Preface

Patronage dictated all Senate staff appointments in the years before the Second World War. Not only members of each senator's personal staff (then quite small in number), but also committee clerks and messengers, elevator operators, doorkeepers, waiters, barbers, and Capitol police officers mostly owed their appointments to the patronage system. After the war, the Senate underwent modernization when the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 restructured committees and expanded the staff. During the subsequent three decades the number of Senate employees grew from 1,000 to over 6,000, accompanied by an increasing professionalization of the staff. The Senate developed a permanent service force, chosen for individual expertise rather than political loyalty.

One man closely identified with the transformation from patronage to modern, professional staff was Darrell St. Claire, who served the Senate for almost forty years until his retirement on April 1, 1977. As an aide to Arizona's long-time Senator Carl Hayden, St. Claire became secretary to the Democratic Patronage Committee, which dispensed staff positions to majority party members during the New Deal years. Later, as Chief Clerk and Assistant Secretary of the Senate, he became a leader in the movement to install a more professional staff, and took on the responsibilities of personnel management in the office of the Secretary.

Aside from administrative matters, Darrell St. Claire's interests lay in foreign relations. As a new Senate employee in 1933, he attended the London Economic Conference, chiefly to keep an eye on the unpredictable Foreign Relations chairman, Key Pittman. During the war, he served overseas in the Navy before returning to become legislative liaison for the State Department. He later served on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's staff, under chairmen Theodore Green and J. William Fulbright, and for many years was executive secretary for the American delegation to the Interparliamentary Union, bringing members of Congress together with their international counterparts. His role was chiefly that of planner and facilitator, but his efforts helped smooth the way for those directly involved in the policy-making process.

Seated at his desk beyond the swinging doors of the Secretary's office, just off the Senate floor, Darrell St. Claire was well known to Senators and Senate staff. From that vantage he observed and dealt with some of the Senate's most influential and colorful figures, whom he describes in detail in these interviews, along with his own role in the modernization of the United States Senate.

Darrell St. Claire died on April 8, 2011, at the age of 104.
RITCHIE: I think that probably a good way to start off would be to ask you about your background in Arizona and what it was that eventually led you to Washington.

ST. CLAIRE: Well, I was born in the territory of Arizona, in Phoenix, Arizona, and educated in the public schools there, and went to the University of Arizona in 1924. For one year I was an undergraduate student at the University of Missouri, ostensibly to take a journalism course which I ultimately did not get because I did not have the basic requirements that the University required for a journalistic major. I returned to the University of Arizona, where I graduated in 1929. I went on to the Arizona Republic, where I was a cub reporter, police reporter, real estate editor, sports reporter, and did some desk work and other specialized work.

I found myself out of a job because of the declining revenues of that newspaper in June 1932. I had become a friend, however, of a man who had built the first tall building, Valley National Bank, in Phoenix. When Carl Hayden came home with thirty days left to run for renomination in 1932, my friend, knowing I was unemployed, recommended me to Carl Hayden. I was literally taken out of bed, I suppose, by the knock of opportunity, because I was at that time living by myself in my parents' home, my parents being in Long Beach, California, for their summer vacation. I heard this rap on the door; it woke me up, and I walked through the living room just in time to see the former city manager of Phoenix stepping in his car. I said to him, "Do you want to see me?" He said, "Are you Darrell St. Claire?" And I said, "Yes." He said, "Do you have a job?" I said, "No." He said, "Well, I've got one for you, with Carl Hayden."

I went downtown to the Hotel Adams where Hayden was, and he asked me if I were
married, and I told him no. He said, "Those travel fastest who travel alone." He took me on for $25 a week to drive his car, to devise his advertising, to do publicity, and in general, to be his companion in what was to be a fast coverage of the state of Arizona for his renomination and reelection in 1932.

Afterwards he asked me if I were willing to come back to Washington. I said I was, and I've been here ever since. I came on as the bill clerk of the Senate for a time, and then they made me assistant printing clerk, and then I became assistant enrolling clerk. In fact, I'm sitting in the same room where I began in 1933.

RITCHIE: What type of a person was Carl Hayden back then. I'm only familiar with him when he was very elderly.

ST. CLAIRE: He was one of the early youths of Arizona. His father had come to Arizona as a straight-out pioneer in a wagon train that was fired upon in the Chiricahua Mountains by the Apaches, probably under Cochise. Hayden's father came to the Salt River Valley and founded a flour mill that was then known as Hayden's Ferry. The Salt River actually had water in it in those days, and there was enough water for a ferry and also for a ford in times of dry weather.

Later on it was renamed Tempe, after the Vale of Tempe in Greece. It's well known that the names Tempe and Phoenix were selected by an English "remittance man" by the name of Darrell Duppa, who actually was called "Lord" Duppa by local residents. He was something of a saloon character, but he also had a classical education and was called upon to make judgment on many of the saloon bets in Phoenix in the early days. When the time came for the founding of Tempe and Phoenix they called upon him to suggest their names.

Carl Hayden was born in a town that his father had helped found. He grew up there, was quite tall, and very rugged physically. He was reputed to control all of the young "lords" who lived in Tempe, particularly those of Mexican ancestry. One of his forefingers, I think it was the left forefinger, was half missing. It was gone at the knuckle of his finger. You never quite were aware of it, because he was successful in covering it up. He never told anyone how he got this half finger, but it was said that one of the Mexican-American youths had found this dynamite
cap, and Carl Hayden took it away from him, and blew half his finger off picking at it.

He went on from there to Stanford University, where he was a center on the football team. He was in possession of the axe at the time that the Stanford students were jumped by the student body of California and the axe was taken from his arms and afterward disappeared for years. He was always famous for having lost the axe to the University of California; and also, for having lost the student body presidency of Stanford University to Herbert Hoover's brother by one or two votes.

Hayden's father became quite ill while he was at Stanford, and he came home and took over the flour business. From there he went into politics. Before coming to the Congress as our first representative he was sheriff of Maricopa County. There used to be a picture on his apartment wall in Washington showing him in those days. He was a "Marlboro character," very handsome, quite Western in a broad hat. He stood over six feet, was very well liked always made and sought out friends. He never permitted himself the luxury of enemies. If he had any enemies he turned them around to make them his friends. Even political enemies were modest in their pretensions against him. I found him to be kind, and very quick and perceptive about what he did.

He was not particularly a good speaker; in fact he was known for not saying almost anything on the floor. He was what you might call a cloakroom or Senate Office Building Senator insofar as he was able to command response, and get what he wanted by his grin and his arguments. He had a way of dealing with adamant personalities who stood in his way for what he thought was the best for his state and also for the Senate. Certainly, he did a great deal for his state. He also was very good to a great number of people.

I was fortunate, as a young man, since he and his wife had no children of their own, that they practically adopted me when I turned up in Washington, D.C. to go to work for him the first time. There was a very warm relationship between the two of us. I've always been proud that I was able to help him, and more than that, he was able to help me, that he picked me up by the scruff and threw me into the opportunities of Washington.

I would say that as a Senator, you will find that his accomplishments are in the law; they are not in the Congressional Record; they are not in the speeches or addresses to the Senate. They are primarily to be found in the appropriated process of the Senate. His acts pulled this country along and pushed the West, in particular, to the forefront of much of what it thereafter
Hayden saw to the West's largess and development, and as it prospered, so did Arizona.

**RITCHIE:** Did you ever consider working in his office?

**ST. CLAIRE:** I started out in his office, as a matter of fact. I came back with some shorthand ability because Hayden, in the early days, would employ no women secretaries. His secretary, a man, had been a court reporter. There were no administrative assistants then. We were to take his dictation and do all the typing in the office. As I didn't have enough facility in shorthand, he ultimately put me over into the Secretary's office where he had two patronage jobs. I took one of them. I continued to do, however, all of his publicity. In those days it was quite easy because there was no television and only the rudiments of radio. All the publicity amounted to government-paid telegrams sent to the editors of newspapers in the different counties and cities of the state.

He also made me the secretary to the Patronage Committee. The Democrats had taken control of the Senate in 1933 for the first time in many years. In those days practically all the clerical, police, and service jobs were emptied and refilled upon a change in control of the Senate. "Uncle Joe" [Joseph T.] Robinson, the Senator from Arkansas who was the Democratic Leader, went to Carl Hayden and said he wanted Hayden to handle the Democratic patronage. Hayden, in turn, handed it to me. We had a Patronage Committee composed of Carl Hayden, Chairman, and Alben T. Barkley; I can't think of the original third name. Ultimately, it was J. W. Fulbright who became the third one.

It sounds strange these days, but all the police jobs, the elevator jobs, the door jobs, and even my own clerical job were acceded to the Democrats for the purposes of appointment. We took all the available jobs, after deciding those career employees that we wanted to retain. Principal among these were the Chief Clerk, Journal Clerk, Printing and Executive Clerks, Deputy Sergeant at Arms, and the like. The rest
were assigned on a pro rata basis to the Democratic majority Senators. After that we ran it as the circumstances demanded. It did give me an opportunity to become acquainted, as a young man, immediately with a number of Democratic Senators. They were quite interested, those being Depression days, with finding employment for some of their people.

RITCHIE: There weren't that many jobs on Capitol Hill at that time, were there?

ST. CLAIRE: I wouldn't think so. I can't remember what the exact number was, but it doesn't seem to me that there were too many. Shall we say two hundred?

RITCHIE: A Senator's staff was pretty small.

ST. CLAIRE: Yes, in truth, I think that Hayden's staff when I first got there was no more than four or five persons. The secretary, as I recall, was paid a statutory amount of about five thousand dollars. If you were chairman of a committee, however, you got a clerk of that committee who made more than that. You always appointed your top political officer, or top political supporter and political manager in your state to that particular committee function. It was quite common in those days. You didn't go out and solicit around, looking for somebody who would have had competent training to take on the substantive work of that committee.

In fact these committees, I would say that except for the Appropriations Committee, Military Affairs, the Naval Affairs Committee, and the Committee on the Judiciary, almost never met. And those that I'm talking about met for the purposes of passing on nominations, and even then the committee members were polled week after week after week on legislation. They about never went into a committee room. Committee rooms were used primarily by the committee chairman for his in-office and his state-office affairs. It was only the Appropriations Committee, to my knowledge, that held regular full sessions to pass on supply bills.

In those days, when I attended any number of mark-up sessions of the Appropriations Committee, I have seen the chairman wait until one member of the opposite party showed up, and then the two of them would begin to mark up and report out bills in millions of dollars, just on their own. If there was ratification of their options by the full committee, it was
done by proxy, or by polling the committee. It was not uncommon for two or three appropriation bills to pass in an afternoon. You did most all your work, actually, in conference. The other committees almost never met.

After I became clerk of the Foreign Relations Committee I received any number of calls from researchers who wanted to get what records there were of the Key Pittman days on the Foreign Relations Committee, and I told them they didn't exist. We had checked the Archives and found they had nothing. Then one day we pulled away a cabinet from the wall to put in another file and there were the records. They were just a bundle of papers that had fallen down between the wall and the cabinet. All there were

were notes, in the Clerk's handwriting, some poll slips, and proxy statements. That was it. That, essentially, was the way they ran their committees. They did almost everything under the chairman's hat.

RITCHIE: So the chairmen back then were much more powerful than they are today?

ST. CLAIRE: I would think they were, because they had the power to call committee meetings. Today, under the rules, there's much more opportunity for Senate members to assemble the committee for the purposes of legislative matters. In those days, if the chairman wanted to stuff something in his pocket, he did. If he wanted to keep the committee from meeting, he could. Of course, the pressures of the Depression, and afterward the pressures of the oncoming war in Europe, forced committee members and committee chairmen into doing much more legislatively on the floor and in the committees than they had done previously.

RITCHIE: That first year you arrived must have been a particularly hectic one.

ST. CLAIRE: It's a strange thing, I think they call it "One Hundred Days" but at the time it didn't seem to be too crucial; it didn't seem to be much of a crisis period. I can recall that for many many weeks in that "Hundred Days" we adjourned from Thursday to Monday, notwithstanding the condition of the country. I stood outside the Capitol steps when Roosevelt made his Inaugural Address, and watched him as he came down the ramp off the speaker's platform into his car. We went back into the Senate, where Joe Byrnes and Joe T. Robinson and some of the others were rather vocal about getting things done. But, as time went on and more
and more of the Roosevelt legislation came up or was initiated in Congress, it seems to me that it was accepted without much discussion. There was a common, silent consent that something had to be done quickly, and the best way to do it was to follow the leader.

You must remember that they didn't speak as long as they do now, they didn't read as many speeches. They didn't have

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nearly the preponderance and volume of amendments, or amendatory legislation as is suggested on the floor these days. They put much more faith in their leadership, much more faith in their committee chairmen, if the committee chairmen could be enticed to come forward and take the leadership as in the early days of Roosevelt.

Until the last war it was almost impossible to get a yea and nay vote, notwithstanding the constitutional provisions for a show of hands, unless the leader put up his arm. If he didn't, you didn't. Further than that, they decided many votes in those days, which they don't now, by voice votes and divisions.

A close voice vote usually resulted in a call for a division. And a close division could result in a yea and nay vote. But it was the leaders who called for the yeas and nays, who first raised their arms on the demand, not the Senators at large. If you were a Senator you looked over to see your leader's arm, generally, before you raised yours.

There was not, in any sense, the questioning in debate or the amendatory process which is so prevalent today on the floor. It was uncommon to amend an appropriation measure from the floor. The Appropriations Committee had spoken, and that was it. If any other committee reported something, as the Commerce Committee perhaps, that really was it.

RITCHIE: I've been reading about Joseph Robinson. Many writers credit him with being one of the strongest majority leaders in this century.

ST. CLAIRE: He was one of the greatest men I think I ever saw. He was a tremendous, commanding person, with a terrifying, open-air voice. He could visibly shake the chamber when he wanted to. He seldom spoke, but when he did he spoke vigorously. He never used a note, never used a paper. He had a Scotch temper that would brook almost no opposition. He was a Senator, as leaders in those days did, who sat afternoon after afternoon on the floor, waiting, cajoling, counseling, not saying a great deal, but just by his very presence commanding people to
keep still and get on with it.

His one anathema was Huey Long. He bore him grudgingly. In his final year, Long had to make an hour speech every day to the galleries. It was a very good speech, a convincing speech, but it was the same speech. It would have had its affect on the 1936 election, I'm confident, if Long had survived the assassination. But after a while, Joe T. Robinson could not abide the man. Long was, in return, sour and bitter about the Roosevelt administration, which of course was his personal enemy.

I don't know what they were quarreling about, but one afternoon Long was seated on the far seat, front row, closest to the door. ([Thomas L.] Blanton of Texas said he always wanted to be closest to the door in the House if anyone threw a bomb.) Robinson, of course, occupied the front desk on the middle aisle. Robinson rose to denounce Huey Long and the entire row between Robinson and Long was vacant. I can see Joe Robinson now going all the way down that empty row to Long, talking at the top of his voice about Huey Long,

and putting his fist under Long's face as he stood over him. It was a dramatic bit, to stand over somebody and look down at him and lecture to him vigorously within inches. Robinson was shaking his fist under Long's chin, roaring out his words. Long, seated, looked meanwhile, at the ceiling as if he heard nothing, as if he had no idea anyone was anywhere around. But Long was that way. He was a professional.

RITCHIE: Was Long just a clown, or was there anything more to him?

ST. CLAIRE: No, no. He was probably one of the most extraordinary minds that was ever on the floor. A man who could speak almost on anything after a minimum of preparation, because he had an extraordinarily receptive and retentive mind. Who also could speak to the horizon, you could hear him anywhere in the chamber. He spoke rapidly, almost without gesture, using what I would say was the vernacular of the South, but in perfect grammatical form. His sentences, I was told, always parsed. He never said anything that wasn't connected, wasn't argumentatively sound.
In fact, he seemed to be a joy to [Arthur H.] Vandenberg, who to my mind was someone who never spoke a cliché in his life. He had been a writer and as a consequence, he had great respect for the English language. Vandenberg understood descriptive phrases, descriptive expressions. Vandenberg, when Long was speaking, would sit there listening to him with a grin on his face, because he knew he was listening to a master of English. Certainly American. He said as much at the time. This man Long was a great orator. You remember also that he lived at the same time as other great orators, Churchill, Hitler, Roosevelt. He was a fine lawyer and not a clown.

He probably had no respect for politics. Essentially, he might have thought that politics was a profession, but he didn't practice it as a profession, but more or less as a way of life, a day to day occupation, and as something that had no meaning beyond what could be done expertly and cleverly. In those days there was a recess in the wall of the Senate, which has now been covered by a false wall, where he kept a Biblical Concordance or a Shakespearean Concordance by his desk. If he got into an argument, or sensed one, he would turn to the Concordance immediately to look up something, and then throw a Biblical phrase or a Shakespearean phrase into the debate.

The only man who could probably do anything to him was J. Hamilton Lewis. Very few could ever understand what J. Hamilton Lewis was talking about anyway. He was a man who just kept talking, quietly, rather disconnectedly, because I think he felt that if he kept on saying something people would think he was saying something, when in actual fact, all he was doing was reaching for words. Long found him to be quite a delight, because Ham would stand up and point to Long with his gloved fingers and lecture the Senator from Louisiana on his manners. If Long actually enjoyed Ham Lewis, most of the others he had very little respect for. He might have been afraid of some of them, but I doubt very much that he had any respect for them.

If he had stayed in the profession of law he would have been probably one of the finest trial lawyers, possibly even one of the finest trial judges that ever lived in the United States. He sensed power that came to him as a young man when he was able to convince housewives of his goods, of people in the street of his purposes, and the voters of his promises. Early in his life he developed what in the old days of his salesmanship would be called the "gift of gab" that made him an attractive personality. Out of that his political personality grew, but he remained essentially a hawker.
Probably the finest modern political work in the United States, to my mind, is his *Every Man a King*. I have talked to some senators about that, and I find that most of them have read it. It's an extraordinary textbook on what you might call Bayou politics. It's good, it's funny, and it's all Long.

**RITCHIE**: Was he in any way effective as a senator, or was he outside the pale?

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**ST. CLAIRE**: No, he was not effective as a Senator. In fact he didn't want the responsibilities that would come with committee membership. He gave up, in the latter part of his career, his committee memberships, because he said they were useless, but I think they were of no value to him. I had a friend who used to watch him when he went into the Committee on the Judiciary, which is now part of the Appropriations Committee rooms. This friend of mine was the clerk of the Judiciary Committee. He told me that Long very seldom participated in any of the Judiciary hearings, or in any of the committee work. He simply sat there and looked at the cupids on the ceiling, one after another. He'd look at one cupid, then he'd look at another cupid, of course, he was thinking all of that time.

He had a different drum. He was not a working Senator, he was a speaking Senator, he was a state-side Senator. He did not, to my mind, ever argue too much in depth. He had a favorite political maneuver, which I think someone later described: When you're attacked at home, respond nationally; when you're attacked on the national plane, counter with home affairs. I noticed that if he were challenged on any of his facts, while on arguing national affairs with his colleagues he would often say, "Well, I don't know how it is here in Washington, but in New Orleans . . .", and go on from there. Of course, he had an extraordinary command of Louisiana politics and Louisiana politicians and personalities.

His addresses and public appearances were all pitched on a very competent plane to a particular auditor or particular people with certain convictions, principally those who had suffered childhood privation, or who had not gathered too much after attaining adulthood. What you might call the lower middle class, and even those above them. Of course, I realize that that's snobbery. But he knew where his consensus lay, where his power was, and he knew where his responses would be. It was in those people, and those were the tourists who would come to the galleries every day, to look on the Senate. In them Long had a new
audience every day for his speech, "Every Man a King," which, as we know, generally proposed the redistribution of wealth in the United States. It was an extraordinary speech. It varied in some measure, but it was essentially the same speech day after day. It's well worth reading now, because it shows you what a man of his persuasion, his competency, his talents, could possibly do in the open honest forum of American politics. And he almost got away with it, almost.

RITCHIE: One of the people he seems to have befriended in the chamber was Hattie Caraway; that seems like a very unlikely combination.

ST. CLAIRE: Well, it was unlikely to the point that he was able to club Joe T. Robinson over her head. He was able to club Robinson with Hattie Caraway by going into Arkansas and insuring her election there against the political powers of the state of Arkansas, who were of course headed up by Robinson. There was more to it than that, but we at the time also thought that what he was trying to do was expand his regency from Louisiana into adjoining Southern states. Arkansas was the first. I believe he also told Pat Harrison of Mississippi that he was going into Mississippi, an adjoining state, and defeat him. He threatened Josiah Bailey of North Carolina, politically. Bailey had opposed and lectured him on the floor. I feel Long wanted to build himself into a political power by transmutation of his oratory to the Southern states. I doubt very much if that procedure would have succeeded anywhere further up. But he was successful as far as he went.

Another thing is, and this is an assumption, the Democrats were split in Arkansas at the time, and [Thaddeus] Caraway had been quite a dominitive Senator himself. Mrs. Caraway may have represented a compromise such as sometimes is not uncommon, of picking women while the local politicians meet again to decide who they are actually going to back while they let her hold the interim office. But she was a near loss. She dressed in black, actually read newspapers at her desk, seldom spoke, and voted invariably with Huey Long.

I can't say the same thing for Rose Long, Long's widow who succeeded him. She was a delightful character, a fine woman. She was not at all like Mrs. Caraway, and I might also say
not at all like any other woman Senator since. She was a good woman, who did her job while she held her office. She was the one that saw that sign on the Senators' restroom, "Senators Only," and started to walk in, thinking that was another place, or so it was said.

RITCHIE: I guess they didn't have to make any distinction at that time.

ST. CLAIRE: No. There was one other woman before Hattie Caraway.

RITCHIE: Just Rebecca Felton, who only served for two days.

ST. CLAIRE: Yes, and I believe you will find that Senator Walter George stood aside so that she could get that honor. But I believe Mrs. Caraway was the first elected one.

RITCHIE: You mentioned earlier Key Pittman, who also seems like a fascinating figure in that period.

ST. CLAIRE: Yes, he was something of a rogue. He came out of Alaska and Nevada and would make a speech about silver if you dropped a quarter at his feet. It was possible for him to speak on almost no other subject except mining and the price of silver, on ferrous and non-ferrous metals. You can well understand why, because in those days, before they discovered easy divorce and the slot machines out there, there had been nothing in the way of taxable resources except railroads and mines, which was about true of Arizona. He became chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, later.

He attended the London Economic Conference in the summer of 1933, which was ultimately broken up over the irreconcilable nationalist economies of the world at that time, and I think also over the devaluation of the British pound. Mr. Pittman liked his drink, and we were not at sea beyond the three-mile limit before he asked for an Old-Fashion. I was on the staff on the United States delegation. We were in the lounge at the bar, and we were sailing at noon. Being a child of Prohibition, I had never seen an Old-Fashion, didn't know what they were. He continued to drink them from
there on, for eight days across the Atlantic. We practically took him off the ship in a halter.

