Preface
by Donald A. Ritchie

Senator J. William Fulbright holds the record as the longest serving chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (fifteen years—from 1959 to 1974), but Carl Marcy served even longer as the Committee’s chief of staff (eighteen years—from 1955 to 1973). For most of that time their service overlapped, and Marcy’s recollections are in large part the story of Fulbright’s impact on the Committee. These were dramatic years, from Lyndon Johnson’s intervention to remove Theodore Francis Green as chairman, making way for Fulbright, to the presidencies of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, and to Senator Fulbright’s break with President Johnson over American policies toward the Dominican Republic and Vietnam. It was a period in which the bi-partisan consensus in foreign policy unraveled and the gap between Congress and the White House steadily widened. No longer completely trusting the executive branch as a source of information, the Committee expanded its staff and pursued more vigorous oversight of the policy makers. The Foreign Relations Committee, when Marcy left it, had become a strikingly different institution from the one he joined in 1950.

Born in Oregon in 1913, Carl M. Marcy graduated from Willamette University in 1934 (LL.D., 1960) and from Columbia University (LL.B., 1939; Ph.D. in international law and relations, 1943). He was a lecturer and instructor in economics, international law and relations, and public administration at Columbia and the College of the City of New York from 1935 to 1942 when he joined the Department of State as assistant legal advisor and legislative counsel. At the invitation of Francis Wilcox, the Committee’s first chief of staff, Marcy joined the Foreign Relations Committee staff in 1950. When Wilcox left the staff in 1955 to become an assistant secretary of state, Marcy succeeded him as chief of staff, a position he held until his retirement in 1973. Wilcox and Marcy also published a book together in 1955, Proposals for Changes in the United Nations. Earlier, Marcy had also published his doctoral dissertation, Presidential Commissions (New York, 1942).

"Although I understand the reasons, I deeply regret Carl Marcy's retirement," Senator J. William Fulbright commented in November 1973. "He has contributed immeasurably to the work of the Committee through some extremely difficult years. He has been thoroughly non-partisan in his management of the staff, in his approach to the issues of foreign policy, and in his devotion to the constitutional principle of the separation of powers in the American government. The insights which he has brought to his job will be sorely missed." After leaving the Senate
staff, Marcy worked for the Council for a Liveable World, and served as co-director of the American Committee on United States-Soviet Relations, which later became the American Committee on East-West Accord. In preparing for these interviews, the interviewer had access to Carl Marcy's files in the papers of the Foreign Relations Committee at the National Archives. These were copies of all out-going correspondence and memoranda during his service as chief of staff. They should prove an invaluable resource for students of American foreign policy during these pivotal years.

**About The Interviewer:** Donald A. Ritchie is associate historian of the Senate Historical Office. A graduate of C.C.N.Y., he received his Ph.D. in history from the University of Maryland. He has taught at the University College of the University of Maryland, George Mason University, and the Northern Virginia Community College, and conducted a survey of automated bibliographical systems for the American Historical Association. He had published several articles on American political and economic history, a book, James M. Landis: Dean of the Regulators (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), and has edited the Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series for publication by the Committee. He has served as an officer of both the Oral History Association and Oral History in the Mid-Atlantic Region (OHMAR), and in 1984 received OHMAR's Forrest C. Pogue Award for distinguished contributions to the field of oral history.
RITCHIE: I read in the Congressional Staff Directory that you were born in Falls City, Oregon. Did your family traditionally come from Oregon?

MARCY: No, my father came to Oregon in the late 1890s from Minnesota. My mother was a native-born, first generation Swede. She came to Oregon with her father, who would have been my grandfather on that side, following the migration of the Swedes who left Michigan when the forests there began to be depleted. Many of the people in the lumber industry then moved to Oregon and Washington. Her father made his living as a lumberman, and my grandfather on the other side was a hardware merchant. I think my father got into--let's say into the professional class because he was the only male member of the family. He had four or five sisters and I think his parents pushed him in the direction of becoming a white collar person. He became a minister. So I spent my childhood mostly in the Willamette Valley of Oregon as Dad moved from one parish to another. Among my first memories were Dad as a circuit rider. He had the biggest, fastest horse in town to get him from one church to another in the countryside. He was probably the first person in town who had a motorcycle, which got him out to his parishes faster. I think he was one of the first people in town--maybe the doctor was ahead of him--in a small town, who had a Model-T Ford. I can still remember going out into the barn on Monday mornings to see if Dad had managed to run over a jack rabbit so we would have some meat that week.

RITCHIE: What church was he a minister in?

MARCY: Methodist Church. He liked the Willamette Valley and spent most of his life there, although he did end up as minister of one of the prime churches in Portland, then he moved to the First Methodist Church in Tacoma, Washington.

RITCHIE: You were born in Falls City and you lived in Salem for a while; were those your two primary places of residence, or did you move all around?
MARCY: Oh, we moved up and down the Willamette Valley. We lived in Forest Grove, Hillsboro, Eugene, and other places. The reason we moved to Salem was that Dad became District Superintendent. He was on his way up and that's where the D.S. lived.

RITCHIE: So then you changed schools a lot while you were growing up.

MARCY: Yes. I moved from one grade school to another. I went to two different high schools. I finally settled down when we moved to Salem. I went to Willamette University, which is described as the oldest college west of the Mississippi. It was a small Methodist college. I think Dad was a trustee. So that's where I got my college education.

RITCHIE: You started out at Willamette University?

MARCY: Yes, I started at Willamette and I finished there. One of the reasons I started at Willamette was because Dad as a Methodist minister got a cut-rate on the tuition, which was very modest as I recall. But he wasn't able to help much when it came to paying my fraternity and other expenses, so while I was in college I had two very interesting jobs which pretty much paid my way. One job was as a wrapper at the state library, which was located in the capitol building of Oregon, across the street from Willamette. I'd spend every afternoon, usually from about 4:00 until 6:00 or 7:00 o'clock in the evening wrapping books, to be mailed to people all over the state who had written and asked for books. My other job, which was much more interesting, was as a proof-reader on the Salem Statesman. It was a daily morning paper, edited at that time by a Mr. Charles A. Sprague, who later became governor of Oregon. That was fascinating work, although I must say it was rather hard. I would start work at 6:30 in the evening and usually got off about 2:00 o'clock in the morning. I'm still a fairly good proof-reader as a result of that experience.

RITCHIE: Well, then you decided to come east to Columbia. What made you make this big jump from west coast to east coast?

MARCY: When I finally got my degree--well, let me intervene with what I consider an interesting episode. I ran for student body president at one point and was defeated, very narrowly I must say, by the prime athlete of the university at that time. As a consolation prize I was made editor of the yearbook, which was called the Wallulah. There was a provision in the by-laws of the student body stating that if the editor and manager ever managed to break even financially on the publication of the Wallulah, they would get up to five hundred dollars which
they could split between them. I think I was very astute. I picked as business manager a man named Herbert Hardy, who subsequently became a distinguished attorney in the state of Oregon. Herb came to me and asked for the job. He said, "Now, if you let me be the business manager, we'll make some money." The way he did it was he went to each of the fraternities and the sororities and the dormitories and asked them simple questions like "Where do you buy your milk?" and "Where do you buy your groceries?" Then he went to the local dairies. In the past they had bought space in the yearbook for about $25.00 a page. Then he went to the merchants and said, "Well, now, I'll tell you, last year you had a full page in our yearbook and you paid $25.00 for it, but I have checked on how much money the university spends with you and have decided that this year instead of letting you have that page for $25,000, it's going to be $150.00." By use of that less than subtle businessman approach we did come out in the black. We got our $500.00. So between our junior and senior years, Herb and I decided that we would invest our profits and see the United States. We decided to go back east and look at the universities where we thought we might go for graduate study. So we started out on the theory that we would thumb our way to the east by highway. We spent a day with thumb outstretched on the highways and nobody gave us a ride. Towards evening a freight train came by going slow enough, in our direction. So we hopped on the freight train and rode the Union Pacific from Portland to Chicago. Then we bought a Model-T Ford for $25.00 and toured the northeast. When we got ready to come back, we decided to see more of the United States and the Milwaukee Road provided us with travel. Fascinating summer.

RITCHIE: This would have been in . . .

MARCY: This would have been in 1933.

RITCHIE: There must have been a lot of people riding the rails in 1933.

MARCY: There were, yes, the cars were crowded. We usually rode on the top of the trains, tied ourselves on at nights so that we'd be sure not to fall off. Recalling that summer reminds me of my first experience with the United States Senate. We decided we ought to visit Washington, and go to a hearing. The hearing we attended was in what is now, maybe even then was called the Senate Caucus Room. My recollection is that at that time they were having some very interesting hearings. So we spent a day in the Senate Caucus Room, obviously in the back because we were not very well dressed. As a matter of fact, we earlier on had stopped to see the Rockettes at United States Senate Historical Office -- Oral History Project

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Radio City Music Hall in New York, which had just opened up. We got there at eleven o'clock in the morning, carrying packs on our backs and pretty dirty. We paid our entrance fee and came in. Then these fine ushers looked at us and said "Ahem, gentlemen without coats will sit on the first mezzanine." We went to the first mezzanine, and the attendant said, "Gentlemen without coats will sit on the second mezzanine." Anyway, at that age, which would have been about sixteen or seventeen, we obviously wanted to get as near the Rockettes as possible, but we ended up in the top gallery.

**RITCHIE:** It seems to me that in the summer of 1933 the Wall Street investigations were going on, the Pecora investigations, with J.P. Morgan. They were using the Caucus Room.

**MARCY:** I guess that's right. You're right. I was thinking of Senator Nye and the munitions investigation, but it does seem to me that the day we were there--and I'm not sure whether I'm remembering this or built it up since--one of the witnesses was a midget. That stuck with me, anyway.

**RITCHIE:** There was a midget that they sat on J.P. Morgan's lap at one time during those hearings. That was in the summer of 1933, at least through July of '33 the Pecora investigations were going on. A lot of the people who testified in the Pecora investigation also testified in the Nye committee because it was all about Wall Street bankers and their relationships with the international munitions trade. So it could have been one or the other.

**MARCY:** Somehow J.P. Morgan sticks with me now that you refresh my recollection of that episode.

**RITCHIE:** Well, what was your impression of the east coast, having grown up in the west?

**MARCY:** I should add one other thing. That was the summer of the World's Fair, as I recall, so we stopped in Chicago. And again being anxious young men, I remember we showed up on the Midway, and we went to one of the girlie shows. Herb and I showed up as early as the show opened and were the very first ones there and sat in the front row. I remember the master of ceremonies looking at these two kids sitting in the front row and saying: "Young gentlemen, you may see but you may not touch. Well, reverting to your question, the upshot of our survey of the universities was that Herb liked Harvard. He had his mind pretty well made up to be an attorney. I didn't know what I wanted to do. But when I finished my senior year the only job open to me was that of a teacher at a high school in

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Dayville, Oregon, which was way, way out in the corner of the state. At about that time, for some reason, I don't recall quite why, I applied to go to graduate school at Columbia. And for some reason I was accepted. Columbia probably wanted some geographic diversity in its student body. So I was set to go to Columbia, but I didn't have transportation from Oregon to New York. I went to the editor of the newspaper, who was then no longer Governor Sprague, but was Sheldon Sackett, who at that time was dating the secretary to the governor. Anyway, he ran an ad in the paper a couple of times: "Young man seeks transportation to east coast." No luck. Finally, the editor said, "Well, I will have my friend, the governor's secretary, take care of you." The upshot was that she made arrangements for me to be a guard as we were returning people from the insane asylum to the states from which they had come. The rule, as I recall, was that you could not put a deranged person on a train without accompanying guards. We had three patients to deliver to the Chicago area. The guards, or keepers, or whatever they might be called, consisted of a nurse at the state mental hospital and her husband, who was a guard. I went along as a third person, the sort of muscle man to make sure that we got the patients to bed at night and they didn't cause any trouble. Instead of buying a round trip ticket so I could come back to Oregon, the state was kind enough to buy me a through ticket, so after delivering our patients in Chicago I came on to New York. That's how I got back there without having to pay for transportation.

**RITCHIE:** When you came to Columbia you were going to go into the government and political science department?

**MARCY:** No, as I look back I don't think I had my mind made up. I just knew that I wanted to have graduate education, and New York was intriguing--everybody wanted to see the Big City. And Columbia was a nice big university. Columbia had a very good employment office, so I was able to get a job right away that took care of my board and room. I was a tutor at the Horace Mann School for Boys, which was a very plush private high school for the rich. My job was to keep order in the study hall from 7:00 o'clock at night until nine o'clock. Usually I would go there for dinner. The boys would stand up and bow their heads, and one would say the blessing. The blessing was standard, and I thought very appropriate for a boarding school. As quickly as possible the designee would say: "For what we are about to receive, may the Lord make us truly thankful." Not a bad way to deal with the food of a boarding school! I kept that job for a while, and then my sweetheart, that's what girlfriends were then called, joined me. In December of 1934 we were married at the little chapel at Riverside Church. Mildred was a competent secretary, having been secretary to the treasurer of the state of Oregon, so she
immediately got a job on Wall Street, which kept the money coming in and paid
the rent. In the meantime, I had found another job, which was very interesting.
At that time, Columbia had an undergraduate course called "Contemporary
Civilization." Every student was required during the second year to take field
trips to visit five institutions around the city--a governmental institution, an
industrial plant, and so on. My job was to take twelve or fifteen students at a time
to visit the Ford factory across the river, or the Bellvue Morgue (which was always
intriguing), or a court, or the Nabisco cookie factory, the New York fish market,
and so on. I got paid $5.00 a trip, which was not bad. I did that for a year, under
the direction of an economics professor named Roy Stryker. At that time,
Columbia professors were very much in demand in Washington. Roosevelt's New
Deal was underway and the big wheels--Rex Tugwell and people of that kind--
were going to Washington. Roy Stryker, who had set up this field trip program
left for Washington and the Department of Agriculture. There he set up and ran
that part of Agriculture which sent photographers to record the dust bowl and
agricultural poverty. But anyway when Stryker left I was fortunate enough to be
his successor with an office and secretary. The first book I wrote was a
description of each of these institutions we visited. I held that position for several
years and finally persuaded the head of the department, Professor Horace Taylor,
that it wasn't enough to have somebody just running these programs and taking
the students on trips

and that I ought to be engaged in teaching them, too. With some reluctance he
gave me one of the classes, so for several years I taught a beginning course in
economics at Columbia. Since I had a good job, my wife was working, and we
were comfortably ensconced, I took a master's degree in international relations
under Professor Parker T. Moon. Then I developed a close relationship with
Professor Lindsay Rogers, whose name might strike a bell with you. He was
Burgess Professor of Public Law.

RITCHIE: *The American Senate.*

MARRY: He wrote *The American Senate* in 1926. Lindsay asked me to write the
foreword to a subsequent reprint. That was after I was at the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, so I was able in a sense to pay back my friend Lindsay for
all he had done for me. I got acquainted with Lindsay Rogers in an interesting
way. I remember going to his seminar of twelve or fifteen students. He lectured
for an hour and then he asked: "Any questions?" Dead silence. Lindsay folded up
his papers and walked out, saying, "If I can't stimulate any questions from this
audience in an hour, I don't know why I should spend a second hour with you."
At the next class I sensed a repeat performance. So I spent my time while he was
lecturing thinking, "if he does that, what am I going to do?" Sure enough, he got to that point, "Any questions?" Again, dead silence. I don't remember what the question was, but with great fear I asked him some question, and he took off. Thereafter, our friendship grew. Jobs were scarce those days so after I had my master's degree I thought I might as well stay in the university and get a Ph.D. I asked Lindsay Rogers for advice. He suggested I take advantage of a system then in effect at Columbia whereby if you get a law degree, that satisfies all residence requirements for a Ph.D. in international relations. So if you take the law degree, then all you do to get a Ph.D. is to pass the oral exams, pass the language exam, and write a dissertation. So I did that. After I got my law degree and passed the New York Bar exams, Lindsay said, "Now, let's get those orals out of the way and let's get that dissertation done." He added, "I don't really think you need a Ph.D. but," he said, "if you want to teach you just have to have a Ph.D., it's a license to go into teaching if you decide to do that." He added: "When it comes to the dissertation, let's pick a subject that nobody knows anything about, that there isn't anything in the literature about it, and you can do a minimum amount of research but you will still know more about the subject than anyone else." So we picked the subject of presidential commissions. Lindsay said, "And when you come to the orals and you have to defend your dissertation, I'll help you." So in due course I got the book done, and he helped me, and I got the degree.

At that time Columbia required that all dissertations be published. Nobody was interested in commercially publishing dissertations, so we were compelled to go to Columbia University Press and pay to get dissertations printed. I think I had to pay $400.00 to get Columbia's King's Crown Press to publish *Presidential Commissions*. Some years later, Columbia Press sent me a letter when I was in the Department of State. The letter said, "We have 200 copies of your book left, and we're cleaning out our storage space, and we'll either sell it for scrap and send you the money or if you want to pay the transportation costs we'll send the books to you." So I said, "Send them to me" and wondered what to do with them. They were out-of-date.

At that time, many of the bookstores in Washington would put out a lunchtime display of books, ten cents a copy. I made a point of going to three or four bookstores, looking up the manager, saying "I've got ten copies of a book here you can put out on your display." I'd give them away. And they'd put them out and I'd get a playback. Colleagues would come to me and say, "I saw one of your books on the bookstand today, I bought a copy for a dime. Didn't know you ever wrote a book." So it worked out very well. Some twenty-five or thirty years later, a publishing company called DeCapo Press asked me for permission to republish
the book. As I recall they paid me something like $500.00 for reprint rights. So after all those years, I didn't do too badly on that dissertation!

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**RITCHIE:** Did it shape your opinion of presidential commissions afterwards?

**MARCY:** Yes. Every now and then I go back and look at it; ever since recent presidents have appointed so many presidential commissions I've gone back and referred to it. I think I made some rather acute observations at that time. I remember I categorized them, some of them were "shirtfront" commissions, appointed because there was a political problem, not because they were expected to do anything about it. It still holds.

**RITCHIE:** Herbert Hoover was also a great one for appointing commissions.

**MARCY:** Oh, he was, that's right. But in the late 1930s nobody had written about the subject, and there was hardly anything they could dig up. But I got 150 or 200 pages out of it, and a degree, that was enough.

**RITCHIE:** What were your aspirations at this time? You were getting a law degree . . . .

**MARCY:** It is hard to say what my aspirations were. I guess I hoped that when I got through law school some big law firm would come around and say, "Marcy, we need you." Nobody did. The market for jobs until the time of World War II was depressed.

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In any event, I did get a job at the College of the City of New York, and I taught there for a couple of years, both in the day school and in the night school. My recollection is that I was teaching something like eighteen hours a week, which sounds terrible, and it was. I taught public administration, and constitutional law, and state government, and American government--the whole schmeer. It wasn't just repeating the same course. But it was a magnificent experience because the students at City College, as we called it—that was at 138th Street—were brilliant. They were mostly highly intelligent young men and women—as I recall there were a few women in the classes—all of whom competed to get into the university. About all I had to do was to open the subject and then sit back and listen, because the students would have done their work. As I recall, one of my students was Marvin Kalb, who has gone on to greater fame. I kept that position until the spring of 1942. The man who then headed the department at the College of the City of New York, who was a great man to talk about the advice he was giving people in Washington, came to me and said, "We're going to have to cut back, and you're not going to get tenure." He fired me, to put it bluntly--I
wouldn't have admitted it at the time. But, in any event, that was the end of that job. Fortunately, I had a friend who had come to Washington a couple of years earlier, a man named Willard Barber. Willard was in the Department of State. At that time the Department of State was recruiting. He suggested that I talk with a man named Joseph Green, a man of some eminence in the Department of State. Joe Green was setting up a division of the Department of State which was called the Special War Problems Division. Essentially this division was to make sure, as best we could, that the provisions of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention were observed. So I came to Washington. My immediate superior was Bernard Guffler, a career foreign service officer who subsequently became ambassador to Norway and then Ceylon. We conducted negotiations for exchanges of American civilians who had been caught in Europe in the war, and German civilians who were in the United States. Subsequently, after the war had been going on for a while, sick and wounded prisoners of war were exchanged. We dealt with the Spanish who represented the United States with Japan, and the Swiss represented us with the Germans. That was fascinating because the Germans were meticulous in observing the Prisoner of War Convention. Privates were treated as privates. Officers were treated as officers. By then we were getting German prisoners of war in this country, so I saw a good bit of the United States, traveling by train with representatives of the Swiss embassy who were charged with visiting prisoner of war camps in the United States where Germans were held.

I'll put down for the record one incident that I recall. At that time I visited P.O.W. camps in the United States with a Swiss diplomat. At one time we were to investigate an American officer at a camp in New Mexico who allegedly had pulled a pistol on one of the

German prisoners of war. We showed up at the camp commander's office on a hot, Sunday morning. We walked in on the camp commander, who was obviously a tough soldier. One of the first things he said was, "I shouldn't be here trying to baby these German bastards. I should be out in the front-lines. That's what I was trained for, and they keep me out here feeding these guys potatoes, pandering to their every need." And the Swiss looked at him and said, "Well, I am here to investigate the shooting incident." I thought, my gosh, we're in real trouble. And the camp commander pulled back and roared with laughter. He said, "Those prisoners, they'll get you a story any time." He said, "Here, I'll show you the pistol." And he reached into his desk and pulled out a pistol. The pistol projected a BB shot by rubber bands. He said to the Swiss, "Put a quarter up on that file cabinet over there, stand it on its edge. I'll show you the kind of thing I was doing to those prisoners." The Swiss put it up, the commander took careful aim, pulled
the trigger: Bang! he hits it. Then he shoots a BB into his own hand. It was a toy. Well, by this time, the Swiss was so intrigued he asked the camp commander, "Where can I buy one, I want to get one for my son." There were more egregious things than that that occurred. During that time I got a fascinating education in treaty law. I was aboard the Gripsholm on one of its exchange trips to Marseilles. At that time, while we were negotiating exchanges with the Swiss, the Swedes were running the ship. We crossed the Atlantic

on the Gripsholm with about six hundred Germans, sick and wounded, and picked up an equivalent number of Americans, who were mostly downed fliers, burned, or seriously wounded. The Gripsholm sailed all lights on with a big red cross on its side. This was at the height of submarine warfare, but we had conducted enough negotiations through the Swiss so the Germans assured us that all of their submarine commanders had been informed that this was a Red Cross vessel. Hopefully we were assured--we always had our fingers crossed. In any event, the trip went without trouble. I don’t remember how many voyages the Gripsholm made. I went only once.

RITCHIE: What was your function on the voyage?

MARCY: To keep the records. The principal American officer was a career foreign service officer, named Sidney Lafoon, who also had a long distinguished career in the foreign service thereafter. It was a riotous bunch of American prisoners that we got back when they knew they were headed for home. It was a fascinating experience. Shall I continue in this vein?

RITCHIE: Before we get a little more into the State Department, there was one question I wanted to ask about Columbia in the 1930s. I was just reading James Wechsler’s obituary the other day. He was the editor of the school newspaper in 1935.

MARCY: The Spectator.

RITCHIE: He wrote a book then, Revolt on the Campus; and there was Reed Harris, who was later active in the USIA who published a book on Columbia called King Football that later came under fire. There was a very strong leftist political tinge on the campus.

MARCY: Yes.
RITCHIE: Did you find that the political atmosphere of Columbia shaped your thinking when you were a student there?

MARCY: No, I don't think so. Wechsler and Reed Harris were in the college and the *Spectator*, was an undergraduate publication. I was no longer an undergraduate. I don't remember this having any effect on me that I can identify.

RITCHIE: I've read Lindsay Rogers' book on the Senate, and the thing that struck me most about it was his defense of the filibuster, although I suspect that was more a defense of the legislative branch versus the presidency. Did you think that intellectually he had an important role in shaping the way you looked at things?

MARCY: Oh, yes, very much. Mildred and I knew him and his wife very well. I was one of his executors. His wife, Dona, preceded him in death. He was a lonely man in his later years. At the time of his death he was doing a biography of Nicholas Murray Butler, a former president of Columbia. I don't know if that's ever been finished. Lindsay certainly did have an influence on my thinking.

He didn't point me in any particular direction. He never said, "You ought to be a professor, or you ought to go to Washington, or you ought to be in the government," anything of that sort. We were compatible people, and when I went to Washington and ended up at the Senate, he was obviously pleased. But I don't think he had anything to do with it. That was fortuitous for a variety of reasons.

RITCHIE: Sort of a natural development.

MARCY: A progression, natural development, luck. Be at the right place at the right time--or the wrong place. As I look back, the most fortunate thing that ever happened to me was to be fired from City College and not getting tenure. If I had gotten tenure at City College at that particular time . . . when the depression made teenagers and young people job-security conscious, these other things would never have happened. I'm sure I would have grabbed security.

RITCHIE: When you came to the State Department, did you consider going through the foreign service officer program?

MARCY: No, although after the war I did consider going into the foreign service under the Wristonization Program but decided not to do so.

RITCHIE: For any reason?
MARCY: That's hard to say. I had a good job. I was enjoying what I was doing. The foreign service didn't particularly appeal to me. I guess I didn't give it too much thought. I didn't go home and think for hours about whether I should join the foreign service.

RITCHIE: During the war you stayed with the treaty division?

MARCY: Yes, I stayed with SWP, Special War Problems, until the end of the war. Then as war problems disappeared the Department of State began to think about peace problems. In fact, they had been doing it during the later days of the war. As the special war problems were dying out and we were worrying more about peace issues, I was invited to join the UN division by a man named Durward Sandifer, who was very deeply involved in UN affairs and getting the United Nations started. I'd had a little bit of contact with him earlier in connection with the Vandenberg resolution and others that were adopted during the war period. Sandifer invited me to become an officer in the division of United Nations Affairs. I got there just in time to have an administrative load dumped on me in connection with the first meeting of the General Assembly in London. I did not go to the first conference in San Francisco. Then I became quite involved in UN affairs. I don't remember when I shifted from the UN side of the operation to the Legal Adviser's Office. I was indirectly involved when the UN charter was sent to the Senate. After the first meeting of the General Assembly in London, I was on a committee to find a permanent headquarters for the UN. This was after it had been decided that the headquarters would be in the United States. An engineer and I inspected a number of possible sites. We went to San Francisco and visited the Presidio and other sites in California. There was much competition at that time between various cities that wanted to have the UN headquarters. I personally wanted the UN to be in San Francisco. If the headquarters had been in San Francisco I'm sure I would have become a UN employee. That was a fascinating period.

I was beginning to do more and more legal work in connection with problems that were arising as a result of the UN being in the United States. I worked closely with the then Legal Adviser, Charles Fahy, who had been close to President Roosevelt. At one time he had been promised the next opening on the Supreme Court, but Roosevelt died. Subsequently, Charles Fahy became a judge on the Court of Appeals here in Washington, and served with distinction for a number of years. When Mr. Fahy was Legal Adviser, I went with him on several occasions to the UN General Assembly and sat with him on the Legal Committee. He was a wonderful man. On several occasions he went out of town just in order to give me
a chance to sit in the United States chair on the Legal Committee. I worried. He said, "Oh, that's all right. You can do it. You can raise your hand just like the rest of us." That was an interesting experience. But about the same time, I was engaged on behalf of the United States in negotiating the Headquarters Agreement between the United States and the United Nations. This agreement is still in effect. It gives all nations access to the UN and restricts the powers of the city of New York and the police department in the UN area, and so on. In the latter years I used to see Judge Fahy occasionally. He would look at me, smile, and say, "You know, that agreement we negotiated was pretty good, wasn't it? Nobody's raised a fuss about it." So far as I know, that's still the case. Actually, I give myself a more important role than was the case. There was another lawyer working on the same problem, I.N.P. Stokes. Ike Stokes was a very competent New York lawyer. He provided the brains, and I would simply do the drafting under his guidance.

RITCHIE: I.N.P. Stokes used to work with Benjamin Cohen.

MARCY: That's right, yes. Then when the Headquarters Agreement was finally negotiated, I got to know Francis Wilcox, who was then chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. During hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee I would sit behind Mr. Fahy, or the Secretary of State and pass notes to the witness.

About that time the problem of liaison between the Department of State and the Congress was coming more to the fore. Charles "Chip" Bohlen was counselor of the Department of State and with an assistant secretary of state named Breckinridge Long, Bohlen was saddled with the responsibility of trying to keep the Congress happy--handling legislative relationships is the better term. He didn't much like that job. It wasn't the sort of thing a career diplomat particularly enjoyed, and so he passed much of that responsibility to me. I became his right-hand person on congressional relations. I had two assistants: Darrell St. Claire, who handled the Senate relations; and Allen Moreland, who handled relations with the House. I sat at the top, but there wasn't much to sit on. Darrell knew his way around the Senate, and Al knew his way around the House. All I had to do was to say, "Yes, Darrell, that sounds fine to me."

It was during that period of time that Francis Wilcox and I became better acquainted. And it was during that period of time that the Marshall Plan was presented to Congress. I don't remember very much about the Marshall Plan
liaison activities. Walter Surrey, now an attorney in Washington, handled most of the legislative drafting. He did everything. One incident I recall was an encounter I had with General Marshall, who was then Secretary of State. One of my responsibilities was to edit General Marshall’s testimony. You’re familiar with this: the transcript is sent to the witness for correction. So I got General Marshall’s transcripts to "clean up." Secretary Marshall called me to his office one day. He was very austere. He looked at me with a transcript in front of him that I had corrected. He said,

"Marcy, you in charge of this?" I said, "Yes sir, I did that." He said, "Well, I don’t know what it is, but I feel when I’m talking to the senators that I’m making sense and they understand me. But then when I look at the uncorrected transcript it doesn’t make much sense." But, he said, "After you fix it up, it looks all right. You keep on doing it." I said, "Do you want to see the corrected transcripts after this?" He said, "No, that's all, Marcy." So from then on, all of the syntax and various things that did not get cleaned up in General Marshall's testimony, can be blamed on me. The substance can be attributed to General Marshall.

When Marshall was secretary he would come to the meetings of the General Assembly for a few days, and chair the United States delegation. He was an authoritative, powerful figure. We'd meet every morning and different people would report. When he would get through, held say to Bohlen, "All right, Chip, you take care of the press." Marshall was quick, clear, concise--no doubt about positions he was taking, and no question about his authority. The clarity with which he would delegate responsibility was magnificent.

RITCHIE: How did that compare with the other secretaries whom you worked with?

MARCY: Well, that's really the only one that I remember clearly. I was closest to him during that period. I didn't really know Acheson. Subsequently, of course, I saw Dulles, Rusk, Rogers, and Kissinger, but from the other side of the table.

RITCHIE: Could you describe a little bit about the office of the congressional liaison? How did the State Department see that office when you were there? Was it to keep Congress happy? Was it to be a link between the Congress and the State Department? What was it's main function?

MARCY: At the time the attitude was more: "Oh, congressional liaison, it's a damn nuisance." The practice was for individual officers to deal directly with the Hill. If the subject related to the Middle East or Japan, the desk officer would deal with it. Our job in congressional liaison was as much to try to rein in the individual officers in the Department of State as it was to know about what was
going on on Capitol Hill. And the habit on the Hill was to go to congressional liaison only to ask: "Who's in charge of such-and-such?" I don't think there was even an office of congressional liaison except as it grew out of the need to get United Nations legislation approved.

RITCHIE: Congressional relations with the State Department hadn't been particularly good before that period, and that was a pretty stormy period when you were there as well. Was there a conscious feeling on the part of the State Department that they had to do something to better the relationship?

MARCY: Yes, I think there was. As a matter of fact, that's one reason I went to work on the Hill. I think Francis Wilcox always wanted to have a job in the Department of State, and he worked very closely with the individual desk people. I think he originated the idea of getting some Department of State officers to work for the committee for a while and then send them back to the department to improve relations. I was the first experiment. Francis Wilcox asked if I'd like to come to work on the Hill for a year and I agreed. However, the administrative officer in the Department of State was a man named Arch Jean, and when I asked him if I could have a leave of absence for a year, he said "No, the department's regulations would not permit it." So at that point I had to make a decision, whether I was going to stay in the Department of State, or resign. The most the Department would do was to write me a letter saying we're sorry you're resigning from the Department of State, but if you decide to come back within the next year, we'll do the best we can to provide you with a position of equivalent rank. When I resigned from the Department of State I got to withdraw several thousand dollars from my retirement fund. So not only was Francis Wilcox going to pay me an equivalent salary, but I was getting a little extra cash at a time when I needed it. It was Francis Wilcox who gave me the opportunity to work for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I did have an interview with Senators [Tom] Connally and [Arthur] Vandenberg, just to size me up. But in any event, what I remember about that interview was that I was conscious of the fact that the committee staff was small and the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 was still operative. One provision fixed the professional staff of committees at four. There was also language to the effect that the staff should be chosen with respect to their competence and without regard to political considerations. I remember Connally asking me point blank: "You in politics?" I thought to myself, well, it's going to be a political appointment. But I answered him, "No." He said, "Well, you vote, don't you?" I said, "Yes." He said, "That's all I wanted to know." That was the end of the conversation.
RITCHIE: He didn't ask you which way you voted?

MARCY: No. That was it. After the first year with the Foreign Relations Committee, just to finish up how I happened to end there permanently, after the first year I liked it there, but I hadn't gotten to know the senators very well. So I decided to stay another year which stretched into twenty-three years. I was one of the first failures of the personnel people in the Department of State who wanted me to develop close liaison between the Department of State and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The idea was that I would work on the Hill for a year, learn all about these S.O.B.s and then come back to the Department of State and forever after, as long as I lived, there would never be any further problems because Marcy would have understood those senators, and be able to protect the Department of State from mistakes. It didn't work.

RITCHIE: During that period when you were handling congressional relations, did you have very many dealings with the members of Congress, the Senators and House members on the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees?

MARCY: Very little. I traveled with them on several of their trips. I remember in particular a trip that I went on with members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, whose chairman was Congressman [Joseph L.] Pifeffer from New York. We had three escort officers, one was the chairman's son, who was a lieutenant in the Army, and myself. A third escort office was C.B. Marshall who was on the House Committee staff.

I recall one incident when we were in Cairo. Burt Marshall and I were in the Semiramis Hotel. We had arrived late Saturday night and were briefed by the ambassador. It was one of those times when tensions were high. One of the bridges across the Nile had guards and barbed wire. We'd been told that we should be very circumspect, the next day being Sunday, and pay attention to the regulations. No cameras, nothing of that sort. On Sunday morning the phone rang in our room about 6:30 or 7:00 o'clock. It was Congressman Tom Gordon who called me and said, "Carl, the Chairman has been arrested." I said, "How do you know?" He said, "Well, he was going to church and he saw these camels going across the bridge and he took out his camera and took a picture of them, and the guards were right there under the bridge and they arrested them. He's now being held by the guards under the bridge. Can you do something?" I then woke Burt Marshall up and told him what had happened. I said, "Now, what do we do?" And Burt said, "Turn over and go to sleep. By the time we wake up at 9:00 o'clock,
somebody will have done something and they will have gotten him out." That's exactly what we did, and that's what happened! Anyway, to come back to Marshall, Burt Marshall and I have had a very good relationship for a long time. He's turned out to be very conservative, in my view, and I'm sure he thinks that I'm a left-wing dove, which is not quite my description of myself.

When I was in the Department of State and handling the liaison job, I got a call one day from Paul Nitze, who was then on the Policy Planning Staff--he may have been chairman. He asked me what I knew about Marshall who was working for the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Nitze said, "I've got to put him on the Policy Planning Staff." I said, "Well, why?" He said, "Congressman [John M.] Vorys of Ohio is insisting that Burt Marshall be put on the Policy Planning Staff. What can you tell me about him?" I had very high praise for Burt. About the time Burt left the House Foreign Affairs Committee to come to the Policy Planning Staff, I came to the Hill.

