RITCHIE: I really liked the first interview, because you really covered that material so well—you were talking about 1964 essentially.

MURPHY: Essentially.

RITCHIE: From when you joined the staff in January through Hugh Scott’s reelection in ’64. I thought that would be the place to start today. Lyndon Johnson wins by an enormous landslide and the Democrats have huge majorities in both the House and the Senate. Where did that leave the Republicans in the Senate to be such a minority party at that moment?

MURPHY: Well, they were really pretty much isolated. However, in the case of Hugh Scott, I think he cosponsored some of the administration’s bills. I couldn’t tell you which ones now, but I know he did cosponsor some of them. Probably some of the education bills. And you know, otherwise, what can a senator in the minority do? Well, he can propose bills. The bills may not go anywhere, but you know, we would offer bills. Get a little publicity on it. And beyond that, you know, just work in the committees. And there, of course, the committees were really quite congenial and they welcomed input from the minority . . . at least on the committees that I was familiar with.

RITCHIE: The Republican Party was pretty split then between its conservative and liberal wings. Did that give Scott more ability to maneuver because he was more in sympathy with what the Democrats were trying to do?

MURPHY: I think so. When—of course, this was right after Goldwater had taken such a shellacking that the right wing was discredited. So I think that gave the moderates more heft.

RITCHIE: And there was a lot more coalition-building, it seems to me. Less party-line voting and more coalition voting.
MURPHY: Exactly. And especially on civil rights. But even on some of the Great Society bills, I think you saw some bipartisanship.

RITCHIE: Well in your first interview you talked very extensively about the Civil Rights Act of ’64, but I thought maybe we could start by talking about the Voting Rights Act of ’65.

MURPHY: Right.

RITCHIE: Can you give me some of the background on that?

MURPHY: Well, as I recall, the president, he may have even come to a joint session of Congress to demand passage of a voting rights bill, and there was a big head of steam behind it. I believe the Senate took it up first. [Everett] Dirksen again, like he did in the Civil Rights bill, played a key role. But I remember we had an executive session of the Judiciary Committee in Dirksen’s office to mark up the bill. That was fascinating because back then the only staff people who were admitted to a Judiciary Committee meeting were the professional staff of the committee. The senators couldn’t bring their own people. And so I had never been in on an executive session of the Judiciary Committee. But each senator was entitled to bring his own guy in with him. So we were there and we sat around the table. [James] Eastland of Mississippi presided, but it was in Dirksen’s office. And of course, some of the southerners tried to offer some amendments to gut the bill. In fact, I remember [Jacob] Javits almost was going to vote for one and Hugh Scott tugged at his sleeve and said, “Hey, Jack, watch out.” [Laughing]

But Senator [Roman] Hruska of Nebraska—“the noble Roman” as we called him—he, for some reason, decided he had to filibuster because I think he felt this thing was being steam-rolled through the committee and the Senate. And so he asked for copies of the United States Code from the Senate Library. Somebody came down with a big pile of books and Hruska starts reading from the U.S. Code. So the rest of us all left the room. He was there by himself reading the Code. This lasted for several hours and then he finally relented and we all came back and ordered the bill reported. [Laughing] But we had a filibuster and we must have had three or four cloture votes. And Dirksen was—oh no, I’m sorry, I’m getting confused with another Civil Rights bill. We didn’t have cloture on this one. But those are the things I remember. Primarily that executive session in Dirksen’s office.
RITCHIE: Do you have any idea why they would hold a committee meeting in the Republican leader’s office? Just because he was such an influential player on that?

MURPHY: I don’t remember. It could have been because the Senate was going to take it up pretty darn quickly. Maybe it was just convenient to the chamber. I don’t know why.

BIRKNER: Was there any doubt that Dirksen would support the voting rights measure?

MURPHY: No. On that one, no. I don’t think there was. The next Civil Rights bill came and that was another story.

RITCHIE: That was the ’67 bill, some of which passed in ’68. Can you talk about that bill?

MURPHY: Yeah, that was a bill to protect civil rights workers and blacks attempting to exercise their federally protected rights down there in the South. To protect them against intimidation and violence. That bill had been a part of a package of measures that [President] Lyndon Johnson had proposed and which failed in the previous Congress. They couldn’t muster a cloture vote in the Senate on that. So this bill came over from the House and was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. That year, at the beginning of the year in ’67, Senator Scott had been invited by Oxford University to come over and give lectures on American politics. He went to Senators [Mike] Mansfield and Dirksen, the two leaders, and told them about it and said he wondered whether he could accept the invitation. And they said, “Oh yeah, go ahead, Hugh, because we’ll probably be out of session by that time.” Because I think we were talking about late September or early October.

So Scott went off to England. Well, a bill had come over from the House and I was over in the Senate Chamber one day and Senator Phil Hart came up to me and he said, “Dick, this bill is in the committee.” He said, “We’re going to have a meeting of the committee.” And he said, “The committee is deadlocked seven to seven. Hugh is the swing vote. Will he be here for the meeting?” I said, “Well, Senator, I would think he would be. I can guarantee how he’s going to vote. So he’ll be the eighth vote.” I said,
“But there’s a little problem. How are we going to get him here?” And I said, “It seems to me that since the president is pushing for this bill that the White House ought to provide transportation.” Hart said he’d look into it. And you know, nothing was happening. Hart kept talking to me, and Clarence Mitchell with the NAACP, the 101st senator, Clarence spoke to me about it and I kept saying the same thing, that if the White House will arrange for the transportation, I said, “You’ve got your man.” And nothing happened.

I remember the Friday before the vote, that would have been Friday, October 20, I got a call from Mike Manatos at the White House. He was the top Senate liaison guy for the president. Mike called me and he said, “Dick, what’s going on?” I said, “Mike, you ought to tell me what’s going on. Hugh Scott is sitting over there in England.” Incidentally, the only thing that Scott knew about this was that I sent him a memo by snail mail telling him about this when Hart first raised it with me. So he knew, but that’s the only communication I had with him. Anyway, I said, “Mike, you guys have got to get Hugh Scott a plane if you’re going to get his vote. If the president really wants this bill, I’m sure you guys can arrange for a plane.” Mike said, “Well, I’ll look into it.”

The next day was the day of the big anti-war march on the Pentagon. The defense of the Pentagon was entrusted to the assistant attorney general for civil rights, a fellow by the name of Steve Pollack. Steve was the commandant of the U. S. Marshals and the military police that were defending the Pentagon. So the weekend passed and that Monday evening my parents happened to be in town. My father was a pediatrician and he had been here for a meeting of the American Academy of Pediatrics. We went out to dinner with my parents and some of their friends at the Washington Hilton Hotel. We were in the restaurant there. And around nine o’clock the headwaiter came through booming out, “Mr. Richard Murphy. Mr. Richard Murphy. The White House is calling.” [Laughing]

BIRKNER: Your stock went way up in that place! [Laughing]

MURPHY: So I went to the phone and he said, “Murphy, this is Steve Pollack. I got you a plane.” And I said, “Good!” I had never met Pollack. I said, “Where will the plane be?” He said, “Such and such [Mildenhall] air force base. And I said, “Where’s that?” He said, “Hell, I don’t know.” You know, this is one o’clock in the morning London time, so I said, “How’s he going to get to the airport that you don’t know where?” He said, “I don’t know.” I just lashed into him and I said, “Look, you guys want
this bill. It’s time you get cracking on this thing! You find out where the plane is going to
be and you arrange for the senator’s pick-up.” And then to me he said, “When I have that,
then you call the senator.” I said, “No, you call him!” So he called the senator. It must
have been around three o’clock in the morning. The senator thanked him very much, then
he said, “You don’t have to send a vehicle for me. My good friend admiral so-and-so”—who was the top American naval officer in Britain—“he’ll take care of me.”
[Laughing]

So Scott flew back and he came in Tuesday evening. We went up to Hart’s office
the next morning and we had a big meeting there of the civil rights senators and Clarence
Mitchell. And Pollack was there. I walked in there and I recognized him even though I
had never met him. I walked over to him and I said, “Hi Steve, it’s good to see you.” I
thought he was going to punch me in the nose. [Laughing] But anyway, Scott came and
he was the swing vote on it. First, I think they had an amendment by Sam Ervin to, in
effect, gut the bill. Scott voted against that. It was eight to seven against that and then
they voted for the Hart version of the bill. Then the senator held a news conference and it
was played up big in the New York Times and other newspapers. Then that afternoon he
flew back to England to continue his lectures.