He had one speech and he was going to make it on silver, and they kept saying, "Don't let him get to that conference." It was a very staid conference, with all the heads of Europe of that time in attendance. On the last day, as the conference was winding down, I'm told that the back doors of that conference hall sprung open. It was Key Pittman, arms spread, on unsteady feet, standing there, wanting to come in and make his speech. And he made it. We never saw him again on the way back.

It was too bad, because he could do very well, either drinking or not drinking, in his speeches. He was extraordinarily gifted and loved people. In 1932, his colleague was a Republican (Tasker Oddie), and Pat McCarran ran against him. Hayden happened to run into Key Pittman one afternoon and said, "How's that election going to go in Nevada?" Pittman said, "Oh, this McCarran, he's just a mean Irishman. Everybody dislikes him. He hasn't got a chance." Today, McCarran's in the Hall of Fame. Oddie is gone. But Mr. Pittman's assessment of Mr. McCarran was absolutely correct. He was a mean Irishman.

RITCHIE: A pretty tough character.

ST. CLAIRE: Very tough, almost self-indulgent in his ruthless attitude towards others. I was working in the State Department and McCarran's office called me to come over. The war had ended, and the descendants of one of the silver fortunes of Nevada were at that time locked in Prussia. This daughter's mother had gone over to Germany and married into the Junker aristocracy. The granddaughter, born in Germany and a German citizen, of this family somehow got to McCarran's office, utilizing contacts that went back to the Nevada silver fortune. She could guarantee that they could get to Hamburg, then under British control. But the British would not admit them or pass them through into Norway or Sweden unless the United States embassy in Oslo or Stockholm would guarantee visas to their German passports into the United States and ultimately I guess to Nevada.

I worked on the case for weeks. Ultimately, I could get nowhere with it within the State Department (I was liaison for the State Department with the Hill at that time) until I walked into one office. There was this friendly foreign service officer sitting there, to my complaints, he offered: "Well, can't you draft a telegram instructing our embassy in Norway (or Sweden) to give
them the visas, and send a copy of it to our consulate in Hamburg?" I said, "Yes, I can draft if, but it needs the Secretary's authority." He responded, "All departmental telegrams carry the name of the Secretary at the bottom. Draft it, and if it goes out, you are his authority." He was an old hand. The telegram went out. The family got to the United States.

Five days later, I was showed a letter from McCarran about another matter, to [George] Marshall, who was then the Secretary of State. In two lines it abused Marshall as no man could be abused because he had not assented to what McCarran wanted him to do in another matter. I took that letter back to the gal in his office and

said, "For crying out loud, what are you doing to this man? Here he got these Germans out of Germany for you and five days later he's sending this kind of a letter:" She said, "Well, you just don't know how he is." That was the way it was from there on. To this day I know nothing of him that justifies where he stands today, in the Statuary Hall.

RITCHIE: In his judicial robes.

ST. CLAIRE: As a matter of fact, he would have been defeated for public office had he not died in the middle of his last campaign. He was on his way to defeat when he had a fatal heart attack. That's true, and everybody admitted it. He was about to lose not only the election but the nomination of his party.

RITCHIE: The Senate in the 1930's seems to have had a lot more showmen than it does now.

ST. CLAIRE: Well, yes, those men came from a different background. Chiefly from law, I suppose, from trial practice. They were young lawyers who became very good at thinking on their feet, being quite clever, who more often than not fashioned themselves in the image of other politicians who had

preceded them, many of whom came out of the Civil War. They had a different type of education, classical education, and read law rather than studied law to get their license to practice law. They literally climbed the ladder of politics to get into the Senate of the United States, rather than making it in one fell swoop from the presidency of a university, shall we say.
They had been county attorneys, members of their legislature, Representatives, they had honed themselves over in the House, where politics was rough and vigorous and quick. You start out under [Thomas B.] Reed and go right on through to Champ Clark and read the House proceedings and you'll find some of the best debate, I think, that has ever been made on the floor. They had men like [Thomas T.] Connally and Barkley as Representatives before they graduated to the Senate. They had to be clever, they had to have humor and be resilient, sometimes impractical, and sometimes even unconstructive, in order to get where they were. But when they got there, they were a joy:

[Everett] Dirksen, Barkley, Henry Ashurst, Connally, Jim Reed of Missouri, Pat Harrison of Mississippi, Huey Long.

The only person you could actually compare them to today is Hubert Humphrey. Hubert Humphrey can walk in front of an audience of 1,500 or 2,000 or 5,000 people and start talking about Hubert Humphrey, take them off and charm them, and do it for 15 or 20 minutes, or an hour, make a marvelous speech, and do it right out of hand. And these men could do it all in those days. They never read anything that was written for them, they didn't have to. They were totally brought up on another bias all together. But they wouldn't last much today, because they would have to come up with facts, with research, with depth.

When you take a man like Henry Fountain Ashurst, my favorite Senator from Arizona, who received ten letters a day, maybe ten a week, in the 1930's, even during the Depression, you can see what they had time for. They had time to fashion their skills to the point where they could go out and take on audiences and bring the audiences up to them. And with that, of course, support and votes. Today those speeches would be rejected. They would say the man was quaint. Nothing would come of it. This is why there has been no Dirksen since Dirksen. There is going to be no [John] Pastore soon.

RITCHIE: What was it that made Ashurst your favorite Senator?

ST. CLAIRE: I suppose he was the best stand-up conversationalist the Senate has ever had. He made a profession of it. He liked to stand and talk to people, get them into small knots and entertain them with one story after another, about himself, about Arizona, about territorial days. Also he would bring in other references, and thoughts, he had gained through reading.
He'd been a young cowboy, bright, who was picked up by the widow of a man who'd
gone to Arizona to die of tuberculosis. She had some money, and some downtown Washington,
D.C. property, as I recall, now in the vicinity of the Statler Hotel. Her husband had been the head
of a top employee of the Weather Service. He died in Arizona and she picked up Ashurst. She was older
than he. She was a real Irish biddy. She didn't stand more than five feet. She was peppy and
bright. She sent him off to the University of Michigan, made him get an education, and then
pushed him into politics.

He was always known as a show orator, a flowery user of speech. He made a habit of
acquiring two or three new words a day and if they were more or less exotic he would use them
in his next speech. More than that, he could talk to people, and to other Senators, and bring in
reference after reference out of the classics, out of American history, out of the Encyclopedia
Britannica, giving it an overlay of his experience and personality, and put it out with the
brilliance of an Arizona sunset. In fact, that was one of his great ploys, when he failed of
anything else he would describe an Arizona sunset.

Everyone knew he was probably pretty much two-dimensional. He was something of a
political fraud, they knew this, but he

was a charming man, and he was a charming fraud. He sat in the back end of an automobile
coming out of Prescott at two one morning, when I was driving Hayden down from Prescott to
Phoenix (in those days it took that much time), and he never stopped talking about early Arizona
characters. He knew them, and he was one of them. When Ashurst talked you heard every word
he said, you never missed anything.

But, again, he was lazy, and he didn't look after Arizona too often. When his little wife
died, he lost much of his initiative. He stayed back here working for "his people and his state" as
he said in his election year, rather than go home and campaign. I sometimes wonder if it wasn't
suicidal, and knew damn well it was suicidal, staying back here. I wonder if he really wanted the
job. But the fact that no one had seen much of him back there, and that they'd had a bad drought
in the state that year, helped defeat him. He was defeated by a man who had conned the state
year after year as a county judge, and had laid a great ground-work of support to run against
Ashurst.
Ashurst never forgave him for it. That man was E. (Ernest) W. McFarland, who ultimately became Democratic leader for two years.

When Ashurst finally decided to go back to Arizona and speak for the national ticket, people said, "I didn't know he could speak that well. If I'd known that he could speak that well I would have voted for him. I had no idea who he was." There was a transposition in the history of the state and we had gotten a lot of immigration. Essentially this is what happened to Hayden. Too many people came into the state for him to master. Where your population explodes through immigration it has no sense of state history, or territorial tradition. As a newcomer, you have no bond with the state except for the fact that you arrived two days ago, and you registered on the third.

RITCHIE: You worked during this period mostly in the Secretary's Office, as enrolling clerk.

ST. CLAIRE: Yes, I suppose during most of this period I was assistant enrolling clerk, and assistant journal clerk. Then the enrolling clerk died one night in a Union Station hotel and the Secretary called me down. The Secretary said, "I want you to be the enrolling clerk." I was the enrolling clerk when I left to go in the Navy during the war. I guess I was in the Secretary's office during most of this period of time, but in those days we had quite a bit of opportunity for observation on the floor. It wasn't anything for us to spend two or three hours just listening.

Senators gave the floor a good deal more of their attendance, as did the Vice President in the 1930's. And the cloakrooms were full of Senators, lying on the couches they had in there, smoking cigars, telling stories. If there was a vote they would come out. Then they gave more attention and time, to the floor. There wasn't the committee pressures, the social pressures, the political pressures they have now.

By in large, when you shape a current-day Senator up against the man who represented his state in the 1930's and '40's, the current one comes off very well indeed.

In fact, he comes off much better in nearly all instances. It's only the few greats, like Joe T.
Robinson, Robert La Follette, Hiram Johnson, Pat Harrison, George Norris, and Huey Long that you remember. They were stand-outs. You have to remember there were many other Senators with no great prominence. Many of them who came in with Roosevelt's sweep of 1936 would turn your hair white if you had them in there today. I don't know whether they were political accidents, but they were there simply because they happened to get the Democratic nomination. And they routed from office a number of fine Republican Senators.

RITCHIE: Some historians have made a distinction between the old "Sons of the Wild Jackass," independent, progressive types, who were in there from the 1920's on, and the New Deal types who were elected in 1934 and 1936, who weren't as independent as the old school.

ST. CLAIRE: Well, the "Sons of the Wild Jackass" turned out to be rather conservative by the time that the first Roosevelt sweep took effect, and certainly after the '34 and '36 elections.

[William E.] Borah, for instance, became extraordinarily conservative, where up until 1928, '29, '30, he had enjoyed the insulated position in his party as an obstructionist, and one of the irreconcilables. He and his friends, I think, delayed the organization of the Senators for weeks in 1929, by withholding their votes from the majority side. He enjoyed that type of obstructionism because it gave him identification.

He was also a very vain and proud man, a man who had early in his life learned to speak in fine, declarative sentences, who prepared his speeches with a good deal of care, so that he got a good deal more press attention than he otherwise would. Newspaper men, because of his clarity, would attend his speakings, whenever they could. As a man, himself, there were several stories about him. They opened up his bank box after his death and found $75,000 in cash in it, or something like that amount. All his widow could say was, "I didn't know he had it." Where did he get it? They thought that he couldn't possibly have saved that from his salary, and in those days you were only making 8,000 or 10,000 dollars and were spending it all on expenses.

But these men were individuals and individualistic, and I think there was a reason for it: they could prepare themselves for a certain individualism by being quite clever and being exceptionally fine speakers, in a popular way. They weren't required to do homework or research, or have research staffs, to have briefings or the analysis that they need today to attack
this institutionalized government of ours, which is totally out of control anyway.

RITCHIE: One Senator who interests me in the 1930's was Harry Truman, who seems to have emerged very slowly from the pack and not very noticeable at first. In fact, he seemed like an appendage to Burton Wheeler in the beginning.

ST. CLAIRE: Well, could have been. Harry Truman was not a very distinguished Senator until he took up that war investigation. Up until that time he was known chiefly for his friends on the floor. He was a friendly man who was liked by everyone, but he had done nothing of particular merit to distinguish himself from the pack of Senators. However, when he did take hold of the War Investigating Committee, it seems to me, he grew and demonstrated his worth to the country and to himself. He turned out to be a vigorous President. He's now part of the cult, the Truman cult. He may well deserve it, or it may be a cult that will die out like other cults die out when more history intervenes.

RITCHIE: I thought it was interesting that when he became President, the first person he called was Leslie Biffle.

ST. CLAIRE: Yes, and yet they ended up, I think, somewhat in different corners. I was told, though I don't know whether this is true or not, that Biffle used Truman, Truman's name, and Truman's friendship. He used it to help out Les Biffle. I remember talking to Senator William Benton one night, when we were going home. I told Benton, who agreed, that Biffle enjoyed political power because he never had to use it. You assumed that Biffle had a great deal of prestige and authority within the Truman Administration and within the Democratic Administration. And yet, I wonder. I knew Les, I was a close friend of his, and I just wonder whether he had the influence we thought he had. The Democrats would not return him to the Secretary's Office in 1955, when he wanted to come back. Again I say I was told ultimately that he and Truman ended up in different corners. There used to be a line to the White House on Biffle's desk, and I heard it was taken out by Truman. What the cause was I'll never know.

He had power he wanted you to assume he had, and as a consequence you thought,
though you really never knew, that he might have done something for you in a political way, that
he might have propitiated your purposes. He was very good at creating hope and optimism and
extending it to you, with the feeling that everything is going to turn out all right. Eventually,
when he left, he didn't leave a vacuum, because he had spatial or real.

You've got to remember, too, that this was the days before the federal election laws. We
had what we called, and still call, Senatorial Campaign Committees. Their records were
variously kept, or not. Somebody who was a multi-millionaire would come in and give you
$20,000 for the boys in the next election. You put it in the safe that was always in the Secretary's
office (in those days there was a safe in the Secretary's office). The contributor didn't know
whether you put in $10,000 or $20,000 in that safe. He had no way of knowing it. But if he came
back with a request, it was up to me to produce: "I'll have some senators together for lunch
tomorrow and you can tell them what you want." That's the way it was done. Not now, nor has it
been that way in recent times, but in early days the Secretary of the Senate, for that very reason,
because of his dependence upon the senatorial futures and successes of his colleagues, was im-
portant to them.

Senator Hayden would get a wire from Les Biffle, or from (Edwin) Halsey, saying
"Forwarding $5,000, congratulations on your nomination." The $5,000 was to be used for
Hayden's election campaign. I saw Hayden turn his check over and endorse it to the Democratic
committee of the State of Arizona. He didn't want the money. He was great about the way he got
rid of it; he could say that he never used it. No more.

RITCHIE: What type of a person was Colonel Halsey?

ST. CLAIRE: He had been a page, and superintendent of the press gallery, and had been
the first minority secretary when those two positions of majority and minority secretaries were
created. Of course he stepped from that into the Secretary's office. He was a man who was very
good to me, really promoted me into two Democratic conventions and helped me along, quite
well. He died while I was in the Navy. But extraordinarily vain, terribly vain. He had a son
whom he worshipped who was tragically killed in an automobile accident some years ago. He
had a wife
who was as broad as that cabinet over there, a lovely woman who came from a marvelous Virginia family. She happened to adore ice cream.

Halsey was an easy man to counsel because he did not have too much education, but he knew how to establish his personality, and his presence, so you knew that he was there. He would go in on the floor and walk up to a senator and say, "Here, have you seen this today?" It would be something that that senator was interested in. He just played these senators like a harpsicord. He could have stayed in bed all day long, never coming to the office, and sometimes he did. As a matter of fact, sometimes he showed up at five minutes to twelve, to sign enrolled bills for the House message. In those days I was the Senate messenger to the House, and would take off on a dead run to get the message in. I guess he was lazy, but adroit, and a product of his times. He couldn't exist today.

**RITCHIE:** Did the Secretaries then have anything to do with legislation?

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**ST. CLAIRE:** No, none. They kept the "well", which of course, we still keep. If you want a drink you go in there and get a drink. They staged luncheons at which legislation might have been discussed and some programming might have occurred. In the early days, actually, the Secretary was the source into the Senate, the communication line for the Executive. There was a direct line from the White House into the Secretary's office. In fact, it might even exist today, I don't know. But it was used much more in those days. There was a phone booth in S-221 on which you could get the White House operator, and the President was nearly always available for the call. This was before instant radio.

**RITCHIE:** It seems like New Deal support in the Senate fell apart after 1937 with the Court Packing controversy. That must have come as quite an explosion.

**ST. CLAIRE:** It did. It's rather a shame because I would have thought that even in cursory readings of the Supreme Court’s decisions after the election in 1936, Roosevelt would have realized that these old men, who had opposed him, were turning around. I think they were. As Mr. Dooley said, the Supreme Court follows the election returns. I think that's what
they were doing. But Roosevelt was never known for his lack of confidence, and when he sent
the court bill down it did fracture the New Deal coalition.

It betrayed a number of his friends, who had to defend it, like M. (Marvel) M. Logan of
Kentucky, who was one of the top men on the Judiciary Committee. The day it arrived, Logan
was baited like a badger on the Senate floor. I can see him yet, twisting and turning, fighting off
one man after another, because the chamber had filled with senators who had come to talk about
it. Joe T. (Robinson) was called upon to defend it. It may have hastened his death. Certainly, his
death denied him a post on the Court. For two or three days he was in high anger about this move
of Roosevelt's and yet he felt compelled as the leader to defend it.

The last day, or maybe the next to the last day he was on the floor, after he finished a
speech, when he also had been baited, he sat down. His face was quite red. He had been on a
strict diet for several months. Robinson pulled a cigar from his pocket, bit the end off, and started
to light it, sitting in the chamber, until a senator reminded him about smoking on the floor. He'd
forgotten. People said that's when he started back. Within a short time they found him dead in his
apartment.

Roosevelt could not possibly have survived the court bill if it had not been for the
outbreak of war. He would have been denied a third term. By then (James A.) Farley had gone
against him, and (John N.) Garner had gone against him, and Carter Glass had decided that he
was going to nominate Farley. Garner really wanted it. Garner was one of the boys who met
afternoons in his formal office during the '30's. You could hear laughter all the way into the
Senate chamber. This was in the age before air-conditioning

They had opened windows, and the whiskey vapor would come flowing into the chamber from
the formal office, along with the laughter. Garner eventually emerged, red-faced, ready to
adjourn the Senate almost by himself. Garner wanted the nomination. He stopped drinking,
cleaned himself up, bought himself some expensive suits. I would go into the Marble Room in
the morning to pick up a paper and Garner would already be there, from dawn practically,
moving and walking up and down that Marble Room, thinking and walking. You could just see
what was on his mind: he was doing his damndest to see how he could plan and plot to get the
nomination.

When they were attacking Huey Long, you also could go in the Marble Room to find
Long in the morning, reading the *Washington Post* or the other local papers opposing him. He
always looked up with a smile. On Long's last night on the floor, he was opposing some bill that had the backing of labor. (Lewis B.) Schwellenbach of Washington, a great labor leader and labor senator, was trying to force it through, and Huey was conducting a one-man filibuster against it, for reasons I don't know. The more they asked him to yield for the purposes of doing something popular or in the public interest, the more stubborn he got. Schwellenbach kept asking him to yield, "Is not the Senator aware that by his opposition, etc.?"

Finally, old Joe T. Robinson got up and asked for immediate unanimous consent for consideration of adjournment resolution that provided that when the hour of twelve had arrived that the Senate would thereby adjourn sine die. Long allowed the request, not quite realizing, I think, what he was doing. Robinson walked out into the Marble Room, where I heard him saying, "Now I've got the son-of-a-bitch where I want him: He's got to shut up and pass this thing or he's going to adjourn the Senate at twelve o'clock." And Huey adjourned the Senate at twelve o'clock. He was gaveled down, though the Record doesn't show it.

With that, Long picked up two of his aides and walked out through the door and along the rear corridor, as fast as he could. He always walked fast, maybe because he was afraid of strangers, and well he might have been. If you talk about people being threatened, he was threatened. As he walked out, everybody was relaxed and standing around looking at each other. Outside the Senate wing an auto backfired, and somebody said, "I wonder if he's been shot." He went home and shortly afterward he was shot.

That was a dramatic time. I have that part of the Record that was taken out of the Record by Long and by Bennett Champ Clark, an exchange they had on the floor of the Senate one afternoon when Bennett came in about four o'clock, showing no pain, got mad at Long and they started abusing each other. It's all there. The next day they took it out, but I'll bring it in and let you have it. I doubt if there's any record of it left anywhere else. I found it in the basement.

RITCHIE: That's great. I imagine that there are a lot of interesting stories that don't make it into the Record.

ST. CLAIRE: That's true.
ST. CLAIRE: I am a member of the Phoenix Historical Society. They sent me a publication last week, and in it is a page on Hayden, and a sketch of that photograph that I referred to last time. It's not a very good sketch, but it does show him more or less when he was a younger man. I put it away and when I get back I will send it to you and you can make it part of the archives. They mentioned one activity of his as the sheriff of Maricopa County. It was the train robbery or hold-up of the Maricopa Junction to Phoenix shuttle train. In those days, the Southern Pacific Main line did not run through Phoenix, Arizona. It was some thirty miles south, from which stage lines used to get from the main line of the Southern Pacific into Phoenix. This publication will identify the two brothers who headed up the bank of train robbers. It was a celebrated case.

The way Hayden told it to me was that they had staked their horses in an arroyo or mesquite area several miles out of Maricopa, and got on the train at Maricopa and started toward Phoenix, and when they neared where their horses had been staked they stopped the train and went through the coaches and held up the passengers. Having pocketed what they could they sped the train on its way. When the train arrived, of course, there was an instant sensation all over Phoenix that these main line passengers, and many local citizens had their watches and other valuables and cash taken.

Since it was a Maricopa County robbery, Hayden immediately organized a posse. He asked the Southern Pacific Railroad to furnish him with a flatcar and he put two automobiles on the flat-car, I guess they were vehicles called the "Brush." He organized this armed group and started off from Maricopa. They had made up a special train for the flatcar and the posse, and they stopped where they found the horses had been staked out and immediately started on the trail. The trail went around Maricopa and beyond heading toward the Mexican border, but particularly toward the mining camp that was just getting under way called Ajo, which is still in existence today and still is quite a copper mining operation. They took the cars off the flatcar at Maricopa Junction and started down the main road, for what it was, in those days it was just a track through the desert.

The train robbers had stopped somewhere where there was water. They saw the cloud, as
you can on the desert, the dust clouds of the approaching cars. They put their horses away and came out thinking that what they were going to do was to stop someone who was heading out of Maricopa County into Ajo, some mining executives, or some of the mining operators, and it was their purpose to hold them up and take their cars and speed further on and faster towards the Sonora border. When they came in view, here was the posse sitting in the automobiles, with shotguns on their elbows.

