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THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE  
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RITCHIE: Why don't we begin with the points you wanted to raise about the Legislative Reference Service?

VALEO: All right. The first one has to do with the Marshall Plan, in that period around '48. One of the main inspirations for that was Dean Acheson. General George C. Marshall was then secretary of state. I always regarded Marshall as one of the truly outstanding figures in American history. Little understood, largely because he refused to keep any memoirs, and he never had an oral history! But he was an extraordinary man and probably the key to the military victory in World War II. You may recall, Roosevelt jumped him from colonel to chief of staff over a lot of old heads, after Pearl Harbor. Anyhow, Marshall, after he first presented the Marshall Plan to Congress, insisted upon including the Soviet Union under that plan. It always struck me that in spite of the hysteria which had already begun, he refused to put the Marshall Plan in the terms of an anti-Soviet program. The theory was to restore Europe, and any country in Europe, so that all could eventually become effectively a part of the United Nations. You restored any that were willing to cooperate in the Plan.
The invitation was extended to Eastern Europe, much to the chagrin of some members of Congress at that time, who were really beating the drums already on the anti-Communist end. But Marshall never changed that. He refused to do it, refused to put it in any terms other than that: that it was open to any country that had been one of our partners in the war. I always thought that was a characteristic of his greatness. On another side of it, when the question of including China came up, Marshall also stood fast against Congressman Walter Judd, who was pressing for the inclusion of China. He finally yielded to a degree, in order to get support for the Plan. Judd tried to get him to say that China should be treated the same as our European allies, that it was just as strong and just as important an ally. Marshall refused to go beyond saying that he would include it. And he only included it because it was an afterthought and a compromise. But the original plan did not include China. The inclusion was Judd's doing, primarily.

Well, the Legislative Reference Service got into this thing largely because the question, inasmuch as it involved money, gave the House Foreign Affairs Committee its first real grip at something big. Up until that time, the House Foreign Affairs Committee had not been very active. It had a chairman named Sol Bloom, who used to make occasional speeches on subjects, generally in support of Roosevelt and Truman. But the first major role came
with this Marshall Plan. Chris Herter, who later became secretary of state, was a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee at the time, and became part of a special group. I believe it was based on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, but it was called the Herter Committee. I think it was probably a subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Herter needed help and he went to Ernest Griffith. Ernest turned to Dr. William Yandell Elliot, at Harvard, who was then one of the leading—or the emerging, significant anti-Communist figures and big business figures after the Roosevelt administration. Although he was ostensibly a Democrat, he had begun already to move into a much more militant anti-Communist position than was ever taken by the Roosevelt administration. Bill Elliot came down, he was a rather overbearing man—he was big and booming—and he was assigned as staff director to the Herter committee. This was an important element in the development of the Legislative Reference Service. Elliot had a tendency to run roughshod over anyone around, and one of the people around was a fellow named Boyd Crawford, who had been the clerk of the committee for many years. Crawford was later to catch one of the people who shot up the House of Representatives. He was a meek, unassuming man, you would never have thought of him doing it, but he disarmed one of the people in that Puerto Rican independence demonstration.
Boyd Crawford resented Elliot very much, who had been brought in primarily because of his knowledge of national defense, and national security affairs. I was then rather junior at the Library, and had been befriended by Dr. Howard Piquet, who was the international trade specialist, one of the early people hired by Ernest Griffith. He came from the Tariff Commission, where I believe he had been either a member or the executive director, and then he had been one of the founding staff members of the Food and Agriculture Organization. He came to the Library as a senior specialist, and I served as his young assistant. Piquet went over to work with Elliot, and I went with him as his aide and mainly paper carrier. We sat in on those early meetings when Herter really dominated the proceedings.

One of the things that sticks in my mind most clearly from that period was that there was a congressman, I believe from Ohio, named [John M.] Vorys who was a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. At that time there were several aid programs, one called GARIOA, which was the Army’s General Relief Program to prevent disease and unrest in the occupied areas. In addition, I believe Greek and Turkish aid had also started, and then came the Marshall Plan. People came from the Department of State who were trying to push the Marshall Plan bill, and Vorys said to them "Oh, for God’s sakes, you’ve got so many of these aid things floating around. Please put them all together in one bill. We can’t be
bothered doing them separately." That was the origin of the Aid bill, which has since had, of course, not only those original things in it, but hundreds of others. But the original consolidated aid legislation grew out of one comment by Vorys, who was defeated the next year. It was done primarily to please him. It's something that occurs repeatedly in the legislative process: you put something into a piece of legislation to bring one of the members along who is critical at that moment; long after he's gone it's still in and a whole bureaucracy is trying to enforce something which had no more meaning other than the fact that one member at the time the legislation was passed tended to need that or want it for some reason. It's a very strong argument for sunset legislation.

Well, I wanted to bring in the Herter committee, and the role that the Legislative Reference played. Yandell Elliot was eventually eased out by Boyd Crawford, who then became chief of staff and began to develop a regular staff structure. I had the feeling then that had Elliot not been so aggressive in his behavior, there was a strong possibility that the concept that we talked about last week, where research for Congress, at least in foreign affairs, might have developed and stayed in the Legislative Reference Service. Boyd Crawford was not a foreign affairs specialist. He was a general clerical, administrative person, and
would have been glad to work with something like that, and would have kept the committee staff smaller had that been possible.

Had it developed that way, then I believe you would have seen the use of senior specialists in the pattern that Ernest Griffith had in mind, on special assignment to committees for a period of time and then back to the Library for research and for recharging of batteries in the periods when there was no immediate legislation. That did not work out. I think partly because again, the problem of the need for a bridge between the scholar and the politician was not recognized in that period. It's one of the things I thought Ernest did not understand.

RITCHIE: Did you think that the Legislative Reference Service had any difficulty balancing House and the Senate requests?

VALEO: Not in that period. Ernest was eager to take on anything that he could get, and I agreed with that approach. He brought in a lot of people, as many people as the budget would allow. Many of the more senior members of the service at that time were sometimes lacking in work to do, so Ernest went out to find work for them, wherever possible. He had many run-ins with members of the Appropriations Committees who insisted that that was what he was doing. But Ernest felt that there was no way to
build a service that could be effective, if you didn't bring people in and hold them when you had a chance to get them.

