and that was the end of Julius.

**RITCHIE:** There's basically an unwritten rule that staff members did not . . . .

**MARCY:** That's right, at that time you didn't go out and participate in political activities. I never, for example, went to Arkansas while Fulbright was chairman of the Committee. I have a couple of times since. I never wrote a political speech for Fulbright or other senator. There were a couple of occasions when

---

a member would ask for a memorandum to refresh his recollection of a series of events, that kind of thing. No, we stayed very far away from political activities.

**RITCHIE:** Again on the question of how the staff was used, I know that the Foreign Relations Committee developed a particular type of subcommittee, the consultative subcommittee. When did these consultative subcommittees develop, and what was the purpose behind them?
MARCY: I don’t remember when the first ones were developed. Whether they were developed when I was staff director or earlier, I just don’t recall. But the concept was that these subcommittees had no legislative responsibilities. A senator was named chairman of a subcommittee in order to permit that chairman and associated senators to specialize. So there were consultative subcommittees on the Far East, on Africa, on Western Europe, and so on. They never were given—I shouldn’t say quite never—but I don’t recall any significant case when a consultative subcommittee was given a legislative responsibility. Even on a mundane treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, the treaty would be handled either by a special subcommittee or by the full Committee.

The theory, as it developed over a period of time, and I don’t know that it was ever enunciated, was that legislation was of concern to the full committee. There was a feeling that the full committee should not be fragmented—that if a Western European problem went to the Western European subcommittee, it might be a very, very important matter which should be considered by the full Committee. Senator Fulbright, and his predecessors, were very strong on that point. They were chairmen of the full Committee and, by gosh, it was the full Committee that was in charge. The full Committee handled the legislation and the treaties and these subcommittees were as described, consultative.

Nevertheless, there was always a feeling on the part of junior committee members that they would like to have some substantive responsibility. That feeling grew especially as the proliferation of subcommittees was going on elsewhere.

The chairmanship of these consultative subcommittees was decided on a purely seniority basis. When a new Congress was organized the most senior person would get his choice of subcommittees. I’m talking about the Fulbright period principally, but that was true under both Senator Green and Senator George. The way we would pick the chairman, would be to go to the ranking member on the Democratic side, if it was a Democratic majority, and say, "All right, which subcommittee would you like?" They could switch. I remember, for example, that at one point Senator [John] Sparkman, who had been chairman of the Far Eastern consultative subcommittee, said he’d like to switch, to be chairman of the Western European subcommittee. He was the ranking Democratic member, so he got his choice.

I do remember, I guess I can put this in—maybe we should keep it out at least for a few more years—at one point I could not get anyone to accept the chairmanship of the consultative subcommittee on Africa. At that time Senator [Mike] Mansfield was majority leader and we left him alone . . . He was so busy he didn’t
want to have a subcommittee. I remember going to him and saying, "Senator, I can't get anybody to be chairman of the African subcommittee. How about you taking it?" He said, "Well, I'll make a deal with you. I will become chairman of the African subcommittee if you, Carl, will guarantee to me that the subcommittee will not meet." And that's what happened.

**RITCHIE:** Wasn't John Kennedy chairman of that committee?

**MARCY:** Yes, at a later time.

**RITCHIE:** And it also didn't meet under him, because it seems to me that in 1960 that was an issue in his presidential campaign, that he was chairman of a subcommittee that never met.

**MARCY:** That's right.

**RITCHIE:** What was it about Africa that drove the senators away?

**MARCY:** Well, I don't know what it was. Nobody was interested in that subcommittee.

**RITCHIE:** It wasn't the type of committee that would get a lot of publicity, I suppose.

**MARCY:** I suppose there wasn't a great deal of attention paid to it. But not much attention was paid to the consultative subcommittees anyway. We would meet in the back office, S-115, which was where my office was, and it was always a private session. As a matter of fact, I don't think there were any transcripts kept of those meetings. There may have been once in a while.