RITCHIE: Did they give him a military plane to go back as well?

MURPHY: Yeah, I think going back he went on a scheduled airliner.

RITCHIE: Okay.

MURPHY: But the White House paid for it. [Laughing]

BIRKNER: They got something out of it.

MURPHY: Yeah. But that bill—of course, that was the first session of the
Congress. I think it was on the day that Congress adjourned, Mansfield quietly arranged
to make it the pending business coming back in January 1968 so that they didn’t have to
have a filibuster on the motion to take up. It was the pending business. So we had a
filibuster. Then the question of open housing came up, and of course, open housing was
one of the things the Johnson administration and the civil rights people wanted. Scott was
all for it. And Clarence Mitchell was urging that they attach an open housing bill to this
bill. Some of the civil rights senators had great reservations about it. Mansfield was against it because he felt he didn’t have the votes to include an open housing measure. Dirksen was against it. Hart had some doubts. I remember we were in a meeting of the civil rights senators where Ted Kennedy expressed doubts. Scott told him, “Don’t worry, Ted, this thing will pass. It may take some doing, but it’s going to pass.” We had, I think it was four cloture votes on that measure. On the second vote, I think the Republicans were evenly split. On the third vote, at which point Dirksen started to reconsider his position on open housing, a plurality of the Republicans voted for cloture. It fell something like six or seven votes short. And Dirksen executed one of his marvelous 180-degree turns and came up with a compromise. I think [Walter] Mondale was the one who was pushing the open housing bill. Everybody was just ecstatic when Dirksen did his turnabout. He did the same thing in 1964. Of course, this was a time when there was a lot of unrest in the cities and Dirksen noted that. Anyway, we finally got cloture on the bill and it passed.

I think it passed right around the time of Martin Luther King’s assassination. And the day the president signed the bill, that morning, Lyndon Johnson went to Barefoot Sanders, who was one of his aides, and said, “Barefoot, I want a signing ceremony in the East Room and you take care of it.” And we had a big signing ceremony in the East Room that afternoon with something like 400 people packed in there. I remember I was standing in the back with Edward Bennett Williams and it was quite a big occasion.

RITCHIE: That was right after the riots in Washington?

MURPHY: That’s correct, right.

RITCHIE: So Johnson wanted to show business as usual and his success as well?

MURPHY: Yes, exactly. This was after he had announced he was not going to run for reelection.

BIRKNER: I want to ask a quick question that sort of stems from the byplay between Dirksen and the Republican senators. Did you ever notice any jealousy on Scott’s part about Dirksen being the top dog? Did Scott feel that he should have been in that role or did he just accept the fact that he was a role player elsewhere in the Senate and Dirksen would get the limelight?
MURPHY: Well, I think it was the latter while I was there. He never indicated to me that he had higher ambitions than the Senate. However, that summer in 1968, Senator [Thomas] Kuchel, who was the Republican whip, was defeated by Max Rafferty in the Republican primary out there in California. Within hours Hugh Scott was off and running for whip. Within a day or two he had contacted every Republican senator and gotten commitments from most of them. And Roman Hruska of Nebraska, he wanted to be whip. I think he thought that they would just fall in his lap because he was in tight with Everett Dirksen. But Scott got a head start on him and he won the contest. That’s how he came in the leadership. Then, of course, about nine months later in September of ’69, which was after I left the senator, he became the leader when Dirksen died.

RITCHIE: The Republican Party was pretty evenly split, as you mentioned, before that. There were a lot of Eisenhower Republicans as well as Goldwater Republicans at that point.

MURPHY: Oh, yeah.

RITCHIE: So Scott had a lot of support within the party.

MURPHY: Sure. At that point, Dick Schweiker was a new Republican senator from Pennsylvania. He was a moderate. And we had [Charles] Percy and Javits and Ed Brooke and—

BIRKNER: [Clifford] Case.

MURPHY: Yeah, Cliff Case.

RITCHIE: The 1966 election had expanded the Republican ranks at that point. But more moderate Republicans came in at that election than conservatives.

MURPHY: Yeah, that’s correct. That’s correct. Howard Baker was a moderate basically.

RITCHIE: Well, you mentioned a lot of your discussions about civil rights legislation. What was Scott’s relationship like with the southern senators? They were all
the powerful chairmen of the committees but they were on the other side at least on all the civil rights issues.

**MURPHY:** Well, he had good relationships with them, particularly with [Richard] Russell. I remember, and I think I told you this, Michael, that he wanted me to tell him how to vote on matters in the Senate floor. But he said, “There are certain senators that I follow on certain issues.” He said, “On defense matters, I’ll invariably follow Dick Russell.” They had a good relationship. I don’t think he thought much of Strom Thurmond, particularly when Thurmond became a Republican. I don’t think he was particularly close to [Sam] Ervin, but they got along. But Russell he had a very good relationship with.

**RITCHIE:** Then there’s James Eastland, who chaired that Judiciary committee.

**MURPHY:** Well, Eastland was a special case. We got some staff people. Eastland would give some Republicans some staff people to keep them quiet, basically. [Laughing] He knew he couldn’t keep them quiet on civil rights, but you know, that was a sop to the Republicans. There was Scott on the Senate side, and Tom Curtis on the House side, who were pushing for more minority staff for members, and Eastland would give the Republicans some on the Judiciary Committee.

**RITCHIE:** One other senator I wanted to ask you about was Russell Long. I’ve heard that you have a wonderful story about Russell Long.

**MURPHY:** [Laughing] Yes. I don’t think Hugh Scott and Russell Long were terribly close particularly. But Russell Long had a bill to finance presidential campaigns with money out of the general revenue, and he was pushing it hard in the Senate. One evening the senator and I had had dinner in the senators’ dining room and I think Scott had had a couple of drinks beforehand. We got over there on the Senate floor and Russell Long was in his cups and he was waving his arms and haranguing the nearly empty chamber on the virtues of his bill, and Scott was opposing it. The two of them got into an awful shouting match. I mean, it really was unbecoming of both of them. Finally, Long just stomped out of the chamber. Scott stood there for a minute looking bewildered and then he walked out another exit. I’m standing there with Will Leonard who was Long’s guy, and I said, “Oh boy, that was something, Will. What are we going to do?” He said, “Well, let’s go in the back room,” where the shorthand reporters were, “and let’s take a
look at the transcript.” We both looked at the transcript. I think it was Will who said, “Let’s delete it.” I said, “Good, let’s do it.” We never told our senators about it. I told Hugh Scott about it years later. He said, “You did the right thing, Dick.” [Laughing]

RITCHIE: You were telling that story about the Congressional Record and I was thinking there are a few senators who woke up the next day and found that their remarks had made it into the Record, but they could still take it out before it went into the permanent Record.

MURPHY: Yeah.

RITCHIE: We have a few of the daily Records that contain some unusual speeches that you will not find in the permanent Record. I’m sure Senator Scott was very pleased that his dialogue with Senator Long didn’t get in the Record.

