RITCHIE: The last time we talked about the Class of '58, and this time I thought we could survey the senators who were elected in the early 1960s and early '70s, while you were secretary of the Senate. I thought we could start with some of the liberal Democrats who arrived in that period, and Ted Kennedy, who was elected in 1962, was the first of that group.

VALEO: Yes, I think he was greeted in the Senate originally with mixed feelings, in part that he was profiteering on his brother. Then his opening speech was a passionate defense of someone who was doomed not to be confirmed as a judge.

RITCHIE: Francis Morrissey.

VALEO: I don't remember the name, but Kennedy made an impassioned plea for him. I think the reactions were mixed on this: one being that he obviously felt things deeply, more so than most, and that he expressed those feelings much more readily than either Jack or Bobby. Jack concealed his feelings in humor, and Bobby was essentially quiet, also with some humor, but basically not responding to provocations. But Ted Kennedy came out with all guns blazing and made, I thought, a very impassioned
plea. I was impressed greatly by the speech because it seemed it was not politically expedient. It showed an indication of character which I felt was not to be denigrated.

There was some deference in treating him, at first, as the president's brother, but no great amount of that. Of course, the press at that time was full of stories about a Kennedy dynasty, first with Jack, then Bob and then Ted would take over after that. By that time we would be ready for the next generation. But Ted Kennedy played it smooth on the floor after that first speech and did the things that younger senators usually do, without any difficulties. I can't be sure but it must have been after Bobby's assassination that he was elected whip. I suppose that election was almost a blood-debt, if I can use that term, for the deaths of Jack and Bobby. Who was going to oppose him at that point? The mood of the country was enormously Kennedy. There was great sympathy for the family at that point, and it was recognized almost without being spoken that Ted Kennedy had some recognition coming to him just by virtue of being a member of that family.

Then came Chappaquiddick, which was a disaster for him of course. I can't remember when I learned of that. I remember Mansfield being on the telephone in connection with it, and I was in the room at the time. That's where he first used the phrase, after he hung up—I don't know who he was talking with, whether it was actually with Teddy or with someone else—but after he hung up
he said, "My God, what an ill-starred family." He used that phrase for the first time in that connection and many times thereafter. When Kennedy was whip, he wasn't necessarily at that point yet running for the presidency, but his staff was. I think I'd better get into the reactions to Chappaquiddick. There were very mixed feelings in the Senate when he made that statement on TV after the incident. I watched him. My own reaction to it was that it was a bad statement, that he would have been better not to have made any statement. What came across almost was that this incident, tragic as it was—and he did stress the tragedy to the girl that was involved—I had the uncomfortable feeling that he was saying, "God, this has interfered badly with my career." That, I think, was probably what communicated itself to the public, and probably doomed him politically.

I don't think it was immediately after Chappaquiddick, but when the drums began to beat for Kennedy to run for the presidency and then the press reactions came on Chappaquiddick, he finally decided not to make the run. Mansfield's reaction was: "Thank God, for his own good it's better that he doesn't." I think he felt at that point that the Kennedy mystique was beginning to disappear. The public reactions to the mystique was such a mixture of genuine sympathy for the family plus a great deal of hostility to the Kennedys for daring to suggest some new turns in American life, or daring to suggest that there were some darker
areas in the American scene which we hadn't looked at. The hostility came mostly with the older people. The younger generation, I think, were generally taken by the Kennedys, certainly by Jack Kennedy in that period. The Kennedy mystique rubbed off on Ted Kennedy to a point, but Chappaquiddick acted to undermine the mystique as it might have been a political asset to him. After that I think we began to see some books that were anti-Kennedy, and some of the more disreputable writing about Jack Kennedy's personal life and that sort of thing. They began to stick pins in Jack Kennedy's image, and of course to the extent that that had a negative impact, Ted Kennedy felt that.

I never felt particularly close to Ted Kennedy. As I say, I was impressed by his defense of an appointee in the beginning as being an indication of a profound, and, from my point of view, desirable kind of character. But in politics sometimes loyalties are a burden, and his tendency to be very loyal may have hurt him. That may also have been involved in his relationships with his brothers. I think, watching him over the years, he was not an effective senator during the period that I was the secretary of the Senate. He was ineffective as Proxmire is generally ineffective, or as Hatfield is generally ineffective. Their views and their instincts are, from my point of view, essentially sound ones, and someday the country is going to have to go in the direction that Kennedy, and to a lesser extent Hatfield, and to a lesser
extent Proxmire, have been pointing, each in their own particular sphere. In the Senate, it's good to have these new directions in the back of your mind, but the time to introduce them is when you're going to get a motion going that will bring you somewhere near their achievement.

