Warren Featherstone Reid
Assistant to Warren G. Magnuson, 1949-1981

Preface
by Donald A. Ritchie

During the years that Warren Featherstone Reid served on the Senate staff as an aide to the chairman of the Commerce Committee, the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, the president pro tempore, and the senior Senator from the State of Washington, he needed only one calling card: "Assistant to Warren G. Magnuson." Reid's close association with Senator Magnuson stretched from his appointment on the senator's patronage as an elevator operator in 1949, to their mutual retirement from the Senate in 1981. Over the years, Reid had the opportunity to witness the inside workings of the Senate as an institution through one of its most influential members. In these oral history interviews he recounts his experiences and observations.

Featherstone Reid was born in Wenatchee, Washington, where he lived until he came to Washington, D.C. to attend George Washington University, supporting himself as a Senate elevator operator and member of the Capitol Police Force. In 1950-1951 he served in the United States Air Force, and then returned to Washington State, where he completed his B.A. at the University of Washington. He also attended law school there, and received his J.D. in 1961. After a stint on the staff of the state legislature in Olympia, Washington, Reid returned to the national capital to work for Senator Magnuson.

Specializing in health and education matters, Reid worked with the senator on the Commerce Committee and the Independent Offices and Health, Education, and Welfare subcommittees of the Appropriations Committee. When Magnuson became chairman of the powerful Appropriations Committee and also president pro tem of the Senate, Reid became his chief aide and troubleshooter. From this unique vantage, Featherstone Reid discusses both the legislative and the appropriations processes, the influence of lobbying by private groups and by presidential administrations from Lyndon Johnson to Jimmy Carter, the impact of the media on state and national politics, and the transformation of the Senate from a small community with an "Inner Club" to a large, complex institution whose procedures have been opened to public view through various "Sunshine" regulations. Throughout it all, Reid also narrates the remarkable political career of one of the Senate's great "Work Horses," Warren Magnuson, his personality, his elections, and his legislative accomplishments.

After he left the Senate, Reid became chairman of the Washington State Board of Health. In 1994 the Washington state legislature authorized an annual Warren Featherstone Reid Award for Excellence in Health Care. He died on October 20, 2002.
RITCHIE: I'd like to begin by asking you about your background, where you grew up and where you went to school. It was in the state of Washington, wasn't it?

REID: Yes, the town of Wenatchee—it's Indian. I spent my entire childhood and common schooling there. It's a fairly small town; it's still about the same size as it was when I was raised there, sixteen thousand. It's a sort of a center in a way because it's at the confluence of the Wenatchee River and the Columbia. It's a very rich agricultural area in that the soil there is excellent for any kind of fruit, cherries, apricots, apples. It's also very rich for wine grapes. Now, when the West was won and the empire builders like Jim Hill, who built the Great Northern Railroad, came through there, his railroad wanted tonnage so they pushed the production of apples. So that's how the area originally started. As a kid I did pick cherries and 'cots. I never picked apples, we had migrants that came through and did most of that. I did pick apples one year during World War II when the migrants weren't coming, the apple crop wasn't getting off, they let school out and everybody went and helped get the crop off.

So I grew up in a fairly small town, a very stable town, a town that did not have any minorities. I remember going to school with two kids that said they were Jewish, I was Presbyterian. It was almost entirely white, Anglo-Saxon. During that period that I was growing up—I was born in 1929—during the mid-1930's we became the recipients of immigrants. But these were immigrants in a different way. These were people from Kentucky and Oklahoma, mainly, and some from Arkansas, that were driven out by economic and climatic conditions. I heard about the "Dust Bowl" from some of them. They'd been second or third, even fourth generations in their home towns and had to leave and come in cars, pick-up trucks, with all their belongings. Many of them established themselves in the fruit business and eeked out a living.

It was a relatively small town with only three grade schools, when I was there, one junior high school, and one high school. It was separated from another county by the Columbia River, where there were two grade schools, a junior high, and no high school. So in the valley everybody went to the same high school. My graduating class of 1946 had two hundred and twelve kids in it. I think the graduating class today in Wenatchee approaches three hundred and fifty, or something like that. I have a lot of friends that are still there.

I would say that it was a typical small town. Not really rural America because we were very close to Seattle and Spokane, which were large cities then and still are. I never visited Seattle as a youngster. I did maybe as an eight or ninth grader. Then when I was out of high school I went to a junior college. We call them
community colleges now. That high school building, the physical plant that I went to as a junior high school person, all I did was cross a magic dividing line near the center of the building and moved into the high school when I went to high school. There was another little magic dividing line of an addition to that structure that was the junior college. So I spent over six or seven years in this same building that was only three blocks from where I grew up. I walked to grade school, junior high, high school, although many of my classmates had to take buses because they lived up the valley and were ten and twelve miles from town. That was growing up in Wanatchee.

RITCHIE: What did your parents do?

REID: My mother was always a mother and a housewife, an old fashioned one. She was Scotch-Irish. She died at eighty-five. My father only lived to be sixty-one. He was a bookkeeper. He was born in upstate New York. His parents moved to Chicago where his father was a tanner of leather. His father went into "town"—they lived in Chicago but he went into "town" to collect a debt. He collected the debt and never returned. My father was about twelve or thirteen at the time. There was an uncle that was involved with the railroad, the Great Northern, somehow, and so my father and his mother and a brother went out west. His father didn't show up and they presumed he had been killed or was dead, it's never been established. They left Chicago and came to the Wenatchee Valley and settled in Wenatchee. My uncle settled in Cashmere, which is twenty miles from Wenatchee in the same valley.

My mother had been born in Minnesota. She was born in Featherstone township and was a Featherstone. And again, the railroad brought them west, because her father—my grandfather Featherstone—was an engineer with the railroad and had an opportunity to "move out west," and did. At the time the section, the dividing point where men got off a train and other men got on board and went further, was in Leavenworth, which again was only about thirty miles from Wenatchee. So my mother came to Leavenworth in about 1904 to 1906, as a very young girl. She was in grade school. She finished the schooling that Leavenworth was able to give, and her parents had enough money that they sent her to Pullman, which was the state college, but it was also the finishing school for kids in eastern Washington who did not have a high school. It had a residential program. My mother graduated in 1914 from a program that gave her some kind of a diploma. At that time they even called it a baccalaureate. So my mother had an advanced education. My father never finished the eighth grade because of that problem in Chicago. He had gotten into retail merchandizing. He was working in a grocery store, furniture store, or just a general store. Later, he stayed fairly close to the furniture business, even though through the LaSalle Extension Courses he learned bookkeeping. He was a calligrapher. He used to do what I would say was calligraphy for Wenatchee. Not quite as fancy as some of our people do here, but for Wenatchee he was very much in demand and could earn four or five dollars by doing a fancy piece of paper for somebody, and that was big money in those days.

They got married just before World War I. My oldest sister was born in '17, while my father was in France. He was with the Signal Corps. He developed an interest in photography, being with the Signal Corps.
The Signal Corps still handles "signals" and they still handle photography. In fact, in my experience here at the White House photo shop, I ran into people who were with the Army Signal Corps. But my father developed quite an interest in photography. He was a good photographer and took the first aerial photograph of Wenatchee that is still blown up wall size and displayed in the Chamber of Commerce, because it was such a good one. Before the days of pollution it was a very clear photograph. He took it from a plane that was piloted by a character named Pangborn, and a character named Pangborn was the first one that did to the Pacific what Lindbergh did to the Atlantic.

During my time, when I knew my Dad, he was a bookkeeper and accountant. I can remember when he was secretary to the county commissioners in the mid-1930's. He was involved in the Works Progress Administration as the administrator for the county commissioners in handling the book work that the program required. He was also one of the founders of the American Legion. He was at the meeting in Paris when it was launched, and then returned to Wenatchee and helped organize the one in Wenatchee. He was the adjutant of that particular post, Post 10, all of his adult life. In fact, when he died, he was still the adjutant, he was the secretary. But my father died in '53 and my mother died in '74.

My mother never worked until just before my father died, when she took a job with a hospital in Wenatchee, which was right again half a block from where we lived. She was the night person on the desk and handled the phones and did the book work of entering patients in and out, and keeping the ledger that every hospital has—every new patient has a new number, and it's serial—and that's what she did. She did that for about eleven years, until about '65 when she did not enjoy keeping the yard up at the old family home and moved to Spokane where my older sister and her husband, the three of them, lived together the last years of my mother's life.

RITCHIE: When you went to junior college, did you intend to go into accounting to follow your father? What were your objectives, at that stage?

REID: My first job, I got a job when I was eleven or twelve years old with another hospital. We had two hospitals in Wenatchee. One was Protestant and the other was Catholic. At that time we lived a half a block from the Catholic hospital. All of this within a six block radius. I wanted a job, and it was during the war when there were no men around. I went over to this Catholic hospital. I had always seen these nuns walking around, the Sisters of St. Joseph's of Newark, and I had always been fascinated by them. As a Presbyterian, I didn't have any of the fear of them that a young Catholic boy might have. So I just stormed over there one day and went up to the one that I knew was the boss. Of course, I knew enough to call her Sister. And I asked her if there wasn't any job around there that they needed done that I could do. There was, and I went to work for fifty cents an hour. I stayed associated with that hospital for ten years. I swept the floor and mopped, and did everything. In fact, I ran an elevator. Of course, it wasn't legal, but there wasn't anybody around, there weren't inspectors, so here was a twelve or thirteen-year-old child throwing the crank and opening the door of an elevator.

I became fascinated with the doctors and with nurses. I've always been able to, I think, meet people
easily. Here I was, a very young boy, and here were these young girls who were maybe eight, nine years older than I, who were in nurses training. They came from the same background I did, and so I was sort of a very younger brother. I was no threat. I hadn't discovered sex or anything yet when I first started there. So I had a rapport with the nurses and the sisters, and some of the doctors because they knew my dad. I was actually allowed to watch an operation.

It was an appendectomy, and there wasn't much to see. I became fascinated and I wanted to be a doctor. So when I started community college I had that hope. But I did very poorly in chemistry. In fact, the only D's I ever got in college in my entire career were in chemistry. Well, in those days you could not aspire to medicine unless you had a scientific baccalaureate, and so that went out the window.

I was in community college from '46 to '49 before I came back here, and I became fascinated with the production of dramatic events. I had been in drama a little bit. I didn't like serious drama; I liked comedy. But then I became fascinated with the production side, and I was quite good at it. I can make things with my hands with wood or anything. I know something about electricity and I know something about lighting. We had quite a good auditorium. It was antiquated, but we were able to make do. And I had a couple of associates that were brilliant. I had one especially that was a brilliant electrical engineer. He took some of the surplus military property of World War II and some of the miniconductors at that time, and we were able to change our lighting system entirely from old rheostats that just burn up the heat and put in a very modern transformer system. So we had a ball. We had a very good drama coach.

We also had a brilliant art director in Wenatchee—Fern Cousineau Duncan. The Cousineaus goes back to the Arc du Triumph, because one of her uncles was the architect of the Arc du Triumph. She was very much involved in a civic event that we had in Wenatchee, the Apple Blossom Festival. It's about seventy years old now. I became involved with it in 1946. It was shut down more or less during the war, but when it came back in '45, '46 I became involved with it, and for five years I was very much involved with this production. It was a three-day event and we built an outdoor stage and put on an outdoor production, day and night. I was very much involved in the building of the structure and executing her designs. She had her own students that did the artistic painting and everything, but I had to make sure that they could stay up. One year we almost failed because we had a sixteen-foot wall and we did not have enough support holding it, and the wind came up. We almost lost it. Well, I was very taken with this, and still enjoy it. In fact, whenever I go to the theater today I not only enjoy the production from a dramatic standpoint, but I enjoy it from a technical standpoint, because I know some of the things that are in it. I've loved it back here because I've been back stage at Wolf Trap, and at the Kennedy Center, and at Radio City, and gone through some of the things with some of the people there and have just loved it. And I was thinking of that.

But I got involved with a fraternal organization, the Order of DeMolay. Some people call it a junior-Masonic, it is not. It is sponsored by the Masonic Fraternity. DeMolay was an organization for young men, at one time it was sixteen to twenty-one, but after World War II they dropped it to fourteen to twenty-one. Wenatchee had had a DeMolay chapter before World War II. It died during World War II and they brought it
back in 1947, '48. I became a member. I became "the scribe," the secretary of the local chapter. I went to a state convention in the fall of '47 in Olympia, and it's the quirk of politics I guess. Here I had been a member less than six months, and a couple of people were running for state secretary, state scribe, and it became apparent everybody was mad at one of them. So the night before the election somebody said, "Well, Feather, why don't you run?" "Oh, you've got to be kidding." Well, I ran and won. So I was state secretary. The following year, at our state convention, again there were two people that thought they should be state master counselor. I couldn't make up my mind about them, I liked them both. And again, some people said, "Feather, they're no good, we've got to run you." So I ran and on the tenth ballot, by two votes, I won. So that in a way was an introduction to politics. I discovered in that experience of a year and a half, of being one, secretary and two, president, that there were certain benefits in both jobs, but that for me personally, I enjoyed being the secretary. I think that has helped me in my "political career" because that is the position I have enjoyed for almost thirty years. It does not bother me, I'm not frustrated that I only am an aide and that he has the vote. I've never forgotten that somebody else has the vote, not me. I agonize less over those votes because he has to agonize. But I found myself, I think, in that year and a half period. It also opened the door for coming back here.

Two of my friends that I had met in Olympia in '47 that were political associates within DeMolay somehow discovered that Scoop Jackson, their congressman, had patronage jobs. One of them could be a doorkeeper in the House. The other one could be a stack person at the Library of Congress. So they were going to go to Washington in January of '49, and they said, "Feather, why don't you come along." I said, "Well, I know Scoop Jackson, but I'm not from his district. My district has Walter Horan, he's a Republican, he doesn't have any patronage." "Well, you must know Maggie." I said, "Maggie? Who's Maggie"? But again, going back to my father, my father's county commissioner at the time, I knew him quite well, was Art Garton. Art Garton was a person who had been in politics in the state of Washington from the early '40's, was very active at that time and is still somewhat active today, and Art Garton was a "neighbor" in Chelan County, and Art Garton did know Magnuson very well. So Art Garton contacted Magnuson and said, "You know, we've got this kid in Wenatchee who wants to come back with two kids from Billingham. Can't you do something for him?" Magnuson said, "Sure, I've got an elevator job. He can be an elevator operator."

So I arrived here in January of '49 and became an elevator operator and went to G.W. [George Washington University] and got to know Magnuson personally. Another child from Wenatchee, whom I never knew in Wenatchee, he was thirteen years old when he arrived here, was the son of Magnuson's roommate [Joseph Leo Hughes] in college. In 1932 Magnuson ran for the [state] house in Seattle and his roommate ran for the house in Chelan County. His roommate ran as a Republican, Magnuson ran as a Democrat. One was elected and the other was not. On election night they talked to each other, and according to Magnuson and Joe Hughes, Magnuson said, "You can still come to Olympia because I think I've got some kind of patronage down there, you could be my page. You're not making any money practicing law." Joe said, "Oh, to heck with that, but I'll just take a rain check." Well the rain check was picked up in 1949. His oldest boy, Benjie, came here to be a page. The relationship between the Hughes and Magnuson was extremely close, still is. Strangely enough, my
father had taught Sunday School, and Joe Hughes had been a student of his in Sunday School. So there was a relationship between me and Joe Hughes, but I didn't even know it. So when the boy came back here, the boy was "put in my charge," so it was really through the boy—the three of us, the boy, me and Magnuson—that I really became personally acquainted with Magnuson, and he with me.

Of course, I was in awe. There was a chemistry there that worked. And so in 1950, when Magnuson had a reelection campaign, and I got through the college term here in June, it was decided, "Well, why don't we send Feather out and he can drive and do all sorts of funny little things." I went out home to help on the campaign, and Korea broke. My father was on the draft board. So my father was able to advise me that my number was up. And I was able to suggest to my father, "Well, if my number is up and they know it, then I can't enlist. But if they don't know it and I don't know it officially, right?" Right. He was able to delay the paperwork through about a ten-day period in September, the primary was on the 12th. So I was able to get through the primary and went into the air force and bid a fond adieu to Magnuson and politics.

RITCHIE: As a young man coming to Washington and meeting a senator for the first time, what was your impression of Magnuson? I always think of Magnuson as a much older man who had been in the Senate for thirty years, but when you first met him he was still in his first term. How did he strike you back then?

REID: Well, when I first physically saw him he was much smaller than I had pictured him, because I had pictured him as a taller man. And he was rather short. He's always had a barrel chest, so he was a little bit big and imposing. He's always had relatively broad shoulders and a straight back. He almost looks the part of a lineman on a football team, or a running back, and he was while he was in college. He was a quarterback and a runner when he was in college. But when I first met him he was in his late thirties, early forties, so he was much older than I, and I was in awe. I did run an elevator, but I think it was a small town—it's still a small town in a way but it was a much smaller town when I was first here, in only the Russell Building. Patronage was very much the thing, and there was, I wouldn't say a lot of patronage, but comparatively there was more, although the police force was small, the number of doormen were small. The elevator operators, in a way, was one of the best because you had a set shift and you didn't work overtime. All the elevators had a handle and had to be operated, and so we had a full crew. But you got to know people. The Carroll Arms was a place where if you were high paid you could afford to go, but almost everybody ate within the [Senate Office] building. And an awful lot of people came by the trolley that stopped right outside the building. I was fortunate to start out on Carroll Arms side—no, I started out on the other corner, which was a little bit slower, it didn't have as much business. But I liked it and they liked me, and somebody—I think Caraway [Lewey Caraway, Superintendent of Senate Office Buildings] was even then what he is today, of course he was somebody I never saw, but the person that worked for him decided, "Well, we'll put Reid over on the busy corner."

You got to know people, and of course, I was a brash young person. It didn't bother me to say hello to a
senator when they were alone. Now if they were with people and talking, I never interfered. But when they were alone it didn't bother me to say hello, and I would try to remember something from the Post or the Daily News and I'd ask them something. So I did get to know people. I think it was a gal who became Mrs. Joe McCarthy, Jean [Kerr] that worked up in Ed Thye's office when I first saw her. I started talking to her because she was a good-looking gal. I was fortunate when I was on that corner that Harry Cain, who had become a senator from the state of Washington, his office was up on that corner and all of his people came up and down that elevator and I got to know all of them. Some of them are still friends. One girl who was his secretary and involved in press I got to know quite well, Emily Walker from Tacoma.

Then I did well on that corner and they moved me around to what was known as the elevator entrance to the Russell Building. Now that was the crème de la crème, because that elevator that went up and down from the limousine entrance to the Caucus Room, that's where I got to chat with people like Dean Acheson. I'll never forget that first time when he got aboard alone and he kind of looked at me and he said, "Well, son, what year are you in college." He knew with the patronage system that you had to be in college. You know, that really impressed me, that the secretary of state going upstairs to testify on the NATO Treaty at the time would be so relaxed and cool that he could talk to an elevator operator, and me to him. Later I asked him one time, "You know, in there, you and Mr. Taft don't seem to get along, and yet I've seen you in the hallway." And I think they were both Overseers at Harvard at that time. He said something like: "Well, son, you have to realize that there is a difference between 'in there' and the real world."

But it was a much smaller town, Capitol Hill and the Senate. Although I was only here really a year and a half, there were people that I met then, some of them became infamous or famous, some of them are still around. Joe Stewart [Walter J. Stewart, Democratic Secretary], I remember him as a page. Although he and I weren't really friends, we at least knew each other to the point when I got back here in '64, and Joe was still here, he remembered me. Dicky Darling was still here—Dicky's mother had been Less Biffle's [Secretary of the Senate] private secretary. There was another page that was in the '49-'50 period that was still in the cloakroom, and there were a few other people around that I remembered and that remembered me. But it had grown, of course, with the new building. I think when I came, Magnuson's staff numbered nine or ten at the most in '49, and was compacted into three rooms; it later became four rooms. When I came in '49 he was where he ended up in '81. He never moved after he got that one central core office, 127. He loved the outlook on the park over there with the fountain, so he never opted for the Dirksen Building. There was only one building then, we just called it "the" Senate Office Building, later it was "the Old," then it became Russell. But for some people it's still "the Old Building."

RITCHIE: As an elevator operator there must have been a certain protocol that you had to operate by, as to who took priority over others. Were they very strict about it in those days?

REID: Oh, yes. In those days the buzzers, the thing you punch—there's still a couple of them around, I think one of the freight elevators over there still has a brass knob. You push it and it
engages the electrical system. But in those days it was an actual buzzer. When you touched it, it buzzed and it lit up on your screen, and it lit up red or green. Senators pushed it three times, although some of the more elderly ones had a little trouble differentiating. But if it wiggled, you assumed that it was a senator. Also at that time all of these elevator shafts were "open." They had grills. The doors were glass; at least half of them were glass. The interior door of the elevator was all glass with a frame around it. You had a knob that you twisted back and forth, one way for up, the other way for down, and you had full control. Most of them you actually had to level it, by that I mean you had to get it down so that it matched the hallway floor and you could walk out without stumbling. It was during that period that Otis came along and came up with some kind of an automatic leveler. If you got it within eight or twelve inches, then the automatic would take over and level, but only some of the elevators had that.

If you were moving, and there was three buzzes, you just looked. It was second nature, you would see and you would tie that blinking light to a senator. If you were anywhere near you went, even if you reversed direction, which you could do by just flipping the handle, and you picked them up. Some of them were very insistent on being picked up. And the word got around. You just did not pass up somebody like Pat McCarran. You just broke your ass not to get them upset. And sometimes there was a need—you know, if there was a vote on and the bells were ringing they had to get over to the Capitol. And in those days all we had were bells. We did not have the electrical lights that came along in the mid-60's. All we had was a buzzer and the phone.

Although in those days, in '49, '50, up through the '50s, it was almost unheard of for the Senate to have more than maybe between eighty and 125 roll calls a session. They did things different then.

Although I was not intimately involved in the floor by any means, I would watch it and I would follow something like the NATO Treaty and some of the big arguments that they had in those days, and the civil rights things where I had a personal feeling on. I would sit in the gallery. I did not have access to the floor. Floor access was very limited. You might see an AA [Administrative Assistant] down there once in a while, but I can remember in those days, you never saw a woman on the floor, never.

RITCHIE: I understand that Pat McCarran once took vengeance on an elevator operator.

REID: Yes, on one of my, colleagues one day. When I moved to the Carroll Arms corner it was somebody that took over at that corner, and Pat McCarran's office was located somewhere up there in that tier that's nearest Constitution Avenue; that was his elevator. He went out and buzzed for the elevator one day, and he got passed by. Then he got passed by twice. He just turned on his heel and went back to his office and called Joe Duke, who was the sergeant at arms, and that kid was "fired." It took moments for that word to get around to the rest of us, that it could happen. Of course, I never knew McCarran, I knew of him and had heard about him in other contexts.

There was a period when the operation of the Senate allowed the
all-powerful chairmen, when chairmen alone had the power to call a meeting, when a chairman alone had the power to set the agenda. This is true in the state legislatures, too. I've worked in Olympia and I know how it can operate. But there, during that period, during the '40's, '50's, almost well into the '60's it was possible for a person who wanted to pocket anything he wanted to pocket and it just didn't come up. It was dead if he didn't want it to come up. It didn't matter what the entire rest of the membership wanted, it didn't come up. And McCarran was one of those people, had that reputation.

I think Magnuson would confirm it because when Magnuson had the opportunity to get off Judiciary and get on a better committee, he took it. He served on Judiciary, I think, for five, six years. In fact, I think he went off Judiciary when it was possible for him to go on Appropriations. Although he got along well with [James] Eastland on a personal level, not a political level, or at least not on civil rights, I know that he did not feel close to McCarran, neither politically nor personally. So he got off when he could get off.

RITCHIE: Were there certain senators in those days that you were warned about, that were known as sticklers and difficult people in general?

REID: Yes. Although I never had any trouble with him, Tom Connally was one whom the word was out on. And [Joseph] McCarthy was one, although the only times—as I said when I worked that elevator I did get to know the secretary that later became Mrs. McCarthy—my first meetings with McCarthy were when I was a cop. I was on the Capitol detail for a while and then I switched to the Senate Office Building detail in order to get on the midnight-to-eight shift was a time when you could "study as well as sleep." My duty desk during those months that I was on the SOB detail was the Rotunda of Russell, and in those days the Rotunda of Russell was a door that was kept open twenty-four hours. The elevator entrance [at street level, one floor below] was only kept open until about midnight and then it closed. But the Rotunda entrance was the one that was kept open.

I can remember many times that McCarthy would walk in that door late at night, two, three o'clock in the morning. He was usually in his cups, and once he did stop and chat. I don't know why, because I couldn't stand the man. That was after Wheeling, that was after the famous speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, and I thought he was really off his rocker, and he was an anathema to me politically, although he was a jovial person, I thought, personally—the type of guy you might want to go and have a beer with. But I did not care for him politically, and I let that interfere with my feelings perhaps personally. Because that one night when he came in and he did seem to want to chat, and was interested in what I was doing, and what I was taking at GW, and where I was from. He found out who I was under and of course said nice things about Maggie. I think I was brash enough to say, "Well, I hope you won't say anything unkind this fall when he's up for reelection." And he said "Well, why should I ever do that?" As I remember, that's what he said.

But normally when he came in, it was with two or three people. Roy Cohn was one of them. Of course, Cohn was one of the people at that
time that you knew because he was very active with McCarthy. G. David Schine was one, but I didn't really know him, and he never seemed to surface, but I found out who he was. Again, it was such a small place, it was easy to find out about people, because if you saw a person twice you knew they worked there. If you saw a person three times and asked somebody else, they knew. It was a very small place so it was easy to find out who was who, and what they were, where they fit into the picture. But again it was a fairly small picture because that was the space. All the committees met there, although when Magnuson first became chairman of the Commerce Committee, their quarters were in the Capitol where the sergeant at arms is today, and that was it. They had five people, that was the staff, and that's where they were.

RITCHIE: You switched over from being an elevator operator to the Capitol Police about that time, around 1951 . . .

REID: No, I switched in '50. I went on the elevators in January '49. I'm sure they do it today, GW and Georgetown had the ability to sense whatever we were making and set their fees just slightly ahead. You know, I'd come from Wenatchee where I'd paid a $25.00 fee and that was it, and was able to matriculate and take twelve hours or eighteen hours, it didn't matter. To pay by the hour, I'd never heard of that. When I got here and got on the elevators, I don't remember what the pay was, but I knew that cops made a thousand or fifteen hundred dollars more per year than elevator operators. It was under four thousand I'm sure. But it was a matter of money. Magnuson did have a patronage slot on the police force, and I let Irv Hoff know, who was the AA, that if it became available I could sure use it because GW was taking more than I could afford. It became available and I moved over to the police force. But I moved over to the police force before I was twenty-one, and we had to cheat a little because there was some sort of a stipulation that you should be twenty-one before you carried a weapon. Well, we all carried weapons in those days, but most of us hadn't even qualified. And they were never drawn. In the period that I was on the police force, we did pick up some sort of a purse snatcher on my shift one time, but we seldom had that kind of a problem. We were uniformed tour guides, we helped the tourists find out where they were and where they wanted to go. It was a lovely job. It was nice. We had the same uniforms, they haven't changed the uniform hardly at all, except that more people wear white now, because it used to be only the lieutenants wore white shirts. And it was a small force. But it was done for money, I needed the money and George Washington took it away once I got it.

RITCHIE: What were you taking at George Washington?

REID: Political science, liberal arts. There was a requirement in those days for a B.A. that you have language. I had taken Latin, of course, in high school. So I was faced with the possibility of getting a B.A. from George Washington and so I had to take German, and I had trouble with German. It was difficult for me. But other than plowing through German I was taking political science courses and some history. But then Korea interrupted the whole thing and I stayed out of school for five years before I went back to the University of Washington and completed a B.A. and went into law school.
RITCHIE: I'm interested in your career on the Capitol Police force. How do Congress and congressmen appear to a person on the police force?

REID: Well, again, in those days it was pure patronage. I know that the shift I was on, there were about twenty-one people assigned to it. There would be about seventeen to nineteen that would show up every day. There was one old man that I recall, he was an appointee of somebody like Walter George or Kenneth McKellar. The rest of us, except for the lieutenant, the lieutenant was from Georgia and he was under [Richard] Russell, the rest of us were all college kids, and most of them were a little bit older than I. Many of them were World War II G.I. Bill types that were completing their educations. In fact, at one time, I was on the four-in-the-afternoon-until-midnight shift in the Capitol, and at one time, well over half the men were law students at Catholic, at Georgetown, at GW. The rest of them were upperclassmen of some type. I was the only underclassman. I was a junior at the time and I was the only person that was that lowly in the educational pecking order.

To us all, congressmen appeared extremely powerful, because in those days if you infuriated one enough, if you bothered one enough, you could get yourself canned, because it was patronage and most members are not going to stick with their patronage appointee over the violent objections of their colleague. You know, they're going to get along. The lieutenant couldn't fire me. Only the sergeant at arms could, and Joe Duke wasn't going to fire anybody unless he had the acquiescence of the sponsor. If you were smart you kept your sponsor very happy, but if you were really smart, you didn't get anybody unhappy. So we were extremely responsive to any member of Congress or spouse thereof.

I can remember, because I not only ran that elevator for a while on the elevator entrance, I had that assignment on the police force when I was on the Senate Office Building detail and was on the afternoon shift. I loved it because you did get to meet people. I met Alice Roosevelt Longworth. The first time I ever saw her was there, and then I got to meet her one day and got to talking with her because her car and driver didn't show up. You got to meet the spouses because in those days, many of the wives appeared at the hearings. I can remember Owen Brewster's wife was with Alice during one of the major hearings. So you did get exposure, if your eyes were open and your ears were open, you saw them. And if you were brash, as I say, you could talk to them.

RITCHIE: Was security a big problem in those days?

REID: No. There was a famous time when Warren Magnuson and John Bricker got aboard the old subway, the one that's still down there, and a person with a revolver took six shots at John Bricker, and the policeman standing right next to him said, "You're not allowed to shoot senators." Well, this person was deranged, and he was from Ohio, and there had been some connection between John Bricker and this man. The subway person was smart enough to get the thing underway and get them away. As Magnuson has told the story, he said "You know, it's really crazy, here this guy was, he had a revolver, he wasn't ten feet from us, and he fired six shots and none of them came anywhere near us."
And they were live bullets. But that never hit the papers. That happened in 1947. He was crazy and he missed, and they just carted him off to St. Elizabeth's. But the period that I was here, security? No. You had a few kooks. You had the type, he was still around maybe when you were here, because he was here in the late '60's. The man who tried to look like Uncle Sam or . . .