MURPHY: Well, and Scott usually spoke extemporaneously on the Senate floor and you really did make a few minor edits in his remarks because he was very good about that. But I remember you had to be a little careful in that back room there because sometimes Roger Mudd [CBS News correspondent] was there. [Laughing] But I don’t think there were any journalists there that night that Will and I excised the colloquy from the Record.

RITCHIE: Now you worked with him on the Civil Rights Act in ’64 and Voting Rights Act in ’65, and the other Civil Rights Act in ’67-’68. Was that essentially a major area of your time? Did he divide up his staff in such a way that you specialized?

MURPHY: Well, no we didn’t. Back when I was with him I didn’t specialize in anything. The first year I was with him I was it. Me and my secretary. And after the election, I went into Bob Kunzig, our administrative assistant, and I said, “Bob, I need some help.” He and I interviewed a couple of people and we hired a guy to help me. Eventually we had another fellow, Ken Davis, who later became the senator’s administrative assistant in the leader’s office, after Bill Hildenbrand became secretary of the minority. That was after I had left the senator. But we didn’t really have all that much specialization in that thing. I handled all of his floor stuff, so I had to be an instant expert on everything. Thank God for people over there in the Senate Chamber who I could turn to. Just like senators turn to certain senators, I’d turn to certain staff people because often
I didn’t have time to read a committee report. But thank God for *Congressional Quarterly*. That was indispensable.

**RITCHIE:** So you handled anything that was going on on the floor no matter what the subject matter?

**MURPHY:** Everything. That’s right, and that was back before the senators would have to ask unanimous consent to have a staff person on the floor. Javits often had as many as three people on the floor at once. It was like a three-ring circus with Javits. But I was it for Scott. Lamar Alexander, he spent a lot of time on the floor. He was [Howard] Baker’s guy. And Mitch McConnell was Marlow Cook’s guy. So we three were often all on the floor together.

**RITCHIE:** Would you sit in the back on the couches?

**MURPHY:** On the couches. When I wasn’t with the senator, I’d be on the couch. Gene McCarthy liked to come over and engage in what were very enigmatic conversations. [Laughing]

**RITCHIE:** That was in the days before there was any way to finding out what was happening on the floor, unless you were on the floor. There was no squawk box. There was no TV.

**MURPHY:** We depended—if I was back in the office, I wasn’t always on the floor. I was back in the office and Edie Skinner was the senator’s executive assistant. Whenever the bells would start ringing, she’d pick up the phone and call me wanting to know what it was. I’d tell her, “Don’t worry, Edie, it’s not a live quorum call, not a vote.” I said, “I’ll let you know when.” My source of what was going on on the floor was either Mark Trice, the secretary of the minority, Bill Brownrigg, his assistant, or the guys in the cloakroom. I’d call over there.

Well, in I think this would have been around ’66 or something like that, there was a fellow I’d gotten to know from the then-Legislative Reference Service, Bob Chartrand, who was their expert on computers. Bob had come to the library from IBM and there was a small group of us staff guys that were trying to stimulate interest in getting computers for the Senate: Steve Horn, who was Senator Kuchel’s legislative assistant; Bill Welsh,
who was Senator Hart’s administrative assistant, they were kind of the ring leaders of this little group. And we’d meet with Bob Chartrand and talk and bat around ideas for how computers could better serve the Senate. Well, one day I was in my office and Bob came by. He stuck his head in the door and he said, “Dick, I’m running off to lunch, but call this number.” It was a number over in the House. He left already. I called the number and I get a recorded announcement from the House Republican Cloakroom telling you what was going on. Well, I called up Bob and I said, “This is the greatest thing since sliced bread! We ought to have something like this in the Senate.” And he said, “Yeah, you should. Your man is on the Rules Committee, isn’t he?” I said, “Yeah.” He said, “Well, why don’t you get him interested in this thing?”

So I told the senator about it and he went to the Rules Committee and I went with him. The Rules Committee, Senator [B. Everett] Jordan of North Carolina was the chairman. Bill Cochrane was his guy. The Rules Committee meetings always were pretty quiet and sedate. So Scott raised this issue. Well, everybody thought that was a good idea: “Yeah, let’s do it.” Not long after that, I think the same day, Mark Trice called me up and he said, “Dick, what is your senator doing anyway?” I said, “What do you mean, Mark?” And he said, “He wants to have recorded phone announcements from the cloakroom.” He said, “This will be an absolute disaster!” You know, knowledge is power. [Laughing] He said, “I’m going to fight it!” I said, “Well, you’re welcome to fight it, Mark, but I think it’s a done deal.” And it was. That was our first modern information technology in the Senate.

RITCHIE: We still have it.

MURPHY: Yes, exactly. And I’m sure there are many other ways of finding out what’s going on on the floor, but back then, you know, I had to call Mark or the cloakroom to find out what was going on.

RITCHIE: People have told me that’s one reason why people spent a lot of time in the chamber as well.

MURPHY: Exactly. On a major bill, particularly.

RITCHIE: Or at least in the vicinity of the chamber if you weren’t in the chamber.
MURPHY: Yeah, and oh, I was in the chamber.

RITCHIE: Now I understand that Senator Scott gave you sort of leeway to think up some legislation as well for him when he was in that second term.

MURPHY: Yeah, he did. He just kind of gave me carte blanche. He said, “Any good ideas you can come up with for legislation, be my guest.” There were a couple of bills in that regard that I came up with. One, by way of background, concerning this one, the Comprehensive Planning and Development Act [S.799], about which I was not a specialist by any means. But up in Harrisburg there was a body called the Pennsylvania State Planning Board. I think it might have been started by Governor Bill Scranton. This was a group to advise the governor on state planning. And the chairman of it was a fellow by the name of Jack Busby, who was chief executive of Pennsylvania Power and Light. Both senators were on the committee but I don’t think either one ever attended a meeting of it because, you know, it conflicted with stuff down here. So Ralph Widner, who was Clark’s legislative assistant, and I, would sit in for the senators. Other people on the commission included some members of the governor’s cabinet and, I remember, the president of the Pennsylvania State AFL-CIO was on it. It was a combination of private citizens and state officials. And it was quite interesting some of the things that they talked about. I got to know the executive director of the commission, Irving Hand.

So I became quite interested in this whole business of planning. I thought, well, I’d gotten to know folks from the National League of Cities and the National Association of Counties and The American Institute of Planners, and there was a fellow down in the Bureau of the Budget, Bill Brussat, and we got together and batted this thing around and we came up with this Comprehensive Planning and Development Act of 1967, which the senator introduced early that year. The bill was pretty complex, but essentially it was to provide governors and local elected officials with the tools and some federal assistance to pull together the functional planning of various agencies of their governments into kind of a comprehensive planning strategy for the state and for the metropolitan areas and cities and whatnot. Not exactly a politically sexy topic, but it was of quite a bit of interest to the state and local governments and people in the planning profession. We introduced the bill.
The senator, of course, knew less about the subject than I did, which wasn’t much. But he was invited to give a speech to the American Institute of Planners at the Shoreham Hotel at a luncheon. And with the help of a couple of guys, I wrote his speech. I remember he hated to read speeches. He just hated to do it. But he knew in this case that he had to. And he got down there and he started off ad-libbing. He quoted from the book of Genesis something about the hand may be that of—

RITCHIE: Is this the Jacob and Esau story?