Hayden immediately stopped the car, and put them under cover with the shotgun or rifle or Remington or whatever it was he had, and told them to get their hands up. One of them had a Deringer or some small pistol in his pocket, and instead of putting up his hands, Hayden told me, he started to put his hand down into his pocket. With that, the Arizona Librarian, an old man by the name of Con Cronin, who had been a railroad telegrapher before he became State Historian by law of the State, who was quite an intelligent man and he was my next door neighbor when I was a kid, got quite excited and started to draw back on this man.

Hayden said, "Now wait a minute Con, wait a minute, he's going to get his hands up, that's all right." So they finally got their hands up, the posse put them back into the automobiles, and got the horses and brought them back to Maricopa, where the special train was, and brought them into Phoenix.

By that time, I suppose, they had restored the telegraph wire between Maricopa and Phoenix, which of course, had been cut by the bandits, and the whole town came down to see the robbers brought in on the special train. A great story developed out of it and years later when I came back here after he had told something of the small detail of it, I went to the Library of Congress and found the newspaper articles and had them Photo-statted and gave them to him. He had never had them in his possession. But out of that one incident, and of course, his popularity around Phoenix, and the fact that he had been, once if not actually twice, to a Democratic convention as an Arizona Territorial delegate; he decided he would run for House Representative, Arizona just having come into statehood. He came home and told Mrs. Hayden, Nan Hayden, his wife, that he was going to run for Congress, and her immediate remark was, "You've certainly got your nerve."

He had two opponents. One of them I can remember was Mulford Windsor, who was I think Secretary of State in the
Territory days, but in any event was a very prominent Democratic politician. I can't remember the name of the second one. Hayden carried the central part of the Territory and the two others divided the rest, and Hayden, of course, got the nomination, as the consequence of the splitting of the three-way race. He didn't get a majority, but he did get a plurality out of it. Then he ran against a Republican nominee and came to Washington.

He was reluctant to come back to Washington, D.C., until he ran into some friend of his on the street, and he said, "Carl, what the hell are you doing here, you've been elected to Congress." He said, "Well, I thought I'd wait a little while before I go back." He said, "You've been elected; Congress is in session; you get the hell back there." So he got the hell back. That was the way it developed. I mentioned the train robbery because it brought him a good deal of statewide notoriety which of course he had only had for the most part in Maricopa County.

I think I told you that Mrs. Hayden was also quite a beauty in her time. She originally was from California, and had many relatives in California which they used to visit every summer. She was a great horsewoman and used to ride the hills around San Pedro in her early days. She was quite an intelligent woman, and they had a very warm relationship, if you want to call it that; as man and wife. They quite well understood each other, and I don't know of a more congenial man than he was with his wife. In the latter days she was bedridden or confined mostly to chairs, and even before he would rap on the door and put his key in the door of his apartment at the top of the Methodist Building, he would always whistle, and he had a merry whistle that he would whistle, before he came through. They were extraordinary to each other. They got on well indeed, even as I say for a marriage, it was a very close and warm relationship within marriage.

Toward the last, when she started into ill health, I think it was a heart condition, and she could no longer campaign or drive around the State with him, she became somewhat distraught. He had to shorten up his last two campaigns, apparently because he had to leave her in a Phoenix hotel in order to go out. Other than that, she used to accompany him over what they used to call roads in Arizona in these old automobiles with canvas water bags put in front in order to keep the water cool. You carried water for yourself and water for your car, and you always had at least three tires strapped to the back. In those days when you changed a tire, you changed it right off the rim, and you had to patch the tube.
I don't know that there was a location in the State that he didn't know and remember. It was a positive joy to ride with him on his campaigns. He would sit back and point out these hills and valleys, this grove, or this monument, or this ranch. He had the whole history of it, because as a young man he had ridden over most of the central part with groups of horsemen. In those days young men and woman would organize these horse expeditions, go off into the desert for a week and camp out. They would select certain places where they would go and visit and then talk about the early history of the territory.

Mrs. Hayden, even though she rode with him, she never quite liked to campaign. She was not a relaxed personality around other women. It wasn't a matter of being jealous of her husband, nothing of that nature, she was very highly interested in what he was doing, and she was a good counselor about his politics, but she didn't like the demands made upon your time of meeting people. She always reluctantly went to political luncheons.

RITCHIE: How frequently did someone like Hayden go back to his home state?

ST. CLAIRE: He went back every opportunity. I'm not too sure of this statement, but I don't think that he was ever outside of the United States, except on one visit to the Orient, and that might have been in conjunction with an investigation of the Philippines' application for independence. He did not go for their independence celebration. I do believe, though, that he had gone earlier to the Philippines in connection with their desire for independence.

He once told me that he was on a train in Tokyo, if I recall this correctly, talking to an English speaking Japanese, who said to him, "What is your name?" He said, "My name is Carl Hayden." The Japanese said, "Oh, but you must have a middle name." And he said, "No, I do not." The Japanese said, "But all Americans have a middle name." That reminds me that he may have been in Japan; but he did have a middle name, he was Carl Trumbull Hayden, but he never used it. I know he went into Mexico several times. I'm not sure that he ever crossed the Atlantic, in fact, I don't think he did.
He went home at every recess or every adjournment the minute he could close up his office. Within a week of the recess or adjournment sine die, he was on a train to home. When he got there, he had started operations. By that time they had bought a house near the Phoenix Country Club. He would go there, but he would set up either hotel headquarters or someplace where they could reach him downtown, usually at the Hotel Adams which is the old politicians hotel. Or, he would rent a storefront, and get two or three of his male administrative assistants.

One morning he would get on the road and from there he would travel into all corners of the State. Once he arrived in a town he would immediately walk into the offices of his friends, his old territorial and statehood friends, and talk to them, tell them where he was. He would register at a local hotel. He always saw the local weekly newspaper. He knew all the editors. He would sit down and talk to them, and they were all on his list for sending them Congressional Records. Then he saw to it that he was seen on the street corners in the company of one of his deep friends or the editor, and then he spoke to the local Rotarian or Kiwanis Club, because in those days if the program chairman of the Kiwanis and Rotarian clubs could find a speaker they had done their duty for that week. It was touch and go to get a program up and, of course, here came a real live Congressman or a real live Senator to tell them what it was about in Washington.

Then he would go out to the mining offices if it were a mining town or he would call on the County Agricultural Agent. He kept no real mailing list, of course, and he never put out a weekly bulletin on himself. If something happened that was newsworthy, or he thought it was newsworthy, he would simply send a telegram to all these editors he knew. Generally speaking, it would come out; and since he had a short name, Hayden, it always got into a headline. Then he would come back to Washington. This is something that his colleague, Henry Ashurst never did, and Henry Ashurst, of course, owed a great deal of his defeat by Ernest W. McFarland, due to the fact that Henry fell in love with Washington, D.C., and stayed here more time than he should have.

RITCHIE: I was listening to Senator Baker yesterday in the debate on salaries, saying that his father, when he was in Congress was really a citizen-statesman who came to Washington a few months but then was home the rest of the year, and now it's a full-time job.
ST. CLAIRE: It's very well known that in the early days you didn't buy a house here. If your people at home heard that you owned a house in Washington, D.C., they would say that you had permanently moved back there, and would make sure that they replaced you. Senators lived in hotels, or in apartments, and most of them in the very early days, had quarters in the Old Congressional Hotel which was in back of, or maybe on the site of the present Rayburn Building. They probably tore it down to build the Longworth Building.

A great comradeship developed in that Old Congressional Hotel, I'm told, because they all had rooms there for the purpose of attending the sessions. In those days, you want to remember also, that they had that short session that went from December to March 4. Then the next year they would have a session which I think began on December 5, or thereabouts, this was before the Norris Amendment, so that it was imperative for them to return home. It would be expensive for them to stay here. What is amazing though, is how over a period of years the rapidity and the increase in communications, particularly in travel, the constituency has now come to the senators, rather than the senators going to their constituencies.

As a young man in Hayden's office I was then the travel agent, and if somebody came through, like the Governor or the Secretary of State because they were usually the only people who came back here, on official business, or if it was someone that would be here from one of the newspapers, I would take them to Arlington and Mount Vernon and show them around. How many times I've been in Arlington Cemetery:

RITCHIE: The Methodist Building seemed to be very popular. That's where Joe Robinson lived wasn't it?

ST. CLAIRE: Yes, it was, that's where he died as a matter of fact. The early members, Truman, Barkley, and my wife's father (Congressman Samuel D. McReynolds), and a great number of those who were here in the '20's had apartments out in those old apartment buildings, which still stand and which are still very affluent, right by the Shoreham Bridge just before you cross the Shoreham Bridge in the direction of the Shoreham Hotel. This was where a great number had their early apartments. And then, the Methodist Building was built, and it was a hard place to get into
because it had a waiting list. Those who could came into the Methodist Building and rented there. Very few bought homes.

I was walking with Hayden one day during his re-election campaign in November, 1932. At that time he had an opponent who had been a United States senator from 1921 to 1927, by the name of Ralph Cameron, an old-timer from Arizona, who had been financed by the Stetson people of Philadelphia to make the race against Marcus Aurelius Smith, one of our first two senators. Ralph Cameron was running against Mark in the ’20 campaign, in the Harding Landslide, with the Stetson money behind him, the Stetson's having made millions out of their campaign hats for the Army of the First World War. Cameron managed to defeat Marcus Aurelius Smith for the Senate. Cameron had been at one time, for two years, our territorial delegate to the Congress and had always claimed that he was the father of Arizona's statehood because the Taft Administration was the one that had admitted Arizona to the statehood on the theory that Arizona was a Republican state, and it was.

Cameron came back from Washington, D.C., where he had lived, to run against Hayden in 1932. We knew that he had been in this city for a number of years, so we looked up the Washington City-Directory and found out where he was listed so we could point out, if we had to, that he was really running from D.C. not from Arizona. Walking down by the Hotel Adams one day I was with Hayden and Hayden saw the Republican State Chairman coming towards him. At that time Hayden was running for the nomination. Cameron had an opponent who was a very fine orator and a very old fashioned territorial type. Hayden just stepped up in front of him to stop him so he could not get around him, and said to the Republican State Chairman, "Who do you think’s going to win your nomination for the Senate?" And the man said, "Well, I think Ralph Cameron will." And he said, "Fine." They had more conversation and then went on. And Hayden told me, "You know why I did that? If you ask a man whom he thinks is going to win, he's always for that man."

RITCHIE: You mentioned, the last time, that Hayden was on the Patronage Committee.

ST. CLAIRE: Yes, he was Chairman of the Patronage Committee when the Democrats
took over the Senate in 1933. Joe T. Robinson had asked him to serve. I'm not sure now that Joe Robinson wasn't the third man, I said there were three.

**RITCHIE:** Was the Patronage Committee a powerful committee?

**ST. CLAIRE:** No. In those days the staff of the Senate turned over, almost wholly, with the change of Party control in the Senate. This is to say that the doormen, the police, even the Chief of Police, practically all of the staff of the Secretary's office, nearly all of the staff of the Secretary's Office, nearly all of the staff of the Sergeant-at-Arms office, and the Post Office, the mail carriers, including the Postmaster, were replaced by candidates from the Party which gained control of the Senate. The Republicans having the Senate since 1919, had many, many jobs available for replacement, and reassignment. The Democrats also had an extraordinary number of candidates, including myself, because many were out of jobs as a consequence of the Depression.

There was a Connecticut senator, Hiram Bingham, who had been censured earlier for I think bringing a lobbyist into a committee of conference on a tax bill, who had been the Republican patronage chairman. Bingham was rather an austere, tall, gray-haired man, as I remember seeing him, who had been defeated in Connecticut in the Democratic landslide of '32. He gave us all of his records, including the books, and showed us the places that were considered patronage and who their sponsors were. So we had that to go on initially. It did not touch the janitorial staff, and there would be career people, such as the chief clerk, the journal clerk, and the deputy Sergeant-at-Arms, and a number of others like that, who would not be replaced, but would be reassigned to the minority or the majority depending upon the history of their partisanship.

I was instructed by Hayden to take all of these positions, I have no idea how many there were then there weren't many, possibly less than two hundred. I added up their salaries and then divided by the number of Democratic senators, so that we came out with what you might call a "patronage mean", which would be say $4,000 or $5,000 or $6,000. Then it was up to me, by the assignment of two or three of these available positions to Democratic senators for their patronage appointments, by assigning them let's say a policeman, a doorman, and an elevator operator, come within that mean that
that we had established. So we did not give them jobs so much as we gave them patronage in
dollar amounts. That sounds strange these days, but this is the way it was done. You would write
them a letter and say, "You are hereby assigned this place, this place, and that place." I added up
and it would be $4,300, some had $4,500, some had $4,100, then we averaged them out on that
basis.

    Then I sat there in the Secretary's office, and as they would come in I would type out a
yellow or white patronage appointment blank and give it to the candidate, file the letter he
presented to me from the Democratic senator, and send him off and he would go to work the next
day. It was a strange process, but it did have the advantage of putting me in touch with a vast
number of new senators, democratic senators, whom I would otherwise never have known. Many
of whom, like Alben Barkley and Tom Connally, remained my friends for a long time,

as long as they were in the Senate, just as a consequence because of the young kid doing this
work for them, getting them the jobs they wanted for their constituents.

    RITCHIE: Did they ever cut a senator off from patronage, someone like Huey Long?

    ST. CLAIRE: No, it was argued at one time that they ought to deprive Huey Long,
because of his opposition to the President, and the well-known antipathy that Joe T. Robinson
had for him, and Hayden had one for him, too. But, apparently the Republicans at one time or
another had withdrawn the patronage rights in the Senate, and also at the National Committee,
for some senator who had not supported Hoover in '28, one of their Wild Jackasses. All it did
was increase the man's majority at home. It was considered to be a rather bad show if you were
punitive in your treatment. You instead tried to talk them down, reason with them, rationalize
with them, or ignore them, and hope that

their people would not be so benighted as to return them at the next time that they came up at the
polls. This did not keep Franklin Roosevelt from trying to beat Walter George in Georgia,
thereby increasing Mr. George's majority in that state. It has, I think, been fairly well
demonstrated that your Party is like a corral, you take all manner of mavericks in it. You don't
try to turn them out, because it only increases their range and prestige.

RITCHIE: The reason I asked about the Patronage Committee was because I thought Hayden seemed like the ideal member of the "Inner Club", as chairman of the Rules Committee, and on the Patronage Committee. I wondered, did he ever use that position for his own benefit or for his own legislation?

ST. CLAIRE: Never. The only utilization that we could make from it was that we would have a waiting list of people who wanted temporary work, and if one of these positions opened up for a few days, a week, or a month, I would call a man up and as a favor to that senator or to that man, put him in on a temporary basis. But he took no patronage of his own. I actually, I think, was his only patronage employee, if you could call me such. He did this deliberately. In the end it turned out to be more a nuisance than anything else because we got more requests than we could fill, particularly coming from your friends. As time went and the Democrats kept on retaining the Senate, year after year after year, the Patronage Committee died out. I wouldn't know if there is such a thing as a Democratic Patronage Committee anymore. Mansfield told us that he was going to be the Patronage Committee. As far as I know, he had no formal program for the appointment of Senate personnel. The Republicans, on the other hand, do have a very formal program, and still have a committee on personnel.

In truth, Hayden and I, and (Felton) "Skeeter" Johnston as Secretary of the Senate ultimately, I think, did as much to destroy the patronage system as could be done. Particularly in the Sergeant-at-Arms office and in the office of the Secretary of the Senate. "Skeeter", if he had a position open, liked to accommodate somebody, or he liked to put in somebody with merit. If he called me and said, "I'd like to do this." I'd say, "Sure 'Skeeter', do it." What you see today, in fact, for the most part, are people who are there on my recommendation. There is many a man over there on my recommendation, and sometimes I take pleasure in reminding him of it when I'm annoyed with him. He's there because of the system we instituted under "Skeeter" Johnston.

In addition to that, Joe Duke of Arizona was the Sergeant-at-Arms, and Joe Duke cooperated in this area to install people there notwithstanding that fact that they might have been recommended by a senator who had two other assigned places. I think under Joe Duke and later
Bill Wannell as long as we were around and working under the leadership of Mike Mansfield, and before him L.B.J., the patronage system as formalized program just fell into disrepair. If it exists today I don't know. Of course, it could be reinstituted tomorrow.

RITCHIE: We talked a little bit the last time about the Court Packing case in 1937, and the changes that created, and in a previous conversation you had expressed some very strong opinions about the leadership contest that succeeded Joe Robinson, between Pat Harrison and Alben Barkley. Would you care to talk about that now?

ST. CLAIRE: Well, I only hazard something. I thought that Mr. Barkley might have been President of the United States if he had not become leader of his Party in 1937 after the death of Joe Robinson. I say that because Barkley, being ambitious, naturally went out and with the open support of Franklin D. Roosevelt, received his Party's designation by one vote. That one vote which changed, I think, was Pat McCarren's vote. But a man like Hayden had pledged his vote to Pat Harrison and stood with Harrison on the caucus vote. So did many of the other old-timers, who felt that Pat Harrison deserved it and that Alben Barkley was a sort of brash newcomer did not, although Barkley was very competent. This is just a theory. If Pat Harrison had got it by that one vote he would thereafter have died, as he did, from cancer, which he probably had at the time of the vote. Then Alben Barkley would have come in. This would have been a matter of months. It took those months for Barkley, in the latter days of his leadership, to sour on Mr. Roosevelt and to lead something of a floor revolt against Roosevelt. This was during the war. It could well have been if Barkley had stayed in the track with the Senate Democrats and Roosevelt and got the nomination that Truman got. Roosevelt was certainly casting around for a replacement for Wallace. That's just a theory I have, you see, because the leadership ultimately gets you out in front, where you are not only exposed to your own people, you're exposed also to your President.
RITCHIE: And you can't please both of them.

ST. CLAIRE: No, you can't. When you consider that a man like Senator Hill of Alabama would be sitting where L.B.J. sat as leader of the Senate, but Hill realized when he was deputy to Scott Lucas of Illinois, that he could not hold his Senate seat in a liberal Democratic administration, and so he backed off of it. If you want to become leader you have Party responsibility and you have constituent responsibility, and you have administration responsibility, and all three of them seldom coincide.

RITCHIE: Robert Byrd's voting on the salary issue the other day is very typical of that. He said it was the first time in twenty-five years that he had ever voted for a salary increase.

ST. CLAIRE: Oh yes. You see, as time goes along, the demands of a President will put burdens upon you. You can't shuck them. You have to carry them along. They are like that little figure in Bolivia which carries all the worries of the housewives. Ultimately, you end up with such a burden that you collapse under it, because politics is a place where memories are long.

RITCHIE: That period after the leadership fight had to be a particularly trying one for Barkley. That's when all the isolationist sentiment started rising and when Roosevelt intervened in the 1938 Democratic nominations.

ST. CLAIRE: I would have to read the history of that time to recall any of it. You get busy and you don't really read what's taking place around you, and if you do it moves so fast that you forget it. The public memory they say is only supposed to be twenty-three days long.

RITCHIE: Historians who write on that period talk about the growth of the conservative coalition in Congress, that started with Court Packing and was solidified by the Roosevelt interference in the Party nominations, and then really came together on the anti-war issue.

ST. CLAIRE: You want to remember, though, that the South which had been with the
Democratic Party for years and had institutionalized many of their senators, who later became committee chairmen almost overnight, had great reluctance, particularly the men I am thinking about, concerning Mr. Roosevelt and his policies. They only followed him because the mass shoved them ahead of them. The mass was following Mr. Roosevelt to better times, and the old senators had to go along, notwithstanding their ingrained conservatism. Of course, one who did so, Joe Byrnes of South Carolina, profited by it. He saw this turn of politics and became a Roosevelt administration advocate, and was on the Supreme Court, Secretary of State.

But there were others, like (Ellison D.) "Cotton Ed" Smith. He was an extraordinarily amusing orator. He never spoke even from notes. He had a habit of walking up and down the aisles, speaking primarily on cotton, and getting in front of another seated senator, and looking at him, of standing over him, weaving back and forth, shaking his head as if he was attempting to use him as a witness and as a foil. It was an act. It had quite an effect.

When the time came for the Roosevelt administration to initiate a lot of this forward-looking legislation in all fields including agriculture, and to have committee meetings on this crisis legislation, these old-timers would not accept the responsibility of advocating it on the floor, even though they were chairmen of these committees. They would not follow through. They held the meetings and hearings that resulted in the legislation being reported, but once it got to the floor they only gave it cursory support or no support at all. I remember hearing Joe T. Robinson saying, "I am tired of doing the chairmen's work on this floor. This is crucial legislation, you should come in here and push it or vote against it." The pressure on him, I talked to his AA (Administration Assistant) in those days, was utterly horrendous. His office, and he only had three rooms, was just packed with people day after day. Because he was the great pleader of the first Roosevelt Administration in the Senate. The pressure did contribute to his death. You can't say enough to praise him. He was I think one of the great men of his generation.

RITCHIE: How would Barkley compare with Robinson?

ST. CLAIRE: Barkley was an opportunist, fairly nimble in his views and his expressions, and discussions, and debate. Barkley had been a good lawyer, but at times was a
superficial senator. Barkley was lazy. He had not been lazy in his early days, he had been a very fine and able young lawyer, as I was told, from Kentucky. But as he got more and more polish, and became more a master of the reflective story, or the

attributive joke, he had an amazing amount of relative pieces of humor that he could throw into his speeches, I think he became something of a show-house on the Senate floor. I don't think he ever really went into depth on anything. If he did, he would read it. As an extemporaneous speaker he was quite good. Probably one of the best after dinner speakers in the United States. Where he was backing legislation he would have to bring the lectern in front of him. Pleasant man, though, a very pleasant man.

RITCHIE: I noticed that in 1939 you joined the Navy, that was kind of early wasn't it?

ST. CLAIRE: It's one of my regrets. I had anticipated in my mind that we would enter the World War, and I had gone on active duty for thirty days in what they called a censorship course, gone off the Senate rolls for thirty days to participate (in those days you couldn't get two salaries). I came back but, as the clouds more and more gathered it seemed to me that it would be better if I went down there and attempted to be on the organization and expansion of the Office of Naval Intelligence, which I did. I took a fifty dollar a month cut to do it, which was rather important money in those days, because I was only getting about $3,600 a year. I went to work for them in their Administration Section.

Just the other night I was lying awake and thinking, "Why in the name of God did I do that?" I could have kept my reserve commission right up to December 7th and then utilized it to go into Naval Intelligence at that time, or might have gone elsewhere. Some parts of it, of course, you don't regret. I don't regret the time I spent in the United Kingdom, in London during the V-1 and V-2 campaigns that were made against it by the Germans. Nor do I have any regret for the service that I put in over in France. But, I can't say that I have anything to add about California or the Hawaiian Islands where I finished out on Mr. Nimitz' rear echelon staff.