**RITCHIE:** Abe Lincoln.

**REID:** Abe Lincoln, yes. That type of person was around, but they were harmless. They had some petition, some bill they were trying to get sponsors for. They were nice people and they were not physically threatening. I would say there was much more respect perhaps for public officials. No, we were not security minded.

**RITCHIE:** But you did have the shooting of five congressmen by Puerto Rican nationalists in the 1950's. That must have been shocking.

**REID:** It was shocking, it had to be. I can understand the reaction because I went through a similar incident later. We had the situation where some woman with a knife ended up in [Edward] Kennedy's office and tried to do something. This was during the period that Magnuson was chairman of Appropriations and Nordy [Hoffmann] was sergeant at arms. Well, all Hell broke loose after that. Everybody started pushing Nordy and pushing Chief Powell: "We've got to do something!" I remember some meetings that we had between the chief, Nordy, and others. We got involved because money would have to be spent. They were going to have all these damn screens, these metal detectors that you and I would walk through every day. I was a voice in the wilderness for a while because I said it was really impossible unless you put a fence around all three Senate buildings, and you're going to have to include the House, because how are you going to stop people who come in through the House doors, and aren't checked, from getting through the Capitol. Because are you going to put a damn thing down here at the tunnel and make everybody that comes out of the Capitol go through it again? But they started to go and buy those damn screens for every entrance to the Russell Building, for every entrance to the Dirksen Building. Finally, when we got to the point of trying to negotiate what was going to happen in the Capitol, a little modicum of restraint and sense broke in.

I'm sure that the same bit of hysteria—because it was a hysterical response to a stupid, unfortunate thing that almost happened to Senator Kennedy—but I'm sure some of that same hysteria hit the House the way it hit the Senate. And you have to remember, when the Puerto Ricans did their thing in the House gallery, they also did their thing down at Blair House, and Leslie Cofelt, the White House policeman, got shot and killed. I remember the name because in 1949 when the Apple Blossom queen was here and I took her around, we spent an evening walking from Jefferson to Lincoln to Washington Monument to the Blair House, and we got to the Blair House around ten-thirty, eleven o'clock at night. They were staying at the Statler, which was up on Sixteenth Street. And here was this nice guard that spent fifteen minutes talking to us. He had a little badge and his name was Leslie Cofelt, and it was not a common
name so I remembered it, and when that incident took place, he was the one who was killed.

Those two things happening, the Blair House and the House chamber, I'm sure there was hysteria and there was some change, there was an increase in numbers, there was a slight increase in training, and we became a little more security minded. But then the events of the '60's starting in Dallas, and the Ambassador Hotel, Maryland with Wallace, it's pushed us to where we are. Now I'm told, I've never been there, I'm told that in England, you do not get inside the grounds of Parliament without going through security. But I've also been told that the Parliamentary House does not have the accommodations for tourists the way we do. I've always felt that our Capitol Building especially, with its art, with its Brumidi, with its statutes, there's no other way to handle it than to have open house.

I had to remind some of my colleagues when I had some responsibility as Maggie's appropriation person, as Maggie's pro tem person, as a surrogate for him, I had to remind them at times "Look, damn it, this place belongs to the people. It doesn't belong to us. We're custodians, temporary." (Although I didn't want to be as temporary as I was.) It belongs to the people and they've got to be let in, and that was one of the arguments I had when we were running around trying to find where we could buy metal detectors, let alone where we'd find the money to buy them, all these damn machines that we were going to have on every entrance to the building. The poor chief, he doesn't really make the rules, he just follows them, he was telling us "You know, if you do that, you've either got to lock that door or I've got to have somebody there, and I don't have the people."

RITCHIE: Despite the fact that by that time the police force had grown incredibly larger.

REID: Oh, yes.

RITCHIE: You said that they had a very good communications system when you were on the force.

REID: When I was on the force we did. Capitol Hill, again, was a small town. There was a switchboard, and it was one of the old-fashioned ones with the cords, and the phones were old-fashioned, you picked them up and a human voice came on. They knew who you were and where you were, or at least they knew the number. I strongly recall a gal, her name was Mary, I don't remember her last name. At that time their switchboard was over in Longworth some place, and I remember going over there one time and thanking her for helping us out. Because on the police force we had various phones hidden around on all the doors to the Capitol Building—the Capitol Building was the one I was working in at the time—Statuary Hall and various other places. These weren't our phones, they were just phones. Often they could be "hidden" in some kind of a cabinet or maybe even a little door. Or maybe they'd be on a desk, because the tour guides were operating in those days and there were phones that they had. And that was our communication system for the police force. We would pick up the phone, and especially in the evenings we might be the only people around, except for a few members. It always amazed me some of the members that worked late and would be around. So that human voice was our "communications network."

In those days there was no radio or anything like that, and I think
there was one or two squad cars—they were black and had some kind of seal for the Capitol Police—that were available. I know my lieutenant at times used to have that car take him up to Mike Palm's or someplace up on the Avenue for dinner. He could afford it. We all brought brown bags. I can remember having the car go and pick somebody up, a member that might be coming in at National [Airport] or something like that. The leadership might get a hold of it. They did it then because if there was something happening and somebody was coming in by air, those cars were sometimes used to pick them up and get them there in a hurry. But there were no walky-talkies, although walky-talkies had been invented during World War II. I had used them in Wenatchee and the audio was lousy—very crackly and very difficult and not very good range. The FM band was just being explored, and it's the FM band that really has allowed the kind of walky-talkies that police use today. But they're awfully expensive. You know, the only expense that I could see when I was on the Capitol police force in '49 and '50 was the uniform.

The artillery, handcuffs and a weapon, was passed on. I know the weapon I got hadn't been cleaned in ages. I did clean it. I knew enough about weapons to know you should clean them, and so I cleaned mine when I was issued one. And those handcuffs had to have been around thirty years because they were so worn. Where the manufacturers' name was had been rubbed down. And that weapon and those handcuffs were issued to me by a Private Ballard. He now is over in the Plaza. He is Inspector Ballard. He worked in the chief's office when I first became a private, he was a private too. Leonard and I still get together once in a while. But that was the only cost, because they didn't have a fleet of cars (they still don't have really a fleet of cars, but they have more cars than they used to, and they have motorcycles). If you're going to have to patrol the grounds, we patrolled the grounds by foot, shanks' mare. And we bought the shoes. We were not issued boots, we were not issued shoes, we purchased our own shoes and socks. The shirts and the uniform were furnished, but that was it. There was none of this fancy micro-everything else that we have to buy today, and its appreciable.

**RITCHIE:** You also had responsibilities for visiting heads of state, presidential visits, and all the rest of that.

**REID:** Yes, but I can remember the first time Harry Truman came when I was on the police force. Harry Truman as president came to the Hill one day. It stands out in my mind every time that I see what goes on today, because two cars came under the portico and Harry Truman and two Secret Service agents were in one of them. Mr. Truman and one of the agents got out. Another agent joined them. Mr. Truman and two Secret Service agents entered the Senate wing of the Capitol. Mr. Truman went upstairs, went to the chamber, wandered around, because I remember on that particular instance, I came down the back stairway from the chamber on the east side. I was almost to the bottom and I looked to my left and coming down the corridor were Scott Lucas and Harry Truman, and Harry Truman was on my side. He was looking at me, so I said "Mr. President," and he just nodded back, and he went around the corner. He stopped around the corner because in that particular corner, that's where Foreign Relations is, there was a post office. Now it was a wooden structure, it was almost like a ticket booth, but it
harmonized with the corridor. There was a "post office" there and the lady in that post office, Truman stopped to talk to her, because he remembered her from the time that he was a senator.

I came down and I was standing watching all of this, because here was the president of the United States talking to this little old lady. Afterwards I went back and talked to her and found out that she was related to former senator Carter Glass, and it was patronage. When I came back here in '64 that structure was gone. I'm sure it was long gone. I suspect that this was a patronage job, she had it, she performed a service, she sold stamps and registered letters, and that when she could no longer work it was torn down. But to get back to the visiting head of state, here was the president of the United States, the majority leader of the Senate, Scott Lucas, nobody with them, no Secret Service man. The Secret Service agent was around the corner and joined them there in that hallway where the elevators, are, because Mr. Truman was headed for the car. We were alerted to the fact that he might arrive, but you didn't have a chief, two inspectors, ten captains, and fifteen lieutenants, and forty sergeants emerging and covering every stair, and every step, and every door, and every potty. You did not have a phalanx of fifty arriving and a phalanx of a hundred greeting, and this whole rigmarole. Mr. Truman got in the car—in fact I remember he got in the front seat where he could see, the driver was Secret Service, and they drove away.

**RITCHIE:** Compare that to today!

**REID:** Yes. We've gone a little bit crazy. Now maybe we've been forced to go crazy, but we got a little bit crazy.

I know it bothers Magnuson because Magnuson had some kind of a bad experience. He was prosecuting attorney in King County before he became a congressman, and he had always been close to the police, he was an attorney and he had a few criminal cases, maybe that started it, but he always had friends on the police force. One of his friends, Ernie Yoris, was a deputy chief in Seattle for years. And something happened then when there was some sort of a police escort, motorcycles, and somebody got injured, and Magnuson, in all the time that I have worked with him, has abhorred police escorts. He thinks they are a waste of time, a threat to those involved. He would never allow us to set anything like that up for him.

As a passenger, and he enjoys being a passenger rather than a driver, he again has one rule: you do not speed, you never exceed the speed limit. As he says: "If you miss the plane there's another one. There's no reason to speed." I think part of it might stem from safety, but I think also part of it is that he enjoys looking at the scenery. No, it has always thrown me during the last few years, I remember last year when we had several presidential candidates in the Senate, I felt sorry for Ted Kennedy one day. Here I saw him as he was going someplace over towards the Disbursing Office, and my God there were at least three in front and four behind, and less than five minutes later he's coming back. Just looking at him, I don't think he enjoyed it that much. It just seemed to be such a waste, such a waste.

**RITCHIE:** I remember once seeing Henry Jackson and Birch Bayh in 1976 in the basement corridor of the Russell Building. Each one was surrounded by a phalanx of Secret Service people, they were
both announced candidates for president. They passed each other like two ships. I couldn't imagine what kind of danger there could be for them in the basement of the Russell Building to need that kind of protection.

In 1950 when you went back to Washington to help Magnuson in his reelection campaign, did you have to take a leave from the police force?

**REID:** I switched from the Capitol Police force payroll to his office payroll.

**RITCHIE:** Oh, I see.

**REID:** I was on his office payroll while I was in the state of Washington. I was on his payroll for thirteen days in September and I'll never forget when the check arrived because that check for thirteen days on the Senate payroll at about four thousand or something like that was bigger than about three-and-a-half months' pay as an air force private. So I was rich when I was down in Barksdale, Louisiana, and that check caught up with me. I was rich. And I was smart, I hung on to it too, I didn't spend it all. I didn't play poker in those days. But I was on his personal office payroll.

**RITCHIE:** What kind of functions did you perform for Magnuson when you were out there?

**REID:** Well, it was a small campaign. It was a campaign where I was one of the few paid people. Those were the days when friends could do all kinds of things, and Magnuson had a friend that owned a newspaper chain. They owned the *New Orleans Picayune*, but they also owned a paper in Seattle, the *Star*. It was a paper that had been a money-maker and it fell on bad times and had been closed. The building was still there, the equipment was still there. There was hope I think, in the family of opening it up again, but they never did. But the building was there and it was right in the heart of Seattle. The building was donated. Other friends donated typewriters and things like that and we set up shop.

I was sort of the handy-person to help out in any way. I could type, so I did a few things there. I could organize and so under direction I was doing other things. I could drive, and Magnuson liked my driving, so I drove him. I would take him to functions. Magnuson has never liked to travel with an "entourage." He likes to sit in the passenger seat, and he doesn't like chatting from the backseat. He likes quietude when he can get it. It was often just he and I and we'd head off to some Chamber of Commerce or some place. Magnuson has never enjoyed the private airplane bit. He does not mind scheduled airplanes, but he does not like small airplanes. So his campaign historically, and even this last time, was mostly by car and at a little bit of a leisurely pace. Leave enough time to get where you are going. Although in former years he had a reputation of always arriving late, he never had a reputation of leaving early. No matter when he got there he would always stay and at least give himself as well as the people a chance to interact. So I was a gofer in many ways during that campaign.

Now, Magnuson was only out there maybe three or four times during that period. I didn't go out until the middle of June, and disappeared the middle of September. But I was there for one of the more extensive
trips. We went north of Seattle and down into Tacoma and over to Bremerton. I was his driver and a very minor aide, because I certainly wasn't proffering advice or research or anything like that. But I was exposed to campaigning.

The campaign manager for a while was a person that I had known previously. Ted Little was the campaign manager for the first three months. He later filed for office himself, so that took him out of the job of campaign manager. He filed for Congress, he lost. Irv Hoff, the AA, came out and was really the campaign manager, in fact, not in name. His wife Florence also was very much involved. She's a great organizer. We had an operation on the second floor of the Star building. We had thirty or forty at any one time, usually women, sometimes men, volunteers. They were addressing envelopes and getting mailings put together and doing all those things. I would be somewhat involved with that, in making sure all the supplies were there, and working with Florence and the others that were involved in that operation.

In the 1950 campaign there was a young advertising person. His name was Jerry Hoeck of Miller McKay, Hoeck, and Hartung. Jerry later sold out to J. Walter Thompson and is "retired," although he's too young to be retired, he's barely sixty. He's always been a political media adviser to Scoop and did a couple of Scoop's campaigns. He's also been a media adviser to us in recent years. But in 1950 he had just opened shop. Shop was a set of two small rooms. There were two other people, Miller and McKay, and there was no secretary. They did our media. Of course, our media in that time was radio and billboards, matches and brochures. We didn't have any television in '50. We had television in '56, and Miller, McKay did the '56 campaign for Magnuson too. But they had gone out of business, they sold out to J. Walter Thompson, before the '62 campaign. So they were not involved in that one.

RITCHIE: So in the middle of the campaign you suddenly became an air force private and packed off to Louisiana.

REID: Yes.

RITCHIE: Since you enlisted, you were in for a four year term?

REID: No, I did not serve my full four years. My father had a very serious heart attack in '51. I had the option of either going on dependency allotment to help out, or a dependency discharge, and I got the dependency discharge. I only served nine months and five days in the air force and I got out and went home and worked to help support the family. The family was just me, my mother and my Dad, and my Dad lived another two years before he died. So my career in the air force was not long. It was illustrious but it was not very long.

I wormed my way in because of my typing skills to an office and had the designation of sergeant-major. Now in the British system, sergeant-majors are very high-fallutin' people, and you served probably twenty years before you aspired to that designation. I was in the air force less than ninety days when I became a clerk, and I was in less than a hundred-and-some when I became "sergeant-major." I became sergeant-major only because everybody else left and I had mastered all of the forms and knew my way through and was able to handle all of the paperwork—and we were a high volume paperwork outfit. I was sergeant-major of the
301st Food Service Squadron, and in those days everybody that went in the air force, when they came out of basic, went to a Food Service Squadron as a holding pattern before they went on to whatever they were going to be. So we were handling all of the papers and trying to get people into schools.

Barksdale was a nice place, Shreveport is a nice part of Louisiana. It was an old air force base built many, many years ago, back in the early 20's. The town liked us. I'm sure we spent good money at the bars and we didn't disturb things too much. It was a pleasant assignment and I got to meet an awful lot of people coming through. I was able to put together my own little office crew. I was a little prejudiced, everybody was college, and none of us liked it but it was the patriotic thing to do and we were doing it and we were going to make the best of our lives on that base. We had a radio station supposedly only for the base, but we had listeners in Texas and we got fan mail. We had "Warren Stone Views the News" every night at six o'clock. We had a ticker tape, and I would do the news, and then later, I did a classical music program. We had a fairly good library of records, so about eight o'clock in the evening, I'd play classical music. But they didn't like my name, they didn't like Featherstone, so the management of the radio station—all of us enlisted—the management decided that Warren Stone was a good name. So it was "Warren Stone Views the News."

Of course, I made sure that Magnuson's name got on whenever it was possible. In fact, I was there, I was viewing the news, April 1951 when Warren Magnuson was in Tokyo, having lunch with General MacArthur, and Mac got sacked. I was delighted because April 12 is Magnuson's birthday and I wanted to send him a birthday card. Well, when I found out he was in Tokyo, Hell, I can't send a birthday card to Tokyo, so I went down and sent a telegram. I think it cost almost two dollars a word. So all he got was "Happy Birthday. Feather." That was all I sent because it was too damn expensive for a corporal. But he was with MacArthur when MacArthur got the message. Truman later told him, "If I had known you were going to be with the son-of-a-bitch I would have had you deliver the message!" Magnuson would never say what MacArthur's reaction was. When reporters asked him, he would only say, "Well, what did the General say? That was the General's hour." That's the kind of man Warren Magnuson is.

RITCHIE: You came back out of the service in 1952 . . .

REID: I came back out of the service and went back to Wenatchee.

RITCHIE: You stayed in Wenatchee basically because of your father's health, but did you ever think about going back to Washington, D.C. to work for Magnuson at that period?

REID: Not at that period, because I had to be at home, or I felt I had to be at home. And then I fell into politics at home. I got active. You know, "You worked for Maggie, you've got to help us." They think you know something because you were with "the Man." And I got active in local politics in Chelan County and I helped with the election. I was a campaign manager in a way. I worked with a candidate, Art Garton again, he ran for Congress against Walter Horan. Both Walter Horan and Art Garton were old friends of the family. I
knew both quite well and I'm still friends with Sally Horan, Walt's widow. Art didn't win, but we did elect some local candidates to county offices and we also elected a state representative.

It was through that state representative that I met another state representative who said, "Well, why don't you come to Olympia and be on my staff. I'm going to be chairman of the Revenue and Tax Committee in the House." And so I did. Now in those days, the Washington state legislature had very few permanent staff. It had a legislative counsel that carried on between sessions and about five or six people. So for about three sessions, while I was in school (I didn't get back to school until '57), but in the '55 and '57 legislative sessions I was staff during the session. I loved it, and became quite good at it. I had more than one patron, I worked for three different chairmen in that period. But I did stay with Rev and Tax in a way. I started out with Rev and Tax, but then when my chairman went to the Senate and he took me, it became Ways and Means. I enjoyed the Ways a little bit more than the Means. So my indoctrination into the appropriations process started out in '57. Then I served two additional chairmen through that period, '57, '59, ‘61, ‘63. I was the staff part of the time. Early in the game I was the staff. Our secretaries were in a pool. In the later part I was the chief of staff of maybe two or three people. Of course, we were able to call upon others, the permanent state employees, and did.

Our state was just getting into the Budget and Accounting Act business about that time. In fact, our O.M.B. was created in the '56-'57 period, so they were learning at the same time I was learning. It was a good relationship. Not adversarial. Probably for two reasons: they were new, we were new; they were Democrats, we were Democrats. Because this whole system in the state of Washington got started under a Democratic governor who was elected in '56, and the initial people were Democrats. Two of them later went on to higher education. One of them became the financial veep at Washington State University, the other became the financial veep at the University of Washington. I do know now that that camaraderie is a little less, because I do have friends that are in the operation in Olympia today. Both sides have become bigger, they've become a little bit bureaucratic, and there isn't as close a working relationship as there used to be. But that's how I got into the legislative process more deeply.

In a state legislature at that period in our state's history, staffs were very small. They didn't have an office building, they just had a capitol building, and members at that time did not have any office, they had a desk on the floor that they used. If they were a chairman they had a committee room that they could use. There were two desks in the committee room, one for the clerk and one for the chairman. So it was a very intimate situation. We had, though, a very good membership because on both sides of the aisle we had some very high-class people that were willing to give sixty days of their life each year to being a member, and the rest of the time they were farmers, automobile dealers, lawyers, bankers, a lot of lawyers.

**RITCHIE:** Were you on the staff then for just the sixty days they were in session?
REID: Right. Now I would be paid for a few more days, especially in the latter time. In '59 I helped somebody create an interim committee. We had the Joint Committee on Governmental Cooperation, and this interim committee was going to launch the career of a state senator so that he could become the attorney general. The state senator was an awfully nice guy, he's a good friend of mine, became a good friend, was a good friend, is a good friend, but he's always been a little bit lazy. He's brilliant but he's lazy. So he never did run for attorney general, but we had a hell of a good time with our joint committee. Our joint committee was joint in that it was both House and Senate, and we had some of the heavy-hitters on both sides of the aisle from the House and Senate.

It was not a big committee. In fact, there were only eight members. But we got into some interesting things. Law enforcement was one. I helped write the basic legislation the state of Washington has now for intergovernmental operation, in that if a governmental service like garbage collection or law enforcement is available from a county, that instead of a city setting up a system, a city if it wants to can contract with the county. Well, now this was something that was already being done in California, contract services for public services between governmental units, but had never been done in the state of Washington, and wasn't even legal in the state of Washington. Well, we explored it, we devised the legal basis for it, and started it, and it's grown now. We were also responsible for establishing a law enforcement training commission that now is very well established and that allows for the training of law enforcement personnel by this commission. This makes it possible for a small town that can't afford the training to get it for their people. Now if they can afford to help pay for it, then they're nicked and they pay, but for many small towns it's all they can afford to put the guy on the payroll and let him be gone for two weeks to a school, and not patrolling. They can't really afford that, they've got to have him busy, they've got to have him out there shaking the doors and watching the streets at night. And we put in a communications network. Teletype was what we started with, and it's become a little more sophisticated now. But we had a good time and did some good work.

Of course, I was going to law school at the same time, and so I was dividing myself between some of this legislative work and the study of law—squeaking through. In fact, my first year of law school I was the anchor man, I was the last man on the totem pole. Now by my last year of law school, I was up in the mid-range, but in my first year of law school I was involved in a race for county commissioner, I was campaign manager for him, Scott Wallace who ran for county commissioner in King County and got elected. And I was involved in a state senate campaign in the area that I lived in Seattle. And I was also working at a liquor store as a clerk, shoveling booze. We have state monopoly for liquor in the state of Washington. At that time all those jobs were patronage. It was a great job for a college boy, because you could set your hours. I was never gifted by a large inheritance. In fact, all I got from my father was some of his brains and some of his looks. So I had to work my way through, and was fortunate. I did go through and never had to borrow. I didn't even take out an NDSL [National Defense Student Loan].

RITCHIE: In that period, did you work for Magnuson's campaign in '56?
REID: Yes. I was never on the payroll, but in '56 I was active in our own operations in eastern Washington, Chelan County. I was involved in local races there and I was involved in the Magnuson race. In the spring we thought it was going to be rough because everybody knew that Art Langlie, the governor, was going to run against Maggie, the senator. All of the polls and all of the gut feelings indicated one hell of a race. A good, solid Democrat opposed by a good, solid Republican. Then Time magazine even put Art Langlie on the cover, and that scared us. But it was a spirited campaign. It was one that was run physically, and on radio, and some TV, and billboards, and committees, and all that old-fashioned stuff. Along comes the primary in September and my God, Magnuson carries all but two counties. Historically, the Democrats never carried some of the eastern Washington counties, but in the primary I think he carried all but three. It became evident that Art Langlie wasn't as popular as Art Langlie thought he was, and Magnuson was not as unpopular as some people thought he was.

In those days there were always rumors about Magnuson because, you know, Magnuson had girlfriends and wasn't married. He might even have a mistress! This never hit the press but it was talked about a great deal. Art Langlie was a teetotaler; at least that's what he said. He never served booze in the mansion. As far as I know he never served it, but he claimed to never have any. He always went to church and he was a good Christian, but Maggie beat him in all but three counties and then

in the general election, beat him in all counties. It was not expected by most of the people. Most of us thought we'd win. We considered the possibility that we might lose this part or that part, but that overall, you'd win, you'd come through. Of course, in '56 Ike carried the state handsomely. But again in '56 the president was Republican but the governor was Democratic. Langlie was defeated in his race against Magnuson and his lieutenant governor was defeated in his race to succeed him. The Democrats were able to elect a governor and reelect a senator.

We had another bad thing going against us in '56. In 1950, when they counted the herd and said "Washington gets a new Congressman," the legislature of the state of Washington couldn't agree and so there was an election at-large. About sixteen people filed on the Democratic ticket. I had at least three friends that were on that ticket. Nobody knew what was going to happen. There was a character on there whose name was Don Magnuson. Nobody even saw the guy, this was 1952. But all of a sudden on primary night he's nominated. Then they saw him and then they knew who he was. He was a writer for the Seattle Times and he had a dog and he wandered around to political meetings. Well, he got elected. He was a good writer and a nice enough fellow, a fairly good-looking fellow. Absolutely no relation to Magnuson. And he did get himself into some trouble because one, he was an alcoholic, he could not handle booze, and two, he was a gambler, and he was not a lucky gambler. So he had the twin failing of losing more than he could afford and drinking more than he could handle. That became public knowledge, that was published and it even hit the radio at times. Well, in the public mind there was confusion. There were people that would swear to you:

"Warren Magnuson? You mean that drunk who won't even support his wife and kiddies and plays cards?" It hurt.
Don Magnuson was finally defeated by a very conservative Republican, because he had deserted his
wife and kiddies. But in the '56 campaign this was the kind of thing that was not published, at least the
connections and discussion. But it was there among the body politic. I know it concerned some of us that
realized that at least some people were confused. Because Warren Magnuson of course has never been a
teetotaler, and he's admitted to playing cards and has played cards, and is a very good card player. He's not one
who has ever deserted his wife and kiddies. And you can't talk about it. The Warren Magnuson campaign
couldn't talk about, "Well, that other guy's the one that's the drunk, we’re not." You just have to live with it and
go through that, and worry about it. Of course, Langlie tried to use it, in a way, but it backfired on him and
didn't work.

Don Magnuson was still around in '62, in fact he was defeated in '62. That was when Warren Magnuson
was running again. In fact, that was the time Warren Magnuson came closest to defeat, in '62, when an
unknown person ran against him—a very charismatic minister, Richard Christiansen. He was a minister in the
Billy Graham sense because he was a revivalist type who could really motivate an audience. Nice looking
person, attractive, although he was a flash in the pan. He tried subsequently to run for other office, governor,
etc., and went down. But he was a very attractive candidate in '62, and came within fifty thousand of putting
Magnuson out to pasture.

Don Magnuson by that time had really hit the bottom, and hit the bottom with his constituency and was
ousted. By that time he was no

longer at-large, he had a district. In the late '50s, the League of Women Voters redistricted. The legislature
couldn't do it, so the League did it. The state of Washington has the initiative, referendum, recall, all the
Populist protections, and we use them. The League used them and was able to redistrict the state legislature as
well as to force the redistricting of the congressional districts. So Don was running at-large in the '56 campaign,
but by the '62 campaign he had his own district, which was part of King County, our most metropolitan area.
That's when he was defeated.

RITCHIE: Well, before we go further into the '62 election and your coming back to Washington, we've
been going for two hours now and I think this might be a good time to call a break.

REID: Fine.

[End of Interview #1]
RITCHIE: In our last interview, we concluded with the 1962 election. From most of the things I've been looking at, the '62 election looked like a real turning point in Magnuson's career. So I thought this would be a good point to talk about the election and about Magnuson's political career before that election. Could you give me some background information on Magnuson as a Senator before 1962?

REID: As a Senator?

RITCHIE: Well, his political career.

REID: That may take too long. Let's start in '44 when he did run for an open seat in the Senate. A close friend, political colleague, co-worker, Homer Bone, who had been a senator from our state since 1933, had been offered and accepted a federal judgeship and did not seek reelection. So there was an "open" seat. Bone did not take the judicial position until after the election—he remained in the Senate in '44. So Magnuson ran and was easily nominated and easily elected. Then there was a resignation and an appointment by the then sitting governor, Arthur Langlie, that accelerated Magnuson's seniority within the Senate. He came here in December of '44. He went on the normal committees. He went on Judiciary, he went on Commerce, and several others. There were a lot of committees in those days. It was the '46 reorganization that slimmed the number.

Then there was the turnover to the Republicans in the '46 election, and the only Republican senator from our state was elected at that time, the only one for several decades, Harry Cain. Magnuson was in the minority. Of course this accelerated his seniority within the Senate, so by '49, he was up a little bit, but he still was not a chairman. It was in the '49 to '53 period that he switched from Judiciary to Appropriations. Again, the Democrats regained control in the '48 election, but lost it in the '52 election. I think Magnuson, from what I have been told by Irv Hoff, who was his AA at that time, and Fred Lordan, who was very close to the office and later became the second administrative assistant to Magnuson, that Magnuson was a little uncertain if he really wanted to stay in politics. He enjoyed the work. He enjoyed the backroom work more than anything else. He enjoyed committee work, and he enjoyed working on little projects, be they parochial for the state, be they parochial for the Northwest.

We've always had a different approach towards the ownership of natural resources in the Northwest. The bulk of the hydroelectric power in the Northwest is publicly developed and publicly sold, although we do have two major private companies, Puget Sound Power and Light, and Washington Water Power. But in the state of Washington the bulk of the customers, the bulk of the power, is sold by public agencies. Magnuson believes in that type of development of the natural resources because in the Northwest, we've been able to develop the Columbia River to its highest potential because we not only invested public funds to produce power, but we took public funds to have flood control, to have wildlife enhancement, to have recreation. Nobody believed
they were going to have recreation, but today behind every major dam—every dam—on the Columbia River you've got huge marinas, any number of power boats, many sailboats (although sometimes the sailing isn't that good in eastern Washington as it is in western Washington). And you've had an entire new industry develop, where people have taken shoreline behind a lake, behind a dam, and developed tourist attractions. We have developed tourist attractions. We have developed public parks. Often this was done with some political controversy.

There's one major park in the eastern part of the state called Sun Lakes that was a major contention in the 1948 governorship race. I remember it, I was fairly young at the time, but Sun Lakes was close to our home town, and there was a great deal of controversy about spending this public money to build this park that included a golf course. I believe there was a candidate defeated for the statewide office because of it. But yet today, Sun Lakes is one of the major money-makers of the state park system. It is a beautiful park. It does have a golf course, and it has everything else including boating ramps and camping sites, daytime as well as overnight, and it's typical of the public investment that has been made by various governments, state, county, local, federal, in facilities like that. If you're driving around the country and you go through the state of Washington, you will find more overnight camping spots, more pullouts off the road where you can stop and picnic, than in any other state in the nation. Some people called it socialism; I would rather call it populism.