The budget of the Legislative Reference Service in those days had lots of ups and downs. Some Congressman would be antagonized by a job from the Service and he’d be strategically placed and he’d throw in a fifty thousand dollar cut, just to express his anger. Then, of course, Ernest would go over to some friend on the other side—it often happened to be Pat McCarran on the Senate side, whose daughter happened to work in Legislative Reference Service—and he’d try to get it restored. But that was part of the early, and really relatively simple, politics of the Legislative Reference Service. Ernest, a religious man with great faith, always looked on the brighter side of things, even when we took beatings from the Hill. But gradually the concept took root. One has to bear in mind, at that time the idea of professional research specialists was alien to about 90 percent of the Congress. They just didn't know what you would do with them. It took some time before the idea began to work into the system.

RITCHIE: It's interesting that you mentioned that he was a religious man, because Francis Wilcox said the way he got hired was because he went to the same church with Griffith.

VALEO: Very likely!
RITCHIE: He sounds like he was very imaginative in the way he recruited.

VALEO: There's one other thing that I would like to get into the record, because I take a certain amount of pride in it. In the period of Communist hysteria, which came shortly after the war, growing largely out of a domestic situation projected abroad into a situation where I didn't think it was applicable, there were many, many speeches written in the Library of Congress of an anti-Communist nature. I wrote my share of these, but I take pride in the fact that I never used the phrase "Godless Communism," which was the then-prevailing cliché. I don't know whether it was because it didn't really matter to me whether Communists were Godless and I thought maybe we ought to keep ideology separate from religion, or whether it was just a certain artistic resistance to using clichés. I resisted using that phrase in any speech draft, but it was a common one, repeated ad nauseam.

RITCHIE: On one hand, the Legislative Reference Service was there to give detached advice; on the other hand they were there to provide partisan rhetoric.

VALEO: This was very difficult. As far as I know—there may have been a couple of exceptions—but generally speaking we would not arm a member of Congress against an opponent in a
political campaign. But there was partisanship on ideological questions, and this caused much soul-searching in those early days of Legislative Reference. Everybody could agree that if you were asked for a bona fide study, you did a bona fide job, and did it as objectively as you knew how, and you presented the arguments on both sides of any issue. That much was accepted generally, many congressmen had no interest in that sort of thing. They wanted a speech that they could make, either to express a viewpoint or to condemn another viewpoint. The question came up and Ernest ruled that we would do "objective speeches on one side of an issue," with a clear understanding that this was not an objective treatment of the entire subject. That was the way it was resolved. To do those speeches was essential at that time in order to develop the kind of rapport with members of Congress which was to make the service increasingly useful as an institution of objective research. Had it not been done, I don't think the Service would have ever gotten off the ground.

**RITCHIE:** When you were doing that early research on foreign policy, did you have any cooperation from the State Department?

**VALEO:** We began to develop it at that time. The only place I can think of involving me was a publication put out by the Department of State which attempted to wash our hands of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang government. They put out something called the "China White Paper," which became a classic in its
time. It was a very elaborate treatment, assembling virtually of all the papers associated with our relationships with the Nationalist government. It was a best seller, quickly out of print. And it was a long thing, maybe about a thousand pages. Members of Congress didn't want to read it, but wanted to know what was in it. So my job was to do a summary. We had a number of requests for something like that. It became a challenge in a sense to do it objectively, and a source of worry. If you did an objective summary it clearly came out that it was time to get away from the Nationalist government of China. The White Paper didn't say to go to the other side, it merely said get away from the Nationalist Government. It was after Marshall had come back from China, had given up on his mission of bringing the two sides together.

So I did the job. We pondered for a long time how to make it acceptable to people who were very passionate supporters of the Nationalist government. We decided to put an addendum on it which would include press comment from both points of view on the White Paper. That was the way it was published. Now, I believe, it is in the Rare Book collection of the Library of Congress!

**RITCHIE:** Well, before the Legislative Reference Service, and before there was a staff for the committees, the State Department really provided the background for the Foreign Relations Committee. I just wondered if they might have felt somewhat suspicious of what you were doing.
VALEO: They were, as everyone was at that time, in other departments as well, because when congressmen needed expert advice, they normally turned to the executive branch. This was characteristic of the whole Roosevelt period and it carried over into the Truman period. That changed when the Republicans took control of the Eightieth Congress in 1946. They didn't trust the administration, didn't trust anything that came out of the executive branch. So it was one of the things that gave a rather formidable boost to the Library and the Legislative Reference Service as an arm of Congress.

The reason why I raised the White Paper, I did get cooperation from the Department of State on the summary. Before we printed it, we asked for a review in the Department of State. The man who reviewed it was Carl Marcy, whom I didn't know at the time. He sent it back with no changes and he said it was a great job, or something to that effect. That was one of the things that began to establish some of the credentials of the Legislative Reference Service with the Department of State. In that situation, I presume they saw us as an ally, which of course, we weren't. It just happened that in that instance the service's work worked to their advantage. But it was a very gradual thing, and some of the early contacts, as we'll get into later, were periods of great suspicion of the upstarts from the legislative branch of the government.
Eventually it evolved into what is still a distrustful relationship, in my judgment, but at least has some elements of interchange between the two. I think the Department of State has finally come to recognize that the Congress is here to stay and that they’d better work with the staff people on the committees, at least, and with the Congressional Research Service. As time went on, we had more and more telephone contact with the department on questions which we could not answer from public sources. But by the same token, we also developed contacts with the embassies, to get information, largely from their information officers. In those early days however, we worked primarily from newspapers, periodicals, and books.

RITCHIE: It was in a sense synthesizing larger amounts of material into shorter reports for congressmen who didn’t have much time to do it themselves.

VALEO: Precisely. I’m sure it was helpful in that period. Although you have a mixed bag. There are some congressmen who believe there isn't anything they don't know. And there are some who really want to be informed on issues. We tried to help those, at least, who wanted help.
RITCHIE: Well, I wanted to ask about the Foreign Relations Committee as it existed when you first went over there in 1952 with the information subcommittee. Could you give me sort of a general description of how it appeared to you when you first got there?

VALEO: Well, it was two rooms in the Capitol, one of which is still the historic office of the committee. We had another room across that little corridor from the historic office. I think later they acquired an adjoining room, which prior to that time had been used, I think, as a hideout for some member. I can't remember which one it was, but he used to sleep down there most of the time in between sessions. Oh, and there was a third room behind the main committee room that served as Francis Wilcox's office. There were two male clerks, Cy O'Day and a fellow named Emmett O'Grady. They were Connally's people maybe before that, I don't know. Of course, Francis Wilcox was there with his secretary, and Pat Holt, Carl Marcy and eventually myself, and Nancy Dickerson, the TV commentator, then Nancy Hanschman, who was the secretary in that office.