RITCHIE: When I look at some of the members of the Senate and the Foreign Relations Committee in the late 1940s, they seem to be a "race of giants," the Vandenberg's, the Tafts, the Connally's, and all the rest. How did they strike you as a person who had to deal with them?

MARCY: Well, you must remember, Don, that for the period from 1950 to 1955, I was one of four professional members of the staff. Francis was the one who handled most of those relationships. So I didn't have a very close relationship with Connally. I must tell you one story about him, interesting, but not a judgment of his personality.

One day I got a call from Senator Connally when he was on the Senate floor. He said, "Marcy, come to the floor, I want to talk to you." So I went up. Connally asked if I remembered how he had voted on the congressional retirement act? I said, "No, senator, I don't." He said, "Will you check and come back and tell me how I voted on that act?" So I checked, and found he had voted against it. I went back and said, "Senator, you voted against that congressional retirement act." He said, "Marcy, I was 'fraid of that"--he was a flamboyant man; a ham actor--"I was 'fraid of that," he said, "Got a letter from a constituent." He reached into his pocket and pulled it out. "Constituent says: 'Since you voted against the retirement act I don't think that you should draw any retirement now that you're leaving the Senate." I said, "Oh, senator, I wouldn't pay any attention to anything like that. You've been here a long time and
you deserve your retirement." Connally patted me on the shoulder and he said, "Marcy, you're right. And anyway, I'm a lawabiding citizen."

There's a footnote to be put to that point, and that is there are a number of instances in which senators may have voted against something—the North Atlantic Treaty, for example, but subsequently it was the law of the land, and they supported it. Senator Taft, as I recall, voted against the North Atlantic Treaty, but thereafter voted for its appropriations saying the treaty was the law of the land. One of the last jobs I did for Senator Taft was immediately before he went into the hospital. It was a report on Palestine refugees. Held been chairman of a subcommittee. I don't remember much about the research or whatever I did, but I do remember that I did a very short draft report, maybe four or five pages. Senator Taft called me to his office on a Saturday or a Sunday morning, and went over that draft meticulously, point by point by point, and made

it his own. I remember being tremendously impressed. It was the first and only time I really worked closely with him. The care with which that man absorbed every word and knew what he was putting down impressed me no end. He was a great man. I think it was the next day he went into the hospital and he never came back.

I had a much closer relationship with Elbert Thomas of Utah, and also with Guy Gillette of Iowa. I went with Senator Thomas to conduct several hearings on the UN in various parts of the country. Did the same thing with Guy Gillette. He was a charming individual. I remember one incident in a town in the midwest when we went for a walk before breakfast and several people came up and spoke to him. He was innately gracious. I recall his saying to me at one time: "I don't know what there is about me, I guess I just look like a senator." Then he told me about an incident in California when someone had come up to him and said, "Mister, we're looking for a person to play the part of a senator in this movie, and would you like to come and try out. The producer had gotten a real live senator by the lapels.

RITCHIE: What about Arthur Vandenberg? Did you have any dealings with him?

MARCY: I don't recall any particular incidents. I should, but I think he relied mostly on Francis.
out of the State Department and going to the Committee. I was wondering how you looked on these people. Did they seem like major figures? Or politicos? People to be humored? How did you come into this scene, making a large leap from the State Department to the Committee?

MARCY: The main thing I recall that is relevant to the question you ask is, when it became known that I was leaving the Department to go to the Committee, I got advice from all kinds of people. Generally, the advice was don't do it, don't do it--stay with the bureaucracy. This is a good, sure, solid place. You go to the Hill and get involved with those politicians, and you may be there for a couple of years, and then you will be out on your ear. It's the same kind of advice that I got from my friend Lindsay Rogers. He said, "You know, it's nice that you're working with them up there, but for heaven's sakes, don't try to make a career out of that." So I was sort of running against the tide, which makes of your point.

As for the general attitude of the Department of State it viewed Congress as just a damn nuisance. We answer their mail, we provide parking places for them when they want to come to the Department of State, we're constantly interrupted in our work by hearings. That was pretty much the attitude. I was running against the general trend of things when I left the security of State to go to work for Congress. I don't remember anyone else very anxious at that time to leave the Department of State and work for Congress. I recall one State Department officer who asked me after I was working on the Hill: "Well, Marcy, are you with us or against us?"

One of the things that intrigued me about the Hill was that it is a much better place for the propagation of ideas than in the Department of State. When I was in the Department of State, if you drafted a paper it had to be cleared all over the place. Eight or ten signatures was not unusual at all. And anyone would be likely to make changes. As a matter of fact, that first man I worked for in the Department of State, Bernard Gufler, was a career foreign service officer. I would say, "Now, Guf, you sign this and we'll send it directly to Breckinridge Long." "Carl," he said, "You've got to learn a lesson. You want these people in the Department to know about you. It's a good draft. You want to get that draft circulated so as many people as possible will say Marcy's pretty good." So he said, "Let's see, the Western European division ought to see the paper because it relates to something there, but that's certainly also of concern to the Far East, so let's put that down." That was one of the games that was played. My main point is that within the environment of a congressional committee if Senator A doesn't like the idea, Senator B might, and right on down the line. In a congressional committee there are ten or twelve potential outlets for a concept. So that's a game that can be
played within limits. If you've got some wild idea and a senator says, "Oh, that's no good," you drop it. But on the other hand he might say, "Well, you know, that's not bad, you might want to try it out somewhere else," so one can toy with concepts and get an amendment drafted, or a speech made, or a study started. Much depends on your own initiative in the congressional environment. All of the good ideas, of course, that the Foreign Relations Committee developed came from me, and the bad ideas originated elsewhere!

RITCHIE: The staff of the Committee when you joined it was actually smaller than the number of Committee members; there were only seven or eight full-time staff members.

MARCY: That's right.

RITCHIE: So you must have been the right arm of the members of the Committee.

MARCY: There was a change in emphasis during that period. Francis and I had different ideas about the role of the staff and our relationship with the Department of State. I say this with some qualification and it would have to be checked out more carefully, but my recollection is that prior to the time when Francis was chief of staff, practically all Committee reports were either written by the senators themselves or written in the executive branch. An issue would come up, there would be a hearing, and the executive branch would be asked to draft the report. That kind of thing. Francis began to change that system and the staff started drafting reports. I can't say I know of any instance in which Francis asked the Department of State to draft a report, but the reports we drafted were almost invariably sent downtown so they could be checked out, or they would give us paragraphs to include. After I became staff director, we dropped that. I thought the staff was there to write the reports. The reports were to express the senators' views, and it was really none of the State Department's business. I guess I tended to be more secretive than the Department liked. I'm sure some officers there resented the kind of change that was going on.

[End of Interview #1]
RITCHIE: Last week we discussed briefly your role in drafting the headquarters agreement for the United Nations, and it seems by coincidence that agreement has become front page news, with Andrei Gromyko's plane forbidden to land at Kennedy Airport, and the Soviets' charges against the United States. I was curious about your opinions of these events in light of your own role with drafting that agreement.

MARCY: As soon as this event occurred, and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko was being shunted to a military airport, I said to my wife, "For heaven's sake, where's a copy of that headquarters agreement?" Relevant portions have been in the press at one time or another. My recollection is that the idea of the headquarters agreement was to make it absolutely sure and positive that any representative of a foreign state could come to the UN headquarters without any hindrance whatsoever, and that the United States undertook to give them complete access. As we negotiated the treaty we were thinking then that at some future time there might be a war going on between the United States and another country. The question was: If there were a war going on, could the United States prevent the party from the other side, if a member of the UN, from coming to the UN
headquarters? The whole concept was "no," that the right of access absolutely had to be guaranteed. Now, I suppose we can futz around with whether it’s access to provide landing rights at a military airport instead of at a civilian airport. But I think it’s clearly the case that the governors of New Jersey and New York were completely outside the law in denying the Soviet airline the right to bring the Russian delegation to the UN by normal means. Treaties are the supreme law of the land. I’m surprised that somebody in the Department of State didn’t call up the two governors and say, "Watch it, withdraw your remarks." There is a fundamental constitutional proposition involved which has not been much discussed. I think it's unfortunate because the situation may arise again.

RITCHIE: In some respects it was counterproductive for the administration since it shifted the focus of the debate.

MARCY: I think it did, and I think that's unfortunate also. As a matter of fact, I've toyed with the idea of what the United States would have done if Mr. Gromyko or his entourage had said, "We are coming in, we're going to be on an Aeroflot airliner, and we are going to land at Kennedy Airport." What would we do? Shoot them down? Escort them? Or let them land? There might be a parallel to the KAL [Korean Air Lines] tragedy--a thought which intrigued me. Obviously it won't happen that way. The more we can do now to avoid confrontations, the better.

RITCHIE: I remember years ago in New York City there were great controversies whenever a Saudi official would come, because of the politics of the city it was usually to the advantage of the incumbent mayor to make some public slight of a prominent Arab delegation, that would renew the charges that the United States was a poor host for the United Nations.

MARCY: Yes.

RITCHIE: But that seems to have been relegated to the past. There hasn't been a real flap like that for a long time, and then this whole incident exploded this week.

MARCY: That's a good example, but interestingly enough this is the first time since that headquarters agreement was negotiated that I have seen anything in the American press about it. I think maybe I mentioned earlier that every time I saw Judge Fahy he would say, "That headquarters agreement must be pretty good, it hasn't caused any trouble." Well, he's gone to the happy hunting ground now, so he's not here to see this flap.

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RITCHIE: Getting back to the Foreign Relations Committee, when you first joined it in 1950, I was wondering if you could describe a little bit about what you found when you came from the State Department; what the Committee was like, and the Committee staff, and what your impressions were once you started working here.

MARCY: Needless to say, I was delighted to have the opportunity to work for the Committee. I mentioned earlier how I talked with both Vandenberg and Connally prior to being put on the staff. Francis Wilcox was a very competent staff director. He ran the Committee with an easy hand. He was the main person who kept in contact with Vandenberg and with Connally, although the rest of us knew all the members very well. Francis at that time was very United Nations oriented, that was his main interest. As a matter of fact, he proposed that he and I write a book for the Brookings Institution. We did. The title was Proposals for Change in the United Nations. We wrote the book under contract with Brookings--one book of a Brookings series on the UN. Francis was the principal instigator of the project, and--with apologies for him if he reads this record--I think I was the one who did most of the work (at least it seemed that way!), which was done after 5:30 in the evening. I would settle down between 5:30 and 8:00 p.m. and line up all the proposals for change that had been made.

At that time there was a good bit of attention given to the role of the United Nations and its future. We had a subcommittee, of which Senator Elbert Thomas of Utah was chairman. He held hearings in various parts of the country. Senator Thomas and I often traveled together to these hearings. Sometimes there would be other senators along, sometimes it would be just Senator Thomas and me. I don't now recall that anything very significant came out of them. But they did provide opportunity for the people, in effect, to petition the Congress. I'm diverting a bit, but one concept I have had for a long time and it continued to influence me during the time I was with the Committee was that provision in the Constitution which provides the right of the people to petition the Congress. That is a basic and very significant provision. It tends to be lost sight of, but it comes up in practical ways. For example: is it appropriate for a Senate committee to receive testimony from foreigners--to give time for non-citizens to petition the Congress? I always felt that one of the principal functions of a congressional committee was to receive petitions from the citizens. Many times we would hold hearings on different subjects, and there would be a number of private citizens who wanted to be heard--to testify. The attitude of many senators was to hear the principal witnesses, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and some well known people; but when the time comes to hear John Jones of Paducah,
Kentucky, or some other place, there was always the feeling, "Oh, it's a damn
nuisance." And it was, in a way, it took time. But I was always insistent that any
American citizen who wanted to be heard on a subject which was timely--that is
in the sense it was a subject which was before the committee--had a right to be
heard. Often, however, they were scheduled at the tail end on the last day of the
hearings. Time

limitations were imposed, and it was always difficult to round up a senator to
come to hear the testimony of the Great American Public. The "person in the
street" was seldom given the dignity I thought they should have, but nevertheless,
their views were in the record. Would you like to go back to . . . .

RITCHIE: Back to a sense of how the Committee was set up and what your
functions were as a staff member. You had just come from the State Department,
a large organization, and now you were a member of a small committee staff.
What was expected of you as a staff member at that time?

MARCY: One job was to handle the mail--Pat Holt was hired by Mr. Connally, in
the first instance, to handle Senator Connally's mail from Texas. We prepared for
hearings, pretty much the routine which still exists. We tried to prepare questions
which would be useful to the senators (although we did a lot more of that in later
years than we did in that earlier period of time). We corrected transcripts,
followed up with the executive branch to get information which they said they
would supply, and drafted Committee reports. Francis would assign different
members of the staff to hearings, so we had fairly clear lines of responsibility. I
mentioned before that I did serve with Senator Taft when he was looking into the
Palestine Refugee problem. That involved a good bit of independent research.
That's pretty much it. Maybe if I were reminded I would think of

some very significant things, but I didn't view it as particularly--I guess I
shouldn't say this--but as I look back on it, it didn't seem to me at that time to be
a particularly challenging job. But I always liked to come to work in the morning,
and to stay late at night. There was always something interesting going on. We
were very conscious at that time of not loading the Committee with excess staff
members, especially at hearings. When the MacArthur hearings were held, for
example, I would have *loved* to be present at the hearings. There was so much
interest in that subject that some of my former colleagues in the Department of
State, in particular Chip Bohlen, were invited to sit with the Committee during
executive hearings in order to immediately delete secret material from the
transcripts so that there would be a sanitized version to be given to the press. I
would certainly have liked to have been present at the MacArthur hearings, but as
it was, Francis handled those with the assistance of another staff member. The

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staff work was pretty well divided, not so much on the basis of what I would call substance, but on the schedule and who was available.

RITCHIE: As a Committee staff member, did you serve all the senators? I know you worked with Senator Thomas and Senator Taft—were there certain people you were assigned to. Or was it just sort of a first-come-first-served basis?

MARCY: It was a case of first-come-first-served. We tried to serve all the members of the Committee with equal attention. After all, they were senators and we didn't think very much about whether they were Republicans or Democrats—at least I didn't. As you know, at that time the concept of a bipartisan or nonpartisan approach to foreign policy was pretty well accepted by the Committee members. That was reflected in the staff. I think Francis, for example, was probably a Republican, but I'm not sure. He never made a point of it. I called myself an Independent, but I did tend to be more oriented towards the Democratic side.

I recall one incident that illustrates the relationships that existed. When General Eisenhower was president, I remember Senator [Bourke] Hickenlooper, a Republican, came to me one day and said, "I've got an inquiry from a Republican county committee in Arlington, and they want to know whether you're a Republican or a Democrat. They must be considering recommending you for some position with the administration." I said, "Well, senator, just call me an Independent." Hickenlooper said, "Well, that's fine with me. It doesn't make any difference. You're doing a fine job." So I don't know what he told the Republican committee. Nobody made me any job offer. And had they, I probably wouldn't have been interested because I was enjoying very much what I was doing.

RITCHIE: You were hired when the Democrats were in the majority, although in that period the majorities weren't very large, the Senate was pretty evenly divided. But in 1952 the Republicans won the election and in January 1953 they became the majority in the Committee. Did you wonder if you would be continuing on, or if they were going to change the staff at all?

MARCY: No, I don't recall that that bothered me at the time. Perhaps it did because I do remember that at the first organizational meeting when Senator [Alexander] Wiley was chairman, he said: "The first thing I want to do is to move that the Committee make no changes whatsoever in the staff. They've done a good job and I want to keep it that way." So I guess I breathed a little easier. But then I also remember the next thing that he said, "Now, I do have my administrative assistant. I want him to have a more active role with the Committee, so I propose that he be put on the staff." I think there was a bit of...
hassling, a tug-of-war, between Julius Cahn and Francis Wilcox. How deeply that went, I don't know. I don't recall any great to-do about it. As far as I was concerned my relationships with Senator Wiley were absolutely superb.

About that time, and I could be off a year or two, Senator Wiley married a British citizen, Dorothy, I forget her maiden name. Francis came to me one day and said, "You know, Senator Wiley and Dorothy want to go to Europe this summer. They'd like to have you

and Mildred go along." Well, my wife was at that time homekeeping and working as a volunteer with the League of Women Voters, and I guess our children were something like four and eight. We shipped them to my parents on the west coast, got aboard the United States with the Wileys, and sailed for Europe. I don't remember how long we were there, but it must have been a period of four to six weeks. With Senator Wiley as chairman of the Committee, the Air Force assigned him a DC-3 and a crew of six. I must say that if the word "junket" is applied--I always resented that word--I would argue that if anybody had a right to go abroad, it ought to be the chairman and the members of the Foreign Relations Committee--but I must say that we had quite a tour of most of the European capitals.

The Wileys were wonderful people to travel with. There were just the four of us, served by a crew of six or eight Air Force officers and enlisted men, who took us all over. Wiley was the commander. I spent most of my time airborne trying to figure out something appropriate for him to say when we would land in the next country, something appropriate to say about United States-Soviet relations. Senator Wiley and I always had serious conversations with our embassy people and foreign officials. We filed an extensive report on Wiley's trip.

Here is another diversion from your main question. I do remember an experience with Senator Wiley, after he was no longer chairman. He came to see me one day and he said, "Carl, I wish you would take over drafting my press releases. For some reason I used to be able to say something and put out a statement and the press would pay a great deal of attention to it. But they don't anymore. I think if you would draft some press releases for me, maybe I could get some attention." I said to him, "Well, senator, it was a big difference when you were chairman of the committee. Then you could say almost anything and you would be covered in the press. But you're no longer chairman of the Committee." I added that I could draft a press release that would get a headline, but, I said, nit would probably need to be some wildly irresponsible statement that you wouldn't really want to associate yourself with." That was the end of the conversation. But it makes a point which is important: if
you're chairman the press pays attention; if you're not chairman, you're not as newsworthy.

RITCHIE: Just going back to when you mentioned Julius Cahn. I came across him at one point in connection with a controversy on the staff in the mid-1950s. Apparently he had made a speech at a Republican organization defending John Foster Dulles, or whatever, but it was considered to be a political speech, and it caused quite a stir in the Committee. Do you remember that incident?

MARCY: Oh, I hadn't thought of that for years. I can give a rough sketch. You're right--and it illustrates how non-political,

non-partisan the staff members were expected to be. Julius said something to the effect that John Foster Dulles was the greatest Secretary of State we've ever had, or maybe even stronger than that. At that time, Julius must still have been on the Committee payroll. I remember Senator Fulbright was absolutely--well, I was going to say infuriated, that's too strong--but Senator Fulbright was very disturbed that a staff member would go out and make a political statement like that. He raised the question, as I recall, with Senator Wiley, and again my recollection is that at a subsequent time Julius did the same thing again and Fulbright got him fired. I may have the sequence wrong. Julius made a speech somewhere in the midwest that had political overtones, and was warned that he should be discreet, and then the second speech he made was to a small women's club in Maryland, where nobody would expect any press attention at all, but he got press attention, and that was the end of Julius.

RITCHIE: There's basically an unwritten rule that staff members did not . . .

MARCY: That's right, at that time you didn't go out and participate in political activities. I never, for example, went to Arkansas while Fulbright was chairman of the Committee. I have a couple of times since. I never wrote a political speech for Fulbright or other senator. There were a couple of occasions when

a member would ask for a memorandum to refresh his recollection of a series of events, that kind of thing. No, we stayed very far away from political activities.

RITCHIE: Again on the question of how the staff was used, I know that the Foreign Relations Committee developed a particular type of subcommittee, the consultative subcommittee. When did these consultative subcommittees develop, and what was the purpose behind them?
MARCY: I don't remember when the first ones were developed. Whether they were developed when I was staff director or earlier, I just don't recall. But the concept was that these subcommittees had no legislative responsibilities. A senator was named chairman of a subcommittee in order to permit that chairman and associated senators to specialize. So there were consultative subcommittees on the Far East, on Africa, on Western Europe, and so on. They never were given--I shouldn't say quite never--but I don't recall any significant case when a consultative subcommittee was given a legislative responsibility. Even on a mundane treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, the treaty would be handled either by a special subcommittee or by the full Committee. The theory, as it developed over a period of time, and I don't know that it was ever enunciated, was that legislation was of concern to the full committee. There was a feeling that the full committee should not be fragmented—that if a Western European problem went to the Western European subcommittee, it might be a very, very important matter which should be considered by the full Committee. Senator Fulbright, and his predecessors, were very strong on that point. They were chairmen of the full Committee and, by gosh, it was the full Committee that was in charge. The full Committee handled the legislation and the treaties and these subcommittees were as described, consultative. Nevertheless, there was always a feeling on the part of junior committee members that they would like to have some substantive responsibility. That feeling grew especially as the proliferation of subcommittees was going on elsewhere.

The chairmanship of these consultative subcommittees was decided on a purely seniority basis. When a new Congress was organized the most senior person would get his choice of subcommittees. I'm talking about the Fulbright period principally, but that was true under both Senator Green and Senator George. The way we would pick the chairman, would be to go to the ranking member on the Democratic side, if it was a Democratic majority, and say, "All right, which subcommittee would you like?" They could switch. I remember, for example, that at one point Senator [John] Sparkman, who had been chairman of the Far Eastern consultative subcommittee, said he'd like to switch, to be chairman of the Western European subcommittee. He was the ranking Democratic member, so he got his choice. I do remember, I guess I can put this in--maybe we should keep it out at least for a few more years--at one point I could not get anyone to accept the chairmanship of the consultative subcommittee on Africa. At that time Senator [Mike] Mansfield was majority leader and we left him alone . . . He was so busy he didn't
want to have a subcommittee. I remember going to him and saying, "Senator, I can't get anybody to be chairman of the African subcommittee. How about you taking it?" He said, "Well, I'll make a deal with you. I will become chairman of the African subcommittee if you, Carl, will guarantee to me that the subcommittee will not meet." And that's what happened.

RITCHIE: Wasn't John Kennedy chairman of that committee?

MARCY: Yes, at a later time.

RITCHIE: And it also didn't meet under him, because it seems to me that in 1960 that was an issue in his presidential campaign, that he was chairman of a subcommittee that never met.

MARCY: That's right.

RITCHIE: What was it about Africa that drove the senators away?

MARCY: Well, I don't know what it was. Nobody was interested in that subcommittee.

RITCHIE: It wasn't the type of committee that would get a lot of publicity, I suppose.

MARCY: I suppose there wasn't a great deal of attention paid to it. But not much attention was paid to the consultative subcommittees anyway. We would meet in the back office, S-115, which was where my office was, and it was always a private session. As a matter of fact, I don't think there were any transcripts kept of those meetings. There may have been once in a while.

RITCHIE: Very rarely. The only ones I've seen regularly were probably Latin America, and it was always over an issue like Nixon's trip to Venezuela, or the Bay of Pigs, when the issue was obviously so substantive they had a transcriber there. But most of the time the minutes of the committee just say: "No record was kept."

MARCY: That's right, it was just a very casual sort of thing. The assistant secretary would come. Sometimes he would ask to talk to the group. Sometimes the subcommittee would ask me to call up the assistant secretary. Let's have him down on Friday afternoon and see what's going on. That kind of thing. Very casual.

RITCHIE: This raises the question of how the Committee got information from the executive branch, and how well it got it. Did
the consultative subcommittees develop because the Committee was looking for systematic ways of getting information? What was the general mechanism for getting the administration to spell out what exactly was happening?

MARCY: Well, there really wasn't a mechanism. Very little attention was paid in those early years, even during most of the time when I was there, for the committee to seek information, search for information, what is the word that I want? Oversight. There was very little in the way of oversight, digging into things. We were mostly involved with getting the legislative program enacted. Shall we continue on the subcommittees?

RITCHIE: Sure.

MARCY: The concept of the consultative subcommittee began to break down a bit when we decided to look at the United States Information Agency. We set up a subcommittee of which Senator Mansfield—the Voice of America was what we were looking at. I'm sorry to be so hazy about this, it's gradually coming back. I guess it was the information activity generally.

RITCHIE: There was an investigation of overseas information.

MARCY: Who was chairman of that?

RITCHIE: Was it Hickenlooper?

MARCY: It was Hickenlooper-Fulbright, and Hickenlooper was the chairman, so that would have been...

RITCHIE: The 83rd Congress.

MARCY: That, in a sense, was a subcommittee with a specific investigative kind of assignment. Then subsequently Mansfield was chairman of a subcommittee. Do you remember what that was?

RITCHIE: I'm not sure, I'll have to check.

MARCY: Well, that will come back as I look over my notes. I think Mansfield was chairman of a subcommittee on Point IV—the Technical Assistance Program. But the concept of a consultative subcommittee was beginning to break down. The way it began to break down was that there would be one subcommittee each Congress that did have substantive responsibility. The Hickenlooper-Fulbright Subcommittee on Information was the first one. It didn't have any separate staff.
Then subsequently, Mansfield was head of the Subcommittee on Technical Assistance. A full-time staff man was assigned to that, Francis Valeo. The idea was that a single subcommittee with substantive responsibility would be created at the beginning of a Congress and would last for two years. It had to have its work done at the end of the Congress and file a final report, and that was the end of the subcommittee. The Mansfield subcommittee filed its report and expired.

As I recall, at one point when Frank Valeo and I had the same office, and the Mansfield subcommittee was expiring, he and I talked about, "Well, what about another subcommittee? What would be a logical subject?" That was about the time that President Eisenhower had appointed [Harold] Stassen as his advisor on disarmament. Valeo and I figured that if the administration was going to have a special person in the executive branch on disarmament, the Senate ought to have a subcommittee on disarmament to follow the same subject closely—a group that would have a separate identity. Valeo and I also thought the logical person to be chairman of the subcommittee was Senator [Hubert] Humphrey from Minnesota, Mr. Stassen's home state. I went to the Senate floor and discussed the idea with Max Kampleman, who was administrative assistant or legislative assistant to Senator Humphrey. Max thought it was a great idea. So we took the legislation which had created the Mansfield Subcommittee on Technical Assistance and adapted it to create a Subcommittee on Arms Control and Disarmament. Humphrey introduced the resolution, it passed, and as was the practice generally, Senator Humphrey became chairman. Valeo became staff director of that new subcommittee. The concept at that time was that the subcommittee would last for two years and then phase out. That subcommittee had separate money. One of the first people we put on the staff of the subcommittee was Betty Goetz. Betty Goetz was on the professional staff of the League of Women Voters, and as a matter of fact my recollection is that she was recommended to me by My wife. So Betty came onto the staff working under Valeo. The combination of Valeo and Geotz didn't work out. The upshot was that Valeo didn't want to stay with that subcommittee, and by then he was working closely with Mansfield. Hubert Humphrey and Betty Goetz got along fine. So she became director of the subcommittee, and did a very effective job. Betty did a comprehensive survey of what arms manufacturers would do if we had disarmament and there was no market for military aircraft and other arms. When that Congress expired the question was whether the subcommittee should continue to exist. I remember Senator Hickenlooper and Fulbright discussing what to do with the Humphrey Disarmament Subcommittee and deciding that "Hubert's had his two years. Let I s have another subcommittee." As the conversation went on their view was that once Hubert gets his hands on something, he's not going to give it up. I think it was Hickenlooper who said, "Let...
Hubert keep it. He'll keep that until he's elected president or vice president. He's not going to give it up." So that is how the Arms Control and Disarmament Subcommittee became the first permanent institution. It broke down the concept of consultative subcommittees.

RITCHIE: This is just a question about Betty Goetz. Didn't you object to a woman being staff director of a subcommittee at that time?

MARCY: No, not of a subcommittee. Subsequently, in the next year or so, there was an opening on the full Committee staff. As I recall it was one of only four professional positions. Betty was staff director of a subcommittee, but then the full Committee had its four professional staff members, and there was an opening. I made a mistake. In the interest of candor, I took Betty to lunch one day and said I hoped she would understand but that I proposed to recommend filling that vacancy with someone else with stronger qualifications. I thought everything was okay, but it obviously wasn't. When the Congress reconvened, Senator Humphrey ripped me to pieces for not having recommended Betty for that spot. I was guilty of discrimination he said. Betty was the best qualified, and on and on. My recollection is that I just sat there taking all of this. Finally I said to Senator Fulbright, "Give me a chance to say something!" What I said was that there were four professional positions and that the four people in those spots had to be able to do all kinds of things for the full Committee. They had to travel abroad if a senator wanted to go abroad, and it seemed to me that there were certain kinds of things that could only be accomplished by a--I don't remember whether I said male, but that's obviously what I was thinking of. Anyway, it finally quieted down. No member of the Committee came to my defense during the meeting. Afterwards, Fulbright said to me, "Forget it, you know Hubert, it wasn't necessary to say anything. I remember Senator Hickenlooper saying to me, "For Christssakes, they sleepin' together?" Obviously I remember that remark well. That was the kind of remark that Hickenlooper would make, absolutely tongue-in-cheek, there being absolutely no evidence, no hint of any such thing, but that was what he said. Senator [Frank] Lausche also came up to me afterwards. He said, "I just wanted to tell you, Carl, yours was absolutely the right decision. If I had traveled abroad and they sent that lady along with me as the staff person, my wife would have raised hell. You did the right thing."

Since an oral history presumably is for the purpose of telling things like they were, not as they might have seemed, I add one more private reaction to the Goetz episode. Senator [Stuart] Symington, who seemed to agree with Humphrey and thought I'd been discriminatory against Betty came to me several years later.
after Betty had married a distinguished Indian diplomat named Arthur Lall, the
Indian representative at the UN. Senator Symington said: "Carl, you remember I
thought you made a mistake by not putting Betty Goetz on the staff? Now she's
married that Indian, and by gosh, you were right!" As I look back I suppose the
Goetz episode is characteristic of the male chauvinism of the time.

RITCHIE: Going back a little, I'm still interested in the question of information,
and the reason I bring this up is that I looked through some of your memos from
1953 and I was really stunned to see you pointing out in your memos to the
Committee that there was a real problem of getting information from the State
Department. You said in a memo to Senator Taft that "the lack of sources of
information independent of the executive sources tends to create a suspicion on
the part of members of Congress as to the objectivity of facts and
recommendations made to the executive." This was when you were proposing
that an independent investigator be sent by the committee to the Middle East to
look around. Just about the same time, in a letter to Senator Hickenlooper in
1953, about the Central Intelligence Agency, you wrote: "While the CIA cannot
conduct its operations in the open, its secrecy is sure to lead to a congressional
investigation," meaning that they weren't providing documents. These are all
issues that came up later--there was a congressional investigation twenty years
later. There was a congressional response to these things, but I was really
surprised to see your observations on them so early in the Committee's history.
Did you feel that there was some real problem with how the Committee learned
about what was happening?

MARCY: Those memos must have been related to some specific incident, some
particular search for information. But having come from the executive branch to
the Congress I continued to be sensitive
to the feelings that my former colleagues generally thought of the Congress as a
nuisance: congressmen always want information; they send letters they want to
have answered; a State Department officer goes to testify, and maybe the senators
come and maybe the senators don't come. The word nuisance is the best way to
describe it.
I probably felt this because having come from the legislative liaison side of the
Department of State, and being in charge of liaison for the Department of State, I
was often caught between somebody in Congress who wanted an item of
information and a substantive person in the Department of State who didn't want
to be troubled because he was working on something serious such as drafting a
confidential memorandum for the Secretary of State, or a cable of instructions, or
something of that sort. I often had the feeling that I was interfering with conduct
of foreign policy while I was trying to do something to keep a senator happy. I

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think that that was reflected in my attitude when I went to the Hill. I think there is still a lingering feeling in the executive branch that the Congress isn’t quite with it, that they are a nuisance. I think you see that perhaps even in the way in which the Reagan administration has dealt with the War Powers issue the last week: Congress is a nuisance at least and a disaster at worst, in the view of many in the executive branch.

RITCHIE: And yet that was a period when the Committee was particularly supportive of American foreign policy. You mentioned the bipartisanship.

MARCY: That's right.

RITCHIE: And I would imagine that relations between the State Department and the Committee were extremely close at that time, rather than say the more strained relations later on.

MARCY: Well, I guess they were close because there wasn't anything that the Committee was trying to get. We weren't investigating any aspect of the Department’s activities. Things seemed to be moving along pretty smoothly. I don't remember any great controversies that were existent during that particular period of time. That was perhaps partly because the Congress--I can only speak about the Senate and the Committee--was reasonably happy with the way things were going. The Democrats didn’t much like Mr. Dulles and his policies, but we didn't have any big hassles about NATO or about SEATO, the kind of agreements that the Department of State was negotiating.

RITCHIE: The biggest controversy between the executive and the legislative branch, at least in the 83rd Congress, was the Bricker amendment to limit presidents' independent decisions on executive agreements. Did you get involved in that controversy at all?

MARCY: I don't recall that I was directly involved in that. I think another staff man, Thorsten Kalijarvi, handled most of that Bricker amendment. I wrote some memos on the subject for Senator Wiley.

RITCHIE: I read your memos for 1953, and they really make a wonderful record of what was going on in the Committee.

MARCY: I better read them myself!

RITCHIE: The memos for 1954, '55, and '56 aren't in the files at the Archives, there is a gap between '53 and '57, so I can help you out a lot better on the '53 period than afterwards!
**MARCY:** Where are they?

**RITCHIE:** I'm not sure.

**MARCY:** Did you go to the Archives?

**RITCHIE:** Yes, I went down to the Archives and the set they have for you has '53 but then picks up in '57 and is consistent all the way from there, but for some reason there are three years missing. It looked like you changed secretaries in 1953.

**MARCY:** I probably did! But the secretaries were very good, weren't they? They kept a very good record of most of what I wrote during that period.

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**RITCHIE:** It's a wonderful file, a reading file of what the Committee was doing. That was where I came across the material about requests for information.

**MARCY:** Well, I'll look in my basement and see if there is any chance that I've got something there. I just might have.

**RITCHIE:** You mentioned earlier about the investigation into overseas information, which also took place in 1953-1954. I gathered that was a response to the McCarthy investigation, when he sent Roy Cohn and David Schine over to Europe for a well-publicized tour of the USIA libraries, which seemed to be treading on the Foreign Relations Committee's turf.

**MARCY:** That's right, that was as I recall a factor. Hickenlooper and Fulbright were both very offended by the Cohn-Schine operations. Fulbright probably more so than Hickenlooper, but nevertheless Hickenlooper felt very much the same way. Hickenlooper and Fulbright, while they disagreed politically, on many things worked very closely together through those years. They each felt that the other had qualities which they did not have, and they recognized them and were willing to accept them. Hickenlooper thought that Fulbright was much more of a scholar, but Fulbright thought Hickenlooper was a down-to-earth fellow, a farmer from the midwest, closer to the people. And they accepted each other in an admirable relationship.

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**RITCHIE:** So this subcommittee was their way of trying to get back some of the momentum that McCarthy had seized?

**MARCY:** Yes. I don't think of it so much in terms of getting back . . . . I don't think that was a significant motivation for the Committee. There were other
factors. I'd have to go back and look at the report. I made several investigative type trips looking into United States Information facilities accompanied by Jack Yingling from Senator Fulbright's staff. I understand the report of that subcommittee is still used in USIA. Maybe they just liked the results of that investigation more than they liked the results of the Cohn-Schine-McCarthy operation.

RITCHIE: Mentioning Cohn and Schine brings up Joe McCarthy. Did you feel the impact of McCarthy in the Senate in your early years here?

MARCY: Not directly. I was personally offended by the things he was doing. I knew some of the people that he called before his committee. But that was a different department, so to speak. I had my things to do, and don't recall that anything McCarthy was doing was hurting specific legislation we had before the Committee. It's hard to remember whether I was appalled when he said there were fifty-three, or was it fifty-seven, Communists in the Department of State. I probably wasn't as appalled then as I am now, looking back on the event. Nevertheless, his allegations struck me as absolutely preposterous. Many of the people he had on that list were people I knew. When I was in the Department in the division of the UN affairs, I knew Alger Hiss. He was the chief of the division. I was one of the people under him on the administrative side. I knew him as one of the people around the place, but really knew nothing about his politics or his attitudes. I'm really kind of speculating now. I speculate that I probably thought: "My goodness, Hiss is an absolutely loyal, trustworthy American." I couldn't believe what was going on, and I don't know quite what to believe still.