But it was a way of developing public resources, and Magnuson enjoyed his own participation in that. Of course, he was a forerunner in it. He had a little help from people like Bone, because Homer Bone was older than Magnuson, preceded Magnuson in the state legislative system, of course, got here sooner. Homer Bone had been one who had pushed for the legal basis for public utility districts, people-owned utility districts in the state of Washington. Magnuson had picked up that fight when he was in the state legislature, had advanced it when he was a county prosecutor. And then when he got to Congress in '37, joined Bone in various things like that.

It was in the late '40s, early '50s that there was a "CVA." We have the Tennessee Valley Authority, there was a push to have a Columbia Valley Authority. Of course, this got bound up with the private versus public ownership issue, and the fact that the Columbia River is the border between Oregon and Washington. Many of its tributaries come out of Montana and Idaho as well as Canada. The political fight really involved those states, and the Montana Power Company had a great deal of influence on the Montana congressional delegation. The Idaho delegation did not include people like [William] Borah. The Oregon delegation did not have Charles McNary and was very much for private power. So it was a big fight, and it was one that Magnuson lost. It never came about, but they did preserve the federal agency Bonneville.

Magnuson did go through, I believe, some personal question as to whether he really wanted to stay in this business, and this might have affected the '50 campaign, when he came close to being defeated, within fifty thousand votes. But he survived. And then in the mid-'50s, when accidents like the death of Burnet Maybank accelerated Magnuson not from a lowly member of Appropriations but chairman of a subcommittee, chairman...
what Magnuson felt was a choice subcommittee, Independent Offices, that included the Veterans' Administration, the National Science Foundation, which Magnuson had personally worked to get authorized, and all of the independent agencies, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the F.C.C. [Federal Communications Commission] , all of the alphabet soup down there, that also appeared before Magnuson's authorizing committee, Commerce. In '55 he became chairman of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, as it was called then, and he became chairman of the Appropriations subcommittee on independent offices. He became a baron, with all the perks, the power, etc. And in those days they were, I think, more considerable than they are today.

I think starting in '55 he really found himself—enjoyed himself—within the Senate. He'd already been accepted as one of the boys, because he had been one of the boys under [Sam] Rayburn. The holy water that Rayburn could put on a member of Congress was considerable. Magnuson came from the House to the Senate with that imprimatur: Here's a guy that will go along; here's a guy that cooperates; here's a guy that keeps his mouth shut; here's a guy that you can work with; he's liberal but, you know, forgive him on that. So Magnuson immediately was accepted, but then when he got to the position of power, that acceptance was even more so. He was able to accommodate the regional interest of people.

In the '50s he did a number of things with the Commerce Committee. They got very active in the radio field in protecting both FM and UHF, the channels that were outside the normal television band. It was a Maggie law that required, in interstate shipment of TV sets or radios, that the FM be on the radio and that the UHF be on the TV.

Coupled with that was an understanding, a very strong understanding with the FCC, that these channels would be reserved for more public use, and so that there would be public television, public radio. Subsequently there was even funding allowed, and it all went through the Commerce Committee. These were Maggie laws.

So after the '56 election and his assurance of staying, which was almost a landslide, he approached the '62 election with relative confidence. The polls that we had out there approaching '62 looked very good, with Magnuson's favorable ratings. There were signs that weren't good. The bad signs were the fact that of seven congressmen, the Democrats only had two. The Republicans who were in Congress, Walt Horan in the 5th District, Tom Pelly in the 1st, Thor Tollefson down in Tacoma, Catherine May in the eastern part of the state. They just seemed to roll up bigger votes all the time. I think we helped, the Democrats helped, because we didn't put up very good candidates against most of them most of the time. When Scoop got elected to the Senate and left the 2nd District, which had been solidly Democratic for many years, it went Republican and no Democrat could dislodge Jack Westland. And Jack's only claim to fame when he first got elected was that he won the PGA. He was a good golfer. He came back here and played at Congressional and he was still a good golfer and he kept winning.

And then Don Magnuson in '60, the denouement of Don Magnuson as a public official was right there in the election results because the poor devil only won by 139 votes. Ninety-five thousand on each side and he had
just 139 more than the other guy. Julia Butler Hansen had been elected to the House from the 3rd District. Julia was an old-time political figure in the state of Washington. She was a fantastic legislator, and had been in the state legislature for many years. When she got back here she got next to Mike Kirwin and others and was quickly accepted as a legislator, not just a female. She became quite a power in the House before she left. Her seat was good but the Don Magnuson seat was lousy. Approaching '62, if you looked at the congressional election figures, it didn't look good. But the polls were good as we approached '62.

RITCHIE: Would you say that the population of the state was becoming more conservative at that time? Was Magnuson perhaps more liberal than his constituents? Or less liberal?

REID: It's hard to say, because our state with its initiative and referendum, we had issues on the ballot that have always been issues where you might put a conservative-liberal question mark, and our people have been able to vote. By and large our people have taken what I think the ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union] or anybody else might measure a more liberal stance. Our state defeated right-to-work laws on three occasions. Our state adopted a very liberal and very costly public welfare program at one election. It almost broke the bank in the state coffers. There had been issues like public power that had been on the ballot and the public always went with the public side of the issue. So I think you could say that our state was liberal.

Magnuson always had a more liberal tint to him than most of the members who were elected, or most of the state officials. He was usually out on, not the fringe, but the forefront. He probably was a little more liberal than the average. Our people had a fairly good voting participation. It was well over 50 percent in those days. It's been dropping more recently. Our population, whether it was stable or not, it was always increasing. The war brought a lot of people, the Depression, of course, started it, but the war brought people. Boeing expansion, shipyard expansion, the military bases that we've always had. Fort Lewis is a very old army base, along with Benning and a few other places; it was an assignment where rising stars always ended up somewhere along the line. Ike was there in '35 or '36 as a young major. Bremerton has always been a major facility for the building and repair of naval vessels. So the war did bring more people, and they stayed. If you can find a job in the state of Washington, most people don't leave.

There had been that increase in population. As we approached the '62 election there probably had been at least a doubling of the population from that time that Magnuson was first a congressman, representing the major portion of the metropolitan area of Seattle and Bremerton. In '37 I'm sure we were down—I know before World War II we were below the million-and-a-half mark, and that by '60, we were up to the three million mark, and now we're over four million. So you had that addition, and of course you had births and new voters. It wasn't as bad as this last time when over two-thirds of the population in the state of Washington was born after Magnuson first was elected to office!

RITCHIE: Magnuson had been particularly successful over those years in bringing federal money into the state.
**RITCHIE:** I was looking at some statistics that 15 percent of all the federal funds for public construction were spent in the state of Washington, which had 2 percent of the population of the country.

**REID:** Well, the Columbia River was the biggest single reason for that. The Columbia is one of the greatest natural resources in the world. It is a river that has quite a fall from its source to its ocean. It is falling water that can become hydroelectric power. Whatever happened back a zillion years ago that helped form the Columbia created a gorge, where we were able to put up dams. For the early dams, none of the great thought went into it, but they didn't make any booboos. They discovered by the time Magnuson was active and the Roosevelt administration was receptive, that you could build dams very close to each other and you could have that backup from one literally come to the doorstep of the next one. So that's what we were up to. We were able to do that without flooding great expanses of land.

I know in my own home town, we had an early dam that was built privately, in fact the only private dam on the Columbia was Rock Island. It was built by Puget Sound Power and Light back shortly after World War I. It was built low, just to get hydro, just to generate electricity, not to do a damn thing about holding back water and preventing floods or anything else. Well, that dam was condemned and purchased by our PUD, our Public Utility District. Later, our Public Utility District raised the dam, made it higher. When they did it, it took out some acres of orchards, but only a few. It was not like some rivers—you could never

build the dams on the Mississippi that we've been able to build on the Columbia, because of the Mississippi Valley. You would end up flooding a zillion acres and people just wouldn't stand for it. It would take out too much good bottomland. The Columbia River really doesn't have good bottomland in the more accepted sense because of the way it was built. God was very kind to us.

So we were able to develop the Columbia, but that was costly. Even though we make the claim that Uncle just loaned us the money, we're repaying it with interest (and we have repaid, in fact the Grand Coulee is way ahead of schedule of being "repaid"), that took a lot of money up front. And the up-front money came from the federal coffers. Magnuson and everybody else out there that has represented the state, and even the Republicans, Walt Horan who was a very good Republican all the years that he was here, was a strong public power advocate and supporter of U.S. public investment in the development of the Columbia. So when it came to public works the state of Washington and the Northwest picked off an awful lot of that money. We got more than our fair share, perhaps, but yet it was a national investment and it is being repaid. If it hadn't been done, we'd be burning barrels of oil in the Northwest for electrical energy. We might not have had the cheap power that could have produced all the aluminum, reduced all that bauxite to aluminum, and that aluminum went into bombers, and P-38's that that helped win World War II.

**RITCHIE:** Yet here you have a senator who has obviously been very successful in drawing in . . .
REID: The pork.

RITCHIE: The pork through the pork barrel, who's chairman of a major committee, who's responsible for the federal funding that is helping all these people move into the state, and all the rest, and in 1962, which was a Democratic year in the state of Washington.

REID: It was not much of a Democratic year in the state of Washington. Nixon carried the state of Washington in '60. Kennedy was popular but yet an unknown quantity. The '62 election, the things that hurt Warren Magnuson, I think he was hurt most by Don Magnuson. Don was still on that ballot. They tried to get him to read the tea leaves and get the hell off and not run for reelection. He did run for reelection. He had been reelected in '60 by 139 votes. He was defeated solidly in '62. In that '61-'62 period there was one time in the spring of '62 when Don Magnuson, and as I mentioned he had the twin failing of cards and liquor, he was found dead drunk in the skid row area of Seattle. He was arrested, he was booked, he was released. The radio stations that found out about it published the fact on the air, on their newscasts. There was one radio station in Seattle that didn't say Don Magnuson, they said "Senator Magnuson." Now that broadcast did not continue all day, but it was part of the morning, into the day, before somebody got it corrected, got it changed. Now, there was no way the Warren Magnuson camp could get everybody to publish the fact: "Look, it was Don, it wasn't Warren; it was the congressman, not the senator." We just had to live with the fact, but that went on. He had also publicly divorced and separated, and all of this was public knowledge, it was widely published, and Don Magnuson's opponent used it.

Warren Magnuson's opponent was an unknown. There were several opponents in the primary, but the one that emerged from the primary was a fellow named Richard Christiansen. He was a reverend. He was ordained in the Lutheran Church. That's a big plus in the state of Washington. We have a lot of Scandinavians; we have a large Lutheran population, a very respected Lutheran population. Nobody knew this Reverend Christiansen and he was not the choice of the, what you might call the "Powers That Be" of the Republican party. I know he was not the choice of the Weyerhaeuser group, the Norton-Clapps, and others who historically had supported more conservative candidates, who had strongly supported Eisenhower and Langlie, and later supported Richard Nixon over Nelson Rockefeller. He was not their candidate; they had another candidate. But Christiansen emerged from the primary, and he emerged because he got in a car and went all over the state and he was able to motivate women. He was a handsome guy, charismatic. He was what I would call a Billy Graham type, because he was a revivalist. He would get these women to throw a tea party and he would go in and he'd work with these gals for an hour or so and then they would go out and work like hell for him. In fact, they came up with the slogan "Women on the Warpath," WOW, and it was very successful in numbers of volunteers. It was also modestly successful in raising some money, because these gals would have bake sales and cookie sales for Richard Christiansen.

Well, Richard Christiansen's people had made some other contacts. They made one with big oil, [H. L. ] Hunt in Texas, and they'd made a connection with the American Medical Association in Chicago. Dwight David Eisenhower's brother Edgar got involved in Christiansen's campaign.
as the treasurer. It's documented that the American Medical Association put in $197,000 for the defeat of Warren Magnuson, not really the election of Richard Christiansen, but the defeat of Warren Magnuson. They saw Warren Magnuson as a socialist, he favored the Ewing Health Plan, which Oscar Ewing and Harry Truman tried to put through in the '49-'50 period, and Magnuson was an avowed supporter of this thing called Medicare that was coming down the pike. And by gum they were going to get rid of him! Magnuson had always been against big oil as far as its depletion allowance. He voted up here, he and Russ Long might agree on a lot of things, but they never agreed on that. So Magnuson had always been a no vote in oil depletion allowance and he'd always been a yea vote on some kind of national health plan for the people.

So there was big money that had come into the Richard Christiansen campaign. It was smartly handled. As I said, he was a revivalist, he was an excellent TV performer. We have a great example today in the White House. Richard Christiansen was a fantastic performer on the tube in 1962. They were picking up half-hours and they were challenging Magnuson to a debate. They came up with a gimmick that was, as far as I was concerned, very devastating to us. He would start off by saying that he'd invited Senator Magnuson to debate, but the senator couldn't get there, or wouldn't get there, but we have his chair over there. And there would be a rocking chair, it was a Kennedy-type rocking chair, but they had the damn thing wired in some way so that it would move. So Christiansen would make some kind of comment on where he stood and then he'd give some kind of a lead into what Senator Magnuson's position was, and once in a while they would zero in on that chair. Sometimes the chair would move very slowly, and sometimes it would move very fast. It was a clever visual gimmick.

Of course, all Magnuson's advisors told him that he should not debate. The results of the '60 debates between Nixon and Kennedy, people read them all sorts of ways, but our people were reading them that an incumbent should never honor a challenger and give him visibility, blah, blah, blah. Magnuson himself probably wanted to. I know he did this last time, and he had previously, and I know from one of his appearances in the '56 campaign—there was an instance where the Seattle Rotary Club held a big lunch in Seattle, and both Governor Langlie and Senator Magnuson appeared. They did not debate, but they both appeared. Governor Langlie went first and opened the door by casting stones and political barbs, so when Magnuson got up, he did his part. According to most people, Magnuson just devastated Langlie in that encounter. I tend to agree with Magnuson that he could appear in a joint appearance and he'd come off the better. But I was perhaps one of the few that felt that way in 1980, and that was certainly true in '62.

I was involved in the campaign in King County, I was living there, practicing law, and was involved in the campaign there. There were no joint appearances, and it was a very close election. But, again, the congressional side: Don Magnuson lost badly, Julia was the only Democrat who retained her seat, and when you totaled up the Democratic vote for congressional candidates and the Republican vote, the difference was about 250,000 on the Republican side. The margin between Warren Magnuson's vote, about 492,000, and the Democrats for Congress, was over 150,000. And Magnuson's race was the race. It was the one time no governor, no president, the senatorial race was "the race." You didn't have any protection. There was no cover, with some
other race taking the spotlight. So Magnuson did run well ahead of the congressional candidates, well ahead of his party. Christiansen ran behind his congressional people, and he ran behind his party. I would say it was a personal triumph for Magnuson.

Any review of the 1962 election must factor in the physical arrangement of the ballot in Washington state. The Senate race was on top, followed by all of the U. S. congressional races—and the preferential placement for all of the Democrats or Republicans goes, by law, to that party which carried the previous presidential race. So not only was Senator Magnuson somewhat "exposed" in the only statewide race, but as a Democratic candidate, he suffered the handicap of Nixon having carried the state in 1960. Another factor, missed by many national types, is that voters in Washington do not have the option of voting a straight ticket by hitting just one lever at the top of the line or marking just one box on their paper ballots.

The money spent on the other side exceeded the money spent on his side. I think they spent their money much more wisely. We had an instance of sheer horror when our billboards first appeared in about June or July. When they first went up, something had happened at the printers, because Warren Magnuson's picture was on each billboard, and it was in beautiful color, and there was a background. The backgrounds differed, but the picture was the same. But the picture came out just horribly, and they had to replace it. Why—this was a question we asked Jerry Hoeck and others—why somebody hadn't looked at the damn thing before it went out? It was embarrassing, and it was something that was picked up by not only the television and radio but the newspapers, so it drew unfavorable attention to something that really was unfortunate. I felt there was a mistake in the billboard verbiage, because it was very egotistical. It was: "Magnuson Makes Washington Great." It was an egotistical statement. If they had just added the word "Helps" in there, I thought it would have been better. But, you know, in those kinds of decisions, everybody argues and everybody has a different opinion.

RITCHIE: That was the campaign where his face was on the billboard with a picture of the Grand Coulee dam, with the assumption that he helped to build it. Something of an allusion to one of John Kennedy's references.

REID: Right, Magnuson helped. In fact, when Magnuson was in the state legislature in '33 he led the attempt to get money from the state coffers to help build Grand Coulee, but he was not in the Congress. It was more former U.S. Senator C. C. Dill. Dill struck a bargain with Jim Farley before the Chicago convention. Dill had the votes, Dill was the favorite son from the state of Washington. Magnuson was in the delegation, but Dill was the leader of the delegation. And it was C. C. Dill that stuck a deal with Farley, you know, we'll give you the votes, but here's what we want. We want that Grand Coulee Dam built. Dill paid off and so did Farley and Roosevelt. It got started as a W.P.A. project and grew. Of course, Magnuson over the years did help add powerhouses, in fact they're still building powerhouses with some of the Maggie and Scoop money that we've gotten. There's a hole there where they can build another powerhouse someday, because that was one of the things that Magnuson worked on, because Grand Coulee is capable of even more generation that it's doing right now.
RITCHIE: So when the votes were all counted up in this election, Magnuson had won by about fifty thousand votes . . .

REID: About forty-five thousand or forty-six thousand, less than fifty thousand.

RITCHIE: It must have come as something of a breathtaking surprise that it was such a slim margin.

REID: It was, and it did bother Magnuson personally, a little, although he put that behind him quickly. There was another factor. We had the Cuban Missile Crisis hit during the campaign. We also had a session of Congress that ran later than normal. I believe they didn't get out of here until the middle of October, October 13th, something like that. Our primary was in September, the general of course in November. But during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy had some kind of a briefing down in San Francisco that a lot of the western senators went to. Magnuson went there and was there overnight. He came back to Seattle late in the evening from San Francisco, from this presidential briefing. Our P.R. people thought this was a natural. They wanted to seize the initiative and get people thinking about Cuba or something or other, so they took Magnuson directly from the airport to the television station. As they walked in the door they turned on the cameras. Now, I was not present, but I was on the other end of it, I was watching the tube. It was one of the lousiest appearances I have ever seen. Technically it was not coordinated, and Magnuson was not up to snuff. He was tired and he showed it. It was not a good appearance. Now, it did come late in the evening. As I remember it was either ten or ten thirty. So many of us, I know I certainly just sat there praying that nobody else was watching. We did get a little flack from it the next few days. But it was a booboo on our part. We made every mistake (“we” collectively) and Magnuson won in spite of it, and us.

RITCHIE: You said you were working in King County during that election. What were you doing during the election?

REID: Well I was physically on the payroll of the Washington state legislature, the Joint Committee on Governmental Cooperation. I lived there, I'd been living there since '57, and I also had a very modest, modest law practice. And I was involved in the Magnuson campaign, as a friend, as one of the older-timers but yet still young. Not on his payroll, but I did go out and represent the senator at some events. I'd been doing that for several years. In fact, I remember in 1960 I went out to represent John Fitzgerald Kennedy, and a state representative at that time by the name of Joel Pritchard joined me. We both went to a fraternity and he spoke for Richard Nixon and I spoke for John Kennedy. Joel and I had known each other since he first appeared in the state legislature in the House. Of course, now he's back here as one of our congressmen. So I had done things like that in past elections, I'd been a "speaker." I did quite a bit of that in the '62 election, because you have to have surrogates.

Magnuson has never been a hit-and-run artist. It's always been very difficult, if not impossible, for him to fly back to the state on a Friday and appear Friday night, Saturday, and Sunday and get on the "red-eye" and get
back here Monday. He would much prefer to go out there and stay five or six days or a week. The job here has not allowed that very much. But that's the way he's operated. Whenever he could get away from here for five to ten days, that's what he would do. Scoop, on the other hand, has been making that weekend run ever since he was in the House, and still does. I think it's almost habit now with Scoop. But it's a different campaign style, and it's a style that Magnuson never was able to do, even though some of his newer people in the '60s and '70s thought that was the way to go and tried to get him to do it. He just refused and would not.

RITCHIE: I suppose when he started out his political career the type of transcontinental transportation wasn't as good.

REID: That's right. There were several stops on that airplane before it got here. He didn't take his first, non-stop transcontinental flight until 1960, when he flew from Baltimore to Los Angeles for the Democratic National convention! Of course, when he first started out as a congressman he was able to go home and spend three or four months and get around casually, and he did. He got to know people, people got to know him, but as the population expanded, that old style of spending more time with a group and for an entire evening, or at least for two or three hours, was diminishing returns. When you start getting a population of two and a half to three million, three and a half, four million,

there's just no way. Even if you do it like Scoop does, there's still no way that you can really physically meet all those people, although Scoop meets more of them than Magnuson, and more of them actually see him. He has the ability to go into a room and make the circle and get out of a room in twenty-five to thirty minutes that Magnuson finds impossible. He just won't move that fast and won't pass people by that fast.

RITCHIE: Well, after that '62 election, Magnuson came back to Washington and began to make some changes in his staff, particularly in the Commerce Committee and I assume on his personal staff as well. Was this a direct result of the election, that he felt the time had come to make some dramatic changes or change the advice he was getting?

REID: It was a mix. There was a changing of the guard. One, Irv Hoff opted to leave. I know it was financial with Irv. The pay, the offers on the outside were much greater than the ability on the inside. So Irv had left as AA. A new AA had come aboard, Fred Lordan. Fred was an old friend of Magnuson's, a long-time associate, able lawyer and an expert at legislative craftsmanship. There was another person that most people can't even remember, Frank Pelligrini. Frank Pelligrini was a very good lawyer and had been the more or less top staff person on the Commerce Committee, very capably. Frank died of a heart attack, early. There was an opening that neither Magnuson nor Frank Pelligrini wanted!

Jerry Grinstein, who was the son of an old friend of Magnuson's, and from the state, and a very bright lawyer, Harvard-type, was there on the staff at the time. So Jerry became the top counsel. Now there were some old-timers that were on the staff that Magnuson had inherited and that were experts. Then there was of course the fact that Dirksen [Senate Office Building] had been built and there was more room, and with more staff allowance, and the increasing demand by other members for some kind of direct assistance that the staff did grow. You want to remember that the Commerce Committee had the likes of Phil Hart, who was certainly just
as liberal, if not more so, than Magnuson, many of the same people. It had some very able people like John Pastore, Bob Bartlett, Clair Engle, Joe Tydings, Bill Spong, Dan Inouye, Adlai Stevenson, John Tunney—and on the Republican side the Thruston Morton's, Norris Cottons, and men like Bob Griffin, Ted Stevens and Mark Hatfield who were all equally interested and active. So there was an expansion of the staff, mainly on the younger scale, and we acquired some very able people that were able to work with the old timers like Nick Zapple. Nick was a real expert in communication law. Magnuson had really inherited him, but came to depend upon him, and trust him a great deal. Magnuson himself had a keen interest in communications, and a long interest because when Magnuson was an attorney back in the '29, '30, '31 period, Magnuson had represented a small radio station in Seattle that needed to get a permit in order to get more wattage, and so Magnuson had a personal knowledge of the FCC and its problems and complexities that he brought here. He didn't learn it here. He may have honed it here, but he didn't come here a virgin and discover there was an FCC. But Nick became an extremely valuable staff person to Magnuson as well as to John Pastore and others in the FCC area.

After the '62 election some of this became a little more evident. Which was first? You have to remember that the Kennedy administration started, or tried to start, a surge of domestic initiatives and the Johnson administration grabbed the ball and ran with it. One of the key decisions of the Johnson administration, civil rights, Magnuson was a participant in the White House decisions on that legislation. I think he was perhaps the author of the idea that the bill be split when it came to the Senate, and that Mr. Eastland and Judiciary be given the Civil Rights bill, but that the Commerce Committee, because of the interstate and commerce clause, be given the "public accommodations" section, which certainly impacts more on Commerce than it does the Judiciary. Well, everybody knew that the Civil Rights bill under Jim Eastland would not see the light of day. There was some hope that a public accommodations bill in the Commerce Committee might see the light of day, and it did. It didn't get out without some problems, some troubles, even a physical altercation between a Ralph Yarborough and a Strom Thurmond. But it did get out and Magnuson carried it on the floor. One of our future administrative assistants, Stan Barer, was the key staff person on that public accommodations section and was stuck on the floor with Magnuson for almost three months when that bill was filibustered. Of course, the plot was that when Commerce reported it, that the other portions would be added to it as amendments, and it would be the vehicle for getting the Civil Rights Act through the Senate. The plot worked, not without some consternation on the part of Richard Russell and the old-timers, but it did work. Cloture was voted, and it did pass, and it became law.

But yet that was somewhat typical of some of the things that were happening: the Johnson administration, the Great Society efforts, many of the bits and pieces of that legislation did hit Commerce and go through Commerce and make it possible for the Mike Pertschuks to emerge as visible people. We got Mike from Maurine Neuberger's office. Of course, being from Oregon, being from Washington, we had some more than casual working relationships. We got to know Mike when Mike had been picked up by Maurine. Maurine was the one that really got him started on the Commerce Committee, but he's a bubbly guy, a bright guy, very capable. He quickly became part of the Magnuson cabal that permeated the Commerce Committee at the time, and became a successor to Grinstein. When Grinstein left the Commerce Committee, Pertschuk became the chief counsel. But a lot of things were done during the mid-60s that were a combination. I don't know who
deserves most of the credit, but I think it has to be shared between the Johnson administration and the Califanos, and whoever it was down there in the White House bowels trying to stir up things, Johnson trying to stir up things, Hubert Humphrey stirring up things, and Warren Magnuson stirring up things.

**RITCHIE:** In terms of creating the staff, Jerry Grinstein seems to get a lot of credit. I was wondering what kind of a person he was, if you could give a sketch of him, and what his influence was on Magnuson at that time.

**REID:** Well, Jerry's extremely bright, not just as a lawyer. And he's concerned. He carries some of the same concerns about injustice that many of us in the Magnuson camp carried. Of course, Jerry being Jewish, there might be a heritage there of discrimination, anti-discrimination that would filter into some of his thinking. But he certainly found a compatible group, starting with Magnuson and most of the people associated with Magnuson through the years on his staff. I would say most of them, myself and Magnuson included, it's the helping hand rather than the handout that we are trying to achieve, that there shouldn't be any artificial barriers. I know I personally had a great deal of trouble with Affirmative Action, because to me it's more a euphemism for quotas, and I've seen quotas used to discriminate. So I've had trouble with Affirmative Action myself.

But Jerry did have a great deal of influence. He came to Magnuson as somebody that Magnuson had known casually as a child, a little better perhaps as a teenager and college student, but then joined the staff and proved himself intellectually and personally very capable. He proved that he was capable to others as well as to Magnuson, so it didn't cause Magnuson any trouble with his colleagues when Jerry was given responsibility. Magnuson has always delegated a certain degree of hiring capability to his staff. Magnuson has not personally interviewed every applicant. Magnuson would like to see and chat with prospective finalists, and almost invariably sprinkled his blessing on any selection that any of us might make. He of course retained veto power and only rarely did Magnuson exercise that power for either clerical or professional type personnel. Of course, Jerry had an opportunity to garner more, but Magnuson also started a program in the early '60s, about '63.

He started a program together with the University of Washington Law School of accepting from the Law School a senior, a graduate, whom they

...two law professors and another professor from political science, three of them would interview and select—and we would take. Magnuson's idea was that the individual would spend a year on his staff, on the Commerce staff, and then go back and not be afraid to represent home state clients before federal agencies. That was modestly successful, that portion of it, because a few of them did return after only a year. Most of them stayed here. A lot of them stayed here. That's how we got Stan Barer in the first place. That's how we got Lynn Sutcliff. That's how we got Dan O'Neal, and a number of very good people. And they stayed with us. One that didn't was a young fellow named Norm Maleng, who admitted that he was a Republican and mentioned that to Magnuson, and Magnuson said "Well, we don't worry about politics here, you know, worry about politics later." Well, Norm Maleng did stay just a year and then went back home. Later he ran for prosecuting attorney of King County and in every bit of literature and everything else praised the fact that he'd been an intern with Warren
Magnuson, and it didn't hurt in his election as King County prosecutor, and he's prosecutor right now. But that farm club from the UW Law School proved very fertile, very fertile indeed. I don't think we had a bust in the lot. Magnuson was proud of it, liked it. It gave us some very good, active young people, and continual freshness.

RITCHIE: Well, this then brings us up to the time when you came to join Magnuson's staff. Was that in 1964?

REID: Yes, I had been yakking with them in '63, but I had commitments out home that kept me there through '63 and I came to the staff in '64.

RITCHIE: What made you decide to join the staff now, some fourteen years after you first worked for Magnuson?

REID: Well, one was an accident of politics in the state of Washington. We had a Democratic governor, a Democratically controlled House and Senate, but a Democratic Speaker of the House who was at political odds with the Democratic governor. The governor of the state of Washington has the item veto, which the president doesn't, so the governor of the state of Washington was able to veto all funding of all legislative interim committees. That veto, which was exercised in '63, wiped out the funding for the interim committee that I was associated with, and that was still in existence. On July 1, we didn't have any money. I had the choice of either finding something else or—and the governor at the time, [Albert] Rosellini, there was an offer of "you know, we'll find something, don't worry, we want you around." But I had gone through a personal situation with a gal that I thought I wanted to get married with, almost since '49. She and I had a romance off and on, and I had gone through a situation with her where she was on but I was off. So I thought a personal change would be good. It was a combination. If the interim committee had stayed in existence with money, I think I probably would just have stayed, because I liked the work, I enjoyed it, I was able to help fabricate legislation, look into local problems, see them very closely and help work out changes, and see the changes work or not work. It was a very intimate association with government. That's one of the problems I felt back here, it's less intimate. But the combination of personal and political, and the offer—I grabbed it.

RITCHIE: Did you come back to work on the Commerce Committee staff or on Magnuson's personal staff?