I don't think Kennedy, or certainly the people who worked with him (and much of this, I think, is staff work with Kennedy; he's always had an able staff)—I don't think they were in contact with the realities of the Senate—and certainly with the realities of the public outside of their own state. They were producers of ideas out of time, if I can put it that way. In a way, I'm kind of glad he's not going to make the run again this time. We've already gone over the problem that came up when he thought about running and we had the dispute over whether he should have Secret Service protection. I think if he made the run now it would be less necessary than it was at that point. That was the height, I think, of the perceived Kennedy threat to the status quo, right after Jack's death, one of the considerations that attract political assassins. In a sense, Johnson recognized the wave running for the Kennedy ideas when he became president. He took the ideas that Jack Kennedy's people had formulated and he pushed them over the top. Many of them came parts of the "Great Society" which now Reagan is trying to demolish. Ted Kennedy was a positive force in the same direction as Johnson in that period.
I don't know what his future is going to be. I suspect he'll stay in the Senate as long as he wants to, and apparently he wants to stay another six years at least. I think as time goes on the questions of social welfare that he has raised and will continue to raise are those that country will have to confront. I guess that's why I'm glad to see him stay in the Senate, because if he tried to make the run for the presidency now, with the mood of the country being what it is, he would have to begin to dilute what I think are essentially direction pointers for the nation's need. There were signs of that when he was testing the waters, you know, the little exchange with Jerry Falwell and a few of the others. That's what you do when you run for the presidency, given the mood of the country as it is now. That is not the mood that existed when Jack Kennedy ran. It was different; it was expansive and open and interested. At the moment, the mood in the country is disinterested, contracted and almost reactionary. So it's best for him to stay in the Senate at this point, even if he could win the nomination. He'd have to win by so much compromise that he wouldn't look like a Kennedy that would be worth anything.

RITCHIE: Almost as soon as he came into the Senate he was perceived as someone who was going to run for president someday. Is that a handicap on a senator, that other members see him as a presidential candidate and perhaps see themselves as eventually having to fight him for the nomination?
VALEO: Probably an unconscious one, but generally speaking not among those who have decided to make their life in the Senate, because they're kind of glad. I mean, if somebody's going to run for the presidency he's not going to be a problem within the Senate for them. So the tendency is to give him a good push in the direction he wants to go, as was done with Jack Kennedy and to a lesser degree with Bobby, and for a while with Ted Kennedy. When he decided to make the run against Carter there was a lot of support for him in the Senate. They wanted to get him out. I think that's basically what the reason for the support was, not that they thought he could win or necessarily wanted him to win. I think they did think he'd run stronger than Carter, and therefore help pull in a majority for the Democrats in Congress. Among the real fixtures in the Senate, they're delighted when a powerful personality in their midst decides to run for the presidency.

RITCHIE: Another senator who ran for the presidency was George McGovern. What were your impressions of him?

VALEO: George McGovern asked me to go to work for him at one time. I like him. I still see him, as a matter of fact. I think he's one of the most honest men I've ever run into in politics. I've seen very few people in the Senate or in any aspect of government who have been more straight-forward in what they think and what they believe in and in saying it. He's a very, very determined man. If he gets a hold of the doll he shakes it
and shakes it and shakes it, he doesn't let it go. That's the way he has done with his ideas. My first encounter with him was mostly on account of Vietnam. I think he knew I was doing a lot of the work for Mansfield on Vietnam, and my ideas coincided with his own. We talked a good deal about Vietnam and I had the impression that he would have liked me to go with him when he decided to make the run for the presidency. It never came to an actual discussion of this, but one has this sense without it being said.

We met again in this early period in Atlantic City at the Democratic convention of 1964. The question came up as to who would be Johnson's candidate for the vice presidency. I remember meeting him in the halls of one of the hotels, and we talked for a little while. It hadn't been decided yet, but he said he thought it would be Hubert and he was glad it was Hubert. He himself at that point had not yet gotten into the presidency act, but it was clear that he was thinking in those terms. It's interesting, Mansfield always was on his guard against senators who were running for the presidency. He had an early warning system which told him apparently who they were. He had it on Jackson, he had it on McGovern. He knew early in the game that McGovern was thinking of the presidency—probably even before McGovern knew it himself. He used to always treat them with a certain amount—disdain is the wrong word—but a standoffishness. His interest
was in Senate personalities and he didn't warm to people who were running for the presidency in the Senate. It's either that, or he was thinking of running for the presidency himself. I don't really know for sure. But he spotted McGovern as a candidate very early in the game.

I must say, when McGovern decided to make the run, he made it primarily on Vietnam, like so many others did. I thought that he was really outstanding, from my point of view, but again I thought he was out of step with the times. I think he would have run a heck of a lot better had he kept Thomas Eagleton with him on the ticket. I think the dropping of Eagleton was a grave mistake, which I attributed not so much to McGovern, an act which seemed out of character for him. It occurred to me that he'd be the kind of person who would understand the situation that Eagleton was in. But I attributed it to his campaign manager, whose sense of timing and whose sense of the appropriate thing to do in a campaign was very badly off. He could have run a lot better race than he did.

**RITCHIE:** Was that Gary Hart you're referring to?

**VALEO:** No, it was a woman chairman of the national committee. I don't remember her name, I didn't know her. But I think McGovern was ill-advised on the Eagleton affair. He would have run much better with Eagleton. First of all, Eagleton would
have been an excellent campaigner at that time. That was Eagleton at his height. I think he sort of tapered off after that and lost interest, and I can understand it. But at that point he was a very effective politician and could have made a major contribution.

RITCHIE: What were your impressions of McGovern and Eagleton as senators? Were they team players? Were they the type that Mansfield called on?

VALEO: No, neither of them. McGovern was a very determined man and he was very persistent on principle. He was one of the few people in the Senate like that. He would compromise on certain things, but basically he knew what he thought the government needed, what it needed in the way in the legislation, what it needed in the way of political leadership, and what it needed in the way of policies. He was quiet but uncompromising in his advocacy of those views. I think his loss of his Senate seat was a tragedy. He had a lot more still to give. He was also terribly upset by the loss of the presidential election, as most people are who make that run. He would come up on the floor occasionally after that election and say, "You see, I said it in the campaign," referring to something that was going on, "but nobody paid any attention." He kept returning to that theme.
I met him in India on one trip; I was traveling alone at the time. William Saxbe, a former senator, was then ambassador in New Delhi, and we both stayed with Saxbe. I had a chance to talk with him. His views were good. McGovern is a very, very decent human being and I think would have made an excellent president, notwithstanding a lot of the comments which came out at the time. He was not naive—that’s the wrong word. He just happened to be decent and at that time there was a tendency in the country to equate decency with naivety, as witness Nixon who was not decent and was not regarded as naive. No, I think McGovern was vastly underrated by the press, and especially by those image-makers on TV. They confused his simplicity with stupidity, and there is quite a difference.