RITCHIE: I was just curious in the sense that Senator Fulbright became one of the few senators who had the nerve to stand up against McCarthy, and McCarthy leveled a lot of attacks on him, called him "Senator Halfbright," and things like that.

MARCY: Oh, I know. Fulbright took him on, and I was very proud that Fulbright did take him on. But you see, Fulbright was not chairman then. I had very little to do with Fulbright at that time, of any importance, other than the Hickenlooper-Fulbright subcommittee. I do remember Fulbright saying to me one time about McCarthy, he said, "You know, considering McCarthy is such an S.O.B.," or words to that general effect, "he's a very interesting personality. You know, I enjoy him in the locker room." That kind of business. McCarthy was sort of the macho type of person. Sort of a hail-fellow-well-met--if he wasn't butchering people in the public
domain. I don't know whether Fulbright would still say that today or not, but I suspect he would, it was one of those casual remarks.

RITCHIE: That's very much the way the recent biographies have been: the two sides of McCarthy, "good-old Joe" versus the thug.

MARCY: That puts it very well. That was what he was saying, "good-old Joe." [End of Interview #2]
RITCHIE: You said you had a point that you wanted to bring up?

MARCY: Yes, in the first volume I mentioned Senator Taft as one of those typical senators who voted against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and subsequently, because it was as he said the law of the land, supported appropriations for United States participation in the organization. Here is another example of a senator's influence which is not often recognized. I was with Senator George on the floor of the Senate one day when he was chairman of the Committee. Some issue was before the Senate, which I don't remember precisely, but it came to a crucial vote on an amendment. Senator Mansfield, who was then majority whip, came to Senator George and said, "Walter, how do we vote on this?" Walter said, "Well, Mike, I'm going to have to vote aye, but I hope it's defeated." So Mansfield spoke to different senators and presumably said, "Don't follow Walter George on this vote." George voted aye, but the majority rejected the leadership of Walter George, the chairman of the Committee. I recall a day or two later the Washington Post had a blistering editorial attacking George for having voted as he did on this particular measure. It excoriated
him, yet I know that the very thing that Walter George had said to Mike Mansfield was what got the amendment defeated. I suspect that that occurs quite often--a senator knows he must vote one way to represent his constituents or a special interest, yet at the same time he conceives the national interest must prevail. This is one instance when I was in on the conversation.

RITCHIE: That's sort of a nice introduction to the person I really wanted to know about. When Walter George died, his papers were destroyed, and there is so little evidence other than his public utterances left. No one has ever written a biography of Walter George, and I don't know if anyone will tackle one under the circumstances. What sort of a person was he? Could you tell me a little bit about him?

MARCY: I would say he did not have a commanding presence, but he had a commanding voice. When Walter spoke, senators listened. They came to the floor to hear what he had to say. I did not have much experience with him in the way of drafting statements or making suggestions. George was his own man. He commanded the respect of other senators. He was chairman only for two years. It was Senator George who appointed me as chief of staff, to succeed Francis Wilcox. I had great admiration for him, but was never close to him. He had an able assistant, Jake Carlton, with whom I had a good relationship. In fact, our relationship was such that he came to me one time and said, "Carl, Walter is not going to run for reelection next time." I asked, "How come?" Jake said, "The businessmen," and I think that he referred specifically to Coca-Cola, "have decided that it was time for a change." And I believe that change was what they then supported Herman Talmadge, and Walter George retired gracefully, no longer having the support of the people he needed in his home state.

RITCHIE: That's interesting. When he was chairman of the Finance Committee he was sometimes called "the Senator from CocaCola."

MARCY: I think that was probably the key. I just don't know. It was just that I happened to get that message from Senator George's right-hand man, prior to the announcement that he was not going to run again.

RITCHIE: Your comment also reminded me of when I interviewed "Doc" Riddick [former Senate Parliamentarian]. This is a quote from his interview:

On another occasion (Carl Marcy was the staff director of the Foreign Relations Committee at that time), the Senate was considering a reciprocal tax treaty with Canada. As you know, the practice is for someone, some
staff director or aide, to sit next to the chairman to supply him with data and with details that he might forget while he's speaking. Well, on this particular occasion, Senator George took the floor on this reciprocal tax agreement, and I notice Carl Marcy in the back of the chamber instead of sitting next to Senator George.

Nobody was sitting next to Senator George to assist him, but he was standing again without notes speaking. I walked around to the back of the chamber and encountered Carl Marcy and I said: "Carl, why aren't you down there next to Senator George, assisting him?" He said, "Hell, he knows more about the treaty than I do, why should I be there?" And that was the attitude that those who worked closely with Senator George had towards the senator. He was very competent and made very brilliant speeches on the floor, and was considered one of the most informed senators.

**MARCY:** Well, that's fully consistent with my view then and now. Of course, having been chairman of the Finance Committee on that particular subject . . . . But then that was true with respect to Senator George on all of these issues, he was his own man. It was rather remarkable, because Senator George's eyesight was not good. How he ever absorbed all the knowledge and had the capacity and ability that he exhibited I still marvel.

**RITCHIE:** I've heard stories that the Eisenhower administration, the Eisenhower-Dulles team, really urged Senator George to become chairman as a means of preventing Theodore Green from becoming chairman in 1955. George could have become chairman of the Finance Committee again. Did you ever hear anything along that line?

**MARCY:** No, I did not hear anything that would support that or negate it.

**RITCHIE:** I was just wondering in the sense that Senator George had been for so many years the chairman of the Finance Committee, I wondered how really interested he was in foreign relations and international affairs by comparison.

**MARCY:** I really don't know. I don't know why the Eisenhower administration would not want Senator Green, unless it was because Green was getting along in years. In the area of foreign policy, as I recall, Green didn't exhibit any great antagonism towards positions of the executive branch.

**RITCHIE:** The same time that Senator George became chairman, in 1955, Francis Wilcox went to the State Department. How did that happen?
MARCY: Francis Wilcox was close to John Foster Dulles. They had a good relationship, and Francis had always been interested in United Nations affairs. In fact, he and I wrote a book together on contract with Brookings—which I mentioned earlier—on proposals to change the UN. Francis had become quite an authority in that area since he had been involved in UN affairs during the war years. Francis always seemed to me to be intrigued with the executive branch. He came from the University of Louisville originally, and then was in the Library of Congress, and doing work for the Foreign Relations Committee. And as the Foreign Relations Committee became more involved in the potential creation of the United Nations,

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Francis became the full-time assistant to Senator Vandenberg. But Vandenberg and Connally worked so closely together during that period that whatever Francis did was done for both Connally and Vandenberg.

RITCHIE: Well, when he moved to the State Department, did you assume that you would be moving up or did it come as a surprise that you became chief of staff?

MARCY: I don't remember that it was a great surprise. I was gratified, let's say. I suspect Francis recommended me to Senator George. But I don't remember that I was smacking my lips to have Francis leave and take over. It was one of those things that happened. I'm trying to recall the other people who were on the staff at the time. I guess I was more or less the natural person to move into the position of "chief of staff," a title created by Francis. Also I had been there longer than any other staff member, which, of course, is a significant factor in the Senate environment. Pat Holt, who was close to Tom Connally, came to the Committee at the same time I did. Pat was a newspaper type. I think probably the fact that I had been in the Department of State before I came to the Foreign Relations
Committee may have been a factor in Francis making a recommendation, and George going along.

**RITCHIE:** That was pretty good for someone who came up for a one-year stint in the Senate to wind up as chief of staff just a few years later.

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**MARCY:** It came as a surprise to me. I didn't mind it!

**RITCHIE:** Did you intend to make any changes in the way things were done when you became chief of staff?

**MARCY:** There were some things that I thought we needed to be a little more careful about. It seemed to me, as I look back on it now, that I was not quite as close to the Department of State and wanting to satisfy them as Francis had been. My tendency was to keep them at arms length. I think Francis' tendency was to think that most of the things the Department of State suggested were absolutely right, and tended to support them. It was almost natural that the Department would look to him, that Secretary Dulles would look to him, as a possible replacement, or to fill a post in the Department of State. I guess maybe my reputation in the Department of State is evidenced by the fact that in all of the years that I was on the Hill I was never offered any position in the Department of State.

I did have an experience one time with Henry Kissinger. At the time his nomination was before the Foreign Relations Committee to be Secretary of State, he invited me to the White House one day, and asked me if I would like to be an ambassador. He thought I was well-qualified to be an ambassador. What would I like? This took me by surprise. I guess I took it seriously at the time and I said, "Well, the only place I think I would like to go as an ambassador would be Sweden. It was left there and no offer ever came through.

So I never had a chance to accept or reject this quasi offer. Whether to relate that to Mr. Kissinger's concerns, or to some of the incidents that are described in Sy Hersh's book *The Price of Power*, I don't know.

**RITCHIE:** That's very interesting. Did you feel that there was any impropriety in somebody who had a nomination up before the Committee making an offer to you like that?

**MARCY:** No, I didn't relate the two at that time. It didn't occur to me that he was suggesting that this would make it easier for him to be confirmed as Secretary of State. Actually, I don't think it would have had any effect whatsoever.
Senator Fulbright was a great admirer of Mr. Kissinger. As a matter of fact, I think most of the members of the Foreign Relations Committee thought the Kissinger appointment was very good. The reason I suspect was that there was a feeling that Secretary [William P.] Rogers wasn't quite up to the job, maybe that's not as fair as to say that Kissinger was actually Secretary of State even while he was National Security Advisor. There wasn't very much for Secretary Rogers to do, so it seemed like a perfectly natural shift to make. The place where the policy was being made was in the White House. The Committee always objected, believing foreign policy should have been made in the Department of State. So when Mr. Kissinger moved to the Department of State governmental organization was back into the framework which seemed natural. Let the State Department run the foreign policy.

RITCHIE: Thinking about the State Department in the earlier period when you became chief of staff, it was 1955, the Democrats had regained the majority in the Congress but the Republicans were still the party in the executive branch. What was the relationship between the Democratic Foreign Relations Committee and the Republican State Department and White House?

MARCY: I think it was very good. One of the reasons was that if the executive branch is in the hands of one party and the Congress is in the hands of the other party, there is a certain inducement for the executive branch to pay more attention to Congress than is otherwise the case. When the Congress and the Executive are of the same political party, the White House expects members of its own party to go along, whereas if the Congress is in the hands of the other party, the Executive has to worry a little bit about it. And as a consequence there is a lot more cozying up to the Congress.

RITCHIE: Now, I don't think of John Foster Dulles as a person who "cozied." What was your impression of Dulles in those days?

MARCY: I dealt at that time mostly with William B. Macomber, "Butz" we called him, who had been Secretary Dulles' aide for some years. As a matter of fact, I think he married Secretary Dulles' principal secretary. Bill and I got along very well. We had our ups and downs. Bill grumbled many times about the Foreign Relations Committee and things that were not doing right, or that he was questioning. But I had very little to do with Dulles. Members of the Committee found Dulles a forthright witness. I don't recall any significant clashes.
Dulles was very good during that period in consulting the Foreign Relations Committee in connection with the negotiation of SEATO, and several other conventions of that kind. He would come to the Committee and consult with them during the negotiation process. I think that was pretty much the case during the time when Francis was staff director and the consultations that went on in connection with the creation of the United Nations. There was much more in the way then of bringing the senators in while the process was still going on.

I remember, for example, at one point there was an issue about how the United States would react in the event of an attack on one of its treaty allies, and how one would spell out in the treaty itself how the United States would respond. I recall handing Senator George a note saying, "Why don't you say the United States will respond in accordance with its constitutional processes," which of course mucked everything up. But I think you will find that that phrase is now pretty well embedded in some of those treaties. Confusing as the phrase is, it avoids that issue of who declares war, what the commander-in-chief is going to do. The phrase "in accordance with our constitutional processes" ducked the issue, as you can see. I'll have to go back and take a look at the treaties and make sure it's still there! Illustrative of the way in which Senator George, in that particular instance, and Dulles worked together, Dulles said, "Well, that's a good idea, let's try it." They were still in the negotiating process and that phrase survived.

RITCHIE: Were there regular contacts between George and Dulles? Were they people who consulted frequently?

MARCY: My recollection is that they did not consult very frequently. When Dulles had a problem he appeared before the Committee. Senator George was a senatorial person. He conducted business within the framework of the Committee. Now I can't speak to private conversations, of course. Dulles may have called George many times. But my recollection is that most of those meetings with Secretary Dulles were in the environment of the Committee.

RITCHIE: There's another Dulles in the 1950s who is interesting and that's Allen Dulles, who also testified, although, it appears, a little more reluctantly than John Foster Dulles, before the Committee. Did the Committee have any difficulty in getting Allen Dulles to come to give executive session testimony and to provide information in general?

MARCY: Yes, it was always difficult to get anyone from the CIA to testify, and that was especially true with respect to Allen Dulles. The few times he did come, I...
don't think the Committee members were very impressed with his testimony. He was not forthright. He tended to act like he was the man who knew what was going on; he had the intelligence and seemed to feel no particular need to communicate with the senators. I don't recall that the senators ever went after Dulles very vigorously. I recall at one point, one of the members on the Committee--somehow the name Senator [Leverett] Saltonstall sticks in my mind, but I don't think he was a member of the Committee, but the remark came out that: "Well, the kinds of things that the CIA is doing, I don't want to know." That was much the attitude, and I think that Allen Dulles approached the Committee very much that way.

RITCHIE: Looking back, as historians look back, we realize how much of a role the CIA was playing in foreign policy in events like Iran and Guatemala. Do you think that the members of the Foreign Relations Committee were aware of the role of the CIA in foreign policy in those days, or was it just this "I don't want to know" attitude, or they just flat didn't know?

MARCY: I think the main view was that they did not want to know and did not know what was going on. Perhaps if they had known what was going on they would have been more critical of CIA operations. I think it was Jack Peurifoy who was ambassador to some Central American country, it was Nicaragua or Guatemala, pulled off a coup, knocked off one government and brought in another government more favorable to the United States, and he was admired for that. Peurifoy was clearly acting in cooperation with the Central Intelligence Agency. He was proud of that. I knew him slightly. But the CIA was not thought of as a bad, bad thing, which I think now many senators tend to--not say it's a bad thing--but tend to question many of the things that it has done.

RITCHIE: Do you think it was the general air of anti-communism in the early 1950s, that basically any method that worked was okay?

MARCY: It's hard for me to answer that. Certainly it was a factor. It's hard to go back and reconstruct the attitudes at that time. But it was clear, I guess, that communism was the enemy. But I don't recall that the Central American incident that I've just mentioned was related particularly to the fear of communism in Central America.

RITCHIE: From reading back through the executive session transcripts I'm surprised at how little reference there is to the CIA in the early 1950s, and I guess my suspicion is that it was more that people just didn't know what was going on. There don't seem to be that many connections between events to say that the Central Intelligence Agency was involved for sure, in Guatemala, let's say.

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MARCY: I think that’s right. They didn’t know. They didn’t particularly care. And a few of those who might have cared tended to say, "I don’t want to know about it."

RITCHIE: The big turning point, or at least one of the biggest events of your first two years as staff director was the Suez crisis. It seems in many respects to have called into question a lot of policy decisions by the State Department, and there were a whole series of joint meetings between the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee (by the way, Saltonstall was involved in those joint meetings, which is possibly where he made that comment).

MARCY: That may be.

RITCHIE: How did the Suez incident affect the Senate and the Committee’s relationship with the Eisenhower administration and with John Foster Dulles?

MARCY: Don, I haven’t thought about that for so long, and my memory is very, very fuzzy.

RITCHIE: One of the reasons why I brought it up was that Senator Fulbright made quite a few significant speeches on the floor about consultation. This was a case where I think that he believed the White House had called them in at the very eve of the decision and it was more of an announcement of what was happening than a consultation, and I wondered how significant it was in terms of his later beliefs. He also made a lot of demands for information from the State Department, and they were shipping down cartons of documents on the whole history of the Aswan Dam, and all sorts of stuff. So if you do want to think about it, I would like to follow it up at a later time, if there is anything else you’d like to say.

MARCY: Now you’re refreshing my recollection. The best person to discuss that with you and the Committee attitudes was Pat Holt. When we got the documents from State--and they were very forthcoming--with many file cabinets marked classified, Pat hid himself away in a small room in the Capitol and worked those documents over for many weeks. Pat produced whatever was finally produced. As I recall Pat’s product was in the form of a Fulbright speech.

Many times when a committee staff gets involved in an issue of this kind, the regular committee business has to go on while someone is tied up doing the
research or getting particular kinds of information. During that period of time I was delighted to have Pat do the job, and as I recall Pat was under a great deal of pressure to get it done. I was probably worrying about the next Committee meeting, which would involve the confirmation of an ambassador or some item of legislation. But that is one of the things where Pat took the burden, and the Committee then looked to Pat for information.

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RITCHIE: That brings up another point: how did your role change from going from professional staff to staff director? Did you continue to specialize in any areas, or work with any subcommittees or were you basically supervising the work of the other professional staff members and the areas that they covered?

MARCY: My role did change. The management of the Committee and the staff is a time consuming job, and a lot of it is managerial work. So to the extent that I could give a staff person the responsibility for a particular area or a particular problem, I did. I expected to be kept informed when significant things were happening, so that if Pat, for example, were going to draft a speech for a senator or make some particular request of the administration, he would check it out with me. The staff we had was very competent. I had very few problems of individual members of the staff going off on wing-dings of their own. I don't mean "on their own" in the sense of behind my back. But within a committee framework there needs to be somebody who knows what the right hand is doing and what the left hand is doing. So a staff member who becomes completely immersed in one aspect of a problem, which may interest a particular senator, may also find that there's a problem developing from another quarter, from another senator. So I sort of--I was going to say "rode herd," but that's too tight. I tried to keep my fingers enough in every stew so that I knew how it was cooking.

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RITCHIE: Did you have any difficulties with the problem of the professional staff serving both the minority as well as the majority?

MARCY: No, we were very fortunate in that we all viewed our . . . . One concept I tried to convey to all of the staff members, and to the senators as well, was that we were professional staff members and our responsibility was to provide the senators with whatever information they requested or whatever information we thought they might need. What they did with it was obviously up to the senator, whether it was a Republican or a Democrat. I tended to view us as a law firm, in a sense. One day we might take a case for a plaintiff and another day a case for a defendant. In both cases we would do our level best to make the best arguments we could. My theory was that ultimately the arguments which were put forth on each side of an issue would be resolved where they should be resolved and that was on the floor of the Senate by elected senators.
In one instance a new senator came on the Committee, Senator [Karl] Mundt, who didn't much like the idea of having a "nonpartisan staff." He wanted to have someone who would prepare his minority views. I recall one instance when Senator Mundt came to me and said, in effect, "I want to get someone who is not on the staff to do the minority report." I said, "Well, why don't you try us." I think the staff member responsible for the issue was Jim Lowenstein. Jim wrote both the majority report and the minority report. Senator Mundt came to me later saying, "I thought that minority report was great, it was much better than the majority report." So I asked Jim about it, and he said, "Well, I did the best I could for both the majority and the minority, but it was much more fun and easier to write the minority report than the majority report." And I think that is generally true. It is much easier to be vitriolic and use strong language if writing on behalf of a minority than on behalf of a majority, where the responsibility for the ultimate action is more likely to rest.

RITCHIE: I suppose it helped in the sense that there was still a bipartisan feeling about foreign policy and a relative consensus about what the foreign policy ought to be. You didn't really have that many members who were off on a fringe.

MARCY: That's correct. I think that came in part from the fact that at that time the Foreign Relations Committee operated very much as a unit. As we discussed earlier, there wasn't a tendency to have a subcommittee with a particular area of legislative responsibility that would lead to a report or action which would have tended to fragment the group. If you look at the Congressional Record today, especially on the House side where they have a much larger committee, very seldom do you see that the full committee is meeting. There may be two or three subcommittee meetings a day. The result is that the full committee seldom comes together to exchange views on a particular issue. During the Green, the Fulbright, and

the George period a factor that tends to keep the Committee in a nonpartisan mode was that the full Committee acted as a unit, and they enjoyed that.

RITCHIE: The one thing that the Committee seemed to spend most all of its time with was foreign aid. The Mutual Security Acts must have taken months every year to get them organized and reported, and it looked like to me as if the full Committee was sitting on that and fighting it out paragraph by paragraph.

MARCY: You're absolutely right. It was a very tedious exercise. But it was the biggest bill that came before the Foreign Relations Committee every year. Unless

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there was some big treaty or some unusual event, it was the foreign aid bill that involved foreign relations more than anything else we were doing.

**RITCHIE:** The executive branch was always arguing for multiple year appropriations, and the legislative branch was always arguing for a year-by-year review. Why was there such resistance to long-term foreign aid?

**MARCY:** I think it was the feeling that the Committee had to keep reins on the Department of State. Another very important factor was that if an authorization were for several years the Foreign Relations Committee would lose jurisdiction over that subject matter. But since appropriations are always yearly, some jurisdiction of

the Foreign Relations Committee would be surrendered to the Appropriations Committee on the years when there was no authorization process. There was some of this internal Senate jurisdictional problem, although I think the most compelling factor was the feeling on the part of the Committee that it needed to keep a close rein on the administration.

**RITCHIE:** One author that I was reading recently said that it was because of foreign aid that the House finally got a role in foreign affairs, because that was the only real foreign policy issue that constitutionally the House could take a big share in. Did you find that the Committee was beginning to work more closely with the Foreign Affairs Committee, or at least take them more into account as a result of the foreign aid bills?

**MARCY:** Yes, I think that's a fair description. In many instances it seemed to me that the House Foreign Affairs Committee came to conferences, when we were trying to work out the differences between the House authorization and the Senate authorization, better prepared than the senators. I think this was partly due to the fact that senators tend to have more things on their plate, whereas House members can concentrate on specific issues. I think if you checked out the amount of time that was spent by the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on a foreign aid bill you would probably find that the House spent more time on the bill.

**RITCHIE:** There seemed to be a general pattern that the House would cut the president's request rather severely, and the Senate would inflate it a little bit, and they would split the difference, at least dollarwise.
MARCY: I don't remember that the House always came in with less than the Senate, but it was true that in conference that's the way to do it. I shouldn't say that's the way to do it, but that is the way it is done. If there is a difference the easiest way to reach a conference agreement is to split the dollar difference in half, unless there is some real vital issue that's involved.

RITCHIE: Did you feel that there was a lot of domestic pressure on the Committee in terms of where American money was allocated internationally? Let's say from various business groups, and labor groups, and senators representing states that had concentrations in sugar or any other commodity or product. Did you see any strong ties between domestic issues and foreign issues like that?

MARCY: No, I didn't, with one exception. Some of the members of the Committee always wanted to give more money to Israel than the administration asked. I recall one incident that stuck in my mind. Senator Humphrey would almost automatically move to double the Israeli authorization. I remember one time the administration had asked for something like let's say $100 million. Humphrey said, "I move we make it $200 million." And Senator [Jacob] Javits, who we always thought of as representing the Jewish constituency more than other senators, said to Senator Humphrey something like, "Oh, no, Hubert, no Hubert, that's too much. Make it $150 million." Senator Humphrey was very excitable about anything. He never did anything halfway. But on this issue to have Senator Javits impose a restraint on Humphrey was rather interesting.

The only other lobbyist that I remember as very effective was a woman named Virginia Gray. She represented the children's fund, UNICEF. She was, I swear, one of the most effective lobbyists I have ever seen on the Hill. She would go from office to office to office. No matter what the administration asked for children she always wanted twice as much for the children's fund. She was a gentle woman, grey-haired. She would get in and sit in an office until she got to see the senator. I remember one mark-up session when we came to the authorization for the children's fund, and Senator Lausche of Ohio, who was always very hard and tough on aid programs, as soon as we came to the children's fund he said, "I move we give Gray what she asked for. Let's not spend any time on it. She came to my office, we're going to do it anyway, so put it in.' So they did! So there's a certain kind of lobbying, maybe it's not a
certain kind of lobbying but certain kinds of issues that are very hard for senators to oppose. You can’t be against children especially if their cause is promoted by a nice person who feels very strongly and is persistent.

RITCHIE: Did you have to deal with lobbyists as a regular part of your functions?

MARCY: Very little. That’s about the only instance that I can recall. Mostly on aid bills we dealt with the Department of State and AID. AID had a very competent man who handled aid bills for a number of years. C. Tyler Wood had absolutely the confidence of the Committee members. He represented the executive branch, but he was one of the few representatives who participated on a rather continuous basis in executive session mark-ups.

Many times when a foreign aid bill was being marked-up in private sessions, there would be maybe half a dozen people from the Department of State or AID, as the case might be, waiting to be called on. So if somebody had a question, "How come we've got this amount for Indonesia this year and we only had that much last year?" there would be a witness close by. But it got to the point where Tyler Wood, who was the most competent and the senators trusted him implicitly, participated in most mark-up sessions. I don't think he ever breached a confidence. He was a better resource than anyone on the staff, understandably, because he would spend the whole year on

an aid program. Thus, when the foreign aid authorization was before the Committee he obviously knew more about it than any staff member.

RITCHIE: Down at the Archives I've seen those huge mark-up books that fold out and have the House version, the president's version, the Senate version, and blank spaces, and reading the transcripts it seems like you were constantly telling them, "Well, now we're on page 69, it's paragraph 3, in column 4." It struck me that your job was to keep the Committee straight in what must have been an incredibly complicated task.

MARCY: It was a complicated task to keep the Committee straight. But in the process there wasn't much time left for me to argue about the substance of some of the issues. But usually on those mark-up sessions one of our staff people would be the principal substantive person, and I would try to keep the Committee on track and moving.

RITCHIE: There are a lot of plaintive "Carl, where are we?" questions that appear in the transcripts.
MARCY: Well, somebody had to know where we were!

RITCHIE: One other person who was a member of the Committee at that time who interested me, and I wondered if you had any dealings with him, was William Knowland. He was the Republican leader as well as a member of the Committee, but in some respects was more out of step with the administration on foreign policy than the Democrats were. What type of person was he?

MARCY: He was physically a fullback, not only in build but in manner. Bulldoggish, the way he'd speak, a hard driver. He didn't spend too much time with the Committee because he was usually involved in broader Senate business. I knew him reasonably well, liked him very much. He was democratic and authoritarian at the same time. Sometimes a senator's attitude is that he's the senator and you're the staff. Knowland was never that way. To Knowland all people were equal as far as he was concerned, and he would beat another senator up as quickly as he would beat up a staff member--I don't mean to imply that he would, or did it as a general practice, but that was the impression that he gave.

RITCHIE: He always appeared like the bull in the china shop.

MARCY: Now that I look back, he always looked like he was about ready to have a heart attack. He committed suicide, didn't he?

RITCHIE: Eventually, yes, in 1975. In terms of the general unanimity of the Committee he seems to have been one of those people who was furthest away from the general consensus.

MARCY: That's correct. He always seemed skeptical about foreign aid. Of course, the skepticism of the Committee, during that period of time, continued to grow. I think the Committee originally rather reluctantly entered into the concept of foreign aid. Then it seemed to go along and accept it pretty well, cut a bit here, add a little there, but over a period of time, and more after Senator Fulbright became chairman, there was increasing skepticism of what was foreign aid accomplishing. Was it creating dependence? Too much dependence? Getting to be a habitual kind of thing? Nations relied on the United States more than their own efforts.

Fulbright had an illustration that he would often use. He felt that handouts might be necessary but they were demeaning to the recipient. He frequently asked rhetorically how one might feel if he were a banker and a person asked for a loan.
When the loan was paid back the borrower would be grateful, but was not subservient to the banker who made money out of the operation. On the other hand if a banker gave a quarter or a dime to a bum on the street, a person who really needed it, who couldn’t borrow money on his own credit, that person might be forever grateful but would feel he had demeaned himself. He would take his hat off to the banker when they met on the street. Well, this is a rough illustration of the way Senator Fulbright began to feel about foreign aid--that if aid was an outright gift, it was demeaning to the recipient, so he came out more and more for loans, not grants.

RITCHIE: There also seemed to be a lot of criticism in the '50s that money was being concentrated in a few countries where the objective was more military than economic. More money went to Korea than to all of Latin America, and a lot of other Third World countries. That issue seemed to have been boiling in the pot during the '50s.

MARCY: Yes, I think the senators felt that we were buying allies, not helping them economically. It is a little incongruous to talk about an aid program when in fact the principal money went to nations where we were trying to get their good will so we could establish a base, or keep a contingent of Americans in the country. It would take an analysis of the administration's attitude toward foreign aid, but I do think aid tended to become more militarily oriented than an eleemosynary activity.

RITCHIE: Senator George's term as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, as you mentioned, last just two years. He did not run for reelection in 1956, and in 1957 Theodore Francis Green became chairman. He had been a member for years, but was just about ninety years old when he became chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Is it possible for a ninety year old person to really be a functionally effective chairman of a Senate committee?

MARCY: I don't think so. Senator Green was a perfect gentleman. He could always make appropriate remarks at a dinner or when called upon. He was of the old, old school in many respects. I traveled abroad with him several times. I remember two incidents in Paris.

One morning before breakfast I bought some French newspapers and gave them to Senator Green. He asked if I had paid for the papers. When I said yes, he said, "Well don't forget to charge the Committee." It was a nickel or a dime, or the equivalent in francs. On another occasion, he looked out of the window one day and he pointed out the Eiffel Tower and said, "The first time I was here that hadn't been built." Then he had some story about elephants marching down the
street, I don't know why that sticks in my mind. In any event he could not keep track of things. Do you want me to go on and discuss Senator Green?

RITCHIE: Yes.

MARCY: During the years he was chairman he depended upon me a great deal in all kinds of ways. That quickly became apparent to a number of people. For example, after an executive session of the Committee, it was the custom for the press to come into the Committee room to learn what had been done. I am not referring to secret briefings of the Committee but to mark-up sessions which were always held out of the public eye, at that time. But the decisions were always immediately made public. Senator Green loved to have the press come storming into the room so he could tell them what happened. Reporters might ask a question or two and then thank the senator and leave. Senator Green would leave, and then the press would come back and ask me to straighten it out, tell them what happened as distinct from what Senator Green remembered. That was a bit embarrassing, but the press and I had that informal understanding. I don't remember for how long that went on. But it became more and more apparent that, with all due respect, I was acting as chairman of the Committee because he wasn't. And no other member would take over. Again, this seniority, "he's the chairman" kind of business.

At one point we wanted to start an elaborate study of foreign policy. I think we called the product _A Decade of Foreign Policy_. In order to do that we had to have a committee or some kind of device other than expecting Senator Green to be in charge. So we set up an executive committee. Essentially it was Senator Fulbright and Senator Hickenlooper. They ran it, while Senator Green was chairman of the Committee. But this is leading up to a final development.

I recall during one Senate debate, probably on a foreign aid bill, Senator Green was managing the bill and I was sitting beside him. An amendment was proposed and Green turned to me and said, "Well, what do we do?" And I said, "Well, that's up to you. If you oppose the amendment it will be defeated, and if you support it, it will probably pass." And he said, "But I don't know what to do." I said, "Well, Senator Hickenlooper and Senator Fulbright are on the floor, let's ask them." And Senator Green said, "But we can't, the Senate's in session." I said, "Senator, you do just what I tell you to do. Stand up and interrupt the proceedings and say, 'I suggest the absence of a quorum',' which he did. Under the rules of the Senate, the Senate cannot continue business until a quorum has been established or there is
unanimous consent that the quorum call be canceled. So Senator Green and Senator Hickenlooper and Senator Fulbright and I grouped together on the floor of the Senate and I told them what the issue was--well, they knew what the issue was--and I said, "Do you want the chairman to oppose this amendment or support it?" We talked about it a while, and then as we went back to our seats I turned to Hickenlooper and Fulbright and said, "What do you want to do?" And they said, "It's up to the chairman." I said, "But the chairman will do whatever you tell him to do." "It's up to the chairman," they repeated. So we sat down and I said to Senator Green, "We'll oppose it. Read this paper." We'd had these papers in advance of positions that might be taken, so he stood up; read the paper opposing the amendment and it was defeated.

Sometime about that period of time I talked with a couple of press people. I remember particularly Carroll Kilpatrick who was then with the Washington Post and I told him of this incident on an off-the-record basis. I said, "You fellows are all absolutely wonderful. You treat Senator Green just beautifully all the time, but he's not with it."

Sometime after that there were a couple of blistering editorials written in the Providence Journal, as I recall, calling Senator Green too old to serve and suggesting he ought to be replaced. The senator was terribly hurt by these editorials. But the first inkling I had that something was going on was when I got from Lyndon Johnson one day, saying, "I want every member of the Foreign Relations Committee present tomorrow morning. Senator Green has resigned" or "I have a letter from him resigning." So we got all the members there. Lyndon was not a member of the Committee, but he sat in as chairman. The Committee was in executive session, and Lyndon read Senator Green's letter of resignation. Then Lyndon took charge: "Theodore, you can't do this, it's the goddam press that's picking on you, you know they're a bunch of so-and-so, and you're the greatest chairman that the Committee has ever had, and you mustn't let these people get under your skin. I plead with you to reconsider." That theme was picked up and went right around the table with everyone saying in effect that Senator Green had to stay. It soon became apparent that Green was beginning to have some second thoughts himself. Senator Johnson turned around to me and whispered: "Carl, I'm going to get him out of the room, you go out with him." Johnson put his arm around Theodore and said, "Theodore you're feeling very strongly about this, I wish you'd go outside and think about it a little bit. It's a very important decision that you're making." So Senator Green and I went into the back room, where Eddy Higgins, Green's administrative assistant, was waiting. Johnson hadn't told me what he wanted so I had to guess. I talked with Green

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and reminded him that he had submitted his resignation and ought to stick with it. I referred to some other very distinguished people who had resigned at appropriate times. I think I mentioned [Konrad] Adenauer. I also suggested Senator Green could set an example. I said, "You will be more honored in sticking with this decision than if you change your mind now." We went back to the Committee room shortly and Green said, "I'm going to stay with my decision."

The senators went around the table again telling Senator Green what a wonderful man he was and complimenting him for the right decision. Then Senator Johnson proposed that Senator Green be made chairman emeritus. After a chorus of approval, Johnson turned to Senator Fulbright saying: "Bill, you're the chairman." That was it, the meeting broke up.

Subsequently, I learned from Pat Holt--who had stayed in the Committee room while I was outside with Senator Green--he told me, as I now recollect, that Johnson, as soon as Theodore left the room, changed his tone and told members that Senator Green was sick and tired. He said he had been told that if Green were not relieved of

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this responsibility "he may not be with us for very long, so I think it would be a great thing for the old man if we accepted his resignation."

Sometime later I checked with Carroll Kilpatrick of the Washington Post to see if he remembered my saying to him that Senator Green was getting so confused that in effect I was becoming chairman of the Committee and that something ought to be done about it. Carroll remembered the conversation very well, and said he had made the age point to a friend on the Providence Journal. That is the round-about way Green, hurt terribly, was removed from the Committee. I don't know if it was good or bad, but it happened.

**RITCHIE:** I'm delighted to hear your version of this because we printed in the 1959 volume of the Foreign Relations Committee's "Historical Series" the transcript of that incredible meeting, with Lyndon Johnson there, with Johnson and the members saying "You can't resign," and Theodore Green responding, "Well, if you really want me to stay . . . ." At that point suddenly Johnson's tone clearly changes and there's a parenthesis "the chairman and Mr. Marcy left the room. And I've always wanted to know what happened when you left.