**RITCHIE:** Very rarely. The only ones I've seen regularly were probably Latin America, and it was always over an issue like Nixon's trip to Venezuela, or the Bay of Pigs, when the issue was obviously so substantive they had a transcriber there. But most of the time the minutes of the committee just say: "No record was kept."

**MARCY:** That's right, it was just a very casual sort of thing. The assistant secretary would come. Sometimes he would ask to talk to the group. Sometimes the subcommittee would ask me to call up the assistant secretary. Let's have him down on Friday afternoon and see what's going on. That kind of thing. Very casual.

**RITCHIE:** This raises the question of how the Committee got information from the executive branch, and how well it got it. Did
the consultative subcommittees develop because the Committee was looking for systematic ways of getting information? What was the general mechanism for getting the administration to spell out what exactly was happening?

**MARCY:** Well, there really wasn't a mechanism. Very little attention was paid in those early years, even during most of the time when I was there, for the committee to seek information, search for information, what is the word that I want? Oversight. There was very little in the way of oversight, digging into things. We were mostly involved with getting the legislative program enacted. Shall we continue on the subcommittees?

**RITCHIE:** Sure.

**MARCY:** The concept of the consultative subcommittee began to break down a bit when we decided to look at the United States Information Agency. We set up a subcommittee of which Senator Mansfield—the Voice of America was what we were looking at. I'm sorry to be so hazy about this, it's gradually coming back. I guess it was the information activity generally.

**RITCHIE:** There was an investigation of overseas information.

**MARCY:** Who was chairman of that?

**RITCHIE:** Was it Hickenlooper?

**MARCY:** It was Hickenlooper-Fulbright, and Hickenlooper was the chairman, so that would have been... 

**RITCHIE:** The 83rd Congress.

**MARCY:** That, in a sense, was a subcommittee with a specific investigative kind of assignment. Then subsequently Mansfield was chairman of a subcommittee. Do you remember what that was?

**RITCHIE:** I'm not sure, I'll have to check.

**MARCY:** Well, that will come back as I look over my notes. I think Mansfield was chairman of a subcommittee on Point IV--the Technical Assistance Program. But the concept of a consultative subcommittee was beginning to break down. The way it began to break down was that there would be one subcommittee each Congress that did have substantive responsibility. The Hickenlooper-Fulbright Subcommittee on Information was the first one. It didn't have any separate staff.
Then subsequently, Mansfield was head of the Subcommittee on Technical Assistance. A full-time staff man was assigned to that, Francis Valeo. The idea was that a single subcommittee with substantive responsibility would be created at the beginning of a Congress and would last for two years. It had to have its work done at the end of the Congress and file a final report, and that was the end of the subcommittee. The Mansfield subcommittee filed its report and expired.