**RITCHIE:** What was it about McGovern as a senator that drew him into the presidential picture?

**VALEO:** I guess it was mostly his stand on Vietnam. There were a lot of the young people who mobilized around him, particularly after Gene McCarthy was not viable. I think they turned to McGovern. He really represented the young people of that period in the Vietnamese situation.

**RITCHIE:** I wondered also what Eagleton had done to make him a national candidate? Was he that effective as a senator?
VALEO: No, I don't think he was that effective as a senator. It would not have been his record in the Senate. I think the judgment that was made on Eagleton was that he was effective in the sense of public relations, which is an essential characteristic of running for the presidency. He came across well. He made a good speech. He had a great sense of humor. He was extremely bright. He was Catholic, which at that particular moment was probably a desirable characteristic. He looked very good. I don't know what the reasons were that led McGovern to select him, what their own relationship was, but I suspect that they probably both had essentially the same ideas and the same views of where the Democratic party ought to go. Eagleton was a little more conservative and much more acceptable among the labor unions perhaps than McGovern.

RITCHIE: Another Democratic senator who ran for president was Walter Mondale. What was your impression of Mondale?

VALEO: Well, he used to come into the office once in a while. He smoked cigars and I'd give him one of my Philippine cigars occasionally. He did that for a while, and then he stopped coming in. He and Gaylord Nelson used to drop into the secretary's office together. They'd chat a lot. They were very close friends in that period. I thought Mondale was bright, I thought he was extremely bright, and I wasn't surprised that he
moved in the direction of the presidency. But I think there were a number of things that kept him from it.

He probably made a mistake by staying out of public office after the loss of the vice presidency. He should have sought some other office, probably governor of Minnesota. I think Gary Hart may be making the same mistake. That hiatus takes an awful lot of the shine off the stone. You lose that touch which has to be constantly nourished as a political figure if you're going to stay in a position of leadership with the public. You have to be in touch with them at all times, and, generally, you cannot do that, in my judgment, unless you are in office. It can be done, but it's much more difficult to do it when you're out of office. You lose the continuity and the feel of the changes which come in public reactions almost imperceptibly. If you're away from it you don't get them. He probably would have been well advised to run for governor of Minnesota before making the run for the presidency, after the Carter defeat.

I think Mondale would have made a good president. I think he got adopted by the Georgetown snobs, or his wife did, although actually they lived in Cleveland Park. He was president of the PTA in the same neighborhood that my son was going to school. His daughter went to John Eaton school with my son, so I knew him quite well in that period. And I liked him personally. But I wasn't surprised by his defeat for the presidency. He was
certainly an asset to Carter. His views were closer to mine than Carter’s would have been.

**RITCHIE:** He always seemed to be someone's protégé. In the Senate he was clearly Humphrey's man.

**VALEO:** Yes.

**RITCHIE:** Did that affect his Senate career?

**VALEO:** Not in the same sense that Eugene McCarthy suffered from that. Here we’re coming back to the same problem which reoccurs between two gifted senators from one state. I think there was a sufficient gap in years between them, so that Mondale represented a newer generation, whereas Gene McCarthy was very close in age to Hubert. He really was in Hubert's shadow, and suffered as a result. It sometimes leads the fellow who's in the shadow to do some foolish things. That happened certainly to McCarthy. But Mondale I don't think suffered from that. The gap was large enough in years.

It's interesting that you had a whole series of very competent people coming out of Minnesota in that period, undoubtedly growing out of the Humphrey mystique. He was of the post-World War II reform movement, and Minnesota has a lot of reform movements. I think it comes in part out of the old Scandinavian Germanic liberal background in states like Wisconsin and Minnesota.
and goes back to the nineteenth century and who settled those states. Hubert came out of that and he inspired really a whole generation of political figures in that area. I think it's run its course now. I don't think there's anything much out of Minnesota at the moment, but there was a lot for a long time. Mondale was a product of it and he would have made an adequate president.

**RITCHIE:** Just adequate?

**VALEO:** Yes, I don't think he'd have made a great president, no.

**RITCHIE:** What did he lack?

**VALEO:** Vision.

**RITCHIE:** Well, we have one other Democratic senator who has been running for the presidency, and that's Gary Hart. Did you have any dealings with him? I know you overlapped briefly.

**RITCHIE:** Only briefly. I guess my first contact with him was really with his wife more than with him. At that time I was a very close friend of the Washington Zookeeper, Ted Reed. We lived at Ordway Street at the time and my son grew up spending a lot of time at the zoo. Jamie had become very close to Ted Reed, and I had started the custom of taking any children of newly arrived senators on a night tour of the zoo, with Ted Reed.
He'd give them a personal tour of the zoo at night. It was always a fascinating experience. Animals react quite differently when there are not a lot of visitors around, and the zoo is quiet and dark and when they see the zookeeper whom they recognize. I think I took Gary Hart's kids with his wife, and the chap from Vermont . . . .

RITCHIE: Patrick Leahy?