REID: Well, I knew I was going to be associated with the personal office, although I didn't worry about the paycheck. It had been explained that I would be housed probably in 127 [Magnuson's office, Russell Senate Office Building] but that I would be paid by Commerce, and don't worry about it. I didn't. So I came back and joined the Commerce Committee staff as a professional staffer. I was housed in 127. And calling cards were printed and it said "Assistant to Warren G. Magnuson." I used the same calling card for eighteen years, although I occupied different positions and was "on different payrolls," the disbursing clerk sent a check to Riggs [Bank] every month and it didn't matter where it showed up in the Secretary [of the Senate]'s book, to me.

RITCHIE: Before we get into just what you were doing, I was wondering what your impression was of
the Senate after being away for fourteen years. Were you impressed by the changes or the lack of changes in the institution?

REID: At first it didn't seem that different, because there were a few people on the floor, Dickey Darling was still here at that time, Joe Stewart was still here. Dickey I had known quite well in '49, '50, Joe I had known of. They were still in the cloakroom. The floor didn't look any different. I remembered the old cars, and now they had new cars. More people. And Dirksen [Senate Office Building],

which I never cared for. At one time I did occupy an office in Dirksen, as well as an office in 127, and I never did like Dirksen. I think the differences that first hit me were physical. Then the larger city, the larger population of the Hill. There was still Ballard on the police force, but now he was a captain, when I got here in '64. He later became an inspector. There were a couple of others I remembered from the police days that were lieutenants. But it was bigger.

I've spent a lot of time on the Hill because I found an apartment—I set out to find a place to live right on the Hill, I didn't want to have to commute—over on 110 D Street, just behind the Cannon [House Office] Building, and moved in in January of '64, and I'm going to move out August 8th of '81. I've been in the same two rooms all this time. I've done the Mike Palm eatery and other eateries on Pennsylvania Avenue and have walked the grounds day and night, early and late. I love the Hill. I love the Capitol grounds. I still get a thrill when I fly back to town and see the Capitol, or when I drive up Pennsylvania Avenue on the way home, and see it sitting there. Or when I walk across the grounds in the early morning when the blue is sometimes prettiest.

I think the increase in the numbers of people was most striking. There used to be an intimate dining room up there on the second floor of Russell. That was gone and there was a new cafeteria in the basement. I still call it the Hayden Memorial Lunch Room, because I can remember walking through there and Carl Hayden being there. He refused to pay more than a nickel for a cup of coffee. When coffee went to a dime he'd get half a cup but he'd only give them a nickel. Those were the days when Carl Hayden did eat down there quite often. Today the only senator

that I've ever seen there, and quite often I see him there, is John Stennis on Saturdays. I have seen Sparky Matsunaga bring in a group and have lunch there on Saturday also. But in the old days in that cafeteria on the second floor, you used to see a number of senators that came in, although they even then had their place in the Capitol, where only they could go. But the larger buildings, the larger accommodations, the big cafeterias in Dirksen were all a little dehumanizing.

RITCHIE: Had the type of senators changed very much in the interim?

REID: I think so, because you didn't have the Tom Connallys or Vandenbergs, McKellars, or the likes of the Senior Harry Byrds and Robert Tafts. Of course, Richard Russell was still here when I came back, and to me he was perhaps the epitome of the more old-time senator: well-schooled, well-honed, coming up through the ranks, being a governor, being a state legislator, learning the ropes before they got here, and then spending a long time in the vineyards here before they emerged as some kind of public figure outside of their own
constituency. Of course, Warren Magnuson and Henry Jackson have much the same background. The only difference between Magnuson and Jackson is the fact that Magnuson did serve as a state legislator. Jackson was a prosecutor and House member before he became a senator. I would say more in the '60s, and now perhaps far too much, you have people immediately somehow entering the chamber, and being given a toga, that you didn't have in the past.

**RITCHIE:** Your official title was assistant to the Chairman of the Commerce Committee . . .

---

**REID:** Well, on the calling card it said "Assistant to Warren G. Magnuson" because that's the only name that was on the ballot in the state.

**RITCHIE:** But what actually were your responsibilities?

**REID:** Well, during the earlier period, when I first came around, I immediately assumed a responsibility within the office for relations, mail and physical relations with education and health people within the state. That also brought with it some of the national associations that might get involved. One of the things that I did in the health field, just by accident the president of the Washington State Medical Society at that time was my sister's surgeon in Spokane. He was coming back here for a national meeting, and he happened to mention the fact to her. She said, "Well, look up my brother. He works for Warren Magnuson." Dr. Carl Schlicke, who was a conservative Republican but a concerned physician, felt that the antipathy that had been highly evidenced in elections between the Medical Society and Magnuson was not healthy for either. So he did contact me not just to see me but to see if it was possible for them to see Magnuson. I said, "Well, why not?" So I talked to Magnuson and he said, "Well, that's a surprise."

We got them together over in the Senator's dining room over in the Capitol. We took a table and we had, I think, seven or eight people there. Dr. Schlicke had three of his people with him, and Magnuson and myself and Carl Downing, who was our press man. We had lunch and then we went up to Magnuson's hideaway [office], S-239 on the East Front of the Capitol, and sat and talked for about an hour. There was another doctor with the Washington state group, he was from Tacoma, who was really an ultra-conservative type. At the time Medicare had just passed and the debate within medicine was whether or not they were going to play the game. This guy was against playing the game and wanted some kind of a strike, but he didn't prevail. He remained on the board for several years and came back several times, and as he said, "Well, you know, Magnuson doesn't have horns."

That started the relationship between "organized medicine" in the state of Washington, the Washington State Medical Society, and Warren Magnuson. There was another fellow involved in this, his name was Harlan Knudson. He had just gone to work for the State Medical Society in 1963 as some kind of a legislative representative. Well, Harlan Knudson and I had met in Seattle when I was there, and he had run for the state House in 1962 and had been defeated, at the same time a friend of mine was running, and I was supporting, and he got nominated on the Democratic ticket, but he did not win the general election. So Harlan and I knew each other, and I liked Harlan. Harlan became a very lowly staff person for the Washington State Medical Society.
Over the years he became their top non-physician, still, is their top man. I helped engineer this meeting and over the last twenty years, a good working relationship has developed between organized medicine within the state of Washington and Warren Magnuson personally, and Warren Magnuson's staff. I wasn't the only one involved with that, there were other staff people that got involved, but I helped engineer it.

I did the same type of thing with some of the educator groups, common schools, colleges, universities. Magnuson had already had a

reputation and an entree with some of them. There has always been a good chemistry between Warren Magnuson and the Jesuits. We have two Jesuit colleges in our state, Seattle University and Gonzaga. There's always been a good chemistry between those people and Magnuson and with [President] Tim Healey out here at Georgetown. Magnuson's always enjoyed their company and there's always been an entree if they had a problem. They always felt free to come to him, and he always saw them. So I didn't have to help open that door, that door was already there, but perhaps I expanded it and opened a few others, got a few others into Magnuson. We had a very good working relationship over the years with those people, and with various disciplines within the community of higher education as well as elementary and secondary. That was a major responsibility that I had within the office.

I had some other responsibilities at that time with the Commerce Committee. I worked on a publication that was going to publish the election speeches of the presidential candidates in '64. The Commerce Committee had done it in '60, because of the equal access law. They did publish the Nixon-Kennedy appearances and debates, but we never did go to publication on the Goldwater-Johnson race in '64. But I sort of honchoed the compilation of it. I also worked on the problem we had with the St. Lawrence Seaway that Phil Hart wanted us to look into.

RITCHIE: What was that?

REID: It was some sort of an expansion. I don't really recall at the moment. It certainly wasn't a high priority with me, I was just doing something to help out and fill in a vacancy on the staff at the moment.

RITCHIE: The staff of the Commerce Committee has been described as one that worked primarily for the chairman. Some of the members complained that the staff wasn't as well distributed as it could have been. Is that a fair assessment?

REID: It could be, because you could say that there was three divisions of the staff. There was a minority and Jerry Kenney was head of the minority staff most of the time I was there, and they did their thing. There was another small cadre of people that kept the ship running, that handled documents and set up hearing rooms. Then there was the Chief Counsel, Jerry Grinstein, and company. It might well be that some of those members were unhappy with the fact that the Chief Counsel's group were more responsive, or totally responsive to the chairman. Of course the time that Strom Thurmond was a Democrat on our committee he would certainly be critical of the chairman as well as the staff because we were doing things that he opposed, like the public accommodations. The staff was just as gung ho as any member, and some of the members were certainly gung
ho, but the staff was very gung ho. I can picture the person, I can't remember his name, but I know that Strom had a person on our staff that was responsible to him. Magnuson never stood in the way of members having a person, even before S. Res. 4 or anything else came along. If they personally voiced to him an interest, he acquiesced. He started it with John Bricker when the election of '54 threw John out as chairman and Magnuson in as chairman. John bitched and Magnuson acquiesced and minority staff were allowed. Magnuson tried to hold it down, but whenever they expressed a desire,

they got it. But just having somebody, the fact that a Mr. Thurmond might have a person, didn't assure the person any power or persuasive skills. It was still the majority that were going to prevail, and the majority's desire, whether it was labeling on cigarettes, which Thruston Morton didn't want to see, or public accommodations, which Strom Thurmond didn't want to see, it was going to happen. The staff was there to make sure it happened and happened well. So some of them would have reason to complain, and there must be some justification.

RITCHIE: I was thinking about people like Pastore and Hart and others who were pretty strong-willed individuals and who had particular interests of their own. I wondered what kind of demands they made on the staff of the committee.

REID: I know that Mr. Pastore was very active and persuasive and forceful, and had his people. So did Fritz Hollings. You have to remember also that when I first got here we still didn't have "Sunshine," and executive sessions were relatively closed. They were relatively closed to the staff too, you did not have a lot of staff in there. There was no rule but there was an understanding, and it was also a small room. We held our executive sessions in those rooms right behind the hearing room. 5110 was our big hearing room up in Dirksen, and there was a room right behind there and that's where the chief clerk, Eddy Jarrett, was, and that's where the executive sessions were held. The press and the public and the lobbyists were outside in the hallway and stayed outside in the hallway. They saw the people that went in, but that was all. The people that came out said whatever they wanted to say and that was the result. There were no minutes, no verbatim minutes, of executive sessions. There were minutes, yes, recorded votes, but it was just the bare bones. It wasn't until much later that you got "Sunshine," and open execs with even verbatim transcripts.

RITCHIE: Do you think the system lost something by switching over to the Sunshine laws? Or did it gain more than it lost?

REID: I'll let somebody write extensively on that. My own personal view is that Sunshine created much more posturing. I can remember sessions, and cigarette labeling was one, that both Maggie and Thruston had counted the votes, and Thruston knew he didn't have them, so Thruston didn't spend a lot of time holding up final action. I honestly felt during the sessions, I was there at a number of them, that there was less posturing. They made their point quickly, sometime eloquently, but they made it quickly and most of them were pretty good head counters anyway. Some of them weren't, of course. The real movers were. So things did move a little
more quickly.

**RITCHIE:** I understand from all accounts that I've looked at that Magnuson really excelled in the executive session, backroom discussions. That he had a technique of dealing with people that won him tremendous support from his colleagues.

**REID:** He always tried to be accommodating, he tried to be understanding. He did spend time trying to really understand why these people might feel the way they did. He spent time with them in the cloakroom of the Chamber, in the back dining room, the private, private dining room that they have, because he invariably ate there. It was rare that we would schedule him for a luncheon with constituents. He would meet constituents in his office, get it over with, wander over and have lunch with his colleagues. Although Magnuson cam remember baseball scores and talk football or anything else, I know that isn't what they talked about when they would be in that backroom. Magnuson never tried to steamroller. He'd get impatient towards the end, but he had subtle ways of showing that impatience. He didn't do it verbally.

One of the ways he showed impatience, that he displayed more when he became chairman of the Appropriations Committee than he ever did before, and this was caused by Sunshine and the fact that Sunshine had a crowded room and Sunshine required the use of a gavel. Magnuson never used a gavel as I remember in the early days on Commerce. It was only Sunshine that required the presence of a gavel. But Magnuson would take the head of the gavel in his hand, and he's start tapping the handle on the table. It was kind of a slow tap, but as it got faster and louder, it was a way he was sort of showing anyone around the table: "Look, fellows, let's get to it." It was never very loud but whether you were a new man like Jim Sasser, or an old-timer like Stennis or Proxmire, it didn't go unnoticed, and it had its effect. But Sunshine did force these people who had a constituency or had any reason for publicly showing their hand to make sometimes long speeches.

**RITCHIE:** Tell me, in a situation where a senator is also the chairman of a committee, what's the relation between his personal staff and his committee staff? Are they two different institutions, or do they intermingle?

**REID:** Well, they basically have different responsibilities. Of course, every chairman has the power to manufacture any kind of system he wants. Some members keep their personal staffs almost entirely divorced from committee work, or other work. And a personal staff does have, I think, I know Magnuson believed it, and the people who really ran Magnuson's personal operation, that the first job they had was to be responsive to constituents. As time grew, constituent mail grew. The personal staff did not have time to spend on things outside the state of Washington mail. So they either chucked it or sent it off to the committee. There's always a tendency on the part of staff of committees to ignore anything outside of their immediate concern and immediate assignment. Mail is a burden. Many committees on the Hill do not answer mail. Some of them will answer constituent mail of chairmen or a ranking member, if they are forced to, and some of them probably do a fair job of answering some outside mail. But I think by and large most of the committees do not answer mail addressed to the committee or addressed to the chairman or members.
I think it's one of the contributing factors to the turn off of some people. Because I know I looked at this problem when we were in Appropriations, and we had a very modest operation. But the rules at the time did not allow committees to have some of the equipment with which you can answer mass mail. I encouraged the Rules Committee people to really take a closer look at the mail that a committee has dumped on it, one way or the other, either it comes in the front door or it comes in the backdoor from a member's office. And it does concern me. I'm leaving that concern behind right now, but it does bother me. I hate to see it, especially I hate to see the little postcards that's personally addressed and personally written (the printed postcards that's put out by some interest group, that doesn't bother me as much) but the really personal letter that some citizen out there puts their stamp on and sends to a senator that they don't even know, that complains, or that urges, or advocates. I think there should be a response. We tried to do that for Magnuson. But our first priority, of course, was the home state mail.

But the relationships, Magnuson had the power and the wallop, even before Dirksen was built, to acquire real estate in Russell. There was real estate in Russell that was dedicated to the Commerce Committee before Dirksen opened up, so there was a small enclave of Commerce Committee staff right across the hall from 127. And there was an interplay between those staffs, at the higher level, "professional level," and at the secretarial level. So there was, I think, a very good working relationship. Now there were always problems and jealousies because of pay or perks or something like that. And when we acquired chairmanship of Appropriations and lost Commerce, we also acquired real estate across the hall from 127, in 132, we acquired two rooms where we housed the key staff of Magnuson's involvement with Appropriations. Again, there was constant interplay between the two.

Before he became chairman of Appropriations and I was in the personal operations, first he was chairman of Independent Offices [Subcommittee], then he switched to HEW [Subcommittee]. While he was chairing Independent Offices, I had some responsibilities within that personal operation for independent agencies because of the National Science Foundation and because of the Veterans' Administration. Then when he switched to HEW, and health and education, of course, were in there, I had more responsibilities, and more interplay with the Appropriations staff of HEW. So I was always involved in interplay with other staffs, or other staff people who were on Appropriations as well as Commerce.

When I first got back in '64, the personal operation was not that large. In '49 I guess he had nine or ten people, when I got back in '64 we had about twenty here, then we went to about thirty which included two in Spokane and four in Seattle, so the 127 group didn't increase that much. I can remember in '49, you had one secretary handling "legislation." In '64, we had two or three people involved, but within four years we had about six people in the legislative office. They would also handle some constituent mail and constituent relations on the legislation that they were working on. So it was the legislative office that really grew. The case worker didn't grow that much. The [service] academy person was still an academy person, the numbers might go up and down but the staff that handled it remained a one-person operation, with other duties too.
RITCHIE: But as the staff grew, that enabled you to do some more specialization, say in the areas you mentioned of health and education?

REID: Yes. I was perhaps one of the first that became that much of a specialist. Later we had others, in the late '70s we had one that was "energy," even though Magnuson didn't personally need an energy person, because of his own knowledge and interest in hydro, the fact that solar and atomic and everything else was coming along, we had somebody, Ed Sheets, who spent a lot of time working on some of the complex questions and issues in energy. When HUD [Housing and Urban Development] was created and you had urban development, and we had cities like Seattle, Tacoma, even some of the smaller ones that had redevelopment problems and particular issues, we had somebody that was sort of honchoing that and watching it closely and working with the department, working with the committees, and the local officials. Your committee personnel spend most of their time authorizing. Often they are more interested in authorizing than they are in reviewing existing situations or working with constituents. Of course, on Appropriations you've got half an eye on the back of your head looking at authorizations but you're more worried about what's actually happening and what's being proposed. But in a personal office, you've got somebody who's either trying to unscrew a screw up, or that's trying to get something put together so they can be on the front lines. So that staff person in a personal office has to really be looking in a broader spectrum than the staff person that sits someplace else.

RITCHIE: I was just looking at Eric Redman's book, *The Dance of Legislation*, and he was saying that when the Vietnam war picked up, the personal staff members were swamped with constituent letters and protestors and delegations and all the rest, but the business of the committees continued, that no one came to the committee staffs to complain about Cambodia; instead they went to the senators' personal staffs. He drew a very strong distinction between those who are insulated from the pressure of constituents angry over a particular issue, as opposed to those on the firing line.

REID: And of course, in numbers, constituents far outweigh lobbyists. Now the best lobbyist knows that he needs to cultivate that key person who's sitting somewhere down on the staff of an authorizing committee, as well as the member. But the constituents don't. When Nelly Gray and company march through the building with their red roses, they're going to members' offices and just packing the reception rooms. They could walk right by a committee, be it Health and Human Services, or Judiciary, or Appropriations. And the mass mail hits the personal office, not the committees. So Eric is very, very right, very true.

RITCHIE: Now, when you say that you had responsibility for Independent Agencies, and you were interested in health and education, what kind of functions were you performing? What duties did you have?

REID: Some of them I shared, some were ones that Magnuson had originated and just handed me. Early in the game, when he acquired Independent Offices and the Veterans' Administration, he discovered a Veterans' Administration hospital system that was doing almost nothing in the way of bio-medical research, basic research in what they were doing. He had arguments with medical directors as well as VA administrators,
because he perceived this 180-some hospitals, the largest number of beds under one control in the world, and he
couldn't understand how these people could go about their business and not be doing some basic research on
their business. How could we do it better? So that was something that he kept after and he wanted some
independent

keeping after, so that was one of the little things we were watching, and that got handed me.

He'd helped create the National Science Foundation, to fill what he perceives—today as well as back in
1945-49—and a few others perceive, as a real void in the production of personnel that were capable of doing
basic research in the basic sciences. It stemmed out of our experiences in World War II, and it was finally
authorized in '50, came into existence in '51, Magnuson took over their money in '55. So we were watching and
finding out, and trying to discover how well NSF was doing, what they weren't doing. So that was sort of an
assignment that stemmed from him, but I found very compatible, very interesting.

RITCHIE: It was sort of an oversight role?

REID: Yes. And one of the outcomes of it was: you know there's a National Science Board, and there's
never been anybody from the state of Washington on it; why don't you do something about that Magnuson?
Well, he did. And there became a "Magnuson seat" on the Board. The first occupant was Dr. Frederick Thieme,
who was then vice president of the University of Washington, later became president of the University of
Colorado. He was originally appointed by Magnuson and Johnson. We had to get after [Jack] Valenti on that
one. He got reappointed by Nixon over the strong objections of John Ehrlichman, because Fred Thieme and
Gordon Allott became friends. There was a personal antipathy between John Ehrlichman and Thieme, and the
fact that Gordon Allott overrode Ehrlichman on that, to this day I believe that it was John Ehrlichman that
prevented the plane from stopping in Denver when

Nixon flew to California in '72, the day before the election, and that contributed to the defeat of Gordon Allott,
and Gordon certainly didn't deserve it. I think it was one of those little things that happen. But Fred and Gordon
had become good friends. Gordon was on Appropriations, was on Independent Offices. They developed a
personal friendship and Gordon got him reappointed. So Fred served twelve years.

John Hogness is on right at the moment, and he was the successor to the "Magnuson seat." At the time
John Hogness became a member of the National Science Board, he was president of the University of
Washington. That will probably be the last occupant of the "Magnuson seat," because there probably won't be a
"Magnuson seat" in the future.

The Science Board members are the ones who are legally responsible for direction and policy of the
NSF. And Magnuson had some impact on some of the things that they did or didn't do, especially in science
education in the junior high, senior high school levels, some of the programs that he urged various directors, as
well as that showed up in the reports of Independent Offices Subcommittee. Sometimes it was something that
the Board was hesitant to do, and so a little nudge from the Hill helped. Or it was something the OMB [Office
of Management and Budget] didn't want to do, and the Board did, but the Board played the honest game with
OMB and let us know, so that we took them off the hook. Many times the same thing has happened with NIH, National Institutes of Health. The Appropriations report differed from what the OMB thought should be going on.

**RITCHIE:** Well, I'm learning a lot about the mechanics of the staff system. This has been very useful information for me. I think the interview has been going very well, but we've been at it for about two hours, so I'm going to give you a break.

**REID:** I'm glad you don't have a clock on the wall.

[End of Interview #2]
RITCHIE: Could you elaborate a little more about the divisions of the staff between a senator's personal office and his role as chairman of a committee?

REID: Well, first my own definition of staff: I've used the word "tool." When I think of a tool, I'm thinking of not only of something intellectual but something physical. A tool that helps members do their job. Some might disagree with the choice of the word tool. I don't mean to dehumanize the staff, but staff must remember that they are there to assist the member to do his or her job, and that they are hired for both intellectual and physical reasons to do various things in capacities and assignments that the member might give to them. Whenever staff or the member forget this, they are both in jeopardy.

One of the problems that a staff has, whether it's personal office or committee, supporting a member, is having access to the member, because a member is just like you and I. He only has so many hours in every day that he can focus on any one thing. As a member acquires more responsibilities—higher seniority, subcommittee chairmanship, committee chairmanship—the pressures of staff to gain access to him, get his attention, get his answer, get his direction, this creates problems. In the case of Magnuson, he did have the advantage that a newcomer today would not have, because he came here in the days when a House member only had two rooms. He was over in Cannon [House Office Building]. A House member only had maybe two or three staff. So Magnuson survived politically, stayed here from '37 to '81, and went through quite an institutional change, quite an increase in the number of staff. He also dealt with a number of problems over those years, so in many ways our job as staff was different than it might be for others, because we joined an organization that he fashioned that was perhaps somewhat unorganized.

There was no real table of organization that the military might have. People might have a general responsibility in legislation, but they'd also have a constituent mail. They were housed together without any great thought of compartmentalization. The only staff people in our office that enjoyed the privacy of a single room was the press operation. Normally, the press operation was a single unit in a single room. Everybody else was jumbled up, and there was a lot of interplay among that staff, whether it was two or three or whether it got up to the point where it was in the low twenties here. At the same time, when he acquired chairmanships, he acquired real estate, so that some of the staff of that committee or subcommittee were across the hall, where there could be the interplay. So it made it possible for the staff, collectively, to be aware of what other people were doing, sometimes just by osmosis, because you're in the same room, and you know how these rooms are. They are not soundproof. Your little cubbyhole in your little corner of the room isn't soundproof. You just hear what's going on. Constituents or others come in to talk to a staff person, or other people in the room, at least some of it seeps in.
In Magnuson's personal dealings with staff, his door was always open. As the staff increased, there were AA's that thought they might attempt to be a gatekeeper, but Magnuson never allowed them to be a gatekeeper. He never got himself in the position that Mr. Nixon did with Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Anybody on the staff could come in at any time they could find him and throw their question at him, and they did. The only failure, perhaps, in this process is that Magnuson preferred to deal verbally and face-to-face with a staff person when a question had to be decided. There might be a piece of paper that would have been put on his desk earlier in the day, or earlier in the week that he might look at, when he's dealing with you on that issue, but he'd get away from the piece of paper, he'd give you the answer, and if you made any notes, and they stayed in the office records, fine. But Magnuson didn't hang on to memos or notes. He always trash-canned those memos that might come to his desk. He preferred to deal verbally. So the historical record in his office files on staff interaction is very slim.

There was the push and shove between committee staff (and of course Magnuson had two committee staffs, Commerce and Appropriations) and personal staff for access and for his personal time. Now people could always gain access, but they might have very limited time. Often these times were concurrent. There would be a time late in the morning, or late in the afternoon when the word got out: "Magnuson's in the office." Everybody showed up. You might have four or five staff people with four or five different problems, and they'd all be standing there together. When they could get in [snap fingers] they got in, got into the conversation. I think this was very beneficial, because they weren't staggered and they weren't in and out. They were forced to stay there and listen to the other guy or girl's problem. So there was osmosis going on there. They were forced to wait their turn while the other staffer made his presentation, and usually the first or second man didn't leave the room, but stayed to listen to the third or fourth or fifth.

This process of meeting with staff, Mike Pertschuk I think came up initially with the phrase, it was what we called the "Children’s Hour." That took place late in the afternoon, early evening, when the Senate might still be in session, there might be a late vote, and Magnuson would sort of hold court. It was a relaxed affair, and half a dozen or as many as a dozen staff members might come in. They would discuss all kinds of things. Usually these were not formal decision sessions, although if you hadn't gotten your answer, that was the time that he was most receptive, because it was a relaxed affair and there were no inhibitions. Magnuson was never critical of staff pushing him to try and get an answer, except that he did not want to commit himself until he had to. You were free to advise him: "Here's something that's coming, and it's troublesome." But Magnuson wouldn't commit his position, if there was any doubt in his mind, until he had to.

By and large, I don't think there were too many problems, vis-à-vis the various staff. There were some jealousies. Staff are really picked on the basis of their intellectual and physical capabilities. Their individual personality often enters in later. There were personality clashes, like there are in any group of people. Although we were a family, it was a large, complex, and extended family and some people didn't like each other. But I don't think that ever interfered with the efficient operation.
RITCHIE: How did the fact that Magnuson was on the Appropriations Committee, and had very important subcommittees there—HEW and Independent Offices—and was chairman of the Commerce Committee, affect the relationship between his staff? In effect, one of his committees was funding the products that were coming out of the other. Was there any tension over money issues like that?

REID: No, except that if Appropriations in its funding and oversight look at, say, the ICC, Interstate Commerce Commission, and came up with something that they thought maybe should be cut, you might have the people at the ICC going around to their friends on the authorizing committee, the Commerce Committee, and saying "Look, Maggie's people over on Appropriations are trying to do us in on this. Can you help?" That's always true with agencies. If the House tries to cut them, then the agency runs to the Senate and pleads their case. So there might be a little of that, but I can't remember of an instance where there was any real problem between staff on Commerce and Appropriations.

There were many times that the Appropriations staff, because they didn't know the field as intimately as maybe the Commerce staff knew it, that some kind of informal network developed between the staff on Appropriations and the staff on Commerce. I know when we took over Appropriations, we tried to encourage even more of that, because it is important that the appropriating people understand what the authorizing people are up to, and the interplay between those staffs can be very helpful. I know in our own operation on HEW, in student assistance we had very good relations with the people on Labor and Human Resources in the Senate, Pete Williams' committee, and Senator Pell's staff, who were handling the student assistance programs at one time. Rick Jerue, Letitia Chambers and others that were on the staff of Human Resources, we had informal discussions with them many, many times. We even had some input, from our vantage point, our view, when they were working on authorizing legislation. And they in turn would come to us when it came time to appropriate funds for new programs that they had authorized. But I wouldn't say there was ever any policy conflict. It was more a community of interest and an effort to make the programs work better.

RITCHIE: In my readings, the one person I've been coming up against the most in terms of HEW appropriations is Harley Dirks. He seems to be very much a major figure. Could you tell me a little bit about him, what type of a person he was and what his role was in all of this?

REID: Well, he came to the staff shortly after I came back in '63, '64. He originally worked with the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee. He was from the state of Washington, from eastern Washington, from Othello. He was a very personable individual. He came to us because it was a political favor to somebody else. One of those things where a politician leans on a politician. It was a politician in the state of Washington that knew Magnuson that leaned on Magnuson and some of our staff people, Fred Lordan, our AA at the time. It was done as a favor, "help Harley out."

There was a senior person on the Appropriations staff on the Independent Offices subcommittee that
was quite senior and beyond retirement age. There was a move to put Harley over there, and Harley did go over there, and worked there from about '65 through '68. Then, when Magnuson shifted from Independent Offices to HEW—he didn't really want to shift, in fact, it was Richard Russell who, in a way, leaned on Magnuson and convinced Magnuson that he should take it—when Magnuson did take it, Lister Hill, who had just retired, informed him that Magnuson ought to get rid of the person who was there, Herman Downing, who had been there a long time. Magnuson did not get rid of Herman Downing, did not ask that he be retired or fired or anything like that. He just moved Harley over to be Herman's assistant. In fact, I had worked with Herman before and I had some of the same feelings maybe that Lister Hill did, but I kept them to myself.

RITCHIE: Downing was something of an obstructionist?

REID: Well, he was a loner. You can look at the record of the subcommittee, prior to Magnuson taking it over. It was almost invariably Lister Hill settling alone listening to administration witnesses. It was very seldom during Magnuson's tenure as subcommittee chairman that that took place. There was usually at least one or two other members there. It was almost unheard of in Lister Hill's day for that subcommittee to hold a hearing without Senator Hill chairing. The opposite was almost the rule under Magnuson. Magnuson encouraged it. He even encouraged minority members to chair. I thought it was a great ploy on his part, because it was one of the ways that he made certain that the other members of that subcommittee came to know what was going on in the various programs, because they weren't just allowed to come when their pet was up and they wanted to make some point, but they were encouraged—maybe even stronger words than that—to take over and chair a whole morning, a whole afternoon, sometime during the course of events, and they did.

Well, Harley became a very capable clerk. He had learned the technical process quite well in the '65-'68 period. He learned to work an appropriation bills quite quickly. He discovered that he was much more visible, because HEW with all of the social programs, all of the health programs, came into the fore more during the late '60s, early '70s with the expansion of many of those programs, the expansion of federal aid to education and social services, and the interest groups that were involved of course knew where the money was coming from and were very active in buttering up and everything else anybody that they felt could be helpful. Harley was very capable at meeting people. He's a gregarious type. He did quite well on the technical side and everything else on that subcommittee.