**MARCY:** I had forgotten there was a transcript of that meeting.

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**RITCHIE:** It's a very interesting piece, and it seemed to me in a lot of ways a wonderful example of Lyndon Johnson's technique, that he exerted so much overkill that he . . .
MARCY: He almost succeeded!

RITCHIE: In doing just the opposite of what he wanted.

MARCY: That's right.

RITCHIE: Can you think of any other example where the majority leader imposed himself on the Foreign Relations Committee or any other committee like that?

MARCY: No, I can't. Johnson was such a leader, nobody would have thought of questioning his role in this instance.

RITCHIE: It's certainly a remarkable story.

MARCY: I recall another incident illustrating how Johnson ran that Senate with an iron hand. I believe it was Prime Minister [Harold] Macmillan who came to lunch with the Foreign Relations Committee. During the lunch Lyndon said, "I think you ought to come to the floor of the Senate and make some remarks." Under Senate rules foreigners are not supposed to speak to the United States Senate when it's in session. But Lyndon grabbed the Prime Minister by the arm and hauled him up to the Senate chamber and moved the Senate stand in recess. So Macmillan made the speech. While this was going on,

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Darrell St. Claire, who was the Committee clerk, came to me as I was sitting in the back of the Senate chamber and handed me a piece of paper saying: "You better give this back to the Prime Minister." I asked what it was. He said, "Well, the PM dropped it when he was at lunch. When he left, I picked it up." After I returned the paper to Macmillan and he had left I said to Darrell, "Well did you make a copy of it?" And he said, "Of course!" What the paper turned out to be was the British Embassy sketch of every member of the Foreign Relations Committee, what they were like. It had been prepared for the benefit of the Minister, so he would know how to deal with them. I showed that paper to only one person--I don't know where it is now--and that was to Senator Fulbright. Fulbright was the only person who came off clean. The British thought he was great, a wonderful chairman, intelligent, articulate, all of those things. And I remember particularly they had an analysis of Senator Wiley, who had married a British citizen, and it was not very flattering.

RITCHIE: When Lyndon Johnson was the majority leader, how did it work in terms of getting your legislation from the Committee out to the floor. Did he strong-arm the Committee to get legislation out when he wanted? Or vest pocket it until he wanted?
MARCY: Oh, no. Johnson's attitude toward Fulbright was: Fulbright's in charge of foreign policy and whatever Bill wants, Bill gets. So we never had any problem in getting legislation before the Senate at any time. I remember one time, however, when Johnson was holding up a foreign aid bill and I asked him when the bill was to come up. Johnson went to some length to explain to me that he was holding the bill up until the last days of the session for negotiating purposes with the White House. Johnson usually wanted to speed things up, "Let's get going, let's get going, let's go." That was his whole role. He seldom participated in the debate on foreign aid, but it was "let's go, let's go, let's get it through tonight," that kind of pressure.

I remember one item Johnson muscled in a bill. I can't identify the period, but I remember at one point Bobby Baker called me up and said, "Lyndon wants X millions of dollars in the foreign aid bill for the East-West Center in Hawaii." I protested no hearings, no background. "The leader wants the money in the bill," was repeated, and it was up to me to work the thing out, get the language. The reason he wanted the money in the bill, I learned, was the [John A.] Burns who was then Democratic governor of Hawaii was in a tough race, and Lyndon thought money for an East-West Center was one way to help him. And so the East-West Center in Hawaii was established by Lyndon Johnson. Now, where he got the idea for the East-West Center, I don't have the slightest idea. All I know is Lyndon wanted it, Bobby told me, and the Committee jumped. Lyndon got what Lyndon wanted, and the East-West Center still operates in Hawaii and is, as I understand it, a very successful operation, well-financed. And I think Senator Fulbright's on the board of directors!

RITCHIE: How do you explain someone like Lyndon Johnson? How was he able to break through what is basically a pretty tradition-ridden and slow-moving institution and exert such incredible pressure and dominating influence and personality?

MARCY: That's hard to say. He was a very hard-driving person. Lyndon, in a way, was the same kind of majority leader that a Bill Knowland would have been. They were in charge. They were clearly leaders in that sense, whereas say a Connally, or a Vandenberg, or a George were not leaders in the sense of being hard-driving individuals. They led by experience, the way in which they talked, their general low-key demeanor, argumentation they would make, whereas the other two, but especially Lyndon, would just drive it in. That's the only way to describe him, he was a driver. There are different kinds of leadership. You can lead by getting people to follow you, which would be say what a George, or a United States Senate Historical Office -- Oral History Project
Connally, or a Vandenberg might do, but Lyndon never got people to follow him. . . how would I describe it? He would drive them as if senators were rowers on a galley.

RITCHIE: I've talked to other people who found themselves on the other end of Johnson's wrath at times. Did you ever have any run-ins with him when he was majority leader?

MARCY: Not while he was in the Senate. I felt his wrath, indirectly, after he became president and after he and Senator Fulbright had broken. I remember I went to the White House several times before they broke and it was always, "Carl, how are you?" first name basis. But after the break between President Johnson and Senator Fulbright I went to the White House one other time, and as I sought to shake hands Lyndon looked at me, looked right through me, and said: "What are you doing here?" I was never invited back, and I don't think Fulbright ever was. But to answer your question specifically, no, I never felt his wrath while he was majority leader.

RITCHIE: It sounds like you were one of the lucky ones.

MARCY: Maybe so! I think one of the reasons was that during that period of time when he was majority leader, Lyndon never rode roughshod over Fulbright. I think that Fulbright's intellect, background, education, whatever it was, cowed Lyndon a bit, or made him hesitant to take Fulbright on. That may be one reason why when he did finally break with Fulbright it was a complete break. In a sense I was protected by Fulbright.

[End of Interview #3]
Carl M. Marcy  
Chief of Staff  
Foreign Relations Committee, 1955-1973

Interview #4  
Fulbright and Kennedy  
(Wednesday, October 12, 1983)  
Interviewed by Donald A. Ritchie

MARCY: The story is brief. Senator Green was not about to give up the Committee office in the Capitol, even though his personal office was in the Russell Building. He liked it. He was of the old school. When the new building was constructed, Mr. Green was adamant in insisting that that room be kept for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As I recall, the Foreign Relations Committee kept the Capitol room and the Committee on Appropriations kept its room. I was delighted myself. My office was adjacent to the Committee room in the Capitol. In thinking back, maybe it was a good thing for my role as staff director because I was rather isolated from the rest of the staff. I was not a constant burr under the staff saddle. I could call up and ask staff members to come and see me, or ask them to prepare a speech or draft legislation or whatever it might be.
So, while I was closely associated with all the members of the staff, I sometimes think they were pleased to have me stashed away in the Capitol Building.

**RITCHIE:** The situation, from what I understand, was that it must have been pretty uncomfortable. In fact, there was even a newspaper article about how cramped the staff was in their old offices. Senator Green just wasn't aware of the conditions under which people were operating at that time.

**MARCY:** Oh, I don't feel that we were particularly cramped at that time. The staff wasn't very large. By the time the new building had opened there were large amounts of space available.

**RITCHIE:** Well, at first wasn't it an either/or situation. You either stayed where you were or you got space over there. And then they finally compromised and gave you one foot in one and one foot in the other.

**MARCY:** Don, I don't think it was that way, because when people moved into the new building there was a reluctance to move, but we had really very little space in the Capitol Building itself and I don't recall any kind of deal that was made. Perhaps Darrell would be clearer on that, because Darrell was delighted to take over quarters in the new buildings.

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**RITCHIE:** I had a sense that one of the reasons why the Committee got its space in the Capitol was because it hung out as long as it did before accepting space in the Dirksen Building.

**MARCY:** Oh, I think that's right. Senator Green just did not want to talk about the Committee moving any place else. And neither did I.

**RITCHIE:** So the squeaky wheel got the grease in this case.

**MARCY:** I think that's right.

**RITCHIE:** Some people from different committees have told me that they regretted the move out of the Capitol because up until that point the chairmen of the committees had always been in the office building, and the staff had been in the Capitol, and that meant there was always a five minute lag between the time you got the telephone call and when you had to go in to see the chairmen, but now the chairmen wound up in the office right next to the staff, and they didn't particularly like the proximity.
MARCY: Well, it didn't bother me because our chairmen were located in the office buildings and I was located in the Capitol.

RITCHIE: Did you always work out of the Capitol the whole time?

MARCY: Yes, the whole time.

RITCHIE: That room is used for almost ceremonial purposes in the sense that there are so many receptions and luncheons for heads of state and others, beyond just hearings.

MARCY: At that time all executive meetings of the committee were held in the Capitol Committee room. In fact, most of the meetings were held in the Capitol. Very few of them were held in either of the office buildings.

RITCHIE: One of the big attractions for moving into the Dirksen Building was that it provided for televising regular hearings rather than just when you met in the Caucus Room. I was wondering if Senator Green, being sort of old school, wasn't as interested in going public with a lot of the hearings as some of the younger, more politically-ambitious members of the Committee might have been.

MARCY: I don't think that was the case. He liked television just like all of them. I never saw any reticence on his part. Usually television cameras would be set up outside the Committee room, which provided a convenient place for meeting after sessions were over. But if there were a significant hearing on a public issue, usually the hearing would be held in the Dirksen Building or the Russell Building. But don't forget, television was in its infancy—not as all-pervasive as today. The press frequently referred to TV as the "boob tube."

RITCHIE: Did you get a sense that after they moved to the Dirksen Building and they had the larger facilities that the Committee held more public meetings than they did before?

MARCY: I guess so, but I wouldn't relate that to the fact that there were better facilities for public hearings in the new building. With the passage of time there were more public hearings held. It was pressure of the times or the nature of committee business that led to that, not the fact that there were larger, more commodious facilities available.

RITCHIE: That's interesting. You always wonder what was the cause and effect.
MARCY: After we were holding hearings in the Dirksen Building, television news was coming of age, and it was more convenient to have television facilities, I probably got more inquiries from senators: "Are the television people there this morning?" If they were, we were assured of a good turnout. If they were not there, there was a little more difficulty in getting senators to be present. For a time the television facilities senators thought the television people would be there all the time, but they were not.

I may have mentioned earlier, one of the problems I frequently had with senators was that they felt I could persuade television people or press people to come to a hearing, which was not the case. You know very well the Fourth Estate manages to decide what is important and what is not important. Sometimes they came, sometimes they didn't; sometimes they were bored, sometimes they missed a good story.

RITCHIE: Just on what the issue was that was being debated.

MARCY: That's right.

RITCHIE: Well, we talked last time about Senator Green stepping down and becoming chairman emeritus of the Committee, and then after a brief lapse of a couple of weeks Senator Fulbright became the chairman of the Committee in March 1959, and then remained chairman until 1974 and became one of the major figures in American foreign relations. You worked with him that whole stretch of time. Could you tell me something about J. William Fulbright and his character, and your relationship with him?

MARCY: I was rather in awe of the man. He was a well-known figure by the time I went to work for the Senate. Held been prominent during the war years in connection with the UN resolution and other activities. The Fulbright name was even then being associated with the exchange programs. He was always business-like. He never seemed to have much time for idle talk. As I say, I stood in awe of him, but I was also a great admirer. I don't recall any particular problems when he became chairman of the Committee. There were some kinds of things that I wanted to do. I suppose I wanted to prove to him that we had an effective staff operation. I believe it was after he became chairman that Pat Holt and I did quite a bit of work in trying to pull together, or I should say maybe ghostwrite a book for Senator Fulbright. I still have a lot of the things we pulled together in my files, but he was never much intrigued.

RITCHIE: What was the book going to be on?
MARCY: It was general concepts on foreign policy, the way we felt it ought to be looked at. It dealt with the foreign service, the way it should be organized, and so on. It was not until Seth Tillman became a member of the staff some years later that Seth was able to put Fulbright's thoughts into a form which Senator Fulbright found pleasing and satisfactory. So Seth did much of the ghostwriting for Senator Fulbright. The two of them worked together very closely. Maybe you can twig my memory a little bit with some other events in that early period. I just haven't thought about it for years.

RITCHIE: Well, I looked through some of your memos and one of the things that struck me was that right after Fulbright became chairman you wrote a sort of precautionary note. Apparently there had been a lot of comment in the press that the Foreign Relations Committee had one of the smallest staffs of the standing committees of the Senate and they were putting pressure on him to expand the staff. It was interesting for me to read you as staff director saying "Don't be too hasty," that the staff had to grow organically, and there were problems with rapid growth. I wondered if you could talk a little about that, on how you saw the staff and why you cautioned him at that stage.

MARCY: There was at that time, in the Senate, a growing feeling that the Senate lacked expertise. I think it was Senator Humphrey who used the phrase "We need to have our own experts." And there were several articles criticizing the Congress for not having adequate expertise. I felt at the time, and I am still somewhat influenced by the feeling, that in the field of foreign policy to develop independent expertise in the Senate almost inevitably would involve conflict with the executive branch and contribute to a lack of clear direction, or clear signals, on foreign policy issues. If, for example, the Foreign Relations Committee had a first rate expert on the Middle East, I felt that he or she would almost inevitably be in conflict with the assistant secretary or the desk people in the Department of State on what our policies should be with respect to almost any Middle East issue. In a sense, independent expertise almost by its nature implied having a person who either would be more expert than a person from downtown, or at least there would be a need for that person to differentiate or have a different point of view than might be expressed in the executive branch. That was one of the factors that inclined me to feel the staff should be knowledgeable but kept relatively small. The experts, as I viewed it, were the senators themselves. They tend to be experts in the larger political framework. The nuts and bolts of foreign policy are extremely important, but a senator does not need to get himself involved in the nuts and bolts of foreign policy to have the instincts or the judgment of the way in which our society should go. When you stop to
think about it, you know very well that a President of the United States, or a Secretary of State, is not an expert in what I would call the nuts and bolts. Essentially, people in those high positions make political judgments. They take advice from the experts down the line, but it seemed to me that the kind of expertise the staff would provide would almost automatically run into the large volume of expertise that existed in the Department of State. For example, suppose an assistant secretary of state for the Middle East goes to the Middle East on foreign policy business and talks with the foreign ministers of the countries there. What does the congressional expert on the Middle East do? Read the report when the assistant secretary comes back? Or does that person feel that he or she must go to the Middle East to make an independent examination? And if it's the latter then you almost automatically build in a conflict between the executive and the legislative branches of government.

Now, I realize our system is based upon conflict between the two, but in a sense it seemed to me that the role of the Senate and the role of the staff of the Senate was to provide overall political

judgment and not to begin to seek out areas in which there might be different interpretations, where there would be a search for different facts which would lead to different political judgments. By and large, the political judgments that are made are based upon what appears in the newspapers, what had been gathered in a general way, not by some in-depth expert analysis which would disagree with an expert analysis made by someone else.

RITCHIE: Did you find that Fulbright shared your views on that?

MARCY: I believe he did, although I don't recall that he and I ever discussed this. The reason I say I believe he shared my views was that he thought of the Committee as a totality, all of the members. He didn't much like the idea of creating subcommittees, of having subcommittees which would have areas of separate jurisdiction. If an issue was important he felt it ought to be considered by the full Committee. If it wasn't important enough to be considered by the full Committee, I think he questioned whether the Committee should be involved. The Committee had tremendous amounts of significant business to do. It is very difficult to find time to digest the product of experts on its staff. We did, however, from time to time, call on experts outside of the Committee and outside of the executive branch. I think that was probably a better technique than to build up contrary expertise. I think it was Senator Humphrey who insisted that we should have "countervailing expertise" on the

Committee staff. Now, I could never really be sure what countervailing means, but I interpreted it as meaning that we ought to have experts who somehow
countervailed, enunciated different points of view, gathered different kinds of facts than those that were gathered by either the foreign service generally or by a full-time expert from one of the universities.

RITCHIE: Did you have a lot of pressure from some of the other senators who wanted to be perhaps more independent as subcommittee chairmen, the Wayne Morses on Latin America, the Hubert Humphreys on Disarmament, and people like that?

MARRY: No, the principal problem I had, if it could be a problem, was with Senator Humphrey, who was an extremely active person. Anything that Hubert got involved in became the most important thing to him and to the Nation and he would never drop anything. He had a tremendous capacity to absorb information from all sources. I don't remember that any of the other senators felt particularly left out because they didn't have their own expert. Although I was probably not in a good position to view that. After all, a senator was not likely to come to me and complain that we weren't supplying him with adequate information—although as time went by more and more of them felt that senators on the Committee ought to have a particular person on the staff who would deal with the subject of foreign relations. Senator Morse, for example, had a very competent lady on his staff, Phyllis Rock, who worked very closely with our staff. One of the problems which arose, however, as senators began to put persons on their staffs solely to deal with foreign relations matters was that those staff people wanted to have access to classified Committee information and attend all Committee hearings sitting behind their principals. I resisted that.

I recall one incident which illustrates the problem: I believe it was Senator Symington who had a very competent assistant. Senator Symington came to me one day and said, "Now, I want my man sitting behind me in this executive session with the Secretary of State." And I said, "Well, Senator, we have not done that in the past." "I want my man there," insisted Symington. My reply was "Well, Senator, if you're going to have your aide present, then you must realize that Senator Morse is going to have his assistant on foreign policy, and so it will soon be with every member of the Committee." As I recall, Senator Symington said, "Well, if Senator Morse is going to have an assistant sitting behind him, I guess I will give up my request." So, the point was not pressed. But that's really where the crunch came. If one senator was going to have a subcommittee that had legislative power, then all of the members of the Committee wanted to have a subcommittee that had legislative power. I'm coming full circle to Senator Fulbright's feeling, as I enunciated earlier, that if it was an important matter it was of concern to the full Committee. If it was not a concern to the full Committee, why bother with it?
RITCHIE: In the case of Fulbright, did he have members of his own personal office staff who dealt with foreign policy matters whom you had to deal with, or did he separate out his committee and personal staff?

MARCY: He relied very much on the Committee staff. He did have people on his staff that we worked with very closely. When I first came to the Committee and we were working on the subject of the United States Information program, one of his assistants, a man named Jack Yingling, whom I have mentioned earlier, and I, did go to Europe together. But I think that was the only occasion. There may have been a few instances in which someone from his staff traveled with the Committee staff to a parliamentary meeting or something of that sort. But I don't recall that anyone on his staff got very deeply involved in foreign policy matters. Norvill Jones, I guess, became somewhat involved in foreign policy matters. When we had a vacancy on the staff Pat Holt and I decided that if we could get Norvill on the full Committee staff that would be absolutely great because he was very competent. That’s how he came on. It was not a case of Fulbright saying, "Put Norvill on the Committee staff." My recollection again is that Senator Fulbright didn't much like the idea. He wanted to keep Norvill with him, but he consented to having him come to the full staff.

RITCHIE: Was there ever any concern from Fulbright's staff that actions that he was taking as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee wouldn't leave him in good stead politically in his homestate?

MARCY: I recall grumbles several times from staff members, but nothing pops to mind. Fulbright’s staff would take their Arkansas foreign policy political problems up with the senator, not the Committee staff. As you know, Senator Fulbright was very independent. He told me many times that he thought he had a compact with the people of Arkansas. It was that if he represented the people of Arkansas on the issues closest to their hearts, they had given him, as the other part of that contract, freedom to act as he felt he should act in the field of foreign policy. The classic case of where he represented the people of Arkansas right down the line was in connection with Civil Rights.

RITCHIE: Did he ever express his feelings about that position, that he was taking a stand with the Southern senators?

MARCY: Not to me. I often had to defend positions which he took, in the sense that someone would come to me and say, "I cannot understand how Senator Fulbright, liberal, broad-minded, can be like he is on Civil Rights." And I would give the explanation which I have just given to you, and also pointed out that
probably the Fulbright program did more for the international education of minorities than almost any other piece of legislation that came that early. Under the program people did go abroad as scholars, teachers, or artists, absolutely regardless of race, creed, or color.

RITCHIE: There was always the issue that Washington was a segregated city and as African diplomats were coming they had difficulty in restaurants and other places. Did Fulbright ever express any concern about what this was doing to American policy towards emerging nations? Did it ever both him?

MARCY: Again, Don, I don't recall any examples of that. I'm quite sure that we had a number of visitors, I mean official visitors from Third World nations that were received at the Committee. I don't recall any instance when anybody was excluded, whether it was a chief of state or a foreign minister, and it was appropriate for that person to meet with the Foreign Relations Committee there never was any discrimination. Of course, we're talking about different levels.

RITCHIE: Yes. One of the other things that I noticed that Fulbright was interested in doing when he became chairman was that he wanted to set up regular meetings or luncheons with members of the press who were interested in foreign relations. Somewhere in June of 1959 you and he had lunch with James Reston. It looked like this was going to be the first of a series. I was interested in looking over your report on that luncheon. Did Fulbright carry that out? Did he meet on a regular basis in private luncheons with journalists?

MARCY: I think that was an idea which was started and we may have had two or three such sessions and then it disappeared. It didn't go anywhere. The best I can say is that it seemed like a good idea and it didn't go anywhere. I suspect what happened was that about the time the third luncheon was set up there was a roll call on the floor, or some hot debate issue, or somebody had to cancel at the last minute. The life of a senator around noon in the United States Senate is a bit irregular. If you're a Washington socialite, it's not smart to plan luncheons around having senators there if the lunch is going to run until two or three in the afternoon.

RITCHIE: Senator Fulbright always had a good press. He seemed to have been always admired, at least by the journalists who specialized in foreign relations. I wondered if that was solely because he was doing his job well, or was he really building strong ties to the working press?
MARCY: I think it was because he was doing his job. He did his work. He sometimes grumbled but never turned press people away. He always found time to talk with them. He was friendly. I never heard him upbraid any press person. But he did not go out of his way to cultivate them as such. He as in the Senate for a long time, and developed a good working relationship with them.

RITCHIE: Did you find that there was a group of journalists who specialized in foreign policy matters, who stayed around the Committee, or did you have a large sea of reporters who came around regularly?

MARCY: It was rather a limited group, maybe twelve or fifteen. People like Ned Kenworthy and John Finney of the New York Times, and Don Oberdorfer of the Washington Post, and other of that type. There were probably fifteen or twenty, who covered--Murrey Marder--covered most of our hearings. If it was an executive session they were always standing outside the Committee room when the session was over. I.F. "Izzy" Stone seldom came to hearings. But he invariably came to committee offices the day after a hearing meticulously to read the transcript. So he got his stories in depth and with nuances. They were a very skillful group of reporters.

Now that there is so much discussion about leaks, there were certainly leaks at that time, but a good reporter doesn’t have to get somebody off in a corner and have that person tell everything that went on. A good reporter will say to one person, "Well, did you discuss so-and-so today." or such-and-such, and the person will say, "Yes, we did, and I made a good point." "Senator, tell us what that point was . . . . Well that's interesting." Then the first thing you know the reporter goes to another member of the Committee and says, "I hear the Senator so-and-so said such -and-such. "Ohq did you? They can build on from there. I don't recall any instances when there were leaks of the kind that jeopardized the national security. But the good reporter does not have to have some person who is slipping him secret papers to figure out what goes on.

RITCHIE: From time to time there are always accusations that the staff must be leaking documents to the press, but the implication usually comes out that the senators are the major source of that information.

MARCY: Well, I can't remember any time when I gave any piece of paper to any reporter. There may have been some time, but I think I would remember. But on the other hand, if a reporter knew that a piece of paper existed, I would say, "I
can't give it to you, but each member of the Committee has a copy," or something like that. I suppose that might be a quasi-leak, or lead, I guess, one would say.

**RITCHIE:** Getting back to Senator Fulbright, did you find that when he became chairman that the atmosphere of the Committee changed? Was there any noticeable feeling like that?

**MARCY:** I can't recall any distinct change. I was greatly relieved because we finally had a chairman who was vigorous and active and knew what was going on, and was a recognized leader.

I divert for a moment to tell a story that you reminded me of: that is that it was only ten years from the time Senator Fulbright came on the Committee until he was chairman. That is an unusually short time in that period of history for a person to rise from the bottom to the top of the Committee. He was quite surprised himself, because there were a number of younger people ahead of him who looked like they had firm seats. Senator [Brien] McMahon of Connecticut, for example, died of cancer as I recall. And others were eliminated in various ways. So he became chairman quite quickly.

Did I tell you about the time when Senator Connally wanted to have Fulbright come to a Committee meeting? We don't have this in the record? Well, I will tell it then. When I first came to the Foreign Relations Committee in 1950, Senator Fulbright had just come on the Committee. I was sitting in Francis Wilcox' office one day while he was trying to round up a quorum. Connally walked in and said something like this, "Well, Francis, get hold of that Bill Fulbright, he's the newest member of the Committee and I got him on the Committee. Get him over here so we can get a quorum." Ten years later, I was the staff director, the chairman of the Committee was Senator Fulbright. Senator Fulbright walked into my office one day and said, "Carl, get a quorum so we can do some business. Call up that Jack Kennedy. He's the junior member of the Committee, I helped get him on the Committee and he doesn't come to any Committee meetings." I said, "Well, Senator, Senator Kennedy's pretty good, he comes to most of the meetings."

"Well, I know," said Senator Fulbright. "When he comes to the Committee meetings, what does he do? He sits down at the foot of the table autographing pictures of himself." A year and a half or two years later, Jack Kennedy was President of the United States. I always thought that he came to those Committee meetings and autographed pictures of himself because he was running.
RITCHIE: That's a nice introduction to Kennedy. He was from 1957 to 1960 a member of the Committee. Did you have very many dealings with him when he was a member of the Committee?

MARCY: Not a great deal, not in an independent way. I had dealings very closely with Fred Holborn, who was on Kennedy's staff, and a few others. But my relationship with Kennedy was, I don't know how to describe it, austere, at arms length. He always called me by my first name, but he had his own entourage, his own people. He always came to Committee meetings very well prepared. Reliable, as far as Senator Fulbright was concerned, they had a good relationship. But I wouldn't say my relationship with Kennedy was close. I had a much closer relationship with Senator Morse, or Symington, or Fulbright, or Wiley, or Hickenlooper, than I ever had with Senator Kennedy.

RITCHIE: How would you describe the relationship between Kennedy and Fulbright?

MARCY: That's hard, because I didn't see too much personal interplay between them. Within the Committee framework there was always respect. I think that Senator Fulbright thought that Kennedy was kind of a young Brahmin, smart. And I suspect Kennedy thought of Fulbright as an intellectual and not quite of the social class that he, Kennedy, was. It's hard to say. I really can't go much further than that.

RITCHIE: In 1960, it seemed as if half of the members of the Committee were running for president. You mentioned that you had a lot of trouble getting a quorum. Did you find in any way that presidential politics was interfering with, or seeping into the Committee?

MARCY: No, I don't think that there were instances in which points were made in hearings that would support one candidate rather than another. You're probably right, there was a difficulty getting a quorum. Senator Symington was running at that time as I recall.

RITCHIE: Humphrey.

MARCY: Humphrey was running. When did [Eugene] McCarthy? McCarthy came much later. McCarthy came while Johnson was president. No, I don't remember that politics injected itself into Committee meetings.

RITCHIE: The only political statement that I've seen in the transcripts was a suggestion by George Aiken that the African subcommittee be sent on a three month investigation of Africa--this was in August of 1960--of course, Kennedy
was chairman of the African subcommittee. Then Wayne Morse proposed that the vice president lead a special study group to Latin America for the same three months.

**MARRY:** There was always that chit-chat back and forth, and tongue-in-cheek comments, but I trust in looking through the records you didn't find anything of substance that injected a political note.

**RITCHIE:** No, in fact, I'm surprised how little politics there is, even "behind-closed-doors" sessions, it does seem to be a group that worked together very well, despite the fact that they were clearly political rivals, even within the same party.

**MARRY:** Yes.

**RITCHIE:** Well, when Kennedy was elected, there was a lot of speculation that Fulbright would be considered for Secretary of State, and he wasn't. There was some speculation that it was because of his stand on Civil Rights. Was there any truth behind those stories? Did you hear anything or was there any feeling within the Committee about whether or not the senator was even interested in becoming Secretary of State?

**MARRY:** When Congress reconvened after the election, and Lyndon was vice president, I encountered him one day in the Senate cloakroom, and he came up to me and grabbed my lapels, breathed in my face, and said, "What's wrong with that Bill Fulbright? I had it set up for him to be Secretary of State and he turned it down." I said, "Well, I didn't know anything about it." He said, "Well, I had it set up, and Bill called Dick Russell and said he wasn't interested. And I had it set up." That's all that I knew at that time.

Some months later, maybe even years later, I told Russell what I have just said, and asked him if that was true. Russell said, "Yes, Bill Fulbright called me when he understood that his name was under consideration and told me that he was not interested, and I passed the word along." Now, who Russell passed the word along to, or whether the Southern issue came into it, or not, I don't know. Senator Fulbright has told me the same thing, that he called Dick Russell and told him that he wasn't interested. So the aspect of this event that I know about had nothing to do with Senator Fulbright's position on Civil Rights.

I am reminded of a related event. Immediately after the election, I had a call from Fred Holburn, asking me if I had any ideas as to who Kennedy might name as Secretary of State. I told Fred my first choice for Secretary of State was Senator Fulbright and my second choice would be Dean Rusk. And I remember Fred Holburn
asking: "Who's Dean Rusk?" I described that he had been an assistant Secretary of State at an earlier time and was president of the Rockefeller Foundation. Holburn said that sounds interesting, and we dropped it. I heard nothing further until Rusk was named as Secretary of State, and then Holburn phoned me and said, "Well, we did it till Since then I have heard many others claim credit, or responsibility, for Rusk. I don't know the full story, but I'm sure if you ask Fred Holburn, who is in town now, that he would probably recall this very much as I did.

RITCHIE: Well, actually there is a memo from you to Fred Holburn in your files in which you cited Dean Rusk. You said that he was "a top-notch man for under secretary and possibly for Secretary."

MARCY: Oh, for goodness sakes.

RITCHIE: And this was in November of 1960.

MARCY: That would have been just about right. Probably, now recalling it, Holburn said something to me, "well, if you think he's so good, send me a memo," something like that.

RITCHIE: What was it about Rusk that made you single him out?

MARCY: I don't know. I had known him in the Department of State in a very casual way. He always seemed like a very decisive person. He was at that level of person who should be considered.

Having seen now some of the things that Mr. Rusk did as Secretary of State, and recalling subsequent disagreements that I had with him, and certainly Senator Fulbright had with him, maybe it was a mistake to have suggested him for the post of Secretary of State. That's on the assumption that my recommendation was the only one that carried any weight, which, of course, was not true.

RITCHIE: Was your feeling of disappointment later on strictly on policy disagreements, or in terms of his character as Secretary?

MARCY: Fundamentally it was on policy disagreements, although somewhere in my files there is a memorandum of a conversation that I had with Dean Rusk at a time when relationships between Rusk and Fulbright were very bad. I recall Dean Rusk saying to me, "That Senator Fulbright is a poor chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. He might be a great college professor or a college
president, but his is no person to be chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee." I'm sure you've seen that memo somewhere.

RITCHIE: I haven't seen it yet, but I'll look for it. Well, when Rusk took over as Secretary of State and when Kennedy was inaugurated as president, how would you describe the relations between the Committee and the new administration?

MARCY: Speaking just for myself, I was rather disappointed, because I thought that with the Kennedy administration there would be close cooperation between the Committee and the new administration, and between the staff of the Committee and the new people who were coming into positions of power and influence in the administration. That wasn't the case, or didn't seem to me to be the case. I may have expected too much. Kennedy brought his own people in, his friends, and as I indicated earlier, he had his own coterie of assistants, people who had helped him in the campaign, people who had worked with him in the Senate. He didn't have any close relationships with any member of the Committee staff. I think one could also say that Kennedy didn't have very close relationships with many senators. I don't know that he ever had a buddy-buddy kind of relationship with any senator. My impression is that he was always a little aloof from the rest of the group. He was very close to Charles Ferris, who was at that time, or subsequently, secretary to the Democratic Policy Committee of the Senate. But it seemed to me that the people from the Hill who went downtown for positions in the new administration were relatively few. Those who did seemed to be glad that they were downtown and away from the Senate, glad to get out of this place. From then on the general syndrome developed—I'm speculating now about the executive branch attitude—that the United States Senate was a nuisance. New executive branch officials had to start worrying about it. They had to testify, supply reports, and it took an inordinate amount of new policy makers' time to keep senators happy. That's a characteristic of people in the executive branch, I think, whether they come from the Congress as Kennedy and some of his group had, or whether they come from a governorship.

RITCHIE: Did you find basically that the State Department was pretty much the same as it had been under the Dulles-Herter regime, in terms of its relationship with the Committee?

MARCY: Yes. Yes, I thought it was very much the same. Who was Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations when Kennedy came in? Oh, I know, it was Fred Dutton. Fred and I had a very good relationship, but he was part of the United States Senate Historical Office -- Oral History Project www.senate.gov
Kennedy group, came in with the Kennedy group. I don't remember what Fred had done before that. I think he had been an official in California. My relationship with Fred Dutton in the Department of State, and earlier with Bill Macomber, who had occupied the same post of Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, was about the same. We always had a very good working relationship. My comments about general attitudes did not go to those individuals. They worked very closely with the Committee.

RITCHIE: Well, very shortly on in the Kennedy administration, within four months, he had a major foreign policy disaster with the Bay of Pigs disaster. This was a case again where the Foreign Relations Committee was not consulted in advance, although Senator

Fulbright apparently found out in advance and was the only person to make any kind of a negative commentary or warning against proceeding with the invasion.

MARCY: That's right. I'm a little hazy during that period. What was the date?

RITCHIE: It was mid-April of 1961.

MARCY: I think Pat Holt had been working in that area and got wind of the invasion plans. My guess is that Pat alerted Fulbright, and that Fulbright was not informed independently by the executive branch. Pat would recall that. My guess is that there was not any advance consultation which the administration would, I should think, have initiated in an event of this kind.

RITCHIE: Did you get a sense that Senator Fulbright was disappointed in the way things were developing with the new administration?

MARCY: No. That's about all I recall at the moment.

RITCHIE: Did you feel that after the Bay of Pigs debacle that the administration made any changes in its approach to Congress, was there any effort to straighten things out and to consult with members?

MARCY: No, I don't recall any great move on the part of the administration to be more friendly and cultivate the Committee. We each did our own thing. They prepared legislative proposals and we held hearings on them. Things seemed to go along pretty well until further down the road we came to the Dominican development, but that was after Kennedy had gone. I gather, at least my impression is that Fulbright and Kennedy had a reasonably good relationship, but not intimate. One reason I say that is because after Johnson became president, for a period of time Johnson turned to Fulbright extensively, calling
Fulbright "my Secretary of State"--as he had done when he was majority leader in the Senate. I don't know how this went down with Secretary Rusk. Fulbright had a very close and intimate relationship with President Johnson and Mrs. Johnson, as did Betty Fulbright, for a period of time. The very fact that he, Fulbright, was all at once welcomed in the White House by Lyndon suggests to me that the relationship between Kennedy and Fulbright had never been very close. Let me just say, I want to be sure it's understood that I am just speculating about this, and I know that I should probably not do that.

RITCHIE: Oh, no, I'm interested in what you have to say. Yours is an educated speculation.

MARCY: All right.

RITCHIE: But I appreciate your pointing out when you are speculating as opposed to talking about your direct involvement. Again, I guess a speculation question: Looking back over the Kennedy administration from this perspective, in terms of foreign policy it was a very tumultuous period, from the Bay of Pigs to the Berlin Wall crisis, Kennedy's meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna, the Cuban Missile crisis. Do you think that there was a problem of capability involved there, that this administration wasn't all that it was cracked up to be in terms of being able to handle international relations and situations?