VALEO: Leahy's wife and kids, on one of these tours, along with a lot of other kids. That was my first contact with Hart. After that I didn't have a great deal to do with him. I remember Harold Hughes speaking of Gary Hart, I guess Gary Hart was working on the Hill if I'm not mistaken at the time.

RITCHIE: He worked for McGovern.

VALEO: For McGovern, right. I remember Hughes saying at a policy committee luncheon, this was during the Vietnamese thing, he said, "You know, there's a whole new generation coming along here. And man they're powerful. They're thinking deeply about this Vietnamese thing especially." He said, "Take that young kid who was in my office the other day, Gary Hart." He was one that he had singled out as being a particularly formidable newer generation Democrat. He said, "They're not going to take any nonsense. They have a different view of things." But I didn't have a great deal of personal contact with him. I swore him in when he came,
and did the usual treatment for new members, but nothing exceptional. I have reactions to him, but I can't make them on any basis of a direct knowledge of him other than just watching him in action.

Maybe I don't know enough about that generation, and that generation is really becoming the numerical generation now, the majority generation. I have difficulties with him, but then I'm basically urban and this is a suburban generation. Their values are not necessarily the same as mine, they're much more nearer to my son's than to mine. They've grown up essentially in affluence, but they also grew up under the shadow of Vietnam and the shadow of the nuclear bomb. So there's a different mixture of major considerations that have shaped their thinking. They're also the TV generation, everything has to be done in cartoons. So I don't know where Hart is going.

From my own point of view, I don't think he's what I'd like to see in the presidency. I like his views on many subjects; I like his views on defense. He's on the Armed Services Committee, to which Mansfield appointed him. He's cut through some of the baloney and dispensed with it. He is part of the movement for trying to treat defense a little more rationally than we have in the past. I guess my concern with him is my concern for the forgotten people in the country. I don't see enough there of the kinds of things that Jesse Jackson is talking about. These
problems may be beyond Gary Hart's ken. He has never been exposed to them; how would he know about them?

I don't know if he's ever been in northeast Washington, not close up to Capitol Hill, but way out. That's part of America, and it's a very important part of it because that's where your trouble can come from, if you don't deal with that sort of thing. I don't see enough signs that he's prepared to cope with that kind of situation. It's almost as though it didn't exist for him. This is my problem with the affluent generation from which he comes. Maybe if he had the right kind of vice presidential candidate with him the thing could work out, because most of the country isn't looking at that kind of problem either, and he's being in some ways more representative of the country than he would be if he showed more concern for the forgotten. Mario Cuomo in New York does more of this. I think he senses this a little more deeply. That may be his Catholic background in part. Whatever problems may come from Catholicism, a concern for the poor is not one of them. I think Cuomo shows a little more of that. That might be a ticket.

**RITCHIE:** Among the non-presidential timber but still influential Democrats, Gaylord Nelson always seemed to be a senator with a lot of authority.
VALEO: He didn't have a lot of authority, but he was a good senator. He was another one of these men whom I felt became increasingly embittered when whatever his ambitions were—and they probably were for the presidency—faded increasingly into the realm of the unlikely. His health gave him trouble: he had a bad leg among other things. He, by the way, was one of the people who pushed Stan Kimmitt for the secretary's job and made the basic commitments to Kimmitt that were part of the conflict that later arose. But that doesn't in any way detract from my appreciation of his ability as a senator. I think he was a good working senator and he had an interest in the kinds of problems which you need to have an interest in, such as environmental questions. I think Gaylord Nelson was certainly in the top 20 percent of the Senate that I knew at any given time. He was effective in environmental questions, and he was also very perceptive on the Vietnamese War, or at least on the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. He saw through it more quickly than those whom you would expect to like Mansfield and Fulbright, to have seen through it, or if they did they guarded their peace. But he didn't. He didn't go as far as Morse or Gruening, but he saw what was going on and he sensed where we were going. I think he was a good man.

RITCHIE: What was your impression of Joseph Montoya?

VALEO: I was secretary for the majority when he was first elected and I went out to New Mexico for the campaign committee to
see how the elections were going. I can't remember whether I met him out there at the
time, probably not. He was busy campaigning somewhere else and I went to
Albuquerque. But I talked with his staff and I looked around. From all the reports they
could give me it looked rather good for him. Then he came to the Senate. He's out of that
same southwest pattern that included Dennis Chavez, but he was head and shoulders
over Chavez. Chavez was a Mexican-Indian and he was a real tough cookie. He grew up
the hard way in the Mexican-influenced politics of the southwest.

Montoya was much more polished, and he wasn't an alcoholic as Chavez was. I
liked him. I felt that his positions on most issues were ones that I would have no trouble
endorsing and supporting fully. I thought he was effective. I imagine in that southwest
situation, which I do not know well, there is a lot of old-fashioned Tammany-type
politics, Latin style. But in the Senate I thought Montoya was excellent. I would have put
him rather high on the list.

RITCHIE: He's a senator who didn't get much national attention except during
the Watergate hearings.

VALEO: That's ironic, because his interests were elsewhere, not necessarily in
that. He was important on natural resources and on water for the West and things of
that sort. I think he was a member of the Appropriations Committee and
eminently fair in his judgments. He was definitely out of that Mexican background in that area of the country, but I think he was much broader than that. Chavez was not. Chavez was strictly on that level and worked in a Tammany-type milieu. He got along great with Johnson.

**RITCHIE:** We've been talking about liberal Democrats; one of the conservative Democrats of that era who stands out is James Allen. I wondered what your impression was of him.