As I recall, at one point when Frank Valeo and I had the same office, and the Mansfield subcommittee was expiring, he and I talked about, "Well, what about another subcommittee? What would be a logical subject?" That was about the time that President Eisenhower had appointed [Harold] Stassen as his advisor on disarmament. Valeo and I figured that if the administration was going to have a special person in the executive branch on disarmament, the Senate ought to have a subcommittee on disarmament to follow the same subject closely—a group that would have a separate identity. Valeo and I also thought the logical person to be chairman of the subcommittee was Senator [Hubert] Humphrey from Minnesota, Mr. Stassen's home state. I went to the Senate floor and discussed the idea with Max Kampleman, who was administrative assistant or legislative assistant to Senator Humphrey. Max thought it was a great idea. So we took the legislation which had created the Mansfield Subcommittee on Technical Assistance and adapted it to create a Subcommittee on Arms Control and Disarmament. Humphrey introduced the resolution, it passed, and as was the practice generally, Senator Humphrey became chairman. Valeo became staff director of that new subcommittee. The concept at that time was that the subcommittee would last for two years and then phase out. That subcommittee had separate money. One of the first people we put on the staff of the subcommittee was Betty Goetz. Betty Goetz was on the professional staff of the League of Women Voters, and as a matter of fact my recollection is that she was recommended to me by My wife. So Betty came onto the staff working under Valeo. The combination of Valeo and Geotz didn't work out. The upshot was that Valeo didn't want to stay with that subcommittee, and by then he was working closely with Mansfield. Hubert Humphrey and Betty Goetz got along fine. So she became director of the subcommittee, and did a very effective job. Betty did a comprehensive survey of what arms manufacturers would do if we had disarmament and there was no market for military aircraft and other arms. When that Congress expired the question was whether the subcommittee should continue to exist. I remember Senator Hickenlooper and Fulbright discussing what to do with the Humphrey Disarmament Subcommittee and deciding that "Hubert's had his two years. Let I s have another subcommittee." As the conversation went on their view was that once Hubert gets his hands on something, he's not going to give it up. I think it was Hickenlooper who said, "Let
Hubert keep it. He'll keep that until he's elected president or vice president. He's not going to give it up." So that is how the Arms Control and Disarmament Subcommittee became the first permanent institution. It broke down the concept of consultative subcommittees.

page 57

RITCHIE: This is just a question about Betty Goetz. Didn't you object to a woman being staff director of a subcommittee at that time?

MARCY: No, not of a subcommittee. Subsequently, in the next year or so, there was an opening on the full Committee staff. As I recall it was one of only four professional positions. Betty was staff director of a subcommittee, but then the full Committee had its four professional staff members, and there was an opening. I made a mistake. In the interest of candor, I took Betty to lunch one day and said I hoped she would understand but that I proposed to recommend filling that vacancy with someone else with stronger qualifications. I thought everything was okay, but it obviously wasn't. When the Congress reconvened, Senator Humphrey ripped me to pieces for not having recommended Betty for that spot. I was guilty of discrimination he said. Betty was the best qualified, and on and on. My recollection is that I just sat there taking all of this. Finally I said to Senator Fulbright, "Give me a chance to say something!" What I said was that there were four professional positions and that the four people in those spots had to be able to do all kinds of things for the full Committee. They had to travel abroad if a senator wanted to go abroad, and it seemed to me that there were certain kinds of things that could only be accomplished by a--I don't remember whether I said male, but that's obviously what I was thinking of. Anyway, it finally quieted down. No member of the Committee came to my defense during the meeting. Afterwards, Fulbright said to me, "Forget it, you know Hubert, it wasn't necessary to say anything. I remember Senator Hickenlooper saying to me, "For Christssakes, they sleepin' together?" Obviously I remember that remark well. That was the kind of remark that Hickenlooper would make, absolutely tongue-in-cheek, there being absolutely no evidence, no hint of any such thing, but that was what he said. Senator [Frank] Lausche also came up to me afterwards. He said, "I just wanted to tell you, Carl, yours was absolutely the right decision. If I had traveled abroad and they sent that lady along with me as the staff person, my wife would have raised hell. You did the right thing."

Since an oral history presumably is for the purpose of telling things like they were, not as they might have seemed, I add one more private reaction to the Goetz episode. Senator [Stuart] Symington, who seemed to agree with Humphrey and thought I'd been discriminatory against Betty came to me several years later.
after Betty had married a distinguished Indian diplomat named Arthur Lall, the 
Indian representative at the UN. Senator Symington said: "Carl, you remember I 
thought you made a mistake by not putting Betty Goetz on the staff? Now she’s 
mARRIED that Indian, and by gosh, you were right!" As I look back I suppose the 
Goetz episode is characteristic of the male chauvinism of the time.