RITCHIE: Wasn't he a little overbearing?

REID: I would say yes. I don't know why. I was much closer to Harley in the early years that he was here. We worked together quite well from when he first came. We worked together on a number of joint projects in the education field. We put out a little booklet on federal aid for students in higher education, NDSL loans, scholarships and the other programs. We worked together very well until about '71 or '72. I think that the fact that he wanted to hire somebody to be on the staff of the subcommittee, and Magnuson didn't allow it, and I told Harley that I didn't think it should happen, I think Harley blamed me for the
fact that it didn't happen. I made no secret of the fact that I disagreed with him on the personnel issue and that I would tell Magnuson so if he asked me. So that perhaps started a cleavage in our own personal relationship that never did get repaired. But Harley was a tough taskmaster. I've heard enough from some of the people that worked under him that they had their problems too. Harley didn't want any of them to have any relationship with the Magnuson personal operation, especially Magnuson, and that was something that I didn't like, because I felt the more people that have access to Magnuson, the better overall advice Magnuson gets. Even if he gets conflicting advice, it's better that he at least hear it. So Harley and I had a disagreement on that score.

RITCHIE: I wondered if some committee staff members became so associated with a particular subcommittee that they become sort of minor powers in themselves. I'm thinking of William Jordan of the Appropriations Committee, and Dirks and others. Is it a function of being with something for such a long time that it can go to a person's head?

REID: Yes, and I think that we're more susceptible to this on the Senate side than on the House. The fact that senators do serve on more committees makes it difficult for a senator who is on a subcommittee to intimately know all the programs that he's forced to deal with. If he finds that a staff member is capable, does give him good advice, there's a deference that he then pays towards that staff member, and there's a price, because that staff member does become a person that others rely upon, not just the subcommittee chairman or the ranking member but others. And this is true on any subcommittee of any committee, but perhaps Appropriations is more susceptible to it. The longer a person stays there, the more able they become, the more intimately they know the programs, if they've got a good memory and common sense, then anytime a member may hit them with a question they've got the answer.

I know that in the case of a Bill Jordan, he listens to the news and he reads the news and he knows when he sees a certain article in the Evening Star that he'd better get on the phone because he's going to have conversations the next day with members and he's going to have to have more answers than the Star had. I've seen them do it. I've done it myself, because I knew that Magnuson was an avaricious reader and that he was always tearing things out of the paper, and the next day he'd ask me. The better staff people do that, and they do become major powers. But again, they are really tools, whether they're a subcommittee clerk or a subcommittee secretary, or a receptionist, they're a tool. They are there to help the member do his job. If they start going out on their own, there is trouble. If members don't keep them on some kind of a leash, there is always trouble.

A good staff member should come up with things from his own perspective, he sees a problem and he should raise it with the members and say "Look, this is something that may be a problem, should I look into it?" Almost invariably he'll get an okay to go ahead, and he does it. Well, then the people he's looking at, the agency or the program, they may accuse him of being off on a frolic of his own. If he's on a frolic on his own, he's courting trouble. But if he's brought it up, and checked it out and cleared it and gotten the go-ahead, he's got the support of the members.
RITCHIE: Well, Dirks eventually ran into trouble by printing a hearing that never took place. Was that a sign to Magnuson that he's gotten too independent and uncontrollable, perhaps?

REID: There were earlier signs. For at least two or three years there had been communications to Magnuson of a certain overbearing approach. Within the departments, especially HEW, there was a phrase "Harleygram." These were handwritten notes that went down to people. They were often of a nature that would disturb anybody who might receive one. When Caspar Weinberger was secretary [of HEW], there was a time when Caspar Weinberger himself personally raised Harley Dirks with Warren Magnuson. Now, Caspar had no qualms about doing this, because Magnuson and Caspar Weinberger had known each other for quite some time. Caspar even communicated with Mike Pertschuk, because of something that Harley was doing that was upsetting them. They went to Caspar, and Caspar went to Mike. And there had been some other incidents. Harley had appeared in Jack Anderson a couple of times on other things that disturbed Magnuson.

In this context, perhaps I should digress a moment. For whatever the very personal reasons, Senator Magnuson always avoided verbal praise directly to staff members. He only evidenced such confidence in very subtle ways. For those who might need constant stroking, this was frustrating, to say the least, and some staff found this difficult to accept. The furthest he'd often go would be to say "that was a good meeting" or something like that and you had to infer whatever personal credits there might be.

More often he would praise an absent staffer to others, like his AA or his private secretary—especially Jessie Robertson—with the hope, if not expectation, that his comments would be passed along. He often did this through me and at first, I must admit, I found it strange, perhaps even amusing.

By the same token, correction or possible disciplinary action was difficult for him. When the infraction was minor, he would just suffer it with silence. When it was major, Magnuson would escalate that silence by finding ways to ignore that staff member and he would also use others as "conduits" for some comment.

In Harley's case, that happened on occasions before the phony transcripts. Magnuson used his AA, Stan Barer at the time, and on one occasion I believe Jerry Grinstein, his former AA, was even pressed into carrying messages to Harley, and he used me. Because my own relations with Harley in 1974-75 were sour, I was not very successful. Harley weathered those storms.

But the events of the hearings that never took place, the record that was manufactured almost out of whole cloth, were done deliberately. I know that it hurt Magnuson deeply that Harley's actions hurt Magnuson and hurt the committee. It was not a good scene. At one point, Magnuson said to me, "Well, you've never liked Harley." I said, "Magnuson, it's not a matter of liking. I don't have to like the people who work for you." But the change had to be made and Harley was relieved of any responsibilities on the Labor-HEW subcommittee. The eventual arrangements for his termination were handled by Senator McClellan, as chairman of the full committee, and his staff.
RITCHIE: Last week we introduced the whole question of oversight in the Senate, and the relations between a subcommittee and a whole department like HEW, or with the Independent Offices. Oversight is perhaps the least publicized role of the Congress. You were involved in it for a long time and I wondered if you could explain a little about how the whole congressional oversight process works.

REID: Well, unless it involves the McClellan or Estes Kefauver type crime hearings, oversight is perhaps the least publicized and least understood, although it's probably among the most important, aspects of what Congress should be doing. Because in essence, the analogy isn't perfect, but in many ways the Congress is the Board of Directors of this corporation that we call America. Because the Congress collectively exercises the people's power, and the Congress is the ultimate power, after the people. The Congress has the power to tax; Congress has power to spend; the Congress has the power to impeach, whether it's a president or a Supreme Court justice, Congress has the power to remove any executive. It's the Congress that has the power to enact legislation, to establish a program or disestablish it.

Oversight, whether it's looking into the peccadilloes of a Supreme Court judge or an executive, or whether it's looking at a program to see if it is operating the way Congress intended, the way the law intended, and if it is operating in that way is it still needed, is it meeting the needs of whatever Congress perceived when it established it, and is it doing it efficiently, these aren't very glamorous things. They don't get headlines. Everyday the hearings that are getting the headlines and a great many that are probably having only an audience of tourists that happen by, and waltz in for five or ten minutes at most, and representatives of interest groups that are vitally concerned about the interest at hand, or the department has their people watching. But it is one of the most important, I think one of the most important aspects of a legislative body if they are going to do their job as policymakers.

When the Congress attempts to run a program, or a war, disaster is the end result, because Congress is not designed to be an executive. They are not designed to administrate. They are policymakers. But how can you make policy unless you know the policy that was made yesterday is operating correctly today and will meet the needs of tomorrow, as well as look at the problems that aren't being dealt with and come up with whatever society needs to effectively deal with them. But it isn't glamorous. It often involves what Magnuson would refer to as "kitchen work." It isn't glamorous; it's drudgery at times. If you're really going to do a job of oversight, you've got to talk and listen to a lot of people, especially listen, and listening isn't glamorous. A member of Congress sitting at a dais listening isn't going to be on the evening news. A member who's up there pointing a finger and viewing with great alarm, he runs a pretty good change of maybe getting on the evening

news. Now what's their priority? Is their priority really doing a good job, and making a mark and helping the country run better and be a better place to live, and probably get very little credit for doing that job? Or do they want headlines and air time on Cronkite?

RITCHIE: So is it hard to get some of the members of the committees to play their role in the oversight process?
REID: Yes.

RITCHIE: But Magnuson has made oversight a much larger part of his interest than others.

REID: Well, I think anybody that really looks at the record, and of course the record isn't just the daily *Congressional Record*, the record is the sum total of the hours that members spend in these confines or out in the field. I think when anybody looks at Magnuson's service from '37 to '81, they will find that he spent a lot of hours in the backrooms of the chamber, but he also spent a lot of hours, probably by a factor of four or five, in hearings himself, as well as hearings that he launched and forced others to continue, and in executive sessions. A lot of that was oversight. And you can't really compartmentalize oversight from the fact that you may create something new. Because it was oversight of the marketplace that did some of the things for "consumerism:" the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Flammable Fabrics amendments, switching the side of the strike face on matchbooks, the list is mighty long, and some of those programs that were initiated by Magnuson came about because oversight into the market-

place was conducted by the Commerce Committee. There was some glamour in some of that. There were some headlines and some good pictures and some good editorials.

Of course, members of Congress are not averse to having good editorials written about them. The people that write editorials are the journalists that don't have to make a daily deadline, or a weekly deadline. They have the freedom to look around and they discover and they see this going on so they write an editorial. Whether it's the *Post*, or the *Star*, or the *Wall Street Journal* or local Podunk press. I think a member who really does that kitchen work, over time, will acquire the praise, the recognition that is politically good for him and his future elections. But it does take time, most often a long time, and the personal investment of time by the member before fruit of those efforts might appear. It boils down to that phrase about work horses and show horses, and each member of Congress often faces decisions about which type he wishes to be. At the same time he's doing that, he sees a character like Joe McCarthy that goes to Wheeling and makes a fancy speech and gets all the headlines in all the papers across the entire nation eventually and you know what all that leads to, including a new word in our vocabulary—at least until another Senator McCarthy came along.

RITCHIE: Were there any senators who stood out in your experience as particularly devoting a lot of attention to the oversight process?

REID: Well, on the Commerce Committee I think Phil Hart certainly did, and there were a number of areas that John Pastore

was very interested in. There were certainly others that might come to mind if I had more time to reflect on it. I want to say Mike Monroney when he was with us. He was a good one. But it's sometimes those that are a little more settled in where they are, that have a good grasp of who they are, and love the Senate and aren't off looking at some "higher office."
RITCHIE: In terms of day-to-day operations, does it require that a staff member build personal ties to people in the agency that you are conducting oversight over? Are there certain people that you would call regularly to get information, or would call you regularly?

REID: Yes, you do. You can't really look at an agency in a clinical way just from the outside. You've got to have people within the agency that you can depend upon to give you honest, straightforward facts and figures on whatever it is. You invariably make acquaintances, maybe even friendships with some of those people. I know I felt we were very fortunate in the HEW Department. A fellow died here just a couple of days ago, Jim Kelly, who was comptroller when we first took over. His number one was a fellow named Bruce Cardwell. We got to know them very well, because they always appeared with the secretaries, and secretaries came and went but the Bruce Cardwells carried on. Bruce's number one was a guy named Charlie Miller. These were highly educated, highly capable people who had risen through the Civil Service System and they were comptrollers.

In a department, the comptroller does know the dollars and cents, but the good ones also know all the ins and outs of the programs. They have been trained within the department to brief a new secretary succinctly and quickly, and get them up to steam, so it's relatively easy for them to do the same thing with a member of Congress. They are generalists as well as specialists, so you get to know people like that. I know in the instance of those three, Kelly, Cardwell, and Miller, that myself, and Magnuson and I think everybody else that worked on the committee, and I know Norris Cotton especially with Cardwell and Miller, felt very comfortable and confident that these guys knew what the hell they were talking about. They were personally and professionally honest, because once in a great while you'd throw a question to one of them and they'd say "Senator, I don't know, but I'll get you the answer." Now, very seldom did they ever plead that kind of ignorance, because usually they did have knowledge and some kind of an answer. Often they would give an answer and then they would ask "Now, if you want to know more, I'll get it for you." And even if you didn't want to know more, they often would come back and give you more. Never once did we get thrown a curve, or were given a left-field answer by those type people.

Now there were times that secretaries would give us a left-field answer. Because they really didn't know. I know it happened with Elliot Richardson one time. We were talking about bio-medical research—Magnuson was, I mean—it was a hearing, and Richardson said that one of the reasons that they were proposing to cut back funding was because that particular program was taking too many M.D.'s out of the system, and the M.D.'s should be out there delivering health care. Well, Magnuson was well briefed, and Magnuson came back and said "But, Mr. Secretary, over 70 percent of bio-medical research is conducted by Ph.D's not M.D. 's." I was watching Richardson at the time and his eyes popped open. I said to Magnuson later on, "You really hit him on that, and I'll bet you when he gets back to the office he's going to hit somebody!" And it probably happened, because Richardson was not the type of person that would be ill-informed normally.

RITCHIE: As you say, secretaries come and go, administrations come and go, but there is a certain level of civil servants who are there no matter what.
REID: Right.

RITCHIE: Does it create any problems when an administration changes in terms of your contacts with people within an agency? Do they ever try to do an end run around the president and the Office of Management and Budget by using their contacts with the Congress?

REID: I would say in my own experience—my own sources of information were more the comptroller-types, not the legislative liaisons. The comptroller-types usually stayed and there was not the turnover within a comptroller's office. There was always turnover within a legislative office, because it is more political. The new secretary has certain things the secretary wants to achieve. The agents for achieving that are usually legislative liaisons. So the personnel within the legislative liaison would change rapidly. And there was a higher turnover even if there was no change. I think the "burn-out" factor is higher among legislative liaison officers. In a way, comptrollers have it easier because they only need to be on top of things as they exist, as they are, not how they should be. So I would say the authorizing committees might have more problem of tenure of their own confidants and their own people that they would depend upon at that level. But again, the authorizing committees would probably get to know some of the operational people down below, that would be the GS-13's, 14's, 15's. Those operational people, the Civil Service protects them and keeps them in, and there would be more tenure and continuity there. Although we dealt with program people too, and I know in some instances there was considerable continuity.

RITCHIE: Is there any difference between dealing with an agency like HEW and dealing with the independent offices, the regulatory commissions that don't quite fall under the same executive structure?

REID: Well, of course, HEW is an amorphous combination. You have some parts of HEW that are certainly independent. The independent agencies, I think, do tend to be "a little more independent." They have a separate authorization; they have separate and distinct constituencies—like the trucking industry or the broadcasters; and their concerns could perhaps be termed more parochial or insular. Some of them have a long history. The Veterans' Administration certainly has a long history, the FTC, the ICC. But yet in HEW, you've got the Public Health Service that is celebrating today its 192nd or 193rd birthday. The NIH stems from the 1930's. So you have a long history of independence in some ways from presidents and secretaries, a momentum within the program or the agency for whatever its mission is that survives no matter what administration is in the White House. So there is that difference. I was never intimately associated with the Independent Offices except for the NSF and the Veterans' Administration. I didn't really get in to the ICC, FTC.

RITCHIE: I could see why Magnuson would be particularly interested in those independent offices since so many of them had, in effect, their own oversight over Commerce Committee areas of activity.
REID: Well, Magnuson had a number of interests, and one of them was his own perception of what helps make this country great. Whatever importance that some of those agencies might have—as he says, "You can't kill the golden goose." The golden goose is the economic system out there that is producing the jobs, that is producing the taxes, that is producing the things that make it possible for us to have the society and economy that we have and produce the excess that can be utilized to do some of the things that should be done. Early in his career, Magnuson felt that our system ought to be investing more money in bio-medical research. Well, you've got to have an economic system out there that can first afford to pay taxes, and then have enough left after everything else is done, that has to be done with the taxes, so that you can take some of the taxes and do some bio-medical research. So his interest in the marketplace and keeping it competitive and responsive, and working, was an intellectual one, and an enjoyable one from the Commerce side. He had most of those regulatory commissions before the Commerce Committee, because the Commerce Clause of the Constitution is one of the most powerful weapons that the Congress has for dealing with anything within our economy.

RITCHIE: Would you say that the Senate and the Congress are particularly protective of the regulatory commissions over presidential policy? I know, for instance, Nixon tried to abolish the Public Health Service at one point, or talked about it at least. There have been all sorts of plans to put regulatory commissions under presidentially appointed administrators rather than panels of commissioners. Do you think that the Senate sees the regulatory commissions as being responsive to it as they are to the president?

REID: That's difficult. You're getting into a real difficult question, because what we're faced with is the fact that some of these regulatory commissions were the product of another time and a different set of circumstances. Again, they all deal with the very particular concerns of particular constituencies who, by and large, play vital roles in our society and our economy. At least they all did when the agency was established. Perhaps the time has passed that a particular regulatory commission is meeting the need that the public, or the society had, and maybe their time is gone. But I don't see how you can say that about, let's take one, the FCC and the current efforts of various interest groups within the communications field, starting with AT&T and ending with the fellow that makes the smallest widget that goes into the smallest device that is used in communications. The predictions of very bright people are that the next decade or two are going to see an explosion, the likes of which you and I can't even conceive in communications. You know, the Dick Tracy watch is not way out there in left field. It's technologically possible for the Dick Tracy watch to be on our wrists within a very few years. Via satellite, there is no way you can get away from your office or your wife or your mistress. Well, that's just one of the little things that could happen.

It seems to me that that type of explosion also involves megabucks the likes of which we may not have seen even in oil, even in energy. My own experience in this business is that when megabucks are involved, the interest groups are very active. And they are not always interested in protecting the public. Well, how is the public going to be protected? How is the public even going to understand what is going on? Maybe these regulatory commissions are one of the ways in which we are protected. Certainly a regulatory commission with a fairly narrow mission can do a better job in that narrow mission than the Congress, which has the whole ball of wax they have to look at. But the Congress has to continually look at society, at industry, at commerce, at
free enterprise, or the productive system, and see what it is that needs to be there to help make it work better.

**RITCHIE:** You've been talking about interest groups and lobbyists. Before we talked about the role of the people in the agencies themselves dealing with committee staff people, how much dealings did you as a staff member usually have with representatives of different interest groups who were lobbying for their particular interests?

**REID:** I would say considerable, because at least a goodly percentage of my time involved either talking with interest groups on the phone, in person, arranging for a time that they might be able to spend a few moments with Magnuson, and put their word across. All of the staff were the interface between various interest groups, associations, individuals, organizations, enterprises. Most of these interest groups are seeking a friend at court. When they see legislation going through the Congress, they are obviously going to be coming to the Congress and trying to approach a member. Their initial approach is either on the telephone or in a piece of paper, a letter. Some staff member works on that, responds, helps respond, and some kind of an interface is developed. When they personally arrive, or you meet them in the state, it's not uncommon for a member to have a staff person with him. Most members don't like to make notes, and so it's a staff member that has to make notes and follow up on the meeting. So we did interface a great deal with interest groups or lobbyists of whatever you want to call them.

**RITCHIE:** Did they provide much information for you?

**REID:** Yes, they do. You have to realize, you are always getting their own perspective, and again, the quicker they can do that, the more succinctly, the more usable their information (and a short memo, a short treatise, as opposed to a tome that's fifty pages long) the better. They've got to be honest, because if a lobbyist, if an interest group representative (and to me, a lobbyist is not a pejorative term, it never has been, although maybe when I was a kid going to high school and reading about politics, lobbyists was a bad word, but when I got into the business I discovered it was a very able, honest profession that was necessary to the members). They have to give their perspective and their position and their view. Normally, in any situation, you will have conflicting lobbyists, because you will have a lobbyist for one group that has one perspective, another group that has another.

Then you may have some citizen group that's coming forward with their perspective. Of course, the member's got to have common sense and some perspective of their own. They may have some intimate knowledge of their own that they bring to bear on the situation to counteract the special interest that comes from only one direction. But we were fortunate in most of the things that I was involved in that we did have a good cross-section of interests in our own state that they were always welcome and usually did come forward. Sometimes they had a different perspective than the national groups. In the health field our state was a little more progressive than some. And we normally listened to the representatives from our own state rather than the national associations, whether it was the hospital group or the AMA or individual professional disciplines.
RITCHIE: Home state groups would take precedence?

REID: Oh, yes.

RITCHIE: In terms of dealing with lobbyists, did you tend to deal with the same faces most of the time, or were there new people that came along depending on new issues? Was there a group of people that you were most likely to deal with?

REID: Most of the associations that I dealt with, like the hospital association out home, often referred to the lobbyists as the "hired gun." And most of the hired guns that I dealt with were quite able and they had an association, like hospitals, the hired gun was John Bigalow, excellent man who had been with the Washington State Hospital Association for about thirty years. Well, his organization, the way it was operated, he would have elected officers of the association that were either administrators of a hospital or on the board of directors. He'd usually show up with some of those administrators and some of those board members. There might be seven or eight of them, and they'd represent the geographical areas of the state of Washington. They would represent the publicly-owned hospitals as well as privately-owned hospitals. We're fortunate in the state of Washington to have quite a mix, and a good mix, a healthy mix. So you would have one face that was very familiar. You might have new faces that had only been there once or twice. And then a face or two that was there for the first time. Because Bigalow probably had one of the best operations for that kind of lobbying because he would bring seven or eight of his group with him, but there would always be a few that were more or less old-timers and had been here before. They came every year, they came in February, and we had a luncheon. All the delegation would show up and they would make their pitch about their concern of the moment, and then they'd usually spend a time or two going around seeing the various offices individually.

It was an excellent way to operate, because you got to know John and you realized that he did speak for his group, and that he represented their position, and some of the group were with him to reinforce him, and they were all from home. So you had to give them an audience. You didn't have to follow their requests, but at least you had to give them an audience, and you heard their pitch. Here on this scene in the national group it was usually an old face that you would see many times that would be carrying the current water or the group. From the education group we always referred to "Dupont Circle" because there just seemed to be a whole bunch of them down there. Then we would see representatives of the American Hospital Association, and various academies that are involved with the disciplines in health affairs.

RITCHIE: I always think of the American Medical Association as being one of the big lobbyists around here. Were they an effective group?

REID: Never with us, because Magnuson had a reputation that preceded me. Magnuson made them mad
from the earliest days because Magnuson felt that any "specialty" that could help a person in pain feel better was a health professional. Magnuson thought, and thinks, that chiropractors are a health profession, that osteopaths are a health profession. Well, there was a time, early in Magnuson's career, that the M.D.'s and the osteopaths were at war. The attitude that Magnuson carried with him into legislative bodies that both these professions are health professions and an anathema to the AMA. There were few times that the AMA ever showed up in our office outside of perhaps sending memos and being on the mailing list. Even when Harley Dirks left us and went to work for them, the door wasn't open.

**RITCHIE:** Are there more citizens' groups now than when you first started?

---

**REID:** I think so. I think people with a particular interest have realized that they can get that interest before a legislative body and get the body to focus on it and maybe pay some attention to it if they organize, and if they work. They've seen the success of the League of Women Voters or the Abortion Rights groups, so you have more groups that do try to bring their cause before the board of directors.

**RITCHIE:** Do you think the citizens groups have been as effective as the groups that represent the large associations, say the Hospital Association.

**REID:** You'd have to take a particular issue and follow it and analyze it and see where the votes fell to really come out on that. The more effective interest groups have certainly been able to translate their position into support at the polls, either with votes or with money.

**RITCHIE:** Does the proliferation of interest groups make your work on the staff harder or easier?

**REID:** I don't think it affects our work as much as it might affect the members' vote, the member's coming to a decision. Either proliferation or vociferousness can pose real problems for a member. Some of the issues that have come to the fore in the Congress, like abortion, where it's not only proliferation but vociferousness, have caused members far more problems than they would like, or than they deserve.

---

**RITCHIE:** In a sense, each administration is a lobbying group of its own legislative programs. What kind of contacts and ties do you have with the people who represent the administration in power, rather than the civil servants? I guess we could start with Lyndon Johnson and all the consumer legislation that Magnuson was involved with.

**REID:** Well, of course, Lyndon had a good operation, starting with himself. He was a great one for picking up the phone and being on the phone when he wanted something, as well as having phone calls stacked up and fed into him. He had very able people within his operation that you knew when they came to you and they said, "Look, this is what we want," that they were speaking directly for Lyndon Johnson. In our own operation, we often heard from White House people that were good and were able and that we knew spoke for him. I know that a Tom Korologos was equally capable on the Republican side. We also heard from the OMB types, because OMB is one of the more effective arms of any administration. Again, it's a comptroller operation where they should know. They know the dollars and cents and they should know the programmatic aspects. So
it's important that OMB be involved in any legislative initiatives that the administration is taking. We had good relations there, whether with [James] McIntyre or Herkie Harris, hardly a week went by that we didn't have personal contact from either Jim McIntyre or Herkie Harris during the Carter administration. They were capable of enunciating whatever it was that the Carter administration might want, and they were receptive to hearing from us what we felt they might do better. They were perhaps more receptive than they were in acting on that, but at least they were receptive and, in turn, always welcome.

RITCHIE: You've been here under several administrations, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and the beginning of the Reagan administration. Which one was the most effective in administration lobbying efforts?

REID: Well, I would have to say Lyndon Johnson, although the Reagan administration may rival the success of putting their stamp on corporate America. We're just six months into it, and they've certainly had some successes thus far. But it's the long term and we're looking back at a Johnson administration, so it's much easier to say that they were successful. I think we'll have to wait another ten or twelve years and then look back at the Reagan administration. I don't want to make it sound pejorative, but I'm suspicious that the Reagan administration may well be as successful in their efforts. They certainly appear to have put together the basic operation. I mentioned OMB, they've got a strong, active [David] Stockman that certainly rivals anyone else that's held that position. He's in that top echelon of OMB directors that I might list. They have a very good Congressional relations office in the White House. They have some very able top staff, Jim Baker, that know what's required. So if they don't pull it off it won't be because they haven't organized their forces to effectively use all the powers that they have at their disposal. They certainly have in Ronald Reagan personally a very potent force to mobilize public opinion,

capture the attention of the press, get on the tube, to advance whatever it is that they are trying to do. So I am suspicious that when somebody sits here twelve years from now their answer might be "Well, the Reagan administration by all means. Johnson was pretty good, but Reagan really put it together."

RITCHIE: By comparison, what about the Nixon administration?

REID: One of the problems with the Nixon administration is that Watergate overshadows so many other things that they were up to. I was suspicious, again using that word, after the '72 election that they were really going to do us in, and by that I mean turn the Great Society programs upside down. On Superbowl Sunday of 1973, Magnuson and I went down to John Hogness's house on S Street where John and his wife and a couple of other doctors and their wives all watched the Superbowl. During the half-time, we got to talking about Watergate. They asked Magnuson what he thought would happen. He said "Well, you know, what should happen and what will happen: what should happen is that we really get into it. But you know, we're reading the Post every day, but people out in Spokane aren't reading the Post. Outside of this town, who really cares? Unless people care, things just don't happen. So I'm afraid nothing's going to happen." Well, I agreed with him. I was afraid at the same time that the initiatives that the Nixon administration had taken, starting right after the election with the resignation of all top administrators and the restructuring they were going to advocate, even
though they didn't have the Congress, that they might see some headway. And of course they tried a number of things in the '69-'72 period, but they weren't as successful, they didn't change the course of some of the programs, and they didn't achieve the results they sought. So I don't think I would give the Nixon administration very high marks for really changing any courses outside of foreign policy. The thing they did in foreign policy, which stands out to me, is opening up a third of the world to us. And a damn good thing that he did, because he certainly, during the late '40s and the '50s, helped close off that third of the world to us.

RITCHIE: China was always an issue that interested Magnuson, wasn't it?

REID: Yes.

RITCHIE: Part of it was intellectual, part of it was personal. He spent six months in China as a relative youth. He worked his way across on a boat for American Mail Lines and then worked in their Shanghai office for six months in between college and law school. He had a love affair with the Far East. He loved the people, found them good individuals and interesting, and a work ethic that he admired. Just because they had decided to have a different political regime, this didn't bother him, because his view of a people is that that's their right. So if one group of leaders gets thrown out and another group is in, you don't ignore the basic mass. And he had the personal interest of anybody from the Northwest, because Seattle and Puget Sound are still the nearest point by water or air to the Far East, and it's a major part of the world. We are a producing area where we produce things that can be sold, either agricultural or timber products, and the things that those people make can come through our ports and help our people. In foreign policy, Magnuson has always felt that if two peoples had commerce beneficial to each going on they were less likely to find a reason, ideologically or otherwise to have problems that might escalate into war. So he has a feeling that trade is one way to achieve peace. He was advocating trade with Red China when things changed over there. We'd had trade before the war, we had some very little trade during the war, and it started to pick up after, but then it went to pot. This didn't help the economy of the Northwest, and it didn't help relationships with that third of the world's population. He was an advocate of opening the door and opening trade again regardless of the regime, even though he had a personal relationship with Chiang-Kai-shek and the Taiwanese.

RITCHIE: In what way?

REID: They knew each other personally and had met on several occasions.

RITCHIE: Going back a bit to the question of oversight again and the Nixon administration. I wanted to follow up on whether or not the Democratic Congress was a little bit more careful about oversight with a Republican administration, between the Johnson administration to the Nixon administration. Did it become more of an issue of concern to see what the bureaucracy was doing with the legislation they had passed, under a Republican administration?
REID: I would say it's a natural tendency for opposite parties to be a little more critical of their view of each other.

Your criticisms will take a more public avenue. So during Nixon the Democratic Congress would be more publicly critical. During a Johnson administration, if you discovered something, you'd try to take care of it privately. But there were instances of taking care of it privately during Nixon as well. There were a number of times in sessions between secretaries and Magnuson that something would be resolved in the quietude of an office without press and without any public disclosure. I think it was an effectiveness that Magnuson cultivated. He had a reputation that he could be talked to and could be dealt with and that he wouldn't speak out of school. So we were able to do many things with secretaries that were of a caliber of Weinberger and Richardson that could be done that way.

It's easier for a Congress of one party to take to task an administration of another party. We do get partisanship rearing its ugly head, so to speak. But I think the overall effort to have a "bureaucracy that is responsive" is something that the Congress, as well as presidents and secretaries, all the transitories, want. Because the people that have to keep the ship running, or the trains on time, the bureaucracy who are going to be here after we leave, many presidents, secretaries, congressmen, realize that they have a mutuality of interest regardless of party. So long as the program is needed, then let's all cooperate and see how we can get these bureaucrats to do it better.