**VALEO:** Well, he gave me a plaque when I left the Senate. Yes, for outstanding service. Allen was the one who finally destroyed the relevance of the cloture rule. One of my duties at that time, of the secretary's office, was to get presiding officers for the Senate when you couldn't get the president pro tem or the vice president. Allen was always willing to do that. We called him repeatedly and he was always perfectly happy to oblige. He studied and learned the rules very carefully in the process.

As far as I'm concerned, after Russell, he was the new master of the Senate rules and also like Russell, of how to exploit them. And he did. But he was also to some degree in the Russell tradition. You didn't exploit the rules at every turn. You picked an occasional spot only. If you exploited them at every turn you could bring the Senate to a standstill. Eventually the Senate would have to recognize something drastic had to be done about
the rules. Then the game would be over. You don't want that to happen if you're an Allen or a Russell. You want to be in position to exploit them only when you need to do so desperately. However, in time, Allen began to work the rules to circumvent the cloture rule—not so much the rule itself but the parliamentarians' interpretation of the rules, which had come up originally, if you recall, in the Civil Rights Bill of '64, when the first precedents for what cloture meant were being established. Allen understood the significance of these interpretations and he manipulated them very well.

But I must say that except in those matters which he felt very strong on, Allen followed the Russell tradition. He was more exploitative but not excessively so. He yielded enough to permit the Senate to do its business. Mansfield became very concerned about Allen. He said he didn't understand what he was trying to do, but he was making it tougher and tougher to run the Senate. I think the comment was a response to something that Allen had done on the floor which provoked Mansfield to say to me for the first time, "We're getting out of here just in time." I think he sensed that Allen was going to push the interpretation of the rules to such a point, particularly on cloture, that he would be no longer able to function as he had functioned in the Senate as leader, and that the next leader would find that out. He didn't want that to happen to himself. Other than that, Allen was a straight southern
conservative, and a gentleman. Our personal relationships were excellent. I found him always to be essentially a man of integrity in personal dealings. I didn't have any problems with him.

RITCHIE: Another southern Democrat of that period was Sam Nunn, who is now rising to be a power.

VALEO: Yes, I had an experience with him in connection with the campaign contributions law. I feel it's always fair to give my bias before I get into a further discussion so that you can discount some of it which seems too hostile. I didn't know him well, and I didn't get to know him much better as time went on except by watching him. We exchanged pleasantries, that's all. But the problem began with the campaign contributions law. I think he was challenged on some campaign expenditures report in Georgia, and he discovered that I was going to treat him like I'd treat anyone else, even though he was a Democrat. I don't think he fully appreciated that, and I think he became suspicious of me after that, that I might be in league with the Republicans or something of the sort. Whatever the case may be, it seemed to me he was seeking something—maybe it was just the anxiety of a new member and he didn't want anything to go wrong with his situation in Georgia. I'm trying to remember now, did he come in on an appointment at first?
RITCHIE: He beat the guy that Jimmy Carter appointed. Carter appointed David Gambrell, and then Nunn beat Gambrell in the primary.

VALEO: I see. Well, in any event, I always felt he was one of the new cardboard-mold senators, created primarily by TV. Maybe that's the new south too, but it's a southern version of the same thing in the north, as far as I can see. You look good on TV and you make some smooth sounds. He'll probably wind up a longtime senator, as Russell did, but I don't think he has much comparable ability with Russell. I think Russell was head and shoulders over him. An extremely cautious man, I guess maybe that explains the business on the campaign contributions law.

RITCHIE: Did Nunn work well with Mansfield?

VALEO: I don't think that was important one way or the other at that time.

RITCHIE: Another conservative or centrist Democrat is John Glenn.

VALEO: Yes, John Glenn is one of the really fascinating characters of the Senate. He certainly is of a character that should be in the Senate. He brings a note of individuality into it, not because he's an astronaut, I don't think that's a good endorsement. We'd have astronauts coming out of our ears in the
Senate if you thought that was enough to make a man a senator. But Glenn has
developed greatly in the Senate in my judgment. I never thought he was for the
presidency. He did, but that, I think, came from his astronaut background more than his
Senate background. He was on one of Mansfield’s trips to China; I can’t remember
whether it was the second or third. I got to know him well on the trip, he and his wife
Annie who is a charming woman. He handled himself on the whole quite well on the trip
to China. At that time there was not that much curiosity yet with our astronauts in
China, it was still early in the game and the Chinese were still very much concerned with
more earthly matters.

He did commit one faux pas, although he didn't know it. Anybody could have
done it. We had a Chinese escort, a woman who later became the Chinese ambassador to
Rumania. She was a real firebrand from the revolution and she’d been one for a long
time. She was one of Mao's strong supporters. I can't remember her name now, Madame
Chung or Chong. Anyhow, she called me aside, because we spoke a little bit occasionally
in Chinese. By that time, after two years of working on it, reworking it, my Chinese had
improved a little bit. She said to me on the side in a very conspiratorial way: "What does
Senator Glenn think he's doing?" I said, "Well, what's the matter?" She said, "He showed
me a map in which Taiwan is colored differently than China!" I said, "Well, I'm sure he
meant nothing by that." It was a National Geographic
map, and the National Geographic Society hadn't caught up with political events yet, so they showed Taiwan in a different color than China. I said it wasn't anything, but she was convinced it was part of the business of detaching Taiwan. She immediately tied it into a conference of Sinologists that had met in the states a few weeks before. It was headed by the fellow up at Harvard, what's his name?