I did have an excellent opportunity that was given to me, and I didn't
appreciate it at the time, I was made chief naval officer in what they called the War Room, in Grouvener Square. The building is still there, but what they did was brick up all the windows and made a Situation or War Room out of a room probably about twice the size of this one. The Army had a room next door to it. It was a room that had a high-priority fix so you had to be known to get into it. We had a Situation Board on one wall which showed the location of the German submarines, particularly in those dreadful days in 1942, when they were sinking more tonnage than was getting into London. The Army in turn had a map of the British Isles showing the build-up of American forces there. Afterwards they put up a Situation Map of France during Operation Overlord.

I was there for the entire build-up for the cross-Channel invasion, and the operation of Overlord, and participated in some planning, not much, because I didn't have any real naval experience.

I would run a morning briefing, would take two or three hundred dispatches from the Admiralty and summarize them and give a ten to twelve minute exposition on the situation of worldwide to an assembly of all the top officers: Admiral Kirk, Admiral Stark, and, you wouldn't believe it, General Eisenhower. In particular General Bradley and his people after they came to the U.K., and also General Derers. At times, it would be interesting when we could tell them that a Japanese battleship, Yamamoto, I think it was, had blown up in Tokyo Harbor, just blew up. They said, "Why?" And we said, "We don't know." It did blow up, and no one knows why to this day. And the battle that sank the Scharnhurst. Then I would go from there over to the Admiralty, I was one of two United States naval officers permitted in the very secret part of the Admiralty, the Citadel. The last time I was in London I stopped and took a picture of it, so it's still there. Then after that for most of the afternoon I had nothing much to do.

It gave me prestige and confidence and ability to give expression to naval situations worldwide, to talk familiarly about them. To see particularly a man like Bradley in action as a young commander, you could really know by just the way he would walk into a room with his aides with him, here was a guy that you could follow. He made great morale. He built morale in one like nothing else. That part of my Navy duty was all right, particularly the night's events. I had a room on top of the Cumberland Hotel, which I have since pointed out to my wife. From there I could look out over south and west London, in those days you could see everywhere. This was where all the flying bombs were landing, night after night. You couldn't sleep, you would
just sit there and watch them explode. You would go down in the morning and have breakfast and go to work. You remember a good deal of something like that. Other parts of it were a mistake, but what do you do?

RITCHIE: When you came back you went to the State Department?

ST. CLAIRE: Yes, as legislative liaison. I was working full time with (Charles E.) Chip Bohlen, who as counselor became in charge of legislative affairs. I developed a very fond respect for him, very warm friendship with him. At that time we were also working under Joe Byrnes, and George Marshall, and Dean Acheson. I never saw Byrnes, I only saw Marshall once, though I did have a great number of contacts with Acheson. I grew to be very fond of him and thought he was an excellent assistant Secretary of State, and Secretary of State. I would come up on the Hill and do case work for the Department, take complaints back, try to make friends, and generally speaking, do the best I could.

Another mistake was that I agreed to be on their Loyalty and Security Board. They would bring to us members of the State Department about whom the FBI had discovered early indiscretions, Communistic indiscretions for the most part. We would conduct hearings and Acheson's old law firm would defend most of them free of charge, which I thought was quite good. Our board was told by the lawyers who were defending these people, that we were probably the most organized and most intelligent security board of any. We, I think, had a greater sense of what we were doing than did the others. They were turning people out, we were not. We were counseling with them.

I got to the point after about fifteen cases where I thought I was running an Inquisition. I realized at the time that I was part of a mass hysteria against many people who had been radicals in their early youth or even while they were working for the Department of State or elsewhere but, who nonetheless thought that their radicalism did not prejudice their patriotism. I just don't think it ever did. I think the proof of that is that not one of those cases which were ever presented to the Department and we heard at that time ever resulted in true bill from a grand jury. None whatsoever.
It was just a case where the FBI was getting this information out of the Justice Department, under the nose of Truman and George Marshall you might say, and leaking it or avowing it to Congress and to the departments. The departments in turn, in order to protect themselves from J. Edgar (Hoover), would have to organize these hearings before these loyalty and security boards. A man would come in front of you and he had been a Communist on a college campus, then he went off to war, and had been badly wounded, he had really gotten out there and fought Fascism, our true enemy, and yet you would have to say to him, "Well, why were you a Communist, I just happened to go to a meeting," and that would be all it was, it was all based on that. Ultimately, you got the feeling that you had a black conical hood over your own head. I gave it up.

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I got to the point where they began to send me some of these rather famous cases that were in the newspapers, where dossiers were thick, and they had to do with persons who had operated for long times and made judgments in China, and had told the truth about Chiang-Kai-shek, and what a charleton he was, and had advocated that we get along with Mao-Tse-Tung and the rest of them because they were the coming people in China, which is now proved out, thirty years later. But, they were turned away, and a dossier was compiled on them, and they would put a dossier like that in front of me, and in the end I just said, "I'm not going to read it, this man, as far as I'm concerned is loyal and secure. Here's my signature, to Hell with it." I'd throw it back at them, and I quit. I just wouldn't do it. What do you do after a war? This happened after World War I in my home state of Arizona. They gathered together a number of people that used to be known as the "Wobblies" (I.W.W.), and put them in cattle cars of the Southern Pacific railroad and dumped out in the desert of New Mexico. Constitutional rights? Everybody regrets it today, but that day it was popular.

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RITCHIE: What was it that made you go to the State Department rather than back to the Senate?

ST. CLAIRE: Well, I came back, and my job had been enrolling clerk, and I have a letter that assured me that I would have my job back, and on that letter are the names of Barkley and Garner, and my God you'd be amazed at the signatures that are there. Hayden took the letter around and got all these signatures from these people, the leaders in those days. It's quite a
document, I probably ought to sell it for the signatures that are on it. I came back, but by that time, as was the general rule, those who stayed home had ingratiated themselves into the same jobs that had been vacated by those that had gone off to the Army or the Navy. Felton "Skeeter" Johnston had come back to the Hill to become Secretary to the Democrats, on the vote of the Democrats, and had vacated this job. So Hayden said, "Do you want that?" It paid twice as much as what I would have made in the Senate, and I said, "Yes, I certainly do." So I took it. Then four years later he came back and said, "Look, I need a clerk for the Rules and Administration Committee." I said, "Fine, I'll come back, Senator."

RITCHIE: You must have worked quite a bit with Vandenberg when you were with the State Department.

ST. CLAIRE: Let's say I had him under observation for those two years that he was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. I thought he was a great Senator, with a fabulous mind. There are many stories about Arthur Vandenberg, but I can say this; in his conduct of his committee meetings and in the interpolations and suggestions he would put into conversations, he demonstrated an ability that I have not seen in a senator in many, many years. He never had to reach for a word, he never used a bromidic expression. He had been a writer, like Churchill. He had written fiction at one time, and he had an extraordinary capacity for words and for employing them in new thought. It was just a pleasure to sit there and listen to that man talk. I went into his office after he died and they were closing it up, and he had an extraordinary collection, one of the finest modern collections I think I've ever seen, of historical American characters, their pictures, autographs, letters, and all of that. Arthur Capper, also, must have had pictures that went all the way back to Lincoln that were autographed, when he, too, left.

RITCHIE: When you were working for the State Department during the 80th Congress, did you notice a real change in the attitudes and atmosphere of Capitol Hill?

ST. CLAIRE: Yes, the war had made the place much more intense. Pressures had grown during the war and continued after the war. For a while there was a great relaxation, particularly among the staff people,
there were always parties, here and there, and you would go by for a drink. We were all survivors. We were all glad to be back. We were all glad to have our arms around each other, generally to enjoy our jobs in politics. But, the new intensity, the rigidity of the office operations were very noticeable. When you walked into an office you found that they were not aware of you, they were trying to do something else before they spoke to you. I think this was a result of the war, how or what caused it I don't know. Also, a lot of it might have been due to the fact that there was a tremendous increase in communications flowing toward Washington, and the advent of the airplane was bringing more and more people in for interviews and for lobbying.

RITCHIE: Was there any lobbying involved in your job for the State Department?

ST. CLAIRE: Yes, I did a great deal of lobbying for the State Department. I tried to talk people like Homer Ferguson out of putting in an amendment to reduce our appropriations in one case. I would escort Acheson up and try to backstop him on many things he might have to do at an appearance. Nobody ever accompanied George Marshall to the Hill. Marshall was a completely insulated individual. Acheson used his staff very well indeed. Byrnes never used any staff, in fact, Byrnes was like John Foster Dulles, nobody at the State Department ever knew what Byrnes was doing, nobody knew what Dulles was doing. They tell me that they would prepare a position paper on something and take it up to Dulles' office and find out that he had already answered it twice as long as they had framed up something, and possibly not nearly as relative to the national policy as it otherwise would have been. Quite an extraordinary man, too. I was gone from the Department by then.

RITCHIE: Your liaison position, was it more to serve Congressional needs, or to serve State Department needs?

ST. CLAIRE: Congressional needs, then and now, I think, more than anything else.

The office is something of an anomaly, because you don't have the substantive information that
you need in order to carry the argument with Congress. All you can do is be generally a lobbyist, a good guy, to know these people, to try to introduce the informational people into the hearings, to advise them on the personalities the people are talking to. The people who were on the National desk and other desks at the State Department suspect the legislative affairs people would borrow to their own aggrandizement. So they don't produce it. There is this division down there that existed then and still exists today between the "informed" and the "pleasant uninformed."

RITCHIE: In 1949, you decided to come back to the Senate.

ST. CLAIRE: Well, yes, on Hayden's invitation. Hayden had taken over the chairmanship of the Rules Committee and he needed a clerk, so I came back. That's where we began formulating a lot of the policy that later was adopted by the Senate in the matter of administration of the Senate.

RITCHIE: Hayden had just become chairman that year?

ST. CLAIRE: The Democrats took over the control of the Senate in 1949.

RITCHIE: What actually does the Rules Committee do? Is its role anything close to what the House Administration Committee does?

ST. CLAIRE: Well, it was really an amalgamation that occurred of several committees, chiefly the Committee on Contingent Expenses, which used to approve all of the voucher payments of the Senate. Which was no more than Joe Byrnes as chairman and one woman did in the early days. That, and then the Library Committee was brought into it, and the Privileges and Elections Committee, to pass on election contests. They were all put into this one pot and it was given the name Rules and Administration Committee.

In my day it was chiefly a place where they came to what I'd call a "wailing wall", because I would get nothing but calls day after day; "What can you do for us about additional space?" "What can you
do for us about additional paper?" "How can you go about getting another allocation of typewriters?" "How do we get an automatic typewriter?" All these things, new fangled things, were being invented in order to increase correspondence while simplifying it. We had no space. We had to tell them that we had little money for automatic typewriters, unless they wanted to pay for it out of their own personal allocations. That no, you could not send out a thousand telegrams, you could only send out two hundred. And no, you could not have unlimited telephone allocations, and so on. All of this was hazarded by an increase in the senators' business. So we sat there just day after day saying, "no, no, no." Or, "we can't, we can't, we can't."

I suppose I must have told at least fifty lies a day on the telephone. They were "lying promises", I knew full well that all I could do was be sympathetic and make some assurances. But I knew that I could never be able to carry out the assurances. In the meantime, the business of the senators was increasing, their staffs were increasing, their allowances had to keep pace with them. As an administration duty we had to formulate regulations that would be applicable to the expenditures of new sums under new concepts. At the same time we had to keep them within a rational budget figure. It was a good introduction to the Senate, because most of the new senators passed through the Committee membership, even for only a period of six months or a year, before they went to other committees. I got to know them, and understand who they were, and the friendships there were quite satisfactory to me. Of course, then we also had (Joseph) McCarthy.

RITCHIE: I could never understand McCarthy's role in that. He came on the Committee and then he went off the Committee and then came on again.

ST. CLAIRE: I suppose so, but I think that was an Assignment that was given to him by his Party, or he may have asked for a reassignment because of the Tydings election contest. Do I know? I don't know; I'm not too sure.

RITCHIE: It seems like a lot of the leadership of the Senate served on the Rules Committee.

ST. CLAIRE: Yes, they did. We had Ken Wherry, who was the Republican leader. We had Cabot Lodge, oh hell, who didn't we have?
The rule-making duties or provisions or prerogative of it were never invoked. They really are only being invoked now under Senate Resolution 4. We didn't bother. It was primarily an administrative committee on which we tried to fight off new ideas while perfecting the old, and yet to try and adopt new ideas for the limited increase of the Senate's operations. Those were the days of printed regulations, new regulations, new thoughts, new pronouncements.

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**RITCHIE**: Did anyone ever try to use the Rules Committee the way Wayne Hays used the House Administration Committee?

**ST. CLAIRE**: No, never.

**RITCHIE**: Do you think it's possible?

**ST. CLAIRE**: No, it's not possible. I don't see how you could. We had to put in telegraph regulations because of Senator (George W.) Malone of Nevada who sent out pages and pages of telegrams one night in opposition to some legislation. The statement had been prepared for him and the bill came to a very important figure, maybe it was $5,000 or $15,000, which was bad in those days. So then we put in telegraph regulations. Up until that time you could send unlimited telegrams. Then again, we used to make them pay for their long-distance calls. They'd say, "Look, it's costing us too much money to call these guys back in the States." So we put in a long-distance phone allowance. You find that all of these standing orders and regulations, what came out of that period when I was clerk, were our doing, Hayden's and mine, because we just had to do it in order to keep pace with the Senate and keep pace with the senators' demands on us, and the rising demand on them.
RITCHIE: The last session we were talking about when you joined the Rules Committee in 1949, with Senator Hayden as chairman, and some of the functions of the Rules Committee at that time. That whole period from 1949 on through 1955 seems to have been a very unpredictable one, with a lot of change in party in the Senate, change in leadership, two Democratic leaders, Lucas and McFarland, were defeated in succession. I wondered what your feeling was, having lived through that period and seen all the change.

ST. CLAIRE: Well, I imagine the turbulence was caused by an almost equality between the parties in the United States at that time. The strength of the Democrats had deteriorated. They lost the House of Representatives and the Senate in 1947, yet reestablished control in 1949. After '49 and into the first two years of the Eisenhower administration there was turbulence of politics in the United States in which a good number of factors contributed to keeping the parties on a fairly even basis, so far as Congress was concerned. Also, it has to be remembered that these were the years of the outbreak of the Korean War. All this destroyed a good deal of the old political stabilities in the Republican and Democratic parties nationwide. The Democrats kept the Senate by one vote in 1955, for example.

RITCHIE: How did that affect the staff? You started out as chief clerk of the Rules Committee, and then the Republicans took over the Senate in 1953. What happens to a staff member when the parties change? Did your function change very much?

ST. CLAIRE: Yes, mine did, because I went from chief clerk to assistant chief clerk. Senator [William E.] Jenner of Indiana became Republican chairman of the Committee in the first two years of the first Eisenhower administration. He appointed a friend of his, a man who had been one of his campaign aides, W. F. Bookwalter, as chief clerk. In what proved to be a very favorable and amiable arrangement, Jenner had confidence in me to the effect that he wanted to keep me there to work on the committee. Without doing an injustice to Bookwalter, I continued to do the major work of the committee in his name, and I was very pleased to do it, and keep a job in those days
when there was a great turning out of Democratic appointees. Jenner also appointed a couple of people to the staff in a secretarial capacity.

We had what I thought was an exceptionally fine relationship that even lasted through the politics of the Chavez election contest, when I was suspected of having more sympathy for Mr. Chavez than I ever had in my lifetime. Essentially, Jenner's staff people worked well toward the improvement of the business of the Senate, and were able to do what we could within our limitations to keep

the Rules and Administration Committee ahead and abreast of the demands that were made upon it, politically and administratively.

RITCHIE: Could you give some of the background of the Chavez contest?

ST. CLAIRE: From a very faulty memory, I remember that Chavez came through the 1952 election by a narrow majority and there was some question as to what the vote had been in certain counties in New Mexico, and whether the ballots had been legally and honestly counted. There was some question about the destruction of certain ballots by one of the county judges in New Mexico. I remember that since the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections came under the Republican control, they immediately organized a group of persons, with minority representation, to go to New Mexico and look into the details of the election and make some report and determination to the full committee about Chavez' victory. Although Chavez had been seated without prejudice, which is to say the Senate

had seated him conditionally, I believe a report was put into the system by the subcommittee in which they declared that some areas of perhaps fraud of questionable voting in New Mexico had resulted in Chavez' narrow majority. I believe it was an adverse report that reflected upon Chavez. The report was filed, but the Senate took no action and Chavez continued on without challenge after that.

New Mexico was very well known for chicanery in its election procedures. When I first came here I had as an excellent friend a man, who is still alive, who worked for Carl Hatch. Hatch was one of the finer New Mexico senators, who later became a federal judge, and was the author of the so-called Hatch Act. This friend of mine would tell me stories about one county which was thirteen miles outside of Santa Fe by concrete road, and yet was never able to get its
election results into Santa Fe under a week because of "weather conditions." There was another story, these may be all apocryphal, in which there was in a certain county a regular re-election of the sheriff and all the county officials, notwithstanding the national results, year after year. So they put the ballot boxes under guard and put them within the county courthouse under lock and kept them there immediately after the polls had closed. Ultimately, my friend told me, they discovered a tunnel under the street into the county courthouse that came from the cafe across the street. They would use this tunnel to get to the ballot boxes and open them up and put in the ballots that they wanted.

It was a state, in the early days, where money made a great deal of difference in the matter of what kind of votes were obtained in certain sections, I would say particularly in the Spanish-American sections of the state. They had a senator, Bronson Cutting, who came out there for his health. He had a strong Eastern, or Harvard, accent. He ran for the Senate and was successful and was a very fine senator. But he owed his principal strength to his family fortune and was able to use it effectively in certain space areas of New Mexico. Chavez ran against Cutting and was defeated by him. Chavez was one of the very few native New Mexicans to run for the House or Senate and make it in the early days. Chavez actually had been a clerk on the Senate staff as a patronage post and got his legal education here before he went back home to run for the Senate.

Cutting went out to New Mexico to face a challenge that Chavez had presented him, but unfortunately Cutting was involved in a commercial air accident and was killed. Chavez was then appointed by the Governor as a consequence of Cutting's death. When Chavez appeared on the floor of the Senate to take the oath, La Follette and some of the other liberals got up and left the chamber. They would not witness him taking the oath because they had been Cutting's friends.

**RITCHIE:** Was Chavez an effective senator?

**ST. CLAIRE:** He was, I thought, rather a poor senator. I believe many of his
actions could be put to question. That still does not account for the fact that he's in the Hall of
Fame and his statue stands outside of the financial offices. Well it might, because his interests
personally were financial. But, I would not put him in the category of a great senator, I would not
think that he would at all rank with a man like Borah, or Hi Johnson, or some of the early
western senators. He was eminently successful at the polls. He had a speech which he gave to his
constituents, that had to do with the "little boy from Valencia County" in which he depicted his
Horatio-Alger-rise in New Mexican politics. I do not feel that he was at all worthy of his post.

RITCHIE: There was another politician about whom I was interested in your reactions,
and that was Ernest McFarland.

ST. CLAIRE: Yes, who is still alive and a good friend of mine. There is a story about
McFarland that he flew in from Oklahoma and alit running. Certainly the day he arrived in
Arizona he put himself right into the political arena. He did a very effective job of pulling himself up from a
small law practice in the small town of Florence, Arizona into judgeship, and running
successfully against Henry Ashurst, and then to become Democratic leader in the Senate. At one
time he was seriously considered as a Vice Presidential candidate. After he was defeated by
Barry Goldwater he went back and became Governor and was also on the Supreme Court of our
state, and I think the owner of a very prosperous radio and television station.

A man of infinite energy, but very, very close on himself. That isn't to say that he wasn't
outgoing, that he didn't have an "old-shoe" personality which you need in the west, that he
couldn't squat down with any cowboy group or appear before a ladies' luncheon club, because he
could and did, and did it successfully. In fact, he was a man who was intensely interested in
himself and what he did and how he did it. He was impatient for success

and impatient with himself and did not spare himself in any way. He always went up the stairs
outside the Senate two or three at a time. He was always in his office very early in the morning
and did a prodigious amount of work. You would think that with no real early Arizona
background that he could have gotten where he did, nationally, but he did.

I think it could be said that he used the Robert Byrd approach to the Majority Leadership.
Under Lucas he was willing to come into the Senate chamber at five o'clock in the afternoon and
take on the cleaning-up process and adjourn the Senate. He showed himself willing to undertake
the small chores. In a sense he also demonstrated a loyalty to his party and to his leader as Byrd
did, and therefore, he was able to rise into the Majority Leadership. As a leader I don't think he
was too articulate. Certainly, he did do his homework and I think he was master of his facts. But
he didn't have that ability to dominate the

other side of the chamber and to lecture and harangue them. Maybe it was best that he didn't. He
did all of his work by accommodation and conciliation.

RITCHIE: It was about that time that you got involved in the John Marshall Butler
campaign hearings and became the object of Senator Joseph McCarthy's attack. I wonder if you'd
like to describe some of that incident?

ST. CLAIRE: That was really what we called the Tydings Case. McCarthy, of course,
was a member of our committee and I think had gone on the Rules Committee for the purpose of
seeing what he could do to get Butler elected to and kept in the Senate, notwithstanding the
Tydings contest. This is all on record, but there had been a great deal of odd political practices
inveighed against Tydings while he was running, possibly by the people who were supporting
Butler. Certainly there was a good deal of importation of political experts into Maryland to
handle Butler's campaign.

He was congenial and well-liked, but strictly a light-weight, Tydings was not. Tydings had a
very fine mind, he had an extraordinary war record, and I think in his time was an effective
senator. The trouble with Tydings was that he was too austere. He had married money and began
to lift that chin of his, and he had a very good chin, in and around the Senate and in Maryland,
and they got a little tired of him. I don't think that it was as much Butler as it was that Tydings
ultimately stopped being the barefoot kid that he was in Havre De Grace in his early days and
had gone social.

Why McCarthy went on the Committee? I don't know. Maybe he went on to insure that
Butler would remain in the Senate. Maybe he went on because there was no other post open to
him. Or he wanted to intervene and interfere into the Tydings-Butler contest. Assuredly, the
woman he married (Jean Kerr) had been, I think, an employee of the Republican forces in one
capacity or
another, and her name did come up in the report on the case, but only incidentally. I'm not too sure that McCarthy had as much interest in it as he thought, or as it was generally supposed. He did divide the committee quite bitterly, and I've already referred to some of the incidents of it. It divided the committee right down the line, and a great deal of the bitterness was due to McCarthy's attitudes and the way he expressed himself. Had he not been there, I think they would have arrived at a better accommodation. I can't think, though, that the Democrats were too anxious to support Tydings wholeheartedly. He was a man who did not make friends easily. He might have made them in his early days in the Senate, but he just didn't have that clubbiness about him that you get in many senators. But they had to conduct an investigation into the contest. It would have slid by, I'm sure, if it hadn't been for McCarthy's interference. It would not have attracted the historical notice that it has gotten since.