Francis handled the staff work very cautiously. He knew that it would be regarded as an upstart activity from the Hill on the part of Acheson and the State Department. But Francis had an awfully good way of working with people in the executive branch. He was educated at a time, bear in mind, when foreign policy was
regarded almost exclusively as an executive prerogative, growing out of the war situation and out of Roosevelt’s enormous popularity; the State Department and other departments rode on those coattails. There would be polite meetings with the committee, very little exploration in depth. If there were hearings, Mr. Acheson would come, or Mr. Marshall would come. Very rarely anyone under the level of undersecretary; confirmations were perfunctory. The ambassador at the UN would meet with the committee. The first one was [Warren] Austin, who left the Senate in order to become ambassador. I can’t imagine a member of the Senate doing that now.

The hearings were very formal. I’m not the best source on this. Carl and Francis especially were in attendance at most of those meetings and I rarely became a participant, except when the information program was in the forefront. But I got descriptions from various members, and occasionally, if they were open meetings, I would sit in on them. There were very small audiences.

To show you how limited our knowledge was at that time, I came to work one morning and there were a number of people in what I took to be essentially African clothing, standing outside the door of the committee, a group of about eight or ten. I overheard one of the policemen on duty say to a friend, "Here, he'll be able to tell us who they are." So he said, "Do you happen to know
where those people are from? What country?" I replied that I didn't know about specific countries, but "I think they're probably from Africa." Well, the group turned out to be a very militant American Moslem group from Chicago who were then petitioning Congress for money for resettlement in Africa. They were opposed to the breakdown of segregation and they just wanted to move their group back to Africa. Our knowledge at that point of foreign relations generally was rather limited.

But the committee was a very friendly place, very warm. You knew everyone, you could talk to any member. Senator [Alexander] Wiley of Wisconsin used to come by whenever he was anywhere in the neighborhood and greet the "boys and girls" on the staff. I met [Arthur] Vandenberg, I met Connally, but I never really got to know them. A good deal of tension developed in that period, it was probably during the 81st or 82nd Congress, when the Democrats took over and Connally became chairman again, but there was still a great deal of deference between Vandenberg and Connally. Connally particularly zeroed in on William Knowland of California, who later became the Republican floor leader. He would insist upon calling him "the Senator from Formosa," which he did repeatedly on the floor, much to Knowland's unhappiness. It was in a way, in a political sense, an apt description, because Knowland really carried the torch for the Nationalist government, I think partly due to his constituency in California. San Francisco's
Chinatown at that time was pretty much Nationalist. There was very little support for the Communists in that community. The same would have been true in the Los Angeles community.

But, as I say, the committee was a sort of open and easy place. I had a couple of experiences at that time which would be typical of the way it was. I guess by this time Carl Marcy had become staff director. He said to me one day, "What have you done to Senator Morse?" I replied, "I haven't done anything to him." He said, "Well, he's sure down on you." I said, "What for? I can't imagine why. I hold him in very high regard. I think he's probably one of the brightest members in the Senate. I can't imagine saying anything more offensive than maybe he talks at the wrong time, or he talks too much and that makes him less effective. That would be absolutely the worst thing I can think of, although I didn't remember even that." He said, "Well, one of his staff people overheard you saying on the subway something derogatory about Senator Morse, and reported it to the senator, and the senator wants you fired." I said, "Well, I hope not. Maybe I better talk with him." He said, "No, I've talked him out of it. But be very careful with him because he was really very angry."

Well, I gave Morse a wide berth, I didn't go anywhere near him at the time. About a year later, Marcy asked me to write a minority report on the foreign aid bill. "It's for Senator
Morse. "This was the first time there had been an official dissent on the foreign aid bill in the committee. He said, "He needs it for tomorrow. He wants it on the floor." So I worked most of the night and got out a minority report on the bill. Marcy gave it to Morse. Morse came back to him an hour later and said, "I want you to know, that's the finest report I've ever had done for me in all my years in the Senate. Who did it?" Marcy said, "That fellow Valeo." "Well," Morse said, "that's all right, that's all right. I'll, tell him myself." That was the end of my dispute with Senator Morse! He took the report and went up on the floor. The report could have been read verbatim in about fifteen minutes. He spoke for three or four hours on the report, in absolutely perfect syntax, and with really profound reasoning. He was an extraordinary man. He couldn't get along with anyone for any length of time, but his capacities were tremendous. I had only the highest regard for him.

But the committee was kind of personal in that way. You did know the members and you did develop relationships and rapport, as I did with Senator Hickenlooper and of course with Senator Mansfield. I can remember people like Theodore Francis Green of Rhode Island and Walter George of Georgia; they were not close relationships but they were friendly. If you had an idea you could get it into the pot, somebody would listen to you. I think that's changed a great deal, largely because of the size of the
committee staffs. It just becomes relatively impossible to move an idea from way down the line up to the point of action.

**RITCHIE:** When you first went over, you were with the subcommittee on information. What kind of responsibilities did you have there?

**VALEO:** Well, they'd never done a study in depth on the committee, at least none of the people there, as far as I know, had ever done one. It was the first real exploration of the oversight function of the Congress in a non-domestic subject; they've always had them on domestic subjects. It was left pretty much to me to design the inquiry. What I did, again bearing in mind the point I raised earlier about the need to focus professional learning into a usable format for members of Congress who are not scholars, generally speaking, and who have, in turn, to communicate it to people who are even less so, to their constituencies. I kept that very much in mind. From my experience in Legislative Reference, I felt the only way you could do that—the only way you could get scholars to do that was to delineate in detail the dimensions of their research assignment. Left to do that themselves, they would look at it from a quite different point of view than a member of Congress. I had accumulated enough experience working with members of Congress, as well as scholars, I had a pretty good idea of what one needed from the other in a given foreign policy situation.
I designed in detail four or five research studies, which were assigned to the Library of Congress. They were designed to fit closely into the needs of that particular inquiry, in the hope of producing either adjustments in the governing legislation or new legislation, or at least to get us to the point where you could say it doesn't need anything, it's fine, just leave it alone and everything will be fine. In addition to that—Carl Marcy was working very closely with me—his thought was that members of the committee needed to go abroad and see these information posts themselves. So we designed four or five trips abroad to be headed by individual members of that committee. I think we got together a basic approach sheet or questionnaire for use by all of the missions so that we would get the same information from the various locations visited. One trip went to Latin America, one went to Asia, another went to Europe, and so forth. In the end, we were able to bring them all together.