RITCHIE: John K. Fairbanks.

VALEO: Fairbanks, who had been pushing for a two-China policy at that time, and she thought Glenn was part of that same conspiracy. I assured her that that was highly unlikely. But the incident shows how really careful you have to be, especially in the initial stages of redevelopment of a relationship. Glenn astonished me in an unusual way. We were in Xinjiang province in the far west and we went into what at that time passed for a department store in the city, the Chinese call "Wulumuqi" but which I guess goes by the name of "Urumchi" on National Geographic maps. It was the capital of Xinjiang province. They had on display in the department store quite an assortment of Chinese made western musical instruments. Glenn picked up a trumpet and blew it as though he'd blown one all his life. I found out that he and his wife were both in the high school band together, she played the trombone. That's how they had originally met. I thought it was a very charming thing in its Americana flavor.
He kept saying while we were in China, "God, you can't get ice cream anywhere!" He wanted to try the ice cream in China and we hadn't come upon it. Our last stop was in Shanghai. In what had become then a custom for the Mansfield trips, we gave a dinner for the people who had traveled with us. I usually made the arrangements, so I went down to the hotel where we were going to hold it and I asked them if they could possibly get some ice cream for the dinner. They did. So Glenn finally got his Chinese ice cream and he was delighted. It was a lovely occasion. I did a farewell speech in Chinese for our party which I had worked on the entire day and which was very well received by the Chinese, with one of their interpreters translating it into English for the Mansfield group. Glenn was a real asset on the China trip. I don't think he showed any great depth of understanding of how to deal with the problems, but he certainly had an appreciation of the difficulties that were involved.

Again, I thought his great weakness was that he didn't know what poverty was. So many of these newer politicians have had that problem. They didn't have the experience of the Depression. They don't know what poverty is, and there is a lot of poverty in the United States. I think he has a full appreciation, because of his technological background, of nuclear problems. I don't know that he's got any solutions for them but I haven't heard anything that makes much sense from any other quarter either. I never
thought that the Nonproliferation Treaty was going to do a damn bit of good, not unless the two primary proliferators did something about it, which was ourselves and the Soviet Union. There was no likelihood that that treaty could hold, that we could hold, a monopoly together with the Soviet Union over these weapons. But at least Glenn understands the dangers of the problem. I was sorry to see him make the run for the presidency. I just knew he was not going to make it. I knew that when most of my Republican friends early in the game eagerly asked whether Glenn was going to be the Democratic candidate, as though they were welcoming the possibility. He was too close to the Republicans in his viewpoints, but a good man. He's made a positive contribution in the Senate.

**RITCHIE:** What about your impressions of Joseph Biden, another senator who's got perhaps long range presidential ambitions?

**VALEO:** Yes. Well, I swore Biden in, and I went up to Wilmington to do it. He had had that terrible tragedy at the time, the automobile accident that killed his wife and infant. His two sons were in the hospital. He would not come down to be sworn in at the regular session. He said he couldn't leave the children. Mansfield asked me to go to Wilmington, and the Senate deputized me to swear him in, which I did. We did the ceremony in the hospital. He was then just about the youngest person—
certainly the youngest person who was elected that year. He would have been probably
the youngest member of the Senate. He used to speak of himself as the "house youth" of
the Senate. I swore him in and he made a short speech. He had some of his supporters
and friends around in the room with his two kids in their hospital beds. I guess one had
a broken leg. He made this speech and said that he wasn't at all sure that he was going to
run again, that he might be just a one term senator, that he wasn't even sure he was
going to finish out the term, that it would all depend upon what impact it might have on
his children. But I had the feeling then that he was already thinking about running the
next time.

He came in with a chip on his shoulder. You can't put yourself in the shoes of
somebody who's been through a tragedy like that. He may have been blaming the whole
thing on the Senate, you know. But whatever the reasons, he came in with a chip on his
shoulder, and Mansfield did everything to assuage him. He showed him all kinds of
special attention and privilege. Again, I think, trying to neutralize the effect of the
tragedy in some small way. But it seemed to have no effect. Biden would continue to go
his own way and be skeptical of everything that came up in connection with the Senate.
He was very critical of most of the things that happened in the early caucuses and in
some of the luncheons that Mansfield had for the younger members. Then I began to
realize
that probably, it had nothing to do with the tragedy. This was his characteristic. This was his nature.

He's bright; he's able. I don't think he's there at the very top of the ladder, but he's bright and able. I'm trying to compare him with Gary Hart. I think Biden knows a little bit more about poverty and economic anxieties, partly because he comes from Wilmington, and that's an industrial city where space is limited and wages aren't that high, and there's unemployment. Whether he's got it for the presidency or not, I would doubt it.

I had an interesting experience with him in Honolulu a couple of years ago. I was conducting a comparative study of the Diet and the Congress, or it may have been on Japanese and United States foreign policies, and he came out and participated in that. He was excellent in his participation. We were riding in a car going to some function one night. He was running that year and he was complaining about the campaign contributions law, the "damn contributions law" and so forth. I said to him, "Well, you know Joe, I testified against that at the time. And all I got back was a lot of flack even from Senator Cannon who was presiding, and who insisted, 'we've got to have reform, we've got to have reform.'" I said, "You know, a lot of crimes have been committed in the name of reform. But I couldn't stop it. I tried to prevent it from going the way it went. I wanted to get more experience before we moved further, but nobody would hear about a delay. Everybody
was for reform and for a commission to administer it." He said, "Yeah, I know, I was one of them." So he recognized that the "reform" had been poorly thought through thanks largely to Common Cause pressuring it.