RITCHIE: Particularly as you say with HEW, which has always been so amorphous, and almost destroyed Nixon's first secretary, Robert Finch, who couldn't control what was going on, and made life unpleasant for a number of other secretaries over the years.

REID: Magnuson long had the feeling that it was too big for any one person to administer. Now, Joe Califano certainly had enough ego to believe that he could, and probably came closest to putting more of a personal stamp on it. But Magnuson many times felt that it was too big and should be somewhat separated. Now, how you can separate it logically, the interdependence of some things are so obvious, but yet the effort to establish a separate Department of Education was something that Magnuson supported and advocated and finally helped bring about. It is very amorphous and there are certain missions down there that almost everybody agrees we are never going to abolish, but yet, they are an awfully big operation. Social Security is an awfully big operation. But it's more just one of managerial technique, because they have to keep track of the people and get the checks out on time. They don't even manage the funds, there's somebody else that manages the money. But they've got to devise an operation that works, and that will get the checks there on time.

RITCHIE: Of course, that's one of the biggest operations around here for most of the personal staffs: writing letters to Social Security from irate constituents.

REID: But yet, the individual can get things fouled up with his account by either changing his name or making a mistake with his number or moving and not notifying. So there's justification on both sides.

RITCHIE: One other part of the process, we've talked about the bureaucrats, the lobbyists, the
administration, but we haven't talked at all about the House of Representatives. I was wondering what the relationship between, say, the Commerce Committee in the Senate and the Commerce Committee in the House, and the staffs of both of those committees. Could you tell me a little about that?

**REID:** When I was on Commerce, I seldom dealt with the staff on the other side, and I'm not so sure that my colleagues did very much. Often they were so busy with their own problems on our side that they didn't have much time to deal with people on the other side. I do know that in the instance of Nick Zapple, who was our communications man, that he had a working relationship with his counterpart on the House side. I believe in Nick's instance there was a great stability, in other words, there was somebody over there that had been there a long time also. On Appropriations I can tell you that there is a very close and constant relationship that goes on. Again, the respective staffs have been fairly stable, perhaps even more so on the House side than in the Senate. In our own case, Henry Neil, he was there as the staff person on HEW when we first moved in there in '69 and he's still there. Some of the people that work with him have been there almost as long. Keith Mainland who is the top staff person for Jamie Whitten and was for George Mahon, we worked very closely with Keith and had almost daily conversations if not physically at least over the phone.

One advantage of Appropriations, and disadvantage too, is that you are dealing with thirteen bills plus maybe a supplemental or two that *have* to be passed, or a continuing resolution that has to be passed. On the legislative committees, a House chairman, a Harley Staggers, he can have a legislative agenda that is 180 degrees opposed to Warren Magnuson's Senate agenda, and he can pass his bills, and we forget about them over on the Senate side. The Senate can pass its bills, and he can forget about them over there, and the country won't come to a screeching halt if it doesn't pass a Consumers Products Safety Commission bill, or what-have-you. So that is certainly a difference on a legislative side, that the committees often are dealing with subjects that don't have to be passed, and if the other side doesn't want to bring them up everything isn't going to fall to pieces. Now that may not be true when you get into the tax field, and finance. But on Appropriations, the members and staff, both Senate and House, all know that they must get to that point somewhere along the line when they will act in concert. They know they do not have the luxury of "inaction," which for the legislative committees can often be the best result, in the long run, for the country.

**RITCHIE:** On the other hand, you have had times when the chairmen of the Appropriations committees of the House and Senate have had deep animosities towards each other. Carl Hayden, and I've forgotten what the chairman on the House side . . .

**REID:** I believe it was [Clarence] Cannon.

**RITCHIE:** Hayden and Cannon wouldn't cross over the line.

**REID:** Yes. They couldn't agree on a place to meet. Well, that was one thing where I was fortunate. I worked with a man who would never carry personal feelings to that point. Magnuson respected an individual,
on the other side. He might not have liked to play poker with them, he might not sit down and have a drink with them—and some he did play poker with—but many of them he genuinely liked. He had no trouble finding a way to work with them, even at times especially when the conferences became more open. We had pre-conference conferences, or post-conference conferences in his back room. Because that was one of the things that Magnuson did when he became chairman of Appropriations. He took a room that had been used otherwise and made it for himself. He and Jamie Whitten would often get together back there, or other members from the House side or the Senate. Bob Michel was back there several times. They would agree back there that they had to posture a little, but by gosh look, when are we going to get down and cut the bait? So there was an easy relationship that was fostered even in those momentary at times, four or five minutes, that they would get together off camera, so to speak and agree that they just had to get moving.

**RITCHIE:** But on the staff level you were concerned that certain things be mutually understood to make things easier when it got to the committee level?

**REID:** Oh, yes. And we never had any problem in voicing those interests with the House staff and making sure that they understood, and we with them. Again, we were fortunate to have some continuity. We had a number of old-timers on our own side, and they had old-timers on their side that worked together quite well. The physical preparation of the piece of paper that becomes the public law in an appropriations bill is laborious and often takes quite a few hours.

It's impossible for one set of hands to do the typing. You have to farm things out and there's always the danger, when you do that, of mistakes. I didn't help create the system, I just carried on. I think Keith Mainland was the same way. We inherited a system that is hopefully foolproof. At least we never made any major booboos. It takes a lot of time and it takes people. For our self-protection we had to involve a number of Senate side and a number of the House side, and spread the work between the House and Senate and then get together and check the finished product. It's a laborious process. Several times it ran us through the clock and into the following day, because historically in the last few Congresses, money bills have not been passed, something had to be done at the last minute. Abortion and other legislative issues weren't answered by legislative committees and they wound up in appropriations bills, and so the conferences got hung up. Then, when they finally got down to the deadline and everybody realized you had to do something or the government comes to a screeching halt, we were faced with a scribes' task that was horrendous, and a massive printing task. We would work through the night. One time, I know it was over thirty-six hours straight through that we worked before the final pieces of paper were available for signature by the Speaker and the president pro tem and the president.

**RITCHIE:** Appropriations bills always seem to be the last on the agenda, the things you come to watch the senators arguing over at three o'clock on the morning before the Congress is ready to adjourn. In fact, they used to push the clock back so that Congress wouldn't actually end at noon, but would be given another hour to finish off the appropriations legislation.
REID: I've seen that happen in Olympia in the state legislature, where they've stopped the clock.

RITCHIE: To move on to one other thing that I wanted to ask you about. We talked about the '62 election, how close it was, and how important it was to Magnuson. Then in '68, Magnuson came back and won a tremendous reelection victory with almost no opposition. How do you account for the change in tone from '62 to '68?

REID: Well, I think the Republican establishment of the state of Washington realized that '62 was not that close, that the fact that Magnuson ran ahead of his party and the congressional candidates total. They read the election returns differently than perhaps some of the scribners of the press, and some of the less initiated. Magnuson's legislative activities back here perhaps got a little more play. Remember, consumerism and the Johnson period, the activist period, the Great Society, that must have had an impact. Of course, Vietnam had another impact. Magnuson's apparent support of the president and the government, some of the anti-Vietnam activists questioned it. But '68 was a breeze and '74 was an equal breeze. He did very well in both elections, even though he had creditable opposition. The opposition in both '68 and '74 was politically a little more pronounced to the right, perhaps, and Magnuson, of course, had been perceived as an activist as perhaps to the left. The opposition in '80 on the Republican side, I would say that Mr. [Slade] Gorton's position, if understood, is certainly more moderate and centrist. The state of Washington has always had within the Republican camp a Goldwater-Reagan wing, let's say, and a Rockefeller wing. Slade Gorton has always been a well-known member of the Rockefeller wing of the Republican Party. The Republican Party structure in the state of Washington has been dominated more by the Reagan-Goldwater right wing than by the moderate Rockefeller types. But the successful statewide Republican candidates have come from that Rockefeller camp and Joel Pritchard is certainly from that wing of the party. Sid Morrison, who was also a successful challenger for a congressional seat last fall, is another moderate or Rockefeller type.

RITCHIE: In '68 the Republicans had to look pretty hard to find someone to run against Magnuson. I guess he'd gotten a real reputation by that time of being a tough man to beat.

REID: Yes. Well, he'd beaten the best, I wouldn't say that Christiansen was the brightest, but Christiansen was certainly a very bright star at the time. But again he was not the choice of the Republican establishment and he didn't last. He tried for elective office again in '64 and had a miserable experience. But the Republicans in our state had had another experience with that. They had an attorney general at one time. His name was Don Eastvold. He starred in the Republican convention of '52, taking one of the lead spots on the platform in an effort that contrasted the Eisenhower delegates to the Taft slate of delegates and made quite a speech. It got quite a bit of play and he shot up to stardom. But it didn't take long for the Republican establishment in the state of Washington to discover that he was a phony and help get rid of him. Christiansen was also a bit like that on the Republican side.
two hour stretch here.

[End of Interview # 3]
RITCHIE: Last week we discussed the oversight role of the Congress. I wondered if today we could talk about the appropriations process and how it works. It obviously differs from the regular legislative process and legislative committees, but I wondered if you could give me a description of how appropriations bills are considered in the Congress.

REID: Any legislative committee can take up anything that it itself dreams up, or some member drops in the hopper that is assigned to them. Appropriations is a little more unique, a little more, maybe, historical. Appropriations reacts to the suggested budget that a president, an administration, advances every year to the Congress. That comes out in January. It comes out in masses of paper, pounds of backup material, that is delivered to the Congress from the administration—in more recent years, from the Office of Management and Budget. All of those documents are prepared by that office for the president and given to the House and Senate. The Appropriations Committee immediately commences to review the overall budget. Now, way back in the Civil War days, when there was an Appropriations Committee, the evidence is that they dealt with things more in toto, all at one time. But even then, they started to divide up little bits and pieces of the overall budget.

The Appropriations Committee in more recent years has evolved itself into thirteen subcommittees that are somewhat categorical. Probably the best category is defense, because all of the defense money,
of the recommendations. Of course, you spend more time perhaps looking at the changes that are being proposed by the president, or changes that have been generated or germinated within your own operation. Members that do serve on the committee tend to spend quite a bit of time thinking about what they have done, as well as what they might do differently, and they come up with their own ideas and give their own directions to their staff people. So the committee proceeds along several avenues in a way.

In laying out pieces of paper that might graphically show what we are up to, we always look at last year, what was expended in the previous fiscal year, what is being expended now, what is being proposed by the president. Now, on the Senate side we often add another column: what the House has approved. So when we take action in committee, then we have that long series; after the committee has acted, then there will be another line for committee recommendations when it goes to the floor. When you go to conference, then you have all the columns. Sometimes you have to drop one in order to get everything on the same page, so you will often end up with: current spending; president's recommended spending; House approved; Senate approved; and then a blank column for the Conference to look at. That's a very short course. Now, let's get down to what the nitty-gritty might be.

RITCHIE: Right. Your committee is made up of thirteen subcommittees, and you also have several ex-officio members, don't you?

REID: We used to. They used to have ex-officio members of Appropriations. Armed Services had a couple. Government Operations did. Public Works did. But that ended some time during, I think it was the change from Senator Carl Hayden to Senator Russell. But somewhere in the last decade and a half that ended, and there are no longer any ex-officio members from other committees that sit with us. Now, I have yet to see a series of hearings held by our committee, and almost any one of our subcommittees, that does not have appearing before it members of the Senate as well as members of the House that, for one reason or another, want to testify. You'd wonder why a House member might come over and appear before a Senate committee, it might be for a very particular reason. Maybe he got something put in that he wants to make sure they understand, so he comes over and talks about it. Or maybe he didn't get it on the House side and he's appealing to us.

Senators who appear before our committee appear for a lot of reasons. I know in the health field it was almost standard operating procedure for Senator [Edward] Kennedy to appear and speak forcefully for programs in the health field, health manpower, that he was concerned with. Senator [Jacob] Javits often appeared before our committee, and there would be other members that would plead for a particular thing that they were especially interested in.
Sometimes it might be parochial, it might be something just for their home state. But often it was something of more national scope that they were particularly interested in. They were often involved in the legislation that established, re-authorized, or had changed something, and they wanted to bring home to the members of the Appropriations Committee what it was that they hoped we might propose and endorse. But ex-officio membership on the committee was ended, at least a dozen years ago.

**RITCHIE:** What I was interested in was that people obviously specialize, they have areas that they are very concerned with, they are on that particular subcommittee, and you have a lot of chairmen of other committees who also serve on the Appropriations Committee.

**REID:** Yes.

**RITCHIE:** Is the work of the Appropriations Committee primarily in the subcommittees?

**REID:** Yes.

**RITCHIE:** Is it pretty much hashed out by the time it gets to the full committee? Just how does the subcommittee system fit in?

**REID:** I would say that the subcommittees not only do the bulk of the work, but they complete action on the majority of the programs under their jurisdiction. The subcommittees refine or help define the major issues, and then the full committee perhaps resolves problems. Often a subcommittee will have a problem, one that they can't accommodate to their own satisfaction, so they'll come to the full committee with their bill and lay out the problem, lay out the options they've looked at and leave it to the full committee. But the bulk of the kitchen work does take place in the subcommittees. It would be impossible, I think, I know as eloquent as he may sound and as forceful as he may try to appear over the next few months, David Stockman is like any other human being, and cannot possibly know everything about every program that the federal government is operating. David Stockman is depending upon various sub-people underneath him that have divisions of OMB. They do the kitchen work there and they advise him and he follows their advice. Well, the same thing happens up here, because the federal government is involved in so many things.

Many of the issues are very complex. It takes a lot of time, it takes a lot of study, an awful lot of hours of reading and talking to various individuals with opposing views, people that can represent those to you, on behalf of members as well as staff. It's axiomatic that somebody becomes an expert in the problems of public works and waterways and that area. Somebody else becomes an expert in the veterans and the housing and the health and the defense. So a great deal of deference is paid by the other members to a subcommittee that
convinces them that they have looked into this and they have studied it and they have spent hours investigating and this is their best judgment as to what should happen. I know in our committee, just the volume of hearings that take place by the various subcommittees equals, if not exceeds, that of more than half the other standing committees of the Senate. In our own administrative makeup of the staff, it requires a great deal of time. It also requires a certain expenditure of funds just to process all those hearings and all the documents that go into hearings and build the paper base for the actions that are taken subsequently by the members and by the full committee.

The subcommittee structure has been criticized by some outsiders because it does appear, on the surface at least, to give an inordinate degree of power to a very few people. Some subcommittees have as many as ten or twelve members, but other subcommittees may only have five. You mean you are delegating to five people all that power? And there is a certain delegation of power, but the way the committee operates, especially under Magnuson, the subcommittee was given deference but there was no rubber stamp at full committee.

I vividly remember the very first full committee that Mr. Magnuson chaired, the first after Mr. [John] McClellan became ill. Mr. McClellan had written Mr. Magnuson a letter advising Mr. Magnuson that he, McClellan, would not be available for the full committee, and would Senator Magnuson act as chairman. Well, that piece of paper was valid for over six months before Mr. McClellan died. That first full committee that Mr. Magnuson was "acting chairman" happened to be the defense appropriation bill. There was a very interesting byplay as that meeting was about to start, because Senator Magnuson had come in and taken the chair reserved for the full committee chairman, and Mr. [John] Stennis had walked in from the hallway door and had started towards that chair, and realized that it was occupied. He sort of moved back and fourth for a moment or two until Magnuson caught his eye and said, "Good, you're here John," and just pointed across the table. So Stennis sat down across the table, where subcommittee chairmen normally will sit when they present their bill.

Then when the meeting got started, the procedure is that subcommittee makes its presentation, and usually you will have the subcommittee chairman make a brief presentation and the ranking member make a brief presentation and they will open things to discussion. In this particular instance, Mr. Stennis had quite a lengthy presentation. It went on for quite some time. He got to some item and Magnuson interrupted him and pointed over to Bennett Johnston from Louisiana and said, "Bennett, didn't you have something you were talking to me about on that particular issue?" Although Johnston was certainly caught off guard—as I recall he vividly jumped back a bit—he's extremely bright and with only a momentary pause he commenced to voice his position. He had a particular interest in this item, and so he discussed it. As that took place I was watching the senators at the far end of the table, Jim Sasser and Pat Leahy were there, and their eyes just popped, because this was a new order. This was something new that was happening.
It was a precursor of the way Magnuson handled all of the full committees. When an item came up and he knew somebody was interested in, he encouraged them to speak, and before long it was wide open. You no longer sat back and waited until the end of the meeting to bring up your item. You brought it up whenever it was convenient or the order of things dictated. This was quite a change. I think it played into Magnuson's overall strategy of operation. He did it on the Commerce Committee. You get consensus by getting people involved and getting them to lay out what their problem is. That's how you accommodate the divergence of views. And if you do get consensus, then when you go to the floor, you've got the votes.

RITCHIE: So previously under McClellan and under Hayden, how would it have worked when Stennis came in? You said he wavered about where to sit, and he felt uncomfortable. How would that have been different?

REID: Well, you have to remember that I only viewed full committee markup sessions during the time of Chairman McClellan and when "Sunshine" first came into those proceedings. It was not unheard of, before that time, for a subcommittee chairman to actually run the meeting on his bill. [Allen] Ellender, and Russell and Hayden were back in maybe what some people would say would be darker times, or more closeted times. I remember when I first came back in '63, '64 there was no such thing as a person like myself who was attached to another committee, or even the personal office of a member, being present when executive sessions were being held by the Appropriations Committee.

They were very sparsely attended by any kind of staff. There was no record made. When Sunshine hit, our doors were opened.

That first meeting that Magnuson chaired, he also told me ahead of time, he said, "Now, you make sure that some of those chairs down there next to the fireplace are available for the press." We had press people that afterwards told me, "What's going on? Nobody ever saved chairs for us before." That started it with them. S-128 is not a big room, it only has physical chairs for about thirty-eight guests. Last year there were a couple of times I counted ninety-plus people, other than members, in that room. Most of us standing. I always stood because I could see better and keep an eye on everything. But one of our jobs, as far as Magnuson was concerned, was to reserve two rows, they were about five chairs across and two rows deep, there were about ten chairs there that we tried to reserve for the working press. We always held the first row and sometimes if it was highly visible and an awful lot of press people were around we'd let them take the second row. It was a new order.

I can't really tell you, because I never attended an executive session of the committee under the old rules, which were closed. But I do know that under the old rules, when things were closed, even the pieces of paper that had been prepared and printed up by GPO [Government Printing Office] were kept under the highest security. They were not revealed to our personal office, we didn't receive them in our personal office before an executive session was held. That was another change that Magnuson insisted upon, that any printed pieces of paper be made
available to the members of the committee in their personal offices at least twenty-four hours before the meeting was held. Now, that doesn't mean they had to read them. But he wasn't going to be in the position of having one of them come in and say, "Well, Maggie, what is this? I never heard about it." He wanted to be able to say, "Well, I'm sorry, Senator, but it was delivered to your office."

**RITCHIE:** I talked to people from the Congressional Information Service who said they were just amazed at the number of confidential committee prints that the Appropriations Committee had produced over the years. Apparently it outstripped any other committee.

**REID:** I'm sure it was, and even under our regime we did have a disclaimer up there on the front, we called them committee prints and we had a very obvious disclaimer that this was not official until adopted by the committee. Because when you do have a committee print, you do have the involvement of at least two or three, maybe five members that look over everything before it does go to the printer. We did devise, we have an excellent professional person, Neil McGown, who's in charge of our editorial department. Although he's an old line printer and used to work linotypes and hot-lead, he's on the forefront of computer text editing.

Our committee, with our help, and working with the Rules Committee, we've been an experimenter with all kinds of crazy pieces of equipment that Xerox and others have come up with. So we do have a very rapid, very large text editing capacity. We can turn out in a very few minutes a finished product that may have been sitting there in the computer tape for several days and even weeks, and is corrected and changed and redrafted at the last minute. We can crank out fifty or a hundred copies in almost nothing flat. It isn't like the old days when you had to send something down to GPO in the late afternoon and pray it would arrive by eight o'clock the next morning. So our committee, perhaps better than any other on the Senate side at least, has been able to make such information available for all our members and their staff in advance of any markup sessions.

Most of our full committee paper operations that has to be laid before members we've tried to keep in the computer in the text editing division so that we could come out with the latest version and distribute it to the senatorial offices the night before or the day before any kind of meeting. But we'd have the disclaimer on there, because any time you put out a hundred pieces of paper, you know damn good and well somebody's going to leak it to somebody, or hand it to somebody. There's no reason they shouldn't. And once a markup session would commence, Magnuson wanted us to have copies available for any working press in attendance or others who wanted them.

**RITCHIE:** Tell me, when the Budget Committees were set up in 1974, did that change in any way the work of the Appropriations Committee? Did that add an extra layer of something
that money matters had to go through? I've never been able to figure out how they fit together.

REID: The same law that Mr. [Mark] Hatfield and Mr. [Pete] Domenici are operating under today was there in '75 and '76, and the [Edmund] Muskies and the Mc Clellans had to live with it. There were certain requirements that the Appropriations Committee make certain recommendations or reports or advisories to Budget, and in the early days it was kind of a pro forma thing. Even in our early days, it was sort of a pro forma thing, but it got a little more binding. It required the Appropriations Committee to adopt a little more of a macro view of things. Normally, a subcommittee's recommendations are micro, because they are only taking a piece of the pie and addressing it in a very detailed way, and only looking at that somewhat little piece. You have to get all the thirteen pieces in there before you have a full pie, and then it may not be obvious, because there's a lot of backdoor spending that goes on in the federal government that the Appropriations Committee is not responsible for, and cannot address in its bills. So in the earliest days of Muskie and the Budget Committee, and Brock Adams, who was chairman on the House side, it was a little more leisurely as far as Appropriations was concerned, and some Appropriations members spent very little or no time looking at what the Budget Committee was up to. It didn't really change our operation at that period. It has changed it a bit more in the last year or two and especially this year.

RITCHIE: From the Reagan administration's instance on its budget, I suppose that will change how the Appropriations Committee responds this year after the budget has been set.

REID: Yes.

RITCHIE: The Constitution provides that the House originates money bills. This is one of the few cases where the House has initial authority, as opposed to the Senate's constitutional powers of confirmation of nominations and treaties. Does that in effect give the House any additional influence? You said there was a line in your committee print on what the House has recommended. Does this just mean that they physically introduced the bill first before the Senate introduces it?

REID: Well, we use that line in our tabular tables because, for members as well as taxpayers, when you see the dollars, that is the bottom line, although you can't divorce what the dollars are buying. It's very difficult to graphically display what dollars are buying—you know how many people are being fed or how many people are being clothed, or housed, or bombs are being purchased, or whatever it is. It's very easy to put out a tabular bunch of figures and show something. For some members, especially certain mentalities that can grasp the significance of dollars and graphs and ups and downs and percentages, those are very important. But in dealing politically with a program, the fact that it got so much money and did this last year, and is doing this now, and the president wants it to do less or more, or hold it flat, and the House has gone
along or not gone along, has upped it or lowered it, these are political factors that members think about.

For the Senate, it's a blessing and a curse that appropriations start out in the House. Let's say a very powerful interest group has a goal, and they'd don't achieve it in the House, the House cuts their program. They immediately rush over to the Senate and the pressure becomes very intense for the Senate to reserve what the House did. By the same token, if they get what they want, then they amble over to the Senate and try to protect it. Now it's easier to protect a given than it is to seek an unknown. So there is an advantage to the interest if they score over there, they can perhaps protect over here.

It's a blessing in a way to the Senate, or a senator, because he can always say to an interest group, "Well, look you've got to get it in the House. I'll do everything I can, and I'll help you over here, and I'll get it done over here, but you've got to get it done there," especially if he doesn't want to do it and he's a little bit sure the House is going to turn them down. He makes points, but ye,t he doesn't reveal his real intentions. So there is a little protection, because many members, Magnuson has a phrase that he uses quite often: "No politician is defeated by what he didn't say." The longer that you can stave off making a public commitment on a particular issue, maybe the better off you are. The fact that those people have to seek funding on the House side then come over here, staves off some of the pressure.

RITCHIE: The House has gotten a reputation of being the more conservative body on appropriations bills, the Senate has a tendency to be the more liberal. Is there any particular reason for that? Has that been your experience?

REID: Well, you have to look at the House and a member's constituency, and the Senate and a senator's constituency. There are a few senators that have a constituency that is mostly rural, but very few. Most senators, even though they might have a lot of rural area in their state, have some urban center, and there are differences in the problems that people face in the rural areas as opposed to an urban area. Now in the House, you have 435 congressmen, and it's one man, one vote, and you do have those constituencies carved up a little more neatly. You can have maybe quite a few House members who have far more cows and pastoral lands and some farmers, and some very beautiful rural areas that they represent. And they are here to represent them. Even though they might be United States congressmen, they should be representatives of that district first and then think of the total picture second. If they want to get reelected they better think of the smaller picture quite often.

Whereas senators, they're supposed to represent their state but they're supposed to sit on the board of directors of the United States, so they should represent their state and then look at
the bigger picture. I would venture that if you analyze the states, almost all of them have some kind of megalopolis. It might not be as bad as the megalopolis that we see here that runs from Richmond to Boston, but at least it's a megalopolis in that context in their state. Senators may be forced to recognize problems because of their home constituencies that some House members are not force to recognize. There was a period where the Senate was certainly more generous in some of these programs that do have more of a macro impact than the House was.

RITCHIE: Then the question arises: what happens in the conference committee? What happens when the House has passed an appropriations bill that is considerably less than what the Senate has, or on certain items that the two have come up with different versions of the same bill?

REID: There is when push really comes to shove, because any appropriations conference always has minor differences,

and some of those minor differences are ironed out well in advance by the principals involved, and when you do see a conference, there might be 150 "differences" in either dollar levels that would be provided or the specific provisions under which the dollars allowed might be used in the program. There's a conference memorandum that outlines those. The House member and the Senate member that are chairmen of their respective conferees will quickly go through those and there will be House recedes, Senate recedes, and it goes so quickly that most people don't know what's happening. Most often, you'll find them "splitting" the difference in dollars. But then there usually will be a number of items that are really in disagreement, where they are almost diametrically opposed. Then it gets down to real arguments.

My own experience is that House members have it over senators to a certain degree because on the House committee, you do not have members serving on as many subcommittees. In fact, some of them only serve on one subcommittee. They do not serve on other committees in the House. Appropriations is an exclusive thing with them. Most of them have been around a few years, they are comfortable in their districts, and they spend a lot of time in hearings, they spend a lot of time doing their homework, so they come to a conference individually very well prepared. And of course they have staff backup. But they are personally very well prepared. Senators sometimes will come to a conference not as well prepared. Part of the reason is that even members of our committee serve on other standing committees, and our subcommittee chairmen are often chairmen of other committees.

Even though at times, like with John Stennis, he was chairman of our Defense Subcommittee, he was also chairman of Armed Services, so he would have the advantage of the issues that were perhaps boiling in the appropriations bill in the appropriations conference were also issues that he had dealt with as Armed Services chairman. Dick Russell had the same advantage. In that case, you do not have a senator who is not well prepared. You have a
senator who is extremely well prepared, because he's probably fought this same issue for the last five, six, ten years.

When you stray afield from some of that, and most of the little programs that might be a bone of contention, you might be facing a few House members over there that know what they are talking about much more intimately than senators who are trying to carry the Senate position, and that can happen to a member of Appropriations. He might not really care about this program that deeply but somebody on the Senate floor who's not a member of our committee raised the issue, raised the ante, there was a Senate vote, and so here the conferee is stuck with carrying the Senate position even though it might not be something that he personally would like to do, or that he personally is that interested in. So it can be a little embarrassing at times if the House members are adamant and exceedingly well prepared and the Senate members are not that well prepared. Of course, again, these things today are all out in the open, Sunshine again. Sunshine did not come to conferences as quickly as it came to committees. There was a period after Sunshine had come to committees, and the Appropriations Committee, that conferences were still somewhat closed.

RITCHIE: I've been reading the Foreign Relations Committees' hearings in the 1950s on the Mutual Security aid and the

House always provided for less money in the foreign aid program than the Senate did. I've seen on several occasions where the senators have said, "Well, we want such-and-such but let's actually ask for a larger amount, and when we go back the House in conference we can split the difference."

REID: That's right.

RITCHIE: Is that a fairly common practice?

REID: Yes, and regrettably it's a practice that doesn't start in the Congress. It's a practice that starts in the departments and within the subdivisions of departments: always ask for more and settle for less, and you know you've got enough cushion. I don't know how you can avoid it, because an administrator, who's administering a program, he's certainly dedicated to keeping it alive, and he is going to ask for a little bit more than he's spending because if his program is doing well and is successful, it's probably going to need more. So maybe he knows that if he asks for 5 percent more the people upstairs will cut him to 3 percent, well if he really needs 4 percent then maybe he'd better ask for 7 or 8 percent. It escalates along the way and it can even happen in OMB. So when the request gets up here and is acted upon here the same thing can happen.

In the Congress, on so many things where there is a difference, you try to find a middle ground. In legislation you will do it. The two sides that are dedicated to at least doing something then will try to find some middle ground between their two positions. Well, in money
RITCHIE: Does this then encourage the House to pass appropriations bills that are perhaps lower than they know will eventually come out to give them a more fiscally responsible image? If the Senate knows they are raising amounts because they are going to split it, does the House lower amounts because they know it will be split?

REID: That often happens. I saw it many times. I've even seen presidents do it. Impacted Aid, Public Law 874, that passes out money to school districts all over the country, I think all but two congressional districts gets some of that money. [Public Law] 874 was a whipping boy for presidents probably since it got started in the 1950s. I remember Lyndon Johnson sending up their budget with 874 cut, but they knew that we'd add it. The same thing does happen between the House and Senate. There are times that a subcommittee on the House side will lower the amount of a program they know the Senate's going to increase, and sometimes there's a little logrolling, because they will increase a program that they fear the Senate will cut. So they'll put those two in there, and then they've got those two in conference: "Okay Senators, we'll go along reluctantly on one, but you've got to go along with us on the other." So they balance off the two. It's a system that has been here and probably will remain here. It's a way of accommodating the divergent views and represented needs of segments of our society. Sometimes those cuts, which you know the other side will change, are made so that your overall totals will be lower. That cosmetic of fiscal prudence was not invented recently and undoubtedly everyone has played that game now and then. I've also seen administrations and OMB inflate the anticipated costs of a program, far beyond what is reasonable, so they can come forward at the end of a fiscal year and claim savings. Having CBO and other resources at our disposal has made it possible for Appropriations to catch those, and if there are political credits to be gained, we've tried to garner them first.