RITCHIE: Why do you suspect that McCarthy singled you out for abuse in that case?

ST. CLAIRE: Oh, I think it was directed at Hayden. I don't know if I've said this before, but I can recall that we were the managers of the Senate restaurant, which came under the Rules Committee's purview. There had been these two long outstanding bills run up by Chavez and McCarthy. I went around to Hayden and said, "Why don't we write them letters and say pay up." And he said, "Go ahead and do it." So Chavez paid up without any question, but McCarthy wrote a snide letter back and paid up. It was immediately after that, that a telegram went out from McCarthy's office to his office in Wisconsin sending out what they knew of my record and my employment in the State Department and on the committees, and all else. I was acquainted with this telegram by the fact that the man who was reading them, to see that they were official, called me up and read it to me. He was a Democrat and he was at that time working for Joe Duke and he just gave me the benefit of what the telegram said. I can also recall seeing two people, one working for McCarthy, one working for McCarren, talking together in the corridor and stopping immediately when I happened to come upon them, and look at me, which meant that I was the subject of their conversation. At least I've always thought so.
He made an attack out in Wisconsin before a veterans' organization, or maybe another organization, on my record in the Department of State, saying that I had declared a known Communist as a non-security risk. This I think was a direct result of the fact that he couldn't attack Hayden, but he knew that he could attack Hayden's appointee on the committee. Since he was beating the anti-Communistic drums in those days he just happened to include my name in on it because I happened to be on the Loyalty Security Board of the State Department and as an acting chairman had cleared this one case. It was cleared on the basis of an incomplete record, and even

on the basis of a complete record it still resulted in no bill before a grand jury in the city of Washington.

That carried over to his membership on the committee and to me and when he was more or less harassed and harangued on the floor of the Senate about his attitude on the Tydings-Butler contest, he simply picked my name out of the air as the "leak", as he said, on the committee's staff, one who had made questionable decisions about alleged "communists" in Washington. So that's the reason for it. As I told you before, he had me confused with another attorney on the committee staff, at least he said so. We finished up friends.

RITCHIE: What type of a person was he, from your point of view?

ST. CLAIRE: You could regard him in two ways: you could regard him as a pro who had found a vehicle to get him national notoriety, and that he used it because he knew it brought publicity and newspaper people to him; or you can say that he did it from conviction. I was never satisfied that the man did it from conviction. I also don't think that he was a true professional. In the field of boxing, a true pro will go in to kill a guy, but he does it strictly because it's a business for him, because it's his way to make money. He has no animosity towards those whom he may beat into insensibility in the ring. That's considered professional. If you wanted to believe that in McCarthy, if you felt that he was doing a professional job for purposes of his own political advancement, well and good. But he wasn't. I think basically he was malevolent and brutal and I would say that he was a coward in the things he did.

He never really expected to be challenged physically in the arena that he selected for his
politics. In another century he would have been taken to the dueling ground and shot. He knew that the gamesmanship of the Senate was going to be his protection, and that the immunity of the Constitution would protect him. Therefore, he selected for

his accusations a number of very small people. One I can remember worked in the Government Printing Office, probably had a job that paid him $2,000 a year, yet McCarthy denounced him because the man had been an immigrant out of Eastern Europe, and had some radical background. That put him on the front page of the *Daily News* and the man resigned. That's just like stepping on a snail. There was no reason for it.

What can you say about him? Robespierre? Ultimately he would send anybody to the guillotine just to get himself a headline. To my way of thinking, his actions disqualified him from being a pro, disqualified him from having any real patriotic intent. I think he did it out of cowardness and brutality, I really do. Again I say, if he lived in another century he would never have been able to walk off the Senate floor, safely.

**RITCHIE:** For such a long time the Senate gave him free reign, were other senators afraid of him?

**ST. CLAIRE:** Yes, there was fear of him. He had seized upon the prejudice of the moment.

I think it has been widely demonstrated that we were all involved in those days, we were all looking for more enemies than were there. We had won a war and had nowhere else to turn to find substitute enemies except internally. This happened after World War I when there was a great hubbalo all over the United States about radicals and the Wobblies. Here we were, a victorious nation after World War II, and we turned inward on ourselves, I can't explain the psychology of this to myself. We were all at fault, we were all looking for unpatriotic backgrounds, and lack of security. McCarthy had found that this was the vehicle to popularize him, which had emotional reaction.

Right after the war there was the idea to put atomic energy under civilian control. There was a great deal of questioning about the men who had given us this weapon, and what we should do about it. Every time a meeting was held having to do with atomic energy or the continued production of the atomic bomb, if it was
an open meeting, you would be appalled at the type of people that would come and listen to these hearings. They were not agitators, they were really old ladies with nothing else to do, they were literally the ones we later started to call ladies in tennis shoes. They wore hats to the meetings, and sat there, yet you could hear them tense up and murmur at the very scientists who had helped win the war for us. What it was then, I really don't know. A madness, and McCarthy exemplified it.

The senators were reluctant to press him on it at first, because he was difficult to handle. When you did go for him, he came back at you with a knee to the groin. He would not debate within the perimeter of Senate good order and procedure. It was all backroom language and backroom brawling and backroom accusations. That was why they hesitated to take him on. That was number one. Number two was that he was out in front of a very popular political attitude. He was not an intelligent man at all,

nor was he quick. I think if you dissect him you will find that again and again he used the fist in his arguments, and used common phrases over and over that denigrated the people that he was talking to. Why he wasn't taken outside, I don't know. There were one or two who chased Huey Long down a hall, but for some reason no one ever chased McCarthy down the hall. Yet, I frankly think that it was the only way with which to deal with him, that was, to haul him outside.

RITCHIE: Did the Democrats keep quiet to let the Republicans tear each other apart?

ST. CLAIRE: No, his main opponents were the Democrats. The Republicans let him go because they knew that he would help them in certain areas like Wisconsin, Massachusetts, where he had a popular response. It was only when the Republicans tired of him finally that he was brought to book.

RITCHIE: Do you think that it was the McCarthy censure that caused the Republicans to lose control after that Congress?

ST. CLAIRE: No, I don't. It was not one of their proud moments. If it hadn't been for
McCarthy's attack upon a man like [Arthur] Watkins, a fine Mormon saint and certainly somebody of no particular imagination or competency, but of vast honesty and great purpose, I think they might have let him continue to the point where he might have run for reelection and been defeated. They could not stand to him after he began to attack the "betters" among those people on his side. By then he was calling Marshall a traitor, and Eisenhower God knows what. He was maniacal in his pronouncements. There was just no more reason to them. The only way they could get to him was to censure him, but they should have expelled him.

RITCHIE: He seems to have folded very quickly once they censured him.

ST. CLAIRE: Yes, it's said that censure does destroy a man. I suppose history proves that to be the case in all instances. It destroyed [Thomas] Dodd, and there are other cases. I think, though, by this time McCarthy was drinking very heavily and if anything hastened his demise it was not the fact that he was brought to account by his colleagues. Whatever was getting to him, got to him, and a lot of it came out of a bottle.

RITCHIE: When a senator is censured, do the other members of the Senate react to him differently afterwards, do they shun him?

ST. CLAIRE: No, I don't think so. He might cut them dead whenever he sees them. But the principle is that after you've won, you pick up the marbles and start a new game. Historically, that is what has kept the Senate the club that it is. There has always been a good internal relationship among the senators. Though some can't abide others they know they must establish the accommodations necessary for legislation.

RITCHIE: The figure that seems to rise up about that time is Lyndon Johnson, to totally dominate the Senate for the rest of the decade. You must have seen quite a bit of him.

ST. CLAIRE: I did and I didn't. When he came over from the House, warnings had preceded
him. They said, "Wait till he gets here." There was a man who was totally devoted to himself and to his political career and to the ensconcence of it by *any* means whatsoever. Mr. Johnson was the first one to introduce the automatic typewriters into the Senate, to get the Senate to buy the damn things. They are hideous machines that turn out thousands of form letters and destroy the personal lives of the small girls who attend them.

From the first he resolved to take over the leadership of the Senate, just as he had taken over the leadership of the secretaries association in the House when he was secretary to a Congressman. He was always right up there where he could be seen and followed and admired. He loved it and nothing else.

I didn't see too much of him. I had him on the phone several times. On one occasion he called me to tell me that the leadership was only going to allow four staff members of any one office on the floor at any one time.

I pointed out to him that the rules didn't say that. I backed away from the phone for the next five minutes while he told me it didn't matter. He also called me one day and asked me about a job that was on the Senate roll, that paid a fancy salary, but was then vacant. I told him that it was his job to appoint, that it had been created for me by Senator Hayden, but I had never taken it up. He said, "Well, do you want it? I can use a competent man." I thanked him. I don't think I could ever have worked for him. There are people who have worked for him who say that he was the most extraordinary person they have ever known in their lives, that he had a mind that you would not believe. He had a mind that was just impossible to appreciate, and yet he had a personality and a temper to go along with it. At one time he would be loving you and the next time he would be excoriating you in front of people. He would bawl his staff out on a public elevator. Those who stayed with him would not have traded the experience for anything. I've talked to several of them. They said you could never know what it was to work with a person of his caliber. He must have been an appalling and amazing man to those who were close to him.

*RITCHIE*: Very few of them stayed the whole length of the time. Most of them seem to have served him for very short periods.
ST. CLAIRE: He had a great turnover, particularly in his female employees. That was because he drove them as he drove himself. There was no question about it, Sam Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson ran the United States of America, when the Democrats came back into power in '55. Eisenhower let them do it. He had to. That was where Johnson got his training, his administrative and executive training that I think, except for the Vietnam War, turned him into a very responsible and a very successful President. I think one of our great ones. It just so happened that he got caught in that jungle trap, and it was too bad. Maybe not. We look back now on the days of the Korean War, which was highly unpopular, and yet substantially over the last twenty or twenty-five years we have taken a civilization out there, one of the oldest, and brought the Koreans into the twentieth century. And I think with good reason that it's been a success. You have to admire what we did for the Koreans and apparently if we ever get around to it we may do the same someday for the Vietnamese.

RITCHIE: Johnson seems to have had two aides who stuck to him all through his Senate years. They were Walter Jenkins and Bobby Baker.

ST. CLAIRE: Yes, that's true. In my conversations with several of his people, I think Johnson realized that Baker might have been practicing law a little on the side. Certainly Bobby ought not, if he did, have conducted a law practice while he was Majority Secretary. That was his decision, of course, and he suffered for it. But I think Johnson realized that Bobby Baker, whom he liked and trusted, might have been engaged in a few matters of the moment that would have to do with the advancement of Mr. Baker's career. I know that Johnson, when the thing broke, was in a position where he could say to Baker that something of this nature was going to take place, and that he was on his own. I think it's to Johnson's credit that even though he may have been aware or not aware of what Bobby was doing, Lyndon Johnson was himself apart.

He really needed Baker when he wasn't there. Bobby had enough control of the senators that he could keep the Senate in a ferment, keep it in a static condition, while Johnson was in Texas. Again and again Mike Mansfield would try austerely to rise and be acting leader on something, and find he had no troops behind him because Bobby was circulating around the back
of the Democratic side saying, "Johnson wants this kept on the burner for a while." That was one reason for Mansfield's dislike of Baker, I'm sure, because he knew that this was going on. He had no command of the Senate even under the agreed agenda, so long as Johnson wanted to run it from Texas. Johnson would drive the Senate for six or seven days hard and then he would go off to Texas for three or four days and the Senate would do nothing. Then he would come back. That was what he wanted to do. Baker was a very useful, very bright, and a very shrewd young man. He could get those things done because he had, as he has today, a very great memory and talent.

**RITCHIE**: He seemed to have been able to get away with telling people off and manipulating them. I wonder why so many senators put up with him?

**ST. CLAIRE**: I suppose because he did represent the leadership. He spoke for the leadership. I think he did an effective job of it. He was a very effective Majority Secretary. He spoke for Johnson and had the trust of the old-timers, because they could depend upon him. They could call him anytime, day or night, and he knew exactly down to a half vote what the Senate was going to do. I wish he had stayed. He was a beautiful professional.

**RITCHIE**: He was a lot like Lyndon Johnson, wasn't he?

**ST. CLAIRE**: Oh yes, he put himself right into Lyndon Johnson's mold. He saw Johnson's star coming over the horizon and he tagged on to it. He saw (Robert) Kerr of Oklahoma's star going up. Kerr was more of Bobby Baker's mentor, I think, than Lyndon Johnson.

**RITCHIE**: All the way through, or just in the 1960's?

**ST. CLAIRE**: Until Kerr died.

**RITCHIE**: How did Kerr become so powerful?
ST. CLAIRE: Doing his homework. There again was a shrewd mind, a mastermind. He studied taxes and finance. He worked in the Committee on Finance assiduously. He knew what he was doing when he got up on his feet. His work, and his memory, and his energy put him out ahead of everybody else, with the exception of probably one or two others on the Republican side. He did it, I think, as a public duty. I grant you that Kerr probably knew what special taxes applied to what special interests, and how they may have had some special meaning to them. At the same time he was a very effective legislator, particularly in the field of taxation.

RITCHIE: Particularly in oil.

ST. CLAIRE: Well, that was one of the special interests, of course. But, you would expect him to be like that, coming from Oklahoma. Certainly, as they used to say, Walter George went on the Finance Committee to protect the Coca Cola Company from having a tax on their drink. That's not true, but that's what they used to say. I think you can expect anyone on Finance to bring a certain provincialism with him. Certainly, he is going to be interested in the economy of his state, insofar as it may be affected by taxation.

RITCHIE: When the Bobby Baker scandal finally broke, and the Rules Committee investigated, there was a lot of criticism of the Rules Committee for treating the case very gingerly, perhaps because they were afraid that other people and other reputations were involved.

ST. CLAIRE: No, I don't think so. You've heard the rumors about that, that it went into other quarters, but I don't believe it. I think that all the facts of that case were pretty generally presented to the public and to the Rules Committee. I think a good summary was done on the case, if you can call it a case. There was no "ginger" in their actions. I think they found themselves more embarrassed, possibly, by this young man than anything else. They probably might have treated him more from a senatorial standpoint than you might say from a judicious standpoint. Certainly, it might be alleged that the committee was minding its own hens, but I don't believe so in the long run. I think they did an effective job. I had no idea what their
conclusions were, all that time I wasn't going to any of the hearings, I wasn't reading any of it, and I haven't to this day. It was just something that passed by while I was too busy doing something else.

RITCHIE: In the mid-1950's, you switched from the Rules Committee to the Foreign Relations Committee. I noticed that Theodore Green went from chairman of Rules to chairman of Foreign Relations, did you follow Green?

ST. CLAIRE: Yes, more or less. When I took the chief clerk's job I did so with the support not only of Green, but also of [J. William] Fulbright and [Bourke] Hickenlooper, and a few others like that. I went around and saw them. My name had been suggested to them by Carl Marcy. Carl and I had been good friends for years.

Green was my first chairman. You loved him, but he was a little old. There were certain meticulous things he did as chairman that annoyed Fulbright, who was the ranking Democratic member. Green was argumentative, too, about the small things, sometimes the wrong things. As he got deafer and deafer he got more difficult. At one time they said he had one of the most brilliant judicial minds in the East, and I would agree with that. They used to pay him thousands of dollars just to conduct a cross-examination. An extraordinary man. When he was chairman of the Rules Committee they used to call from his office and say, "He's on his way." We would look for him, especially if he didn't show up. I'm not doing an old man an injustice, but sometimes he would be thinking and would pass our door not knowing where he was going. Early in my State Department career I took him to Bermuda with a meeting with some British parliamentarians, and he was a very great, outgoing, social man, liked a good drink, told great stories. He was still wrestling for exercise in those days. He had a tremendous physique for a man of eighty. He was just all muscle, thin muscle, but still muscle.

It was on that trip that he told me a story about himself that I have not forgotten. He said that he always kept a book of his expenditures for each day, no matter what it was--one cent, two cents, three cents--he would put
it down. He would put postage down. As a young man he was on a train coming out of Chicago and he was writing letters to people he had left behind. In those days the parlor car had desks in them where you could write on railroad stationery, they had two up against the bulkhead, and no bars then. He had finished writing his letters, sealed them, and then discovered he had no postage. He wanted to give them to the conductor, as he usually did and have them mailed at the next stop. He said, "Well, I'll put them in my pocket until tomorrow." He had stamps back in his berth. But then he said to himself, "No, don't postpone it. Do it now." He had walked out of the parlor car, and in about five minutes there was a rear-end collision and everybody in that car was killed. He said, "That's why I always do everything when I'm supposed to do it."

He was probably the world's greatest collector of Chinese art in his day. He had agents who would buy it for him all over the world. They would deliver the art to him and he would roll it out once, and only once, on his floor. At that time, he would turn up the lights in his office, because he always kept the lights down to save electricity. He would look at these Chinese rolls once, roll them up, and send them up to Rhode Island to be stored. I asked him why he collected them, and he said, "I'm just interested in them." I frankly don't think he really understood Chinese art. It was just a hobby, or a pretense to a hobby. I don't know who has the art collection now, perhaps some university or college.

All around his walls in his office were W.P.A. paintings that the Arts Project had given him, he must have had sixteen of the damn things. They were the worst possible paintings you could imagine. I understood the W.P.A. paid a flat hundred dollars for them. But he kept them there. One of them was the Minute Men fighting the British on the retreat from Lexington Bridge, things of that nature. I said, "Why do you keep them here?" He said, "I like them, I think they're good art." They were miserable art. You never saw much of his office because he always kept the lights down.

We had the tally sheet of members of the Foreign Relations Committee on which Democratic names were arranged alphabetically at the top and then Republicans were arranged alphabetically underneath. Carl Marcy said, "The old gentleman wants you to take a tally sheet and draw a line between the Democrats and Republicans, a very heavy line, and place it in front
of him." So each time that he chaired, and he was very proud of chairing meetings, I would set before him a tally sheet that would have this black line drawn between the Democrats and the Republicans. I had no idea what the old man had made the request for, until one morning we were sitting in an open hearing in the Foreign Relations Committee hearing room. The Democrats were on the right and the Republicans were on the left,

and Green was looking at this sheet and he would call their names for questions after each witness presented a prepared statement. He would say, "Senator this" or "Senator that." Well, it so happened [Stuart] Symington, who has a short temper, came in and sat down on Green's left, in Senator [Alexander] Wiley's seat. After a witness had finished, Green looked down at the sheet and said, "Senator Wiley?" and Symington said, "My name is Senator Symington," and went on with his questions.

I think that's when the old man realized he had to go, because he was losing not only his hearing, but his sight, and memory, and it embarrassed the hell out of him. Ultimately, he told the leadership that he was going to resign the chairmanship. Lyndon Johnson came down to the committee room and took over the meeting, literally, from Fuller who might have acted as the chairman. Lyndon sat there, with Green on his left and Fuller on his right. He went around the table calling on each Committee member and they all kept saying, "Theodore, you can't do this, you just can't do this. You can't end a marvelous career like this. You've got to stay." Suddenly, he said, "Well, all right, I don't think I will resign." So Johnson had to adjourn the meeting and take him into the next room with Fuller and a couple of others, for a talk. When Green came out he said, "I think I must stick by my resignation." They had had to retalk him back into it.

You know, he was in Paris when they were building the Eiffel Tower. I told him, "I've never seen the Eiffel Tower, Senator, but I've seen you." He could remember meeting Harrison or Cleveland as a boy, he could remember Lafayette Square when it had an iron fence around it. He was an amazing man. We invited him to a cocktail party at our home and suddenly he showed up at the door in the presence of a stranger, who turned out to be one of our neighbors who said, "I just saw
the Senator walking down the street trying to find your house." He had ridden the bus out. He went everywhere he was invited. He never turned down anything. He was congenial, he was fun, he was a credit to the Senate, to his history, to Rhode Island, and to himself. I liked him.

RITCHIE: What were your functions as Chief Clerk?

ST. CLAIRE: That was clerical to the extreme. All I did was organize meetings, write briefs about the items on the agenda, handle nominations, handle the transcripts, run the security, help with the personnel problems, and we had a lot of them for a while, fight for "perks" like more office room. It was secretarial-clerical. I think in the whole time I was there I probably wrote four or five briefs in all. I wasn't called upon to do much of the decision-making.

RITCHIE: What is the relationship between the permanent staff of a committee and the members of that committee? Do the members deal with the staff of the committee frequently?

ST. CLAIRE: Yes, they do. They rely a great deal upon the staff, particularly if they find an early trust in them, then they will go to them, no matter what their political affiliation is. They'll go to them for advice, for ideas, for instruction more than anything else. It's up to the permanent staff to immerse themselves in all of the committee work, in every detail, in all its aspects, so that they can carry water on both shoulders and in both hands. In this way the staff can guide legislative decisions. I'm not above saying that in my time if I had a prejudice when I was a newspaper man, I could slant a story, if I had a prejudice on the legislation before the Foreign Relations Committee and I could put that prejudice to work, I did, definitely, out of conviction. I can say frankly that so did my colleagues. We felt that we had something to give to our country and to our legislative process, so we did so, by instruction and argumentation with the members.

We didn't always win, particularly with a man like Fulbright who had his own mind, and an amazing mind that man had. He knew what he was about every minute of the day. But he would listen, and most of the others would listen, and this is the way you brought what you thought was good policy to bear upon these people, and ultimately upon the legislative decisions of the Senate. This is what they do. First you have to establish trust, and confidence. Senators are very bright and suspicious men, they have to be suspicious because people are
hauling at them all the time. If they felt you were giving them good advice, then they accepted it. A good committee staff, I think, is a good thing.

RITCHIE: Does the committee staff represent the chairman more than anyone else?

ST. CLAIRE: No, not necessarily; maybe in some committees they do, the chairman might bring in his own personal staff. But, under the system of the Reorganization Act of 1946, you have built up a good professionalism in the House and Senate committees. That professionalism still exists and I think it is to the benefit of the country. I have found that dealing with committee people in the House and Senate that they are quite honest about it. For instance, the staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue and Taxation, my God, how devoted they are to the taxation structure of this country, they sit there and read all day, or they used to. You couldn't ask for better service to your country. And they could make millions outside of the Senate if they wanted to walk away from their job, but they don't. Also, there is a sense of being honest, honorable, and a sense of satisfaction of doing a job that nobody else can do, despite the fact that you're getting paid on a much lower scale than a lawyer that works down the street.

RITCHIE: What was it like to work for Fulbright?