MURPHY: Yeah, the Jacob and Esau story. “The hand may be that of Jacob, but the voice is that of Esau.” Which was his way of saying, “This speech was ghost-written.” [Laughing] That kind of broke the ice, you know, and warmed the audience up. He read the speech, but as was typical, he would ad-lib in the course of the speech, which was sort of his way of telling his audience, “Hey, I may know more about this than you think I do.” But it was a bill that really wasn’t going to go anywhere, but we did what we could. I remember I said, “Boy, it’d be great if we could get [Edmund] Muskie as a cosponsor.” Because Muskie was the chairman of the intergovernmental relations subcommittee, former governor of Maine, you know? So I approached Senator Muskie through Don Nicoll, his administrative assistant, but they said "no thanks" because at that point the administration, the new secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Robert Weaver, was dead-set against this bill. The reason was that this particular program would be administered by a unit of the Executive Office of the President. This was the idea of our friend from the Bureau of the Budget. And boy that raised a big red flag with HUD because they administered a program called Urban Planning Assistance Grants and they didn’t want anybody messing around in their turf. It never went anywhere but we offered it as an amendment to another Muskie bill. I gave talks before legislative meetings of the National League of Cities and the National Association of Counties. I tried to sell it, and they were all for it. But it didn’t go anywhere, although eventually I think the Office of Management and Budget was able to implement some of the ideas that were in this bill. They were able to do it executively.

That was one bill. The other was a bill that never was introduced. I was always looking around for ideas and late in 1967, I think the Senate was out of session, we got a letter from the editor of the *Titusville Herald* in Titusville, Pennsylvania, which is somewhere up in the northwestern part of the state. This man wrote a letter supporting a proposal made by a distinguished blue ribbon panel of the Organization of American
Historians to restore the National Archives as an independent agency, because the Archives was under the thumb of the General Services Administration. Well, I thought that was a great idea. Then about that time the New York Times came out with an editorial endorsing it. So I sent a memo off to the senator. I was a history major as an undergraduate so I was really interested in it and I proposed that we introduce the bill. Well, I’d also heard that Congressman [Charles] “Mac” Mathias of Maryland was also interested. I got a hold of his legislative assistant, Carrie Johnson, and we both got together on it and we agreed that we’ll have a bill introduced in both houses and I would arrange to have it drafted by the Office of Legislative Counsel over here. Scott and Mathias put out a press release announcing that they were going to introduce this bill. Well, no sooner had the press release got out I got a call from Bob Griffin, who was an assistant administrator at GSA. He was their legislative guy. I didn’t know Bob at all. He said, “I want to see you.” So he came up to see me and he said, “This bill is an absolute disaster. If Scott introduces this bill, we will destroy it! We’ll come up and testify against it and we’ll bury it!” I said, “Okay, thank you.”

I went ahead and contacted the legislative counsel. The guy who handled it was a fellow by the name of Blair Crownover. Well, Blair was a Pennsylvanian—in fact, he was from the Main Line of Philadelphia—and Blair was a bit of a snob. But a delightful guy and very, very sharp. So I told him what I wanted, which was very simple. Just draft a bill making it an independent agency. Well, Blair called me up and he said, “Dick, there are some policy questions here that we’ll need to resolve. One of them is how do you separate the archival function from the records management function?” I said, “Beats me.” He said, “Well, you know there is a records management thing. Is this going to go with the Archives too or is it going to stay with GSA?” I said, “I don’t know, but maybe we ought to get the chairman of this commission to meet with us and give us his recommendation.” Well, the chairman was a very distinguished professor at Princeton by the name of Julian Boyd, who was the editor of the Thomas Jefferson Papers. He came down and we met in Blair’s office. Carrie Johnson and Blair Crownover and Julian Boyd and I. And he was very, very distinguished. Blair started peppering him with questions and Boyd didn’t have an answer. He said, “I’ll have to convene the committee so that we can discuss the matter.” Well, that ended the whole thing. [Laughing] We talked about that the last time.

BIRKNER: Are you saying that the fact that Boyd didn’t have quick answers really undermined your effort?
MURPHY: Yeah, I mean Carrie and I just dropped it at that point. However, later on, Mac, at this point, was a senator, in fact I think he was the chairman—was he the chairman of the Governmental Operations Committee?

RITCHIE: He was chairman of the Rules Committee in the ’80s.

MURPHY: Yeah. Well, this thing would have been in Government Operations, but anyway, Mac was the guy who did it. I think the Mathias bill was enacted around 1984, which was 16 years later.

RITCHIE: Right. The Senate Historian, Richard Baker, was very active and there was a group of historians here in Washington who were trying to push it through. Senator Mathias was the great sponsor of that.

MURPHY: Yeah, he was your horse.

RITCHIE: It did become independent and it absolutely needed to be so.

MURPHY: Absolutely.

BIRKNER: I think your history background in college served you well and the country well.

MURPHY: Yeah. [Laughing]

RITCHIE: But did Julian Boyd ever come back with answers to the questions?

MURPHY: He never did. He never did. Never heard another thing from him.

BIRKNER: He was busy writing 200-page footnotes. [Laughing]

RITCHIE: When you were promoting legislation like this, did you go out looking to get media support? Did you try to get newspapers to write stories about it or try to work with reporters who might be sympathetic to what you were doing?
MURPHY: No, I didn’t. I probably should have. Frankly, it didn’t occur to me. And I knew quite a few journalists, too. I mean, I knew David Broder, who was with the Washington Star, and Roger Mudd of CBS, and John Averill of the Los Angeles Times, and Bob Albright of the Washington Post. There was a great—Bob Albright. He was an elderly fellow and Bob was a very soft-spoken guy. Bob used to come by every now and then. Come by my office just to chew the fat and find out what’s going on. He was very low key.

BIRKNER: Did you know about him, Don?

RITCHIE: I never met him, but I’ve heard a lot about him.

MURPHY: Yeah, he was a predecessor of—I think he was there before Spencer Rich. Spencer was covering the Senate for quite a few years.

RITCHIE: And Albright had been there for decades.

MURPHY: Yeah.

RITCHIE: I think maybe since the 1930s, and was still there in the ’60s.

MURPHY: Yeah. So he was up in years at that point, yeah.

RITCHIE: He’d covered Joe McCarthy very extensively.

BIRKNER: I’d like to see his papers.

RITCHIE: I don’t know where they are.

BIRKNER: Did you know Richard Wilson, who covered the Senate and Washington for the Cowles publications?

MURPHY: No. I knew Andy Glass, who was with the New York Herald Tribune. But I never tried to promote with journalists, unfortunately.

RITCHIE: Did Senator Scott have a press secretary in those days?
MURPHY: Yes, he did. His press secretary for my first two or three years was Eugene Cowen. Gene and I worked very closely together. We were kind of hand and glove in terms of whenever I’d come up with a bill, Gene would do the press release on it. We didn’t get along as well when he became the administrative assistant. Gene tried to have his hand in everything. He was too controlling for me. But nonetheless, he didn’t interfere with my direct relationship with the senator. But, well, we didn’t get along that well, did we? [Looking at Mrs. Murphy and laughing]

RITCHIE: All of this is going on in the backdrop of the Vietnam War, starting with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in ’64 and throughout the whole period that you’re there.

MURPHY: Yeah.

RITCHIE: I’ve always found it interesting that Hugh Scott was on the side of a Democratic president in the ’60s and skeptical of a Republican president in the ’70s on the same issue. I wondered if you could tell me a little bit about where Senator Scott stood on the Vietnam War.