MARCY: I don't think so. That's a personal judgment, but I don't know how the Berlin crisis could have been handled, how the Cuban crisis could have been handled. I don't think either of them were particularly precipitated by actions on the part of the Kennedy administration. It would have been interesting to have seen what would have happened if Kennedy had stayed in for another six years.

RITCHIE: Was there any prior consultation before the Missile crisis in 1962, as opposed to the Bay of Pigs invasion?

MARCY: Yes. I think though, that all of the consultation came with Fulbright being invited to the White House for meetings, to which I was not privy. I've heard the story several times that when it got to the point of how we should respond to the missiles, take them out militarily or order them out, that Senator Fulbright and

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Senator Russell were very tough, and then it was Bobby Kennedy who was the restraining influence. But that's all hearsay as far as I'm concerned. I read about it in the press, and that's it. I don't recall that there was any great discussion in the Committee at the time. You've looked at the transcripts, was there?
RITCHIE: I haven't seen the 1962 transcripts yet, but I'm curious to see them.

MARCY: I think I would remember if there had been vigorous discussion in the Committee. It certainly was an issue that should have been discussed. But I don't recall.

RITCHIE: One other crisis area that was developing in that period was South Vietnam, and I was interested to see that in December 1959, you and Frank Valeo made a trip to South Vietnam.

MARCY: Yes.

RITCHIE: And I wondered if you could tell me about the background to that, and your impressions of Vietnam at that time?

MARCY: Well, there is a report somewhere, because I'm sure we did a report on it, I remember that. Frank Valeo had special access through Senator Mansfield to /Ngo Dinh/ Diem. We had an audience with him. Valeo conveyed some message from Mansfield to Diem. Precisely what that message now, I don't fairly recall. I think the American ambassador at that time was [Elbridge] Durbrow. I remember Ambassador Durbrow briefing us at great length about how the North Vietnamese were getting prepared to come down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and how the South Vietnamese were positioned to take care of that, there would be no danger, this kind of thing. They were talking about the threat from the North. We also talked at that time with a man named Sam Williams, General Sam Williams, who was referred to as "Hanging Sam" because he had been either the general or the colonel in Germany who had responsibility for keeping safe the Nazi hierarchy during the trials. That's where he got the name "Hanging Sam." I think he was head of the aid mission, of all things, at that time in Vietnam. Valeo and I flew to Hue and came back to Saigon by railroad. I think we must have been one of the last travelers on that railroad, which used to be quite an elaborate French rail system. So we saw a good bit of the country. I'd have to go back to the report to refresh my recollections on other than these geographic features.

RITCHIE: I'm interested in your impressions. I know that apparently the main reason for the mission was that there had been a series of articles by a man named Albert Colgrove on the mismanagement of the aid program in Vietnam. And essentially after the Committee held some hearings and looked into it they came to the conclusion that the charges were greatly exaggerated, and while there was some mismanagement it wasn't gross and flagrant. But still it's such a pivotal time in United States-Vietnamese relations, when things
were still going well but just before we began to get sucked in deeper, that I was curious about your impressions, memories that you carried away from that trip.

MARCY: What has happened since that time has influenced my recollection, because, as I try to search my mind for what my attitude was in 1950, I tend to relate it to what happened later on in Vietnam. So in my previous discussion with you I didn't mention the aid program except through the personality of Sam Williams, who was head of the aid program. Now that you refresh my recollection, yes, that is right. During that period there were a series of critical articles about the aid program. It was about that time that there was a growing feeling and a series of articles about the "Ugly American." There was a book that came out about that time. So we were interested in the aid program. It's interesting that while I recall, quite vividly, the discussion about how the North Vietnamese threatened to come across the DMZ [De-Militarized Zone], my recollection of the aid program is rather weak.

RITCHIE: Which was, of course, the justification for having a big aid program in that country.

MARCY: That's right. That's about it.

RITCHIE: Last night Public Broadcasting did the third episode of their Vietnam series, "Vietnam: A Television History," and it was on the period from 1954 to 1963, very well produced episode, unfortunately up against the World Series.

MARCY: I saw it, the Vietnam program.

RITCHIE: The thing that struck me in watching it was how inexplicable it all seemed to everyone involved: Eisenhower trying to explain what was happening in Vietnam; Kennedy seeming more ill-at-ease than I remember ever seeing him on any issue, trying to explain just what our position ought to be in Vietnam. That sense of confusion, I thought, was the dominating theme of that episode.

MARCY: After Senator Fulbright got deeply involved in the issue of Vietnam some years later, he insisted on reading in depth the history of that area, and insisted also on being briefed. So we brought people in. Bernard Fall, for example, "Street Without Joy," who was later on killed in Vietnam. And other people who were knowledgeable in the area. Fulbright immersed himself in that area in a way that surprised me. I recall his saying to me one time, "Well, I guess I'm going to have to pay some attention to the Far East. I've only paid attention to Europe." He'd traveled all over Europe, held been educated in Europe. Now he felt he had to learn about this part of the world. So we got a lot of books for him
from the library and went through the whole exercise, doing everything we could to educate

RITCHIE: We're at the point where the whole Vietnam issue is going to come up, and I think the best thing would be to spend next week talking on Johnson and Vietnam, rather than trying to start to talk about it at the end of this session. But is there anything else about the Kennedy years that stands out in your mind, that we should cover?

MARCY: For the record, one of the times that I was most embarrassed as staff director of the Foreign Relations Committee was in connection with an item of legislation on which I was presumably the authority. It was in executive session. Senator Kennedy began to ask me questions which I was not able to handle. Kennedy was obviously well briefed, and I had to confess my inability to handle the questions from Mr. Kennedy. One other footnote, my son graduated from Senate Page School the year that Kennedy became president. Kennedy spoke to the graduating class and invited the class to visit him at the White House, along with their parents. So I remember

RITCHIE: Did you say that your wife had a job in the Kennedy administration?

MARCY: Mildred was in the League of Women Voters and went to work for the United States Information Agency when Ed Murrow was head of USIA. I guess that was at the beginning of the Kennedy administration. She went to a Civil Service position, and has been with the agency ever since, and is now, what do they call them? SES, Senior Executive Service person. Ed Murrow wanted to have a women Is advisor. USIA had a policy planning staff with a labor advisor, a youth advisor, a business advisor, and soon, Murrow asked Mildred to be women’s activities advisor. She was at that time working for the Overseas Education Fund of the League of Women Voters. So she was one of those few women who grew up, matured maybe we should say, with the women's
movement. Then she was subsequently in the Department of State and worked very closely with Bill Macomber, who set up a system so that women in the Foreign Service could have advantages which they hadn't had before. Then during the Nixon administration Mildred was executive secretary of the president's commission preparing for Women's International Year. She had an office in the Department of State bigger than any office I ever had! Forty people working for her. Helps to have a wife who is intelligent, able, employed. Makes it possible for you to meet the family budget! We probably will want to take this out of the record. If we don't, she will.

RITCHIE: I think it's great.

MARCY: I'll leave that up to your discretion.

RITCHIE: Well, I thank you. I think this was a most interesting session, especially coming right after that episode, looking back on those old kinescopes of Eisenhower and Kennedy, and getting back into that period.

MARCY: I find it very hard to get back into it. I'm very disappointed in myself in not being able to recall events of that period more clearly.

RITCHIE: On the other hand, we've covered quite a bit of ground.

MARCY: Well, maybe for the next session I'll go back and read David Halberstam's *The Best and The Brightest*.

RITCHIE: No, it's just as well, actually, not to be influenced by those things. In fact, one of the problems I think that oral historians face is that sometimes the people they interview have been reading the same books they have! Then you're really talking about the author's interpretation. I'm much more interested in your memory and things that stood out for you as important, as opposed to anything that I try to impose on you with my questions.

MARCY: Well, then, I will not bone up before our next session. There is one caveat I should not for the record. That is my propensity to recall conversations which end up in the transcript in quotation marks. I said "..."; He said "..." These are not actual quotations--they are my best recollection of words exchanged.
[End of Interview #4]
RITCHIE: When you left last week you said that you had gotten a call from someone in the Soviet Embassy who wanted to speak with you, although you didn't know about what. I've been curious all week as to what the conversation was about.

MARCY: Well, it reminds me of a practice which we developed in the Foreign Relations Committee. That was that when any member of the Committee staff met with an Eastern European diplomat, we made it a practice to send a note to the Department of State, never telling them of the substance of the conversation, but always letting the Department of State know that we were meeting with this individual. At one time, I was having a one-on-one conversation with Secretary of State Rusk, and it got a little brisk. Secretary Rusk said, "I want to say one thing to you, Carl. We know every time that you or people on your staff meet with people in the Soviet bloc." I asked why that should surprise him. And he said, "We have our special sources of information." I said, "Well, I suppose your special sources of information are your own intelligence people, because every time we do have a meeting with an Eastern bloc person, our staff reports that meeting to the Department of State. Not what we talked about, but just so the Department will know when we were meeting with representatives of the other side." So this last week, when much to my surprise I got a call from a man named Vladimir Zolotuhkin, who handles cultural and educational affairs for the Soviet Embassy, asking if he could chat with me for an hour or so, I called the Department of State and told them that I had this invitation. I wanted them to know that, and also whether the Department had any idea as to what might be up. The desk man I talked with had no advice, but said, "It is rather surprising. Ever since the KAL [Korean Air Lines] incident the embassy people have been keeping a low profile, and the fact that they have called you and want to talk may indicate they are now opening up a little bit." I went to the embassy and we talked for an hour and a half or so. There wasn't any particular message. It was a friendly chat. However, when Zolotuhkin got to talking about President Reagan's reaction to the incident, he said, "Your government is making us look like beasts. And when your government talks about Soviet citizens and the Soviet government as if we were beasts, how can we
communicate with a society that feels that way about us?” I think that indicated
current sensitivity as well as the long history of Russia and now of the Soviet
Union. They have pride. They want to be a part of the world. And for us now to
treat them as we did during the time of Stalin, or even earlier periods of time,
indicated to me that rhetoric hurts them a great deal more than we think it might.
Well, shall we go to your questions?

RITCHIE: I appreciate hearing that. I found that very interesting. But to flip
back in time, we ended last week talking about the Kennedy administration,
which came to an abrupt end in November 1963, with Lyndon Johnson becoming
president. I was wondering what your first thoughts were when you learned of the
assassination and that Johnson was president, and how you thought that might
have affected American foreign policy.

MARCY: My wife and I were in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia at that time. We were
beneficiaries of a joint fellowship which had been given to us by an organization
called the Institute of Current World Affairs—a small foundation, but very
generous as they had awarded Mildred and me a year’s fellowship. We rented our
house and made arrangements to have our children taken care of while we were
away. We spent that year in some twelve countries of particular significance to
the United States in the general area of foreign policy. We thought twelve
countries would let us stay roughly a month in each country—longer than the
casual visitor but not so long as to be taken in too much by local attitudes. So for
that year we wrote monthly newsletters, which went to the Institute. Mildred was
interested in the role of women in development, and that year gave her a
wonderful opportunity to visit with women in development in the countries, and
with officials of the United States Information Agency, with whom she had
particular rapport because she was on a leave of absence from USIA at that time.

President Kennedy’s assassination came as a great shock. I remember seeing a
headline in a newspaper, as we were driving towards Kuala Lumpur from
Singapore, which read "Kennedy Shot." We talked about it, and thought, well
Kennedy must be some local individual. So it was not until we got to Kuala
Lumpur that night that we learned of his death. So any reactions that I have to
the assassination of President Kennedy are reactions which were built upon what
I saw and felt during the following year, looking at the United States from abroad.
I will not be very helpful to you in describing what the attitudes may have been
on the Hill.

RITCHIE: I was thinking about your own attitudes. You knew Lyndon Johnson
when he was vice president, and even more so when he was senator, and now he
was president. Did you have any sense of apprehension about his presidency, especially in foreign policy?

**MARCY:** No, I didn't. What doubts I may have had were quickly resolved because after I got back in September of 1964 Lyndon Johnson was very close to Senator Fulbright, and Betty Fulbright. He continued to refer to Senator Fulbright as "my Secretary of State," a carry-over from the time when Lyndon was majority leader and Senator Fulbright was chairman of the Committee. President Johnson did look to Senator Fulbright for guidance in the general area of foreign policy, and it continued for a period of time after Johnson was president.

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**RITCHIE:** Before we move on, I'm interested in that year you spent abroad. What was your view of the United States from abroad? Did you find that being out of the country for that period of time and looking at things from there gave you a different perspective?

**MARCY:** Yes, it did. It seemed that everywhere we went the people we talked with, usually in the foreign office, and leading publicists, looked at the United States as the place to which they would come with all of their problems. Any local problem: the United States will help us. It bothered me, because it seemed to me that many of the countries where they were having difficulties, were not looking for solutions within their own countries or within their own governments. They tended to look to the United States. I had not realized before how influential anything the United States did was in almost any country in the world.

**RITCHIE:** And that began to trouble you?

**MARCY:** It began to trouble me, yes, because I could see that it was not only a big financial burden on the United States, but it seemed to me there was a tendency for countries to look outside for solutions to internal problems. Here was the United States, big AID program, militarily strong, a place to look for help.

**RITCHIE:** So it wasn't necessarily what the United States was doing that bothered you, but that they were doing so much.

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**MARCY:** Not that the United States was doing too much, but that so much was expected of us. This was prior to being deeply involved in Vietnam. I didn't feel that there was any very strong reaction against the United States. I guess I had been influenced earlier by some books about the United States, denigrating Americans who were operating in other countries. But when I saw it from those countries' point of view, there may have been "Ugly Americans," but generally the feeling was that we're in trouble and the United States can help us.

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**RITCHIE:** Do you feel that the perspectives you developed that year influenced your activities on the Committee when you came back?

**MARCY:** Well, Don, it would be hard to trace that. I guess I would have to say, I did not feel it at the time. Undoubtedly, it did have an influence on my attitudes.

**RITCHIE:** I was curious in the sense that it was in January of 1965, after you had returned, that Senator Fulbright announced that he was not going to floor manage the foreign aid bill, which was a big break for him.

**MARCY:** Yes. Well, I suppose that, looking back, perhaps one of the concepts that developed was that we were doing too much, the very thing that I have been describing. That may have influenced my thinking a bit. I don't recall any specific instances. It's hard to know whether I was more influenced by what I had seen and felt, or by the fact that Senator Fulbright had reached the same independent conclusion.

**RITCHIE:** Well, when you came back, did you sit down with Senator Fulbright and give him a briefing on your experiences, or had you been sending him things back periodically during the trip?

**MARCY:** No, I did not send him things periodically. I sent him the letters which Mildred and I had written, which would reflect some of these attitudes. But the foundation grant we had was very freewheeling. I had no very tight program. When I did come back, I wrote an article, the title of which was something like: "It Depends Upon Where One Sits." That was published in the *Saturday Review of Literature*. In going through some papers just a few weeks ago, I came across a letter from Mr. Justice [Warren] Burger, who was then on the Court of Appeals, in which he said he had read the article. He wrote a very nice letter commending it for being perceptive. He liked the article. I think that probably summarized the attitudes that I picked up or developed during that year.

**RITCHIE:** Unfortunately, you were away during the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which is one of the things I am particularly interested in, but I was wondering if when you came back you talked to people and picked up any impressions about it. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was certainly one of those turning points in foreign policy. Did you get any feedback from people you knew on the staff or on the Committee about the resolution?
MARCY: I recall quite distinctly at the time of the incident, and at the time the resolution was adopted, being appalled that the Senate had acted so quickly and so unanimously. I do remember when I came back, I talked with Pat [Holt], who was acting in my absence, and made this point to him. Pat said he was appalled, too. The Committee met on very short notice, held a very short meeting, as I recall, and with the exception of Wayne Morse, I think unanimously recommended approval of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. I'm trying to recall, there was some previous incident in which a resolution had been adopted after a very short consideration.

RITCHIE: It wasn't short, but the resolution I was thinking of in contrast was the Middle East Resolution of 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine, that Senator Fulbright was quite opposed to, and didn't like the idea of giving a "blank check" to the administration. Many members of the Committee talked about the "blank check," and yet in 1964 they turned around and gave the president, in effect, a blank check.

MARCY: I think, Don, you've picked the right words to describe it. But I felt if the Senate was going to give the president a blank check they ought to consider it a little more than they had. Trying to recall, it's very likely that I did have in mind the earlier experience in the Middle East, and Senator Fulbright's attitude there. As you well know, subsequently, Senator Fulbright regretted that vote very much. I have talked with him on and off over the years and the main thing that has come through in those conversations with Senator Fulbright was that the election campaign was on, Barry Goldwater seemed to be making headway, and the stance that Lyndon Johnson was taking compared with the stance which it looked as though Goldwater was going to take, inclined Senator Fulbright to say, "We cannot have Goldwater for president," and to go along with Lyndon Johnson. Who was Goldwater's vice president? Was it General LeMay?

RITCHIE: William Miller. General LeMay ran with George Wallace in '68.

MARCY: That's right, that was later.

RITCHIE: Part of it, I suppose is that a lot of the fears that the Committee had in 1957 really were not met. Eisenhower didn't use the Middle East Resolution as a blank check. In fact, when they sent troops to Lebanon, the administration swore that it wasn't even using the Middle East Resolution, that it was just operating under the president's powers as commander-in-chief. So one might have assumed that President Johnson would have acted with the same restraint. There was some historical precedent for that.
Marcy: And, of course, at that time Senator Fulbright and President Johnson were very close.

Ritchie: It has come out now that the administration actually had a resolution written out months in advance of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, for which they were looking for an opportunity to introduce, and this was the opportunity. This was apparently something that they didn't tell the members of the Committee, but would it have made any difference if they had told them? I assume that most of the members of the Committee were quite on the side of the president in terms of Vietnam policy, with one or two exceptions.

Marcy: Oh, I don't think it would have made any difference had they known that resolution was waiting to be introduced. You really have to remember the way the media treated the Gulf of Tonkin incident at the time. I remember, I was in Europe at the time, having seen the Life magazine pictures of the American destroyers and the headlines, "vicious attack on the high seas." You almost had to be a Wayne Morse or a fool--and I never thought Wayne Morse was a fool--to have voted against the Tonkin Resolution. I've always thought that Wayne must have had someone in the Pentagon who was raising doubts in his mind, but I have no way of knowing.

Ritchie: That's interesting, because I once heard Senator Morse give a speech at the University of Hawaii, after he left the Senate, in which he said that he had heard from someone in the Pentagon, his source, who called him the night before the hearing and said, "Ask to see the logs of the two ships that were involved." That was the only information that he gave him. And when Morse asked to see the logs, Robert McNamara said that those ships were in the Pacific, the assumption being that the logs were on the ships. Morse didn't follow up on that, but he said that later on he discovered the logs had been flown into the Pentagon and were there at the Pentagon even as McNamara was telling him they were still in the Pacific. In fact, the logs would have indicated that these were electronic surveillance ships and they were a cover for South Vietnamese attacks on North Vietnamese bases. So he had some foreboding, but actually his policies would have been opposed to that type of a resolution no matter what.

But it always puzzles me why the administration through 1964 and 1965 acted in basically such a secretive and double-dealing manner towards the members of the Committee and towards the Congress, when in fact it had overwhelming support for its policies, and I would imagine that almost all of the members thought the same way that Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara and Lyndon United States Senate Historical Office -- Oral History Project www.senate.gov
Johnson thought about the role of the Soviet Union and the role of Communist China, that North Vietnam was really just a puppet and that this attack was a surrogate attack. Why is it that if there was a consensus, that Johnson didn't use it, and let the Congress in on the policy decisions and what was happening?

MARCY: I don't know. Looking back it seems like it was a mistake, that he could have had much more support from Congress. But I suppose at the time that Johnson felt he was going with the tide in the country and the press. It wasn't until there began to be doubts about light at the end of the tunnel that the members of the Senate began to be skeptical.

RITCHIE: Do you think that Johnson, having been a manipulative majority leader, thought he could continue to manipulate the Senate? That he really didn't treat them in a collegial manner but in more of a dominating manner?

MARCY: Well, that's speculation, although it's consistent with a point which I think I made in one of our earlier interviews to the general affect that when the administration, the executive branch, is of the same party as the Congress, there is a tendency on the part of the administration not necessarily to be more secretive than usual, but to feel there is no need to keep in close touch with the Senate, because the Senate is Democratic. In this case the Democratic Senate was expected to go along. The executive is prone to believe that party discipline is as tight--they hope it is as tight--as it is in a parliamentary system. I think we have an example of that during this last Congress. Mr. Reagan early in his administration expected Senator [Howard] Baker and the Republicans to go along with whatever Mr. Reagan proposed, and they did. But taking

the Senate for granted is not a very safe course for a president, even when he's dealing with members of his own party who are in a majority.

RITCHIE: Fulbright supported Johnson all through 1964, and pushed through the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. You returned later in '64.

MARCY: Yes, I think I got back in September or October of '64.

RITCHIE: When do you think that Senator Fulbright first began to have doubts about the wisdom of having supported the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and having supported the Vietnam policy? When do you think that he began to question the Vietnam program?

MARCY: I think he began to question it at the end of '64 or early '65. As I mentioned in our last interview, sometime after I got back from my year off,
Senator Fulbright said to me, "This situation in Asia is such that I guess I had better begin to pay some attention to it. I have always been interested in Europe, and followed events there, I know very little about the Far East. See what you can do to pull together information about the Far East." And we did. We got from the Library of Congress and elsewhere a number of books, usually French books about Indochina, and sometime during that year, ‘65, it may have been later, we had several individuals come in and talk with Senator Fulbright at great length. Bernard Fall, for example, used to stop by the Committee every time he came back. Fulbright developed an admiration for Bernard Fall, thought he was reliable. There were some people who suggested that Fall was an agent for the French. I don't think there was anything to that. When Bernard Fall was killed in Vietnam, his wife, Dorothy asked Senator Fulbright to speak at the memorial services that were held here for Bernard. I remember Fulbright being rather surprised that she asked him to do that, and I think he was honored. During that period Fulbright, being a person who reads and always immersed himself deeply in any subject that he was interested in, probably knew more about the history of Indochina, and French involvement there, than did even Mr. Rusk who had been Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs at an earlier time. Certainly during that particular period, Senator Fulbright had more time to look at things from a perspective based on his study of the area, than did Secretary of State Rusk or the people who were involved in the day-to-day operations. In fact, I think that’s perhaps a general governmental problem we have. As soon as a person becomes a policy official of the executive branch, he becomes so involved in making quick decisions on the basis of daily inputs that it’s hard to find time to contemplate, to recall history, and to see where our policies are going with any kind of perspective.

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**RITCHIE:** Did you find that you were doing more reading about Vietnam and Asia as well?

**MARCY:** Well, I wish I could say yes. But the fact is that I was so involved in the day-to-day operations that there wasn't a great deal of time to research, and read such books as *The Street Without Joy*. I participated in the meetings with Bernard Fall, and I think [Walter] La Coutoure who visited us one time and we talked with him, and other with Vietnam experience. I sat in on the meetings, but when it came time to read, to study, I didn't have it.

**RITCHIE:** Do you think this reading and studying began to change Fulbright’s perspective on Vietnam?
MARCY: I would have to say yes, but not very positively. Senator Fulbright is a sensitive person. I think he perceived early on that we were becoming involved in a civil war among peoples and societies with which we could not empathize. It's hard to know. He could have been influenced by the rising casualties. It could have been the break with Lyndon which came along at a subsequent time. He certainly was increasingly skeptical.

RITCHIE: I saw a memo in your files in which you questioned the domino theory at that time. That was interesting to me because the domino theory was one of the most powerful arguments that every administration, from Eisenhower on down, used for providing American aid to Vietnam: that if we allowed Vietnam to fall that it would set up a rippling effect across Asia. Yet both you and Senator Fulbright began to say that perhaps the domino theory was not a valid theory. I was wondering what it was that made you skeptical about it?

MARCY: It's hard for me to say. I do recall that Senator Fulbright at some point felt that there must be a better way. I believe it was the senator who suggested that we take a look at the Austrian model of neutrality, asking if it might be possible to look at Indochina and try to de-militarize it and keep it neutral as between the United States and the Soviet Union, or East and West. We did commission a study, which was done at Princeton by Professors Cyril Black and Richard Falk. It was designed to be a history of the concept of neutrality, and to see if the concept might be applicable in Asia. There was some difficulty in getting any scholars to look at neutrality in the Vietnam framework. There must be somewhere in my files some indication of other educational institutions to which I went trying to find somebody to do this job. We were authorized to pay for the research. I asked two or three places and they weren't interested. But Falk and Cy Black were interested, and they did the study. We hoped that it would have some impact on the administration, but so far as I know their study just disappeared. People were not interested. The general public was not interested in doing anything except keeping North Vietnam out of South Vietnam.

RITCHIE: One of the points you made in that memo was that the assumption was that if Vietnam fell automatically other nations would fall, but that perhaps withdrawing American troops might make other nations around Vietnam more dependent upon their own military resources and in fact put more emphasis on self-sufficiency. You mentioned Japan and some of the other nations in Asia. In some respects that seems to tie in with aid, that other nations were becoming too dependent on the United States and needed to be more self-reliant.
MARCY: Well, I hope I was that perceptive, but I don't honestly recall the connection you're making. So many of these things go on in the mind it's hard in many instances to know where an idea comes from, that you don't necessarily make the linkage between an idea and an event. Or I don't anyway; a historian may—that's one of your great advantages!

RITCHIE: Historians worry that they're making too much of the links, you see. We're looking for the links, but sometimes the connections are more accidental. We don't have a good way of accounting for chance and accidents in history. We think everything should be purposeful. Again, here's a linkage question. Early in 1965 in a totally different sphere, the Dominican Republican revolution broke out and Johnson made some rather extreme statements about decapitations and people firing at the American ambassador, and things like that, and sent Marines into the Dominican Republic. That incident seems to have raised doubts in Fulbright's mind and in the Committee, first off about the Dominican Republic situation, but also about the truthfulness of what information it was getting out of the administration in general. Some linkage has been suggested between what happened in the Dominican Republic and what happened in Vietnam. Could you talk about this from your perspective on the Committee staff?

MARCY: I think that it was mostly Senator Fulbright who was most concerned about our intervention in the Dominican Republic. As you know, we had some extensive hearings on it, and after those hearings the senator made a very strong speech critical—highly critical—of President Johnson. It was during that summer that I think the administration began to worry a little bit about what Senator Fulbright's attitude was. He was a bit too independent for them. It was that summer also when Fulbright was still very close to Johnson. To what extent he may have talked with Johnson about the Dominican Republic, I don't know. Have I told before about Johnson asking Fulbright to go to Rio?

RITCHIE: No.

MARCY: Well, let me make this connection, diverting from Vietnam for a moment. I believe it was in August 1965 that Senator Fulbright called me on a Monday morning and asked how would I like to go to Rio the next weekend. I said, "Fine, what's up?" He said,

"Well, Betty and I were having dinner last night with Lyndon and Lady Bird, and Lyndon said, 'Betty, how would you like to go to Rio next weekend?'" I recall he also said, "It's a wonderful place for you to go, Betty, because you can get jewels"
in Brazil at a very low price. It's a wonderful place to shop." All I can say about this is that this is in my mind, and it would be second or third hand, but I don't know how I could ever have gotten this idea had I not heard it from Senator Fulbright. And Lyndon said, "Take Air Force One." So the next weekend, we took Air Force One, and had a long weekend in Rio.

RITCHIE: There was no business attached to this trip?

MARCY: Well, yes. I think Lyndon felt that it was important for Senator Fulbright to talk with the Minister of Commerce. And we did, and we had a good briefing from the American ambassador and his staff.

RITCHIE: The four of you flew on Air Force One all by yourselves to Brazil?

MARCY: No. I remember when we got on Air Force One, Fulbright was quite surprised, because Lyndon had filled the plane up with the Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, with the head of the Export-Import Bank, and miscellaneous others. It was a relatively full plane. But if you are familiar with the contours of the plane, it was Senator Fulbright, Betty, and I who had the executive compartment at the front of the plane. These lowly assistant secretaries, the head of the Bank, and people like that were at the tail end of the plane. We flew back through Brazilia. On the way back, about the time we were over Miami, the captain of the crew came back and spoke with me privately and said, "We’re going to be about a half hour late. We’ve lost all power in the starboard outboard engine, but don’t tell anyone." Well, we made a safe landing, and nobody was fearful. Events like that have a tendency to focus the mind more than drawn out briefings. The reason that I avert to this now was because it shows that in August of that year Senator Fulbright was very close to Lyndon and was doing work for Lyndon. Most of the secret Dominican hearings were over by that time. Pat and Seth Tillman, shortly afterwards, put together the statement which Senator Fulbright delivered on the floor, which was highly critical of Lyndon, and that was what broke the relationship between the two.

RITCHIE: Fulbright, from what I understand, had hoped that that speech would not break their relations but would cause the administration to reevaluate their policy and change some of their gears. He hadn't anticipated it, from what I gather, being such a dramatic break. But Johnson took it in less than the spirit in which it was offered. Was it just that Johnson could not tolerate disagreement and dissent?
MARCY: I suspect that was part of it. Johnson was never a person who much liked dissent, even when he was majority leader, and maybe even earlier in his history. I remember quite well the discussion that I had with Senator Fulbright before he delivered that speech. Have I recounted that? I've recounted it several times and have seen other accounts. When the speech had been finished but was still in draft form, Senator Fulbright called me to his office one day. Present were his assistant, Lee Williams, as well as Pat Holt and Seth Tillman, who had done most of the work on the speech—just the four of us. We'd all read the speech and Senator Fulbright asked what we thought of it and whether he should deliver it. Both Pat and Seth said yes; Lee Williams and I thought he shouldn't. I said I thought if he delivered that speech it would bring about a severe break between him and President Johnson and that I thought it more important for him to keep a close relationship with Lyndon than to do anything that would break that relationship. I felt Fulbright still had access to and influence with the president, something one does not throw away lightly. But Fulbright cut me quite short. He said, "All I want to know, Carl, is whether you think this is a fair statement of what we found out during the hearings." And he added that he, the senator, would make the political judgment as to whether it was wise to make the speech. Lee Williams took the same position that I did. I think it was Lee who said, "The least you can do, Senator, is to send a copy of your speech to the president before you deliver it." But Fulbright had the speech in hand and delivered it the next day. I'm reasonably sure that no copy got into Lyndon's hands before the speech was made, and I doubt if the president would have had time to read it anyway. Continuing that incident, some months later, when it was clear that relations between Fulbright and President Johnson were in very bad shape and getting worse, I had a session with Secretary Rusk. I think there is an account of it somewhere in my notes. Secretary Rusk was very bitter about Senator Fulbright. He said, "You know, Fulbright would make a wonderful president of a university, but it's terrible to have him as chairman of the Committee." He was referring not only to the Dominican incident, but to a session at which Rusk had been present when there was a good bit of wrangling among Committee members. But in connection with the Dominican incident, Rusk was quite adamant saying, "All Bill had to do was to call me up and I would have given him the facts. Instead of that he's relying on these hearings you had." From then on, things went from bad to worse. There was never an improvement, although Senator Fulbright tried several times. One incident that I recall is that sometime later when Lyndon went to the hospital with some minor ailment, Fulbright used that as an opportunity to write Lyndon a note saying that "I've been in the hospital, too," or "Betty has been in the hospital and we understand, best wishes." He never got a reply from the president.
RITCHIE: Would you think that there was a strong link between Fulbright's speech on the Dominican situation and his growing skepticism about Vietnam? Do you think that he saw any parallels between the two situations?

MARCY: I don't know. I cannot recall any incident or conversation or statement that would suggest that. And in my mind the Dominican incident was quite separate from his attitude toward Vietnam.

RITCHIE: The only connection I can see to it, and the reason why I brought up the question, was because the gist of the Committee's report, and of Fulbright's speech was that the facts did not jive with the administration's position. This was quite a statement to make: that we're not getting the truth from the administration. I wondered then if the next step was: are we getting the truth from the administration on the Gulf of Tonkin and other things related to Vietnam?

MARCY: Don, I don't think so. It may have created a skepticism in Senator Fulbright's mind, but I don't remember any incident when Senator Fulbright ever questioned an executive branch witness on Vietnam in which he implied or said, "Are we getting the full story?" To continue, the only reason that Senator Fulbright got interested in investigating the Gulf of Tonkin incident was because of a small newspaper article which appeared in the Arkansas Gazette,

in which some seaman had come home and said it didn't happen quite the way it had been reported. That was some years later. It seems to me that Senator Fulbright's quarrel with the administration about our involvement in Vietnam was based on his concern as to whether the United States, by sending troops to Asia, could by military means handle what he more and more and more thought was essentially a civil war. It may be somewhere in the record that he expressed the view that he was not getting accurate information when Rusk and the Chiefs of Staff and [General William] Westmoreland testified, but I don't recall any such incidents.

RITCHIE: In January and February of 1966 the Committee held some very well publicized hearings, that turned into sort of "educational hearings" on Vietnam. It was the first real focus of attention, the first debate I guess, public debate on Vietnam. George Kennan testified, and Rusk, and administration and antiadministration spokesmen. I was wondering if you could give me some of the background of those hearings, how Fulbright and the Committee decided to launch these hearings?
**MARCY:** As I recall they started almost by accident when Secretary Rusk appeared before the Committee in connection with an aid bill. Fulbright took that opportunity to launch into a series of questions about our involvement in Vietnam. And there was quite an acerbic exchange. Mr. Rusk was obviously uncomfortable. I don't recall the sequence immediately after that, except to say the witnesses that I would have brought together only on at least the general instructions of Senator Fulbright. He probably said to me, "We ought to look into this further, get some views of people outside the government on the nature of our involvement in Vietnam, where we're going, what the future is." I'm sorry I can't be more helpful in making that connection.

**RITCHIE:** Was his purpose in part to educate the Congress and raise the issues, or was he hoping to spark a national debate or a national questioning of what was happening? This was still prior to the anti-war movement. If anything it was probably the launching of anti-war sentiment.

**MARCY:** Don, I think you used the wrong words when you suggest that Fulbright ran the hearings that we're talking about in order to "educate the public." What Fulbright was trying to do was to educate himself. He wanted to learn more. He wanted to learn more about what these other people were thinking and what they had to say. I don't think he contemplated the public attention those first hearings attracted. Now, I know that Fulbright later in his career talked a good deal about educational hearings and the use of the Committee for educational purposes, but I don't believe as of that time that he was thinking of using the hearings for educating anyone but himself. I don't mean by that to imply that he was a very selfish person, I think he was rather surprised that in the process of educating himself and those few members that he expected would come, that they would attract TV, press, and public attention. His feeling generally about hearings of this kind was, "Well, I doubt if any members will show up, but I want to learn what George Kennan has to say." The fact that they attracted attention at that time was because people were beginning to be worried. The press paid attention, which meant that senators showed up at the hearings--senators attract the press, and vice versa. Some members probably showed up because they thought, "Well, this Fulbright has got to be watched, checked up on." But I don't think that Fulbright's thoughts went beyond educational purpose for himself at that time.
RITCHIE: The media, CBS, took the unusual stance of actually televising the hearings live, at least the first ones when Kennan spoke. Was that strictly the media's decision?

MARCY: Oh, absolutely.

RITCHIE: There wasn't any lobbying on the Committee's part to try to get that kind of coverage?

MARCY: No. During the time I was with the Committee the myth got started that somehow I or someone could get the television people to come, or get the press to be there. I can't remember any instance when I ever tried to get the press there. There may have been a case when some senator said, "Gosh, can't you get some press coverage, or television coverage for this?" But I don't recall any such incident. The myth persists that the staff can manage hearings so as to get television people to be there. No, I have no doubt but what there are instances when somebody has said, "We're going to have a bang-up witness today, you guys better be there. " I never did that. They came. Once it started, it kept on rolling.

RITCHIE: The most famous thing about that wasn't what they televised, but that they didn't televise after a while. CBS got cold feet and ran an "I Love Lucy" rerun instead of one of the witnesses. I think that was when Fred Friendly resigned from CBS News as a result of that decision in 1966.