ST. CLAIRE: Very satisfactory. He was a very fine man, amiable and sometimes irritable, but I always found him exceptionally well adjusted and easy to get to, he would always listen. If you made sense,
RITCHIE: Did he dominate the committee when he was chairman?

ST. CLAIRE: Yes, he did. He and Hickenlooper were the two dominant factors. Hickenlooper was the conservative Mid-West balance to Fulbright. Fulbright very seldom did anything without saying, "Well, Hick, what do you think about it?" He always got a good reply. They kept foreign policy in that committee, I think,

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on as fine a keel as has ever been maintained. Of course, it was the same relationship as existed between Vandenberg and Connally, except that Connally got a little irritable toward the last. Those two men never lost their balance, they also would turn to Mansfield, for a good deal of the guidance.

The thing I liked about Fulbright, I guess, was that he would suffer people like Frank Lausche. Lausche was never on time, for a hearing, always came in midway in the hearing, and asked the questions that had already been asked, asked them in a loud voice, and ultimately ended up saying something about "Red Roosia." We had a number of others like that. Fulbright would lean back in his chair and pull on his hair and let them go on and on and on. He knew that that was the process. He had to let the record run down before he could get to the vote. I never saw a man with more patience as a chairman than Fulbright. Hayden used to jolly his people: "Now, you don't want to say that the way you're

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saying it." Fulbright just let his people go on, but ultimately he got what he wanted.
RITCHIE: We ended the last session talking about your working on the Foreign Relations Committee, and I thought it might be appropriate to start by talking a little bit about the Interparliamentary Union; how you got involved in that; and basically what your role was with the Interparliamentary Union.

ST. CLAIRE: I hope my memory will sustain the facts. Sometime around 1958 or 1959, the United States group had a meeting in Bangkok, which Senator Fulbright and one or two others in the Senate attended. They went to Bangkok on various courses, inasmuch as in those days they traveled individually and commercially. One of our staff members went along with them, and I remember preparing a record which he could take with him for the purposes of keeping accounts and other administrative items during his progress around the world. Having gone that far most of the delegates continued on in the same direction, whether they left by east or west from the United States. That was my first contact with the IPU.

The next year or the year after that the Interparliamentary Union had a meeting in Brussels. At that time there was an executive secretary, whose name escapes me now, who had been a long time executive secretary of the organization, and who also ran what I would consider to be an international peace lobby downtown. For the first time our IPU group was operative under new legislation, which had to do with a greater accountability for the funds that were being expended. Also, Albert Gore of Tennessee had become the elected president of our organization and he was quite active in the Foreign Relations Committee. We held a preliminary meeting of the delegation over which Gore presided. At the insistence of Carl Marcy, who was then the chief of staff of the Foreign Relations Committee,

Gore suggested that I go along as administrative officer to help our long-time executive secretary with the United States group at Brussels.

I remember we went by TWA into London, and from London into Brussels. In those days it seemed to me as quite an adventure, to be one of an advance party and to set the group up in its hotel, the old Amigo Hotel in Brussels. We were on hand when the group arrived the morning the conference opened. We put them into a bus and conducted them over to the assembly hall.
Later on, we held some luncheons for the other delegations that were attending the Brussels conference. Generally speaking, I worked to keep the administrative and financial records in better form than they had been, and I would suppose, set up the first administrative organization that would have some accountability to the Senate under the new legislation then in force. I can remember that Albert Gore, after having emphatically told all the delegates that they should not go to a conference and then leave their wives while they returned home or went elsewhere (as a burden upon the group), did that very thing himself. He left his wife in the Amigo Hotel for a couple of nights while he went—I have no idea where.

But the trip was instructive to the point that I learned a great deal about the organization and its make-up, and its mores. Afterward my wife came over to Belgium and we accompanied Senator Gordon Allott of Colorado and his wife down the Rhine, and then came back home from there. That was my first introduction to the IPU. From then on I was put within the organization, on the staff for each of the Interparliamentary Union conferences that followed.

About that time, 1960, the national organization of the Interparliamentary Union took off on a more active program and began holding meetings twice yearly instead of once a year. They set themselves up into a program where they would hold a Spring meeting to prepare for a Fall meeting. For the first three Spring meetings we went to Switzerland, holding one as I recall in Lausanne, Geneva, and Lucerne. Thereafter, the Spring meetings became more detailed and more important to the purposes of the Interparliamentary Union. They have since been held worldwide at the invitation of the host nation, rather than in Switzerland. For a time I was more or less the representative of the staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations on the Interparliamentary Union staff. This was because the Senate leadership had given the Foreign Relations Committee and its chairman the privilege of the recommendations for the names of delegates to go to all international conferences as well as to suggest the staffing of whatever delegation the Senate sent to worldwide meetings.

While I was on the committee staff I also was staff member to the Senate delegates to the Canadian and United States interparliamentary exchanges, and domestically helped out with the staffing and support of the Mexican and
United States interparliamentary exchanges. I also went on two, possibly three, conferences of the British Parliamentary Association, at which we usually fielded Senate delegates as observers, for agenda items concerned with security matters. On one of these, held in 1959 in Australia, I was fortunate to go around the world with Senator Allen Frear. I was also party to an Italian-United States parliamentary exchange, and I think had some hand in exchanges or correspondence between the parliaments of Japan, Rumania, the Soviet Union, and Israel all with the idea of bringing together on a common level members of different parliaments on a bilateral basis, for the promotion of the exchange of ideas, and I suppose in the interests of international security and peace.

We, for instance, were on our way to an international conference of the Interparliamentary Union in Delhi, India in 1969, when we received an invitation to visit the members of the Supreme Soviet. As a consequence, and after some negotiation, we flew in an Air Force Transport Plane into Moscow and from Moscow to India via Tashkent. I can remember that we were cordially received and conducted about Moscow and also went one morning up to the Kremlin. There the Russians lined us up along a long table, facing them, to be harangued, and that is the word, for more than two hours on such things as the observance by the Senate of Lithuanian Independence Day, and other such arbitrary matters which the Soviets considered insulting to our mutual relations. We had practically no way of responding because we never got the opportunity. This one session we had with them sticks out in my memory because the Soviets addressed us at the top of their voices. I'm certain they wanted to make sure they were overheard on the "bug" that was in the room. They wanted to demonstrate their loyalty to the foreign policy of their country. They didn't want to be misunderstood except at the top of their voices.

And they talked so long and so hard that they ultimately wore down their own interpreter. When he completely broke down, that ended the session. But later they gave us a lunch and we drank ordinary toasts and went on to Tashkent, where we found the people were much better and much more amiable, in the tradition of that section of that country.

RITCHIE: What was the response of the senators to that harangue?
ST. CLAIRE: Amusement. Silence and amusement. They sat there and looked at those men and women addressing us from the other side. Now and then they would say, "Well, can't we change the subject? Why don't we talk about sea beds?" But no one wanted to talk about sea beds. They wanted to talk about Lithuania and Estonia and the Ukraine.

As time went on I became more and more useful to the United States group; I became administrative officer to two executive secretaries. One of them was George Galloway of the Library of Congress, and the other one was a congresswoman from New York.

RITCHIE: Was it Kelly or St. George?

ST. CLAIRE: St. George, Mrs. Katharine St. George. After she resigned (and she had been out of Congress by that time for two years), I then became the executive secretary and carried on until the end of 1977. I was carried over for a period in 1977 by election of the organization even though I had retired on April 1 of that year. This time, when they went to Lisbon, in 1978, was the first time I had not been on one of their meetings since 1959. But it was, and I still think, an extraordinary opportunity to see the world and understand the various forms of parliamentary association in the world. I can't call all of them governments, because they're not. To have met, or at least placed under observation, a great number of worldwide figures was a privilege of my time. All of our conferences, I might say, were opened by the heads of state wherever they were held, which gave us an opportunity to see and hear a number of the more prominent people over the past twenty years.

Many of the delegations, including our own, had some top-flight leaders along. Gerald Ford was one of our delegates when we met in Yugoslavia back in the '60's. Strange enough he never forgot that. Every time he saw me thereafter, even as President of the United States, he always reminded me of the good times and how satisfied he was with our conference in Yugoslavia. Somewhere I have a snapshot of him and two other members from the House, as I recall, lined up with the chief of staff of the Yugoslav airforce, at a place somewhere near the top of the Adriatic. We wanted to see, he and some of the other members, wanted to see what the Yugoslavs were doing with our security contributions, our arms contribution, under the Foreign Assistance Act. In those days the Yugoslavs were part of our security program and were receiving arms supplies. They were a little reluctant to grant our request, but ultimately they furnished us with an old DC-3 of the Yugoslav airforce, and we flew up to this airport, to find
practically everything, not only

their planes but all of their spare parts, warehoused in the open air, because they did not have sufficient covering for them. Of course, this is not true now, but that was in the early days of their airforce, when they were attempting to get something put together in a defensive way. We were cordially received-and drank a hell of a lot of Slivovitz, and came back that afternoon. I lined them all up and took a snapshot, and someday I'm going to find the snapshot and send it to the former President, because I think it was the only one ever taken of that group.

In a sense, I feel that over the past twenty years those delegates that did go to these meetings from Congress accomplished within the maximum permitted them what they set out to do, and that was to promote international relations. One thing that we always remembered, and had to remember, is that the organization was worldwide and had an open membership. Some of the members, like the North Koreans, were and still are our bitter enemies. But

in order to create something that had the breadth and depth of the United Nations and the League of Nations, we had to accept their membership and listen to their points of views, not that you had to suffer them in silence, you never did, but it did give you a forum whereby you could hear these opponents of ours in another context, which was to say on a legislative rather than on a diplomatic plane. They even mouthed the same things their diplomats said. But it helped to understand what their driving force was, and what they were attempting to do, and understand what they thought of us.

The abuse of the United States by these people, by our opponents, seemed to run in cycles. One year we would be labored for our stand in Indochina, the next year we would suffer not too silently because of our stand in the Middle East. Then these diatribes would end. There would be peace and contentment and a general consensus about international relations and international comity for

a year or two, and after that our enemies began all over again.

RITCHIE: Did the Vietnam War create a lot of tensions for the delegates?
ST. CLAIRE: Yes, it did. Each time we went there we heard about it. But not so much of it really as the wars between Egypt and Israel and Syria. It seems that we were more on the attack and more attacked by our non-friends on the matter of our relations with Israel than on any other subject. I think that’s because our opponents understood that they were just as deep in Vietnam, not with combat troops but otherwise as deep in it as we were, particularly so the Russians and their satellite nations. Then again, a good deal of the criticism of the United States had to be tempered, particularly by such people as Poland and Rumania and Czechoslovakia because of their trade hopes, because of their expectations of what we might be able to do for them, independently of what benefit they were getting out of their association with the Soviet bloc. In any event,

we went here and there and ultimately (my prime concern was in the finances of it) I finished up in the black with over a hundred thousand dollars still in the bank, as of December 31, 1977.

RITCHIE: Could funds be carried over from year to year?

ST. CLAIRE: Yes. This was something that I really put into effect as a program for the group. The minute that funds were available to us, particularly the forty-five thousand dollars we received and still receive from the United States Treasury for the purposes of financing our attendance at the conferences, when this became available at the beginning of each fiscal year I would put it in the bank. Then I would draw a CD against it that would pay anywhere from 5½ to 6½ percent interest.

RITCHIE: CD?

ST. CLAIRE: Certificate of deposit. So that it would be government funds drawing private interest. In that way I helped increase our take by several thousand dollars. Also in the early days it was quite a

scratch. We went from prosperity to poverty when Congress decided to put a limitation upon the amount of local currencies, counterpart funds, that could be drawn by individual delegates, or by the chairman, or even by the staff members. When we first started out it was possible for me as a staff member authorized by the Foreign Relations Committee to go to the embassy and just say I
wanted several thousand dollars for the support of the delegation. I would spend that principally on an embassy reception, or on these lunches that I referred to, or on ground transportation. For instance, for the first five or six years we financed our local transportation costs and even our commercial airplane costs out of local currencies. In those days also I used to shake the tambourine under the noses of our escort friends from the Defense Department. I'd ask them how much they wanted to contribute by their presence. They started out with five thousand dollars, to be contributed to the general fund of the group, but that was narrowed down to maybe twenty-five hundred, and finally that dried up altogether. They ended by giving us support for cars that might be rented for local transportation, and that, too, dried up. Finally, they finished up on our back instead of us being on theirs. They managed to reverse the process, but that doesn't keep them from tagging along and enjoying all the prerogatives of a delegate as members of the escort service.

RITCHIE: Does the military provide a plane for the delegates?

ST. CLAIRE: The military does, yes. The planes are provided by the Defense Department, but you have to request them. They are the special mission aircraft that sit out at Andrews and carry not only members of Congress, but members of the Executive branch here and there to conferences. In the beginning we were very comfortably provided for, in these planes with two rows of two seats each, and a VIP section, totaling forty-eight persons. When Lyndon Johnson came in he immediately reconfigured them so that they would carry one-hundred-plus persons. The planes had two rows of three seats each, plus the VIP section. You could hardly get down the aisle. He wanted to take along with him as many as could go, and he saw to it that the press was there also in force. With the advent of Nixon, however, the planes went back to two rows, two seats, and VIP section again. As far as I know they're the same planes that we had in the early '60's, still operating, although they have had new engines which give them longer range.

In the beginning it was quite a scratch to keep ahead of the game financially, because forty-five thousand dollars would not really carry us through two conferences. We were, in fact, beginning to go to three and sometimes four meetings a year. In the early days any of the funds
which I had left over from local currencies I would bring back and put in the bank. And any funds that I had left over from the escort service I would bring them back and put it in the bank. On a couple of glorious occasions, once in Sri Lanka, another time in Delhi, where we had excess currencies, I was able to finance the whole of our conference expenses, everything, just on the chairman's signature. The excess funds were just waiting to be used, to the credit of the United States in Sri Lanka and in India. It was gravy. But wherever we went we paid our way. I think we paid our way more than other delegations. We never asked the State Department for support, which the State Department has done for many, many of these conferences. As I say, in the end, frugality and watchfulness paid off, because I turned over better than a hundred thousand dollars in cash to my successor in 1978.

RITCHIE: Some of the press accounts, particularly recently, have played up the junket side of the trip, and indicated that some senators, like William Scott, have been abusing the privilege. Do you think that's a fair commentary?

ST. CLAIRE: Yes, I think that's a fair assessment of some of our delegates. I will say this,
only a day or just overnight, or even two days, we were brought into the presence of all the leaders of that particular nation. Their leaders talked to our chairman and other members, who were somewhat within the leadership of the United States Congress. And this is good. I don't know how else you can say it is not good, except that it did help to warm up the debate inside the Soviet Bloc, or it helped to solidify our views with other, more friendly countries.

The visit to the United States twice by the members of the Supreme Soviet was a direct result of negotiations which I early carried on with one or two members of the Soviet embassy here in an effort to set up an exchange of parliamentarians between the two countries. Certainly, Senator Sparkman's decision to take our delegation into Moscow and Tashkent in 1969 had its own effect, notwithstanding the probability we were abused more than amused. Then later on, Congressman Ed Derwinski, as House chairman of our group, flew down to Leningrad from Helsinki. As the consequence of those two meetings and visits and other negotiations the Soviets sent over here a delegation a couple of years ago, which we greeted and entertained and debated on the Hill.

On their first visit, the Soviets sent us some of their really top people. They had been deliberately selected to come here for the purposes of promoting Soviet views, but at the same time they were among the most alert and talented members of their Supreme Soviet you would want. That helped, I think, to clear the air, and as a consequence we also sent a very top level group over to the Soviet Union two years ago. So there has been some benefit out of this Interparliamentary Union between the opponents visiting within the framework of the organization.

But, yes, of course, once our delegates land in foreign places, they do tour. There's no question about that. But this is also true of the diplomatic corps going to these special conferences. And this is true of the President and his family. They never go anywhere but what they don't follow a "woman's program," or they don't follow a tour program. You can't imagine them just going to Peking without seeing the Great Wall. The embassy people are so accustomed and so programmed for these conferences that they automatically assume that you want a visit to the museums, as well as a visit to the heads of state. So it goes. So you see a great deal more than you otherwise would if you didn't go, or if you went as a common American tourist. No, I'll take that back. I think the common American
tourist sees much more of these countries than the delegates who go to them, because they do go there for a purpose. If you are a delegate, you have to parcel out your time, you have to give it some occasion anyway. That means maybe your wives are going to see the museums but you don't.

**RITCHIE**: Would you have divided the senators who went on these trips into "work-horses," and "showhorses?" Were there some who were more diligent about attending the conferences and others more interested in the tours?

**ST. CLAIRE**: Well, yes, that's true enough. You do have some who have a hard time getting to the conference hall, have a hard time meeting with group every morning at nine o'clock for breakfast, but they are remarkably few. The rest of them to my mind have always turned to and done their duty and done their jobs. Once they got within the fabric of the conference, once they sat down and began to hear other men speak, this gave them the desire to speak, too. Of course, every man in the Congress is going to want to speak at some time or another, that's why he's there. They might have gone there with the idea of semiparticipation, but you set them down within the body of other men who are attempting to arrive at a consensus in four or five languages, and you begin to hear them talk and present their arguments, then you begin to get ideas to refute them, or to back them. Then you get into it. This is why some of our delegates develop an interest which initially is not there, but which they're glad to express.

**RITCHIE**: Did you ever get any of the presidential contenders going along for some foreign exposure, members like John Kennedy, Humphrey, Muskie, Eugene McCarthy? Did any of them try to use these meetings?

**ST. CLAIRE**: Seldom at the Interparliamentary Union. We did have them, I have seen them at other conferences—McCarthy long before I think he ever thought of being a presidential possibility. Certainly Ford didn't have any presidential pretensions when he went to Yugoslavia. Oh, Lyndon Johnson went to Paris for the NATO meeting that I was on, but that was after he had
been elected Vice President with Kennedy. We did have at the Yugoslav meeting Ted Kennedy.

I don't think you would find that they would consider that exposure sufficient for the media purposes back in the United States. You're set down among anywhere from nine hundred to twelve hundred other delegates, all there from different parts of the world. The general debate is just that, generalized and a little endless, and a little boring. Any decisions that are taken generally are in consensus. They include everything. There's not really the opportunity to try out your lance that would otherwise give you the prominence and notoriety you need back home.

Those men who have had aspirations, like Scoop Jackson, have traveled alone, and having arrived at Moscow have gotten themselves into an hour or so with Brezhnev, or gone to Paris and seen the president. This type of foreign exposure is probably the best because it means that you are followed down and followed out by American press people at that end, and they put you on their wire back home. Whereas anything that was ever filed abroad about our participation in the Interparliamentary Union by the AP or the UPI, ended up on the floor of the editor's desk in New York.

He just put it out of the file and that's it. I think in the whole time, only in Brasilia once during the Cuban crisis, did we get press coverage.

RITCHIE: To continue with the issue of foreign policy, I'd like to go back and talk a bit more about your work with the Foreign Relations Committee. You described your work with the committee as "clerical in the extreme," and that you were involved as chief clerk in basically the business of the committee, but that period from 1958 to 1965 was a very exciting one, with a lot of international activity. It seems to me, looking back, that it must have been a very exciting period to work with the Foreign Relations Committee.

ST. CLAIRE: It was, I feel. A great deal was done by the committee. The committee had a strong voice in the foreign policy conclusions of this country. I would have to talk about personalities, however, to justify that. To say that Senator William Fulbright, for example, was a very articulate and liberal proponent
of our foreign activities, such as they might have been realized in the White House or the State Department, or such as he might have wished to suggest them to the White House. He was an extraordinarily patient chairman. He would hear everybody out, including Senator Frank Lausche of Ohio, who used to arrive one half hour late and then ask the same questions that had already been asked and go over the same ground that had been covered twice, and want to make further admonition to the chairman about what hadn't been done or should be done.

I'm not too sure why Fulbright was a patient man, why he was a tolerant man, because by nature I don't think he was. I think he had many moments of quiet anger, and I've seen him when I thought he was quite an intense man. He, however, was humorous, and very pragmatic, and still has that delightful legal mind. That is something a lot of people very rarely knew about him, that he was at one time a teacher of law, and had practiced law. He was able to arrive

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at equations and solutions that were remarkable and so well put together that you wondered how he did it in the time that was given to us, especially on the mornings that we had our hearings. He did have a few burdens, Lausche was one; Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin was a burden—even to himself; and Senator Green, even though he had slipped away from active participation, also had to be catered to, even after he surrendered the chairmanship.

Primarily as staff members on policy and administrative matters, we would work with the chairman, very amiably and very agreeably with him. We found him to be a very decent man to talk to, to make suggestions to. Essentially, if he said yes, or if he said no, he would say, "Well, but check that out with Bourke."

Bourke Hickenlooper was the number one Republican sitting right next to Fulbright. These two men had the same amity that Connally and Vandenberg had in the earlier days. Hickenlooper and

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Fulbright between them ran the committee, made the judgments, arrived at the accommodations, and I think, angled the committee toward a very useful life and very useful existence. I can't tell you how much influence they had downtown, I don't know. They did what they could.

The only thing I can fault them on is that the committee itself, and this, of course, is second judgment and I suppose the senators who were then on the committee would want a second judgment too, the only thing I can fault them on is the conduct by this country of the Vietnam war, under the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations. I was not there for the
Nixon administration, but I can remember well how Dean Rusk and (Robert) McNamara and Allen Dulles and others would come to the committee with armloads of optimism and all amount of facts and figures, to justify our participation in what was in the next month or so going to be the complete solution, if not a victory, for the

United States forces in Vietnam. It would make extraordinary reading, I'm sure, for anybody who goes back over their testimony. They always appeared together, McNamara and Rusk, in the days when anyone who really knew the facts as they existed, knew there was only one way out of it, and that was the way that Nixon ultimately had to take.

The committee was never, never, never critical of these men, or with Allen Dulles. The only time I ever saw Allen Dulles taken on was by Wayne Morse; Dulles thought that Morse had put something insulting in the Record of him, and Wayne Morse went after him. McNamara's and Rusk's command of information put them at the advantage over senators. I wouldn't think that Senator Fulbright or Senator Hickenlooper or any of the rest of them had even been denied any of the information they wanted. It was more probable that it wasn't volunteered to them. Again, I suppose, there might also be another Congressional conviction: let George do it.

"These people are in charge, if they make a mistake we'll criticize it, if they don't make a mistake then we haven't criticized what they're doing in order to obtain successful results." This might have been part of the psychology of the committee, that they were mostly unwilling to argue with these men, to question them, to even send anybody into the field to find out if they were getting the truth. They were getting the truth all right, but the truth has many forms. Yes, I would fault the committee on that point, and I think that those men who sat there would now fault themselves that they possibly didn't inquire as vigorously as they could.