MURPHY: Well, I think he was very deferential of the executive on foreign and defense issues. On Vietnam, he was right down the line with LBJ. All the way with LBJ. And I, who had studied East Asia in graduate school, including Southeast Asia, I was all the way with LBJ on it. In fact, I never disagreed with any of the senator’s positions on anything. We just had a complete identity of views. But on Vietnam, he supported the president. Of course, he was in the overwhelming majority of senators who voted for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. I spent the whole time on the Senate floor on that and observed the debate and [J. William] Fulbright, who was the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was the floor manager of it. Fulbright made some very strong declarations in support of the resolution authorizing the president to use whatever means necessary. But over the course of time, there was a groundswell of opposition to the war. We saw it in Pennsylvania. Groups would come down from Pennsylvania. Sometimes the two senators met with some. I remember there was one group, Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam. The two senators met with them in a hearing room. But usually it was I who met with people—groups of people or individuals—to hear their opposition.
I remember one was a very nice and earnest professor from a college up in Pennsylvania. It might have been Swarthmore. He came down and he and I had a long conversation on it. He was a Quaker. We had a very pleasant, reasoned discussion. I was explaining why the senator and I supported the war effort. I felt like I was having a one-man graduate school seminar with this gentleman. He wrote the nicest letter to the senator afterwards complimenting me on hearing him out. He was impressed with my reasoning and all of this sort of thing. I was really flattered and touched by it. And I remember meeting one time with a group from Women Strike For Peace. Our office was in 260 of the Russell Building—there was a dead end over there. There was an elevator and there was a little alcove there and I hopped up on this ledge there and these women were meeting with me outside my office. One of them was from Arlington, Virginia, and she was really haranguing me on the subject.

But obviously spent a lot of time meeting with people on Vietnam and following it and all of that. The senator went down to the White House from time to time. Lyndon Johnson would have these briefings down there on the Vietnam War. One time the senator went down and Lyndon Johnson invited Hugh Scott and Cliff Case up to the family quarters. He was up there giving them the treatment. Cliff Case sat on the toilet with the seat covered, and Hugh Scott was leaning against the wash basin. And Lyndon Johnson was moving in on them. [Laughing] But in 1967 the Senate Republican Policy Committee staff came out with a report which was quite critical of the war. I don’t remember now what the report said, but I do remember reading it and I was quite upset by it, that our Policy Committee was taking a different position now, the staff. I got on the phone with those guys, Martin Clancy and Bill Hatch, and I wrote up an analysis on this report, pointing out what I thought were its flaws and I gave that to the senator. The report got quite a bit of attention in the media.

I forget who initiated the idea, but [Charles] Percy was a new senator. Percy’s thing on the war, which he used in his campaign was he said, “We’ve got to get more Asian countries to participate in the war.” The Thais and the Koreans and whatnot, that was his thing. Javits was increasingly turning against the war. So one of those guys, I think it might have been Javits’s staff guy, Les Gelb, who later became president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Les got together with Scott Cohen of Percy’s staff and me and we talked about coming up with a joint statement outlining our common position on the war. We came up with this thing and we were going to give it to our senators at the
regular weekly Policy luncheon. I remember Scott blessed it and Percy blessed it, and I thought Javits had blessed it but there was one—you know, it was a brief statement. It was maybe one page and just kind of bullet points as to what it was we were advocating in connection with the war. There was one thing in there and Javits called me personally, and he said, “Dick, this sentence has got to get out of the bill.” It was something I had put in it. He said, “This sentence has to go out of the bill or I won’t endorse this statement.” Well, I was, to say the least, intimidated. I called Les Gelb and I said, “Your boss just called me and he told me to take that sentence out.” He said, “Don’t listen to him, Dick.” He said, “Keep it in there.” [Laughing] And we did. But it was an attempt on the part of three senators with diverse views to come to a consensus on it. And we put it out as a press release and got attention that way.

BIRKNER: I want to ask you a question about this issue of Scott and the war from one particular angle. One of his most prominent constituents was living in Gettysburg at the time, and I’m talking about Dwight Eisenhower. Although Eisenhower, we all know, had his private misgivings about the war, Johnson worked hard to bring Eisenhower in on the side of the war. And as the years went on, certainly by the years you’re talking about, Eisenhower was increasingly stridently in favor of the war. Did he ever talk with Scott, to your knowledge, impressing on him the need to stay the course in Vietnam and support Johnson’s policies?

MURPHY: I don’t know. If he did, I wasn’t aware of it. He and Eisenhower were very close, so I wouldn’t be surprised if they had talked together. But I wasn’t aware of it.

BIRKNER: Clearly Scott had been a very good ally of Eisenhower in ’52 and helped him get drafted, if you will.

MURPHY: Absolutely.

BIRKNER: So Eisenhower had good feelings for Scott?

MURPHY: Oh yeah, and the two of them tried to drag Bill Scranton into running for governor in 1962.

BIRKNER: And succeeded.
MURPHY: Yes.

BIRKNER: And of course, there was the whole misunderstanding in ’64. But you’re not aware that Eisenhower spoke to Scott on the Vietnam issue, per se?

MURPHY: Right, I’m not aware of it, no.

BIRKNER: What about the issue of briefings and propaganda aside from the president himself. Did Johnson make quote “experts” available to Scott and other Republicans, or even to the staff like yourself, to bolster them as supporters of the war? Or did you guys just work independently?

MURPHY: I worked on it independently. I never was approached by anybody in the administration. I was on some other issues. I remember when Nick Katzenbach was undersecretary of state. He called me several times, I think, on foreign aid issues. But I never heard from anybody on Vietnam. And Johnson did a lot of this himself. Now he invited senators’ administrative assistants to the White House at least once, I know. I think it was Bob Kunzig who went down there. I remember Johnson, at that briefing—Bob told us about it afterwards—that Johnson attacked Wayne Morse and said that he was a hypocrite and he said he didn’t have the guts to vote against the Tonkin Gulf resolution.

BIRKNER: I thought he did.

MURPHY: Morse? No, he did not.

RITCHIE: Morse and [Ernest] Gruening were the two dissenters on that.

MURPHY: Was Morse a dissenter?

RITCHIE: Yes.

MURPHY: Oh, he might have been attacking Fulbright.

BIRKNER: Yeah, he probably was attacking Fulbright.
MURPHY: He was probably attacking Fulbright. That’s right, yeah. I’d forgotten Morse was against it, because he held up Gruening. He said "Gruening and Morse had the guts to vote against me on that one."

BIRKNER: Yeah, he was probably attacking Fulbright.

MURPHY: Yeah. But those were interesting times. And then we had, in early ’68, General [William] Westmoreland, the commander in Vietnam, had made a recommendation for a substantial increase in the number of troops in Vietnam and it was reported on page one of the New York Times. Westmoreland wanted something like 206,000 more troops. And that afternoon we had the closest thing I’ve ever seen to a debate in the Senate on an issue that was not a pending legislative issue. There must have been close to 50 senators on the floor. Robert Kennedy was the one who started it. I remember the one who disagreed strenuously with Kennedy was John Tower of Texas, a Republican. I remember saying to Scott, “Well, senator, you ought to say”—I didn’t tell him what to say, but I said—“You ought to say something on this.” And he said, “No, Dick,” he said, “look at Dick Russell over there. He’s just sitting there and listening.” And he said, “That’s what I’m going to do.” [Laughing] But it was a spirited debate. The only other time that there was something like that—and I wasn’t present—back in ’67, I think. It must have been in the evening when Senator Percy and Senator [Gale] McGee of Wyoming, they got into a debate. There were probably very few senators on the floor. I remember reading it in the Congressional Record. I mean, it was really a good back and forth between the two of them. But you didn’t often see something like that in the Senate, where usually you have set speeches.

BIRKNER: Well, in the old days I guess you did but not so much in the ’60s.

MURPHY: No.

RITCHIE: Every once in a while, a debate accidently breaks out.

MURPHY: Yeah, accidentally.

RITCHIE: But things were becoming much more divisive at that stage. People were having to reevaluate their positions.
MURPHY: Yeah, but it wasn’t until after I left, because you know, when the rubber met the road on the Defense appropriations bill, Congress gave the administration what they wanted. And it was only in 1968 when we had a tax bill up where the administration asked for a surtax on income taxes.

RITCHIE: Right.

MURPHY: That was the first attempt to pay for the war. And that was my last full year with the senate. But it was after I left when the efforts really started to—

BIRKNER: Yeah, Cooper-Church.