MARCY: I suspect, if you look into this, that you will find the reason CBS stopped covering the hearings was because of pressure from the administration. Someone there said, "Look, you fools, this is an unpatriotic thing to do," something like that. It's only a guess.

RITCHIE: The other interesting thing was that those hearings were published as a paperback edition.

MARCY: They published them almost verbatim.

RITCHIE: I can recall when I was teaching, in 1968, a course on contemporary United States history, we actually used those hearings as one of the readings in the class, because it was the verbatim testimony of both administration witnesses and anti-administration witnesses, for a classroom situation it was one of the few books that treated both sides relatively evenly and
wasn't too biased. But certainly it was unusual for congressional hearings to be reprinted in a commercial press. I think it was Vintage Press of Random House that published it.

**MARCY:** Who was the author who did that?

**RITCHIE:** Someone edited them, and I think that Senator Fulbright had an introduction to it. I'm really sorry that the volume isn't here.

**MARCY:** Well, I know the volume you're referring to, because I was interested for the same reason that you were interested. It was highly unusual for any commercial publisher to pick up and publish hearings that were already going to be published by the Government Printing Office [volume under reference: *The Vietnam Hearings*; with introduction by J. William Fulbright; Random House, 1966].

**RITCHIE:** That there was that much demand for them.

**MARCY:** There was that much demand for them, yes. I don't know whether Vintage Press made any money out of it or not.

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**RITCHIE:** Well, on college campuses it sold very well! I was wondering if you could spend a little time talking about some of the other members of the Committee at that period, some of your observations on them. We've talked a lot about Wayne Morse, for instance, one of the two senators who opposed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. You've mentioned him in passing, but could you tell me a little more about Morse as an individual and as a person to work with?

**MARCY:** In the framework of hearings, senators are in and out, not consistent in their attendance. The chairman usually has to be present. I knew Wayne Morse quite well, probably as well as any senator. I was never an intimate of his, but when he would sit down and talk with me about what he was going to do next it was clear he knew his own mind. I guess he tended to be viewed by members as a gadfly. He knew he was considered a gadfly, but he was considerate of other members. I remember one conversation with him, he said "I make long speeches," but he said, "when I make a long speech I try to do it late in the day, when there won't be any roll calls, and other senators can go their way, but I just want to get the material in the Record." He would stand on the Senate floor hours at a time putting material in the Record and expressing his views. I suppose maybe that's, as with some people, that's the way he thought. He thought on his feet.
If you want to move ahead to the time of the Gulf of Tonkin hearings, I can pick up Morse on that. Much of the material was secret—gathered in executive session. One of our last hearings, for example, was with Robert McNamara just a few days before he left to go to the World Bank. That was a secret hearing. But on the basis of the work which had been done by principally Bill Bader on our staff, classified documents, and the hearings, and other people we had talked to, we did produce a committee report which was classified. Senator Morse came to me after the report had been circulated in classified form, as I recall, and wanted to know why we could not make this public. I said that we had a commitment to the administration that we would not publish it because it included classified material. Senator Morse said that he was a United States senator and he could do what he wanted, but he did not want to jeopardize the security interests of the United States in any way. He asked me to go over this confidential report and take out anything that I thought would be damaging to the national interest. He said that he would then put the report in the Congressional Record as his own account of what the Committee had found, which was what he did. So the Wayne Morse speech at the end of the Tonkin hearings is a case in which a senator consciously declassified and made public something that the Committee had made a commitment in a sense to the administration not to do. Normally, if a classified committee report was to be made public, the report would be submitted to the executive branch so it could excise material they felt was of a security nature. In this case, Morse was very clear. I was not to submit it to the administration. It was going to be my judgment as to what should be taken out. And as I recall there was very little taken out of that report.

RITCHIE: How would you describe Morse's influence on the Committee?

MARCY: Not particularly effective. Respected by other Committee members, but I'm sorry to say that I don't think he was very effective in influencing members on their votes. He did some interesting things in the way of amendments he put in at various times on the aid bills. I recall at one point he said, "If we're going to have military assistance to the Latin American countries," which was where he was particularly interested at the time, he said, "let's have an amendment that says all this military aid must be provided by the United States Corps of Engineers. They can build dams and they can build roads, and that's a good thing, and it does not mean they're going to load the recipient countries up with weapons and teach them how to engage in military operations. They're the best engineering corps in the world. Let the aid be in that pattern." I don't remember what happened to that amendment, but that does stick in my mind as one of the things he tried to do.
RITCHIE: Morse strikes me as a very intelligent man, who was often right on the mark when it came to issues, but I get the feeling that he squandered the influence he could have had by his public antics and gadfly approach, and perhaps his personality. Is that a relatively reasonable interpretation?

MARCY: I think that's fair. I don't know that I would add to it. In an interesting way, he and Senator Humphrey were much the same. They were both men who had so much to do in life they could never get anything done, which I suppose is a characteristic of a gadfly.

RITCHIE: What qualities, do you think, in a senator really were appreciated and made them effective as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee?

MARCY: One of the most effective senators on the Committee during the time that I was there was Senator [Jacob] Javits. He was effective because he had an organized mind. He could organize the miscellany of conversations that went on. As you will have seen from the transcripts of executive and mark-up sessions, a lot of things are thrown on the table and then usually the discussion would get to the point where the chairman would turn to me and say, "Well, Carl, write it up," or "include it in the report." And it was very confusing to know what in the dickens the Committee had really done! Often times Senator Fulbright was more considerate of me and would ask Senator Javits to summarize the discussion, put it in a form that could be used. Javits was very good at that. Now, I realize that's not quite in response to your question of influence.

RITCHIE: But there's a member of the minority party who was of service to the majority.

MARCY: That's right.

RITCHIE: I get the feeling that George Aiken, while perhaps not an idea-man, was an influential member of the Committee, from looking at the way his comments were used.

MARCY: Yes. Well, this is a hard question to answer, Don. Most members were influential in different kinds of way. Senator Symington had a certain kind of an input, and Senator [Albert] Gore had another kind. The chairman and members of the staff realized that they all had very significant inputs. Some senators would participate but never seemed to have very much effect. Senator [Frank] Lausche, for example, loveable, but I don't think that you see his imprint in anything that
the Committee might have done. But yet a Symington might throw out an idea, or
a Javits, or a Gore, and it would be picked up and incorporated in whatever the
Committee was doing and would have significance. But during all the time I was
there, there were very few instances in which--now I'm thinking legislatively--in
which an amendment was introduced and adopted and

thereafter became known as the so-and-so amendment. Senator [Charles] Percy
did it at one time, there is a Percy amendment. Is there a Symington
amendment? Or is there a Morse amendment? Or is there a Gore amendment?

RITCHIE: There was a Hickenlooper amendment. That's a famous one.

MARCY: Yes. That's about it. Considering the time I was there, it's rather
unusual that there have been only a few instances.

RITCHIE: Do you attribute this to Fulbright's idea of the Committee as a
totality?

MARCY: I do, yes. I think the members thought of themselves as a totality, and
there was a very freewheeling exchange between them. Minds were changed. Very
few members enunciated an idea, and stuck with it, and by golly you couldn't
change them. One could almost always predict where Lausche would come out,
but Morse was persuasive and Morse could be persuaded. So there was a
camaraderie, freewheeling, very little dogmatism. When Fulbright began to worry
about the role of foreign aid in foreign policy, he tried to persuade the Committee
members. But real acrimony never developed as a result of that.

RITCHIE: That certainly fits the things that I've been reading in the executive
sessions. About the only time that I've seen a

really acrimonious debate--and I've only read up through 1961--was the report
over the U-2 incident, and I think that has largely come down to a political issue
of support for the Republican president in a presidential election year, and
criticism by a Democratic majority, and concern over official lying in public, and
things like that. There's the only place that I've gotten any sense of short tempers
and breaking down of the bipartisan mood that prevails over so much of the
hearings. But I haven't read the Vietnam era transcripts and I wondered if the
mood changed at all when Fulbright broke with the administration and Vietnam
began to divide the nation?

MARCY: No, I think the mood stayed very much the same. I attribute this not
only to the quality of the membership, but to the fact that Senator Fulbright was

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an educator, in a sense. As I mentioned earlier, Rusk said he should be a college president. I think maybe Rusk did hit it right. Fulbright educated the Committee, slowly. I never heard him cut anyone off. This business of the powerful chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, implying that the chairman was a tyrant who controlled everything, when would the Committee meet, what subjects would come up, how people would act, what would come out. He wasn't that kind of person at all. He listened, he'd try to educate. At some point I remember Senator Symington coming to me after he had changed his attitude with respect to our involvement in Vietnam and said something to general effect that "Carl, I've changed my position, and the reason was because Bill educated me. I've learned." For a former secretary of the Air Force to have been exposed to the Fulbright school of foreign policy and admit that it had an impact on him, says much about Fulbright-Symington is not the kind of person anyone would be inclined to whip around at all; Senator Gore was very much the same way. What happens in a committee, or happened in that Committee, was that judgments are developed about how particular people, how senators will act in given situations. Senator Fulbright at one point said to me, "You can't count on Frank Church. You can count on Senator Gore, you can count on Senator Symington." What he meant was that if Symington or Gore or Hickenlooper said they were going to do so-and-so, they'd do it. They would support him on the floor on an amendment or whatever it might be. Fulbright was never sure of Senator Church. Always the implication being, without his every having said it, that Senator Church was a bit of an opportunist. If that meant that he had to change his position or create a doubt about something maybe Fulbright had been led to believe he was firm on, he'd shift. I don't think of any others. Maybe that should stay off the record.

RITCHIE: Oh, I think that's a very good observation.

MARCY: I might leave that.

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RITCHIE: We've been talking now for about an hour and a half. MARCY: Oh, let's stop, I'm hungry!

[End of Interview #5]
RITCHIE: We were talking, the last time, about the mid-1960s, and looking through your memoranda I noticed that you met at that time regularly with a man named Igor Bubnov, who was the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy. There is a whole series of your conversations with him. I wondered what the purpose of that series was and if you could tell me a little bit about your conversations, and why you held them on such a regular basis?

MARCY: Don, you're going to have to jog my memory more than that. I hadn't thought of the name Bubnov for a long time, but I recognize it. I don't have any recollection of what we talked about. Let me say this, I'm reasonably sure that it was an initiative from Bubnov's side, because there wouldn't have been any reason that I can think of why I or the Committee would have initiated any discussions with him.

RITCHIE: They tended to be quite a bit about Vietnam, and about the United Nations. This was 1967, 1968, I guess. I found it interesting, especially in light of our conversation last week about your visiting the Soviet Embassy, that there seemed to be a regular
channel, at least for a while, and I wondered if that was fairly common in your career, or was that an unusual circumstance?

**MARCY:** Don, I don't recall if there was any unusual circumstance. I remember in connection with conversations with people in the Soviet Embassy it was the general practice to keep a record of any conversation we had with any one in the Soviet Embassy, for our own record keeping purposes. We almost invariably told the Department of State of meetings that we had so there was some record in official channels that we were talking with the Russians. But the purpose was not to get particular information from them, or to communicate things which they had to say to us. Can you give me an idea of what some of the memoranda may have been about?

**RITCHIE:** There were some about continuing the "Spirit of Glassboro," for instance. I wondered if it was tied into the idea of keeping relations with the Soviet Union on a fairly positive course at a time we were fighting in Vietnam, if there was any connection there?

**MARCY:** That doesn't ring a bell with me at all. I guess, now that I look back, it would make sense to try to do that, but I don't recall that we had that as a purpose.

**RITCHIE:** It may be that the meetings weren't quite as regular as they seemed in the memos, but there were several of them that ran through that period.

**MARCY:** Well, I guess you'll have to look elsewhere for enlightenment!

**RITCHIE:** There was a lot of discussion in the memos on the United Nations and its role in Vietnam. Could we move from there to talking about the United Nations? Considering your earlier interests in the United Nations were you disappointed in the United Nations' activities related to Vietnam, or lack of focus on Vietnam? Or did you think there was any way the United Nations could have focused on Vietnam?

**MARCY:** No. Probably, during that period, the administration and Secretary Rusk were making a point of the fact that we were not alone in Vietnam. I remember testimony from the secretary on several occasions in which he referred to the number of states that were helping us. He at one point spoke of fifteen or twenty states that were supporting us. Of course, the Australians were quite active in Vietnam during at least part of that period of time. But I do remember one subsequent incident which interested me. That was: a few years after Secretary Rusk had spoken of the nations that were helping us, Pat Holt, in...
checking through an aid program one year, discovered that one of the nations helping was Colombia. As he looked

into the matter, he did discover that the Colombians had helped us in Vietnam, but that it had been in the nature of the United States supplying an aircraft to the Colombians, painting the Colombian Air Force insignia on the aircraft, loading the plane up with officers of the Colombian armed forces and their wives, putting some Red Cross supplies in the hold, and taking off for Vietnam; with—again as I recall—a stop of two or three days outward bound in Hawaii, and the return trip with stops for a similar period of time in Hong Kong. That was one of the things that created great skepticism in my mind—the propensity the administration had for describing the numbers of states that were supporting us in Vietnam, and leaving the impression that the international community was backing us extensively. But when it came right down to one or two specific examples, there wasn’t much. It might be worthwhile for someone, sometime to check out with those governments and see actually what they did to help us in Vietnam.

RITCHIE: Well, we have an example now where the invasion of Grenada seems to be in violation of international law, the Rio Pact and the United Nations. The United States seems to have gotten to the point where it really doesn’t even conceive of operating through the United Nations. Do you think that this was pretty much the way it was in the 1960s?

MARCY: I think that’s right. I started out being a great supporter of the role of the United Nations in international relations, and being pleased when Harry Truman went into Korea and did it under the auspices of the United Nations. As a matter of fact, the forces in South Korea today still fly a UN flag. But subsequent to Korea, somehow the United Nations just didn’t seem to be terribly important. And our government was not making use of the United Nations except as it served our purposes. As I look back over that period, it was interesting to see that at one point we—the United States—used to boast of the fact that we had never vetoed a resolution in the Security Council, and the Soviets were always vetoing resolutions. I think we were supporting the United Nations as long as it seemed to be consistent with the policies that we supported. It was during that period of time that the United Nations began expanding vastly in numbers of members. It started out with around fifty members and it’s gone up to over a hundred now as new states came in after they had acquired independence. The nature of the organization was changing, whereas first it had been almost an instrument of United States foreign policy, it was gradually no longer such an instrument because we were not able to have our way as much as we had hoped to, or had gotten accustomed to in the earlier time. I suppose if you were to look at the
record over the last ten years, you probably would find that the United States has vetoed more measures in

the Security Council than has the Soviet Union, almost a complete reversal. Cause and effect? Hard to say. Something for historians to examine.

RITCHIE: Getting back into the Vietnam issue, and Fulbright and the Committee, when I was looking through your memos I came across a letter you wrote to Chalmers Roberts in 1967, with a wonderful quote in it. You said: "Rusk tends to be a missionary and Fulbright a historian-philosopher. Rusk wants to force change or use force to keep change within control. Fulbright tends more to see change as an evolutionary process." It seems to me that that summarized so much of what you've been saying. Would you still ascribe to that view of the difference between the two men?

MARCY: Yes, that sounds much more astute than I recall myself being at any time! But I think that is an accurate reflection of Fulbright's attitude at that time, and probably was reflecting my own to some extent. I suppose it's the distinction today between the soft-liners and the hard-liners, between the evolutionists and those who think international relations can be controlled by a superpower. I think what happened, Don, was that the United States, isolationist before World War II, came out of the war rather surprised to find it was the greatest, most powerful nation in the world. We had become the leader of the Free World without our having sought leadership. I think what was surprise at first gradually came to be accepted, and perhaps by now even welcomed. I think for a while the leadership role in which we had been cast became almost a religion. We felt a responsibility, we accepted the responsibility, and then we in time resented it when largely through the development of nuclear weaponry it became clear that we could not have our way everywhere, and that there was another power that was in a position to challenge us—not only to challenge us, but to threaten us for the first time in our homeland. I think that one still finds that division, if you could call it that, in attitudes as to what the role of the United States is. There is still evidence, there is evidence in the present administration, that there's a group in the United States that will not be satisfied until it is clear that there is one superpower, and maybe another power is not quite as super as we are. The actions we have seen in the last week, the invasion of Grenada, or the position which we are taking with respect to Nicaragua, indicates that that philosophy still exists and is perhaps in a time of ascendancy.
My general philosophy is that most of United States foreign policy--let's call them aberrations--are temporary aberrations and that the pendulum swings back again. I don't know, coming back to your earlier point about the United Nations, whether we're ever going to swing back into thinking the United Nations is going to serve United States purposes in general. I think making the UN universal almost automatically created a Third World which we cannot manage, even though we still try.

RITCHIE: Fulbright represented that evolutionary change attitude, but it seems that the Foreign Relations Committee as a whole basically adopted that outlook. He wasn't that far removed from the other members of the Committee. Is there a sort of a natural selection in the Senate that senators who believe in military solutions wind up serving on the Armed Services Committee, and senators who are inclined towards diplomatic, evolutionary approaches to world policies wind up on the Foreign Relations Committee? Or does membership on those committees begin to perhaps influence the people who serve on them?

MARCY: There is an initial selection made by senators who want to be on one committee or another--and that depends upon a variety of things. If a senator is from a farm state he wants to be on the Agriculture Committee. And I suppose that for the period when Fulbright was chairman, new senators came in, and knowing of his reputation, wanted to be on that committee, even though they might disagree with him. But you also make a subsidiary point which I think is very valid, and that is: once a senator is on a committee, he tends to be influenced by the nature of the business that comes before the committee. Fulbright, over a period of years, was able to--let's say--educate members who came onto the Committee. When they came as a junior member they looked to him as the most experienced. And Fulbright always thought of himself as an educator. Going over the executive transcripts, and maybe even the public

transcripts, one will find a good many instances in which another senator would say to Senator Fulbright, "Well, Senator, you've convinced me," or "You have educated me," or "I have gradually come around to your point of view." I think specifically of Senator Symington saying that, but that's just one that sticks in my mind. For a senator to admit to another senator that the second senator has educated him is rare. One may be educated, but one doesn't like to admit it. To admit that one of your colleagues may have changed your point of view on something is awkward.

RITCHIE: Symington for a long time was one of the few members of the Committee who really had a military bent, or background, having been Secretary of the Air Force, but in the 1960s, with the break with the administration,
there any pressure to put some hard-liners on the Committee, to have more of a
voice for the Johnson administration on the Committee?

**MARCY:** I don't know of any such pressure. I would not normally have felt it.
Pressure to put an individual on the Foreign Relations Committee would have
been exercised through the Democratic or Republican leadership. I do believe
that during the latter part of the '60s there was a conscious effort for the
Republicans to put on the Committee senators who were of a hard-line
persuasion than Senator Fulbright. I think, for example, of the senator from
Pennsylvania . . .

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**RITCHIE:** Hugh Scott?

**MARCY:** Hugh Scott. And the senator from Michigan, [Robert] Griffin. There
may have been one or two others. When they came on the Committee they
represented quite a different point of view than the Committee had been
accustomed to.

**RITCHIE:** In what way?

**MARCY:** Well, in the sense of tightening up party lines. It seemed to me during
the '60s the Committee seldom divided along party lines. I think Fulbright was a
little ahead of the thinking of most members--ahead in the sense of being more
skeptical of military power as a foreign policy tool. But most of the members
seemed to agree with his general approach, and it was not until the Scotts and the
Griffins came along that there was more evidence of party discipline, party
influencing of the thinking of members of the Committee. Indeed, it was after
Griffin and Scott came on the Committee that for the first time that provision of
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, with respect to staff, was applied. I'm
referring to the provision which said that if a majority of the minority wants to
have a staff person assigned to the minority, they may do so. I don't remember
when that authority was first exercised, but it must have been 1970 or '71, it was
very late in the period of time when I was with the Committee.

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**RITCHIE:** Did that cause some problems for you, setting up a minority staff?

**MARCY:** Well, it caused some anguish when it was done the first time. But the
anguish was mitigated by the fact that Senator Aiken and I had a close
relationship. He was then the ranking minority Republican. He normally stopped
by my office on the way to the Senate floor. He would show up about 11:30 or
11:45, and we would chat about Committee business and any other thing that
came to our minds. When the Republican minority caucused--I'm talking about
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the Committee minority—and decided to ask to have a staff person assigned specifically to the minority, I was a bit anguished when that decision was made known to me. But the day after the decision was made, Senator Aiken stopped in my office and said, "I know this probably bothers you, but the minority authorized me to pick a staff member who would serve the minority and authorized me to go out and hire such a person if necessary. I want you to know that I have picked Robert Dockery to represent the minority." Well, Dockery was a staff member and had been for a number of years, so there was really no change. Communication between Dockery and me and the other members of the staff was very much the same. There was little partisanship that entered at that point. But it did satisfy a distinct feeling on the part of the minority that they needed to have somebody with whom they could communicate and confide, a feeling that the other members of the staff tended to work mostly for the majority.

And that's characteristic. The majority does have the controlling votes. When reports are done, and there are minority views, there is concern that their views are not reflected perhaps as much as they should be.

RITCHIE: You had the Republican hard-liners coming on, but it seems to me there were a couple of Democratic hard-liners who came along at that point. I was thinking about Tom Dodd of Connecticut. He joined the Committee in the mid-60s.

MARCY: Yes.

RITCHIE: Could you give me an assessment of him? I'm curious in the sense that his son is now a member of the Committee, but seems to take a different approach.

MARCY: I can't give you much of an assessment of Senator Dodd. We had a good relationship. I certainly was conscious that he was harder-line than most members, but it did seem to me that he devoted most of his time and attention to the Judiciary Committee. I don't feel that his presence was as disruptive—that's too strong a word—worrisome as the subsequent period of time when Scott and Griffin came on on the Republican side.

RITCHIE: Going back again to the problems of the Vietnam war. Did you find that in 1967 and 1968, as the relations between the administration and the Committee really worsened, that it became
difficult to get administration witnesses to testify on Vietnam, and to make
themselves as available as they had been before?

MARCY: Yes, it did become more difficult. There was more persuading to be
done. I had to insist that we get witnesses. Certainly, Lyndon Johnson was not
very cooperative with the Foreign Relations Committee after the break between
him and Fulbright. I think there was a reluctance to testify. It's one thing if the
Committee sides with the administration. Then witnesses are a dime a dozen. But
if the witnesses have to show up and display their wares before a skeptical forum,
they don't like that so much. It's a little more awkward to get them. I don't recall
any instance when we had a knock-down drag-out fight about getting witnesses.
There were a number of awkward situations that developed, however. It became
much more difficult, for example, to persuade the executive branch to provide
aircraft for senators to travel abroad, perhaps a minor point but nevertheless it's
one of those things that conveys a certain prestige to travel in Air Force One or
Air Force Two, or a jet, as distinct from an old propeller aircraft.

RITCHIE: I heard there was an incident where President Johnson appointed a
committee--I think he sent Senator Mansfield to Vietnam aboard an air force jet,
at the same time Senator Fulbright was going to a parliamentary meeting in New
Zealand.

MARCY: That's right.

RITCHIE: And Fulbright went on an old prop plane and Mansfield took the air
force jet to Vietnam.

MARCY: That was very interesting. I think Senator Morse was going on that
trip, too. I had a real struggle with the administration to get any aircraft at all.
But at that time I guess Mansfield was still pretty gung-ho in support of the
United States in Vietnam. He was majority leader and he felt a certain obligation
there, and he had a good relationship with President Johnson. Fulbright certainly
did not; and Senator Morse certainly did not. So even though Morse and
Fulbright were of the same party as the president, there was no way that you
could see the close relationship between the Democratic president and those
particular Democratic senators.

RITCHIE: Did Fulbright express much regret over his deteriorating with
Johnson?

MARCY: No, not to me. He accepted it. I'd have to say that he was sorry that the
relationship had broken, but I never detected any feeling on his part that it could
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have been any other way. He, so far as I know, never resented having spoken his piece about the Dominican Republic, and his increasing critical attitude towards our involvement in Vietnam. He spoke out. I know he did try to make his peace with Johnson several time, but it was clear that there was no peace there. I think Fulbright made an effort, but it got nowhere with Johnson whatsoever.

RITCHIE: One other official that interests me at that time was the National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy. It seems to me that about the Kennedy/Johnson period the National Security Advisor really began to come into his own as a prominent figure and getting more attention, and yet unlike State Department officials he was immune from the Senate. He didn't have to go up for confirmation, and he wasn't called to testify. Was there any sense of frustration on the Committee's part that there was a key person in the foreign policy decision making who was beyond their touch and who wouldn't testify?

MARCY: Yes, there was. The administration was adamant that the National Security Advisor was not to be a witness before the Foreign Relations Committee. That continued; it continues today. When [Henry] Kissinger became National Security Advisor under President Nixon, Senator Fulbright and he and I did arrange several private meetings with Kissinger. However, he never came to the Committee. We met one time at Senator Fulbright's home; we met several times at the Court of Claims Building off Lafayette Square. But we never met in the White House with the Security Advisor as a Committee, and never met with the Security Advisor on the Hill in the Committee offices.

RITCHIE: Were there any kind of informal meetings with Bundy when he was Security Advisor?

MARCY: I don't recall any. It may have been that Bundy came to see Fulbright from time to time, or individual members, but I don't know. And I think the same thing probably was true with respect to Kissinger. Kissinger did see Senator Fulbright privately in his offices from time to time, but he never appeared before the Committee, to the best of my recollection. I always have to say to the best of my recollection, Don, just to be sure that you don't have a memo that indicates that my memory is weaker than it sometimes seems.

RITCHIE: Well, actually it's been nice that the interviews can go along with those memos, because I think those memos are going to be a really fine research tool for people doing foreign policy studies, and in effect what we've been able to do is to follow the series along and talk about some of the highlights in them. Certainly, in terms of my formulating questions, it's helpful to be able to brief myself by reading them.
MARCY: Well, I have been wondering if I ought to refresh my recollection by going over those memos before we continue. But if you don't mind taking the memory the way it comes back, and you do the refreshing, that's fine with me.

RITCHIE: I think that's a good system.

MARCY: All right.

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RITCHIE: To refer to a memo in this case, one that interested me was a list of suggestions you made back in 1966 to Senator Fulbright about proposed hearings for 1967. One that you suggested was a hearing on a constitutional amendment to define the war powers of Congress and the presidency. It strikes me that this is the beginning of the rumblings for a War Powers Act. I wondered if you could talk about the problem of war powers as Vietnam defined it, and some of the concerns within the Committee, as well as your own concerns.

MARCY: I think, Don, I was reflecting the increasing concern of the Committee about our involvement in Vietnam. That increasing concern was a reflection of the constituencies pressures that were being brought to bear on the senators. Senator Fulbright became more and more concerned about how to get out of Vietnam. In the earlier period he was not so much worried about how to get out of Vietnam as to how we settled the situation. That's when we went through this exercise that I mentioned earlier when he was searching for some means whereby we might neutralize the Indochinese area from possible confrontations of the kind we were involved in. But I don't recall specifically talking about the war power at that time. It must have come up because it was clear that we were in a war, and we were beginning to question how much authority the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution had in fact transferred to the president.

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RITCHIE: It was an early reference to something that would develop later on.

MARCY: Yes.

RITCHIE: Were there any checks that the Committee could have imposed that it wasn't on the presidency? There was no declaration of war, but was there any other action open to the Committee at that stage?

MARCY: I don't think so. The Committee was powerless. The funds for waging the war came from other committees and other sources. There was no monetary limitation that the Committee could initiate. It was on record with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. With American boys involved in a foreign land the feeling was you can't back away from them. You can't leave them there. Very much the same.
situation that President Reagan is now facing with respect to the Marines [in Lebanon]. The decision is made, they're there, and then there is this patriotic instinct that you can't lose in war, you can't back away. If you do, all the men who have died, have died in vain. I guess they don't die in vain if they win a war. It was just that. It was an inhibition which grows out of patriotic nationalism.

I mentioned earlier that during this period, as Fulbright became more and more critical of American involvement in Vietnam, he had a rule that he would not travel abroad. He felt that if he went abroad he would inevitably be questioned, and he was not the kind of person who wanted to be put in a spot in which he would have to express an opinion in a foreign country which was at loggerheads with the position that our government was taking. So he didn't travel. I should put in a footnote here, because he was criticized for not having gone to Vietnam. I remember a number of instances in which people would say: "How can Fulbright be critical of Vietnam? He's never even been there." Well, he was there at some time, but it was much earlier. It was in the late '50s, I guess. I was not with him at that time, but he had been in Vietnam at an earlier time. But he didn't feel it was necessary to go to Vietnam in order to understand what was happening.

RITCHIE: Senator Fulbright became something of a hero to the anti-war movement, because he was an establishment figure who early on spoke out against the war, and questioned it. Did you have any contacts with the growing anti-war movement in 1967 and 1968? Did the Committee feel any pressure from them?

MARCY: When we did get into hearings that involved some aspect of Vietnam, there were always a few public witnesses who we always heard, but the public witnesses never carried very much impact. I think if you look at the record you will find that there were not any very distinguished public witnesses. The "best and the brightest," in the words of David Halberstam, were either in the administration or very quiet. I don't mean to reflect on those who testified, but there were no former Secretaries of State, or Secretaries of Defense, or big businessmen, people of that kind, who were coming around to testify in criticism of our involvement in Vietnam. It was not until, and you'll have to supply the date, until the March on Washington [Moratorium] . . . .

RITCHIE: 1969.

MARCY: At that time Senator Fulbright did meet with a group of the protestors. I recall a Navy officer who assumed a leading position in that protest. My best
recollection is that Fulbright met this officer--I think--at some social function during that period of time. I remember Fulbright coming to me the next morning and saying he had invited the officer to appear before the Foreign Relations Committee the next day and asking me to get the notices out and get the senators there. It was a quick decision that he made. Again, my recollection is that that was a very significant hearing at that particular moment, well covered by television, well covered by the press. That's what sticks in my mind.

RITCHIE: Do you recall him ever expressing any feelings or opinions about the teach-ins and the protests and the student antiwar demonstrations that were going on at that time?

MARCY: No, I don't.

RITCHIE: One of the interesting people of the Committee, who came on in the 1960s, was Eugene McCarthy. I gather that you worked with him on a number of projects. He came to personify the anti-war movement by 1968. What type of a person was McCarthy when he was a member of the Committee?

MARCY: Always stimulating, democratic with a small I'd," very concerned. I remember when Gene McCarthy decided to run for president, it was during a hearing in the new Senate Office Building. I don't recall who the witness was. It probably was Secretary Rusk. It may have been McNamara, probably was Secretary Rusk. It became clear that Senator McCarthy had had it. He stood up and stomped out of the hearing room into the back office. I could see he was distraught, so I got up and followed him out. One of the press people, Ned Kenworthy of the New York Times saw what was happening, and he got up and left. McCarthy and I walked out into the hall, and Ned Kenworthy was there. About all I remember of that conversation was McCarthy saying, "Someone's got to take them on. And if I have to run for president to do it, I'm going to do it." Just flat out. I think that Ned Kenworthy will remember that conversation, because he and I talked about it several times. It was the first indication that McCarthy, so far as I know, without any backing whatsoever, would run. But he said he had had it. McCarthy is still around, you know. You might want to do an interview with him. He's just survived a heart attack. It would be interesting to see if he remembers that particular point.

RITCHIE: Speaking of his presidential campaign, what did you think of his attempt to take on Lyndon Johnson? Did you see it as a quixotic affair, or did you take it seriously?
**Marchy:** Well, as time went on people obviously took it more and more seriously. I was not involved in the campaign. I liked the idea, however. I felt very badly that he didn't get the nomination. I have always felt that if McCarthy had been nominated he would have defeated Nixon. But that's only a feeling, I don't know what the polls would show. It always seemed to me, too, that if Humphrey had been able to separate himself more completely from Johnson's position on Vietnam, he would probably have defeated Nixon.

**Ritchie:** McCarthy has something of a reputation of a poet and a dreamer, was he a man for hard realities as well, or was he intellectually removed from realities?

**Marchy:** I never felt he was intellectually removed from realities. I thought he was a pretty smart fellow. I guess if you are sensitive, have poetic instincts, and a quick wit, that does not necessarily mean that you're separated from reality. I was always a great admirer of Gene McCarthy.

**Ritchie:** One of the issues that he took on in the mid-60s was the whole question of more congressional supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency. I think he put in some of the first resolutions to pursue that. That looked like something you had an interest in as well, and I wondered if you worked with him at all on that.

**Marchy:** Yes, I did. At an earlier time Senator Mansfield had made a move in that direction. Then at a later time I did work with Senator McCarthy in drafting legislation to exercise more supervision over the intelligence agency. Again, that didn't go anywhere.

**Ritchie:** Were you becoming increasingly concerned about the role of the CIA in foreign policy in the '60s?

**Marchy:** Yes, although it's hard to pinpoint any particular incident. It was during that period that I first began to be aware of the extent to which CIA employees had infiltrated the career foreign service of the United States. Infiltrate may not be quite the right word, because I think it was done with the consent of the State Department, but many of the officers stationed in foreign countries were not employed by the Department of State, they were employees of the Central Intelligence Agency. At one time, we did get figures on the number of CIA employees, as contrasted with the numbers of State Department-paid employees, in several embassies overseas. I remember being quite shocked at the time by the fact that in several of the embassies there were nearly as many CIA people
on the payroll as there were foreign service people, although they were all listed as foreign service officers. They had rank and diplomatic status in the countries to which they were accredited. So I was worried about that infiltration of the foreign service by the CIA.

RITCHIE: Did you think there were other members of the Committee who shared your concerns?

MARCY: I don’t recall anyone but Senator McCarthy who was particularly concerned about it. I think they were surprised. But the CIA was a different department, in a sense. The Committee didn’t feel that it had any—-in fact the Committee did not have any-jurisdictional supervision over the Central Intelligence Agency, anymore than we had, say, over the Department of Defense. The Committee’s department was the Department of State, and as long as State was not fussing about it, the Committee didn’t fuss. The Committee tended to look at the CIA and the Department of Defense as agencies which would appear before the Committee once or twice a year to provide information in the area of intelligence or in the area of military defense, as sort of separate from what the diplomats were doing; they were a supplementary source of information.

RITCHIE: Did anyone in the Department of State ever express concern to you about the increasing role of the Central Intelligence Agency?

MARCY: I suspect that there were some who did, but I do not remember any specific instance. There should have been. I guess I’m speculating, I just can’t speak of specific cases.

RITCHIE: Well, one of the big turning points in the Vietnam war was the Tet Offensive at the end of January 1968. The big North Vietnamese/Viet Cong offensive all over Vietnam. Do you recall what kind of an impact this had on yourself and on the members of the Foreign Relations Committee?

MARCY: There was increasing concern, certainly my reaction by that time was what a disaster area Vietnam was turning out to be. This tended to underline my feeling, and that of increasing numbers of Committee members, that there was no light at the end of the tunnel.

RITCHIE: Then by the end of April 1968, Lyndon Johnson withdrew from the presidential race. Was there any thawing of tensions between Johnson and Fulbright, and between the administration and the Committee, once Johnson was no longer an active candidate and was committed to negotiations on Vietnam?
**MARCY:** No, I don't think there was any thawing at all. I think there was pleasure on the part of some of the Committee members after Secretary McNamara left and Clark Clifford came in. Clark Clifford had a very good relationship with members of the Committee. There was a feeling that he was not necessarily dovish but more rational, less committed to carrying on the war in Vietnam, and was looking for a way out. I think that was a very common feeling at the time. I know Fulbright had a number of conversations with Clifford during that period. It was during that period that word got out that we were going to step up the number of troops in Vietnam again. Whether that was before Johnson--I guess that must have been just before Johnson decided not to run. Fulbright became very worried about that and talked with Clark Clifford and a number of others about what a mistake it was. That was also a time when we had just finished our investigative hearings on the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which occupied a good bit of time. We were trying to find out what had happened. It was almost history at that time. We had a very difficult time getting McNamara to testify before the Committee. He did, just a day or so before he left office.