RITCHIE: Looking also back at that period, there were a number of crises that came up in international affairs, like the U-2 affair, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Missile crisis, the Gulf of Tonkin crisis. Did that crisis atmosphere ever permeate into the committee rooms and to the staff?

ST. CLAIRE: No. I wouldn't say that it did. I, of course, was out of the country in
Brasilia at the time of the Cuban crisis. I was on the committee during the Bay of Pigs. Again, that was a question of: "Well, the President is the President, and perhaps he knows what he's doing." I wasn't privy to how much advance information the committee received, for instance, on the Bay of Pigs. I can't remember it ever coming up as a matter of controversy in the committee. It may have. The only thing I do remember is that Senator Aiken and Pat Holt (I was told this and I hope that it's probably true), visited the staging areas in Central America before the Bay of Pigs invasion. They went down there because they had probably obtained private information. They came back and attempted in some way to stop or question that operation. I don't know if they ever thought it was going to fail or succeed, but they had some qualms about it, and these were evidenced, either to the chairman of the committee or to the White House, of course without any result, as you know. That was what I was told. What was the other?

**RITCHIE**: The U-2 was the earliest.

**ST. CLAIRE**: Yes, the U-2 did excite a great deal of controversy in the committee, and that I can testify to. I had just come on the committee staff. There was this investigation. Was it a joint investigation by the Armed Services and the Foreign Relations Committee? In any event, we met over in the hearing room of the Foreign Relations Committee, after having it thoroughly de-bugged, and having drapes put over the doors, and swearing everybody to secrecy. We pulled in members of the CIA and the State Department, as I recall, and they were rather closely questioned about the whole matter of it.

The security part of it was such that we only had one or two reporters, maybe more, who did the transcription right there in our own offices. These transcripts were then reviewed jointly on the spot, ad hoc, by Richard Helms and Chip Bohlen. If there was any controversy between the two of them I was supposed to resolve it. There was never any controversy, except one, and I think I voted with Chip and that was the end of it. Meanwhile the hearing went on. Yes, that excited quite a bit of national attention, and I know we used to have the reporters hanging around outside. But to be honest about it I don't recall what conclusion
came of it. They probably said that it was just a lost bet, let it go at that.

The committee basically, I think, found itself like all the other committees on the hill as sort of an addendum to the declared policies of the executive departments. Not that they didn't try, and didn't succeed, many, many times in making their views known and have a great deal to do with maybe the modifying and reshaping of some of the executive policies and judgments. You see, they sat in judgment on the executive departments, rather than initiating anything. But why go into that? This has been argued by all manner of political scientists in the past as to what the actual relation of Congress is to the White House, and the White House is to the Congress. You can read hundreds of books on it. But just basically to me, here were men, the senators, so hagridden by their own priorities, most of which had to be referred back to their state or initiated from their state, trying to find time during the day for not only the Foreign Relations Committee but the other committees they belong to, to meet their constituents and still make the reception that they're here at that night at a downtown hotel.

They had to come to rely upon their ad hoc conclusions about what was given to them, or said to them, and of course they have to lean particularly upon their staff to give them any reshaping they might wish in the matter of their own conclusions or accommodations, particularly if they were to make speeches. As a staff member, I was primarily concerned with administrative matters, but as a staff

we used to serve committee members evenhandedly. I wrote speeches for opponents and proponents, and considered it a bounded duty to do so. At present it seems quite different. The committee staff has expanded and it's been segmented. Every senator has his own person on there who has to make his daily report to the senator and who might be in a position to tug him away from the general line, what you might call the bipartisan policy. Again, here we are, I'm lamenting the old days.

RITCHIE: You said at one point that you had the committee room "de-bugged." Did you ever feel that there was a possibility that the rooms were bugged?

ST. CLAIRE: Yes, we had them swept. We'd have the people from the Defense Department or CIA come in and sweep the room, before Allen Dulles, for instance, gave his annual summary of the world. Everyone thought it was a very good condensation of the New York
Again and again we felt that we were being palavered and creamed by these appearances of these people, that they only wanted you to hear what they wanted you to hear, and if they had anything really of any deep significance they would keep it for the chairman in his office. Yes, we would have these rooms swept before we had the appearance of these people. If there were to be even a more deep-dyed hearing or session, it was held in the back office.

There was a time when Carl Marcy and I thought that we were being bugged. This came about this way: he and I had had a conversation concerning about the then Secretary of State. Carl Marcy made a remark to me, and I said, "Yes, that's right." A few days later, Carl Marcy was talking to the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State used the phrase back to Carl Marcy that I had agreed with. We thought that our phones, Carl Marcy's phone, was bugged. He wasn't on the phone at the time, he was in his office, talking.

I think that we were all under suspicion at one time or another by the White House or by the State Department for leaks which, candidly, came from the senators and not from us. We had one senator, who's still now in the Senate, who sent over for four top secret folios and they were to be kept in his office and returned to me. He signed for them. They not only showed up at plane side out at Andrews, but a good deal of the information goes into one or two newspaper columns. We know that the senators were responsible. We just shrugged it off. But the staff took the blame for it initially, until we could convince the chairman where the top secret transcripts went.

I think that the window beside my desk was possibly opened to intrusion. I used to check this out now and then with the State Department, and they told me yes that it was possible to put a beam up against it, it was possible to tap the committee room from the outside, or someone could come in and put something the size of a quarter which would have broadcast ability. None of this have I ever checked out. I always lowered the metal Venetian blinds down on my window and on other windows when somebody like the King of Jordan was coming. In that instance I closed my blind and left the committee room. On my return, the King of Jordan was talking and that blind had been opened. It had been changed from the inside, but I was never able to discover
I was called, and this is a matter that someday probably will be used, but I was called down to see an FBI agent in the private office of Senator Hayden, and in the presence of Senator Hayden's AA, Roy Elson, who is still alive, and still my good friend, was asked by the agent how our transcripts were reported and typed up and sent back on receipt to the committee. After he had left, I said to, Roy Elson, "What is this all about?" He said, "Well these transcripts are showing up on one of the bloc embassy's radios at 6:00 o'clock on the same night." The testimony that was given that morning was on the radio (of course, we had broken the code) that night going back to their home office. Later on the same FBI man called me and asked me about certain things having to do with foreign aid. He asked me the same questions that had been asked by me from an embassy, which I took to be the Polish embassy, and he repeated the same questions to me that this Pole had asked me on the telephone about foreign aid, and which I had not been able to answer. I had said, "Please call Pat Holt, he's the expert on this, I don't know anything about it." I realized then what this FBI guy was doing, he was getting a voice recording of me on the phone. That's what he wanted.

Then the CIA would come in, years ago, and sit down with the two transcripts that had been given in hearing by Allen Dulles. They went through them and put marks on the transcripts with paperclips. I would say, "What the hell are you doing?" They'd say, "We're just checking it out." What they were checking out is that they had probably intercepted somewhere some uses of Dulles' transcripts. They probably thought we had a leak in the office. I don't doubt there might have been a leak in the office. I know it wasn't me, I'm sure of that. But I think I came under the same suspicion, I'm sure I came under the same suspicion, as others might have.

Here came the Secretary of State, followed by his man, one afternoon. They walked through the office and the man had a briefcase with him. As he was going by, there was a "sing" coming out of the briefcase. It was probably an apparatus to see whether there was a "bug" in our office, or an apparatus to pick up what they were going to talk about. The chairman of our committee had a bugging apparatus bought for him by the Sergeant at Arms, so he could wear it at times. It's all part of the business. Ultimately, I
think they ended up by taking all the CIA transcripts and putting them back in the CIA vaults. I could never see, to be very honest with you, anything that transpired in that committee room, even though it might have had a top secret category, that would be of any conclusive use, really, to any foreign agents, because our executive people simply would not tell us. This does not mean they would not tell the chairman or the ranking Republican, or would not have members of the committee come downtown, which I'm sure they did. But up there, on the Hill, it was more of a show. There was just an idea of showing ones' self, making a record, then walking out and being put on television for the purposes of the evening news. They would get that media exposure. That's all they ever used it for. They never told us a God-damned thing they didn't want us to know.

RITCHIE: In 1965, you left the Foreign Relations Committee and became Chief Clerk of the Senate.

ST. CLAIRE: Yes.

RITCHIE: And then Assistant Secretary of the Senate.

ST. CLAIRE: Well, they changed the title.

RITCHIE: What was the reason for the change of title?

ST. CLAIRE: Well, Francis Valeo thought it would be a better idea. I frankly didn't care for the idea of changing it, because the Chief Clerk was the old familiar Senate term, and had been since maybe the Second or Third Congress, and up until that time there had only been about five or six Chief Clerks till the time I took the office over.

RITCHIE: What were the functions, basically, of the job of Chief Clerk and Assistant Secretary?

ST. CLAIRE: When I first moved into the Secretary's office he worked on the floor. He was a reading clerk. He was legislative clerk, and reading clerk, and tally clerk all rolled into one. He had some administrative duties inside the office, but they were not many. In fact, they were almost non-existent. The staff was so small then that the Secretary made all of the
decisions, right down to how

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many phone calls you paid for and could have. That held true through the other Chief Clerks that succeeded the man I'm talking about (who is "Uncle John" Crockett, as we used to call him). He was from Iowa and I think I've told you he was an old tent Shakespearian actor, he and his wife, before they came to Washington. He didn't want to make many decisions and conclusions. I was working on patronage for Senator Hayden and most of the administrative conclusions in the office were made between myself and Edwin Halsey.

I came on under "Skeeter" Johnston, Emory Frazier was still Chief Clerk. Later on, I was schooled for floor work, and I was supposed to do it, but frankly it just wasn't my bag. I found I could not call roll calls. I called several of them. I think ultimately I would have gotten to where I was proficient at it, I had no trouble of the rest of it, reading and handling the bills and keeping the leadership advised from time to time as they came

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up and asked me. I did quite a bit of desk work in the early days, but more and more I wanted to pull myself out of it, because of my ongoing interest in the Interparliamentary Union. So it was easy enough to expand the Senate desk force, to find substitutes, and make my job primarily administrative. That's the whole story.

RITCHIE: What type of administrative work did you do then?

ST. CLAIRE: Personnel and a good deal of policy decisions having to do with ironing out problems that occurred, for example, with the official reporters. That was the initial problem. Val and I had that to solve. There was quite a bit of personal jealousy among some of the reporters, and we had to work that out. Then we effected reorganization of some of the Secretary's other departments. I can't say that the problems were great, or that they demanded too much executive ability, but it seemed to me that we were constantly busy. Val and I were constantly talking about solutions within the organization, and what could be done to improve it, what could be done to give it a more non-political flavor.
I had, I suppose, been as much responsible along with Felton Johnston as any to bring what you might call "career people" into the organization, into the Secretary's framework. When I first came there the whole office practically, with the exception of the Chief Clerk and the Parliamentarian, changed when the majority shifted in the Senate. I was a patronage employee and everybody except the Parliamentarian and Chief Clerk, was a patronage employee. As I worked with Felton Johnston and with Valeo afterwards, as we were able to make the decisions for Senator Hayden first and afterwards for Mike Mansfield, we ran people into the outfit who had some promise of staying on, and we knew would give it the old career try. That's what we left, and I think it's to our advantage and also to our praise that we saw that initially maybe ten, fifteen years ago, Johnston, myself, and Val, were able to hand over to the new Secretary in 1977 an ongoing and, I think, efficient administration. He's shown that by the fact that he's left it alone.

RITCHIE: Did you deal mostly with the staff, or did you ever deal with senators' problems as well?

ST. CLAIRE: I had mostly staff problems. And for some reason there were many, I don't know why. Principally, because everybody, I guess, thought he was underpaid, and I think some of them were. My senatorial associations primarily had to do with the Legislative Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and whatever appearances were necessary, of course, before the Rules Committee. Some Secretaries had great personal association with the senators, like Leslie Biffle and Felton Johnston. Others had satisfactory ones but nowhere near the political associations that were evidenced by Biffle and Johnston. Once you left the floor you lost your communication with every member of the Senate.

If you sat at the desk they understood who you were, and they were quite friendly with you if they saw you. This is not to say that I didn't have a great number of friendships among the senators, I did. I suppose I knew at least half of them very well, and they knew me very well, from working on the Rules Committee, from my Foreign Relations days, and from the brief time I put in on the floor. I can't say though that there was much that you could give them as senators, except the services that were accorded them by the Secretary of the Senate's office.

But Val and I always seemed to have problems, there was always some weekly problem
somewhere. It wasn't much, but it was enough to keep us busy, and required conferences, and required patience, particularly in the personnel area. I hope that those that follow after me will not have the temperamental attitudes that Val and I seemed to run into. We inherited a great number of types. We were always constantly adjusting to them, because the people we were dealing with in our area were efficient, and valuable to us, and there was no reason why we should have to get huffy with them. We just couldn't—shouldn't rather, we could have, but we did not.

RITCHIE: How would you evaluate Frank Valeo as Secretary of the Senate?

ST. CLAIRE: By his initial statement about the office to me—"if it works, let it alone." That's the way he looked at it. He was a most pleasant man and a very able man. In fact, I think he was, and I say this advisedly, the first scholar, the first student knowledgeable in political affairs and international relations, who ever held that job. In a way I think he might have been a little odd to the job, because he had come to it not as a politician but as a man who was useful in the foreign relations field to Mike Mansfield. Mike and Marcy and Val, when I was on the Foreign Relations Committee staff, would have luncheon every Saturday in the Senate Restaurant. This went on for months. Mansfield, I think, at that moment was gauging between the two of them to see who would be the most useful to him. But he probably also was sifting for ideas between the two of them, since Mansfield then and now was very much oriented toward inter-national relations.

Then when the Bobby Baker thing broke, Mansfield had to have somebody who was not within the political area of the Senate. He deliberately went out of his way to find people who had no political associations whatsoever or any economic associations whatsoever with any of the senators—and he found Val. So he made him Majority Secretary. This is not to say that Val wasn't the most useful to him in that job. He took it over and he did a bang-up job of it, but one of the conditions that Mansfield put upon himself, I think, when he was trying to select people around him was that they would have no ties back to the former leadership. I've been told this and I think it's true. He also had
great faith in Val, and Val of course, was of great utility to him, not only in the matter of the Majority Secretary, but also phrasing things for him, as he did in the matter of domestic issues, and getting up speeches on foreign relations. He continued this right into the Secretary of the Senate. He was so much on Mansfield's carpet all day long, and in his office, that Val pleasantly enough turned everything in the way of the administration over to me and told people in the office that they should talk to me if they wanted to talk about administrative matters, which gave me great confidence and showed great loyalty, and Val was a man of great loyalty, and still is. He's a great friend. He's a friend to everybody he's a friend to.

RITCHIE: I came across a little piece in one of Jack Anderson's books in the late '60's that it was a great surprise to a number of senators when Frank became Secretary that the “well” dried up in his office.

ST. CLAIRE: That’s not true. The well did not dry up. The well was very much there and in evidence and anybody who wanted it could go in and get it. I think there's no question that Val was congenial, but he was never congenial with them in the way that Leslie Biffle was. Val accepted them as senators and I think treated them with respect. I think inside that office they were not used to it. I know personally that it cost him a great deal of money to keep that well going. He gave me a figure one time, probably could break me to keep up the amount of whiskey that was drunk. And even at that time the number who were going in there had cut back from the early days when Felton Johnston had it. The place was filled for lunch and was filled in the evening, and was filled when Les Biffle had it. Harry Truman, once he answered his roll call headed right back for Biffle's office and a drink. This later became Biffle's strength in the Truman Administration, it was just as simple as that.

Val sat and talked with them, but I don't know that, and of course I never sat with Val too much inside the office, but I never thought that Val was prepared to equate himself with them. Maybe this was the trouble. If you start to drink with these men you start to equate yourself with them, and you begin to tell them the jokes that they later think were their
own. You've got to be part of a hail-fellow-well-met operation.

In the early days, again in the '40's, the Biffle lunches in the Truman administration had great utility and were very useful to the executive departments. The executive departments openly attempted to utilize them and participated in them for their own purposes. This was because Biffle, whether he paid for these lunches or not (and I don't think he ever did), would set up a table in the back room that always had the Vice President at its head. He would have the Secretary of State come up, bring in his people, and sit down with four or five senators, and really hash things over and do a good job of it. This

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got them to know each other on a man to man basis, on an arms-length basis, and this was good. These lunches went on day after day after day. They were a tradition, an operation, and were damned useful to Truman, but they were also useful to Biffle because he at the same time was the secretary of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee. These were the days before we had great responsibility in the matter of contributions and expenditures of finances. And everybody knew this. So that back office was a different operation altogether.

It fell away slightly under Mark Trice, and it fell away markedly under Carl Loeffler. It might have been reinstated, but I think as senators got busier, and as they had less and less time to have longer lunches, they had to commit themselves more and more to committee work and to their offices. As the demands of their constituency grew they couldn’t find the time to come in there and sit and hash things

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over, they had no time to walk in and sit down and talk with one another in the Democratic and Republican cloakrooms. They used to do this in the '30's, you'd find them sometimes in the cloakrooms all day long. So it wasn't particularly that the well had dried up (and the well didn't dry up), but the emphasis had gone off of it.

RITCHIE: Although the same reference indicated that some of them found that (Sergeant at Arms) Joe Duke's office was providing a convivial place to go for a drink.

ST. CLAIRE: Well, Joe set up his own operation in opposition first to Biffle, believe it or not, and then he kept it up in relation to Felton Johnston. But Joe Duke never got the senators that really counted. But he did set it up. Of course, there was also a new well established in the Majority Secretary's office, and a new well established in the Minority Secretary's office.
Dirksen also had his own well. If you were invited down to Dirksen's well afterwards you were made. The Republicans began to flock down there while he was alive. You really were part of the inner circle if you were invited down to have a drink with Everett Dirksen.

**RITCHIE**: I don't think that Robert Byrd is the type of person who had a great drinking crowd.

**ST. CLAIRE**: No. I don't think that of [Robert] Griffin, although he did have that office just off the floor. It's a form of life, maybe, that's not gone out entirely, but again I believe that the emphasis has switched to where senators are finding that those hours after five o'clock are the ones, when their constituents have left their offices and gone back to their hotels, that they can do the best work they want to with their own staff, before they head downtown for a reception. There isn't a senator who can't go downtown every night for a reception, if he wants to.

**RITCHIE**: Well, Valeo as Secretary spent quite a bit of time working directly with Mike Mansfield . . .

**ST. CLAIRE**: Yes, he was his right hand man, no question about it. I think he did both, a great deal of his speeches and probably advised him on it. But this doesn't mean, of course, that Mike Mansfield wasn't his own man. He was very receptive to advice. If he had confidence in you he would take anything you suggested. In fact, he liked to have people come to him and help him, he wanted it. But that didn't mean that Mike Mansfield wasn't his own man. If he had a commitment or a persuasion, he was willing to follow it through, and he was very stubborn about many of his persuasions. I thought he was a good leader because of his tolerance, because of his attitudes towards people. He was sort of a corral boss. You have to be that to get along with those temperaments, those individuals that you find on the floor, where every man is individualistic in his reactions and his attitudes. He was good at that. Right now Robert Byrd and Howard Baker are very much on top of their job. They get the grudging respect that
Mike Mansfield never solicited. He did everything, as I understand it, by negotiation, by attitude, by accommodation, and did what he thought he could possibly do. So you very seldom find him angered in the *Record.*

**RITCHIE:** He seemed to be a natural reaction to the type of leadership that Johnson had given the Senate.

**ST. CLAIRE:** Oh yes, he was the natural reaction. That's a very good statement. That's true. He was the antithesis. Now we have Byrd again, so we have not quite a Johnson but a man who gives the job the tremendous vigor and personal attention that Lyndon also gave it. You couldn't do anything on your own when Lyndon was around. If you tried it and he found out that you did it, he'd just chew the hell out of you, no matter how minor it was. He wasn't going to surrender anything at all, in his office or out of his office to anyone, unless it had been cleared with him first.

**RITCHIE:** Do you think the Senate could have another Johnson as a leader, do you think they would tolerate someone like that again?

**ST. CLAIRE:** No, having been through him, I don't think they would. I think he was a creature of his times. Then again, hard times may demand hard leaders. If you get into one sometime again then you may find the senators falling in behind somebody who is aggressive and hard, demanding, who would point the way to results.

**RITCHIE:** The turning point in Byrd's career, in moving up to be leader, seemed to be his defeat of Edward Kennedy in 1969 . . .

**ST. CLAIRE:** Yes.

**RITCHIE:** For the whip's position. What was the story on that? How did he manage to dump Kennedy?

**ST. CLAIRE:** Well, those men who have decided that they want to try for the leadership have always evidenced a concern in the Senate's proceedings, particularly around 5:00 o'clock at night. They were willing to take on the yeomanry that is demanded of a person, to sit for hours at a time to get the Senate acting and to get the
Senate closed out. I saw this done by E. W. McFarland, who was willing to come in and do the chores for Scott Lucas, when Scott Lucas was far too busy to do them; McFarland would show up at night or in the lean hours of the afternoon to manage what had to be done in the way of the small things that must be done before the Senate adjourned for the evening.

This is what Bob Byrd did. He wanted to make sure that everyone understood his interest in the procedures of the Senate, and so he set out not only to show himself on the floor at all odd hours, and long hours, but if he was challenged in the absence of Mike Mansfield he committed to his mind, and he has a very bright mind, a very great mind, the procedures and the parliamentary maneuvers of the Senate. Certainly he understood what the Senate was doing more than anybody else.

Byrd also understood more than any other man that the Senate is an organization that enacts legislation by unanimous consent. Everything that gets done in the Senate is done practically by unanimous consent. He is the one who began to formulate these long lists of bills that could be considered under this extremity and under that extremity, under this condition, under that condition, and to pay attention to the amendments that the senators have to the unfinished business with the idea of accommodating them for media purposes, knowing full well that if he accommodated them for four hours they'd only take two on their amendment, or be accommodated for the submission of five amendments, they'd only bring up one. He and his staff undertook the accommodation that was necessary from the Senate, which is a parliamentary body without limitation on debate, to enact legislation and to accomplish his day's work within the very spare hours that are allowed him, knowing full well that if he operated the Senate like old Joe T. Robinson

operated it, or Scott Lucas operated it, he would never get much done. Or even if he operated it like Lyndon Johnson did, nothing would ever be done. You have to start by amending and cutting your legislation to fit your time, and that's exactly what he'd done. He's the first to realize this, and that's why he's been probably the outstanding Majority Leader of the Senate's history.