The Legislative Reference Service's studies and the trip observations eventually produced a very successful report. Whether it would have been successful in today's context, I don't know, with so many reports coming out, but at that time it was somewhat innovative and more important, perhaps, it stood in contrast with what was happening on the McCarthy committee. The press locally gave us every break and praised the report, which was restrained but also critical of many aspects of the information program. The
press really gave us a great boost on that report. They all editorialized on it. And that was the beginning of an attempt to get at oversight, at least in foreign policy matters.

**RITCHIE:** Basically, the senators who were on it felt very positive about the experience?

**VALEO:** They became increasingly positive. One has to take in consideration, at that time there wasn't a great deal of foreign travel. It was still something of a novelty to go abroad, and many of them had not traveled a great deal abroad. Some were suspicious about the idea of even going abroad. I think they started out almost in the sense of it being kind of a lark, or something of that sort, but as they gradually got into it, they worked more and more on the substance of the problem.

Even then, one questions how far you got. I remember in the report, before it was brought out, I had to go over it line by line with Bourke Hickenlooper, who was then the chairman. He had taken over from Fulbright. He was fine on the technical aspects of the information program. Wherever we criticized the shortwave signal, it wasn't loud enough and so forth, he had no problem with that sort of thing, but I put a line in the report to the effect that while the signal may be bad, far more important is the content, because if you don't have the right kind of content, you might just as well not have a signal that's going out. He said,
"Now, what the hell does that mean?" Well, I tried to explain it. Oh, he said, "we don’t want to get into that sort of thing."

But Bourke Hickenlooper grew. One of the things that always impressed me: there were some members who grew the longer they were in the Senate and achieved a stature which brought them beyond their state localities into something larger, something national. There were others who never did. They stayed the same or they deteriorated after they got into the Senate. But Bourke Hickenlooper was one of the people who grew, and grew in the sense of his understanding of what was happening in the world. Mike Mansfield was another, although he had a lot to begin with, he was another who grew in the same way. There were others.

RITCHIE: Hickenlooper and Fulbright were the two ranking members, and they apparently got along very well together

VALEO: They did.

RITCHIE: Although they seemed a very odd couple.

VALEO: Part of it was the information program study. They worked well on that together, and it was the first time really, I think, that they’d gotten to know each other. When Hickenlooper took over from Fulbright as chairman, he still deferred a great deal to Fulbright, and I think it came as somewhat of a surprise to the latter. You know, he would praise the Fulbright
Program and things of that sort. Much of it had to do with the information program. They began to work extremely well together. From the point of view of staff people, there was no political differential in their approach as chairman, except in one instance which illustrates the difficulties of objective activity anywhere in a government when a political side is involved.

One of the recommendations of the Information Program Study’s report up until the moment of printing was that the U.S. Information missions in each country should remain where they were, that is, at the time, under the full control of the Department of State. They had been put there when the Office of War Information dissolved at the end of the war and information people from that agency, around various parts of the world, had been moved into the embassies. From all of our objective accounts, we had talked with these information officers all over the world, about eighty to ninety percent of them said: just leave us where we are; this is the best possible administrative arrangement; we're closely interrelated with policy, and we can do our job most effectively from where we are.

Well, just about that time, that the report of the committee was to be published, President Eisenhower appointed a fellow named Johnson, who has been president of the University of Pennsylvania, I believe. He was a personal friend of Eisenhower's, and a super academic salesman. He had been a fund-raiser for the university,
put the university on the map, or at least gave it a little brighter color on the map. Eisenhower brought him down to run the information program. The first thing Johnson raised with Eisenhower was: that he wouldn't take the job unless he could handle it in his own way. He had this thing about winning "the battle for the minds of men." He did not want the secretary of state interfering with his approach. So Eisenhower got word to Hickenlooper that he could not get Johnson unless the information program came out of the State Department." Hickenlooper told the president, "I've got other members of the committee and we're all in agreement that it's in the best possible place where it is." Hickenlooper pointed out that that position reflected the view of the people who worked the program."

When Johnson heard that, he called many of the Public Affairs officers to Washington, the same officers that members of the committee had interviewed abroad. He brought them before the committee and had them reverse their testimony. That was the way it was done. That was the beginning of the United States Information Agency as a separate entity from the Department of State, with all the problems that that's entailed along the way. It's grown in different ways as a result of that decision. The only thing that the Committee had agreed should stay out of the Department was the Voice of America, which was then a major shortwave broadcasting system. But after the reversal, the entire program came out of
the department. Ironically, Johnson had a heart attack a few months later. He left the government and never came back.

It was amusing, when Johnson came down for confirmation, a hearing was held in the Old Supreme Court Chamber. He had just started—one has to say that in his defense—he had just started in the job and really didn't know very much about what he was getting into. Least of all did he know what it was like to deal with a member like Theodore Francis Green from Rhode Island. Green had certain very set ideas, particularly about syntax. He spoke in a very soft voice, and it was sometimes very difficult to understand what he was saying. Johnson made a stirring speech on winning the battle for the minds of men as his introductory statement and then committee members began to ask questions. Hickenlooper praised the statement, and Fulbright praised the statement, Theodore Francis Green's turn came next. He said, "In paragraph 3 on page 4," or some such thing, "you say," and then he read what Johnson had said. He then inquired, "What does the word 'no' mean in there? Why did you put that in that sentence?" Johnson, not understanding that the question was simply one of syntax and not knowing what fate awaited him, immediately got back into the war for the minds of men and talked for about five more minutes on that subject. When he ended, rather triumphantly, Green said, "Are you through?" Johnson replied, "Yes, sir." And Green said, "But that was not what I asked you." So he said,
"I'll ask you once more." He asked him the same question and Johnson just sat absolutely silent. Green got up with a look of disgust and came around to where I was sitting at the end of the table. He leaned over and said, "They're all alike. He won't last six months." Well, he lasted probably eight.

**RITCHIE:** You talked about the relationship between Fulbright and Hickenlooper being so surprisingly good. Was that a sign that there really was a bipartisan spirit on the committee?