MURPHY: Cooper-Church, exactly. And at that point I had left the Senate.

RITCHIE: It’s a backdrop to everything else that’s going on. The Vietnam story was just there.

MURPHY: Exactly.

RITCHIE: And it’s an issue the senators could not dodge. They had to confront it at some point.

MURPHY: Right.

RITCHIE: You mentioned that you had the groups of antiwar people who were coming to see you. Did you talk to constituents on many issues when they came to town with some problem with the senator?

MURPHY: Oh yeah, all the time, it seemed like. I spent a lot of time meeting with people. Of course, Pennsylvania is close by and people would just hop in the car and come down. I remember one guy—I can’t remember what it was he came to see me about—but he was from Philadelphia, and he kept saying, “You tell Hughie. . . .” [Laughing] There were some Republicans up there in Philadelphia that insisted on calling him Hughie. And he’d blanche if somebody called him Hughie. But there was an occasion where I was offered a bribe. Some guy, he said he had invented something, I think, to make cars much safer. I can’t remember what this thing was that he made. He
drove down from Pennsylvania in a driving rainstorm to meet me. And this was early in the evening the day when he came down. And he was just an ordinary Joe. He brought this visual aid with him to explain this thing and he wanted the senator. Detroit wasn’t interested, and he wanted Hugh Scott to lean on Detroit to accept this invention that was going to make cars much safer and all that sort of stuff. And he promised me that—he said, “Do you have any children?” And I said, “Yes, I have a daughter,” who at that point was two years old. He said, “Well, I will finance her college education if you will get the senator to do what I want him to do.” And I said, “No thank you.” [Laughing]

But yes, we did. Of course, I met with lobbyists all the time: labor union lobbyists and business lobbyists and other lobbyists. But we had quite a few constituents coming down. There was one matter which was kind of moving, I thought. The Old Order Amish wanted to be exempt from the Social Security tax, and from Social Security. And a delegation came down from Pennsylvania led by Bishop Fisher, who was a delightful gentleman. And they met with Ralph Widner, Clark’s legislative assistant, and me, in Senator Scott’s office. And from the Treasury Department, we had Gabe Rudney. [Turning to Mrs. Murphy] Remember Shirley Rudney? Yeah. Gabe Rudney, and from the Social Security Administration, there was Hugh Johnson. These men made a plea to be exempt from Social Security. Well, Rudney saw all kinds of problems with that. But they both listened very respectfully and attentively to these people. Afterwards, I invited everybody down to the Dirksen Building cafeteria for ice cream. So we all went down there and I bought everybody ice cream and we had a great old time there. Well, I think it was Dick Schweiker, after he became a senator, who got the exemption for the Old Order Amish. That would have been probably in the early ’70s. But I’m pretty sure it happened.

**BIRKNER:** That’s a nice story.

**MURPHY:** Yeah.

**RITCHIE:** When you had groups like this, was it your main objective to listen to them and deflect them away from the senator? What did you do when you had a group coming to town?

**MURPHY:** Well, I would listen to them and I would tell them that I would bring their views to the senator’s attention—and I would.
RITCHIE: You were essentially the surrogate for the senator?

MURPHY: Yeah, I was the surrogate for the senator. He would make me a surrogate sometimes to go up to the state. Once I went up to the state to accept an award for him at a dinner in Allentown. Another time, in 1967—all invitations that would come to the senator would go to Edie Skinner and she would send it into the senator, indicating whether his calendar was free for the occasion or not. On occasion, he would pass it on to me. He would just write, “Dick?” He was on the Surface Transportation Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee, and he had been invited to give an address on the topic of new directions in transportation policy on April 1, which was a Saturday, at Kutztown State College in Kutztown, Pennsylvania, which is up in kind of the northeastern part of the state. So he wrote on the letter, “Dick?,” and passed it back to me. Well, I took it as an order. I didn’t know much about transportation legislation. So I called up the Transportation Department, which was then a brand new department. Their legislative guy came up to see me and I told him what I was going to talk about. I said, “Can you send me any material that you think would be useful?” Well, they sent me a bunch of speeches by Alan Boyd, who was the first secretary of transportation, and I read them. Then I did some other research and got some stuff from the Library of Congress, and I discovered that there was an awful lot of stuff there. I ended up writing a lecture that was 50 minutes long. I mean, there was an awful lot of waterfront to cover there.

When I finished drafting it, I shared it with Stan Sender, who was the transportation counsel on the Commerce Committee, for his comments. He had a few comments, relatively minor. He said he thought it was a good speech. And let me tell you, going to Kutztown, Pennsylvania, on a Saturday, or anytime, was quite a trip. I think I flew out of Baltimore to Lancaster. Then I went over to Reading and I rented a car and drove over to Kutztown and I gave my talk before lunch and stayed for the luncheon. Then I had to come back to Washington because we had dinner that night at Gene Cowens’ house, and it was about a four-hour drive as I recall. But I gave the talk. It was a talk to the Eastern Traffic Manager’s Conference at Kutztown State College. [Laughing]

RITCHIE: Could you describe what a typical day in Senator Scott’s office would have been like in the ’60’s when you were there. What were your routines of the day?

MURPHY: Well, I was usually in before eight o’clock. I’d come in around eight o’clock and I was the first person there and that was a time when I could quickly look at
the headlines of the papers, take a quick glance at the *Congressional Record*, go down to
the Dirksen cafeteria to have coffee with Bill Hildenbrand and some other guys. We’d do
that every day. I’d be back in the office around nine o’clock and then all hell broke loose
for the rest of the day. You know, the phone was constantly ringing. I was meeting with
people coming in. It was very hard. Of course, I handled the legislative mail, too. We only
had robotype typewriters in those days down in the basement of the Russell Building. For
volume mail, I would draft the senator’s response and I’d send it in to him and he would
make some edits or changes in it and then we’d send it down to the robo room. So we
were able to dispose of quite a bit of mail that way, but there were a lot of individual
letters that I would dictate responses to. Then we’d have the signature machine sign them.

And then I’m trying to keep up with what’s going on over on the Senate floor. We
didn’t really have staff meetings. The senator didn’t believe in staff meetings. So we were
all kind of working independently; the press office and the administrative assistant and
whatnot. I think I told Michael before that Bob Kunzig told me at the very outset, he said,
“Dick, you’re the legislative assistant. You deal directly with the senator.” He said, “Now
and then, I’ll ask you what’s going on.” When Bob would ask me what’s going on, I’d tell
him to wait a few minutes and I’d find the most recent *Congressional Quarterly*, which
had a good rundown on everything that was going on in Congress. I’d take it in to him
and I’d say, “Bob, read this, and if you have any questions, I’ll be glad to answer them.”
[Laughing]

But I think it was around ’67, the senator finally managed to share a hideaway in
the Capitol with Thruston Morton of Kentucky. It was right off the Rotunda. Thank God
for that, because I would go over there. I’d tell my secretary, “I’m going over to the
hideaway.” She had the phone number and she was the only one that had it. And I said,
“If anybody’s looking for me, if Edie Skinner is looking for me, let me know.” So I
would go over there. That was the one place where I found some peace and quiet, where I
could do a little studying. But other than that, I was going back and forth to the floor with
the senator, if I wasn’t over there already. When you went with the senator, he was a very
fast mover. I had a hard time keeping up with him to go over there and back. But it
seemed like every day was a new day and there was always something different.

**BIRKNER:** I have to ask this question. Given that aides like yourself had access
to the floor, how did you know when to let the senator just go and do his talking with his
peers and how did you sort of . . . did you have a sixth sense about when you should be trailing him and when you should give him space?

MURPHY: You mean on the floor?