Lyndon would go off to Perdenales for four days, five days, and nothing would be done. He'd tell Bobby Baker he didn't want anything done. And Bobby would show up in the back of
the chamber when Mike Mansfield was standing to his feet trying to get something done, and do like this (gestures negatively). This was true. Because he knew that Lyndon didn't want anything done unless Lyndon was there. What Lyndon was doing in Perdenales you tell me, I don't know. Breaking in a new secretary. He'd come back and then there would be this instant rush towards judgment on the part of Johnson, “We’ve got to get

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this damn thing done tonight:" And so by letting everything pile up, the dam ultimately would accommodate it and spill some of it over, and this is what happened. Instead of trying to sluice it in a decent way as Byrd does through the dam, he would let everything pile up behind the dam and then some of it would spill over. Then at the end of every session he would get out a list of the accomplishments of the session, mostly accomplished despite him. He was a very poor leader. Thank God he did become Vice President.

In any event, Ted Kennedy, had become the deputy leader but was not giving the job its due. He was not paying any attention to it. He was not showing up at night and filling in for Mansfield when Mansfield was away. Byrd was there, so he just credited Byrd. Byrd would get up, "I move, Mr. President . . ." and so on, and he'd get the things done. When Kennedy realized what was being done to him, by his non-existence on the floor, when he

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realized that he had not accomplished his chores, he started coming in, he did try to get the floor away from Byrd. But by that time Byrd had the floor, by that time Byrd had the job.

RITCHIE: When Kennedy went into the final vote, though, he thought he had the votes to get reelected. He thought he was going to win by some three or four votes.

ST. CLAIRE: I read that, I don't know.

RITCHIE: There wasn't any scuttlebutt at the time?

ST. CLAIRE: The Republicans told me at that time, they said Kennedy was a young man, very brave, able, who would come in on the floor, make a speech, and a good speech, and then immediately leave the floor before anybody could question him. It may be that in those formative years for him as a senator, even before Chappaquiddick, or afterwards, he was finding that he did not want to stay around. He is a man even now who has a reputation for extraneous
activities, and I'm not too sure that he had been a vigorous senator in his time. Now he may be turning into one. Certainly when he goes after something and supports it, he has the best research done, the best reasons. He is a very forceful speaker on matters that interest him, one of the best, to my way of thinking. He probably does have a very fine future. But Byrd's utility to the Senate was his realization that the Senate simply had to put itself into a strait jacket in order to get things done in the hours permitted to it by the clock. His formulation of these long procedural agreements is the best thing that ever happened to the Senate.

RITCHIE: One other point I wanted to ask about was the role of the Secretary's office in the whole Watergate question. Was there any administrative assistance given to the Ervin Committee? And what about when the Senate had to face the question of having an impeachment vote, were there any preparations made?

ST. CLAIRE: Not so long as Sam Ervin's hearing was ongoing, not so long as that operation continued in the media and on television. We only began to think of an impeachment trial when the hearings of the House Judiciary Committee were scheduled. Then we began to realize that possibly we might have Nixon and his managers in on the floor of the Senate. At that time I went in to Val and told him that I thought we should begin to get the literature together. I think at that time also that the Parliamentarian may have privately begun to work on it. We could not say anything publicly, even to each other, because we did not want the Republicans or Nixon's friends to think that we were getting an inquisition ready. But we did go into, I did some research on it, I'm sure the Parliamentarian did some re-search on it. I know I got together all the literature that was in the Senate Library and took it home with me. We began to think of it as a security problem as well. To that end I went to Balfour (jewelry firm) and asked it to resubmit to us the specimens which they had submitted to the Senate earlier for service pins for both senators and staff, to let us look over them and see what we might need in the way of lapel identification on the floor. The Secretary as I understood it, and I
think I may be correct, becomes the officer of the Senate at the time of an Impeachment trial, and
he has many judgments and decisions to make. One of them of course, an early on thing, would
be the security part of it. So we picked from Balfour's file a lapel pin, with a Senate seal on it
with some field around it, and sent off an order for it. Well, by the time we got the order and
got the pins back, Nixon had resigned, so those pins are somewhere in the area of the Senate. I
don't know what happened to them at all.

RITCHIE: They do give a pin to senators, don't they?

ST. CLAIRE: Yes, each senator gets a pin with a chip diamond in it, and the Senate seal
with the field around it saying "United States Senator." But it was really not until those pins were
designed, or until "We the People," I think, picked up the Senate seal and they went about
painting one on the ceiling of the

Secretary's office, did the seal have any coloration in it at all. It just existed as a flat black-and-
white thing, in the resolution that created it.

RITCHIE: When did they originate the idea of a pin for senators?

ST. CLAIRE: That came on just before I joined the Secretary's office, I don't remember
when it was. There had been a resolution of the Rules and Administration Committee looking
into it, and judgments on it were made by the Committee on Rules and Administration on the
recommendations of Bob Brenkworth and Emory Frazier. Even then, there's a flaw in the seal
that's given to the certificate. I pointed this out several times, but apparently no one bothers about
it. But you will notice that there's a shield and on either side there are two branches, one is an
oak branch and the other is, I think, a laurel branch. If you look at it you will find that either the
oak branch or the laurel branch is pulled away from the shield so that the seal itself is off
balance. It was not

artistically drawn as it should have been. I asked Balfour if they would have their artists re-do it,
but it's never been done, so there it stands.

RITCHIE: The first time I ever saw anything about the pin was in the Post on Sunday,
they had an article on the Senate bureaucracy. Senator [Edward] Zorinsky was quoted as saying that he rejected the pin, that he didn't need a diamond pin in his lapel.

ST. CLAIRE: The House I think also has one. One time they called me from the House Rules Committee and asked me to bring a senatorial pin over, and sit there at a public hearing on a resolution by a Honolulu Congressman, which would have created a lapel pin for House members. Mind you, if you go to Russia they have all manner of Soviet flags all over their lapels. The bloc countries, for instance, are great on identifying the members of their assemblies and their parliaments and anything else, with lapel insignia. I went over there to the Rules Committee, and there was

this congressman, who I think now is a senator from Hawaii (Spark Matsunaga), arguing with the Rules Committee to see if they would give him a rule on his resolution to create a pin, or to create a commission to set up a pin-process, for the House. There was an old Mississippi congressman, he's no longer in the House, red hair, who, after Matsunaga had made his presentation, looked around and said, "Well, gentlemen, sometimes I don't know whether I want to be identified as a House member." He said, "That reminds me, about those tags they give us for our cars. You put them on your car and you take 'em home and you go in some coffee shop and have lunch and come out and there are fifteen people around your car." He said, "I can remember when they wanted to give us licenses for our cars saying we were members of Congress, and I said Hell, I don't want to be driving down and here's some woman changing a tire and I drive by and can't stop because I've got a speaking engagement, but

she sees my license." And so they put the rule aside. Maybe they have one now.

RITCHIE: Did you happen to read that article in the Post on Sunday?

ST. CLAIRE: I read it, but I'm not sure I remember much of it.

RITCHIE: It's very critical. A number of the younger senators in particular feel the Senate has become too bureaucratic and doesn't get things done quickly enough.

I'd like to ask one final question, a retrospective question. Your career with the Senate
spanned more than forty years. How does the Senate today compare to that Senate you first came to in the 1930's? What kind of changes have you seen taking place over the years?

ST. CLAIRE: Well, in the nature and characteristic of a senator, I suppose. Those I remember from the early 1930's were products of what I would call small town politics. They were men who had come out of their legislatures, or had been country attorneys, or local representatives in their legislatures, had

been early identified as young men in their party structure and perhaps at their party conventions, who had read law rather than studied it, who had polished their speaking and oratorical skills—many of them had "outdoor voices," before the P.A. system in the present call—and who in their manner and dress were, I don't like the expression but you might say "courtly."

Two examples, were my two senators. Carl Hayden was a sheriff and a member of the House, not a lawyer, but had worked in the vineyards of the party during the early 1900's, gone to a couple of conventions, identified himself with the people who ran his party. The other one was Henry Fountain Ashurst, who had been a young lawyer, a rather brave orator, was known for his platform presence and had polished his speaking presence. He was very good at it, had an extraordinary amount of reference stories, tributal stories, stories that he could recapture in an instant, and had made his reputation on the hustings of his state and in

the local politics and small towns of his state. Sometimes running for office you stood up in front of a car, and if it was evening they turned on the car lights, and you addressed the people, and maybe fifteen or twenty came to hear you. Or you just hired a hall and got thirty people to come out. Or you went along the streets. You knew every one of the local editors, and your local newspapermen, and your local businessmen, you had friends everywhere. In fact, you didn't get where you were in those days, particularly in the far West and the South, unless you were friendly and were known to the people who went out on the Tuesdays and voted.

There were many men like these people: Tom Connally of Texas, Alben Barkley of Kentucky, all of them you could equate with Henry Fountain Ashurst in their attitudes and in their abilities. Their education had been of a different stripe than I guess it is today. You had a classical education, you didn't have to know too much, but what you knew you
learned later, what you acquired you acquired after you left school; the foundations were Latin and the rest of it that you got in school. They were a different type, I guess, than the education you get today. These were men who were movers and shakers in a sense. There were a great number of them: George Norris, Borah of Idaho, Johnson of California, Jim Reed of Missouri, and the other Reed (David Reed) of Pennsylvania, Simeon Fess of Ohio. Give me a directory and I can bring them out to you. They could rise and speak, probably on anything, and were very nimble in debate, particularly Barkley and Connally.

These men had come out of their own legislatures and their own country attorney offices. They had started on flat bed trucks in their states. This was the day before television, this was the day when they had to like you, they had to know you, and they did know you, at first hand. Joe T. Robinson, to my mind was one of the greatest. Hell, Huey Long, just to pick him up for a minute, he's the greatest example of all. He sold from door to door in his early days. He was that type of man. Senators of those days would jostle each other, they would go after each other, yet they had pride in their talking. They'd come to the floor to speak and to be heard. Those were the men of the '30's. So now we say to ourselves, well they don't have the speakers like they used to have. And that's right. Pastore was our last orator. They don't have the speakers, but you don't need them.

Let me tell you what it is. It was phrased to me by Brien McMahon. He went home to run for office from Connecticut, and he said afterward to me, "Darrell, I found out something that I never thought was possible. If you sit in front of that TV camera, you come through that screen just like this, and you've got 'em." He said it was the damndest experience in the world to see yourself coming through a screen like that and you know you're in maybe thousands of homes. You're pushing yourself on them. He said, "That's never been possible in politics before television. And that's exactly where it's going to lie, on TV right there." I paraphrase him, but he said, "There's a new medium, and you master that medium and you've got 'em."

What's the name of the evangelist? Billy Graham. Years ago I listened to him, he was in Madison Garden, and here he is out there on a raised platform. He was as effective a speaker as he could possibly be, the only man you can really compare him to is Huey Long. He's out there giving God to these people and they pick him up on another camera with an overlay and put his
face while he's talking on the upper right hand part of the screen, so that his profile is there talking superimposed over his figure down below. You're looking at God: That's the point, this ghostly figure superimposed over the other, is talking to you. In the beginning Brien McMahon began to know

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what the television could do. Now they are accustomed to it, acquainted to it, accredited to it, and part of it. The whole emphasis is gone from the back-roads to the TV studio.

Do you have a different man now? I think you do. I think you have a man who has to know a hell of a lot more about everything than his predecessors of the '30's did. He's got to be much more sharp with the press and television. He knows that he can't correct the tape, whereas he can correct the Record. He knows that the television prompter is not going to give him the benefit of the doubt that a newspaperman going back to his office to write up a story is going to give him. It's put a different breed into the Senate. I think it's all due to the media exposure. But then again, maybe it's history. It's history to the point that our country is not the country it was forty years ago. It's been through several wars, and has doubled in population, and things that bother us today just never bothered

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these people in the '30's, just never occurred to them. They didn't have the political problems to face that these people have today, which is why we have so much more alert people today, and why they are less senators in the classic tradition. They can't be any-thing else.

I once went to Goldwater and said, "I wonder if you would help me out, some person has been to me and wants to know if you'll go on one of her question and answer programs." He said, "I'll think it over." Then he called back and said, "No, the trouble with those is that you have to prepare for them." He said, "every time you go on any of these things you have to really case yourself up." That's the whole privilege of the modern-day senator, he's got to be really a man of all seasons, much more so than these great orators we had in the '30's, and a hell of a lot of them are in the hall of fame today. Go look and see, you'll find them there. If they haven't got the statue in the

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hall of fame, they've got statues to them at home or they've got bridges named after them, lakes, dams named after them, it's all there. Because their impression on their times was tremendous.
You got the idea that when they rose to speak they got up to lead you. You would follow them anywhere after they got through.

Well, that's it. Thank you.

**RITCHIE**: Thank you, very much.
APPENDIX


For the period of 1949 through 1955, I was the Chief Clerk of the Rules and Administration Committee, and as such had contacts and cognizance with what Griffith calls the "unhappy committee," i.e., the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections.

My memory of the five members on the Subcommittee relates quite well to the roles and attitudes which Griffith gives them in his book. Senator Gillette was weak and ambivalent, and Benton and Hennings strong. Hennings in later times became a victim of his own drinking, Margaret Chase Smith at the time was a very strong character and not the picayune character which she became later in her political career. Hendrickson was not particularly bright—a product of the anonymity of machine politics in his State. Hendrickson had studied art in his youth, and his doodles in the committee meetings were artistic, clever, and sought after. He did have courage, however, and a strong reserve. His well-known family fortune assured him a certain independence in what he did, but he was not one to spend it on himself or particularly on his political career.

I remember at one time, he called me to his office in the Old Senate Office Building to show me where an overloaded electrical plug had burst into flame destroying some mementos of his on a wooden table and a United States flag. In the early days, the electrical circuits in the Senate Office Building were hopelessly overloaded because of self-installed coffee machines, dictating equipment, additional floor lamps, etc. Senator Hendrickson presented us with a bill of particulars for what had been destroyed notwithstanding the fact that most of them were mementos on which one could only put a personal, not a dollar value. We still paid the bill.

At all times, Senator Gillette retreated when he could have stood, and compromised when he could have prevailed. His word was of little use, and as a consequence was never sought. My memory of him is that he resisted almost everything which went through the Rules Committee that in any way benefited Senate employees such as retaining staff members on the roll of senators who had died, of setting up an automatic system for the payment of a gratuity to the estates of Senate employees who died in office, and any improvement of the annuity and retirement system on the floor. Yet,

apparently he never qualified for retirement, from what I suspect was a disinclination to have any
contribution taken from his salary. It has to be noted that he returned to the Senate rolls after his defeat, as a Senate employee for a twelvemonth, in order to qualify for the annuity which he would have denied others. As Griffith says, he was handsome, statuesque, and had all the human warmth of Carrara marble, with a constant, valueless smile.

I began reading the book in Chapter 5, and my comments are addressed primarily to incidents related therein and the memories which they arouse.

Sometime before the Maryland investigation, I went to Senator Hayden and pointed out to him that we had on the books of the Senate restaurant, two bills more than a year's outstanding. I do not remember the amounts, but the two senators were Chavez and McCarthy. Senator Hayden instructed me to write letters for his signature flatly requesting the payment, which I did. Chavez paid his bill at once without comment. We got a check and a not too pleasant letter from Senator McCarthy. Shortly after this, the man who had been designated to read telegrams for their official content for the Sergeant at Arms, sent to me a telegram

that had been sent from Senator McCarthy's office to his Milwaukee office, giving my background in the Senate and the State Department. Part of the telegram was critical of a case on which I had sat as a member of the Loyalty and Security Board of the State Department while I was in its Legislative Liaison Office under Secretaries Burns, Marshall, and Acheson. I had conducted the hearing in this case as Acting Chairman and had with one other member of the Board (there being three on it) voted two to one that the person charged before us was not a security risk. All three of us agreed to his loyalty to the United States was not in question.

Shortly after I filed this decision with the Secretary of State, as required by the Department's security regulations, I came to the Committee on Rules and Administration as its Chief Clerk. I later learned that the complete records in the case had not been before our Board at the time of the hearing, and was advised informally by a person who had been one of my colleagues in the Department that I should recall my decision, but without informing me why. This I declined to do. Meanwhile, I had received a letter from the Presidential Loyalty and Security Board asking for an explanation of my vote in the matter. This annoyed me and my letter back set out that I made my judgment based on the evidence before us, that I was satisfied with the judgment, and pointed out that the Board if it did not concur in our findings, it could by law, reverse me or remand the case to a new Loyalty and Security Board in the Department. This the Board never did. In fact, it
made no finding on the case whatsoever, which essentially amounted to a concurrence of the decision. I later learned that the whole case was taken before a D.C. grand jury, as were many of the security cases at that time, and that no bill was returned by a grand jury. I will say here, however, that had the complete record been in my possession at the time of the hearing, I am sure that I would have judged differently. In passing I had to practically threaten the Department in order to get a look at the complete record but only after the McCarthy attack.

This is the case, however, which found its way into the office telegram going out to Milwaukee, and I regard the attack which he made on me in a speech before the American Legion, a veteran's organization, the next day was his answer to Senator Hayden's dunning him for his $300 bill.

Sometime later I was on a Convair out of Chicago and seated next to a man who identified himself as an official of a large Wisconsin corporation. After we had started a conversation about the hot characteristics of the Convair, he learned that I was on Senator McCarthy's committee, and told me the following. He said that Senator McCarthy, as a Naval officer, had regarded himself as quite a heavy poker player and hearing of this game on another island, had himself flown over to take part in it. My seat mate was also a part of that poker game, knew McCarthy, and took something like $2,800 from him, and for this he got an IOU from Senator McCarthy. He then told me, "if you can get it from him and know him well enough to do so, I will give you half." I am not sure that the debt was ever paid.

I recall going through some of the Secretary's Reports of those days and coming upon an item of $800 for hotel expenses which had been vouchered and paid as reimbursement to McCarthy, while that Committee was under a Republican Chairman. The item was patently against all expenditure rules, but there it was.

Griffith's description of Senator Benton is completely on target. I remember him as a viable, cheerful and industrious Senator, of course, having been associated with him at the State Department and later as United States senator and member of the Rules and Administration Committee.

In the debate referred to on pages 170 and 171, I recall that on that day I was in the office and was told by telephone that an attack was being made. I don't recall ever reading what McCarthy said, and to this day, I doubt very much if I ever read it. Apparently, I had helped draft the Maryland report and that I had leaked the report to the left wing press and that as member of
the State Department Loyalty Board had once cast the deciding vote to clear one of McCarthy's accused cases. 

All of McCarthy's information on the referenced case, it later developed, came from one of the employees of the Presidential Loyalty and Security Board. It was later in the newspapers that this person had confidence in the Chairman of such Board, and had passed a number of the files on the cases to the Senator in her position of trust from patriotic motives. She later resigned from the Commission. I can well suppose she might have had something to do with the letter to me asking for an explanation of my vote, and of course, would have documented my reply.

To continue with Griffith, it is true that McCarthy had himself placed on the committee in order to keep a firm hand on the Maryland campaign investigation. Though he was nearly always absent, he did attend that meeting at which the report was considered for its nine to three acceptance vote. In my memory, it was on this occasion that he told Senator Wherry, "I don't need your protection, and I don't want it. I can take care of myself (Page 164, Page 156)." Wherry indeed at that moment attempted to help McCarthy in his objections to the report. In particular, I think, like McCarthy, Wherry had doubts about the mention of Jean Kerr in the report and her role in the campaign. It was well known that Jean Kerr at that time was in McCarthy's office, that their friendship was close, and they probably had intentions of marriage. I do remember that McCarthy's objection to the report was quite bitter in its illusions to her.

However, when McCarthy said, "I don't need your protection, etc.", Wherry flushed and shut up. A nine to three vote followed at which McCarthy got up and went out into the corridor. Wherry, knowing that newspapermen waited outside the committee room, immediately suggested that they adjourn so that McCarthy did not get the jump on the committee's side of the story by talking first to the newspapermen outside. I was later told by Wherry's liaison woman with the committee that Wherry went back to his office, and was inside his private office and told her, "if I ever do anything again for that son of a bitch, I hope you kill me."

The description of the floor action at the time of McCarthy's attack, and that he deserted the floor without waiting for replies, is accurate to my mind. My memory is that several senators rose to my defense, among them Senator Humphrey. I know I made a point to go around the next day and thank them for their support. Additionally, several of the senators, such as Hickenlooper, approached me personally to say that they had been disturbed by the allegations.
There were two fallouts from this attack. First, the *Baltimore Sun* reporter in reporting the debate the next day in the *Sun* confused the couple in the case with my wife and I, and had Senator McCarthy describing my wife and I as the cited couple in the State Department hearing which I chaired. When this was pointed out to me by a friend, I wrote the *Baltimore Sun* and a retraction was printed on the front page of that paper. I sometimes wish I had seen an attorney, but in politics, you do the expected thing. Secondly, in those days, we were paid in cash by the Disbursing Office. I had stepped on the elevator next to the Secretary's Office and because I was counting the cash, did not see who else was in the elevator.

I heard a voice behind me say, "I will take $20 of that." I turned—it was Senator McCarthy. I think my reply was, "The hell you will" or "No, damn you, not after what you said about me on the floor." It was a good humored comment, but his response was even more wonderful. He said, "Are you St. Claire? Good God, I had you confused with somebody else on the staff," and then named the committee counsel who had been added to the staff on the recommendation of Senator Monroney. We continued to talk on the way down to the underground subway, where we met Senator Eastland. Senator McCarthy volunteered to Eastland, "I said something on the floor about Darrell which I take back. I had him confused with somebody else and charged him with being a left winger" or words to that effect, whereupon Eastland said that I was no Communist. Coming from the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Internal Security, I thought by then I had obtained clearance.

Thereafter, I ran into Senator McCarthy several times, and was twice invited to a cocktail party at the house of his Administrative Assistant at which McCarthy and Jean Kerr were present. Each time McCarthy shook my hand, loudly bused my wife. She and Jean had been sorority sisters at George Washington University, and I understand from another source that Jean had told McCarthy that whatever he had to say about me on the floor, he had been mistaken.

And so it had ended. I once had McCarthy characterized to me as a prize fighter, the kind who would belt the hell out of you, but only professionally and without rancour. But I don't know. Like a prize fighter, he had no compunction or conscience for the pain he caused, or for the people flattened. He was not good to his staff. There was a story at the time, which I cannot vouch for, that McCarthy had employed a man presumably for his knowledge of Communism, but also actually
was a member of the international Communistic underground, and had been planted in McCarthy's outfit by what means I cannot say. The man was described to me at the time, it was said he had come from Europe, and that his presence, becoming known to McCarthy, had contributed to McCarthy's loss of balance and good sense at the end.

One of those close to McCarthy told me that McCarthy had been "betrayed," but that is as far as the story, which I think has no real foundation, went.
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