**VALEO:** Yes. They had different views. They did not approach issues the same way. At that time, Fulbright was an extremely strong supporter of the aid program. Hickenlooper was a very pragmatic man and very skeptical of the aid program, to cite one thing. You could say clearly that Fulbright was internationalist in viewpoint, in the best sense of the word. Hickenlooper was essentially a midwestern isolationist who, along with the Midwest, had been forced by World War II to face the realities of dealing with the rest of the world, and reluctantly, grudgingly accepted the idea that we were not going to get out of it. But he quarreled with the change continuously in his own mind, so that what he said very often was certainly internationalist in viewpoint, but had a strong nationalist flavor.

In a way I would compare it with Reaganism, not as extreme as Reagan's approach, which is a rhetoric which is intensely—well
it's more than rhetoric, it's the way you look at the world. I would regard Reaganism in foreign affairs, if I had to give it terms, as an isolated internationalism. If he goes along the way he is, he will have us eventually isolated from everyone else in the world, which is what we were before World War II, essentially.

Hickenlooper was never that extreme, but he had the same tendency to want to get back into that simple life in the Midwest. He just knew it wasn't possible, largely not because he was on the Foreign Relations Committee but because he was the Senate chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. He never talked about that part of his Senate experience to anyone, as far as I know. He certainly didn't talk to me about it, except once when we were in New York. He and Mansfield were then the delegates to the Thirteenth General Assembly of the UN. I was the congressional staff advisor. Hickenlooper and I were riding in a taxicab along Park Avenue, going to a reception which Andrei Gromyko was giving. While riding in the cab, we came to that area where there were then a lot of new buildings, mostly glass, very, very glassy type of architecture. Hickenlooper was looking out the window of the cab at these buildings and he said, "You know Val, if a bomb ever fell here, this would be meaningless. It would all be gone." That, of course, was twenty-five years ago. He said, "This would all be gone." He knew that, and he knew that you couldn't escape
from that. So he never had the kind of extreme tendencies towards isolationism that you find in President Reagan.

On a personal level, he could be a very amiable person, much more so than Fulbright, as a matter of fact. Fulbright was somewhat dour and very often irritated by the way things were going. But between them they seemed to have a decent respect and a decent rapport.

**RITCHIE:** I've noticed from reading the committee hearings from later in the '50s, when Fulbright was chairman, that he always acted very deferentially with Hickenlooper, let him speak as long as he wanted.

**VALEO:** Of course, that's somewhat traditional in Congress. If you're a smart chairman you always let your ranking minority member have an awfully full sway. If you don't, you're soon in trouble.

**RITCHIE:** At the end of the Eighty-third Congress the information subcommittee filed its report and went out of business. At that stage, you said that you and Carl Marcy came up with an idea for another subcommittee.

**VALEO:** Not immediately. First I went back to the Library for a couple of weeks, two or three weeks. It was beginning to become very difficult because I constantly being called over to
the committee. At that point I went to see Ernest and said, "You know, I'm really not doing justice to either job because I'm going back and forth." He didn't want me to leave, and I didn't want to leave, so we finally agreed that I would become a senior specialist and then be assigned over to the committee as necessary, and that's the way we worked it out.

We had to get a new chief for the Foreign Affairs Division at the Library. One of the people who came up as a possible successor to me was [Henry] Kissinger, who was then at Harvard teaching. Another one was this chap who later became assistant secretary of state under Kennedy.

RITCHIE: Roger Hilsman?

VALEO: Roger Hilsman. These two names came up. It was clear that Ernest favored Roger Hilsman, but he didn't want to pass over Kissinger, so he raised his name. I helped him to ease Kissinger out. I said, "I don't know the man, but I've read his books, and I really think that he's got a one-sided slant on the use of force as an instrument of policy. I just think that held run into lots of problems if he came down here." We got Hilsman, who turned out to be more of a hawk than Kissinger when he got involved in Vietnam and a few other places later on.
RITCHIE: But then how did you go back to the committee?

VALEO: I went over on loan. I can't remember the precise order. There were two studies that came up at that time. I got involved in both of them, primarily to do the design. One was an early oversight review of the aid program; the other one had to do with disarmament. I believe it was Carl Marcy who raised that as a possible subcommittee. Eisenhower had appointed Harold Stassen of Minnesota to head a disarmament group to study disarmament problems as distinct from other foreign policy questions. Carl Marcy was not one to let the executive branch get too much of a jump on the committee. He said, "You know, we ought to have a subcommittee of our own on this subject." It struck me as being a good idea. I thought disarmament was a dangerous subject, full of problems and with very little with which you could at the time come to grips. But Marcy wrote it up as a proposition and we took it up with Walter George, who was then chairman. George said, "It's not a bad idea. Maybe we should have something like that."

Then the question came up as to whom we should suggest for chairman of that subcommittee. Carl said, "I've got it!" "It ought to be Hubert Humphrey, because he's also from Minnesota, and we'll match him against Stassen." So he went back and Walter George said, "That's very good." Walter George didn't want Hubert too close, I think, and saw the subcommittee chairmanship as a way of removing Humphrey a little from the main flow of committee
business. Hubert was then a brash fellow out of Minneapolis, and was a very active civil rightist. None of these characteristics set too well with George, who was a very dignified chairman and very proper in his ways. Anyhow, that was the origin of the Senate disarmament subcommittee.

Then the question came up, who was going to do the staff work for it. Carl said, "You're going to have to do it." It was not a subject which interested me greatly, and I tried really not to get involved in it. I was already working on the aid program study, but I took it over finally. "You better start it," Carl said, "Humphrey loved the idea and we've got him going, so you better get moving on the study." I spent six months thereafter trying to get a grip on the subject itself. I brought people over from the Library of Congress. Ellen Collier came over and Charles Gelner, both of whom are still with the Library. In addition, Humphrey asked me to take on a woman from the University of Minnesota. Her name was Betty Goetz, later Betty Lall. She joined the staff and later replaced me as staff director. Using as much as I could the techniques which we had developed in the information program, I tried to design the disarmament subcommittee's approach in the same way. It was much more difficult. There was so much less that was tangible in the subject.