**RITCHIE:** Clifford, as a new member of the cabinet, was able to make overtures to the Committee and build some bridges. Do you think that Rusk by that stage was just embittered over his relationship and nothing would have changed?

**MARCY:** I think that's correct.

**RITCHIE:** Was the Committee at all kept informed on what was happening in the Paris negotiations with Averell Harriman and Cyrus Vance?

**MARCY:** I don't think so. A couple of people on the staff, maybe Jim Lowenstein and [Richard] Moose, were they still there then?

**RITCHIE:** I think so.

**MARCY:** They were still on the Committee. They may have kept in contact with the negotiations. I seem to recall several memos that I did at that time, making suggestions.

**RITCHIE:** Mentioning Lowenstein and Moose and others, the Committee staff was growing in the 1960s, as the Committee's interests were growing. How did this affect your functioning as staff director?
MARCY: It stayed very much the same. Lowenstein and Moose had their area of responsibility. They worked well with each other. They did their reports. They testified before the Committee in executive session after each of their visits to Vietnam. They’re not the kind of people who need supervision. They were both former Department of State career officers. They were attuned to the kinds of things that I needed to know. I had implicit confidence in them. I don’t recall any particular problems that we had.

RITCHIE: Did you find that staff members were going overseas more during this period and doing more first-hand investigating?

MARCY: Yes. We were doing much more of that. But Lowenstein and Moose were the ones who really took on the main assignment for themselves for the reports which they did. I had mentioned earlier during the Joe McCarthy period when the Committee was very reluctant to have staff people go abroad by themselves without a senator in some way being associated. That gradually broke down so that by the late ‘60s there was no question. We always needed the approval of the Committee for assignments of this kind, but we had had no incidents that reflected on the Committee. I did have one or two cases where some staff member didn't demean himself quite properly under some circumstances, but they were very minor and didn't cause any fracas. Nothing to disturb the Committee about.

RITCHIE: Especially when staff were sent to Vietnam, did the administration cooperate with their being there, or did they object to them being there? Was there any sense of "not butting in?"

MARCY: I don’t recall any particular fuss about it. That was one of the advantages of Lowenstein and Moose. They had come out of the establishment, so the presumption was that they were responsible individuals, that they were cleared, and they were. They didn't blab to the press when they would come back. They would report to the Committee. They were very dissatisfied in some cases with the reception that they got in the missions overseas, but they did not just talk to the ambassador and the ambassador's staff. They made it a point to talk with American press people there, foreign press, foreign diplomats, so they got a much broader picture of the situation than they ever would if they had stuck with the embassy. So unless the administration was adamant and were just going to say "No, we are not going to permit you," they were as free as press people, and they acted that way.
RITCHIE: When they got ready to go on one of these fact-finding trips, did you map strategy with them? Or was it pretty much assumed they knew what they were going to do?

MARCY: No, they mapped their own. They worked very well together.

RITCHIE: They came out with some first-rate reports.

MARCY: Oh, they did. They did a beautiful job. What is the rule? If it's not broken, don't fix it. I guess I was probably skeptical during the first mission, but by the second time they'd gone abroad, there was not much to be skeptical about, because they were doing such a great job.

RITCHIE: Well, we're about to move into the Nixon years and the continuation of the war in Vietnam under different leadership, but before we do that, I wondered if there was anything else about the Lyndon Johnson years and any thoughts about Johnson that we haven't covered that you think we should.

MARCY: Don, you've done such a good job of reminding me of everything that I can't think at the moment of anything that we haven't touched on. I think some of these things we could have covered in greater depth if my memory were better. I say this partly by way of apology, but there were so many things bearing on the Committee during this period that I was very lucky to have a secretarial staff that kept a decent record. I was very lucky to have competent individuals throughout the staff at the period of time. We didn't have any backbiting or jealousies, certainly of any significant kind. It was always a pleasure to have people of that kind to work with. Competent men and women of integrity. Pat Holt was always up-to-date on everything, so if I were away for a time, there was never any question whatsoever about Pat taking over.

RITCHIE: You had some remarkable continuity of staff over that period, people like Morella Hanson, and yourself, and Pat Holt, and others who had been on the Committee since the 1940s and early 1950s. It seems unusual by comparison to many of the other Committee staffs.

MARCY: Well, I think it was unusual at that time, and compared to today it's the difference between day and night. I look now at that staff after I have been gone from there only ten years. There are about three people who were there when I left in 1973. One of them is printing clerk, and there is the clerk of the Committee, and the third an aide to the minority.
RITCHIE: Speaking of the records of the Committee, someone at the National Archives was telling me that the Committee saved none of the petitions and memorials on Vietnam, which surprised me. Do you recall if there was a decision on that, or was it just that you were so overwhelmed with material coming in?

MARCY: I don't recall. Petitions and memorials would have gone to Morella Hanson to put in the files. While Morella was originally trained as a historian, I think she was so overwhelmed that she dumped a lot of stuff. I don't mean by that to blame Morella, but I do remember several times that I thought there were things that we should have kept and I would look for them and discover that they had been destroyed.

RITCHIE: I had a feeling that the sheer volume was the issue.

MARCY: I think that was very much the case. You run out of file space after a time. But Morella would be the person, you ought to talk to her about that, see what her theory and her policy was. You tell her that I said I thought she threw out too many things. But then, I didn't have to worry about storing them! One of the things about Morella was that she has one of the best memories of anyone in the place, so if it was in the files she could find it. If she couldn't find it in the files she could usually remember enough to serve the purposes of the moment.

RITCHIE: That strikes me as one of the problems of a staff starting out as a small staff and growing larger, with the issues becoming more complicated. Just keeping track of the correspondence, the reports, the material, must have become quite a burden as events went on in the '60s and '70s.

MARCY: Well, it did, but fortunately Morella protected me from that. I remember when I was getting ready to leave the Committee and trying to see what records I might want to use. I was absolutely appalled at how much stuff there was. I never did go over it very carefully. I hope most of it is in the Archives. [End of Interview #6]
RITCHIE: Richard Nixon was around the Capitol for a large part of your time here, as senator first and then as vice president; did you ever have any dealings with him before he became president?

MARCY: No. My tracks did not cross with his at any point during that time. I observed him through the press by and large. So I can't give you an objective judgment based upon conversations that I may have had with him, or the environment in which I saw him operate.

RITCHIE: Well, what were your feelings at the time of his election? There was obviously going to be a sharp change in the way things were operating in Washington.

MARCY: I was quite disappointed, perhaps not as much as I should have been, but I felt strongly that Senator Humphrey, who was the Democratic candidate, had been taken in entirely too much by the Johnson administration. I felt rather badly that Gene McCarthy did not get the nomination because I thought he could have commanded the support of those people who did not know how to vote when it came to a choice between Nixon and Humphrey. As a matter of fact, Nixon's appeal to some people was the fact that he was able flatly to say that he would get us out of Vietnam. So on that particular issue, which to me at that time was very vital, he took a more forthright position that gave me more hope that he would get us out than did Humphrey. I'd always felt that if Humphrey had come out much earlier and stated flatly that he was going to get us out of Vietnam, he might have won--because I think that was the crucial issue during that campaign.

RITCHIE: Nixon, during that campaign, said that he had a "secret plan" to get the United States out of Vietnam, although he would never say exactly what it was. Do you think there was very much skepticism on the Committee about this, or did they make any attempts to figure out what he had in mind?
MARCY: I don't recall that there was any skepticism in the Committee. At that point the Committee felt so strongly that we ought to be getting out of Vietnam that anybody who made a promise that sounded like we might get out was not likely to be questioned. It's a bit like the Eisenhower campaign, when Eisenhower said "I will go to Korea." It was a depressing time for people who were concerned about our Vietnam involvement.

RITCHIE: With Nixon's election and the appointment of William Rogers as Secretary of State, and the other cabinet members, did relations between the Foreign Relations Committee and the administration change? Did they improve at all?

MARCY: Yes, I think they did. Rogers was not a very strong secretary, but he was civilized. I think the Committee hoped he would be a strong secretary, which unfortunately he was not. I'm trying to remember, who was the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations? Was that . . . .

RITCHIE: Tolbert?

MARCY: Well, he was for a while.

RITCHIE: Eliot Richardson was undersecretary for a while.

MARCY: Yes, but not for very long, as I recall. But there was someone else. Let's see, Macomber was during the earlier period.

RITCHIE: Did you find that the administration was making any overtures to smooth things out, to try to win support in the Committee? Were they more likely to testify and more open about meeting with the Committee?

MARCY: My recollection is that they were. That was probably largely because conditions had so deteriorated between the Democratic administration and the Democratic Foreign Relations Committee that almost anything was better than what the situation had been prior thereto. To come back to the point which I made earlier in these discussions, there tends to be a greater effort to get along with Congress on the part of an administration of a different party than that of the Congress. They feel they must be sympathetic and understanding of the congressional point of view. Of course, the person who really had the biggest impact on the Foreign Relations Committee during that period of time was Henry Kissinger. While Kissinger never testified before the Committee in any formal sense, he was generally admired by Committee members. Senator Fulbright had great respect for Kissinger's ability. We tried several times to get Kissinger to
come before the Committee. He never would. This was when he was National Security Advisor.

I got quite involved in negotiations to try to arrange it so the Committee members could meet with Kissinger. The assistant secretary at that time was David Abshire. David and I got along very well. Between the two of us we managed to get Kissinger to agree to meet privately with the Committee. We had three or four such sessions. I think the first one was at Senator Fulbright's home--Kissinger came. I remember at that point--this is perhaps illustrative of one of the problems that occasionally exists between a staff director and members of the Committee--the arrangement was that Kissinger was going to meet privately with the Committee members at Senator Fulbright's home. The senator told me, and I said, "Well, do you want me to be there?" Fulbright said, "Oh, no, I don't think that's necessary." I said, "Well, I thought we should have someone there from the staff to make a record of what goes on." He was rather reluctant, but finally he said, "Well, come along. I don't think

Henry will like it." I arrived at the Fulbright home, and when Kissinger came in I recall Kissinger looking past Senator Fulbright and at me, and saying: "Vell, Carl, vat are you doing here?" Whereupon Senator Fulbright nobly looked right past Mr. Kissinger and looked at David Abshire, the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, and said: "Well, Mr. Abshire, what are you doing here?" So that problem of Kissinger having a back-up person, and the Committee having a back-up person was resolved. From then on, when we did hold other sessions between Kissinger and the Committee, both Abshire and I were present.

RITCHIE: How many sessions did the Committee hold with Kissinger?

MARCY: I would say there were three or four. We met several times at the Court of Claims Building, which at that time was just off Lafayette Square.

RITCHIE: Would one of these meetings resemble an executive hearing, in a sense? Would Kissinger give a little speech and then be questioned by the members, or how did it work?

MARCY: Yes, that's the way it usually went. Kissinger would explain some particular facet of our activities and the members would question him quite vigorously. I recall that Senator Javits was very effective during those sessions, making more impact perhaps than other members at the time. I wish we had a transcript. Do you know, did I make memos of those conversations?
RITCHIE: I haven't seen any.

MARCY: I must have. But maybe not.

RITCHIE: What was it about Kissinger that so impressed the members of the Committee?

MARCY: Well, he had a deep voice, and he spoke with authority. He was known to be close to Mr. Nixon. He was--I hate to use the word--but I think he was viewed as an "intellectual," which Mr. Rogers had never quite managed to convey to the Committee. He was a scholar. He certainly seemed candid with the Committee. All of those factors. I think that later on there was some feeling that Kissinger dissembled a little bit, but the members were slow to catch on, if they caught on at all. If they read Sy Hersh's book before they had met with Mr. Kissinger they might have had more doubts. But the general feeling at that time among the Committee members was: "For Heaven's sakes, make Kissinger Secretary of State. He's making all the policy." Rogers didn't seem to be in the chain of command.

RITCHIE: Interestingly, I did come across a letter that you wrote in 1958 to Kissinger. You had just finished reading his book on nuclear power and you commended it as one of the most stimulating books that you had ever read. That was ten years before you had to deal with him in the administration.

MARCY: Actually, I think I met Kissinger even before that. There was a Professor Bill Elliot who was on the Harvard faculty. He used to run seminars and would invite people from Washington to come to Harvard and meet with his students. I think Henry was in one of those classes at that time. That must have been in the mid-'50s or earlier--but I wouldn't want to take any credit for having educated Henry Kissinger! I think he did it himself.

RITCHIE: What about the whole problem of the division between the State Department and the National Security Advisor? It seems to me this was creating a new set of problems for the legislation branch in dealing with foreign policy, because it's really shifted so much authority in foreign policy away from the agency that the Foreign Relations Committee follows and supervises, and can call to testify. How do you account for this shift in power from the State Department to the White House and National Security Advisor on foreign policy?

MARCY: In the first place, it was clear that the shift had taken place downtown, and that the only place the Committee could get any authoritative answers was
from the White House, and the only person in the White House we could get answers from was Kissinger.

Kissinger met a number of times privately with Senator Fulbright, meetings to which I was not privy. Senator Fulbright would mention casually that Henry called him last night or had stopped by the office--that sort of thing. During that period it seemed to me that the Committee pretty well gave up on the Department of State as an effective spokesman for the administration. The Committee was uncomfortable with this situation in the sense that they felt that since Kissinger was running the foreign policy of the Nixon administration he ought to be at the place where foreign policy was supposed to be managed--in the Department of State. I think Committee members were much more comfortable after Kissinger became Secretary of State. That pretty much resolved the problem.

There was nobody left in the National Security Council, after Kissinger left, who was worth talking to. Brent Scowcroft was a nice person, but Kissinger took the foreign policy of the United States from the White House back to the Department of State, which was where the Committee thought it belonged. But when the foreign policy power was not in the Department of State, the Committee, following its instincts, went where the policy was being made, and that was Kissinger. So practically during all of that period, the key to the conduct of United States foreign policy was in Mr. Kissinger. The Committee recognized that.

RITCHIE: The National Security Council has become something of a bureaucracy in itself. It has quite a few specialists in different fields. Were there any contacts between staff members and their counterparts in the NSC? Were there any overtures made on say the lower staff level under the National Security Advisor?

MARCY: I don’t recall any regular communications back and forth, although I think that Dick Moose, Richard Moose, had been on the National Security Council for a time with Kissinger. When Moose came to the Committee he may have kept some contacts with people who were still on the National Security Council, but I can’t speak to that of my own knowledge.

RITCHIE: I did see one controversy with John Lehman, who I think is the current Navy Secretary, who at that time was an NSC member. He made a charge in what he thought was an off-the-record session, but it got printed in the newspapers, that the Foreign Relations Committee was a leaky sieve, and that was the reason why the administration wouldn’t tell it anything. Senator
Fulbright tried to get Lehman to come to testify to explain what he had meant, but he used executive privilege and pulled the covers back over him.

MARCY: I don't recall that incident specifically. I knew Mr. Lehman in another capacity later on. But at that time--well, I guess it's still true, is it not--that National Security Council people do not testify before congressional committees. The White House is the ultimate bastion of foreign policy.

RITCHIE: I was just wondering if there were any informal ways of getting around the whole question of executive privilege, if anyone else was trying to smooth things out the way Kissinger obviously was on an ad hoc basis, rather than on a formal basis.

MARCY: I don't recall any. There was some talk within the Committee of trying to use its authority to approve authorizations. There were several times when there was an issue of executive privilege and the Committee talked about how you managed to get around it, but I don't recall any successful use of that authority. I do recall one spectacularly unsuccessful effort to get around executive privilege. In connection with one of the USIA programs we asked for country planning papers which each mission would send in. Those papers became the basis of the budget of the Information Agency. USIA refused to give the Committee those planning papers, and Senator Fulbright proposed to penalize the Agency by reducing the authorization for USIA by some rather spectacular amount. Somehow the figure $40 million sticks in my mind. He managed to get that $40 million reduction in USIA authorization through the Committee, but lost that fight on the floor.

I mentioned in one of my earlier interviews when we were talking about Senator Church, that Senator Church was one of those that Senator Fulbright was counting on in this instance, but Church took the position on that issue that to use the authorization process to acquire country planning papers was not sufficiently important to gut the United States Information Agency program. So the administration won that particular effort to break down executive privilege.

RITCHIE: Before we go into some of the specifics of foreign policy in the Nixon years, I was wondering if you could give a general overview, your impression of the foreign policy issues and the Nixon administration's handling of foreign policy, from a Capitol Hill perspective?

MARCY: My impression is that the Foreign Relations Committee was rather surprised that Mr. Nixon was turning out to be a statesman. They did not expect
it. I think they found his opening to China and his willingness to talk with the Russians refreshing and unexpected in view of their earlier recollections of Mr. Nixon when he had been one of the biggest anti-Communists in the United States Senate.

RITCHIE: The overture to China was probably the single most noteworthy achievement of the Nixon administration, yet in some respects it seems a cynical action, in the sense that up until the day before we were basically fighting in Vietnam to keep the Communist Chinese from overrunning all of Asia, and suddenly we were making overtures to China as a new ally. How do you explain such a sharp change in foreign policy, and how does public opinion get altered so quickly?

MARCY: Well, I think in that case public opinion was waiting to be altered. What most people knew about China at that time was that it was a place where we had sent missionaries long ago and we had set up medical schools and done that kind of thing and the Chinese were a very interesting people. I don't believe that the public ever felt strongly that China was an aggressive Communist nation. I'm talking about my perception of the general public attitude at that time. I think there was also some cynicism, in the sense that Nixon might have been opening to China with the idea that China would be a counterweight to the Soviet Union. It seemed to me that Nixon was far more open than Johnson had been toward both the Chinese and the Soviet Union. I don't have an explanation. I probably should read Mr. Nixon's books!

RITCHIE: On the larger issues of foreign policy, it seems that the Committee was in accord with the administration, on relation with the Soviet Union and relations with China. On the other hand, the differences come more on the sideshows, as William Shawcross indicates, not the big, global issues, but on specific nations, backdoor activities in Chile, and Cambodia, and Laos. There seemed to have been a dichotomy in which the administration had a master plan on the larger scale, but seemed still to have been conducting back door skullduggery in other places.

MARCY: I suppose that reflects what the Committee felt was an overall Kissinger strategic point of view, although during those years I think the Committee had rather expected much more headway to be made in negotiations to bring the Vietnam war to an end. It was in that framework that worry about the increased bombing of the North and the invasion into Cambodia, bothered them. Chile tended to be a side issue during that period of time. We didn't really
get worried about what was going on in Chile until '73 or '74, when it was looked into after the event. I don't recall much excitement about Chile at the time.

**RITCHIE:** Vietnam was the one issue that continued to fester. The negotiations dragged on, and there was an escalation in the bombing, although there was also "Vietnamization." A lot of the opposition within the Congress began to coalesce around the Cooper-Church amendment. The thing that strikes me about that was that it wasn't the Fulbright amendment. Why was it that Cooper and Church were at that stage taking the initiative and not the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee?

**MARCY:** Well, I would make the point that they were the products of Fulbright's educational process over a period of time. I

never detected any rancor on the part of Senator Fulbright. He was delighted to have Cooper and Church take on this issue. The more the merrier, I guess. I think Fulbright realized that there would be a greater political impact if the lead were taken by members of the Committee other than himself. I don't think he put Cooper and Church up to it. Senators do their own thing. I think they came to it on their own. Fulbright was delighted to go along. This idea I mentioned earlier that Fulbright was a tyrant chairman, that he controlled everything in the Committee, just was not true. He was a very, very broad-minded person. He had his enemies, of course, but I never saw any feeling of jealously, for example, of some other member assuming some role that he thought was his own. He was jealous in protecting the prerogatives of the Foreign Relations Committee as an institution, but not of his own prerogatives.

**RITCHIE:** Did you work at all with Cooper and Church and Hatfield on that?

**MARCY:** Very, very little. I worked with Peter Lakeland, who was at that time with Senator Javits. But most of the work was done by Pete Lakeland, and Senator Cooper's aide, who was Bill Miller. The work was done very largely at the staff level. I was kept informed by Lakeland and Miller, and it was fine to have that kind of communication.

**RITCHIE:** I always thought that the senator who had the best proposal of all was George Aiken, who said we should just declare that we had won the war and then leave.

**MARCY:** You must remember that at that time many senators were looking for some way to end the Vietnam war. Mansfield had--I probably am using the phraseology of the present time--but Mansfield had a "build-down" theory, stop

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where we are. I can only think in the terms of the contemporary. He wanted to freeze our forces where they were. Other senators were coming up with all kinds of ideas. These were the "dove" senators. These were the ones who did not see any likelihood that we could continue to escalate, and help one side or the other win what they felt was a civil war which had to be handled within the confines of Vietnam.

**RITCHIE:** Did you find that the Committee was becoming more divided between doves and hawks? Was it creating any tensions within the Committee?

**MARCY:** No, most of the hawks were on the Armed Services Committee, and most of the doves were with the Foreign Relations Committee.

**RITCHIE:** You had Griffin and Scott coming on, and you indicated that they were more hard-liners.

**MARCY:** They were, and Senator Dodd had taken a harder-line position. I don't recall any particularly rancorous confrontations in the Committee between hawks and doves at the time we're talking about. We're talking about what the late '60s, '68 to '70 at that time.

**RITCHIE:** Did it increase in '71 and '72?

**MARCY:** I don't think so.

**RITCHIE:** Did you have any dealings with Daniel Ellsberg during this period? I know he was moving around Washington trying to get people to listen to him.

**MARCY:** No. Ellsberg saw Senator Fulbright several times, but I don't recall ever having met Ellsberg. There was a historian in the Pentagon who knew about what later on became the Pentagon Papers. I talked with him several times, and made arrangements for him to see Senator Fulbright. But he was not leaking anything. He was trying to persuade the Committee, or Fulbright in particular, to ask for the historical compilation which was being put together.

My first contact with the Pentagon Papers--which I didn't know what they were at the time--was when Senator [Charles] Mathias brought to me one day what turned out to be the Pentagon Papers. He said, "This is very hot stuff." He had asked Senator Fulbright what to do with them, and Senator Fulbright said bring it to me for safe-
keeping. That's just what I did. I gave the papers safekeeping. I did not read
them. Now that I look back I should have had one of our staff members look them
over, but we did not.

RITCHIE: You recognized that it was classified?

MARCY: Yes. That must have been one of Ellsberg's copies that he was passing
around.

RITCHIE: I think it was Pat Holt who said that after the Pentagon Papers were
published, Norvill Jones said, "Oh, I've had that in the safe for two years."

MARCY: Well, that's it. If you were to have asked me where I put the papers for
safekeeping I would have to say, I don't remember, but it's logical that I would
have given them to Norvill Jones.

RITCHIE: What was the impact of the Pentagon Papers on the Committee? Did
it change any minds, or intensify feelings?

MARCY: Oh, I think it did. I think the papers provided documentary proof of
what most of the members had been feeling all along. I doubt that anyone read
them fully, but there was the press summary of what was in the papers. I did have
at that time some advance notice that something was brewing because a New
York Times reporter, Ned Kenworthy, told me that the Times had a hot story

coming out and he was not going to be around for a week because he was working
night and day. But what they were, at that time I didn't know until the story
broke.

RITCHIE: I thought the most telling comment on the Pentagon Papers was
Senator Fulbright's observation that the only time Congress was mentioned in
them was how the administration was going to manipulate it.

MARCY: That's not the first time the Congress has been manipulated, and
probably not the last. I think there ought to be a general rule, however, that
would be applicable to the Congress generally, and that is: don't take any action
until you've counted to ten. As I've mentioned, I was with Senator Fulbright last
night and he said to me what he had said many times: "I cannot understand why I
so quickly accepted the administration's word on the Gulf of Tonkin incident and
helped pass that resolution on such short notice. It was a stupid thing to do."
Most people don't understand sometimes why they do- things in the heat of
passion, but I think it's a good rule, there ought to be a waiting period of some
kind. I think probably the Grenada case is one where it would be wise to wait for a while before any judgment is passed. The same with the KAL airliner tragedy. There is no reason in most cases why something needs to be done within twenty-four hours. As a matter of fact, you can show more outrage probably after you wait for a week than if you do it the very next day.

RITCHIE: Is it possible to make people wait for long?

MARCY: No, unfortunately--and that's dangerous.

RITCHIE: The first think is that the press will be outside of every senator's door asking for their reactions.

MARCY: That's right, and senators and congressmen survive by being well-known figures. The first person out with the most quotable line is going to be in the press or on the tube. It's a tremendous temptation. One can't get headlines by saying "I have nothing to say." I guess that's the way it is, and probably will continue to be.

RITCHIE: In viewing the foreign policy and other issues, the Nixon administration seemed to be obsessed with secrecy. Did you find it more so under Nixon, or the same as it had been under Johnson, or was it a culmination of movement in that direction?

MARCY: That is hard to say. I find it difficult to distinguish between the attitudes that I had towards a Republican administration or a Democratic administration. My instincts were to be suspicious of the executive branch, that they did keep secrets, that the usual attitude of anyone from the executive branch was: if you knew what we know, you would make the decision the way we have made it, but we can't tell you what we know. That was a characteristic of the Johnson administration as it was of the Nixon administration. I think that it's almost a characteristic of the executive bureaucracy in dealing with the Congress, and the smaller bureaucracy which exists on the Hill.

Coming back to my earlier attitudes, when I left the Department of State, it was the feeling that people who worked on the Hill were not specialists in any substantive area. They were politicians at heart and to be a politician one didn't have to read a book, and one didn't have to go into any subject in depth. I think over a period of time that's been disproven, but the instinct within the executive
branch is still that "those fellows on the Hill are a bunch of politicians and to keep them happy you don't have to tell them everything. We make the better judgments in the executive branch."

**RITCHIE:** Given the extreme polarization that was developing over Vietnam, do you think there was any way the Nixon administration could have been more open about some of its policies, or were they being excessively secretive?

**MARCY:** Oh, I think they were probably being excessively secretive, but that's speculation. I'd like to say yes, the Nixon administration was more secretive, but that's not my feeling. They were no more secretive than the Johnson administration had been. What it comes down to in most cases is that by and large basic information is acquired through the press. At least the basic information required to make judgments tends to be available by careful reading of the press. So I've become very skeptical that many secrets are kept that involve the national security--maybe for an invasion and that kind of thing in wartime. I'm sure that within the next few days when we hear more about Grenada we are going to hear again about secret papers which have been uncovered, and we're going to hear about information which we have acquired. But the administration will not tell us where the information came from because it would compromise some system of collection. There may be something that is so exotic that it's not published in *Aviation* magazine, or *Science* but I rather doubt it. And whatever that information maybe it is so infinitesimal compared to what is generally available through public communications or through the press, that I doubt if it makes very much difference. I don't think we give any very great secrets away. I think the secret device is used more to keep the Congress from second-guessing something that the executive branch has already made a decision on.

**RITCHIE:** Okay, going back to specifics, one area that we haven't talked about and I was hoping you'd make some comments on was the Middle East. During the same period that we were focusing on Vietnam, in the late 1960s, there were wars between the Israelis and the Egyptians and increasing American involvement in the Middle East. Do you have any sense of the Committee's concerns over what was happening in the Middle East?

**MARCY:** I didn't follow that area very closely. The general reaction of the Committee was that Israel was our friend, and what the Israelis wanted or needed they got. There were constant quotations about only three million citizens in...
Israel and fifty million Arabs, so there was a feeling that over the long range it was more important to keep on a reasonably friendly basis with fifty million people than with three million, but Israel being an essentially Western-oriented state, its problems were more understandable to the American public. Israel was a democracy. I think there was a feeling that there wasn’t much understanding of the problems of the Arab states. About the only concern was that it was a source of fuel, energy.

RITCHIE: I know that Senator Fulbright was one of the first to indicate that the problems could have been as much Israeli-created as Arab-created, which generated some criticism in the United States. Did you find that there was a lot of pressure from the Israeli lobby on the Committee, or any sense of that in public opinion?

MARCY: Pressure was very subtle. The Israeli lobby did not operate, at that time at least, in a very open sense. It was generally believed that Israel’s security was in the American interest. We’d helped set up the state; we had to help the state survive.

I don’t remember whether I told you earlier that I did travel with Senator Fulbright to the Middle East at the invitation of Colonel Nasser. Senator Fulbright had a Jewish merchant friend from New Orleans whom I had never met, but apparently he had provided some intellectual and financial support for Fulbright over a number of years. He insisted that if Fulbright was going to Cairo he absolutely had to go to Israel. He made arrangements so that Senator Fulbright would go to Israel also. We flew to Tel Aviv and then drove up to Jerusalem. As I recall, we had to fly through Cyprus because there were no direct flights between Egypt and Israel at that point. When we got to the King David Hotel and Fulbright was on his way to make a speech at the University, he asked if I wanted to come along, and I said, "No, never mind, I know about what you’re going to say." Fulbright and Betty, who were along with us, went to make the speech. I remember when they came back to the hotel, Fulbright said to his wife, "Betty, what were all those students doing walking around with umbrellas? It wasn’t raining." Betty said something like, "Bill, they were making out that you were just like Chamberlain--an appeaser." Fulbright was completely innocent of the implication.

RITCHIE: Well, it’s an area that we’ve gotten increasingly drawn into.

MARCY: Most people have forgotten this, but this was in the era when we were talking about mutual security agreements. Fulbright said on several occasions that it’s obvious that if anybody’s going to try to overrun Israel, the United States
is going to come to their defense. He thought we might as well recognize that fact and make a treaty of mutual assistance, or mutual security with Israel. I don't know why that never caught on. At that time the Israelis were saying "Give us the weapons, we can take care of ourselves." But Fulbright was willing to make a flat-out commitment to the state of Israel. I'm going to have to leave rather soon.

RITCHIE: Rather than start another line of questioning, about Watergate and the War Powers Act, if you're under time pressures it would be better to wait.

MARCY: Yes, I have an appointment, so maybe it would be better if we put that off.

[End of Interview #7]
Carl M. Marcy  
Chief of Staff  
Foreign Relations Committee, 1955-1973

**Interview #8**  
**Leaving the Committee**  
(Wednesday, November 16, 1983)  
Interviewed by Donald A. Ritchie

**RITCHIE:** You said you wanted to write an article about committee hearings?

**MARCY:** Yes. I just returned from a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee where four very distinguished witnesses appeared. Senator Fulbright in his first appearance before the Committee since he was a senator was the lead witness. Richard Allen, Reagan's former security advisor, was there. Admiral Noel Gayler, former head of the National Security Agency, and Hal Sonnenfeld, formerly right-hand person to Kissinger, were also witnesses. Senator Percy, Senator [Richard] Lugar, and finally Senator [Claiborne] Pell showed up. Those were the only three senators who were there, and they were not all there at the same time. There were three senators and sixteen staff people sitting at various places behind senators' empty chairs. I don't know what comes out of a hearing like that. The testimony is printed but seldom read. There seemed to be some press coverage--we can tell more tomorrow. [There was one story featuring Senator Fulbright's appearance after years in retirement. I saw no press account of the substance of the testimony.] It's gotten to the point now where you don't have committees or subcommittees. There are in effect one-person, one-senator committees. I don't know how it is in the House, but I find it hard to see that such hearings serve any significant public purpose. It would be much better to have those four individuals on the McNeil-Lehrer show, or have them jointly interviewed and printed in the Post "Outlook" section or the "New York Times Magazine." Maybe these hearings would be of some use to a historian!

**RITCHIE:** Was it that way when you were staff director?

**MARCY:** It was much that way then. I think we did a little better at that time because Senator Fulbright and his predecessors didn't much like the idea of competing subcommittees with significant jurisdiction, or significant constituencies. If the subject was important enough for the senators to pay attention to it, it was important for all of them, or most of them, to be present. As it is now, it's such a fragmented process. Individual senators sometimes use a subcommittee like a lottery. They hold a hearing on some subject and see who comes. Does the press cover it? As a result there are a lot of hearings held that
nobody ever hears anything about, nobody pays attention, and even the senators who set them up don't pay much attention. They try a hearing, it doesn't strike a fire, and the result is that the subject is dropped.

RITCHIE: Well, what's the purpose? For instance, today's hearing: what's the motivation there? It's to generate interest in the subject, but they can't even generate interest among their own members.

MARCY: That's right. If there is any subject that should be of interest to every member of the Foreign Relations Committee, it ought to be the present state of United States-Soviet relations. Are they going to get worse? Are they going to stay about the same? Or are they going to get better? What underlies the present state of affairs? This is the most important relationship that we have in the area of foreign policy. Sure, Grenada is important, the Middle East is important, El Salvador and Nicaragua are important. But underlying it all from the point of view of the president, is the "evil empire," that is communism. Yet we spend time worrying about the next government in Nicaragua or Grenada, and worrying about the Middle East, but in every case the fundamental problem is traced to the superpower conflict. Yet we have a hearing on the subject of the two superpowers and their relationship, and nobody shows up!

RITCHIE: Do you think the Committee spends so much time in executive session hearing what they consider to be more substantive information from people behind closed doors that they think that the public sessions are just decoration?

MARCY: I think that's partly true, but my experience in the executive sessions was that by and large senators don't hear anything in executive sessions that they don't read about in the press. It sounds good to refer to information received in an executive session of the Committee. Senators and staff presumably then know more about what goes on, but the attitude of not only the previous administrations but most executive branch representatives is that they're not going to say anything to an executive session that they aren't willing to have appear in the press. So that's what they talk about. Witnesses in executive sessions discuss things that will not upset the applecart if they become public.

RITCHIE: Do you think there is any way of improving the hearings?

MARCY: That's why I said I think I'm going to write an article, so I can think about whether there is some way to improve the hearing process, to make it more effective. It strikes me that by and large they are not very effective. When was the last time that there was a significant public hearing? It goes back to the Vietnam period. Now and then, the Interior Committee gets a good turnout for a hearing.

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with Secretary [James] Watt, but too few senators come to examine the substance of an Interior policy. They might want to be present to hear a gaff by the Secretary.

RITCHIE: I noticed in your files that at the beginning of each year you would often send a memo to Senator Fulbright outlining what you thought ought to be subjects, or could be subjects, for major hearings during the year. Maybe a half a dozen suggestions. How much planning goes into a public hearing? And when you were looking over these things at the beginning of the year, how did you think out the types of subjects you would recommend to the senator?

MARCY: Well, it depended upon what was current at the time, or what one could see was coming up. For example, if I were now planning hearings for beginning, let's say in January 1984, it seems to me that the hearings could well be focused on how to keep continuity in foreign policy during an election year? It would be a natural. One would hope to be able to establish a record and get attention to the fact that it's going to be a disaster not whether Republicans are elected or whether Democrats are elected, but it's going to be a disaster if there is not some carry-over, some continuity in the foreign policy of the nation. Otherwise, we lose the confidence of our allies and confuse our adversaries. That would be the kind of subject I think needs attention. Maybe it's too exotic.

RITCHIE: You suggested a couple of times that they hold forums for presidential candidates on foreign policy. That one never got carried out.

MARCY: No, I was accustomed to throw up a lot of ideas; some did fly and some did not.

RITCHIE: Do you think that there is a lack of long-range planning and thought now that there is too much ad hoc hearings?