RITCHIE: Going back a little, I’m still interested in the question of information, 
and the reason I bring this up is that I looked through some of your memos from 
1953 and I was really stunned to see you pointing out in your memos to the 
Committee that there was a real problem of getting information from the State 
Department. You said in a memo to Senator Taft that "the lack of sources of 
information independent of the executive sources tends to create a suspicion on 
the part of members of Congress as to the objectivity of facts and 
recommendations made to the executive." This was when you were proposing 
that an independent investigator be sent by the committee to the Middle East to 
look around. Just about the same time, in a letter to Senator Hickenlooper in 
1953, about the Central Intelligence Agency, you wrote: "While the CIA cannot 
conduct its operations in the open, its secrecy is sure to lead to a congressional 
investigation," meaning that they weren’t providing documents. These are all 
issues that came up later--there was a congressional investigation twenty years 
later. There was a congressional response to these things, but I was really 
surprised to see your observations on them so early in the Committee’s history. 
Did you feel that there was some real problem with how the Committee learned 
about what was happening?

MARCY: Those memos must have been related to some specific incident, some 
pARTicular search for information. But having come from the executive branch to 
the Congress I continued to be sensitive 

to the feelings that my former colleagues generally thought of the Congress as a 
nuisance: congressmen always want information; they send letters they want to 
have answered; a State Department officer goes to testify, and maybe the senators 
come and maybe the senators don’t come. The word nuisance is the best way to 
describe it.

I probably felt this because having come from the legislative liaison side of the 
Department of State, and being in charge of liaison for the Department of State, I 
was often caught between somebody in Congress who wanted an item of 
information and a substantive person in the Department of State who didn’t want 
to be troubled because he was working on something serious such as drafting a 
confidential memorandum for the Secretary of State, or a cable of instructions, or 
something of that sort. I often had the feeling that I was interfering with conduct 
of foreign policy while I was trying to do something to keep a senator happy. I
think that that was reflected in my attitude when I went to the Hill. I think there is still a lingering feeling in the executive branch that the Congress isn't quite with it, that they are a nuisance. I think you see that perhaps even in the way in which the Reagan administration has dealt with the War Powers issue the last week: Congress is a nuisance at least and a disaster at worst, in the view of many in the executive branch.

RITCHIE: And yet that was a period when the Committee was particularly supportive of American foreign policy. You mentioned the bipartisanship.

MARCY: That's right.

RITCHIE: And I would imagine that relations between the State Department and the Committee were extremely close at that time, rather than say the more strained relations later on.

MARCY: Well, I guess they were close because there wasn't anything that the Committee was trying to get. We weren't investigating any aspect of the Department's activities. Things seemed to be moving along pretty smoothly. I don't remember any great controversies that were existent during that particular period of time. That was perhaps partly because the Congress--I can only speak about the Senate and the Committee--was reasonably happy with the way things were going. The Democrats didn't much like Mr. Dulles and his policies, but we didn't have any big hassles about NATO or about SEATO, the kind of agreements that the Department of State was negotiating.

RITCHIE: The biggest controversy between the executive and the legislative branch, at least in the 83rd Congress, was the Bricker amendment to limit presidents' independent decisions on executive agreements. Did you get involved in that controversy at all?

MARCY: I don't recall that I was directly involved in that. I think another staff man, Thorsten Kalijarvi, handled most of that Bricker amendment. I wrote some memos on the subject for Senator Wiley.

RITCHIE: I read your memos for 1953, and they really make a wonderful record of what was going on in the Committee.

MARCY: I better read them myself!

RITCHIE: The memos for 1954, '55, and '56 aren't in the files at the Archives, there is a gap between '53 and '57, so I can help you out a lot better on the '53 period than afterwards!
MARCY: Where are they?

RITCHIE: I'm not sure.

MARCY: Did you go to the Archives?

RITCHIE: Yes, I went down to the Archives and the set they have for you has ’53 but then picks up in ’57 and is consistent all the way from there, but for some reason there are three years missing. It looked like you changed secretaries in 1953.