I think Biden is a good senator. If he wants to stay in the Senate he'll probably stay in it and over the years would make a very, very creditable record. But I don't know about the presidency. I would be doubtful on that.

RITCHIE: This whole group that we've been talking about, the young, mostly liberal and some centrist Democrats who came in after Mansfield had become majority leader. They were formed in that period when he was majority leader. You talked about Mansfield wanting the Senate to be a Senate of individuals who could be equals. These were the people who benefited by what he had started.

VALEO: That's true.

RITCHIE: Do you think they made the most of it? Looking back on them as a group, do you have any observations on what they did with what Mansfield was trying to do with the Senate?

VALEO: Well, they all got a lot of exposure that they may not have had. Whether that really in retrospect will reflect itself in effective legislation, I don't know. I think this is a
study for a scholar to make. There was a great input during this whole period of ideas in connection with social legislation. They certainly were also a factor in breaking down the stereotype reactions of war and patriotism in connection with Vietnam and facing some of the realities in Vietnam. Yes, I think that the Senate performed better as a result of these people taking a more active and a more visible part in its proceedings than would have otherwise been the case without the Mansfield approach. As so often happens, liberty becomes license, and I think what's happened since then is that the freedom of interchange, the introduction of ideas which were listened to, has led to some extremes now which make it almost impossible to run the Senate. I don't think that's the only factor which makes it almost impossible to run the Senate. There are others, but I think that's where it has eventually come out.

These fellows like Biden and Bumpers are reaching the point of maximum authority in their careers as senators. Biden is close to the top in the Foreign Relations Committee. Like the others who have gone before him since the Mansfield time he'll probably wish when he gets to that point that they'll have a little more of the discipline they had in the older Senate. But that's the price that was paid. There is the need now to put some order into the kind of freewheeling liberal—take that word "liberal" out, it isn't important, it could be conservative or liberal, it doesn't
matter—but the freewheeling individualistic expression which was the hallmark of the Mansfield Senate.

**RITCHIE:** If and when the Senate goes Democratic the next time, all these people we’ve been talking about will be the chairmen of the committees . . . .

**VALEO:** Precisely.

**RITCHIE:** Where do you see them going?

**VALEO:** I see them complaining about the same things that some of the others did: I can't get any order in the committee; nobody shows up for meetings; they’re all over the place. I can just see that happening, and them saying "We've really got to do something about this." It will come out to something like that. Unfortunately, it's difficult to reverse that in the absence of a party system, and I guess my primary complaint against Mansfield was that he opened up all the closet doors, like Pope John he opened the windows on the church and let in a lot of fresh air, which it needed. But then he left at the time when the consequences of that had to be faced in terms of the capabilities of the institution to perform its functions. The successor, in his case Byrd, or even Baker—I won't make any judgments on Dole at the moment until I see a little more of him as leader; I think his eyes may be somewhere else too—but the successors in the role
have not understood, in my judgment, the need to institutionalize the Mansfield changes in a way which makes it possible for the Senate to function.

The original constitutional concept of the Senate as I see it is that it would be a body of men very much like the kind of people who served in it through the Mansfield Senate, individuals, many of whom would have profound contributions to make in the sense of political creativity. They would be the best of their states, would be selected for that reason—ideally. They would be able to come to Washington and as gentlemen, in the early days only gentlemen, but now ladies and gentleman, be able to deal with the problems of the nation with a high degree of comity with one another. That's what Mansfield tried to do with the Senate. That's fine if virtually all members behave in that fashion. But under the Senate rules, if there are some mavericks who wish to exploit the rules, which are there to guard this right to function in this fashion, they can destroy it.

When Russell used to do it on civil rights, he was really abusing the institution. He wasn't saving the institution, he wasn't strengthening it, he was abusing it. But Russell never pushed it beyond a certain point where the abuse would begin to lead to the deterioration of the institution. Nobody in the Mansfield Senate, not even Jim Allen, pushed it that far, although he came close. He was followed by the fellow from North Carolina,
Jesse Helms. He conspired with Jim Allen on an issue before the Senate, as I recall. They were out in the corridor planning on how to hold up the Senate, just for the sake of being naughty boys in a way, at least Jesse Helms was, and to force their will on the Senate. Helms went back to the chair, with Allen holding the floor, and they performed in a way which would have done that. He was furiously challenged by Mansfield, and crushed by the leader because the Senate upheld Mansfield completely in that case.

That's not going to happen now without a Mansfield. There is nothing in the rules or in the procedures which have been established, which will permit the preservation of the Mansfield concept of the Senate as being one of equal, dignified, outstanding American leaders, which is the way he saw the Senate. So I don't know where it goes from here. The Senate cannot claim survival on the basis alone of being a popular representative body. It's not a representative body in the sense that the House is, in terms of population, which is in the end where your representative body has to come out, if it's going to be meaningful.

Unless the Senate can organize itself to produce the kind of highly responsible behavior that the Mansfield Senate produced, I see its fate as something of the House of Lords. Sooner or later, if an institution doesn't perform a constructive function, it's bound to be destroyed, or to deteriorate to the point where it has no meaning in terms of political power which is what happened to t
he House of Lords. The Senate may stay on as some sort of ceremonial body. As a matter of fact, there have been advocates of that. J. Howard McGrath, who was in the Truman cabinet, wanted, I think, three senators from each state and he wanted them appointed from outstanding men, a sort of breathing statuary hall. Well, that's all right, and that kind of a Senate would be like the House of Lords. That's fine, but its right to legislate for the country would be highly dubious, whereas the House would remain the body that could legislate for the country on the basis of its genuine representativeness. This is the kind of question which occurs to me when I think about the future of the Senate.