The first thing that we attempted was some kind of a rough estimate of the then relative military strengths of the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe and ourselves and Western Europe. The figures that came out of that—all taken from public sources, mostly from the *New York Times*—the figures made us look rather formidable compared with the Soviet Union! To be on the safe side, we sent the report that we were going to put out on this comparison, it was a chart, among other things, that we wanted to publish, rather a primitive kind of thing, we sent it down to the Department of Defense to be reviewed. The reaction from the Department was as though we had just given away all of the state secrets to the Soviet Union—or more likely to Congress. But they just were absolutely adamant that it should not be published. I went back and I said, "It's all from public sources." "Yes, but it's a totally distorted picture." Finally, I took it up with Humphrey, and he said, "Well, let's let it lay for a while." So we just put it aside. It was that way with almost any part of this subject that we tried to deal with.

Finally, Humphrey came to me one day, and said, "You know, Val"—at that time everybody called me "Val" around the committee, this was a nickname that had come over from the Library—he said, "You've been going for three or four months and I haven't got anything to show for it." He said, "I've got to make a speech on this. It's just time that I do something." I said, "Well, I don't really know what to give you. I can give you a report on what the committee's doing. It's going to be pretty drab, there's nothing
really that's been achieved." He said, "Well, I'd like to get something that's got some punch in it." I said, "There's only one thing I can think of that might possibly make a subject for a speech. It's nuclear test ban treaty." This was before the idea of a ban was raised by Adlai Stevenson in the 1956 campaign. There were lots of suggestions in the press pointing out the dangers of nuclear testing, but no American leader had yet proposed a ban, nor had any Soviet official.

I had weighed all the factors as far as I could identify them and it seemed to me that the fears of the strontium 90 in the milk, plus the fact that we were still far ahead of the Russians in the numbers of weapons and bombs we had, and a number of other considerations, particularly the attitudes of the Europeans on this, suggested that this might be a doable thing as a first step in disarmament. Humphrey said, "Write up something for me and let's take a look at it." I drafted a speech proposing a test ban and gave it to him. He said, "You know, that's an interesting thing," he said, "but I want to get reactions from some other people." So he showed it to Tom Hughes, who later became the president of Carnegie, and worked in the State Department for a while, and who was at that time working for Chester Bowles over in the House. He showed it to Senator [Henry] Jackson and Jackson threw up his hands in despair: "You can't advocate anything like that!" Hughes was more inclined to go along with it. He didn't
think the expression of the idea was very good, but he thought the idea might have some merit. Humphrey showed the draft to three or four other people.

After doing that, he said, "I'm going to do it on the floor of the Senate, but I can't do it tonight. For tonight, I've got a speech to make on humane slaughter, one on UNESCO, and one on margarine"—which is important to Minnesota. He said, "I can't do four speeches in one evening, that's too much. You have it printed up, and get some copies for the press. I'll do it the first thing tomorrow." So we did, we got it ready, we ran off the copies. The next day, I got to the office early and I went up to the lounge to look at the news ticker, which was the first thing I did everyday. The first item on the ticker was a report that the Russian foreign minister had advocated a nuclear test ban treaty.

**RITCHIE:** So he scooped you.

**VALEO:** Yes. It all went to Hubert's tendency to go off on any subject that interested him. If somebody put a piece of paper in his hand that intrigued him, he'd follow through. He was so far over the lot that it caused most of his problems. Anyhow, he called me immediately. He'd seen or heard the news item, too. He said, "Did you see the news?" I said, "Yes, I did." He said, "What does that do to the speech? Let's have a meeting." So we met in Carl's Marcy's office. Humphrey brought down a couple of
his office people. I was there, and Carl was there, and there were several others. We went
over the ground and he finally decided it was politically too risky, he could not do it, and the
speech was never made. Then it came up in the subsequent presidential campaign. But that
was really the beginning. From then on the issue of a test ban came into worldwide focus. In
retrospect, he should have made the speech. Had he made it, we would have had the
initiative and it probably would have sped up the development of the nuclear test ban treaty
by at least a year or so. But once the Russians had called for it, it would have been high
political risk for Humphrey. The reactions at that time were: if you ever agreed with a
Russian initiative, you obviously were a fool or worse.

The incident illustrated one of Hubert's problems as a politician. He had great
difficulty in his timing. He was either too soon or too late on issues, and he was into too
many things. He couldn't repress his natural exuberance, his tendency to get into
everything that came within his ken.

**RITCHIE:** What was he like to work for?

**VALEO:** He was easy to work for, but his staff was not. He had staff people that
were pushing him for the presidency at all times. Some of them went all the way back to the
very beginning of his political career in Minnesota. It was difficult, they were
constantly intervening between the senator and the staff on the committee. That's a common complaint, but in his case it happens to be particularly apt. Later he had to let go the woman who was basically responsible for that attitude; she had been his secretary for many years in Minneapolis. But I traveled with him on this disarmament subcommittee. We went up to see Cabot Lodge at the U.N. in New York. We did four or five hearings around the country on the subject, one in Minneapolis. He was pleasant, he was easy to work with in that sense. The main problem was to find him and pin him down. Once you got into a conversation he was very quick, his mind was extremely quick, and if he decided that he wanted to do something, he'd do it rather impetuously.

RITCHIE: I would think he must have had a hard time having patience for things to develop.

VALEO: It was hard for him to do that. But that was the beginning of that disarmament subcommittee and it became an important element in the foreign policy structure. I got out of it after nine months. I really had had enough of it. I didn't want to work with Hubert's staff. It was too difficult to work with them, and besides, I was afraid that we were just not going to come to grips with anything substantial at that point. The nuclear test ban treaty was about the only thing feasible, but then it got involved with the political campaign. Stevenson advocated it and got beaten down by Eisenhower with it, so I saw
no immediate prospects of doing even that. And that was actually the case. It didn’t come up again until Kennedy.

RITCHIE: Did you get any cooperation at all from Stassen?

VALEO: No. I never met Stassen, as a matter of fact. His group worked on their own level. Nothing much came out of it although eventually, you got a Disarmament Agency set up, but that really wasn’t primarily derived from the Stassen group. What did emerge was a readiness on the part of the Department of State to work in close collaboration with the committee staff on the subject. Betty Goetz took over that as staff director of the committee after I left it, and new members came onto it. Eventually, in the Geneva negotiations, the State Department got into the practice of inviting a staff person from the committee—Betty Goetz in this case—and then also a couple of members of the committee, to sit in as observers on the negotiations.

RITCHIE: It does seem as if arms negotiations is an executive function. What role does the Congress really have in it?