RITCHIE: In the appropriations process, any committee on Congress, when it passes legislation, also indicates how much is going to be spent on it. But then they have to get the money from the Appropriations Committee.

REID: Right. Basically there has to be an authorization first, a legal authorization for such-and-such to happen, and tied with that authorization is a recommended dollar level, and then subsequently an appropriations bill has to be enacted that appropriates money in support of that public law.
RITCHIE: Then to what extent does the Appropriations Committee become sort of a court of appeal? Do the factions from the committees that have disagreed come to the Appropriations Committee and present two different points of view, which the Appropriations Committee has to untangle?

REID: Yes. The people that fought it out in the legislative arena, in order to get something authorized, be it a Clinch River [Nuclear Reactor] or a National Defense Student Loan program, the interests that have pushed for, or perhaps fought out the authorization came trotting along to Appropriations and the people that might be against it trottoo. The same fight is made again. Because the Congress has authorized more programs than any prudent man could ever fund, or the federal treasury could ever underwrite, the Appropriations Committee has had to pick and choose which authorized programs they would fund, or if a program was to be funded, just how much they felt we could afford.

We were often faced in Magnuson's time with authorizations in many good areas, most of them ones that Magnuson personally would favor, but the authorizing committees had authorized expenditures that would have broken the bank. As Magnuson would say: "If we did what the authorizing committees said, the Marshall would be down there posting a sign on the door, 'This place closed, bankrupt, out of business' on the Treasury." So we would have to zero in and maybe cut back in appropriation bills. There would be caveats, there would be restrictions placed upon the expenditure of the funds that would allow the administrator only to do so much. Some people were critical of this procedure, but yet it was the only way that the Congress could retain control of the dollar and indicate exactly how they felt it could be spent, and set up the legal basis for spending it. And, of course, it was that technique of tying strings on dollars that Henry Hyde took a hold of to do things like abortion, to handle legislative problems that the legislative committees had failed to deal with.

RITCHIE: I assume this has caused a lot of additional problems for the Appropriations Committees, these extra riders tied on to their bills.

REID: Yes. The members of Appropriations have enough of a problem dealing with dollars let along the—they might use the word "extraneous"—the extraneous issues that have been loaded upon appropriations bills. But if you're a frustrated Henry Hyde and want to do something, and can't get the legislative committees to do it, Judiciary or whatever it is, I can't blame Henry Hyde for doing it on an appropriation bill. I would not deny him that right, because to be fiscally responsible, the Appropriations Committee has to be able to tie strings on the money.

RITCHIE: In terms of everybody appealing to the committee, the committee then has to
have means of evaluating their claims. Is that where the oversight practice occurs? Is the committee keeping track of what is going on so that they can make independent judgments? Or do they base their decisions primarily on the arguments that are brought to them by the opposing sides?

**REID:** Increasingly, I believe, our committee has tried to build its capacity for independent judgment. We as a committee

---

early got into the computer field, not just for text editing but the House Appropriations and Senate Appropriations Committee quite a few years ago acquired a computer capability in order to analyze figures from a computer standpoint. When the Budget Committee came along, we got them into the same act, so that there is a master contract now and a master computer that the Congressional Budget Office, the two Budget Committees, Senate and House, and the two Appropriations Committee, Senate and House all use that same computer. This at least makes it easier for Budget people and Appropriations people to talk to each other, because at least they have the same documentary base.

When Magnuson became chairman of Appropriations, we initiated a more visible investigations unit. The committee had an investigatory authorization. In fact, a piece of paper passed in 1943 gave the Senate Appropriations Committee a small amount of money that they could use to hire investigators. We inherited that system and it was a very lovely system because it meant that for payroll purposes we didn't have to go before the Rules Committee. We had what some viewed as a secret source of funding. It was one of the most luxurious things to ever encounter because in essence, the Appropriations Committee was given an unlimited expense account, because there was a standing order over in the Disbursing Office—they wanted Magnuson to renew the order, but he did not, he just let it stand—but that standing order was that whatever Appropriations spent they always had $200,000 more in payroll. We did not expand the staff. We held our number of staff down and in 1980 we were about $5,000 under what we had inherited in payroll expenses.

But we initiated a more visible investigations unit. Although

---

people had been on the payroll as investigators, they were really clerks, and secretaries, and everything else. We brought in Don Gray, who was an old-timer on the Hill, as our chief investigator. He had an assistant. Then, with detailed personnel from the various departments and agencies that might be needed on an ad hoc basis for a particular investigation, we'd delve into something. Of course, we only had about two years' operation with that investigations unit. But during that period they had a number of good things for us. We had an internal procedure where they couldn't do anything unless, one, a member asked for it; and two, the chairman, Magnuson, and the ranking member, Mr. Young, signed off. There were a few things that we did that were somewhat confidential but most of the things that we did were wide open.
We had a number of members that were very receptive to the capability. Senator [Thomas] Eagleton, [William] Proxmire, [Lawton] Chiles, [Birch] Bayh. They initiated a number of requests that the investigations unit carried forward. Usually the investigators were able to bring at least something preliminary before the members in anywhere from ninety to 120 days. So the turnaround time was a little faster than we would get from, say the General Accounting Office. Even though our investigations unit utilized GAO personnel, we borrowed a lot of people from HUD, accountants and some investigators, we worked with a lot of inspectors general from the various agencies. I felt that we were developing a good capability. And in several of those investigations, the adoption of recommendations that flowed there from, paid for all the costs of that investigations unit many times over. The way we had designed it, there were only two really permanent staff on the committee and ad hoc utilization of "experts."

Now there was the potential for criticism, perhaps, that we were pulling these people out of federal agencies—and we had a couple of FBI men that worked with us for a while—that here we were using federal employees that were going to have to go back to wherever they were, and they were investigating. We never used a detailer from a department to investigate that department. If allegations came in about a department and we were looking into them, we'd use investigators from some other agency or our own investigators. The word was out that we had this unit and I had a number of calls from potential whistle blowers myself. Very seldom would I personally act upon those calls. I would get them to contact our chief investigator and lay it before him. I had enough to do to try and do his work.

RITCHIE: I've noticed that especially in the earlier years, right after World War II, the committee had a number of FBI agents on their staff. I think Tom Scott came from the FBI.

REID: Yes.

RITCHIE: What was it in particular about the FBI that made it so useful to the committee?

REID: Well, there was a time when you didn't get into the FBI unless you were either one, an accountant; or two, a lawyer. Tom did have an accounting background. He's a very capable guy, a personable fellow, very able. He certainly helped me a great deal as I was growing into the job. I had worked with him a little bit before Mr. Magnunson became chairman, because we had some interests that were broader than just the things Magnuson obviously was interested in. He had me dealing with Tom Scott when Tom was chief clerk of the committee. But I think it was a fact that in those earlier days, under the Haydons or the McKellars, the others that were chairman, that they were looking for somebody like that. There was a time that the FBI had a number of people detailed up to the Hill. Now they still have a number of detailees on the House investigations unit of their Appropriations Committee. And of course, we had a couple of them when Magnuson was chairman and we had
this unit. Most of them didn't stay very long, maybe six months, but if they had stayed longer, if we were still operating under that system, it might be that we would get to know some of those people.

I know one of the most able clerks on the committee at the moment got on the committee because he worked for IRS [Internal Revenue Service] and every year for about four months the IRS sent him up and he was in a little room down in the basement of the Russell Building and he helped people prepare their income tax. Well, a couple of members got to know him by that fact that he did their income taxes. The next thing you know, he's switched from IRS to the Hill. I would certainly believe that during that period of the '30s, '40s that the FBI contained a number of people with solid backgrounds, like Tom, in accounting, that would be valuable to the committee. Because remember, it's dollars and cents, and at least the staff have to have a comprehension of dollars and cents and then an ability to translate dollars into programs and verbalize them, and work with members and help the members understand. So that background that an FBI person might have had would be good and translatable.

And if they had done some investigations, this is one of the things we encouraged. We encouraged our clerks to get out of Washington, D.C., to Nebraska, to Tuscaloosa, or wherever it is, where some of their key program operations might be taking place, and find out what was really going on. Don't just listen to these characters in the home office tell you what's going on; get out there and see it yourself. It amazed me how little our travel budget was, our expenditures for travel, when you realize that the members as well as the staff have a responsibility for overseeing those billions that are being spent. Even though you have the input from people out there in the field that might come in, as well as hometown people that are associated with the program that tell you, you still can gain something by getting there and seeing it, and looking it over. Of course, FBI men were trained in investigatory procedures, so that aspect of their background would have been valuable.

RITCHIE: When Magnuson became chairman of that committee, did you become his chief of staff? What was your position after he became chairman?

REID: Well, when he became acting chairman he told me, "Just keep your eyes open, but find out what's really going on." That's all he needed to say, because I knew how he operated. Magnuson has never consciously done anything that would threaten the prerogative, the person of another member. So even when McClellan died, we were still in session, it was November, McClellan's chief of staff, his staff director, Jim Calloway, called me. He said, "You know, I think I should meet with Magnuson." I said "Okay." We met in the Marble Room behind the Chamber. Magnuson said, "Well, Jim, what are you worried about?" He said, "Well, you know, Mr. McClellan's no longer with us, so you're chairman." And Magnuson said, "Until the Democratic Caucus acts, I am acting chairman. You just remain on the job and check with Feather." So for the next two months, December and into January, Magnuson was acting
chairman. He was again being deferential to the fact that the Democratic Caucus had adopted new rules, and chairmanship wasn't automatic. Everything was de novo. You started anew. Until the Democratic Caucus nominated him and there was the ratification on the floor, everything was done as acting chairman.

After that meeting between Calloway and myself and Magnuson, I told Jim, "You know, anything you can do to help us out and clear the decks, you know the people that might not want to stay, or need to stay." But we didn't "fire" anybody. That, again, was a thing about Magnuson, he did not enjoy the problems that might be involved with ever firing anyone. He did want to be involved in the hiring, but he didn't want to do the screening. He wanted to be presented with some options and look them over and make his decision.

When he took over he also carried with him from the Commerce experience some good memories and some bad ones. One of the bad ones, as far as he was concerned, was that the Commerce staff had grown a little too big. He inherited a committee from John Bricker that had five people, and he turned over a committee to Howard Cannon of one hundred and twenty. Now that spanned almost twenty-five years, and it spanned a mushrooming of the activity of the committee, but it still somewhat embarrassed him. So he was looking at a committee that he felt was functioning fairly well, that he'd already instituted some minor changes, major perhaps, and he wanted it to continue to function well, and he didn't think we needed a lot of additional people to do it. He had pressure from some of his other staff people to increase and add and do all sorts of fancy things and I was his foil to try and prevent that. It was not the easiest thing to do because there wasn't the obvious position. Magnuson, as I indicated earlier, never had a "chief of staff" in his own office. He didn't allow his AA's to become gatekeepers; he wasn't about to appoint me to become any kind of a supreme gatekeeper on the Appropriations Committee.

In fact, the only piece of paper he signed was a piece of paper to the Disbursing Office that instructed Bob Malstrom to deal with me and me alone, other than himself, on any items that that office might need to deal with the committee. And of course, when you get down to it, money is the bottom line, and the funding of a committee is just as important as the funding of a program, so the fact that he did that and I was the only conduit in and out of the Disbursing Office, did give me a certain portfolio, not very obvious to the public, because that letter was never published anywhere, but it was the mechanism that Magnuson gave me and that I exercised with his approval and with his sanction that allowed us to control things. And that fact, that letter of instructions was known to a few power centers like the secretary of the Senate, Stan Kimmitt and Nordy Hoffmann, the sergeant at arms. In dealing with members, I know one of the first members that came to him about a personnel problem was Senator [Ernest] Hollings. Magnuson's response to Hollings was, "Well, go talk to Feather." I'm sitting across the hall and in marches Fritz Hollings, and says "Feather, can I talk to you?" And I said, "Are you kidding? Any
time!" And bingo he sits down and he says, "Maggie tells me I have to deal with you."

RITCHIE: He wanted to add someone onto the staff?

REID: Yes.

RITCHIE: Was it your responsibility then to try to talk him out of it?

REID: In that instance, I got all the facts and I went to Magnuson and explained what they were, and elaborated some of the pluses and minuses, and Magnuson okayed it and we went ahead. There were several other instances like that with other members. I did have the uneasy mission at times of trying to hold them down. Sometimes fending them off.

RITCHIE: So you were sort of in between Magnuson and the staff, or how would you describe it?

REID: No. Immediately after his nomination by the Caucus, he did sign another piece of paper, he transferred me. As chairman, he transferred me from—I believe I was on his personal office payroll at the time—he transferred me to the Appropriations payroll. I was put in there and Calloway and I were sitting there at the top of the heap, as far as money was concerned. I was given the title "professional staff member." That's the title I hold now and I will be terminated from August 31.

RITCHIE: Well, how would you describe your responsibilities on the Appropriations Committee?

REID: Well, assistant to the chairman is probably the best, because I did work directly with him and interface on his behalf with any number of people. You know, when it came to the [James] McIntyres and the OMB directors, and others, I was often the interface whom they needed to contact. Then in the operation of the staff, I had the major responsibility of space and the allocation of resources. That was an immediate problem, because my own reading of the Senate Rules that required minority staffing, I read that as a matter of right that by 1982 they had the absolute right to one-third of the staff. I kidded my counterpart, Pete Bonner, I said "You know, it has something in here about right, but it doesn't have anything about responsibility. You get all these goodies but you don't have to do anything. All you have to do is be there."

We looked at our real estate and we did some trading with the Rules Committee and got rid of some real estate in the Senate Courts [Annex] and got a couple of rooms over here [Immigration Building Annex], and we got some real estate in Russell [Senate Office Building]. We got forced out of some real estate in Dirksen [Senate Office Building] when they were carving a hallway to Hart [Senate Office Building]. We reapportioned the real estate; we had to try and give the minority a little more space. We made very few, minor changes in personnel. We launched the investigations unit. There was nothing that I ever did, or that we ever did on the majority side, that was not cleared with the minority. The relationship,
I believe, that we had between Mr. Young and Mr. Magnuson was as cordial and as amicable as anyone could ask for. The same with the minority and majority staffs.

**RITCHIE:** I was going to ask you about how much partisanship plays a role in the appropriations process, or how closely the Republicans and Democrats work together on a committee like Appropriations.

**REID:** Well, there had been evidence in the past that there were clerks that were very jealous of whatever they were doing and would not share that information with others. As I indicated earlier, that was a problem we had with HEW [Subcommittee] at one time, and we changed it. We expanded the role of "members' representatives." In fact, when Magnuson took over, we even published what we called the "green book." We published a book that gave all kinds of information about members and about the staff. It only collected information that was probably existing somewhere, but it put it together in a much more readable form, very easy form. It had the rules of the committee and all that. It also had the staff and the membership on the House side. But there was one page that listed all the members of the committee and then their "personal representatives." This was someone in their personal office that the member told us, "This is the guy I want you to talk to about appropriations."

Well, we did it for the full committee, but I strongly encouraged all of the clerks to do the same thing with their subcommittees, because most offices did have somebody who was more responsible for foreign operations, or more responsible for HUD, or Health, or whatever it was.

You get that person, you make sure that everybody knows it's that person, and then somewhere along the line in the subcommittee operation, when there are staffs sitting down with staffs, you get that person out of John Stennis' office, or Jim Sasser's office, or Dale Bumpers' office, to come in and sit down and participate. This is what the staff at least is fiddling around with, and here's where the problems are, and here's what the options might be, and you generate at a staff level, not just the Appropriations staff but involving the personal staff of Appropriations members, the beginnings of the decision-making process. We had done that on HEW to, I thought, to quite a successful degree, and so we were encouraging it on the other subcommittees. It was time consuming. We often had many filibusters when you'd have one of those meetings, and some of the staff found it frustrating, but some of them found it very fruitful.

**RITCHIE:** I get the feeling from looking at Norris Cotton's memoirs and other things like that the Republicans and Democrats got along fairly well on the Appropriations Committee, that there wasn't all that rigid a difference. Is that a fair assessment?

**REID:** I think that's very true. In fact, just yesterday I ran into Gordon Allott in the

United States Senate Historical Office—Oral History Project
www.senate.gov
subway and spoke with him a moment or two. I can remember when Gordon Allott was the ranking Republican, ranking minority, on Independent Offices, and the relationship that he and Magnuson had. There was a time that Leverett Saltonstall was a ranking member. Most of the times the Saltonstalls, the Norris Cottons, the Jim Pearsons, the Gordon Allotts, the Ed Brookes, the Milton Youngs,

there was never any bitterness or animosity. There were times when there was a very rapid, very early recognition, "Look, this is one where we are going to have to go our separate ways." They'd just kind of smile at each other, and when the time came they went their separate ways. Until then they didn't even spend time on it, because it would have been a waste of time to spend time because they had their paths carved out. Most of the staff mirrored that same attitude. Now it was more prevalent that you would have staff that might be a little more vocal. They had the luxury of doing that because they don't have the onus of having to cast a vote, so we would run into staff people that would be a little more difficult.

RITCHIE: I was wondering if the reason for the good relations between Republicans and Democrats was that Appropriations often has a tone of reciprocity. You have to give a little to get a little, and everybody goes along because everybody is basically getting something out of the final bill.

REID: That has to enter in, because as we discussed earlier, if you are talking about words and you're trying to craft words, you get positions that might be somewhat more firmly opposed and you try to find a middle ground. Well, it's a little more difficult to find a middle ground with words than it is with dollars. So you have that mid-ground splitting the difference in dollars. It's so much easier if you get to that point. Then you're dealing with not one or two programs, but hundreds of programs, so it is easier to realize that "Look, today this is what he wants, but I'm not sure what I'm going to want tomorrow. Now, if I make it too difficult for him on his today, what's he going to do to me tomorrow?" So it's a matter of common sense that a member not oppose too strenuously, or the chickens may come home to roost.

RITCHIE: I suppose even the most fiscally conservative senator has a special project somewhere in his home state that he'd like to raise some money for.

REID: Yes, or he's got some kind of a program that he thinks is important that he's going to want funded that has more than just a parochial interest. And they are all competing for a scarce resource. Money is always scarce. There's never been too much money around to do everything that everybody wanted to do. There's always been too little, so they have to accommodate.

RITCHIE: The Appropriations Committee has always tended to have a lot of other
committee chairmen and ranking minority members as members of its committee. They've already been through the battles in their legislative committees. Do they then come with fairly strong convictions on how much money should be spent for programs their committees sponsored? I assume that John Stennis, by the time he gets to the Appropriations Committee, is already thinking about the program they passed in the Armed Services Committee.

**REID:** They have the intimate knowledge of discussing the options and coming to the point of adopting a program. They have that intimate knowledge based upon all the authorizing hearings, all the discussions, all the private as well as the public discussions they've had. So when they get to the Appropriations process, their position in their own mind is well fixed. Their assessment of the priorities has already taken place. So they tend to be very well prepared, and they're somewhat more adamant in their position. There's little that's more important than money, and the fact that Appropriations has been in charge of the biggest bulk of the controllable federal expenditure, has made it the most sought-after committee.

Until recent years you never saw a freshmen of either House on Appropriations. The more senior members got on. Magnuson came here in '44 and he didn't get on Appropriations until '53. He had to serve in the vineyards first. So when you were a little more senior before you came on the committee, by the time you became a subcommittee chairmen you were probably at least a subcommittee chairman on another committee, if not a chairman. That happened with Magnuson. Magnuson concurrently became chairman of the Commerce Committee, a very potent committee within the Senate, at the same time he became a subcommittee chairman of Appropriations. Now today, you do have younger members, newer members, freshmen members who become members of Appropriations that do not have as major responsibilities elsewhere, nor the experience. I think this is going to have an impact on the Appropriations Committee's operations.

**RITCHIE:** Has it already had an impact in any way?

**REID:** I really don't have the basis to judge because I have not participated in those meetings, I have not gone to one of them. I have absented myself. I've served in a capacity to advise Mr. [Mark] Hatfield's staff as well as Mr. [William] Proxmire's, and given them the benefit of anything that I knew, and share with them some of the memos that I might have drafted to give Magnuson. I've been available as a resource, but I have not gone to any sessions of the full committee and sat as a mouse. One of the problems I faced when I was running things for Magnuson was trying to convince the staff that unless you needed to be there, there's no reason for you to be there.
RITCHIE: One other thing about the appropriations process that interests me is what happens when it gets on the floor. After all this time you've deliberated in the subcommittee and full committee, when it gets onto the floor of the Senate, how much of the bill really is changed?

REID: I would say in a percentage factor, probably by less than 1 or 2 percent. Even though in recent years, you've had people, sometimes just for posturing and just for demagoguery, who would advocate a 10 percent across the board cut, the balance-the-budget types. When you get down to real programs, you would have somebody that might oppose a Clinch River, for some environmental or some other aspect, and might want to delete something. Obviously, if MX missiles came on the floor, you might have moves along that line. But by and large the arguments were not over dollars, they were over something else. In the social field it was always abortion. When the abortion issue was put on other bills, often you'd have more discussion on that you would on something that was really more dollars and cents. The debates were never over major expenditures, and the changes were often modest. You might find somebody who was vitally concerned about youth unemployment and hot summers that would try to add some funds for summer youth employment, or something like that. Or you might have the housing question, subsidized housing, come up and you might have an apparently large dollar issue voted on on the floor. But by and large it was nit-picking.

RITCHIE: The appropriations bill always seems to be the tail end of the legislative session. It's often debated the night before the session adjourns. Is this by design, as a way of forcing the members of the Senate to go along with the appropriations bill, by running them right down to the wire?

REID: It has been used as a vehicle to keep members in town. There have been majority leaders that knew, especially in election years, that they would have trouble keeping a majority around unless they had one or two goodies that people had to be here for, for their own political reasons. And appropriations bills were used by majority leaders at times to help hold the session intact until adjournment. But sometimes it was not by design, it was just by circumstances that you could not get agreement. That happened in the Labor-HEW area on the abortion question, because there was a time when Henry Hyde had the votes in the House, but Ed Brooke, Warren Magnuson, and Birch Bayh had the votes in the Senate. Well, on the abortion issue, Mr. Hyde and Mr. Magnuson didn't quite agree. It became an issue that was almost unresolvable, irreconcilable. When you can't agree, then you can't move. So there were these extraneous things that often held bills till the last.

In the appropriations process, we keep talking about thirteen bills, but historically the Appropriations Committee had come along at the end of the session with a Supplemental bill. And a Supplemental was to provide for those programs that we hadn't done enough for in the regular process, or to provide for funding for programs the Congress had just recently enacted, because at least in theory you might start in January with a new Congress, with a new session.
and the legislative committees must pass through both houses and pass the president a new program that was authorized to get started immediately, and that wasn't provided for in the appropriations process, so you have to have a Supplemental. There would often be a catch-all Supplemental that would need to be passed in the waning hours of a session.

RITCHIE: I've seen Magnuson down on the floor during those late night sessions.

REID: How he could do it! He's always had the ability to catnap. He can lean back in at least a comfortable Barco lounger or something like that, and almost momentarily be in some level of sleep. He can go back there in the Marble Room and in two or three minutes he'd be asleep. If they'd let him sleep for twenty minutes then he could come out, rumpled, but with all of his faculties and survive it. I know several times when we did have those long sessions, one time we started on a Thursday or Friday and he was wearing the same clothes Sunday afternoon. And here the session was really over with, although they had to stay in order to sign pieces of paper, but there was a football game on and he stayed in the cloakroom to watch the football game before we went home, and he hadn't been home for two nights, Friday night and Saturday night. He'd only catnapped in the Marble Room.

RITCHIE: In 1977, James Eastland retired from the Senate and Warren Magnuson was elected president pro tempore.

REID: In '78, and Magnuson was elected in '79.

RITCHIE: Could you explain to me what exactly a president pro tempore really does? How did Magnuson's responsibilities change when he became president pro tem?

REID: Well, again, Magnuson was sensitive to some things. His memory was much longer than mine and he could remember the times when there were president pro tems of the Senate that had a great deal more obvious power. Carl Hayden, when he was president pro tem, had the patronage book, and there was no such thing when Magnuson became president pro tem. But the president pro tem of the United States Senate is the only constitutional officer in the Senate other than the vice president. In the line of succession to the presidency, the president pro tem does occupy a position right after the Speaker. In a way, it was a little bit frightening after he became president pro tem to have these people show up to explain the procedures for emergency evacuation. When they brought it home to him that there would be a helicopter at such-and-such a place and that he would get aboard, and that if his wife was with him she could get aboard too, he said, "Well, if she isn't with me, I'm not getting aboard." He wasn't about to fly down to Charlottesville, or some stupid place and not have his wife with him. We'd just take the car and go out to the Shoreham and pick her up and drive!
Then you get the red phone, an extension to the White House switchboard. There was one
in his personal office in the Russell Building, and another in his Appropriations office in the
Capitol, and there was one at home. The phone at home was a red one. They would test it about
once a month. It rang once when I was there and they were just testing it, and it was a little
disturbing. You did realize that this was a vehicle that might have to be used for other purposes.
He was the only one that ever used it. None of the staff were allowed to use it. It was amazing,
because I placed the calls many times for him. It was almost instantaneously answered, and it
was a male voice that came on "Yes, sir." When you asked for a cabinet member, which he often
did, he would use it for contacting various cabinet officials, it was a very effective instrument.
Because they had similar instruments and they came on the line almost immediately.

But the president pro tem did have certain ceremonial duties, ministerial duties. In the
absence of the vice president, the president pro tem is in that pecking order. One of the nice
things on the Senate side when you are president pro tem, they do provide you with a car and
driver. That was a nice thing to have, it did take some burdens off me personally, because over
the years I had been the one that took Magnuson home every night. I didn't pick him up in the
morning every time. We had staff people that lived out near him that would pick him up and
bring him to the Hill.

Within the Democratic party structure of the Senate, the president pro tem had been
included as part of the "leadership." The Democratic Caucus has a steering committee that
performs many of the functions that the Rules Committee on the House side performs, of
scheduling legislation and making up priorities. Well, Magnuson had been on the steering
committee of the Senate for quite some time, about twenty years or better. So when he became
president pro tem there was some debate as to whether he would get two votes or what the deal
would be. It was more than pro forma because there were other interests within the Democratic
membership of the Senate that wanted to add another member if they could. So that was another
function that the president pro tem might have.

Then, legally, there are a number of laws on the books that require appointments to
commissions, to various federal bodies. They're usually honorary, they don't carry any monetary
value except that national commissions that do have meetings, you get your travel paid and you
get a modest hundred dollars or something a day. But under the law, many of those appointments
are made in the name of the president pro tem. Historically, within the Senate, if the president
pro tem has two appointments to make, one of those appointments is made with the advice and
consent of the minority. That was something that we carried out very assiduously, that the
minority made their recommendation and Magnuson just ratified it. On the Democratic side, as
president pro tem, Magnuson did exercise the influence that he might have on occasion to select
someone of his recommendation rather than just turn it over to the Caucus, although he'd run his
idea by the Caucus—which in essence was

Mr. [Robert C. ] Byrd, the majority leader. In the operation of his duties as president pro tem that
was another assignment that came my way.

We also discovered that the president pro tem is the legal supervisor for the secretary of the Senate, for the sergeant at arms of the Senate, and for the legislative counsel. One of the first sessions that Mr. Magnuson personally had was with Nordy Hoffmann [Senate sergeant at arms] and Stan Kimmitt [secretary of the Senate], when he became president pro tem the two of them met with him to discuss some of their concerns, some of their interests, and pledge their fealty.

**RITCHIE:** Did he have regular dealings with these officers? Did they turn to him for assistance?

**REID:** Oh, yes. There weren't many times that anything had to be formally decided but there was informal, verbal communication between those three people almost on a daily basis. Nordy Hoffmann was somebody that Magnuson knew very well. In fact, he knew Nordy before Nordy ever came to Capitol Hill. Nordy Hoffmann was born and raised in Seattle. He's from an old family out there. Of course, Magnuson knew Stan Kimmitt when Stan first worked with Mike Mansfield and was secretary for the majority. So these were not people that Magnuson was unfamiliar with, nor hadn't had some kind of dealings over the years. Anytime they wanted to see him they usually caught him in and around the floor and would discuss things. I would say that I dealt more with Nordy because the sergeant at arms does have a much broader responsibility outside of the immediate operations of the Senate chamber,

the computer center, and the lease space. Many of the things that the sergeant at arms had responsibility for had fiscal overtones.

Another responsibility that I had for Magnuson was to keep an eye on the legislative budget, because we were all concerned about the bad press of the "billion dollar Congress." And we had concerns about the Library of Congress and some of the things that are funded under the legislative budget. We had been involved with the Library of Congress when I first came back here and some OMB director tried to do away with the program where the Library of Congress makes out those little catalog cards that end up in your catalogs of Podunk city library. Our analysis of it was "Well, yes, it does cost Uncle Sam more money to make those cards. But how much does it save the librarian in Podunk? And what are we about? Why don't we want people to read? Of course, if you're in Podunk and you want to read, you go to the catalog first, don't you?" So we had some interests there, and they were continuing. So our dealings with the sergeant at arms were a little greater in number and complexity.

**RITCHIE:** So the position of president pro tem carries headaches as well as honors.

**REID:** Yes. You have the honor and with it the responsibility. It's an office perhaps that the man, the occupant, makes more or less out of it. Its purely legal powers are more in reserve than anywhere else. The ultimate power that's in reserve is one, I think, almost anybody would pray doesn't come your way. Because I can't imagine a more cataclysmic event than Dallas would be the elevation of a president pro tem to president of the United States. You would have
have a horrendous event to bring that about. And potentially, it's there.

RITCHIE: Well, we've been talking for the past several weeks about your whole career from 1949-'50, and 1964-'81. You talked about the differences in the institution of the Senate from the time you were first here in '49-'50, and when you came back in '64, how much larger the institution had gotten. Now you've had almost twenty years with the Senate. How different is the United States Senate today than it was in the past? In what ways would you say it's changed?

REID: I think it's still a relatively small town. I think it's peopled, by and large, exceedingly well. Whether it's the charpeople, whether it's the plumbers, whatever it is. You know we have some of the finest carpenters that are still alive in this country. Some of them would strike me down for using that phrase because they are really "cabinetmakers," they're not carpenters. They are among the finest craftsmen that are available in this country. They are all dedicated to making the place work, whether it's keeping it beautiful, keeping it clean, keeping the elevators working, or the lights on, the temperature cool, at least they try. I think the staff, by and large, are highly dedicated.