BIRKNER: Right, on the floor of the Senate. My image of the Senate is always of these senators sort of whispering in each other’s ears or telling jokes or whatever they’re doing, but you don’t tend to think of the aides. Maybe because they’re deliberately meant to be obscure. But did you have a sixth sense about when you should be right on his tail and when you should be just somewhere else in the building?

MURPHY: Oh yeah. If he went over to talk with some colleagues, you know, I just stayed behind. I wouldn’t go unless he asked me to.

BIRKNER: Unless he asked you to join him, okay.

MURPHY: Yeah, exactly. I remember one day in 1968, Gene McCarthy was running for president and I had gotten to know McCarthy, if you can say one could ever get to know that guy. Because I was kind of a foil for him over on the Senate floor when I was sitting on the couch. He’d have these little witticisms and everything like that. But he was a total enigma to me, and I wanted to know what made this guy tick. So after the Senate had adjourned for the year, this would have been back in ’65 or ’66, I called McCarthy’s office one day and asked if we could have lunch. He said, “Yeah.” He always called me Murphy. So he and I went over to a restaurant beyond the Monocle over there on D Street. There was a restaurant on the next corner. And we had lunch for two hours and we talked about an awful lot of things. I walked him back to his office and then I went back to my office and I sat there trying to figure out what it was we had really talked about.

Anyway, when he announced his candidacy for president over there in the Senate Caucus Room, I went over. I was in the audience. He saw me there. Some weeks after that, I was in the chamber and Scott was over talking with Jim Pearson of Kansas. Well, it just so happens that McCarthy, in campaigning up in New Hampshire, had announced who some of the members of his cabinet were going to be, and one of them was Jim Pearson. He was going to be his secretary of agriculture, much to the surprise of everybody, including Pearson. But anyway, Scott and Pearson are standing talking, and
they were very close personal friends, and in comes Gene McCarthy. He comes in and he
drapes his arms around Scott’s and Pearson’s shoulders. Then he beckons me over, and
he said to Scott, “Hugh,” he said, “look at Murphy. He’s my secret agent.” [Laughing] I
felt like sinking into the carpet. McCarthy was a man that Scott had little use of because
in 1960, when McCarthy came into the state to campaign for Jack Kennedy for president,
he attacked Hugh Scott. That is something, in those days at any rate, no senator ever
did—and Scott never forgot it.

BIRKNER: That’s a great story.

RITCHIE: Speaking of relations of senators, I was curious about the relationship
of your office, Senator Scott’s office, with the office of the other senator from
Pennsylvania. You had Joe Clark, a Democrat, there for the time that you were in.

MURPHY: Right. Joe Clark, who was a liberal Democrat. He and Hugh Scott
were very close friends. They both lived near each other in Philadelphia, up there I guess
near Germantown. Anyway, they were very close friends. They disagreed on a lot of
things, but it was a very close relationship and that relationship was reflected right
throughout the staff. I worked very closely with my counterpart in Clark’s office, Ralph
Widner. Clark's administrative assistant was a fellow by the name of Bernie Norwich. A
great guy. We just had very, very cordial relationships. Joe Clark, who was quite a snob
himself, and was like a bantam rooster sometimes, and he did not endear himself to many
of his colleagues. He was a great reformer in the Senate among the Democrats. But I
always liked Joe Clark, I guess because he liked me a lot. But he was always very kind
and generous with me.

That changed in the ’64 campaign because the Democrats had a very bitter
primary contest for the senatorial nomination between Judge Michael Musmanno of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Genevieve Blatt, who was the secretary of internal
affairs of the Commonwealth. She had strong political ties with the local officials all
around the state, and she was a protégée of Senator Clark. Joe Clark was zealous in his
support for her, especially against Musmanno. He questioned Musmanno’s origins and all
of that sort of stuff. And he attacked Scott some during the campaign. Well, after the
election was all over, the two senators did a little show. They had had this joint radio and
television program that was on twice a month on Sundays up in Pennsylvania on all TV
stations and radio stations. It was a real news maker program. Of course, they stopped it
once Scott had announced his candidacy for reelection. But Senator Clark wrote a congratulatory letter to Senator Scott, but it was pretty tepid. Clark and his wife went down to Argentina after the election on vacation. And the Scotts went down to New Zealand on their vacation. So things were a little tense between the two offices there for a few months. But then, after the Senate came back in session, Clark made the overture and said, “Well, Hugh, are we going to do the show again?” And Scott said, “Sure.” So they kissed and made up and our relationships were back to normal again. But it was a very close, cooperative relationship.

RITCHIE: There was no rivalry between the staffs?

MURPHY: None whatever. None whatever. It was really a delightful relationship, because we often heard of other cases where there were other states where senators from the same party didn’t get along and that was reflected down the line in their staffs, too. But not in our case.

BIRKNER: So what happened in ’68 when Clark was up for reelection? Did Scott return the favor and attack him?

MURPHY: No. Matter of fact, in the race for the Republican nomination, Scott took a neutral position, publically, at any rate. He told Gene Cowen and me—Gene, at that point, he was the administrative assistant—and he said, “If either candidate comes to you,” (and the two principal candidates that year for the nomination were [Congressman Richard] Schweiker and John Tabor, who had been secretary of commerce under Scranton and secretary of labor and industry under Governor Ray Shafer). He said, “If either one of them come to you for advice, give it to them. Cooperate with them any way you wish.” He never told us who he favored. I think his personal preference was probably John Tabor, but he never gave any indication whatever. Not even a hint of what his own personal preference was on it. I knew Schweiker very well and liked him a lot. I knew Tabor very well from the Pennsylvania State Planning Board thing.

In the autumn of 1967, the two candidates were going to make an appearance in Harrisburg before the Pennsylvania Council of Republican Women. John Tabor called me and said, “I’d like to meet with you.” I went up to Camp Hill at that hotel up there at Camp Hill, on the hill, I can’t remember which one it was. I spent the night there.
BIRKNER: I think it’s a Hilton, but I don’t want to hold myself to that.

MURPHY: Yeah. John Tabor and I met for four hours. He grilled me on issues of foreign policy—Vietnam, NATO, you name it. John was a lawyer. He reminded me of Howard Baker in that regard. I sat in on a session with Baker one time where he was grilling an expert. I mean, these guys had a tremendous ability to elicit information from people. It was a great session I had with John Tabor. I liked him so much. If I could have voted in that election, I would have voted for John. Nothing against Schweiker. I liked him tremendously. But as far as I know, the relationship between the two senatorial offices with Schweiker was the same as it was with Clark.

RITCHIE: I saw that you said in the previous interview that the hours were pretty killing, really, on the job. There was lots of late nights.

MURPHY: Yes, there were.

RITCHIE: And you couldn’t predict your schedule and all the rest. When did you decide that you wanted to hang it up? When did you think that the time was coming to change positions?

MURPHY: I think it was after the... it was probably sometime in ’67, maybe, that I started thinking about it. And I sought the advice of a gentleman who later hired me when I went with Merck and Company, a fellow by the name of Ed Carroll. His title was Director of Economic Research for the company. Indeed, at one time, that’s what he did. But Ed also knew a lot of folks in Washington and so he’d come down here and meet with senators and congressmen. I used to see Ed quite a bit, and I told Ed one time, “Sometime when you’re in Washington, I’d like to get together with you. I’d like to get your advice on career opportunities.” So we talked about education. The Higher Education Act had passed and colleges and universities had a great interest in that. He said, “You might want to consider representing a college or a university here in Washington.” I started looking into it. I remember the University of California Berkeley had an office here and I met with their guy to find out what they do. Well, of course, basically what they were looking for were all the federal grant programs and that sort of thing.
Ed knew a trustee of the University of Pennsylvania. Well, I was acquainted with Gaylord Harnwell—he was the president—because he was on the Pennsylvania State Planning Board. So Ed and I took a flyer at Harnwell through this member of the board of trustees, who was a good friend of Ed’s, to see if Penn would be interested in opening up a Washington office. Harnwell said no. He said, “I have a guy on my staff here and Philadelphia being so close to Washington, we don’t need to open an office down there.” Then Ed said, “Well, we might want to consider forming a consortium of smaller colleges up in Pennsylvania and represent them here in Washington.” Well, we looked at that and didn’t get very far on that. Then, finally, he offered me a job with Merck. I wasn’t looking for a job with a company, particularly, but he offered me the job with Merck and so I took it. The hours at the Senate were very long and we had a baby girl at that point. But it wasn’t because of flagging interest in the work at all. I loved what I was doing. My five years with Hugh Scott were the best years of my career. I just loved the senator and we became very dear friends right until his death in 1994. Had I stayed with him, I might have ended up being secretary of the Senate. Who knows?