VALEO: Well, we were looking for new ideas. The executive branch was so sterile at the time. Invariably they came out with the same kind of proposals. Here again, I think the constitutional validity for the Senate getting involved in foreign policy was vindicated. Leaving aside the question of the Senate antiquated procedural machinery, I personally am convinced that
one of the roles seen for the Senate in a constitutional sense is the injection of creative concepts into all aspects of government. The original concept of their selection by state legislatures would suggest that, I don't want to say that the Constitution saw the Senate as a body of superior men, but rather men with many viewpoints and with a great potential for achievement. This view was later vindicated in Vietnam, because you had an administration that got frozen tight in a position that was bringing disaster to the country and we didn't know how to get out of it until the Senate took the initiative. One of the ways you can break that kind of executive branch log-jam is by the injection of ideas from elsewhere. In my judgment at that time, the Senate became the place to do it.

RITCHIE: How well did the subcommittee work as an educational tool for the senators themselves?

VALEO: It deepened their understanding of specific issues, which were of considerable importance. The attempt to use the oversight function of the Senate did have that effect, but bear in mind, that at the time senators still had relatively limited responsibilities. They had time to work the committees, or the special committees or subcommittees. The way it runs now, they have so many of these assignments, they just cannot get into depth on the committees. Their staff may, but they don't.
RITCHIE: At the time you were doing that, the Foreign Relations Committee still tended to meet as a whole more often than in subcommittee.

VALEO: Yes, so far as I know, those consultative subcommittees were not used very often. They were greeted with certain skepticism by members. As I mentioned, they were set up primarily at the request of the Department of State, which wanted to have a sounding board somewhere in Congress.

RITCHIE: How did the various chairmen of the committee react to the subcommittees?

VALEO: They did not give much credence to them. They did give it to these special subcommittees, which was the title we finally came up with for them, after a long dispute with the parliamentarian, who said they could either be special or subcommittees, but they couldn’t be both. The chairmen reacted well to them in part because they generally got a good press. They got credit for at least trying to increase understanding of rather complex problems. We never had any problem with the various chairmen and we did not set them up as legislative committees. The special subcommittees made proposals which were relevant both to the executive branch and also to the possibility of legislation. But we did not try to make them into decision
makers, in lieu of the full committee. That was understood from the very beginning. There was never any deviation from that.

**RITCHIE:** The last time, you mentioned how when Mansfield came on the committee, he checked in with you to ask about who was who, and what was going on. He wasn't on the subcommittee, was he?

**VALEO:** Well, he headed one of the subcommittees which I did work on, which was the one on the aid program, and he put a lot of time in it. He was a new member, came from a small state, so he had plenty of time. Again, we used essentially the same techniques that we had on the earlier oversight subcommittees. Each one became more elaborate, or evolved as we corrected problems or omissions in the earlier approaches.

But Mansfield's interests were in Asia, from the very beginning. He asked me to travel with him in 1953. I had been out with Bourke Hickenlooper in '52, and then Mansfield in '53 called me one day. I guess it was a period when I was back at the Library. He called me and said, "You know, I'm thinking of going to Indochina. Would you like to come with me?" I said, "Well, sure, if it can be arranged, I'll be glad to do it." He said, "Well, I think I can arrange it over at the committee." That was the beginning of our collaboration on Asia—well, actually we'd had a small experience in the House—but not in the Senate.
I knew a little about Indochina. I was the Legislative Reference Service's Asian specialist, but that meant all the way from Vladivostok down to Karachi, and there's just so much you can carry. Much of my attention at the Library had gone into Korea, because of the natural problems in Korea—the war was just about over at that point—and into China, which were the two main issues of politics and policy at the time. Well, Vietnam was sort of—it wasn't even called Vietnam, just Indochina, nobody mentioned Vietnam as such. I knew there were three kingdoms in the Indochinese peninsula. I always thought of it as three or four places, I wasn't really sure which was the case in an official sense. Mansfield said that he would like to go to the capitals of "all of the states in Indochina." Well, I knew Saigon was a capital, and I knew that Hanoi was a capital. Beyond that, I wasn't sure what the capitals were. So I said, "Well, I'll see if I can work out an itinerary." I went back into the Library's map division; there were no maps in English on Indochina at that time. They were all in French. I found Phnom Penh, which was clearly marked as the capital of Cambodia. Then looking at Laos, I found two capital stars on the French map, one being Vientiane, and the other being Luang Prabang. I said, "My God, I wonder what this means?" I finally reasoned from a related subject that since these places dated from the simultaneous spread of Chinese influence into Japan, that one was a royal capital and one was an administrative capital, which of course is what proved to be the
case. So I called Mansfield back and I said, "We're all right on Phnom Penh in Cambodia and Saigon in Cochinchine, but when it comes to Laos, I don't really know which is the capital." He said, "Why not?" I explained my findings to him, and he said, "Well, let's put both places in the itinerary." That illustrates how primitive our knowledge was at the time.

Mansfield wanted also to go to Paris, because he thought that a lot of matters affecting Indochina were still being decided there, which was certainly true. None of the states was yet fully independent and the United States was only represented in Saigon at the time, with the embassy there still reporting through the U.S. Embassy in Paris. So we went to Paris at the beginning of that trip. Then we went on to Saigon. There was an ambassador there named Heath, and he was very insistent that he go with us on the trip through Indochina. We had a Navy Beechcraft, which was supplied by the military attaché who called it in from the fleet somewhere. It was two-engine propeller plane, with a crew of two and four seats for passengers. The plane had trouble with its landing gear from the very beginning. We flew to Hanoi as a first stop. We had at that time in Hanoi a consulate with about six Americans in it. It was really my first exposure to the French war in Vietnam. The city was filled with French military uniforms but it remained a charming place, very French in its attitudes and
behavior. The consulate was safe. There were no problems of security. The French were still there in full force.

I went to a briefing supplied by the two then-chief commanding French generals of the war against Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh. One was [Henri] Navarre, and the other was [Rene] Cogny. Cogny was the field commander and Navarre was the strategist. Dick Russell happened to be there at the same time. So all three of us sat in on the briefing. I had never met Russell before that. We got the briefing. Navarre spoke, as I recall, rather good English. He was not using an interpreter, he was speaking English, and he described in rather flowery terms his grand strategy for winning the war. The key point was to set the bait for a trap at Dienbienphu. He intended to put troops there that would attract the Viet Minh out of the hills. When they came in for the kill they would be killed instead, and that would be the end of the Viet Minh. He was very persuasive, I must say. I thought this man obviously knows what he's saying, he expresses it so well. Cogny, the field commander, was also a very impressive fellow. He would follow this on the map and interject from time to time some points.