MARCY: I probably did! But the secretaries were very good, weren't they? They kept a very good record of most of what I wrote during that period.

RITCHIE: It's a wonderful file, a reading file of what the Committee was doing. That was where I came across the material about requests for information.

MARCY: Well, I'll look in my basement and see if there is any chance that I've got something there. I just might have.

RITCHIE: You mentioned earlier about the investigation into overseas information, which also took place in 1953-1954. I gathered that was a response to the McCarthy investigation, when he sent Roy Cohn and David Schine over to Europe for a well-publicized tour of the USIA libraries, which seemed to be treading on the Foreign Relations Committee's turf.

MARCY: That's right, that was as I recall a factor. Hickenlooper and Fulbright were both very offended by the Cohn-Schine operations. Fulbright probably more so than Hickenlooper, but nevertheless Hickenlooper felt very much the same way. Hickenlooper and Fulbright, while they disagreed politically, on many things worked very closely together through those years. They each felt that the other had qualities which they did not have, and they recognized them and were willing to accept them. Hickenlooper thought that Fulbright was much more of a scholar, but Fulbright thought Hickenlooper was a down-to-earth fellow, a farmer from the midwest, closer to the people. And they accepted each other in an admirable relationship.

RITCHIE: So this subcommittee was their way of trying to get back some of the momentum that McCarthy had seized?

MARCY: Yes. I don't think of it so much in terms of getting back . . . . I don’t think that was a significant motivation for the Committee. There were other
factors. I'd have to go back and look at the report. I made several investigative type trips looking into United States Information facilities accompanied by Jack Yingling from Senator Fulbright's staff. I understand the report of that subcommittee is still used in USIA. Maybe they just liked the results of that investigation more than they liked the results of the Cohn-Schine-McCarthy operation.

RITCHIE: Mentioning Cohn and Schine brings up Joe McCarthy. Did you feel the impact of McCarthy in the Senate in your early years here?

MARCY: Not directly. I was personally offended by the things he was doing. I knew some of the people that he called before his committee. But that was a different department, so to speak. I had my things to do, and don't recall that anything McCarthy was doing was hurting specific legislation we had before the Committee. It's hard to remember whether I was appalled when he said there were fifty-three, or was it fifty-seven, Communists in the Department of State. I probably wasn't as appalled then as I am now, looking back on the event. Nevertheless, his allegations struck me as absolutely preposterous. Many of the people he had on that list were people I knew. When I was in the Department in the division of the UN affairs, I knew Alger Hiss. He was the chief of the division. I was one of the people under him on the administrative side. I knew him as one of the people around the place, but really knew nothing about his politics or his attitudes. I'm really kind of speculating now. I speculate that I probably thought: "My goodness, Hiss is an absolutely loyal, trustworthy American." I couldn't believe what was going on, and I don't know quite what to believe still.

RITCHIE: I was just curious in the sense that Senator Fulbright became one of the few senators who had the nerve to stand up against McCarthy, and McCarthy leveled a lot of attacks on him, called him "Senator Halfbright," and things like that.

MARCY: Oh, I know. Fulbright took him on, and I was very proud that Fulbright did take him on. But you see, Fulbright was not chairman then. I had very little to do with Fulbright at that time, of any importance, other than the Hickenlooper-Fulbright subcommittee. I do remember Fulbright saying to me one time about McCarthy, he said, "You know, considering McCarthy is such an S.O.B.," or words to that general effect, "he's a very interesting personality. You know, I enjoy him in the locker room." That kind of business. McCarthy was sort of the macho type of person. Sort of a hail-fellow-well-met--if he wasn't butchering people in the public
domain. I don't know whether Fulbright would still say that today or not, but I suspect he would, it was one of those casual remarks.

RITCHIE: That's very much the way the recent biographies have been: the two sides of McCarthy, "good-old Joe" versus the thug.

MARCY: That puts it very well. That was what he was saying, "good-old Joe." [End of Interview #2]