There is an alternative, it seems to me, in which you can keep the substance of the constitutional Senate, but that involves the development of party responsibility, so a lot of the shenanigans which now occur on the floor of the Senate, and which were essentially absent during the Mansfield period, or for much of it, or rarely occurred, can happen in the party halls when the party decides on its major lines and functions. So there may be in that system some potential for the Senate's survival as a meaningful body.

**RITCHIE:** So you are not necessarily pessimistic, but you are not necessarily optimistic about the future.
VALEO: Definitely not. As of now, I don't see any signs of anything developing that will provide the Senate the kind of structure that would give it a durable legislative meaning. I see it much more likely to go the way of Baker's concept of it, where you came in only for a few months of the year and you leave most of the legislative work basically to the House. I think that's what he was saying.

RITCHIE: Do you think that if the Senate changes, it will change because of events or because of strong personalities of the Lyndon Johnson or the Mike Mansfield mold?

VALEO: I come back to Jefferson. It will only change because of education. And somewhere in our educational system—I don't see it yet, but I think this is why we train political scientists and historians and people of this sort—it has to come initially from sources outside the Senate. We have to see some very creative writing on the Senate from these sources which will put some new ideas on where the Senate can go into the ring. If we don't get that, I doubt that the Senate can develop within itself the kind of forward thinking about itself which might lead the change. I think it almost has to come from outside.

RITCHIE: As someone who came out of political science in the beginning, what do you think about the way political scientists
have dealt with the Senate? Do you think it's been adequate, or that they really understand what's been happening?

**VALEO:** I think we've had two things. The first crop of political scientists—they were mostly from my generation or a little earlier—were all presidenially oriented. They came out of the Roosevelt period and they saw really very little function in the Congress. They saw the government as being executive government primarily, with very strong leadership—something like you have had in France since DeGaulle or in the Philippines under Marcos! They wouldn't dare to admit that, but that's in effect what they were saying. The new crop that has come along since has suddenly discovered the Congress. They are mostly out of the period of the Vietnamese War. I think primarily because of the Senate, they have now gone to the other extreme and they see the government being run primarily by the legislative body.

The problem with that is: there is no ordered system for administering the nation's affairs from the legislative body. To do that requires a parliamentary and a party system. It depends upon an integrated political leadership which has genuine control over its forces in the legislative body. That doesn't exist in the Senate. To some degree it exists in rudimentary form in the House, but certainly not in the Senate. It's kind of ridiculous the way it is now. It is rule by the individual members who are able to convert an issue into a media event and by committees,
each in its own realm. In the latter case, eventually, of course the Appropriations Committees would rule or more likely the Budget Committee would rule or even more ridiculous the comptroller general! It's ironic, the one committee that survived in the evolution of the British system with any real power is the committee having to do with money. The others which were numerous and powerful in eighteenth-century England are now meaningless in the British system. Presently, the political scientists talk about a role for the legislative body which is far larger than it should be under a system of divided powers with both branches having a popular constituency. They are asking for the powers of a parliamentary system without the responsibilities of a parliamentary system. The way that plays is by having lots of staff on the committees, or related to the committees or in the individual offices.

One of the reasons why I’m going to the Philippines right now is that there are so many Americans going over to watch the election, the Filipinos don't know what to do with them. There are dozens of people apparently from Congress, mostly staff people, trying to tell the Philippines how to run its affairs or, to brief themselves the situation in order to deal with it when they return. Now, that's the kind of situation that has emerged from the Mansfield Senate. Mansfield did not want this to happen. Mansfield always turned back a lot of money. He never kept a
large staff. One of the keys to the Congress playing the role which it should play is keeping staff limited, because once you have staff people they have to be employed, and then you've got to find functions for them.

Gradually this search for function penetrates into greater and greater detail of administration—an essentially executive function. Congress as a body, cannot perform in this realm. Therefore the committees perform, in effect, on behalf of the Congress. Because members of a committee have six other committees or subcommittees to be on, you're really talking about legislative staffs performing the function for the Congress. When you have two sets of staffs, one in the executive branch and one in the legislative branch, clashing with one another on how to run the nation's affairs, I don't know what happens to representative government. It may be even worse if they cooperate. The whole system begins to be in great jeopardy. I don't know that you can reverse this process; that's why I'm looking at where you go from here. Where do you go in trying to make the whole function effectively? As I say, the only paths I see would be to move towards a stronger party system. There are ways of strengthening party systems. Fundamental is to make the campaign money go exclusively through parties and you very quickly have a stronger party system. That's not what's happening now. We're going to further fragmentation, further and further fragmentation.
RITCHIE: Well, I think this is probably the place for us to wrap up our discussions . . . .

VALEO: Yes, I think so.

RITCHIE: Which we began last July. This has been an absolutely wonderful interview, one of the best we've gotten for the collection. Do you have any ideas about the restrictions on it? Do you want to set a time period?

VALEO: Yes. I think the way I'd like to do it, Don, is to set an embargo for ten years, subject to shortening either with mine, or in case of my demise, my son's approval. If we can set it up like that, I think that will be fine. But at the end of the ten years then let it go out.

RITCHIE: Well, thank you very much for participating. This has been tremendous.

VALEO: I've enjoyed doing it, it's been fascinating.

End of Interview #19