When the briefing was finished Russell said, "Well, that sounds very impressive. You have some very good strategy. Is there anything the United States can do to help you in this situation?" At that time, we were already supplying a considerable
amount of aid, I think about three hundred million dollars to the French. Navarre went into
a tête-à-tête with Cogny and he came back and said, "Well, you're being very generous with
us already. But if you could send us about a half a dozen more helicopters. This we think
would be extremely valuable. We don't really need anything more than that. We really have
it all arranged, and we're quite confident that this strategy is going to work." He said, "You
know, the Viet Minh is a small group and they don't really have much support anywhere,
and we have three hundred thousand Vietnamese troops on our side." And so forth.

We went from there to Laos. The crew that was flying the plane were in no better
shape than we were in the sense of Laotian geography. They had French maps too. So we
flew over the spot where Vientiane was supposed to be, and there was no Vientiane. From
the charts, they didn't know what to make of it. All they could see was that it was supposed
to be on the Makong River. The crew decided that they would fly at three hundred feet and
stick to the river so they wouldn't miss it! And that's how we found Vientiane the first time,
about 200 miles from where the map said it should be. It was really a primitive place. The
airport was a grass field. There were not more than twenty thousand people in the city.

The French Legionnaires who were there were mostly Germans, about 80 percent of the
contingent. They had French
commanders, of course. We had lunch with two of the French commanders, we asked them whether the Laotians were involved in the fighting and all. He smiled sadly and said, "They're such sweet people. They're not warlike. It's very hard. We have two battalions that we are training and we tell them that they must stay in camp, but on the weekends they want to go home and they go." He said, "This is just not a warlike country. We will never make soldiers here. No one wants to fight wars here." That was 1953. Most of the language we heard around us was German as we approached somewhere, what was purported to be the front, somewhere outside of Luang Prabang.

We never did get to see the then king in that royal capital. He was ill, rumored to be under opium almost all the time. You could always get a pipe, if that was your inclination, in either Luang Prabang or Vientiane. The going price at the time was twenty-five cents in the opium dens which were wide open at the time. There were only two Americans in the entire state of Laos at that time: one young foreign service officer named Mike Reeves and one of the ubiquitous information officers. The two were living in very primitive quarters, no running water or very much of anything else. But it was the beginning of our involvement in Indochina.

When we came back from the 1953 trip to Indochina one of the things Mansfield began advocating was separate recognition of
three countries, and the establishment of separate relations with them. Well, the French didn't want this, and the State Department didn't want it, and [John Foster] Dulles had a hard time with it. I think his inclination was to go along with Mansfield, but he didn't want to antagonize the French. In any event, Mansfield's view was that it was very hard to justify aid to a colonial country, and if you didn't have these three states as independent entities, what were they? They were colonies of the French. So he finally won his point and Dulles then came down on the side of recognition of three independent entities which eventually came to pass in spite of French reluctance.

One of the problems of our dealing with the situation in Indochina, I think, was that during World War II we had worked with Ho Chi Minh, very closely. The OSS had very close ties with Ho Chi Minh and had a close working relationship with him. I think they wanted to continue that. There was one school of thought that thought you should go that way, that Indochina should remain a political entity and serve as a counterfoil to an emerging China. Of course, the other side, which really began to emerge about the time of our deep involvement, was the question of how you could possibly support colonial-controlled governments, which was what the French wanted. After Dienbienphu, I think they still had some hopes of holding their influence in Laos and Cambodia. But by that time the game was up.
Well, how are we doing? Is this a good stopping point?

RITCHIE: I think so, yes. I was just going to ask one more question: how influential do you think that first trip for Senator Mansfield and for yourself?

VALEO: It was very important. First of all it introduced me to an area that I did not know with any depth. During World War II, I had been a soldier on the Indochina border, that would have been the Vietnamese border with China. I was in Kwangsi Province in China. My first introduction to Indochina, I didn't even know there was a war still going on down there after the Japanese surrendered, but the Ho Chi Minh people staged an uprising immediately at the end of the war. The Japanese let them out of jail and took over from the French Vichy officials who had been left in place by the Japanese. Of course they went for the French Vichy supporters who were nominally in charge. Many of the French lost their heads in that brief encounter because the uprising was very vicious.

I was in a camp in China on the Kwangsi border, waiting to go to Canton when the war ended. The word came up somebody was needed who spoke some French because some Frenchmen had staggered into camp and they couldn't speak English. I didn't know much French, but I was able to help. I got to know the half a dozen Frenchmen and Senagalise who had reached our camp. They had been in
the Foreign Legion in Tonkin and had been forced to run when the Japanese authority collapsed. They had run across the border for safety after losing a number of their companions along the way. That was my first introduction to the Indochina war. The Legionnaires spoke of the vicious hostility which they had encountered from the Viet Minh.

**RITCHIE:** So from the very beginning you thought that this was a troublesome place.

**VALEO:** Yes, but only in that context. I thought Indochina was all going to be set up under Ho Chi Minh's people at the end of the war. That seemed to be the prevailing wisdom. I vaguely remember writing an article to that effect in about 1947 for the *Annals* up in Philadelphia. Then of course, Indochina sort of dropped out of my ken while we were working on China and Korea and Japan. But it came back rather suddenly when Dulles decided—no Truman decided that we were going to do a rescue operation of the French after the Nationalist government in China retreated to Taiwan. I remember Acheson made a speech saying that the Chinese revolution had gone beyond all bounds and therefore we had to help the French in Indochina too. And that, of course, opened up all of the questions, which until that time we had not had to face.

The British had helped the French to go back, not us. Roosevelt's views were clearly known. He didn't want to get
involved in Indochina. He thought the colony should have independence, maybe under some sort of UN trusteeship for a while. But once the Korean War broke out, we aligned ourselves with the French, who were insisting they had to return to restore order before any further political change could take place. That was a difficult position for us to be in, because most of the analysts, including, I'm sure, some in the Department of State, felt there was no chance of the French being able to return. The French didn't accept that. So therefore, if you aided them, you were going to be first of all on the losing side, and also on a colonial side, which tended to go against our grain. We ourselves had just let the Philippines have independence at that point.

**RITCHIE:** Well this probably is a good place to break.

**VALEO:** Okay.

**End of Interview #2**