RITCHIE: Did he turn to you for advice after you left? Did he ever consult with you on things?

MURPHY: Well, he and I would get together for lunch from time to time. We would just talk about a lot of things, politics and—

BIRKNER: Did he ever talk to you about Nixon?

MURPHY: Yes, he did. Right after the ’68 election, he and I had lunch one day in the Senate dining room. He was so enthused about Nixon’s election as president. He said, “At last we have a Republican president who’s going to really do his darndest to build up the party.”

BIRKNER: Forlorn hope.

MURPHY: He said, “Eisenhower didn’t do it, but Nixon will.” He was so confident of it. Of course, that never happened.

RITCHIE: What did you think of his role as leader? Did you think he was an effective leader when he got to the position?
MURPHY: I think so. He was a consensus guy within the party. Howard Baker ran against him for the leadership position, I think, even in ’69 he ran against him. But Scott was pretty shrewd. He lined up some conservatives to support him. I know Len Jordan of Idaho was one of them. Milton Young of North Dakota and Gordon Allott of Colorado were others. I mean, these were traditional conservatives, not the wacky ones that you have nowadays. [Laughing] In fact, I think Carl Curtis may have been one of his supporters, too.

BIRKNER: Can’t get much more conservative than Carl Curtis.

MURPHY: Yeah, right. So I think he was quite effective. He wasn’t a yes man for the White House, that’s for sure. He couldn’t abide [H.R.] Haldeman and [John] Erlichman. He and Mansfield became very, very close personal friends. So close, in fact, that when Hugh Scott was reelected in 1970, not long after the election he met with Mansfield and he told Mansfield that this was going to be his last term in the Senate. Mansfield was the only person he told. He didn’t even tell that to Mrs. Scott. So it was a well kept secret. I remember in 1975, there were several guys that were looking at that seat in the event that Hugh Scott decided not to run. John Heinz being one. Arlen Specter being another. George Packard, who was executive editor of the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, was another one. Packard had not had any political experience whatever. I remember Packard called Scott in 1965 and point blank asked him, “Hugh, are you going to run?”

BIRKNER: Seventy-five maybe?

MURPHY: Yeah, “Hugh, are you going to run for reelection?” And the senator said, “Well, George, I haven’t made up my mind, but you’ll be the first to know.” [Laughing] He took great umbrage at that. He didn’t believe in disclosing his intentions. In 1966, when John Sherman Cooper was reelected as senator from Kentucky, the very next day he announced that he was not going to run again in 1972. Scott was so shocked he called up John Cooper and said, “Are you out of your mind, John?”

RITCHIE: You just make yourself a lame duck when you do that.

MURPHY: Yeah, right.
RITCHIE: You had such an intimate relationship with the senator and Senate for that time period from ’64 to ’68. Now looking at the Senate, looking back 40 years, how different a place was it then than it is today, from your perspective?

MURPHY: Well, of course, with the Senate nowadays, I only know what I read in the papers, but the Senate was a much more collegial institution. I think the members probably had greater respect for the institution than some of the members here do now. I may be wrong on that. You’re in a better position to judge that than I, Don. But there really were good relationships across the aisle. I don’t recall any personal attacks on other senators. I realize that that’s not allowed under the rules anyway. But no, it was much more congenial than it is now.

RITCHIE: It’s interesting that it was more congenial, but the party divisions were more internal in those days.

MURPHY: Yes.

RITCHIE: The Republican Party was divided between liberal and conservative wings. The Democratic Party was divided between its northern liberal and southern conservative wings. But despite the four political factions in the Senate, there was more overall harmony among the senators.

MURPHY: Absolutely. You could get things done, even with those divisions. I think on that Civil Rights bill we talked about earlier, the one that was enacted in 1968, I think Dirksen could see that he was losing control of his Republicans on those cloture votes in 1968. When it got to the point where more Republican senators voted for cloture than against, I think that’s probably one of the reasons that he executed one of his famous 180-degree turns.

RITCHIE: There’s a political cartoon of Dirksen as a ringmaster standing on top of two elephants. One says liberal Republicans and the other says conservative Republicans. They’re going in opposite directions but he’s maintaining his poise between the two.

BIRKNER: And there it is.
MURPHY: Yeah.

RITCHIE: He was very deft in his leadership of the party.

MURPHY: Yeah. I had lunch not too long ago with a friend who had worked with Javits. I think he worked there after I left the Senate. No, I take that back. But he said that Javits and Dirksen had an excellent relationship. Javits was the most liberal Republican of the lot, but they had a very good relationship.

RITCHIE: Interesting friendships and personalities. One thing that I remember Bill Hildenbrand telling me was that when he was counting heads in the Senate Chamber, he never took a vote for granted, because there are all these interpersonal relationships and personal backgrounds and everything else that would confound a vote. That you would assume that someone was going to vote very conservative or very liberal and they would surprise you because of some personal connection that they’d had.

MURPHY: Yeah, exactly. Sort of like the Supreme Court, you know? We have friends who say, “Well, that Republican judge, you know, they’re always going to vote this way.” You can’t tell how these people are going to vote. Some of it is based on personal relationships.

RITCHIE: Well, this has been fascinating. Is there anything else that you’d like to add?

MURPHY: I don’t think so. [Laughing]

BIRKNER: I have to say, I said this to Don. I think your ability to bring one really back to the scene and recall dialogue is one of the things that, as historians, we both really appreciate very much. Because not everybody has that gift. And your ability to remember specifics as you do is a testament to your good memory, among other things, which I see slipping away from me. But it’s great to be able to do this.

MURPHY: Well, thank you very much. I do pride myself on my memory and things like that.
BIRKNER: And Don can testify that the stuff gets used and it will be for a long time. There’s always going to be new articles and books written about the Senate in the 1960s and you’re going to be in some of those books, I think, down the line. You don’t know this, but I’m proud to say that one of my former students, who was one of my worst students, recently won a prize for a book on the Senate, for the southern Democrats’ opposition to civil rights legislation over 30 years. If you had told me that this fellow would write a prize-winning book—I wrote a blurb for it, in fact—I would have said you were crazy. But when people are 19 years old, they’re not necessarily the same people when they’re 28 or older. But he must have, presumably, used some of these collections to write that.

MURPHY: Had he gone on for a Ph.D.?

BIRKNER: He did. He did. And he teaches at a Louisiana University now.

MURPHY: Yeah, marvelous.

BIRKNER: So surprise, surprise. But it’s an example of the kind of work that can shed new light on the Senate.

MURPHY: Yeah.

RITCHIE: Exactly. Well, thank you so much for coming in today.

MURPHY: Well, Don, thank you very much. I’ve enjoyed it immensely.

RITCHIE: Very good. We will send you a transcript just as Michael did and you’ll have a chance to revise and extend your remarks.

MURPHY: Well, I will be very discreet. [Laughing]

End of the Second Interview