MARCY: I think so. It's a characteristic of Congress to be intrigued by current events. There is another thing that is lacking in the Senate, or in the Congress. It is that there is no senior, executive committee of the Senate to deal with the White House. If the president wants to call a group together, he does it. He can invite the majority leader or the minority leader, or certain others. But it does seem to me that there is a need for a means by which the Senate would have a legislative counterpart to the National Security Council. Now I realize this runs contrary to what I have said, that there has been a proliferation of subcommittees. But it ought to be possible for the president or the National Security Advisor to seek the advice of, and consult with, a counterpart group in the Senate.
Now, what does the president do? He may create a presidential commission on some aspect of policy. I don't object to that, but there needs to be an overall core group that represents prevailing Senate views across the board, as best as it can be done. It may be that there should be (I'm just thinking aloud) a sort of a super Senate institution which would consist of, let's say, the chairman and the ranking minority member of each committee. Maybe that's too large a group. But now the Senate is a fragmented institution as compared with a well-run executive branch.

RITCHIE: Do you think that this is something that is inherent in the institution, or it's been developing this way, because of the reforms that have decentralized the Senate over the last twenty years?

MARCY: To some extent it is inherent in a legislative body. But at the same time one doesn't let heredity control everything. Sometimes heredity can be shaped. That's what I'm trying to think about.

RITCHIE: When you first came to the Foreign Relations Committee it really was a collection of the barons of the Senate. Most of the members of the Foreign Relations Committee were chairmen of other committees. They had long seniority in the Senate. There was sort of an "Inner Club" that ran the Senate. The president would never have thought of acting without getting in touch with the Richard Russells and the Walter Georges, who really made the decisions. Now there has been so much democratization that the Foreign Relations Committee has quite a few freshman senators. I can't think of any members right now who are chairmen of other committees -- there must be a few, Senator Jesse Helms is chairman of Agriculture. But it's a different structure. Every senator has a subcommittee, and a subcommittee staff. Do you think that it was perhaps more effective under the older system and that the Senate reforms have been counterproductive?

MARCY: Yes, it does seem to me it was more effective at that time. Now, whether you can recreate an institution less fragmented I don't know, but I think it's worth thinking about, seeing if it could be done.

I am reminded of an incident that occurred before I was with the Committee, but with which I am familiar. When the international financial institutions were being set up, the World Bank for instance, Senator [Eugene] Milliken of Colorado was chairman of the Finance Committee, and Senator Vandenberg was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Under the Reorganization Act [of 1946] it was clear that the international financial institutions were within the jurisdiction of the Senate.
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. But Senator Vandenberg went to Senator Milliken, and said he didn’t know anything about these international financial institutions and suggested Senator Milliken take over. So without any formal decision, that was what happened. Interestingly enough, some years later when Senator Fulbright became chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, having moved to Foreign Relations from chairmanship of the Finance Committee, I went to him and told him the story that I have just told you. I suggested that if he wanted to reclaim jurisdiction for Foreign Relations, then was the time to make it clear to the Parliamentarian. Without hesitation, Senator Fulbright said, "We'll take it." So Fulbright undid what Vandenberg had done at an earlier time.

RITCHIE: Following up on that, as chief of staff of the Foreign Relations Committee, did you keep an eye on bills that were being referred to make sure that there was no jurisdictional claim-jumping by other committees?

MARCY: Oh, absolutely. You mentioned earlier that you had talked with Floyd Riddick, the Parliamentarian. There were a number of instances when I would think a bill had been misreferred and would go to Floyd and ask if he didn't want to take another look at it "in the light." Usually that was a simple thing. Floyd had read the title of the bill and referred it, and when he would look at the substance of the bill as well as the title, and the Legislative Reorganization Act--the act the defines the jurisdictions of the committees--it would usually be a pretty open and shut case.

RITCHIE: Sometimes part of the legislative strategy of senators introducing the bill is to word it in such a way to try get it to a different committee.

MARCY: That's right.

RITCHIE: Did you have to keep an eye out for that type of maneuver?

MARCY: Absolutely. Especially since Senator Fulbright was very conscious of the area of jurisdiction of the Foreign Relations Committee. He would always go to bat for the jurisdiction of the Committee. A few times there would be some bill that would be so clearly a confusion of the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, for example, that we would work out an arrangement, either for a sequential reference or for the committees to hold joint hearings. There were a few times in which that was done. I don’t recall that we ever had any knock-down-drag-out-fights on jurisdictional questions.
RITCHIE: Usually a word in time to the Parliamentarian would correct things?

MARCY: That usually would take care of it, yes.

RITCHIE: Well, can we go back to where we left off in the Nixon administration? In 1971 George McGovern started running for the Democratic nomination for president and in 1972 he became the nominee. He was at the time a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, which meant he was the third member of the Foreign Relations Committee since 1960 to be the Democratic candidate.

MARCY: Yes.

RITCHIE: I was wondering if you could give me some of your personal observations on McGovern, as a member, as a senator, and as a candidate.

MARCY: Senator McGovern was certainly one of the nicest people I have ever known. Honest, straight-forward, soft in voice and demeanor, but firm in his convictions. I don’t think at the moment of any very significant legislative role which he played in the Committee. I don’t think there is a McGovern act or a McGovern amendment. I would have to say generally that his work in the Committee was not significant. I don’t like to say that because I admire the man very much. But I don’t remember at the moment any very significant thing.

RITCHIE: There was the McGovern-Hatfield bill on Vietnam, but Hatfield wasn’t a member of the Committee.

MARCY: No, he was not.

RITCHIE: So it wasn’t through the Committee. Were you as interested in McGovern’s campaign in ‘72 as you were in McCarthy’s in ‘68?

MARCY: I was more interested in McCarthy's campaign. It seemed like a more crucial time in the Vietnam war. But my role with the Committee was such that when a member of the Committee became a presidential candidate, that was in a completely different department. That’s not quite the right word, but when a member of the Committee became a presidential candidate he’s taken over by a campaign committee, and almost everything that is done is done for a political purpose. As for the Foreign Relations Committee, I had constantly to keep in mind the fact that the Committee had members of the minority party as well as of the majority party. So it was nice to say: "Yes, he was a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and I knew him when he was just an ordinary senator before he
became a candidate.” But after a senator became a candidate for the presidency, the relationship between staff people and the candidate dissipated.

RITCHIE: On the other hand, as a member of the Committee if he was to request information about a bill, or drafting of a speech he was going to give in the Senate on a foreign relations issue, you would still have done that as you would for any other senator?

MARCY: Yes, we would have. But the candidates of whom you were speaking were conscious of the bipartisan nature of the Committee, and that their role had changed. I don’t recall an instance in which any of the candidates asked us to do particular work for them. When Jack Kennedy was a candidate he did call me personally and asked whether when he was chairman of the African Subcommittee it had ever met. I had to tell him the committee met several times but he was never there, or words to that general effect. I recall that particular request. There may have been others like that when McGovern or McCarthy called and asked for information on attendance at a meeting or on a roll call, but we didn’t draft any speeches. There may have been some members of the staff who might have done it on the side, but I doubt it.

RITCHIE: Immediately after Nixon’s reelection in 1972, he became embroiled in Watergate. I remember living in Washington myself at that time and the atmosphere that pervaded everything. How much did Watergate affect the administration’s relationship with the Committee and the foreign policy issues of that period?

MARCY: I think it’s easier to look back and imagine that the events of that time had a significant influence on the attitudes within the Committee. It does not seem to me, however, that the Committee members were nearly as conscious of the impact of Watergate on foreign policy issues as we are inclined to believe now as we look back. The hot news was in the newspapers every day.

RITCHIE: On the other hand, the Committee and the Congress had really been engaged for several years in a running battle with Presidents Johnson and Nixon over authority. In 1972, I went to a special hearing that Sam Ervin’s subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee held on presidential power. They had Arthur Schlesinger and James MacGregor Burns talking about impoundment and war powers and everything else. There was a general sense of despair that the Congress really wasn’t going to be able to wrestle any of this authority back from the presidency. Yet within a year or two they had passed the Impoundment Act.
and the War Powers Act and there seemed to be an attempt to shift some of the power back between the branches.

**MARCY:** It was certainly true with respect to War Powers. But I think that the War Powers Act came about not so much out of concern that the Senate had lost power but as a consequence of the state of the Vietnam war itself. It was the way in which the war was going, and kept going on, which seemed to me to give impetus to the War Powers Resolution. It's easy now to look back and say there was a great constitutional fight going on. But it wasn't the constitutional fight that concerned the individuals so much, it was the fact that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution had finally been recognized as what it was not supposed to be, a declaration of war. It was within that framework.

**RITCHIE:** Did you work at all with Senator Javits' staff on that?

**MARCY:** Yes, a bit, although most of the work on the War Powers Resolution was done by Peter Lakeland, and Bill Miller, who was then with Senator [John Sherman] Cooper. They were more active in developing the War Powers Resolution than any member of our staff. Senator Fulbright never became very deeply involved. As long as Javits, a Republican, was taking the lead, that was just fine. Cooper was a Republican. But my impression is that Fulbright's attitude was "Okay, Jack, go ahead, it's a good idea. Cooper, good idea, it's yours. Take it." Senator Fulbright was always a bit embarrassed by the role he had taken at the time the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was passed. Maybe it didn't seem quite appropriate for him then to be so active in trying to undo it, even though he subsequently realized it was a very serious mistake.

**RITCHIE:** In 1969 the Senate passed the resolution that basically outlined the War Powers Act, but the House wouldn't go along with it. Quite a bit in the delay seemed to be just getting the Senate and the House on the same track. We haven't talked too much about Senate-House relations when it comes to foreign policy, and I wondered if you might comment on what the general relations were between the Foreign Relations and the Foreign Affairs committees, and how difficult or easy it was to get the two to work together?

**MARCY:** The two committees dealt with each other at arms length. One would expect that the chairmen of the two committees would get together from time to time. I don't believe that they did. The times they would get together would be when there was a conference on a bill. There's always a little bit of jealously between the two. I think the jealousies originated mostly from the House side, because they would do something that they thought was
important and nobody would pay any attention to them. And then the Senate committee might do exactly the same thing and there would be big press coverage. Yet when it came to the generation of amendments, the members of the House were just as bright and original, and I always thought they had more time to spend on these issues than did the senators, who had much larger constituencies to worry about. Staff relationships were very good. During most of this period Boyd Crawford was the staff director of the House Committee, and Boyd and I had no problems. We would discuss things informally when problems arose, but we never particularly sought each other out--although we did see each other from time to time socially as well as occasionally for lunches, that kind of thing.

I don't know whether I mentioned earlier in our discussion about the one big compromise that Boyd Crawford and I pulled off, which was to get the Fulbright-Hays act out of conference without Fulbright and Hays having met each other after the first disastrous confrontation.

RITCHIE: No, what was the first disastrous confrontation?

MARCY: Actually, the Foreign Relations Committee had decided that it would be a good idea to take a look at the original Fulbright act and subsequent legislation to see if it could be improved and should be brought up to date. Our staff spent a summer working on it, and developed into what later became the Fulbright-Hays Act. The bill went through the Senate very handily with Fulbright prestige,
I was already trying to get out of the room." And that was it. So all of this work for the Fulbright-Hays Act was going down the drain. Boyd Crawford and I got together and decided that, after he had checked with Wayne Hays and I had checked with Senator Fulbright, they were not about to go back into conference to confront each other again. So Boyd and I worked out the conference report, completely. When we were satisfied with what was in the bill, we each took the conference report, went to our respective chairmen and got them to sign it. I remember Senator Fulbright saying, "Will Wayne take it?" I said, "Yes, I think he will take it this way." Fulbright then asked if he had to meet with Wayne Hays again. I said, "No, just sign. He signed, and then the rest of the Senate conferees went along, and the same thing happened on the House side. So the Fulbright-Hays Act, the differences of which were resolved in conference, were differences which were resolved by Boyd Crawford and myself.

**RITCHIE:** And their names are wedded together forever!

**MARCY:** And their names are were wedded but not forever since Wayne Hays left the House in rather disrepute. References are now more often to the Fulbright Act. Although I must say with the new administration I don't think President Reagan or Mr. [Charles Z.] Wick, who's in charge of implementing the act, particularly welcome the name Fulbright either.

**RITCHIE:** There was a little piece in the paper just recently about a congressional staff member who checked with the Pentagon about the cost of a new missile, and was informed that its price was $40 million. The staff member said, "For that price we could triple the number of Fulbright scholars." The Pentagon official said, "Yes, but those Fulbright scholars don't do a damn thing when you drop them on a bridge from 20,000 feet."

**MARCY:** What a thought!

**RITCHIE:** We've reached the point now, in 1973, when you decided to retire from the Committee. You'd been on the Committee since 1950, and Senator Fulbright was still the chairman.

**MARCY:** The first point to make is that I decided to retire before I knew whether Senator Fulbright was going to be renominated or not. I was influenced by the fact that it was a good time to retire from the point of view of future annuity.

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benefits, since I had had thirty-plus years in the government. For a long time I had resented seeing staff directors, like Jay Sourwine, to use a name, who had been around for twenty-five or thirty years and were decrepit old men, servicing young, vigorous incoming senators. So when some of the members of the Foreign Relations Committee were younger than I, I was uneasy. I didn't feel that it was quite appropriate for an older person to be in this staff role. There was another factor, and that was that Pat Holt had been in the number two spot for a long time. While I don't mean to sound like a philanthropist in turning it over to him, nevertheless it did seem to me that I had been holding a lot of people back for a long time--although before I left, I had talked with Pat about whether he would take over. He said he didn't think he would be interested. So I suggested Norvill Jones to Senator Fulbright. He asked, "What about Pat?" I told him just what I have told you. But after that, Pat came to me and said he'd been thinking about it, and if there was going to be a successor he thought maybe he'd better be staff director, so that was the way it was resolved. It was no great issue, we just operated on the basis that Pat had been there longer, had more experience, knew the people, and was an extremely competent individual. Those were all factors that influenced me.

RITCHIE: And Norvill Jones eventually became staff director.

MARCY: Norvill after that took over from Pat, yes.

RITCHIE: Did you have any anticipation that Senator Fulbright wouldn't be reelected in 1974?

MARCY: No, none at all. I had some personal projects that I was working on. There were things that I liked to do, such as rebuilding a mast on my son's boat. I left the Committee as of the first of January 1974, but continued as a consultant for a period of six months. I took a back office. Pat took the front office. I took my files with me to sort them out and think for six months what, if anything, I might do in the future. But I was available to the senators. But once the shift is made, it's made. There's not much one can do about it. I recall only having one real Committee assignment during that period when I was in a consultant status, and that was a speech for Senator Mansfield. Other than that I twiddled my thumbs and looked at my papers and contemplated the future, and came in three days a week instead of five, and didn't worry about who was going to testify or when or what senators would show up. It was a decompression period which I liked very much. I have never regretted having left, may I say. It might be that I would have regretted if Senator Fulbright had been renominated and elected, but that was not a factor.
RITCHIE: Fulbright set the record for the longest service as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and I suspect that you set the record as the longest serving staff director.

MARCY: I suspect so. And the way it looks, that's the way it's going to be for a long time! We may hold these longevity records into perpetuity. It seems to me that change comes much more rapidly now than in the past.

RITCHIE: Speaking of Senator Fulbright, I wanted to ask you what you thought about why he was defeated in 1974. It seems like a lot of members of the Foreign Relations Committee are vulnerable to charges that they've lost touch with their constituents to worry about world issues. I noticed a memo in your files about Senator Percy, when he came on the Committee, very early on this comment had been made about him, and you had prepared a little defense for him as

to how foreign relations relate to domestic issues. Do you think that members of the Committee are more politically vulnerable?

MARCY: That's the general belief. In Senator Fulbright's case I don't believe there was anything that he did in the area of foreign policy that turned off his constituency. I think he had lost touch with his constituency, not primarily because he was involved in foreign policy issues, but because he was not as well known to his constituency as was Governor [Dale] Bumpers. I'm sure if you looked at the press of Arkansas, you would find that Bumpers was mentioned two or three times compared to Senator Fulbright. I've often thought that it's hard for a senator in Washington to make headlines with respect to things that concern people in a state. Senators from Virginia or Maryland have a much easier time. Take Senator [Charles] Mathias, for example, anything he says on the national scene is immediately read by a large number of people within his state. But when Senator Fulbright said something it might make page 3 or 4 in the Arkansas Gazette. I think there may also have been some question of financial support having fallen off for Senator Fulbright. I really can't talk to that. I have heard implications that he had alienated Jewish constituents or Jewish money, but whether there's anything to that or not I just don't know. I don't know what the figures were, whether he was running out of money or not. I do know that at one point the polls did show he was running behind Bumpers even before Fulbright had announced he was going to run again. I recall a

conversation with Senator Fulbright in which he said he realized he probably would not be renominated, but he said, "It is very hard to pull out voluntarily because there are so many people who are counting on you--the people in your office, your friendly constituents back home, people who have supported you in
the past." He felt, even though it looked like he was in serious trouble, that it was not possible for him to withdraw from the primary without looking like he was leaving a lot of people in the lurch.

RITCHIE: Both Tom Connally and Walter George, having spent long periods in the Senate, read the handwriting on the wall when their reelections were coming up, and retired, while Fulbright went down to defeat.

MARCY: I happen to know in the case of Senator George that certain large contributors did tell him that the time had come for a change and he accepted that. I don't know about the Connally case. I suspect most people would look back now and wouldn't remember whether Fulbright was defeated or retired.

RITCHIE: Now from your perspective of ten years away from the Committee staff, how would you rate the three chairmen who succeeded Fulbright: John Sparkman, Frank Church, and now Charles Percy? How would you rate them as opposed to Fulbright as chairmen of the Committee?

MARCY: Obviously, I think that Fulbright was a much greater chairman than any of the three you have mentioned. Senator Sparkman was getting along in years by the time he became chairman. He used to fall asleep. He would sit in a public hearing and go to sleep, and I'd punch him. Senator Morse came to me one time and he said, "I think, Carl, you've got a responsibility to tell Senator Sparkman that he's got to see a doctor, because there must be something wrong with him. He's going to sleep all the time." I found that suggestion a little bit embarrassing. I said, "Well, why don't you tell him." And Senator Morse said, "Well, I think it would be more appropriate if you did." I said, "Well, I'll consider it," and that's all I did.

As for Senator Church, from the first day he walked into my office, when I was the staff director, it was clear he wanted to be chairman. He looked around the wall and saw these pictures of former chairmen of the Committee and he asked: "Where's Senator [William E.] Borah?" I said, "Well, we didn't start until after Borah." Senator Church said to me, "If I get you a picture of Borah will you put it on the wall?" I said, "Sure." Then he said, "Maybe someday I'll be there." He always had that expectation, and I know he was crushed when he was defeated. I discussed his qualities somewhat earlier saying that Senator Fulbright felt he could never quite count on Frank Church staying saddled, or firm on a position. I suppose you could speculate and say that that's what happened to Senator Church when he became chairman. I'm thinking specifically of how he caved in on the issue of a Soviet brigade in Cuba during hearings on SALT II. I felt that if
Church had held firm on SALT II we might very well have had that SALT agreement. It's hard to know, but that was one of the unfortunate things about our politics. Church had to worry because he was up for reelection the next year. To what extent his hard-line position on Russians in Cuba, led to this defeat, or would have saved him, it's hard to say.

**RITCHIE:** In a sense, he could never have out hard-lined his opponent.

**MARCY:** That's right.

**RITCHIE:** What's your impression of Senator Percy as chairman?

**MARCY:** Well, to my way of thinking, he is not independent enough. It is very difficult for a chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee to take positions contrary to those of a president of his own party. That may be one of the reasons why Senator Fulbright looked strong. He spoke out, he broke early with Lyndon Johnson, and then he never felt much affection for President Nixon. Fulbright was a senator's senator, whereas Percy has one foot in the Senate and another foot in the White House. He never knows quite which way to go. He's always back and forth, back and forth. He obviously needs the support of the Republican party campaign committee in the next

**RITCHIE:** Well, what are your views on the Committee itself, the Committee structure, the proliferation of subcommittees, the increase in the size of the staff? You pointed out the other day that there
are only two members of the staff who are still on who were there ten years ago, which is in itself a major change in the old patterns of operation.

**MARCY:** Yes, as I mentioned earlier in our discussion today I went to my first hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee since I left, this morning, and there were fifteen or sixteen staff people sitting behind the senators’ empty chairs, and there were three senators there, on and off. I think that's a sad situation. We talked much earlier in our discussions about the importance of the Senate having countervailing expertise. Well, there is a limit to the amount of countervailing expertise one needs. Committees must resist getting bogged down in minutia. Staff people are judged by how much attention they can get for their senators. I still think that most senators like to have a piece of legislation named after them. They don't say it, but when somebody says: "What did you do when you were a senator?” one can't very well recall that he voted for the MX, or against the MX. If a senator has his name attached to a piece of legislation--the Fulbright Act or the Percy Amendment, things of that sort that are quickly understood--it is helpful. It's interesting to me that if you look at the Committee today there are few names that the public is familiar with. I suspect a poll would find more people in the street who would recognize the name Helms than would recognize the name Percy.

I think the problem is that increasing the size of the staff has tended to create fragmentation within the Senate, and I don't think that fragmentation as a concept is very good. I suppose you can say the same thing is true with respect to the executive branch: the larger it becomes the harder it is for anybody to know what the institution stands for. I continually ask myself: what are all these people doing? I don't know. Here is an example. The day before yesterday, Senator Fulbright, who was to testify before the Committee this morning, called me up and asked if I knew what the subject matter was to be, and who else was going to testify. I called Bill Ashworth on the staff, who I had known earlier; he didn't know. I called John Ritch, who is Senator Pell’s right-hand man; he didn't know. He said, "Talk to Diane Smith," whom I did not know. I tried to get to her; well, she was busy. Finally got a call back, after about three or four hours, by which time Fulbright had already written his statement.

I must give you one example of an idea which I gave to Senator Fulbright, which he used in his testimony today. He asked what I thought he ought to talk about. I said, "Oh, you can take your usual subject on empathizing with the Russians--they misperceive us, and we misperceive them, and we've got to break those misperceptions down." I said that it occurred to me that the simplest way to make the point would be to look at the senators who were there and say to them: "You know, if you had been born in the Soviet Union, you
probably would be members of the Politburo, instead of United States senators. And what would you be doing if you were members of the Politburo?" He used that as a stimulus. It does provoke a bit of thought, because members of the Politburo got to the top because they had some of the attributes that senators have. Kind of interesting. But that's the first help that I've given Senator Fulbright for a long time--and it wasn't much.

RITCHIE: Moving beyond your observations on the Committee, what about the Senate as a whole? You worked for the United States Senate for twenty-three years, and you've been in Washington much longer than that and have been watching it ever since. How would you say the institution changed, or didn't change during the period you were associated with it?

MARCY: That's a hard question, Don, I'd really have to think about that. I should be able just to say it's worse now than it was at an earlier time, but that's superficial. I think the Senate still maintains a very significant role, illustrated by the fact that at some point enough senators get riled up about an issue so they finally stand up on their hind legs and shout. It took, what, a year and a half or two before senators had had it with [Joseph] McCarthy, just had it. At an earlier time, it took a long time for the Senate to wean itself away from Senator Taft, a strong isolationist voice, but finally the point was reached when enough senators moved in the UN/NATO direction. Same thing is true with respect to Vietnam. Inclination was to go along, give the executive branch what it wanted--provide the money, send the boys--but at some point the Senate perceived the disaster that was going on in Vietnam, earlier I think than did the administration. They perceived it earlier, I don't know whether they spoke up enough, but at some point they would have. Johnson's decision not to run quieted the Senate for a period of time. But I think by the time Watergate came along it was not just the feeling of power that was being exercised by Nixon, but a feeling that they had been misled by Vietnamization which was institutionalized in the feeling that we've had enough of Mr. Nixon, and Watergate sort of adds to it.

To answer your question without having thought about it more than this, let me speculate as to the future. I do think now, on the issue of United States-Soviet relations, call it arms control issues, that there is a growing feeling now that President Reagan and his administration have not produced what the Senate feels is absolutely essential to the security of this country: some kind of control, some kind of reversal of the nuclear race. At some point the Senate will stand up. They haven't quite done it yet on the [Nuclear] Freeze Resolution. They've done it on several general resolutions. They've only gone as far as the president himself
has gone; nuclear war is something we would be crazy to do, but nevertheless we've got to be ready to do it. But I think within the Senate there is a growing amount of backbone to insist the administration negotiate more seriously than they have done. Now, I am passing a political judgment, because one can take the point of view very easily that everything that has gone wrong in this world for the last twenty-five or thirty years has been the fault of the Russians. But rationally you know that's not the case. I think that more and more senators are feeling that way. I would guess that there will be a gradual assertion of power in the Senate.

Going back to the hearing this morning, Senator Percy pointed out that right now there are three treaties with the Russians before the Senate that have been submitted by previous administrations which the Senate itself has shelved and not acted upon. Most people think that the Reagan administration withdrew the treaties from the Senate. Not true. They're still pending before the Senate. And, as a matter of fact, all of them are being observed, even though the Senate itself has not given its advice and consent. In a sense, this shows the weakness of the Senate at this point in time. The Senate will raise hell with Mr. Reagan for not making headway in negotiations on arms control, but the Senate itself is not strong enough institutionally, is not sure enough of itself, to go ahead and act on the treaties before it. Two-thirds of the senators could give their consent to the ratification of the limited test ban treaty. Two-thirds of the senators could amend, or attach such reservations as are necessary to the SALT II treaty and send it back to the president, and exert some power and some influence. They're not willing to do it. At an earlier time, they might have. I would think that if Senator Fulbright were chairman of the Committee today and felt as he did then, and as he does now, he would view the fact that those three treaties are before the Senate as a tremendous opportunity for the Senate to reassert its role in the conduct of foreign policy. And with Senate leadership I think it could be done. You know, you could just embarrass this administration no end by the fact that President Reagan says SALT II was disastrous--what was the word--"fatally flawed." But we're living up to it! Been doing it for three years. It's silly.

RITCHIE: So you think leadership is the real key.

MARCY: I think so.

RITCHIE: Well leadership in some respects comes with the authority of the position. When someone like Fulbright becomes chairman, that carries with it
some authority. But you've pointed out that none of the chairmen who succeeded Fulbright have had the same authority that he had. How does leadership develop in an institution that, on paper at least, is a hundred separate but equal individuals?

**MARCY:** Well, it takes time. It takes personality. It takes hard work. It takes an ability to have other individuals recognize a

person as an individual who knows what he or she is talking about. One of the problems of the Senate is that senators have so many constituencies that they have to worry about. They have to worry about agriculture, about trade, about labor problems. It's very difficult for a senator to become recognized as a great authority on anything. Fulbright very much confined his work to issues of foreign policy. He'd make pro forma speeches on agriculture and rice and things of that sort. Those were the sorts of things that his domestic staff would put into his hands and he would do his domestic duties. But on these other issues, the foreign policy issues, he thought about them, he read about them. I was going to say he knew the figures, that's not quite right, because that's one of the problems. To come back a little bit, there is a distinction between knowing the nuts and bolts and realizing that the nuts and bolts are there because of a policy or the lack of a policy.

I think Fulbright was a leader because he managed to keep his eye on the fundamental, basic, policy issues. To come back to our Church example earlier; the issue of a Soviet brigade in Cuba was certainly not a fundamental policy issue in the framework of the overall impact that approval of a SALT treaty would have had. I think sometimes that leadership comes from a person's voice. Walter George had a tremendous resonant voice, and when he would say some simple thing it sounded like it came from God himself. Those things are characteristics of leadership. And I think leadership within the

Senate means that you can't be anyone's person. You cannot jump to attention when the president or the Secretary of State takes a position. You can't just say, "That's right." When one believes the president is right, you say it's right, but then people listen to you because they know very well that if you think a policy is wrong, that it ought to be changed you speak up, you say it. Too many senators, I think, keep quiet if they disagree with the president, or they make some innocuous statement. You can't lead that way.

**RITCHIE:** Do you think that a different type of person is being elected into the Senate these days? Are the types of senators that you were dealing with when you
first came to the Senate considerably different than the ones when you left, or when you look over the scene today?

**MARCY:** That's a very hard question to separate in one's own mind and judgment. When I went to the Senate as a young man, the great people it seemed to me were Taft, Vandenberg, Connally, and Milliken. I'd look up to them because I was young, they were experienced, and powers in the institution. Now to compare a Vandenberg with a [Howard] Baker, it's just very hard for me. I think, for example, a Baker is probably, potentially, a great senator, had he stayed. And I think he may have other aspirations. But I don't see anyone coming up through the Foreign Relations Committee at this point who to my way of thinking would have the stature of any of the people that I have mentioned.

**RITCHIE:** What is it that has changed the nature of things? Why is the political system no longer producing the Tafts and the Vandenbergs and the Georges and the Fulbrights anymore?

**MARCY:** Well, you see, you're making the assumption that I was trying to avoid. You are saying that those are the great people, and I was saying that I don't know whether they're so great because I have this problem of relating the past, which I admired, to the present, which I do not know as much about. If we take your assumption, I suppose we could speculate and say for some reason the Senate is not as powerful an institution as it used to be. But on the other hand, Don, who are the likely candidates for the President of the United States? This is something that has always intrigued me.

It used to be the governors who became candidates. Recently, we have had Governor Carter and Governor Reagan, neither of whom I think were very competent presidents. They could run a state which is quite different than it is to run the United States. So I tend to think that the best candidates for the presidency are people who come out of the Senate, perhaps out of the House in some instances. I certainly didn't agree with much of what President Nixon did, but Mr. Nixon did know a great deal more about operating in Washington than either Carter or Reagan. Ford know more about operating in this environment than either of them. Kennedy knew more about it because he had had some immersion in the institution. Truman and Johnson knew this place. Yet the very fact that a person acquires experience in this town may be one of the reasons now, speaking in a wider framework, that the public resents.
It's no longer good to say you were a great senator. The public is going to say: "You mean you were a senator when they voted for the ERA?" or when they did so-and-so. The problem with coming from the Senate to become a presidential candidate is that everything you did is on the record. Very hard to find what kind of a record Carter or Reagan had. You can draw some speculation from speeches that they have given, but they didn't have to vote on anything. Senators have to stand up and be counted. They have a record which may deny them a national appeal. Yet, at the same time, because they have had the experience of making tough decisions, and the experience of operating within a bureaucracy, which, like it or not, is going to be here, because that is where most expertise exists.

RITCHIE: It's a paradox.

MARCY: It is. It's a paradox. Let's see, are all I of the [1984] Democratic candidates former members of the Senate?

RITCHIE: Except for Reuben Askew.

MARCY: Except for Askew. And surely if Reagan decides not to run the candidates will probably be Baker, and [Robert] Dole, [George] Bush, all who have had Washington experience. It's a hard thing. All are insiders. I guess Reagan is now an insider, although he seems continually to deny it.

RITCHIE: And Jimmy Carter couldn't run as an outsider in 1980, after he campaigned as that in 1976.

MARCY: That's right.

RITCHIE: Well, can you tell me a little bit about what you've been doing since you left the Foreign Relations Committee?

MARCY: I never looked for a job after I left the Foreign Relations Committee. I sometimes think maybe I should have. I might have become a lobbyist or something of that sort. But I did make a resolve that I was not going to be involved in going back and calling on senators or calling in chits, this kind of business. So, soon after I left I started thinking about the possibility of doing a newsletter, called the "Foreign Affairs Newsletter." I found a friend who helped me get started, and I did a few issues, and then I was invited to go with the Council for a Liveable World, which Senator [Albert] Gore had been with--when Senator Gore left the Senate he went with the Council for a while. For about a year and a half or two years, I had a very nice arrangement which provided me
with an office, an annual retainer, and a secretary. I worked for the Council, not buttonholing people, but nevertheless trying to give them advice on legislative matters that they might support. The Council was very interested in arms control and I did draft and managed to engineer a proposal where we got, I think it was three or four million dollars more for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency than the administration had requested. So I got a few things like that done. But I had other clients. One of my clients was the UN University, which was then being established in Tokyo. The Japanese were behind it and wanted the UN University there, but they couldn't get any money out of the United States Congress. So I represented them for a while, and some other private clients. One of the clients was an organization called the American Committee on United States-Soviet Relations, which had been organized by Fred Warner Neal, a professor at Claremont College in California. It was an organization which was set up to defeat the Jackson-Vanik amendment. I should say it started out with the concept of supporting the idea of detente, and the first issue was the Jackson-Vanik amendment, and I represented them, again not for lobbying purposes, but for sort of advisory purposes. It was a very, very informal group. It was not incorporated. It was most college professors, but it did have three very significant individuals as co-chairmen--John Kenneth Galbraith on the left; on the right Donald Kendall, who was president of Pepsi-Cola; and in the center was George Kennan. That was the core group. When I left the Council for a Liveable World, I decided that this was an organization worth spending a lot of time with. They were willing to have me, so I became co-director of that organization, and secretary-treasurer, along with a lady named Jeanne Mattison, who had been a fund-raiser with the Council for a Liveable World. The two of us got an office and worked with Don Kendall and Ken Galbraith, and George Kennan. We incorporated, began to put out a newsletter, increased the membership. We now have an organization of about four hundred and fifty individuals who believe in negotiation instead of confrontation with the Soviet Union. It's now called the American Committee on East-West Accord, instead of the American Council on United States-Soviet Relations. We get about a third of our support from business organizations, about a third from foundations, and about a third from private individuals.

What draws this group together is they all believe that the arms race has got to be brought under control, that we and the Soviets have got to live on the same world. But they realize we can't make much headway in negotiating arms control if we do not have other kinds of relations with that other society, such as trade. So most of the things we do fall into the category of promoting non-military trade between the two societies, educational and cultural exchanges,
and doing all we possibly can to support strategic arms reductions. It's a very interesting group. We hold one all membership meeting a year. We've just brought out a book called *Common Sense In United States-Soviet Trade*, which is going very well. It's a follow-up on a book with the same title which we did about six years ago. We did a book called *The Common Sense in United States-Soviet Relations*, which was taken over by a commercial outfit and republished as *Detente or Debacle*. We do Op-Ed pieces. We try to get on television shows, news programs, anything we can to promote a general understanding, to empathize with the Soviet Union a little more than we do.

Take the hearing this morning, for example. We persuaded Senator Fulbright, George Ball, Admiral Gayler, to call on Senator Percy last spring and encourage him to hold "educational hearings" on United States-Soviet relations. He thought it was a good idea. This was the opening session, and of the four witnesses there, two of them were members of our Committee, Fulbright and Gayler, so we were able to get our concept before a group like that.

I might mention, for the sake of the record, one other thing that we have done, which is very interesting. One of the ideas we had was to see if we could get all of the former United States ambassadors to the Soviet Union together. At first it was just going to be a dinner. The seven former ambassadors to the Soviet Union with whom Jeanne Mattison and I had dinner on this last Monday night were Governor [Averell] Harriman, George Kennan, Tom Watson, Jake Beam, Malcolm Toon, Foy Kohler, and Walter Stoessel. It’s a very interesting group. They come together, they talk informally. We don't keep any record except notes that I take. This project is intriguing to foundations. The Ford Foundation is sponsoring it now. So far the ambassadors haven't said anything publicly. I think they may. The very existence of the group, however, has excited another foundation, the Sloan Foundation, to prepare a "video-history" with the group. However, I am now in the process of leaving as co-director of the American Committee. I think, Don, I have gotten to the point in life where I'm a little bit tired of taking notes on what other people say, planning agendas for other people. I am now at the point where I want to be invited to come to things and express myself candidly as I have been to you, without having to worry about doing anything more than correcting a few points in the transcripts.

**RITCHIE:** Let somebody else take the notes.

**MARCY:** Let someone else take the notes, let someone else plan the meetings.
RITCHIE: Well, it's appropriate that today is the fiftieth anniversary of United States-Soviet diplomatic relations, for us to be concluding this series of conversations. I hope from time to time we can update them.

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MARCY: Well, I hope at the one hundredth anniversary you're still here and can celebrate it.

RITCHIE: Maybe I'll be retired and someone will be interviewing me.

MARCY: That's a good note to end on.

[End of Interview #8]
Carl M. Marcy
Chief of Staff
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1955-1973

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