I think the biggest change that I would be concerned about is that the "pressure cooker" is hotter, the pace is perhaps frenetic, the complexity of issues greater and the sheer number of issues coming before the Congress is greater. I think about the people that have been involved with me, that I've been involved with intimately, that I've seen have personal problems, that I've seen the divorce rate very high. A contributing factor to those personal problems has to be the time that they spent, the dedication that they have given to whatever it was that their staff mission was. When I was in law school there was a phrase: "the law is a jealous mistress." I think that's even more so about staff work within the Senate, whether it's in the more political parts that the legislative committee might be a part of. I think they are jealous-mistress type jobs that put a strain on the personal relationships that an individual has and needs. I think how people get away from the Hill, from their jobs, to refresh their batteries, to recharge their batteries, whether it's to Rehoboth [Beach, Delaware] or whatever, I think this is a problem that some of the staff have not resolved. It puts a strain on them, puts a strain on the institution.

I know in our own operation at the secretarial level, I tried to find new secretaries that were Class-A, Number One, and all that, and I would argue with the other staff, "Look, if we can get eight hours out of them, that's all I want. Let's bring somebody else in as a part-timer to cover these long hours." We had many operations; we had an operation in the Capitol that, because of our membership and because of Magnuson, we had to keep open whatever the Senate was in session. Well, when the Senate went in at nine or ten o'clock in the morning and stayed until nine or ten o'clock at night, this made for an awfully long day for the people that might be assigned
down there. It put a real strain on them, and I didn't think it was fair to ask that secretary, just because her clerk happened to be located there, that she had to be there from nine o'clock in the morning until nine or ten o'clock at night.

How all staffs resolve these problems, the length of the sessions, the duration of Congresses, the expansion of attention to such a wide span of sub-specialities, is important. We're still individuals, human beings, that need lives that are perhaps a little bit bigger than the micro-thing that we're looking at. But I see it working. If it had been my decision alone, I don't think I would have built Dirksen, let alone Hart [Senate Office Buildings]. At the same time, I recognize that it's important for members to really respond to their constituents with a staff of five or six people housed in three rooms which used to be available in Russell. They've had to acquire the automatic machinery, the System 6's, the mass mail responding capability. You can't operate that without people, so they've had to expand their staffs, committees have had to expand their staffs, just to do the job they've been forced to take on.

The bottom line, for whatever the causes, is that the rate of turnover among staff is surely higher today, just as it is for members. I think that the pace of events and the pressures that come with that will assure an even higher turnover of members and especially the staff who help them to formulate public policy. That means we'll be lacking institutional memory.

I'll admit to showing a certain prejudice in this, for I favor stability. While change is inevitable and usually good, I feel that evolutionary change is the very essence of our system. Those who gain their experience within a stable system, who rise at an incremental pace to positions of power within that system, they do tend to be more cautious. They deliberate suggested changes with less haste—I'd say they weigh all the consequences of any change more rationally.

Within the Senate today, as an institution, far fewer members or staff have that accumulated tenure, that experience that is as deep as it is broad. Far greater numbers of both come here with little experience within legislative bodies at the state or local levels. If that view is valid, and if it does continue, it might well result in sessions where the panic over issues of the moment result in far too hasty action—perhaps revolutionary changes—wider swings of the political pendulum with consequent government action or inaction—that will trigger reactions among the body politic that I do not believe will be in the best interests of our nation.

RITCHIE: Your long association with Warren Magnuson put you in contact with a man who's always been identified with the "Inner Club" of the Senate, from his days of playing cards with the senior senators, to being chairman of the Commerce Committee and chairman of the Appropriations Committee. Do you think there still is an "Inner Club" the way people described it in the 1950s and '60s?

REID: Not the way there was when a Clint Anderson and a Bob Kerr and a Warren
Magnuson, and others, Stu Symington, might get together in one of the east front rooms of the Capitol and play a little cards or just get together—this didn't happen every day, but it happened often. I don't think that happens today, partially because of the speed with which everybody is moving. Those were the days when they had to spend more time here. Today, you have members that are, I would say on any given day there are at least two or three members of the Senate that are flying away from Washington, not to it. At the same time there are others flying back. And yet the Senate is still in session. So they don't have the opportunities to come to know one another well and to build those interpersonal relationships that can be so important, if only for giving them greater job satisfaction.

Of course, Warren Magnuson was here long enough to see Washington become one of the world capitals and acquire embassies from how many nations, and the pressures that that adds to the city that weren't here in the 1930s nor the '40s. The fact that you see such a boom in commercial office space in this town, and how many of them being occupied by Wall Street law firms, Chicago, Houston and Los Angeles law firms. This is becoming, perhaps, not the commercial center that a Wall Street or Chicago Board of Trade might represent, but it's certainly becoming a legal center that wasn't envisioned maybe a decade ago by some of these firms. There's almost a stampede now, if you're a big firm in Dallas, Chicago, or New York, that you have a Washington office.

But that "Inner Club" of the Senate, that White and others wrote about so well and so accurately, is gone. There are still a number of real movers and shakers—those who can almost command others to follow—but their influence is not as pervasive or decisive across such a spectrum of issues. There will always be some kind of small group, call it what you will, that will have the appearance of being in charge, of running the show and calling the shots. But it will be an ever-changing cast of characters, depending upon the particular issues. The likes of a Dick Russell, a Bob Taft, or now a Warren Magnuson are absent from the scene and Warren Magnuson might well prove to be the last of that long line.

RITCHIE: Has television and the media changed the Senate in its way of doing business?

REID: I fear it has because it's put a premium on the successful member to be a successful performer, and to make a good appearance in half a minute, to be able to quickly respond, and appear knowledgeable, and communicate over the electronic media. The fact that it's so easy now for the people within the television industry to have their little vans sitting out there on the northeast drive and do a "quickie" [interview] that's shot by microwave, and processed and can be in Podunk within a matter of minutes. It used to be that you used a crackly long-distance connection at AT&T. You might call a reporter on the local paper, or have a scratchy message that might get out over the local radio station, but now you have a much finer fidelity and higher quality transmission. I think it's created for the successful member, the guy
who wants to get reelected or rise to "higher office," it puts a premium on the ability to electronically communicate. The medium itself is the message today, not whatever lengthy private thought, deliberation or contemplation that a member might have expended in whatever process brought him to his public position.

**RITCHIE:** Do you think it's changed the type of senators we'll see now and in the future?

**REID:** Most certainly and, I believe, with unfortunate consequences. With the ever higher percentage of the electorate making their decisions about public issues and about public figures based upon whatever information they receive from the electronic media, that has changed the basic reasons some individuals are successful in gaining the confidence of the electorate. The pace at which one can gain or lose that confidence is certainly much faster also.

Still some things do remain the same. The electorate has always been extremely jealous about their elected officials. They demand their personal presence everywhere, for anything, at any time. And they don't allow public figures any private life; that is especially true of a spouse or children; even a niece or nephew who might smoke pot is not only fair game for the press, but too often hounded by them.

The electorate is equally fickle and will elect or defeat a candidate for what are truly extraneous reasons. My best examples both come from the South. Decades ago, a member with great seniority always stayed at the Mayflower Hotel during congressional sessions. His opponent demolished him during his reelection attempt with a standard speech, built entirely upon a copy of the printed menu from the Mayflower dining room. He'd read all of those items on the menu—mispronouncing any of the fancy French dishes—and, of course, gave all the prices—and, in that rural area, trounced that senior member. Yet, what connection might a member's eating preferences or his temporary abode have with his possible effectiveness as a member of Congress?

The defeat of then Senator Claude Pepper by George Smathers in 1950 is a far more recent example, where the lack, perhaps, of sophistication among the electorate, and a dash of McCarthyism of the time, brought about the downfall of a most capable, effective and senior member of the Senate.

The electronic media and the pace of events today, which has been escalating since World War II, combine to bring into play what I call "burn factors" that are prevalent among members as well as staff. There is the "burn up" on the inside where those internal drives that are so critical (and so evident also) in successful individuals, whatever their vocation, and they burn up those driving forces for any number of personal reasons. No doubt that has been true from the
earliest times when citizens gained the power to anoint one of their own and put a toga on them, but the pace of events in the public arena today certainly adds pressures to that burn up factor.

Perhaps more often today, a member will dissipate their favorable acceptance among their electorate, and this I term "burnout." Again, this will happen for all manner of reasons but I'd rank overexposure at the top of the list. Overexposure puts modern truth into that phrase attributed to a famous French King who said, "nothing pleaseth like rare appearance."

I felt that President Carter was suffering fatally last summer and fall from overexposure—in sum total and across too broad a spectrum of public issues. The public not only became tired of seeing him, of hearing him, but they became bored and they just tuned Carter out—long before they turned him out. The electronic media, especially television, escalates that risk of burnout among public figures just as surely as it has among those who are just entertainers. How many Fred Astaires can you name who not only have their professional act together and who occupy that premier status among their peers, but who obviously have a keen perception of the burnout risks. And the George Jessel types are legion.

Those burn factors are indeed interconnected and the burden, the pressure they put upon members or any public official is tremendous. Members of Congress must be constructed, psychologically as well as

intellectually, of firmer stuff than the average to withstand those pressures—if we are to have a level of quality among our national board of directors and policymakers that the continued successful operation of corporate America demands. While this has been true for public figures from the earliest of times, the faster pace of our modern world escalates the speed with which all these events occur.

You'd have to wonder if a Washington, Madison, Jefferson or Franklin would be among any "Inner Club" today. The sage of Monticello withstood scurrilous attacks in his day. But what if the tale of Sally Hemmings were at every supermarket checkout stand, harped on constantly by columnists, voiced by TV editorialists and explored in-depth by electronic reporters? Today, it is often just a handful of Cronkites, nationally and locally, who anoint those among a pack as "front-runners" or as real "comers" and all too often this becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Most of those Founding Fathers underwent extensive testing in the public marketplace among their fellow citizens—be it Williamsburg, Richmond, Boston or Philadelphia—over a number of years, before they were given a toga.

Today, the electorate may still anoint the very best and the brightest, but perhaps even more often, we see the dullards and the demagogues in a toga. Those pressures and burdens of public figures are all too evident to the best and the brightest; they opt out on public service; and they put their energies to work in other fields where they achieve equal success and personal satisfaction, without undergoing the deprivations of privacy and the like. This does not bode well for the body politic, and while I feel the potential for harm all too obvious, I don't have the answers for turning it around.
RITCHIE: That brings us up then to Magnuson's last campaign in 1980, his one and only defeat. What happened in that election to end his career in the Senate?

REID: Well, part of what happened was what he feared was going to happen. He feared that the Democratic party was in disarray. That Mr. Carter and his administration were not appreciated, for whatever reasons, and that they weren't selling. There was apathy. There was disaffection. Magnuson has always felt that interest rates are translated into action at the polls. He was concerned about that. He was concerned about his own image. I don't think he showed his age, except in his walk, as much as his age was a factor. He didn't look that much different at seventy-five than he had at sixty-five. His genes are amazing, because he's got more hair than I have, and it's healthier. He's never died his hair. He has an ability to recuperate from a long, hard day in a very short rest span. His mind is as agile today as it's ever been, and of course his memory is expanding every day. The basic qualities that a man might need to do the job of United States senator, I think Magnuson had them, has them, and if anything, they were getting better, like fine wine that might need be aged. As we were approaching 1980, Magnuson did question whether he should run again. He raised the question often, although he certainly enjoyed his work even more and he knew that he could continue doing it as well or even better than in the past, he did wonder if he might be going to the well once too often. At the same time he was plagued with an obligation, for he'd come to the very top; he'd become president pro tempore; he was chairman of Appropriations; and the most senior member of the entire Congress. None of that could Magnuson pass along to any successor to his senatorial seat that the citizens of Washington state might elect. That sense of obligation to hold those positions for those who had placed him where he was able to acquire them was, I believe, the prime factor in his decision to run. But the 1980 voters in our state were looking for change, certainly at the state level.

We had some problems in our own state. We had a governor, Dixie Lee Ray, who had been an official here [chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission], and who was well known in the state. She was elected governor the same time that Mr. Carter was elected president, and she was nominated and elected in that year for some of the same reasons Carter was elected. She was a non-politician so to speak, a change. She had been able to alienate all of the press in the state of Washington during her four-year term. They were all down on her. And she enjoyed fighting with them. She got herself into a situation where there was a primary fight. The leading candidate against her in the Democratic primary bound himself to Magnuson. His name was McDermott and he came up with the "M & M" slogan. She blamed part of that on Magnuson. Well, he had absolutely nothing to do with it. The gubernatorial candidate is the one that started it, and even put out tee shirts with "M & M: Magnuson and McDermott." We had no choice. Magnuson has always been a down-the-line Democrat. He would not get involved in a primary, but whoever the primary selected, he would support. There were friends of Dixie when she was defeated as governor in that September primary that were unhappy with Magnuson because they
But I think the most telling blow came with the Carter-Reagan debate. Watching it in Seattle I certainly felt that Reagan was the winner of that debate and established himself as a very presentable, creditable alternative. The tide turned dramatically. And all of the polls out home confirmed it. Where Carter had been ahead, he was now behind and he was falling fast. We felt it over the following few days, and of course, that was just a week before the election. Then as we sat there and watched the returns early in the afternoon and saw the White House limousines going to the hotel downtown when it was only five-thirty, quarter-to-six in Seattle, and then we got the reports from the precincts: at six-thirty and seven there wasn't anybody there! On primary night we had precincts that had people lined up, they didn't get to vote until about eight-thirty, eight-forty-five because they were lined up waiting at eight o'clock when the polls closed. Our law requires that anybody in line be allowed to vote. We didn't have one precinct in the entire state on the general election night that had anybody waiting at eight o'clock. They were all home watching the new president. It was devastating on the West Coast. It was devastating in Seattle and Tacoma. In fact, Magnuson did carry Seattle but he didn't carry King County and Pierce County, another major area. So the landslide that started here, that rolled west, hurt. When it was decisive, especially the impact of that early hour concession, I leave to those who study returns more closely. I do know that any number of seats in the state legislature turned Republican; where the turnout of those who vote late in the day—the more blue collar types—tend to be heavily Democratic, the results defied all previous voting patterns; and I know that was equally true in other states on the West Coast.

Magnuson made a speech when he went down to his headquarters that night. He ended his comments by saying something to the effect that, "I wish my successor well. It's possible that he did me a favor; it remains to be seen whether he did you a favor." I told him afterwards in the car, "You gave the Ph.D. candidates a subject that many of them will have fun with over the next twenty years." And I know in the last six months, that Mr. Magnuson has come to appreciate that line himself, because the things that he is seeing proposed by the Reagan-Stockman administration, the cutbacks in many of the programs, especially in the social, bio-medical research, health programs, early childhood detection programs, oceanography, these were programs that he very much believed in. He was often involved in the authorizing. He was certainly involved in the funding. He believes they are "investments" that we can ill-afford losing, whether it's Public Health Service hospitals, clinics, wellborn child clinics, all of it is something that he was very dedicated to. He'd have been a most unhappy member in the Senate of today; not because he'd have lost some positions of apparent power; not because of Democrat vs. Republican; but because he believes that government can help to make a difference, that it has an obligation to redress grievances and to help make things better for people. He'd have found those views to be in the minority and I doubt he'd have any relish in rearguard attacks upon the Reagan-Stockman proposals to dismantle so many of the programs that Magnuson had a personal hand in putting in place. So in a very personal way, Slade Gorton did do Warren Magnuson a favor last November.
RITCHIE: Well for me this has been an education in the history of the Senate over the years that Magnuson served. Hearing his story has really been a chronicle of the generation he represented from World War II on.

REID: Well, I hope he writes his story, first-person. He spans a remarkable period in our national life, our emergence from a fairly insular country, insular people, America First, and I don't want to put too many bad connotations on that but we did ignore the fact that there were other people on the other side of the Pacific and the Atlantic. We've ignored the fact that there are people south of the border too. But he spans that period when we came out of isolationism, for better or for worse, into a One World. He spans that period when prop planes could only go a few hundred miles to when jets not only can go intercontinental but we can travel intercelestial. He was part of it, and intimately involved in some of the decisions, and was personally acquainted with FDR, Truman, Eisenhower, the Kennedy's, Nixon, Ford, let alone [William] Douglas who served on the Court, and any number of other people, and was somewhat at the center.

Within the institution here he was close to people like the Dick Russells, and the John McCormicks, and the Sam Rayburns, and Carl Alberts, Mike Mansfields, Bob Byrds, as well as the Bill Knowlands, the Ken Wherrys, Bill Jenner, John Bricker, Norris Cotton, Jim Pearson, Milt Young and the Saltonstalls, and so many of the gentlemen on the other side of the aisle. I think Magnuson's friendships, and I think many of them do approach true friendships, within the existing Senate is probably strong, or stronger with a [Howard] Baker or a [Ted] Stevens than it might be with a [Robert] Byrd and a [Alan] Cranston. I'd say that about Baker because Magnuson had a relationship with his father-in-law [Everett Dirksen] that Baker's not unaware of. Of course, with Stevens, part of it is that Stevens served on Commerce as well as Appropriations, and he is from the Northwest. Magnuson has long enjoyed a reputation—at one time he was publicly called the "Third Senator from Alaska." For many years when Alaska was a territory, Magnuson took it upon himself, both as a congressman from the First District of Washington, and then a senator, to be concerned about and try to represent some of the interests that Alaska had back here, that they didn't have anybody who could vote on. He spent time and tried to help them, and did help them, and was appreciated. He's always had a following in Alaska that is well deserved. But it was an extra chore when he was doing it. Of course, some of that spins off with Ted Stevens.

RITCHIE: I've also appreciated your own observations from the point of view of the staff. Your own experiences, I think, have been in many ways unique, working from an elevator operator on up to the chief assistant to probably the most powerful chairman, I would guess the Appropriations Committee chairmen would easily be considered the most influential of all the chairmen.
REID: I've tried never to forget that experience as an elevator operator, because I do think that I came to appreciate the fact that there were people like the cabinetmakers and charpeople that help make it possible for the Senate to operate. They're just as important, I think. It's the sum total. Whether it's a Byrd or a

Magnuson trying to do a job on the floor, if everybody else isn't trying to help to do that job it doesn't work. We've got some great people that are trying to make the whole thing work, I think for good reasons and with very firm dedication.

[End of interview #4]
INDEX

Abortion, 85, 116, 127, 152, 167
Acheson, Dean, 13
Adams, Brock, 142
Albert, Carl, 188
Allott, Gordon (R-CO), 86-87, 163
American Hospital Association, 115
American Medical Association, 57, 113, 115
Anderson, Clinton P. (D-NM), 178
Anderson, Jack, 99
Appropriations Committee (Senate), 17, 23, 25, 48-49, 80-85, 91, 93, 95, 97-98, 124-127, 131-169, 171, 178, 189
Armed Services Committee (Senate), 133, 147, 165

Baker, Howard H., Jr. (R-TN), 188-189
Ballard, Leonard, 27
Barer, Stan, 66, 69, 100
Bartlett, E.L. "Bob" (D-AK), 65
Bayh, Birch (D-IN), 154, 168
Biffle, Leslie (Secretary of the Senate), 14
Bigalow, John, 114
Bone, Homer (D-WA), 45, 48
Borah, William (R-ID), 48
Brewster, Owen (R-ME), 22
Bricker, John (R-OH), 22-23, 77, 158, 188
Brooke, Edward (R-MA), 163, 168
Budget Committee (Senate), 141-142, 153
Bumpers, Dale (D-AR), 163
Byrd, Harry, Sr. (D-VA), 73
Byrd, Robert C. (D-WV), 173, 188-189

Cain, Harry (R-WA), 13, 46
Califano, Joseph, 67, 123
Calloway, Jim, 157-158, 160
Cannon, Clarence, 125
Cannon, Howard (D-NV), 158
Capitol Police, 17-31
Caraway, Lewey, 12
Cardwell, Bruce, 105-106
Carroll Arms, 12, 16
Carter, Jimmy, 117-118, 182, 184-186
Chambers, Letitia, 94
Chiang-Kai-shek, 121
Chiles, Lawton (D-FL), 154
China, 120-121
Christiansen, Richard, 43, 56-59, 129
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 66
Cohn, Roy, 18
Columbia River, 46-48, 53-54
Commerce Committee (Senate), 19, 45, 49-50, 64-67, 69, 71, 73-80, 82-83, 91, 93, 104, 109, 124, 138, 158, 166
Connally, Tom (D-TX), 73
Congressional Budget Office, 150, 153
Consumer Products Safety Commission, 103, 125
Cotton, Norris (R-NH), 65, 188
Cranston, Alan (D-CA), 188
Cuban Missile Crisis, 61

Darling, Dicky, 13, 71
Democratic Caucus, 158, 172-173
Department of Education, 123
Dill, C. C. (D-WA), 60
Dirks, Harley, 94-97, 99-101, 115
Dirksen, Everett (R-IL), 189
Dirksen Senate Office Building, 14, 24, 65, 71-72, 78, 82, 161, 177
Disbursing Office, 153, 159
Domenici, Pete (R-NM), 141
Douglas, William O., 188
Downing, Carl, 74
Downing, Herman, 95
Duke, Joe (Sergeant at Arms), 16, 21

Eagleton, Thomas (D-MO), 154
Eastland, James 0. (D-MS), 17, 66
Eastvold, Don, 129
Education Department, 132
Ehrlichman, John, 86, 91
Eisenhower, Dwight, 56, 188
Eisenhower, Edgar, 56-57
Elevator Operators (Senate Office Building), 12-19, 189
Ellender, Allen (D-LA), 138
Engle, Clair (D-CA), 65
Ewing, Oscar, 57

Farley, James, 60
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 155-156
Federal Communications Commission, 49, 50, 65-66, 110
Federal Trade Commission, 108-109
Finch, Robert, 122
Ford, Gerald R., 188
Garton, Art, 10, 36
General Accounting Office, 132, 154
George, Walter (D-GA), 21
George Washington University, 10, 19-21
Glass, Carter (D-VA), 29
Goldwater, Barry (R-AZ), 128
Gorton, Slade (R-WA), 128-129, 187
Government Operations Committee (Senate), 133
Government Printing Office, 132, 139, 141
Grand Coulee Dam, 60-61
Gray, Don, 154
Gray, Nelly, 85
Griffin, Robert (R-MI), 65
Grinstein, Jerry, 65, 67-69, 77, 100

Haldeman, H.R., 91
Hansen, Julia Butler, 50-51, 58
Harris, Herkie, 117
Hart, Philip (D-MI), 65, 76, 104
Hatfield, Mark (D-OR), 65, 141, 167
Hayden, Carl (D-AZ), 72, 125, 133, 138
Healey, Timothy, 76
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), 99, 105-108, 132
Health, Education and Welfare Subcommittee (Senate Appropriations Committee), 82-83, 93-96, 132, 162, 163
Health and Human Services Department, 132
Hill, Lister (D-AL), 95
Hoeck, Jerry, 33, 59
Hoff, Florence, 33
Hoff, Irv, 19, 33, 46, 64
Hoffmann, Nordy (Sergeant at Arms), 23, 159, 176
Hogness, John, 87, 119
Hollings, Ernest "Fritz" (D-SC), 78, 159-160
Horan, Sally, 37
Horan, Walter, 36-37, 50, 54
House-Senate Relations, 124-127, 133, 142-150
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 84, 154, 162
Hughes, Benjie, 10-11
Hughes, Joseph Leo, 10
Humphrey, Hubert (D-MN), 67
Hunt, H.L., 56
Hyde, Henry, 152, 168

Impacted Aid, 149
Independent Offices Subcommittee (Senate Appropriations Committee), 48-49, 82, 85 87, 95, 132, 163
"Inner Club, 178-179
Inouye, Daniel (D-HI), 65
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 156
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), 49, 93, 108-109

Jackson, Henry "Scoop" (D-WA), 9, 33, 50, 61, 63-64, 73
Jarrett, Eddy, 78
Javits, Jacob (R-NY), 134
Jenner, William (R-IN), 188
Jerue, Rick, 94
Johnson, Lyndon B., 66-67, 86, 117-119, 149
Johnston, Bennett (D-LA), 137
Jordan, William, 97-98
Judiciary Committee (Senate), 17, 45-46, 66

Kefauver, Estes (D-TN), 101
Kelly, Jim, 105-106
Kennedy, Edward M. (D-MA), 23-24, 30, 134
Kennedy, John F., 55, 58, 61-62, 66, 76, 188
Kenney, Jerry, 77
Kerr, Robert (D-OK), 178
Kimmitt, J. Stanley (Secretary of the Senate), 159, 176
Kirwin, Mike, 51
Knowland, William F. (R-CA), 188
Knudson, Harlan, 75
Korologos, Tom, 117

Labor and Human Resources Committee (Senate), 94
Labor Department, 132
Langlie, Arthur, 41-42, 45-46, 56, 58
League of Women Voters, 116
Leahy, Patrick (D-VT), 137
Legislative Subcommittee (Appropriations Committee), 132
Library of Congress, 132
Little, Ted, 33
Lobbying, 84-859 111-119
Long, Russell (D-LA), 57
Longworth, Alice Roosevelt, 22
Lordan, Fred, 46, 64, 94
Lucas, Scott (D-IL), 29

MacArthur, Douglas, 35-36
Magnuson, Don, 42-44, 50-51, 55, 58
Magnuson, Warren (D-WA), 9-11, 14, 18-19, 22, 25, 31-36, 41-43, 45-71, 73-77, 79-83
85-87, 89-95, 97-102, 106-107, 109, 112, 115, 119, 122-123, 125-126, 128-129, 132
136-140, 151, 153-154, 156-160, 162-163, 166, 168-174, 176, 178-179, 184-190
Mahon, George, 124
Mainland, Keith, 124, 127
Majority Leaders, 168, 173
Maleng, Norm, 69
Malstrom, Bob, 159
Matsunaga, Spark (D-HI), 73
May, Catherine, 50
Maybank, Burnet (D-SC), 48
McCarran, Pat (D-NV), 15-17
McCarthy, Jean Kerr, 12, 17
McCarthy, Joseph (R-WI), 17-19, 104
McClellan, John (D-AR), 101, 136-138, 141, 157-158
McCormick, John, 188
McDermott, James, 185
McGown, Neil, 140
McIntyre, James, 117, 161
McKellar, Kenneth (D-TN), 21, 73
McNary, Charles (R-OR), 48
Media, 49-50, 55, 57, 59-60, 61-62, 104, 119, 139, 179-183
Medicare, 75
Michel, Robert, 126
Miller, Charles, 105-106
Minority Staff, 77-78
Monroney, A.S. "Mike, 105
Morton, Thruston (R-KY), 65, 78
Muskie, Edmund (D-ME), 141-142

National Institutes of Health, 87, 108
National Science Board, 86-87
National Science Foundation, 49, 821 86-87, 109
Neil, Henry, 124
Neuberger, Maurine (D-OR), 67
New Orleans Picayune, 32
Nixon, Richard, 55, 56, 58, 59, 62, 76, 86-87, 91, 118-122, 188

Office of Management and Budget, 87, 107, 117-118, 131, 135, 148, 150, 161
O'Neal, Dan, 69
Oversight, 101-111

Pastore, John (D-RI), 65, 78, 104
Patronage, 10, 12, 19, 21-22
Pearson, James (R-KS), 163, 188
Pell, Claiborne (D-RI), 94
Pelligrini, Frank, 64
Pelly, Tom, 50
Pepper, Claude (D-FL), 181
Pertshuck, Mike, 67, 92, 99
President Pro Tempore, 170-175, 184
Pritchard, Joel, 62, 129
Proxmire, William (D-WI), 80, 154, 167
Public Health Service, 108, 187

Ray, Dixie Lee, 185
Rayburn, Sam, 49, 188
Reagan, Ronald, 118-119, 128, 187
Redman, Eric, 84-85
Regulatory Commissions, 108-111
Richardson, Elliot, 106-107
Robertson, Jessie, 100
Rockefeller, Nelson, 56, 129
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 60, 188
Rosellini, Albert, 70
Rules Committee (Senate), 81, 140
Russell, Richard (D-GA), 21, 66, 73, 95, 133, 138, 147, 188
Russell Senate Office Building, 12-14, 18, 24, 71, 82, 156, 161, 171

St. Lawrence Seaway, 76
Saltonstall, Leverett (R-MA), 163, 188
Sasser, James (D-TN), 80, 137, 163
Schickle, Carl, 74
Schine, G. David, 19
Scott, Tom, 155-156
Seattle Star, 32, 33
Seattle Times, 42

Secretary of the Senate, 176
Sergeant-at-Arms (Senate), 16, 21, 23, 159, 176
Sheets, Ed, 84
Smathers, George (D-FL), 181
Social Security, 123
Spong, William (D-VA), 65
Staff, 77-78, 80-85, 89-101, 158-159
Staggers, Harley, 124
Stennis, John (D-MS), 73, 80, 137, 146-147, 163, 165
Stevens, Ted (R-AK), 65, 188
Stevenson, Adlai (D-IL), 65
Stewart, Walter J., 14, 71
Stockman, David, 118, 134, 187
"Sunshine" Laws, 78-80, 138-139, 147
Sutcliffe, Lynn, 69
Symington, Stuart (D-MO), 178

Taft, Robert A., Sr. (R-OH), 13, 73
Thieme, Frederick, 86
Thurmond, Strom (D/R-SC), 66, 77-78
Thye, Edward (R-MN), 13
Time Magazine, 41
Tollefson, Thor, 50
Truman, Harry S., 28-29, 36, 188
Tunney, John (D-CA), 65
Tydings, Joseph (D-MD), 65

University of Washington, 20

Valenti, Jack, 86
Vandenberg, Arthur (R-MI), 73
Veterans' Administration, 49, 83, 85, 108-109
Vietnam War, 128

Walker, Emily, 13
Washington State Legislature, 37-40
Weinberger, Caspar, 99
Westland, Jack, 50
Wherry, Kenneth (R-NB), 188
Whitten, Jamie, 124, 126
Williams, Harrison "Pete" (D-NJ), 94

Yarborough, Ralph (D-TX), 66
Yoris, Ernie, 30
Young, Milton (R-ND), 154, 163, 188

Zapple, Nick, 65, 124